TO LIVE IS TO DESIRE: CULTURAL PRODUCTION AND THE PHANTASMATIC NATION IN ZHANG YIMOU'S *TO LIVE* (1994)

IRIS SHU
B.A. Candidate Economy & History
Barnard College, Class of 2025

Amidst a nationalizing world in the nineteenth century, within the "Orient," Chinese political leaders of both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party grappled with the elusive meaning and repercussions of establishing a nation-state, long before theories of nationalism or orientalism came to fruition. For these leaders, nation-building could mean many things: the question of becoming "modern," securing a place in the new world order, instituting a Western political structure in the East, restoring sovereignty, and liberating the people. But namely, it also defined an expectation of individual sacrifice for the sake of collective national power. In the mid-twentieth century, Chinese Communist Party leadership chased these goals by setting the authoritarian tone of cultural and political life, at the drastic price of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. During the 1980s, in the ideological vacuum left by the Cultural Revolution—the movement which then brought China onto the international stage—post-Maoist intellectuals guided the production of social-political thought and critical independence in modern China.[1]

In what Walter Benjamin famously refers to as the "age of mechanical reproduction," the reproduction of art through photography and film disintegrated a situated artwork's authentic "aura" and functionalized art as a tool of mass manipulation—such as national political propaganda.[2] I argue that mediatized cultural production not only reflects but also constitutes the mythology and affect of the burgeoning modern nation. The focus of this paper is a psychoanalytic study of media dissemination during and after the Cultural Revolution—the movement that dissolved the existing epistemological division between the first and third worlds in the 1960s and 70s, establishing a "modern" China, and the seminal movement to which Chinese cinema of the 80s and 90s reimagined. After discussing the mass media dissemination of the Maoist period, I will interpret the fifth-generation Chinese filmography that

[1] Guanjun Wu, *The Great Dragon Fantasy: A Lacanian Analysis of Contemporary Chinese Thought* (Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Publishing, 2014), 1.

[2] Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media*, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Rodney Livingstone, and Howard Eiland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nzfgns.

popularized Chinese cinema abroad. Existing secondary scholarship, namely by Chinese media scholars Rey Chow and Ban Wang, diverge in their perceptions of popular memory and media in their examination of twentieth-century China. While Chow focuses on the barren aesthetics of foreign and indie Chinese films, Wang turns to the revolutionary romance as the defining genre of the midcentury. I hope to realize the connections between this scholarship.

In particular, this paper analyzes fifth-generation filmmaker Zhang Yimou's internationally acclaimed film To Live (1994), his adaptation of Yu Hua's eponymous novel. To Live tells the story of four generations of the Xu family, from the Chinese Civil War of the 1940s to the Cultural Revolution of the 70s. The film will serve as a case study of the mapping of the phantasmatic—that is, rooted in the unconscious imagination—narrative of the nation and the subsequent hierarchization of modern cultural production in China. I argue that the discordance between revolution-era media and post-Mao intellectual films unveils the phantasmatic essence of the national myth. I ultimately postulate that film elicits a desire for the elusive objet petit a—which, in this essay, is the nation—and indicates the internalization of the Other's gaze as the core of knowledge production and nation-building in both the East and West.

Section I: Nation and Cinema

After Edward Said's groundbreaking *Orientalism* in 1978, the emerging field of post-colonial studies embraced the structure of the East-West dichotomy, in which the Orient was imagined and constructed to reinforce Western dominance. Other intellectual works of the late twentieth century, such as Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, similarly understood political bodies like the nation-state as illusory, more indicative of power relations than of shared culture or territory. In Anderson's seminal work, he defines the nation as an "imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign": *imagined* because nationalism does not awaken a nation's self-consciousness, but rather invents the nation where it does not, and may never, exist.[3] The state's premise of its perpetual right to exist and delineation of political borders allow the nation to contain itself, its shared history, its teleological rise to civilization, and ultimately to modernity. Thus, in the face of mass human migration, imperial conquest, and shifting boundaries and political structures, the nation-state must retroactively create an image and myth of itself. Cultural

[3] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections On the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb01609.0001.001, 6.

dissemination and the expansion of social practices necessarily came to ground this national community in a shared present, indefinite future, and prior cause.[4]

Anderson posits that this concept of "nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time."[5] The idea of a united community under one nation would both legitimize the sovereignty and power of the nation-state and mobilize populations for collective goals. Indeed, in the early twentieth century, Chinese scholars exposed to Western dogma aspired to construct their own nation-state. Intellectuals of the 1910s' New Culture Movement, emerging from the fall of China's last dynasty to establish a national republic, rejected traditional Confucian values of Chinese society and adopted European Enlightenment ideals of science, democracy, and progress. This outlook, they argued, would heal the fragmentation and backwardness that rendered the nation-state illegitimate and vulnerable to imperialism. Intellectuals therefore positioned themselves as integral leaders of Chinese modernization and re-traditionalization. Almost akin to politicians, intellectuals felt they had a deep stake and an acute responsibility in establishing the national political culture. As the intellectual New Culture Movement gave rise to the mass political mobilization of the 1919 May Fourth Movement, the emulation of Enlightenment ideals became central to Chinese nationalization, even as it was later framed and problematized as a threat of Western imperialism.

