Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

Gate(s) Keeping or Scot(t) Free?

2025-12-17T03:13:28+00:00

In virtually all states, individuals who adopt their spouse’s surname in marriage do not have clear statutory guidance on the right to use that surname following marital dissolution. Because of the ongoing, pervasive practice of surname-taking in marriage, society has long placed the burden on women, not men, to make a choice upon divorce—one at the core of identity—to decide again on a name. The overwhelming majority of state statutes provide women the option to readopt a surname used before marriage; some even allow the adoption of any new surname. But what if a divorced woman wishes to continue using her marital surname? What if she contributed to the value of that surname during the marriage? What if her personal and social identity came to align with the marital surname? Should she not be able to continue using it on firm legal grounds, beyond mere custom? In a purely legal sense, is the name hers?

This Article seeks to establish a firm legal foundation for a divorced individual’s use of their former spouse’s surname following marital dissolution. Part I presents a brief history of surnames, the genesis of hereditary surnames, and the development of patriarchal institutions, such as coverture, that shape a woman’s naming rights. This account includes a history of marital surname usage in the United States, which borrowed from the English common law up to the advent of ostensibly egalitarian protection in a series of 1970s court decisions. Part II examines the social factors driving women to continue using a marital surname and discusses how these matters have shaped the current legal framework of surname usage during a marriage. Part III turns to the law of surname options at the time of divorce and thereafter, detailing the vast differences in the state law governing the area, particularly: what naming options are available in state statutes, when the name change must happen, and who may raise the issue. This section also addresses the legacy of gendered language in these statutes. Part IV proposes a model law on marital surname use post-divorce, establishing guidance and predictability in this area. The model law would allow divorced individuals the statutory ability to confirm their rights in a marital surname for all purposes under a clear, explicit framework.

Laboratories of Reproductive Justice

2025-12-17T03:23:26+00:00

This Note proposes legal strategies for recognizing paid family leave as a constitutional entitlement under state law. Long viewed as laboratories for democratic experimentation, states can play a central role in areas where federal protections remain limited. In the aftermath of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, several states—including Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, and Vermont—amended their constitutions to guarantee a right to “reproductive freedom.” This Note argues that these amendments create fertile ground for rights development and should be read to include an affirmative right to paid family leave. Drawing on a reproductive justice framework, which defines reproductive autonomy as the ability to have children, not have children, and parent children in safe and sustainable conditions, this Note analyzes the text of these amendments and the historical landscape of state positive-rights jurisprudence.

Discerning One Primary Purpose From Two:

2025-12-17T03:27:46+00:00

Survivors of sexual assault and domestic violence often play a critical role in the criminal prosecutions of their abusers. The cyclical dynamics of abuse and corresponding prevalence of factors such as trauma, intimidation, and coercion, however, mean that survivors are often unavailable or unwilling to testify at trial. In these instances, a victim’s prior outof- court statements may nonetheless be admissible if they satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. This Note explores Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in the context of victim statements made during Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) examinations and demonstrates how the divergent approaches taken by courts around the country have left defendants, law enforcement, SANEs, and victims without a coherent framework governing the admissibility of these statements at trial. Part I details the responsibilities of SANEs and the significant role they play in the provision of both medical care and evidentiary support in subsequent criminal prosecutions. Part II lays out the evolution of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, from its longstanding focus on reliability to its modern-day primary purpose analysis. Part III explicates how courts throughout the United States analyze the testimonial nature of statements made by victims of sexual assault in the context of SANE examinations. Finally, Part IV recommends solutions to create a more consistent framework for analyzing SANE testimony when a victim is unavailable come trial, including practical changes to SANE programs as well as doctrinal changes to Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Ultimately, this Note advocates for a declarant-centered approach due to the unique nature of domestic violence and sexual assault prosecutions, including the high rate of unavailable witnesses, the vulnerability involved in a sexual assault examination, and the likelihood of re-traumatization.