"SONATE, QUE ME VEUX-TU?"

The Enigma of French Musical Aesthetics in the 18th Century

Maria Rika Maniates

> Le XVIII[e] siècle ouvre une ère nouvelle dans l'histoire de l'esthétique musicale. Peu à peu, les nombres cartésians s'effacent devant les magies romantiques, tandis que le dogmatisme, combattu par l'«empirisme passionel», s'effondre, laissant au criticisme le soin de reconstruire l'esthétique (Brelet 1958: 398).

The above quotation illustrates a common approach polarizing the 18th century into two antipodes: the earlier part dominated by "rationalism" and the later part dominated by "romanticism." This influential point of view has resulted in a conception of 18th-century aesthetics as either the outmoded remains of 17th-century ideas or the embryonic development of 19th-century thought.[1]

In musical aesthetics, the age of enlightenment indeed presents several obscure aspects to the modern researcher. 18th-century writers based their theories of musical forms, style, and taste, on the fundamental postulate that there existed a *causal nexus* between music and emotion. To be sure, the acknowledgment of this relationship was not an exclusive achievement of the 18th century. The idea of linking music and emotion can be seen weaving its way, like an Ariadne's thread, through the labyrinth of musical philosophy from Plato's time to the present day. In the 17th century this idea became the central thesis of a philosophy of musical expression and as such, was inherited by 18th-century thought. However, an understanding of musical aesthetics in the earlier part of the 18th century cannot be won by viewing these ideas of musical expression solely from the conceptual framework of Baroque *Affektenlehre*. Nor does the gradual appearance of theories of inherent musical expressivity in the later part of the century represent only a move to pre-romantic philosophy.

Both questions and answers in musical aesthetics and criticism in this era arise out of the particular philosophical milieu created by primary notions of the meaning and significance of music. This ambience is obviously connected chronologically

and spiritually to both the 17th and 19th centuries; yet it has certain salient characteristics that are the hallmarks of a unique intellectual situation. It is the topography of this situation that we must come to know.

There are several avenues that can lead to a detailed picture of this terrain. Since the aesthetic of opera and dramatic music has been relatively well mapped out and, in a way, constitutes a special branch of musical criticism, it can be omitted for the purposes of this investigation. Instead we will concentrate on more tortuous byways—attitudes toward absolute music. The striking difficulties 18th-century philosophers experienced in coming to terms with one of the most important developments in music of their own century lay bare the assumptions of their musical philosophy. By examining this problem, we may clarify two obscure aspects of 18th-century thought: the fundamental concept of musical significance and the meaning of instrumental music. The inevitable juncture of these two theories occurs at the focal crossroads of 18th-century musical aesthetics. Progression to this point of confrontation can be traced by following the French careers of the two most ubiquitous terms in 18th-century European aesthetics—expression and imitation.[2]

The apparent predominance of linguistic terminology in French aesthetics was a holdover from the Baroque doctrine of the affections. In the 17th century, the rational theory of the passions rested on the Cartesian principle of the concrete and individual nature of emotions (Schueller 1948: 546). The portrayal of these passions in music was inextricably bound up with a rhetorical concept of music as a language with a grammar and vocabulary of expressive techniques and devices (Kretzschmar 1912). Such a concept was feasible because the affections were thought of not as mysterious, ephemeral emotions of the psyche, but rather as clear, static states of mind. Thus, the presentation of passions in music could be rationally stereotyped into sets of figures and patterns. Bukofzer points out that these figures and patterns did not express but merely presented the affections. In this way, a specific pattern was not considered as inherently suited to "express" a particular passion, and various affections could often be "presented" by similar or identical figures.

The distinctly rational and intellectual connotation of the doctrine of figures was a direct outgrowth of a highly character-

istic attitude toward concrete and abstract concepts in baroque thought, which tried to render abstract ideas concretely and concrete things abstractly. A strictly musical idea was therefore at once concrete and abstract, it presented an abstract affection in concrete form, and for this reason the figure has a structural significance for the entire composition (Bukofzer 1947: 389–90).

In Baroque instrumental music, then, a composition is dominated by one mood presented by one figure: hence the structural unity of Baroque style. The motivic fragmentation of Preclassic style, stimulated by dramatic principles derived in part from opera, brought together many moods and affections in continuous juxtaposition. The mature Classic style further refined the structural function of contrasting elements in composition with the resultant illusion that emotional qualities are not merely presented, but rather embodied within the musical elements themselves.

Baroque aesthetics is concerned with the objective aspect of emotion and music, that is, with the representation of certain abstract affections by stereotyped musical figures. The 18th century swings the tangent in the opposite direction and discusses emotion in terms of the reaction of the listener. The importance of personal sentiment in 18th-century thought is demonstrated by Rivarol's essay, *De l'homme intellectuel et moral*. In this study he states that sentiment is the source of rational thought, perception, and even sensation, and that genius possesses sentiment in the highest possible degree (Rivarol 1808: 4–9, 125). This essentially subjective attitude is further illustrated by the persistent concern with taste in 18th-century aesthetics. Cartaud de la Villate, for example, rejects the mathematical explanation of music in these terms:

> On feroit un peu trop d'honneur à nos maîtres de Musique si on les croyoit de grands Mathématiciens; une science dont les principes varient selon les caprices du goût ne peut être établie sur les règles immuables des proportions (Cartaud de la Villate 1736: 191).

The problems posed by the conflict between absolute and relative criteria of taste in the 18th century is a separate study in itself (cf. Smith 1937 and Chambers 1932).

