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articles

Fragments of a Musical Hermeneutics*

By Carl Dahlhaus
Translated by Karen Painter

I. On the "decayed aesthetic of feeling"

More than a century after Eduard Hanslick called the aesthetic of feeling "decayed" in the introduction to the essay *On the Beautiful in Music* (1854), it still appears as the reigning popular philosophy of music. Indeed, musical hermeneutics is to no small degree the interpretation and paraphrasing of the affects, feelings, sentiments, expressive character, and moods that are believed to comprise the content of music. In the general consciousness of the musical public—whose categories a historian in no way can ignore, but, on the contrary, where he must begin in order to differentiate, elevate, or discard them—the analytical approach is tied to the aesthetic of formalism, and the hermeneutic approach to that of content. The dichotomy may be felt as an unfortunate split—a piece of "bad nineteenth century"—yet it must first be accepted as a historical fact: as an aesthetic form of thought created by music history.

The aesthetic of feeling, undeniably cowed but by no means refuted (it was practiced rather than acknowledged), has withstood the relentless polemic carried on against it with disdain for a century. This endurance need by no means be an indication of the implausibility of the arguments brought to bear against it: the factual cogency of objections and their social inefficacy are not mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, that the philosophical verdict regarding the aesthetic of feeling was not carried out by the musical public is, in any case, an incentive to scrutinize once again the grounds upon which it is based. Not that one can hope for new arguments. Still, reflecting on old ones, however worn they may seem, is not superfluous. The "decayed aesthetic of feeling" is in no way dead and disposed of, and the possibility remains that it may survive the objections that challenge its aesthetic right to exist.

1. The impulse to let music evoke a general atmosphere or transport one into a specific mood invites the suspicion that it will be misused as a means of bringing about a condition in which the mood itself—and not the music—constitutes the object of attention and pleasure. The listener, instead of attending to the musical work, turns back upon himself; he sinks into an emotional state that was aroused through music, without the sounding phenomenon establishing itself as the work, as the aesthetic object in the consciousness of the "emotion-oriented listener"—who is not a listener, but rather a "listener on the side."

That a type of aesthetic perception can be driven to an extreme, whereupon it changes into its own opposite—into non-aesthetic perception—is in any case not enough of a reason to reject the type altogether. As worn and exhausted as the word "mood" *(Stimmung)* may seem, a modest effort to attain a historical awareness should make it possible to repossess its former meaning, or at least to make it intelligible in spite of its distance, as well as to recognize the original thought in its aesthetic legitimacy. As an aesthetic condition, mood is an emotional state which one tries to achieve so as to be able to grasp music as "a secluded world for itself" (Ludwig Tieck); mood resembles a shell in which musical perception surrounds itself in order to be protected from the outer world and to experience the musical creation as an "isolated, closed work"—according to Walter Benjamin, the "highest reality of art." The melancholy or cheerful coloring of the emotional state is a thoroughly secondary element *vis à vis* the essential phenomenon that one feel transported into a musical mood appropriate for the reception of music as an aesthetic object. Mood, whether external or internal, is thus not an aesthetically reprehensible alternative to perceiving a musical creation as a work and structure; in fact, exactly the reverse is true—it is one of the leading presuppositions for the constitution of that "world" in which an aesthetic object is able to show itself as such at all. And the general, internal musical mood creates the medium for the aesthetic transformation of particular moods that are colored through feelings.

2. That hermeneutics and the aesthetics of feeling are grounded purely subjectively, and that the aesthetics of form and structural analysis are in turn objectively grounded, are assertions that persistent repetition has vested with the appearance of the obvious, about which one need not reflect. They are nonetheless questionable. Without having to reflect on what is in any case meant by the expressions "subjective" and "objective"—reflections that would quickly prove to be impractical—one can recall the simple fact that features of musical structure do not belong to the acoustic substratum of music, to the sounding reality, any more than do expressive characteristics. Forms and expressive characteristics are equally intentional elements. Whether a chord represents a dominant or tonic, and whether an interval functions motivically or as a plain interval, are, in the words of Carl Stumpf, "matters of viewpoint and of connecting ideas": the result of a categorical formation of acoustic material. Accordingly, if musical structures are not as objective as the supporters of a naive mirror theory believe, then the aesthetic of feeling, on the other hand, is not as subjective as it seems under the projection theory. Both structural and emotional elements constitute a subject-object relation, and their differences, which were torn asunder into irreconcilable opposites in musical-aesthetic party

squabbles, are in truth only differences in degree. It is time to substitute a dispassionate investigation of gradations for the useless polemic over principles.