Lu Xun, one of the most influential intellectuals of the May Fourth movement, locates in the medium of film a fundamental violence inherent to third-world nationalization.[6] While Lu Xun was a poor medical student in Japan in the early 1900s, he first encountered the spectacle of film. He writes of his visceral reaction to lantern slides, a nascent variation of film, when it had been used as a scientific tool or to narrate "objective" events such as the Russo-Japanese War:

It was a long time since I had seen any compatriots, but one day I saw a film showing some Chinese, one of whom was bound, while many others stood around him. They were all strong fellows but appeared completely apathetic. According to the commentary, the one with his hands bound was a spy working for the Russians, who

[4] Ban Wang, *The Sublime Figure of History: Aesthetics and Politics in Twentieth-Century China* (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 137.

[5] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 3.

[6] Rey Chow, *Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 4.

was to have his head cut off by the Japanese military as a *public demonstration*, while the Chinese beside him had come to *appreciate this spectacular event*…
The people of a weak and backward country, however strong and healthy they may be, can only serve to be made *materials or onlookers of such meaningless public exposures*…[7]
Rey Chow argues in Primitive Passions that Lu Xun's account exemplifies the modernist shock that accompanies this new "discourse of technologized visuality"—a discourse that was seen as foreign, vulgar, and cruel, in stark contrast to traditional art and literature, as it emerged in the Third World. It established a self-consciousness of the Third World that was informed by the positionality of being a spectator, violently splitting the self into simultaneously seeing and being seen, as an individual, and as a nation.[8] Film thus emerged as the medium of the "age of mechanical reproduction" that expressed the relationship between visuality and power.

If, during the May Fourth period, modern writers like Lu Xun invested in the subjective experience of spectatorship, then the Cultural Revolution made vision communal: a "spectacle in collectivity in 1966 constituted the ethnic and nationalistic self-consciousness of 'being Chinese' once again."[9] The era of the Revolution was flooded with the blown-up image of Chairman Mao, millions of copies of the Little Red Book, and vivid propaganda posters. Communist revolutionary cinema, media scholar Ban Wang argues, further displaced the individual's life into the revolutionary experience. The average revolutionary film of this era depicts an individual protagonist transforming into a revolutionary. This image encapsulated the suffering of feudal, imperial China and its growth towards a utopic, communist future. The establishment of this teleological narrative, coupled with the intense emotional exuberance present in these films, Wang contends, created an "identical political consciousness" which sublimated the libidinal desire of the people towards love for the nation.[10]

The image that captured the vitality of the Cultural Revolution was none other than the face of Mao Zedong. This image inundated every corner of private and public life and was indispensable to the media production of the Cultural Revolution. As such, Mao, in his image, no longer human, came into the status of transcendent myth and could thereby be himself considered the *film* of the nation.[11] The power of a filmic image like Mao's lies in its ability to call for submission to what, in the process of making the image, has become past or dead. Mao's status, his aggrandized image, as a symbol of mass worship rendered him ontologically dead. To the Chinese masses, his meaning was complete, signifying the successful dissolution of Maoist ideology into the national imagination and memory. However, not only was Maoist ideology

[7] Lu Xun as cited in Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 4.
[8] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 5.
[9] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 31.
[10] Wang, *The Sublime Figure of History*, 124.
[11] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 31.

internalized, but identification with the visual image of the nation interpellated the individual as film itself.[12] Louis Althusser defines this interpellation as the process by which ideology "hails" and constitutes individuals as subjects, unconsciously aligning themselves with societal norms and roles imposed by dominant ideological structures.[13] In this sense, individuals came to know themselves not as subject or audience. Rather, they became object, movie. This spectacle of Maoist China, now inculcated in the global history of modern visuality, contained both the people of China watching Mao, while the world was watching the people watch Mao. Chow argues that China, ergo violently split as spectator and object in its visual image—a movement from verbal, textual, tradition to technologized visuality— had finally become modern.[14]