The subjective approach of the age of sensibility has a special import arising out of the accepted connection between emotion in music and emotion aroused in the listener. Baroque aesthetics

operates on the premise of a clearly conceived dichotomy between the affection objectively presented by the musical figures and the emotions subjectively present in the listener. In the 18th century this duality is abandoned. Indeed, the aesthetics of this period operates on the premise that the emotion expressed in the music is the same as that which the auditor experiences on hearing the music. In criticizing 18th-century writers for failing to distinguish between the two, Wessel implies that this failure is due to a lack of clarity in their thinking (Wessel 1955: 2–3). Far from being a shortcoming, this identification of the objective-subjective states of emotion in the aesthetic situation represents a recognition of emotive reaction to music, and thus functions as the tacit thesis on which 18th-century aestheticians built their theories of the human significance of music.[3]

The human significance of all the arts finds its expression in a general proposition, developed from Aristotelian mimesis,[4] concerning universal imitation of nature. Musical imitation of nature forms a special, and problematical, category of this general concept.[5] Before embarking upon a discussion of musical imitation, it might be advisable to consider the various ideas connoted by the generic term "nature," ideas that augmented the complexity of the theory of imitation itself. From the writings of this period there emerge five categories of nature:

1. *empirical reality*
   (a) human nature: the "natural" expression of the passions
   (b) relations between cause and effect in human experience
   (c) the world of visible objects and audible noises
2. *ideal type*
   (a) "la belle nature": idealized forms as models for artistic adornment
3. *system of self-evident truth*
   (a) properties and relations of essences
4. *universe of feeling and taste*
   (a) what is sensually perceived and immediately enjoyed
   (b) representation of types and absolute aesthetic validity
5. *primitive and un-artistic*
   (a) primitive man seen as "natural"[6]

Écorcheville quotes a well-known couplet of the time which

sums up the general viewpoint of 18th-century thought in France:

> Et la musique doit, ainsi que la peinture
> Retracer à nos sens le vraie de la nature
> (Écorcheville 1906: 27)

The most outstanding characteristic of French aesthetics is the persistant attempt throughout the century, with the exception of a few writers, to include music in the general theory of the imitation of nature. Music, as well as painting and poetry, has the power to "paint" and therefore to "imitate" and "express."

> C'est [musie], si je ne me trompe, l'art de peindre et démouvoir par le moyen des sons (Laugier 1754: 4; cf. Borrel 1960).

It is significant that early writers, such as Crousaz, Dubos, and André, include their discussion of music in philosophical works about art and beauty. Books dealing only with music do not appear until the mid-century.

Although a rational bias in these early writings is evident, it is not entirely accurate to say that their concept of beauty is independent of the sentiments (Lang 1941: 430). To be sure, these aestheticians still harken to Boileau's precept, "Rien n'est beau que le vraie," meaning that art must imitate real nature and thus become "un tableau fidèle de la nature" (Blainville 1754: 33). Hazard's one-sided interpretation of truth and beauty is seen in his comment on the problem of relative beauty in André's thought:

> Of course there was one way out of the dilemma, or, rather a way of not getting into it at all. All that was necessary was to stand firmly by the classical doctrine. Beauty was a reflection of the true. After that, there was nothing more to be said (Hazard 1954: 357).

As we shall see, there remained a great deal more to be said.

Only when nature is seen as the abstract, general type (Category 2) does beauty become synonymous with clarity and truth. Here the rational emphasis on the intellect reigns supreme. One scholar characterizes this early period of aesthetics as one in which writers ignore all spiritual elements that cannot be grasped by the intellect (Goldschmidt 1915: 33). André, however, distinguishes two meanings of beauty, one dependent on rational logic and one dependent on sentiment.

> Il y a un Beau relatif à nos sentimens: et qui nous cause quelque plaisir; il y a un autre qui ne dépend que de la speculation (André 1741: xiv).

The picture is not quite so bleak as Goldschmidt paints it, for alongside of the concept of nature as the ideal type, there exists the idea of human nature comprised of the passions and sentiments. This latter notion exerts a strong influence on the theory of artistic imitation. It is here that the Cartesian doctrine of the passions instituted a traditional emphasis on the naturalness and reasonableness of imitation (Robertson 1923: 203).

The rational propensity of the early 18th century is also balanced by the hedonistic view which postulates that the natural purpose of art is to please and that musical composition is the art of combining sounds in a manner agreeable to the ear.

> Les Beaux Arts ne se proposent pas seulement d'imiter, ils veulent plaire (Lacombe 1758: 12).

> Le but directe de tous les Arts est de plaire; ils ne sont plus propres à aucune fonction, dèsque celle-là n'est pas remplie (Chabanon 1785: 387).

Scholarly attention given to the intellectual aspect of the theory of imitation has produced an overemphasis on the artificial and rational character of this doctrine. We must not neglect another equally important facet of French thought—the stress laid on "naturalness" and "appropriateness." In the 17th century the peculiarly French notion of *bienséance* led to an interpretation, or misinterpretation, of Aristotle's *Poetics* that contributed to the theoretical foundation of French classical tragedy. This notion, related to Aristotelian mimesis, appears again in 18th-century aesthetics. Attention must be drawn at this point to the first category of nature in which the *natural expression* of the passions is outlined.

A desire to establish an underlying aesthetic unity for all the *beaux arts* permeates the whole of French aesthetics. This unity is found in Aristotle's theory of imitation. The revered tradition of positing the correspondence among the arts on their common imitative nature begins with Batteux's famous book, *Les beaux arts reduits à un même principe*, 1746 (Serauky 1949–51). Batteux's essay constitutes the first systematic formulation of this theory and was well known, if not notorious, in England and Germany where it received numerous editions and translations (Schenker 1909).

The theories of imitation and the natural expression of the passions converge in French aesthetics into a conception of poetry and painting as the most natural imitations of nature. In this context music presents difficulties whose solutions will be studied in more detail in the course of this essay. At this point, it is sufficient to sketch in brief the place occupied by music in the imitative hierarchy. Music rests on a slightly lower level than poetry because its imitation of emotion is less natural and specific than that of the latter art. Musical imitation thus becomes dominated by linguistic principles as a result of its imperfect power.[7] The joining of music and language takes the form of two theories: (1) words can give music concreteness of emotional association and meaning which alone it cannot possess; (2) in order for music to approach the most natural manner of imitating passions, it must imitate declamation.

Dubos (Serauky 1954) is one of the first writers in France to discuss the relationship of music and emotion.[8] True to the tenor of the times, Dubos begins with a reference to classical authority:

> Aristides Quintilian a dit que le chant, que le musique, par rapport à l'esprit dans lequel elle a été composée, et à l'effet qu'on a voulu lui faire produire, se peut partager en musique qui nous porte à l'affliction, en musique qui nous rend gais et nous anime; et en musique qui nous calme en appaisant nos agitations (Dubos 1719, 3:43–44).