Anyone who perceives a musical piece as melancholy does not mean that it "is" melancholy, but that it "has that effect." And it seems melancholy, of course, without the listener himself having to be in a melancholy mood or being forced to infer a past state of mind of the composer from the impression of melancholy. Melancholy appears as an identification—intentional, not real—of the music itself, though an identification that accrues to the aesthetic object only when it is perceived by a feeling listener. The expressive character is inherent in the object, viewed phenomenologically, if exclusively in the present relation to a subject.

3. Against the aesthetic of feeling it was always maintained that the expressive element in which the aesthetic seeks the essence of music is to too small a degree intersubjective—"subjectively universal," to use Kant's words—to be able to determine the artistic character of musical works. In any case, the expressive element is less intersubjective than the structural attributes upon which the aesthetic form is based. To be sure, the argument must be disentangled if the explanation is not to become a distorted dialogue wherein replies stand contrary to each other, instead of meshing. In this way, of course, there is a theoretical separation of the empirical and descriptive element—the assertion about the degrees of intersubjectivity—from the metaphysical and normative—the theses about the essence or artistic character of music—even though, pragmatically, they are closely connected. The lack of emotional content—whether conjectured or experimentally and psychologically determined—would hardly be of interest if it concerned only the peripheral, incidental effect of music and not—according to the claim of the aesthetic of feeling—the essence of music as art. (Hanslick not only condemned the aesthetic of feeling for elevating a vague, merely intermittent, and inconstant feature to the essential identification of music, but, above all, argued that the emotional effect of music, as strong as it may be, is aesthetically irrelevant to the definition of the beautiful in music.)

Thus, it is admittedly possible to disagree with, but not (in the scholastic sense of the word) dispute (i.e., settle the disagreement reasonably) the normative aspect of argumentation. On the other hand, it is not that the empirical claim about the lack of intersubjectivity should be challenged, but rather that the claim needs a historical commentary that arises out of a sense of skepticism. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the sympathizing understanding of musically represented affects was tied to aesthetic and social presuppositions that have since been lost: it seems as if the vocabulary of the musical "language of feeling" (Johann Nicolaus

Forkel) became understood entirely "intersubjectively." First of all, the works remained within the bounds of a single musical language—music from earlier stylistic periods was hardly known; second, the public, in whose sphere one comes to an intersubjective understanding about the emotional content in music, was small and had been raised with the same or similar educational presuppositions; and third, the musical language depended on traditions that had emerged gradually and had been broken through only partially.

4. Alternatively, it has been asserted that the expressivity of music—the affects that are represented through music, the expressive character inherent in them, and the emotional effects originating from them—is "more exact" or "more inexact" than the characterization of feelings in language. In the argument of the musical-aesthetic camp, which is a sham exchange, the concept of uncertainty means that a musically expressed feeling is without object, an affect "*in abstracto*" (Schopenhauer), and that a feeling whose object is not determined itself also remains inexact. By the opposite thesis, that musical expression is too specific to be translated into words, it is meant that musical expression gives way to feelings extending all the way to ramifications and modifications that, outside of a few lyrical moments, cannot be attained in language.

The pretense that the issue is one of thesis and antithesis is, of course, an illusion. Indeterminacy through objectlessness and determinacy in the sense of differentiation are in no way mutually exclusive, and it can plainly be asserted that musical expression acquires in connotation what it loses in denotation.

On the other hand, in the outlined explication of the determinacy of musical expression, the comparison with language is unconvincing. If one assumes (and nothing further can be justified) that the expressive features inherent in music—not the real feelings of the composer or listener—constitute the actual object of the aesthetic of feeling, then the feelings that music possesses with the determinacy extolled by Mendelssohn prove to be not impulses existing outside and without music and whose sounding portrayal is musical, but rather qualities that are feelings at all only as they are expressed by music. That they cannot be translated into language—that language does not reach them—accordingly means simply that they can be what they are only in musically expressive form; it in no way means that language remains behind music in the characterization of real feelings because it is poorer and more undifferentiated. Music is not the more specific representation of impulses that are also comprehensible linguistically, but instead the different expression of different feelings.