Section II: China After Mao

In the post-Mao era of market capitalism, a political-ideological vacuum emerged: what did it mean for China to start anew after the fall of Mao in the mid-70s, to be modern, or even for China to exist? Post-Mao scholars assumed the May Fourth intellectuals' position of legitimacy after the bureaucratic authoritarianism of the midcentury.[15] Deng Xiaoping's utilitarian approach to socialism at the turn of the 80s opened intellectual spaces for "modernization construction," and gave scholars the political legitimacy to regard themselves as key facilitators of bureaucratic and social transformation. Guanjun Wu argues in The Great Dragon Fantasy that contemporary intellectuals' desire for an imaginary fullness of China—as a civilization, or as a nation—was the generative force of their active political participation. New imaginations of a nation, free from the cruelty of Mao's Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, fueled the intellectual revolution within modernity.

In what Chinese intellectuals refer to as the post-Mao ideological vacuum, then, how are competing narrative fantasies, and therefore social reality, created and legitimized? Wu argues the aggressive rhetoric of Chinese scholarship since the 1980s has marked intellectuals' competing visions as fundamentally incompatible. He contends that these hostile encounters cannot simply be examined at the discursive level, but must be psychoanalyzed to grasp their underlying desires and motivations.[16] The political nature of scholars' work in post-Mao modernization construction generated a diagnostic, prescriptive motive in scholarship. The irremediable gaps in

[12] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 33.

[13] Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 115.

[14] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 35.

[15] Wu, *The Great Dragon Fantasy*, 1.

[16] Wu, *The Great Dragon Fantasy*, 2.

Chinese intellectuals' desire for a harmonized, yet modern, Confucian, yet socialist China could only be stitched together by fantasy. And because the coherence of the histories from which scholars develop their work relies on narrative fabrications, other scholars' attempts to reconfigure them also undermine the very reality they understood to be unequivocally true.

This period's prominent film directors, including Chen Kaige, Tian Zhuangzhuang, and Zhang Yimou, entered this intellectual discourse by deconstructing the myth of Mao, creating their own critical portraits of Chinese history. They sought alternative visions to the mythical "China picture" of the Cultural Revolution, which became increasingly perceived as a period of unjustifiable mass poverty and avertable suffering.[17] The era's best-known films predominantly utilized natural figures and landscapes, stripped of the Revolution's images of collectivism, to conceptualize modern China. Their films spoke in the language of empty skies, barren landscapes, roughened faces, and oppressed women to narrate the history of the twentieth century. In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, these "sharply defined pictures devoid of any obvious didactic purpose, surrounded by silence and open to multiple interpretations" stood in radical opposition to the revolutionary mass media these filmmakers saw as deceptive and destructive propaganda.[18] The aestheticization of old Chinese culture in its barebones living, invoking the mise en scène of traditional shanshui (mountain-water paintings) and shuimohua (ink wash paintings), sequestered the past into an image of "ancient China." Modern China — in Benedict Anderson's words—loomed out of this immemorial past, giving political expression to the once-undefined, yet collective presence of China.[19] Cinema therefore illustrated not only the modern, politicized becoming of the nation, but also a "timeless collective life that goes beyond the confines of communist history."[20]

The post-Mao interest in "primitive," traditional culture did not simply emerge from a desire for the past or from nostalgia, but as a co-temporal structure of representation during cultural crisis. If the nation-state as an imaginary construct lacked clear origins, post-Mao intellectuals staged nature and the countryside as the "original." In the imaginary space where the primitive exists, the primitive came to represent the paradox of the Chinese national narrative from past to future. The paradox established China as simultaneously victim and empire: equally subjugated by imperialism during the century of humiliation as it was an outgrowth of a glorious ancient civilization with infinite future potential. Wu's Great Dragon Fantasy argues that this construction of phantasmatic history—that is, narrative fantasy shaped by

[17] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 35.

[18] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 39.

[19] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 11.

[20] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 39.

unconscious desires and anxieties—plays a fundamental role in China's present nation-building. What constitutes China as a modern nation is the collective fantasy of its pre-modern primitive greatness, retroactively imagined through mediated subjectivity. From the Zizekian perspective, this fantasy does not offer an escape from brutal reality, but rather itself constitutes the social reality that shields us against the inconsistencies of symbolic representation. As Joan Didion aptly stated: "We live entirely... by the imposition of a narrative line upon disparate images, by the 'ideas' with which we have learned to freeze the shifting phantasmagoria which is our actual experience."[21]