Dubos evidently echoes the classical concept of ethos based on the idea that music can have a direct and immediate effect on the listener arousing in him an emotion of definite character. This specificity of emotion is central to early French aesthetics and is one evidence of the continuing influence of Baroque *Affektenlehre*, except that the emotion in question is translated into subjective terms. And in this translation lie the seeds of future difficulties. Dubos supports his thesis by suggesting that nature has marked each passion or affection with its unique visual expression, tone, and gesture (*ibid.* 234). He even goes so far as to maintain that absolute music is capable of arousing specific emotions:

> Les symphonies étoient susceptibles, ainsi que sont les chants musicaux composés sur des paroles, d'un caractère particulier qui rendent ces symphonies capable de nous affecter diversement, en nous inspirant tantôt de la gayété, tantôt de la tristesse, tantôt des sentimens de dévotion (*ibid.*, 44).

In this latter view he is seconded by Cartaud de la Villate who feels that an elegaic melody without words moves everyone (Cartaud de la Villate 1736: 290). The philosophical difficulty posed by such an interpretation is recognized by later writers who attempt to solve it in various ways. Batteux, for example, simply evades the issue by ignoring the fact that specific emotions in music often cannot be identified:

> Il suffit qu'on le [emotion] sent, il n'est pas necéssaire de le nommer. Le coeur a son intelligence independent des mots, et quand il est touché, il a tout compris (Batteux 1746: 285–86).

The fact that this unsatisfactory statement really fails to define musical emotion led Chabanon (Sorel-Nitzberg 1952) to formulate his theory of general musical characters. Departing from his idea of music as empirical sensation, Chabanon reduces musical character to four basic types: "tendre, gracieuse, gaie et vive" (Chabanon, 1779: 26). He never clearly explains the difference between his general characters and specific emotions, or between his general characters and Baroque affections. Nevertheless, his theory enjoyed considerable reputation in the 18th century. Laborde (Briquet 1960) lists several supporters of Chabanon and agrees with them in stating that "la musique ne peut rendre que les masses de sentimens, comme la douleur, la joie et la haine, mais jamais les détails, comme le dédain, le mépris, le soupçon" (Laborde 1780: 656–57). Whether an undifferentiated emotion such as sadness or hate can exist or not is, of course, a moot point still in the forefront of emotive aesthetics in the 20th century.

It is in this framework that theories linking music and language come to the rescue of the floundering concept of musical emotion. Blainville (Borrel 1949–51), one of the champions of this approach, limits specific emotions to song, or, as he calls it, the *genre cantabile*:

> Ce genre ajouté à la parole, anime les mouvemens des passions, soit de joie ou de tristesse, de crainte ou de fureur . . . (Blainville 1754: 13).

His two other genres, the *harmonico* and *sonabile*, consist of meaningless instrumental music such as that of Locatelli and Vivaldi (*ibid.*, 7–8). By joining words with music, a composition becomes capable of expressing and arousing specific emotions. Without words, music lacks emotional significance and is devoid of

meaning. Cartaud de la Villate, for example, criticizes Italian instrumental music in similar terms:

> La musique Italienne, livrée aux méditations d'une oreille sçavante, néglige trop les intérêts du coeur. La plus belle voix lasse quand elle parle à vuide. Un concert sans paroles, ou des airs qui ne sont pas montés sur l'accent ordinaire des passions, sont des machines mouvantes qui articuleroient des pas bien cadencés sans aucune trace éxterieure de sentiment (Cartaud de la Villate 1736: 313).

While Blainville uses language, somewhat lamely, to bolster the emotive interpretation of music, Boyé uses precisely the same approach to destroy it. In his amusing and provocative tract,[9] he flatly poses the question, "La musique peut-elle exprimer les passions?" (Boyé 1779: 3). His whole leaflet echoes with a resounding "Mais non!" He notes that it is useless to suggest, as do the Encyclopedist circle and Rousseau, that music should imitate the declamatory manner in order effectively to express passion. His reason reveals a remarkably astute grasp of communication theory; he intimates that words have fixed sounds and meanings (Langer's discursive symbolism) whereas a musical note is indeterminate in this respect (*ibid.*, 7).

> Enfin, tout l'art Musical possible ne sauroit noter ni les cris, ni les plaintes, ni les gémissemens, ni les exclamations, ni les sanglots, ni les ris, ni les pleurs: c'est un fait incontestable (*ibid.*, 6).

In reply to objections raised by an imaginary adversary in the person of a female opera lover, Boyé says that her emotions are aroused not by the music itself, but by the libretto and the acting. Boyé suggests that music may possess several characters, the principal one being joyousness (*ibid.*, 32); but these characters are simply modifications of style rather than expressions of emotion (*ibid.*, 15). He objects vehemently to the current confusion of character and passion with a reference to his cook:

> S'il étoit permis de confondre ainsi les caractères avec les passions, quoique les uns soient aux autres, à-peu-près, ce que le repos est au mouvement; ma robe de chambre auroit donc de l'expression; car, ma Cuisinière me disoit l'autre jour que le dessein en est triste (*ibid.*, 15–16).

Boyé evidently differentiates between passion and character by describing the first as animated and the second as static. Like Chabanon, Boyé is here returning to a more Baroque concept of

static, abstract emotion represented in music. Furthermore, his parallel between style and character vexes the modern reader by its elusive and incomplete exposition.

At any rate, it appears that music with words is a dubious solution to the problem of emotion in music, for it can be used both positively and negatively. Such a theory, however, is only one of two ways by which music and language can be associated. The second develops within the doctrine of imitation.

Musical imitation of nature presents only one facet of the imitative character shared by all the arts as postulated by Batteux. According to this writer, each art imitates nature by its own means. The function of all art is to transport the traits of nature and to portray them through elements which are not in themselves natural.

> Le Musicien par des sons artificiels fait gronder l'orage tandis que tout est calme (Batteux 1746: 13).

Batteux elucidates two categories of imitation, both of which belong to the first type of nature—empirical reality: (1) the imitation of sounds and noises, or non-emotional imitation, and (2) the imitation of animated sounds and passions which he calls "tableaux à personnages" (*ibid.*, 283). In his famous article in the *Mercure de France*, Morellet makes the same division into physical nature and human passion (Morellet 1771: 114).

In discussing the first type of imitation, Morellet likens music to a metaphorical or onomatapoetical language. The musician chooses objects in nature that can be imitated by sounds or motion so that both the objects and their imitation have one element in common. He admits that this type of imitation implies resemblances or rather analogies, a weak form of imitation. Lacombe also discusses musical imitation of natural objects in terms of movement and sound (Lacombe 1758: 252), and chastises absolute music for failing to incorporate this type of imitation:

> Une suite de ces tableaux de Musique [imitations of dawn, storms, etc.] ne seroit-elle pas plus interessante que la plupart de nos Symphonies, de nos Concerts, de nos Sonates, de nos Ouvertures qui ne forment, pour l'ordinaire, à bien apprécier, qu'un bruit harmonieux sans vie et sans expression, et qui ne devroient être regardés que comme ces traits, ou ces Académies que font les jeunes Peintres pour s'exercer (*ibid.*, 255).