5. Since the methods of musical hermeneutics developed by Kretzschmar and Schering were recognized as questionable, no one any longer doubts

the truism—whether used apologetically or exchanged polemically—that the expressive character inherent in a musical creation cannot be adequately translated into language. However attractive in its simplicity, the common explanation that the untranslatability results from indeterminacy—thus from the lack of an object—may be wrong, for translations aim not at objects or circumstances symbolized through words or sentences, but rather at significance and meaning. The objectlessness of music can therefore be no hindrance in translating meanings—to the extent that they are given.

If one understands the feeling contained in sound as the meaning of a musical motif, then musical expression is untranslatable for exactly the opposite reason, as a result of its determinacy, which is specifically musical. Inasmuch as a musically expressed feeling becomes the feeling that only musical expression makes manifest, a transformation into language is precluded.

On the other hand, musical expression of a feeling without a psychological basis is unthinkable *in re;* the musically shaped feeling, the "sounding inwardness," is certainly a different feeling than a common, real one, but not quintessentially different. The reference—"in the last instance"—to psychological reality is as unavoidable as the connection to colloquial language is in hermetic poetry. Yet the aesthetically decisive event that constitutes the artistic character of the products is the separation of the feeling or colloquial language from the reality.

The word "melancholy" is a poor abbreviation for the expressive character of a musical work that strikes one as melancholy. The language of hermeneutics functions abstractly; music, in contrast, functions by individualizing. Hanslick emphasized the difference, yet he shared a flawed presupposition concerning the aesthetic of feeling against which he argued. He identified feeling *in abstracto,* which can be denoted through a word, with emotional meaning, which is generally accessible through music; he was thereby able to conclude that the individualization of music means not a differentiation of expressive characteristics but rather a "purely musical" element.

6. Hanslick's polemic against the "decayed aesthetic of feeling" was supported less with facts that can be described than with norms that must be decided upon. Hanslick denied neither the emotional effects that sometimes come from music (he only derided them) nor the possibility that composers or performers "express themselves" through sound. Yet he asserted that the expressive element is irrelevant for the determination of the beautiful in music. (The backbone of Hanslick's essay presents a thesis about the beautiful in music and not a description of the reception of music.)

According to Hanslick, the beautiful in music must be understood "purely musically." Hanslick was a dogmatic supporter of absolute music, a partisan of the maxim (already formulated by E.T.A. Hoffmann and Nägeli) that assertions about music may apply only to instrumental music (without a program). Limiting the concept of music to the sounding fact—the practice of designating texts, programs, and represented affects as "extramusical" ornaments—is, however, nothing less than obvious. For millennia, the concept of music—that of antiquity and the Middle Ages as well as the modern period up to the eighteenth century—was more broadly defined and included texts, programs, and represented affects.

The assertion that expressive elements are "extramusical"—like the texts through which their representation is determined—is in part based on a conception of music that historically has had a narrow definition. At the same time, even within the era that accepted and colloquially strengthened Hanslick's limited concept of music (though not his aesthetic theories), it is altogether doubtful whether Hanslick's understanding of the reality of musical reception was correct. Hanslick assumed that, as with the aesthetic of feeling, a mirror relationship exists between the represented feeling and the representing music, and he objected to the aesthetic of feeling only in that the determination of the beautiful in music depends not on the "external reference" of a musical motif to a feeling, but rather on the function of the motif in the entire musical form. A phenomenological analysis, however, shows that, as mentioned, there need not be a question of an "external reference"—whether to a real emotion of the composer or of the listener—rather, that a listener to whom a musical piece seems melancholy means a quality that remains with the music itself. But if musically expressive characteristics are not "extramusical" elements, as they were understood by Hanslick—in conformity with the aesthetic of feeling of his time—then there is a flaw in thesis that the "purely musical" collapses into the musically formal, to the exclusion of the expressive.

II. The idea of musical language and the New Music

1

That music is a language is a truism which seems to grow more obscure the more one tries to determine its precise meaning. Nonetheless, its significance is most easily grasped upon recognizing the function it should fulfill. The apologetic motivation to defend music from the charge that it is nothing other than a sounding structure without content and meaning issues from two sources. First, it is in part tied up with the instinctive

propensity to borrow from the older disciplines of grammar and rhetoric in drafting a theory and terminology of music. It is also a consequence of the aesthetic tendency to clarify the emancipation of eighteenth-century instrumental music—an emancipation from both texts and extramusical functions—by considering music a language. It was in this way that music was seen as achieving independence: no longer a secondary, dependent language, it instead became a primary, directly expressive one.

To varying degrees, all levels of language, whether the phonological, morphological, and syntactical, or the semantic and pragmatic, have been recognized in music. This recognition has been gained without the reflection on the logical status of metaphorical terminology disrupting the satisfaction of being able to discuss music with a soberly linguistic vocabulary.