Section III: Zhang Yimou's *To Live*

Zhang Yimou's acclaimed film *To Live* (1994) adopts Yu Hua's 1993 novel to chronicle a tale of Chinese life as a counter-narrative to Party propaganda.[22] *To Live* tells a decades-long epic of one man's life, from the eve of the Chinese Civil War to the Cultural Revolution. Zhang Yimou utilizes chronological structure and conventional, naturalist storytelling to guide the film's momentum as protagonist Xu Fugui endures the rapid changes of twentieth-century China. Once the wealthy son of a landlord, Xu gambles away his fortunes and loses his family's support by the start of the film. Left with nothing, he must start over to rebuild his life, but his attempt to do so is short-lived. Unable to escape the political reality of the ongoing civil war, Xu is soon conscripted into the armed forces. Despite the People's Liberation Army's grandiose message of national liberation, Xu and hundreds of other soldiers face imminent death and immense hardship. Like Xu, Zhang's film cannot begin from a proverbial "blank slate": Zhang's vision of China, in barren wintry landscapes and small village living, actively strips and counters the Maoist "China picture" of the joyful collective.

Zhang locates the central meaning of life in the face of tumultuous political turmoil: to survive. The plot is driven by temporary advances and crushing setbacks, questioning what "progress" in the modern age entails at both the individual and national levels. Upon Xu's return from war, he is reunited with his family, all of whom have suffered immensely during wartime. Years later, as the village finds success during the Great Leap Forward, Xu's son is killed in a vehicular accident while the town celebrates his murderer, the District Chief. When Xu's daughter marries and has a child, the Cultural Revolution's eradication of doctors in her hospital results in her death shortly after childbirth. Zhang's film reads as a stinging critique of the Chinese government's unyielding political governance. In the state's attempt to construct a

[21] Joan Didion, *The White Album* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 11.

[22] Zhang Yimou, *To Live* (China: Beijing New Pictures Film Company, 1994).

collective national identity, there was no consideration of personal circumstance or individuality; the consequence was violence and death.

Zhang effectively asserts the value of a return to something fundamental, primordial, and human—living—to legitimize his critique of the sordidness and improvidence of the bureaucratized revolution. The only way that Xu, his family, his village, and his nation can resist bureaucracy is "to live." The very act of survival serves as the raison d'être of the film. Nevertheless, Zhang's critique hinges upon the revolution's own terms. Zhang legitimizes the categorization of "the people" and "resistance" as part of the Chinese nation while condemning them. The film itself is bookended by the events from which China emerges as a nation-state, from the civil war to the Cultural Revolution, interpellating the Chinese viewer as a member of a nation with shared historical trauma. Just like revolutionary cinema sold its viewers a story of China's progress towards communist utopia, *To Live* is Zhang's own teleological telling of history. Film, inherently unable to project more than the phantasmatic image, but often seen as more real in its illusion than the reality behind it, captures not China, but the unconscious desires and anxieties that create social reality.[23]

Zhang's filmography, critically acclaimed around the globe, asserts his own vision of national myth to both the East and the West: the mapping of the subliminal phantasmatic narrative in *To Live* perhaps legitimizes the Chinese nation even more effectively than revolutionary cinema could. As aforementioned, Ban Wang claims that the moving, melodramatic films of the 50s and 60s could bring forth an identical political consciousness: "Nowhere is this politico-libidinal pleasure in Communist culture truer than in the audiovisual experience offered by revolutionary films."[24] The assumption that Wang makes here is that revolutionary movies elicit a uniform emotional reaction from the universally-present libidinal drive. Wang assumes a certain passivity in the cinema's spectators—and while the revolutionary film may well have resulted in the interpellation of the individual as national citizen, movies like *To Live* demonstrate that such is possible even in subliminal, emotionally complex films.

This mediatized image of an Other becomes an index to "primitive passions" in both the West and China, and establishes a hierarchy of cultural production. Media scholar Ying Qian argues that in 1966, communist theorists, including Mao himself, insisted that "art must depart from reality in order to more clearly reflect the true, the ideal, and the universal."[25] In revolutionary films, cinematic realism and mimesis were replaced with formalism and stylization in an "unmooring of form from reality."[26] In

---

[23] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 40.

[24] Wang, *The Sublime Figure of History*, 124.

[25] Ying Qian, *Revolutionary Becomings: Documentary Media in Twentieth-Century China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2024), 208.

[26] Qian, *Revolutionary Becomings*, 209.

the film's muted color palette and cynical storyline, *To Live* marked the ostensible return to rudimentary realist objectivity. Representation of China and the "Chinese people," as shown in *To Live*, allowed intellectuals to locate a fascination in the primitive that in turn modernized their own cultural production. That is, primitivizing others established the self as modern, while the primitivity of the Other pointed to the moral core of the humanity ethnicized and nationalized as "Chinese."[27] The story of Xu Fugui, among countless other protagonists of post-Mao filmography, confronted political disaster, reality in its rawness and violence, and fractured history with the essence of primitivity and narrative wholeness.