This rather harsh evaluation of instrumental music is typical of

the period. For Lacombe, non-imitative instrumental music is nothing but "a harmonious noise without life and expression." Musical imitation is extremely limited in comparison with painting and poetry because only certain things are suited to musical painting—twittering of birds, cries of people, bubbling of water, etc. (*ibid.*, 256ff.). Lacombe states that harmony dominates compositions which imitate objects, while melody dominates those which express passions (*ibid.*, 308).

This latter idea brings us to the second of Batteux's imitative categories, the expression of passion. Batteux implies, as does Lacombe, that melody or song is superior to instrumental music which possesses only "une demie-vie et le moitié de son être" (Batteux 1746: 284).[10] From this point Batteux concludes that the expressiveness of song is completely significative because song is "le tableau du coeur humain" (*ibid.*, 284). The idea that good melody imitates the accents and inflexions of the voice appears early in the 18th century (Dubos 1719, 1:430).

The most influential exponents of this theory in the 18th century are Diderot, Rousseau, and the Encyclopedists. Their basic assumption is the necessity of imitation and painting in music.

> Un concert, une sonate, doivent peindre quelque chose, ou ne sont que de bruit, harmonieux, si l'on veut, mais sans vie (Cahusac 1751–65, 6:315a).

The fact that the above statement occurs in an article on "Expression" in the *Encyclopédie* raises a question of terminology. Cahusac, the author of this article, provides a clue in another entry on "Enthousiasme." Here he writes "qu'il n'existe point de musique digne de ce nom qui n'ait peint une ou plusiers images: son but est d'émouvoir par l'expression, et il n'y a point d'expression sans peinture" (*ibid.*, 5:121b). Cahusac seems to imply that expression cannot exist without imitation. Elsewhere in the "Expression" article, he is even more explicit. Speaking of painting, poetry, and music as imitative arts, he specifies:

> Chacun de ces arts a et doit avoir une expression, parce qu'on n'imite point sans exprimer, ou plutôt que l'expression est l'imitation même (*ibid.*, 6:315a).

This identification of expression and imitation not only aids in understanding Encyclopedist theories, but also sheds light on the

basic assumptions of 18th-century aesthetics. Although he does not belong to the *Philosophe* circle, Morellet sums up their point of view exactly in his introduction:

> Je regard comme synonimes, au moins dans la question présente, les termes *exprimer* et *peindre* . . . et comme toute peinture est une imitation, demander si la musique a de l'expression et en quoi cette expression consiste, c'est demander si la musique imite et comment (Morellet 1771: 114).

The Encyclopedists are not concerned so much with the imitation of physical objects as with the expression of the passions in music. Diderot (Launay 1954) treats both aspects in *Le neveu de Rameau*, but the bulk of the discussion centers around opera and expressing the passions (Diderot 1761–62: 128; cf. Lang 1968). Rousseau (Cotte 1963) in his *Dictionnaire* refers to Batteux's two types of imitation, but he corrects the latter's classification by making the first category part of the second:

> Il [the musician] ne représent pas directement ces choses [water, thunder, etc.] mais il excitera dans l'âme les mêmes mouvemens qu'on éprouve en les voyant (Rousseau 1768: 253–54, "Imitation").

Thus, even the depiction of natural objects becomes dependent on exciting empathetic sentiments in the listener. It is not necessary to dwell on the fact that in the 20th century theories of empathy, analogy, and resemblance still lie at the basis of symbolic or psychological explanations of the correlation between emotion embodied and experienced in the aesthetic situation.

For Rousseau, the dominance of melody and song is inherent in the concept of musical expression-imitation. In his *Essai sur l'origine des langues* he dismisses sensory data as operative elements in the aesthetic effect of a work of art. Having declared the primacy of imitation at the expense of the sensuous aspect of art, Rousseau proceeds to say that in painting, pure colors only please the eye. It is the design, or the imitation, which gives life and spirit to the colors enabling them to express passion and represent objects (Rousseau 1753+61: 297). He then makes his cardinal point:

> La mélodie fait précisement dans la musique ce que fait le dessein dans la peinture (*ibid.*, 298).

Since melody and song are considered the most natural expressions of emotion, it follows logically for writers in this

tradition to maintain that instrumental music must imitate song in order to acquire expressive power.

> Ainsi, c'est toujours du Chant que se doit tirer la principale Expression, tant dans la Musique Instrumentale que dans la Vocale (Rousseau 1768: 211, "Expression").

Blainville also relegates instrumental music to an inferior position when he states that music moves the soul "par la voix ou par les instrumens. On peut dire que le chant tient ses beautés de la nature, comme de la première main, et que la symphonie les a qu'en seconde. Le chant est la nature même, dont la symphonie n'est qu'une foible imitation" (Blainville 1754: 117–18). In this remark we discern the reason why absolute music is held in such low esteem. It is essentially an imitation of an imitation, or in other words, its expression of the passions is twice removed from the original. Absolute music, limited by the lack of a vocal medium, enjoys at best only a "demie-vie" which it can strengthen by imitating song. But it can never equal vocal music in the natural expression and imitation of emotions.

What precisely is understood by "chant" or "melodie"—the model of all expressive music? It appears from the preceding discussion that 18th-century writers have in mind a specific type of melody which they feel is the very soul of natural emotional expressivity. Lacombe remarks that such melody does not strive to "paint" individual words (as did Baroque figural devices) but rather to imitate the sentiments of the entire passage (Lacombe 1758: 291). This imitation is accomplished by means of a natural declamatory style. Chabanon cites as excellent examples of melodic declamation two passages from Pergolesi's *La serva padrona* and Monsigny's *Rose et Colas* which express respectively impatience and irony (Chabanon 1779: 159). 18th-century ideals of natural declamation are relevant to theories of dramatic music and opera in particular, and as such do not form a central focus in this essay. More important is the influence of this ideal on other genres of music, since aestheticians of this period freely translated this concept into a general precept:

> L'expression de la Musique [instrumental] et de la Dance doit avoir les mêmes qualités naturelles, que l'Eloquence oratoire (Batteux 1746: 287).