Phonological categories have been applied to music only in recent years.[1] By contrast, the beginnings of a morphological/syntactical theory of music reach back into the ninth century: in the *Musica enchiriadis*, pitches and groups of pitches are compared with letters, syllables, and words on the one hand, and the phrases and periods of music with the commas, colons, and periods of language on the other.[2] This syntactical analogy formed the backbone of the theory of melody during the entire Middle Ages and early modern period. In 1739, when Johann Mattheson, considered the founder of modern musical syntax, phrased a minuet in commas, colons, and periods,[3] the attempt was in no way new; rather, all that was new was the use of old terminology for a modern theoretical understanding of the "four-square" musical construction fundamental to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century music: the formation of musical phrases from 1 + 1, 2 + 2, 3 + 3, 4 + 4, and 8 + 8 measures. ("Four-square" refers to an "ideal type" that naturally permits exceptions—whether elisions, contractions, or appendages—but as licenses that must refer back to the norm for their significance to be recognized.)

Attempts to establish either the linguistic character of music or its similarity to language as semantic, rather than syntactic, are precarious. Although semantic elements are undeniably given, the semantic in music—by contrast with language—is not contained in every single element, whether an interval or a motif. There can thus be no talk of a continuous stratum in the sense of Roman Ingarden.[4] To the extent that one expects the terminology borrowed from linguistics and the philosophy of language to convey musical and aesthetic insights, instances of word painting can be categorized as "icons," Wagnerian leitmotifs or musical and rhetorical figures of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries as "symbols," and expressive gestures in sentimental and emotional music as "indices."[5] Yet the theoretical consequences of the merely intermittent nature of the semantic element in music form the central problem.

That the meaning of a musical piece depends to no small degree on the function it fulfills and on the context from which it arises or into which it comes, that musical semantics must therefore be grounded in pragmatism, are insights that were naturally hinted at or set forth on occasion in older aesthetics, but were only in recent years elevated to a methodological principle.[6] The pragmatic approach is, after the phonological, the most modern theory of musical language. Yet the object of the following discussions, which attempt to make conscious the theoretical difficulties inherent in the simple facts, is not the pragmatic as a presupposition and implication of semantics, but rather musical syntax, which is at first blush the most innocuous element.

2

The practice of discussing musical syntax seems to be unproblematic, because fitting motifs into phrases, phrases into half-periods, and half-periods into periods both agrees with the sense of the term syntax[7] and also was understood, since the eighteenth century, as the musical equivalent of linguistic syntax. "Four-square" periodic structure, however, owes its existence not only to language, but also—even if not primarily—to dance. That syntactical categories like those of the period and colon stand beside logical ones like antecedent and consequent in the language of music theory should not be blamed on music theory itself, but rather on its model, the older grammar.

An accurate and comprehensive description of the similarities and differences between musical and linguistic syntax has never been attempted. (The beginnings of one by Forkel in 1788 have historical value, of course, but are misguided.[8]) It can also hardly be foreseen which criteria should be used to in deciding whether it is meaningful (1) to categorize as a musical conjunction a bass figure at the end of a period that in one version leads to the repetition of that figure and, in another, to its continuation, or (2) to understand as musical inflection the alteration of a motif that leads to a half cadence in the antecedent and to a full cadence in the consequent. As long as there is a lack of understanding of the correspondences and differences in principles, searching for isolated analogies is of little use.

In music, even in program music and music drama, semantic elements are, as mentioned, effective only intermittently, not as a continuous stratum; the order of magnitude to which the musical phenomena implying the semantic belong does not adhere to a norm. That a single interval—or even, as an extreme, an isolated note—has semantic meaning is by no means impossible.[9] The reverse is also valid: a complete phrase or period

can remain without semantic content. (That someone with sufficient leanings toward dialectic paradoxes can speak of an expression of inexpressivity does not mean that the semantic element thoroughly penetrates music.)

There is no analogy in music for the qualitative leap from the dependent syllable, which by itself means nothing, to the word, which bears meaning. By its relative sense of closure and independence, the motif—the musical word—is of course distinguished from an upbeat and an ending—the musical syllables that make up a motif. The sense of closure, however, is not grounded semantically, or at least does not need to be.