In his review of To Live, film critic Roger Ebert notes in such dissident Chinese cinema "a certain inexorable pattern: They are made, shown at foreign film festivals, honored ("To Live" [sic] won acting awards at Cannes), play briefly in a few sophisticated cinemas in Beijing or Shanghai, and then they disappear."[28] Zhang knew the repercussions of critiquing the government, including suppression in domestic markets. Highbrow filmmakers like him thus functioned, even if merely subconsciously, to exhibit an image of China overseas in their filmography. Many, like Zhang, were successful. They deconstructed the Cultural Revolution and inaugurated postmodern culture-collecting.[29] They sought to see China anew. Moreover, they saw China as an Other. Through the representation of Chinese suffering and "primitivity," the West not only sympathized with but finally recognized China and its people. Zhang came to be seen as a Westernized traitor, his filmography deemed a "cultural sellout."[30] At the heart of the contempt that many Chinese people directed towards Zhang was that worthiness had to be proven from within, that being meant being seen.

Conclusion

What Ying Qian posits as the "unmooring of form from reality" in revolutionary films is derived not only from the perception of revolutionary art as more exuberant and idealized than reality, but also from political frameworks that found no parallels in real life.[31] Mass media disseminated the old doctrine of class designations when contemporary societal contradictions had since changed nature. The incongruity between party doctrine and lived experience enhanced this "formalist drift." Simultaneously, the melodramatic templates of politically correct speech and

---

[27] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 21.

[28] Roger Ebert, "To Live," *Roger Ebert*, accessed January 12, 2024, https://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/ to-live-1994.

[29] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 39.

[30] Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, "National Cinemas, Cultural Critique, Transnational Capital: The Films of Zhang Yimou" in *Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nation, Gender,* Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, ed. (Honolulu: Hawai'i University Press, 1997), 126, 129.

[31] Qian, *Revolutionary Becomings*, 209.

behavior taught viewers how to adhere to superficial markers of class designations for political survival. I extend Qian's analysis of revolutionary art to the dissemination of all films. The irreconcilability of post-Mao films' aesthetic visions and the original "China picture" of the Cultural Revolution reveals the phantasmatic core of national myth. So while filmmakers like Zhang may have believed they were making films about China, their films were really a representation of a timeless China of the past, signified mythically, and constructed by modernity. This required no exuberance nor explicit political rhetoric. It is not simply the revolutionary film, nor just the arthouse film, but all films that inherently teach their viewers how to desire.

Film encapsulates the hall of mirrors in which nations construct themselves through the internalized, omnipresent, impossible gaze of the Other. Contemporary Chinese cinema, as a kind of "postmodern *self*-writing or *auto*ethnography, is nonetheless… a form of *intercultural* translation in the postcolonial age."[32] The film, through its phantasmatic narration, communicates to its viewers who so affectively identify with the film itself, the elusive *objet petit a*: a shared desire to resuscitate the lost essence of China, a China that is, like any other nation, but a myth. Edward Said once posited the hierarchy between the East and West as the foundational power relations of national self-actualization. In a world of shifting geopolitical relations in which China is increasingly seen as a global hegemon, it is through psychoanalysis that one can understand the internalization of the gaze as a fundamental facet of epistemology and nation-building for both East and West.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Althusser, Louis. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays.* Translated by Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections On the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* London: Verso, 2006.
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb01609.0001.001.

Benjamin, Walter. *The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media.* Edited by Michael W. Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin. Translated by Edmund Jephcott, Rodney Livingstone, and Howard Eiland. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nzfgns.

[32] Chow, *Primitive Passions*, xi.

Chow, Rey. *Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

Didion, Joan. 1979. *The White Album*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Ebert, Roger. 1994. *"To Live."* Roger Ebert. www.rogerebert.com/reviews/to-live-1994.

Lu, Sheldon Hsiao-peng. "National Cinemas, Cultural Critique, Transnational Capital: The Films of Zhang Yimou." In *Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nation, Gender*, edited by Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, 125–154. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997.

Qian, Ying. *Revolutionary Becomings: Documentary Media in Twentieth-Century China*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2024.

Wang, Ban. *The Sublime Figure of History: Aesthetics and Politics in Twentieth-Century China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.

Wu, Guanjun. *The Great Dragon Fantasy: A Lacanian Analysis of Contemporary Chinese Thought*. Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Publishing, 2014.

Zhang, Yimou. *To Live*. China: Beijing New Pictures Film Company, 1994.