Under this general precept, even absolute music becomes a "language of emotion":

> Il est aussi des morceaux de Musique purement instrumentales, suivis avec tant de vérité, qu'ils semblent suggérer des paroles, des idées de passions, d'image ou de peinture: telle me semble être la Musique de Tartini, vrai langage des Sons; phrases musicales, fondés sur la mélodie la plus pure, et sur l'art de faire chanter le violon. En effet, ses Concerts sont vraiment le triomphe de cet instrument, qui semble alors déclamer un beau discours, auquel les autres parties ne paroissent jointes que pour entretenir le ton et la liaison des idées. (Blainville 1754: 86).

Contrary to both Cartaud de la Villate and Morellet, Blainville praises at least one Italian composer of instrumental music. Evidently, Blainville does not place Tartini in the same pejorative category as Locatelli and Vivaldi. The words used to describe Tartini's excellence are significant: Tartini's music is a *language* of sounds in which the violin *sings* and *declaims a beautiful discourse*. These words are not idle metaphors; they reveal Blainville's linguistic terms of reference and expose the underlying ideal of melodic declamation. The more closely music resembles the accents of passionate speech, the more vividly it imitates the emotions; herein lies its expressive power and meaning. This attitude is a marked characteristic of French musical thought. It is not insignificant that chamber music was published in Paris at this time under such titles as *conversation*.[11] The notion of instrumental discourse was so popular in France that even some of Haydn's quartets and symphonies were published under the title of *quatuor dialogué*.[12]

Since all expressive music is by definition linked to speech patterns, any instrumental piece could be easily adapted for the voice by adding words (Chabanon 1779: 81). The implication of a quasi-vocal style is evident in this statement. Furthermore, Chabanon is willing to admit that words would make the expression of such a piece fixed and precise (*ibid.*, 195). By this he does not mean to imply that music is totally inexpressive without words. He suggests that words help the ignorant pinpoint the character of a composition, but that a musical person is capable of grasping this character totally in musical terms. If orchestral players accompanying a singer were asked what the singer is expressing, they would repeat the melody on their instruments and answer, "Voilà ce que le Chanteur a dit" (*ibid.*, 46–7).

Despite his gallant attempt to justify a theory of inherent expressivity in absolute music, the expression of individual emotions in instrumental music posed a real problem for Chabanon, a problem he tried to solve with his theory of basic characters.

Declamation and language influence still other aspects of musical speculation. Cahusac, in the *Encyclopédie*, explains the phenomenon of national styles in instrumental music in these terms:

> Les instrumens d'ailleurs n'ayant été inventés que pour imiter les sons de la voix, il s'ensuit aussi que la musique instrumentale des différentes nations doit avoir nécessairement quelque air du pays où elle est composée (Cahusac 1751–65, 3:142a, "Chant").

The concept that musical style springs from linguistic differences comes from the theory that music and language were the first expressions of emotion in primitive man. Since music became separated from language in the course of human evolution, it still tends to imitate the declamation of the latter for expressive purposes. Rousseau's celebrated arguments in his *Lettre sur la musique française* (1753) depend on this theory. Rousseau claims that the superiority of the Italian language over the French accounts for the more natural and expressive qualities of Italian music. Of French music and language he says:

> Premièrement le défaut d'éclat dans le son des voyelles obligéroit d'en donner beaucoup à celui des notes, et parceque la langue seroit sourde, la musique seroit criarde (Rousseau 1753: 347).

Rousseau's public "letter," of course, forms part of the *Querelle des bouffons* centering around the controversy over the relative merits of Italian and French opera. Thus Rousseau's arguments focus on vocal music. The ramifications of this idea, however, can be seen in Blainville's generalization:

> En effet, le genre d'une Musique naît particulièrement du caractère de la langue d'une Nation (Blainville 1754: 43).

Theories of interrelated national character, language, and style, together with speculation on primitive man as the source (category 5 of nature) all converge to elucidate the "natural expressiveness" of music. Grimm, for example, introduces a new twist to an old problem. He proposes that music, born as expression of passion in primitive man, functions as a universal language addressed to humanity's emotional being. For this

reason, its meaning is necessarily vague, and words are needed to make this emotional meaning precise (Grimm 1751–65, 12: 824b, "Poème lyrique").

The inability of most 18th-century writers in France to conceptualize absolute music as meaningful and significant finds its epitome in the apostrophe attributed to Fontenelle: *Sonate, que me veux-tu?* Boyé has little patience with this attitude and rejects the relevancy of Fontenelle's query (Boyé 1779: 40). He counters the prevalent opinion that words alone give emotional precision to music with the idea that both words and music must have appropriate emotional qualities in order for a vocal piece to express a particular passion. Words alone are not enough. The accompaniment must also have its own "character" which contributes to the total effect—"character" here understood vaguely as "style." He illustrates his point with two operatic arias. The first, "Ah! Laissez-moi donc pleurer" from Grétry's *Zémire et Azor*, is cited as an example of the successful union of poetic and musical expression. Not so with Orfeo's lament from *Orfeo ed Euridice* by Gluck. In this case the music fails to live up to its half of the bargain. The text expresses sorrow, but the music, according to Boyé, lacks the corresponding character. He baldly states that the words could designate a joyous feeling equally well, and suggests a substitute text:

J'ai perdu mon Euridice,
Rien n'égale mon malheur;
Sort cruel,
Quelle rigeur,
Rien n'égale mon malheur.

J'ai trouvé mon Euridice,
Rien n'égale mon bonheur;
Quells momens!
Quels transports!
Rien n'égale mon bonheur.

In performance the singer corrects the defect in Gluck's music by his acting (*ibid.*, 13–14). Limited by his own philosophical assumptions, Boyé is unable to extrapolate the basic questions raised by his illustration; the relation of text and music in an aria is different and more subtle than in a recitative, especially when one is confronted with Gluck's lyrical restraint and sublimated expressivity. Yet this specific controversy has survived into modern aesthetics via Hanslick who lifted Boyé's discussion bodily into his own treatise of 1854, *The Beautiful in Music* (*Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*).[13]

Three leading aestheticians of the later 18th century attempt, each in his own way, to resolve the problem posed by the confrontation of two philosophical concepts: the universal

significance of music based on the imitation of passionate human expression, and the meaning of absolute music. The solutions of Morellet, Chabanon, and Boyé represent a progression from a positive to a negative evaluation of both. In spite of the obvious differences in vocabulary and technique between these writers and modern philosophers, there appears a striking similarity of views and methods in 18th- and 20th-century emotive aesthetics. Old *topoi* of content revive in new configurations of form.

Although Morellet subscribes to the Encyclopedist theory of musical imitation, he finds that he must refine this theory in order to accommodate a reasonable defense of innate musical expression proper to instrumental music. He states that all passions have their individual, natural declamation which can be divided into two types—inarticulate cries and articulate discourse. Music imitates the former and in this imitation lies the secret of its charm. Instrumental music also imitates the accents of passion, but it is impossible to name the passion imitated. To objections raised against the idea that instrumental music imitates declamation, Morellet points out that such a theory is not as arbitrary as it would seem on the surface (Morellet 1771: 128). By imitating natural declamation, instrumental music does not necessarily imitate discourse, but rather the inarticulate cries of man. The passions expressed by discourse can be recognized and named, but those expressed by inarticulate cries remain vague and undefinable.[14] This intellectual play on words and concepts demonstrates the length to which an 18th-century aesthetician was forced to go in order to elasticize an inflexible system of thought.

Morellet admits that such musical imitation is often imperfect (*ibid.*, 135). He points out, however, that it is an error to demand exactness of artistic imitation:

> L'imitation dans tous les arts doit embellir la nature (*ibid.*, 132).

Artistic imitation is, in a sense, an illusion (*ibid.*, 133). Thus Morellet cites the idea of imitative embellishment of nature (category 2—ideal type) to support his theory that the imperfect, illusionistic imitation of absolute music is not a defect but a virtue—indeed it becomes the principal source of music's charm:

> Elle [music] peut se contenter d'une imitation légère; que ce ne sera pas en elle une faiblesse, mais délicatesse d'expression; que des analogies foibles seront pour elle des moyens vraies et que ses

> portraits seront très-ressemblens, sinon par l'exactitude de chaque trait, au moins par le nombre des similitudes qu'elle aura sçu rassembler, et enfin que l'*imitation* et l'*expression* lui appartiennent peut-être à un aussi haut degré qu'aux autres arts qui ont sur nous un si grand empire et qui jettent nos sens et notre imagination dans si douces illusions (*ibid.*, 142).

Morellet's apology represents not only a justification of the capacity of instrumental music to express emotion, but also a defense of the entire imitative doctrine as applied to the arts.

In spite of its great popularity, this interpretation was not without opponents. Chabanon takes issue with several ideas assumed by proponents of the theory of imitation. First of all, he stresses the sensual enjoyment of music at the expense of the importance of imitation as an aesthetic criterion, thus emphasizing the fourth category of nature.

> La Musique au contraire plaît sans imitation, par les sensations qu'elle procure (Chabanon 1779: 43).

Consequently, he places no value on imitation in instrumental music. Imitation of emotions is out of the question since music is incapable of painting any individual, concrete passion, and imitation of physical objects can be considered nothing better than mildly amusing play unless linked to a dramatic situation. As an example of the latter, he cites the overture to *Pygmalion* which represents a storm. Because it precedes the scene of an agitated woman awaiting her lover, this imitation becomes imbued with tragic overtones that would be entirely missing if the overture were played on the concert stage (*ibid.*, 44).

Rousseau and the Encyclopedists come under heavy fire.[18] Chabanon criticizes them severely for maintaining that vocal music preceded instrumental because song was supposedly the first and hence the natural expression of emotion in primitive society. Their error, according to Chabanon, consists in presuming that the word is the mother of song. He suggests that it is much more likely that primitive man expressed his feelings first in wordless song. Hence, song is the mother of speech. Logically, then, instrumental music preceded vocal music, because a song without words is equivalent to instrumental music (*ibid.*, 54–7).

Turning to song itself, Chabanon denies Rousseau's assertion that the merit of song is to resemble discourse by pointing out

that the least musical part of music is simple recitative (*ibid.*, 60). This opinion is shared by Boyé who states:

> La Musique qui approche le plus de l'expression est la plus ennuyeuse (Boyé 1779: 17).

By "expression," Boyé refers to the oratorical declamation advocated by the Encyclopedists by virtue of which recitative rates as the most expressive aspect of music. Chabanon's objection to the declamatory theory, then, rests on the thesis that it tends to ignore the innately musical elements of expressivity in melody. Rousseau and his colleagues built a general theory of musical expression on a very limited conception of song. If this conception were expanded to admit lyrical melody whose meaningfulness and expressivity reside solely within a musical structure that is independent of verbal declamation, then it becomes possible to adumbrate a theory of significance and expression for music without words. Unfortunately, such a theory does not find its formulation in Chabanon's writings, or for that matter, in the writings of any French aesthetician in the 18th century.

Boyé in his inimitable style also opposes the idea that music imitates passionate declamation:

> Un Compositeur qui prétend copier les accens passionés de la nature, est donc aussi ridicule que quelqu'un qui voudroit former tous les mots imaginables avec trois lettres de l'Alphabet (Boyé 1779: 8).

He dismisses musical imitation of physical objects in short order. Natural sounds are noises and therefore have nothing in common with music. Admitting that music is capable of imitating bird calls, he asks what possible contribution such imitation can make to expressivity (*ibid.*, 19–21). Sarcasm is showered on Rousseau's idea that music imitates objects by awakening in the soul the same feeling that one experiences on seeing the object (*ibid.* 23). If music does not imitate natural phenomena or express human passions, what is its significance for Boyé? After roundly rejecting musical imitation, Boyé finishes his pugnacious little pamphlet with his first positive statement: a negative definition of music:

> L'objet principal de la Musique est de nous plaire physiquement, sans que l'esprit se mette en peine de lui chercher d'inutiles comparisons. On doit la regarder absolument comme un plaisir de sens, et non de l'intelligence (*ibid.*, 23).

Foreseeing the inevitable objections that his definition degrades music, Boyé closes his argument with the following broadside:

> Pour moi, lorsque certains effets de Musique répandent dans toutes les parties de mon être ce frémissement voluptueux qu'on nomme vulgairement, *chair de poule*; je préfère cette jouissance précieuse à toutes les tempêtes des froides Observateurs; de même que lorsque Colas embrasse sa maîtresse, il y prend bien plus de plaisir qu'à toutes les comparaisons qu'on pourroit faire sur l'amour (*ibid.*, 26).

Pursuing the pros and cons of imitative theories has lead Boyé into a *cul-de-sac* in which music is relegated to the rank of a purely visceral pleasure. While Boyé's open espousal of a sensual appreciation of music is refreshing, especially in comparison with the stilted and somewhat frigid intellectualism of imitative pedants, his negative praise still does not explain the human and spiritual significance of music. And after all, this is the question that the philosophy of music attempts to answer.

Many are the attempts to solve the specific enigma posed by Fontenelle. However, the impasse created by the interlocking concepts of passion, nature, imitation, and musical significance in effect prevents any satisfactory answer. Having arrived at the crossroads, the French aestheticians lose their way. The writers of the later 18th century do recognize that musical meaning must be liberated from the arbitrary demands of imitative aesthetics and that absolute music must find philosophical understanding. But no philosopher of this period crystallizes a vocabulary adequate to deal with the idea of embodied or innate musical meaning. Indeed, one can summarize the situation in France by asking with Fontenelle, *Sonate, que me veux-tu?* and answering, *Le je ne sais quoi.*

NOTES

[1] Representative examples of this interpretation are: Folkierski 1925; Goldschmidt 1915; Serauky 1929; Damerini 1955.

[2] This essay is the first of three studies in French, English, and German aesthetics respectively. The last two will appear shortly in other journals.

[3] It is interesting to note that 19th-century philosophers carried this objective–subjective association still farther. When formalists such as Hanslick rejected emotion as the content of music, they based their arguments on the fact that the emotional reaction of several listeners to the same piece of music were often quite different. Hanslick's thesis ultimately rests on the rejection of a *causal nexus* between musical meaning and subjective emotion, which is the premise of those Romantic aestheticians with whom he disagreed (*Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* 1854). Modern emphasis on the semantics of meaning and symbolism, as well as on the psychology of information

theory, has produced various attempts to redefine the relationship of the emotional content of music and the emotional response of the listener (cf. S. K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* 1942, *Feeling and Form* 1953, and L. B. Meyer, *Emotion and Meaning in Music* 1956).

[4] Aristotle's theory in the *Poetics* refers only to the aural arts, but was extended in the 18th century to include the visual arts as well (Draper 1921):

(Poetry, drama and music) . . . all happen to be, on the whole, imitations . . .	. . . πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον . . . (*Περὶ ποιητικῆς* I, 15-16).

[5] Serauky (1929: 5) incorrectly divides musical imitation into two equivalent categories—imitation of affects and imitation of nature.

[6] For a more detailed analysis of nature in 18th-century thought, see Lovejoy 1927.

[7] Rousseau is the most famous exponent of this doctrine, although he is by no means the first. Condillac writes in 1746:

> En effet, quel est le son le plus propre à rendre un sentiment de l'âme? C'est d'abord celui qui imite le cri qui en est le signe naturel: il est commun à la déclamation et à la musique (Condillac 1746: 146).

According to this writer, music and words were used together in their infancy to express passion. Only after a long time did they separate (*ibid.*, 13). But musical expression was developed when it was one with declamation (*ibid.*, 138). The echo in Rousseau is striking. He states that poetry existed before prose since the passions spoke before reason (Rousseau 1753+61: 293). Poetry and music were born together in song. Naturally, vocal melody becomes the principal element of music to which all other elements are subordinate and conversely, absolute music becomes meaningless and fugal devices "des restes de barbarie et de mauvais goût" (*ibid.*, 382).

[8] Crousaz (*Traité du beau*, 1715) actually precedes Dubos. However, the only available copy of the former's treatise is the second edition of 1724 in which the author omits the 12th chapter on "Le beau dans la musique" because of objections raised against its obtuse character.

[9] It is significant to note that Hanslick knew Boyé's work and refers to it in his own treatise.

[10] These phrases are borrowed from Dubos who writes that the sounds of a symphony "ne soient que de simples imitations du bruit inarticulé, et s'il faut parler ainsi, des sons qui n'ont que le moitié de leur être, et une demie-vie" (Dubos 1719, I: 436).

[11] For example, in 1746 Guillemain published a set of works entitled *Six sonates ou quatuor ou conversations galantes et amusantes entre une flûte traversière, un violon, une basse de viol et la basse continue* (Bücken, 1931: 51).

[12] In 1764, De la Chevardière published *Six Symphonies ou quatuors dialogués pour deux violons, alto et basse, composés par M. Haydn, maître de musique à Vienne*, consisting of the string quartets Op. 1, Nos. 1-6 (Scott 1934: 4). Four years later he published another collection entitled *Six Symphonies ou quatuors dialogués pour deux violons, alto viola et basse*, this time comprising the Haydn symphonies *Gli* 15, 25, 32, 33, a cassation in G, and a symphony in B flat which is not in the thematic index (Oberdörffer 1939: 11).

[13] Hanslick assumes that Boyé's excursus supports his own contention that music cannot express or embody emotion. In this instance he misunderstands Boyé who suggests that it is possible for music to be suited to the emotional quality of a text within the limitations of its art (Boyé 1779: 13). But Boyé does not believe that by itself music can express individual passions; on the contrary, the limitations of its art only permit music to have general character or style. For this reason the bulk of the responsibility for expressivity falls on the poetry and acting. Hanslick's choice

of a corroborating excerpt from Boyé is unfortunate, for this particular passage seems less of an integral part in Boyé's aesthetic, and more of an excuse to air this writer's manifest dislike of Gluck's music.

[16] Morellet's distinction is attacked by Chabanon who denies that music imitates the inarticulate cry of the passions (Chabanon 1779: 64).

[17] Feelings of violent animosity were expressed publicly between Chabanon and the Encyclopedists (Oliver 1947: 145).

REFERENCES

Primary Sources:

André, le Père J.
1741 *Essai sur le beau.* Amsterdam.

Batteux, C.
1746 *Les beaux arts reduits à un même principe.* Paris.

Beaumont, S. De
1743 *Lettre sur la musique ancienne et moderne.* Paris.

Blainville, C. H.
1754 *L'esprit de l'art musical.* Geneva.

Boyé, M.
1779 *L'expression musicale mise au rang des chimères.* Amsterdam.

Cahusac
1751–65 See Diderot 1751–65.

Cartaud de la Villate
1736 Essai historique et philosophique sur le goût. Paris. In *Cartaud de la Villate,* Berlin 1960. Vol. 1, pp. 202–527.

Chabanon, M. P. G. de
1764 *Eloge de M. de Rameau.* Paris.
1779 *Observations sur la musique.* Paris.
1785 *De la musique considérée en elle-même et dans ses rapports avec la parole, les langues, la poésie, et le théâtre.* Paris.

Condillac, E. B. de
1746 *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines.* Paris.

Crousaz, J. P. de
1715 *Traité de beau.* Amsterdam.

Diderot, D.
1751 Lettre sur les sourds et muets. n.p. In O. E. Fellows and N. L. Torrey, eds., *The Age of the Enlightenment,* New York 1942, pp. 266–273.
1751–65 *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers,* Paris. 17 vols.
1761–62 Le neveu de Rameau. In P. Albert, ed., *Oeuvres choisis de D. Diderot.* Paris n.d. Vol. 6, pp. 19–173.

Dubos, J. B.
1715 *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture.* Paris. 3 vols.

Grimm, F. M.
1751–65 See Diderot 1751–65.

Laborde, J. B. De
1780 *Essai sur la musique ancienne et moderne.* Paris.

Lacombe, J.
1752 *Dictionnaire portatif des beaux-arts.* Paris.
1758 *Le spectacle des beaux arts.* Paris.

Laugier, Abbé M. A.
1754 *Apologie de la musique françoise contre M. Rousseau.* Paris.

Morellet, M. L.
1771 De l'expression en musique. In *Mercure de France*, Nov. 1771, pp. 113–43.
Rivarol, A.
n.d. De l'homme intellectuel et moral. In *Oeuvres complètes de Rivarol*. Paris 1808. Vol. 1.
Rousseau, J. J.
1753 Lettre sur la musique française. Paris. In *Oeuvres complètes de J. J. Rousseau*. Paris 1792. Vol. 19, pp. 341–426.
1753+61 Essai sur l'origine des langues. n.p. In *Oeuvres complètes de J. J. Rousseau*. Paris 1792. Vol. 19, pp. 215–333.
1768 *Dictionnaire de musique*. Paris.

Secondary Sources:
Borrel, E.
1949–51 Blainville, Charles-Henri. In *MGG* 1: 1889–91.
1960 Laugier, Abbé Marc-Antoine. In *MGG*, 6: 525–26.
Brelet, G.
1958 Philosophie et esthétique musicales. In J. Chailley, ed., *Précis de musicologie*. Paris, pp. 389–423.
Briquet, M.
1960 Laborde, Jean-Benjamin de. In *MGG*, 8: 17–21.
Bücken, E.
1931 *Die Musik des Rokokos und der Klassik*. Potsdam.
Bukofzer, M.
1947 *Music in the Baroque Era*. New York.
Chambers, F. P.
1932 *The History of Taste*. New York.
Cotte, R.
1963 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. In *MGG*, 11: 1006–12.
Damerini, A.
1955 Profilo storico della estetica musicale. In *Rivista musicale italiana* 25: 108–17.
Draper, J. W.
1921 Aristotelian Mimesis in Eighteenth Century England. In *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America*, 36: 372–400.
Écorcheville, J.
1906 *De Lulli à Rameau, 1630–1730; l'esthétique musicale*. Paris.
Folkierski, W.
1925 *Entre le classicisme et le romantisme: étude sur l'esthétique et les esthéticiens du XVIII^e siècle*. Paris.
Goldschmidt, H.
1915 *Die Musikästhetik des 18. Jahrhunderts*. Zurich.
Hazard, P.
1954 *European Thought in the 18th Century*. Translated by J. L. May. New Haven. First published 1946.
Jullien, A.
1873 *La musique et les philosophes au dix-huitième siècle*. Paris.
Kretzschmar, H.
1912 Allegoriens und Besonderes zur Affektenlehre, II. In *Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters*, 20: 65–78.
Lang, P. H.
1941 *Music in Western Civilization*. New York.

1967 The Enlightenment and Music. In *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 1: 93–103.
1968 Diderot as Musician. In *Diderot Studies* 10: 95–107.

Launay, D.
1954 Diderot, Denis. In *MGG*, 3: 429–34.

Lovejoy, A. O.
1927 Nature as the Aesthetic Norm. In *Modern Language Notes* 42: 444–50.

Prod'homme, J. G.
1913–14 Diderot et la musique. In *Zeitschrift der International Musik Gesellschaft* 15: 156–62, 177–82.

Oberdörffer, F.
1939 *Der Generalbass in der Instrumentalmusik des ausgehenden 18. Jahrhunderts.* Cassel.

Oliver, A. R.
1947 *The Encyclopedists as Critics of Music.* New York.

Peteut, P.
1902 *Jean-Baptiste Dubos.* Tranelan.

Robertson, J. G.
1923 *Studies in the Genesis of the Romantic Theory in the Eighteenth Century.* Cambridge.

Schäfke, R.
1934 *Geschichte der Musikästhetik in Umrissen.* Berlin.

Schenker, M.
1909 *Charles Batteux und seine Nachahmungstheorie in Deutschland.* Leipzig. Bd. I der Neue Folge, *Untersuchung zur neuren Sprach-und Literatur-Geschichte.*

Schueller, H. M.
1948 "Imitation" and "Expression" in British Music Criticism in the 18th Century. In *Musical Quarterly*, 34: 544–66.
1952–53 Correspondences between Music and the Sister Arts, According to 18th Century Aesthetic Theory. In *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 11: 334–59.

Scott, M. M.
1934 Haydn's Opus two and Opus Three. In *Proceedings of the Musical Association*, 61: 1–19.

Serauky, W.
1929 *Die musikalische Nachahmungsästhetik im Zeitraum von 1700 bis 1850.* Münster.
1949–51 Batteux, Charles. In *MGG*, 1: 1411–16.
1954 Dubos, Jean Baptiste. In *MGG*, 3: 841–43.

Smith, A. C.
1937 *Theories of Nature and Standard of Taste in England, 1700–1790.* Chicago.

Snyders, G.
1968 *Le goût musical en France aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles.* Paris.

Soeel-Nitzberg, A.
1952 Chabanon, Michel Paul Guy de. In *MGG* 2: 996–1004.

Wessel, F. T.
1955 *The Aesthetician in the 18th Century.* Ann Arbor.