Consequently, the doubt remains whether it is adequate in music as in language to draw a line between morphological and syntactical elements—between a dependent upbeat and a relatively independent motif—if the differentiation is supported semantically in language but not in music. Is the partial similarity between musical and linguistic syntax sufficient to justify the parallel in terminology? And, asked pointedly,[10] is syntax that is not grounded semantically syntax at all? What meaning is there in recognizing a musical structure as syntax if the syntactical stratum does not form a continuous correlate?

The discourse seems to run into impracticalities. Still, it can be shown that music has a stratum that is analogous neither to syntax nor to the semantics of language, and yet that fulfills the function of grounding syntax in a manner similar to that which occurs in language through semantics. Insofar as the right to talk about musical syntax, and hence musical language, depends on the support of musical syntax by another constant level (beyond the phonological, of course) in order to be syntax at all and not merely structure, one inevitably becomes entangled in the paradox that the linguistic character of music is connected to an element that has no counterpart in language.

3

The phenomena that merge into a middle level between musical syntax and semantics have been described with various names in music theory—for example, "musical logic," "inner form," and "inner dynamics." The disturbing dissimilarity of the terms shows a glaring divergence in the ways that the situation has been viewed. What is meant from this perspective on the differences in interpretation can still be represented without distortion and at least in vague outline, as is sufficient for the present purpose.

To the elements of the "logic" or "inner dynamic" of music there belong (1) tonal functions; (2) voice-leading, which is perceived as the compulsion to continue; (3) the idea of developing variation; and (4) metrical gradations.

1. For 250 years tonal harmony has been the object of an argument of principles whose resolution is unforeseeable. The risk of becoming entangled in controversies is small, however, if it is maintained only that tonal functions are established in two ways: on the one hand in natural givens like octave equivalence and the fifth relation, on the other hand in compositional and historical situations like the development of the fifth relation into the dialectic of the cadence C–F–G–C = tonic-subdominant-dominant-tonic. (At first C is the dominant of F; at the end, however, after G–C = V–I, the first C is functionally equated with the closing one, so that F, instead of remaining the tonic of the dominant C, appears as the subdominant of the tonic C.)

Tonal functions have been interpreted through physical or psychological metaphors like "gravity" or "kinetic energy,"[11] although not always with an awareness of the metaphorical character of the interpretation. Yet from this aspect of the interpretive divergences that arise from conflicting ideas about the essence of music, it seems certain that it is a question neither of meanings, in the sense of the semantics of language, nor of the merely syntactical rules of operation. That the chord G–B–D is the dominant of C major means that it fulfills a function in the system of harmony but not that it is an acoustic symbol for a meaning, called dominant, which can be compared with the meaning of a word. On the other hand, someone who speaks merely about rules of operation is oversimplifying:[12] the dialectic of the cadence, from which the subdominant function of F results, cannot be deduced from the instruction to bring together the fifth intervals C–F and G–C. The intentional element is not absorbed into the operational.

2. As with the system of tonal function, the principle of voice leading is in part prescribed in the nature of things—that is, in the gradation of chords according to the degree of consonance (the specific difference between consonance and dissonance is a compromise). At the same time, it results from the compositional decision that the progression from lower to higher levels of consonance should be perceived and considered as compelling logic, as a clause, cadence, or resolution. Whether the fourth resolves to the unison and the fifth to the octave (twelfth century), the third to the unison and the sixth to the octave (fourteenth through fifteenth centuries), or the second to the third and the seventh to the sixth (fifteenth through nineteenth centuries), the principle of voice leading is always the same at different stages of its historical realization.

The interpretive difference—that some theorists grasped the urgency of the progression as "logical stringency" and yet others as "inner dynamic"—is in the present context ancillary. What is crucial is that which it does *not* concern. First, it is not a matter of a mere law of nature—the gradation of consonances is, indeed, grounded in the nature of things

and of man, but not the division of chords into two opposing classes or the conception of steps as a compelling progression from the lower to the higher level of consonance. Second, it does not concern mere rules of operation—the norms for resolving dissonance do not produce but, rather, presuppose the principle of the progression's necessity. Third, it does not concern meanings in the sense of semantics—the compulsions of the progression or their suspension (which, as licenses, depend on the norm) can, of course, be expressive or symbolic, but they are not always so. The thesis that the "inner dynamic" of music is always the dynamic of feeling is an exaggeration of the aesthetic compulsion of the system.

3. By "developing variation" Arnold Schoenberg, from whom the term originates, meant the changes to a musical idea which give rise to a new one without a break in the connection. The succession of variants—melodic, rhythmic, or harmonic transformations of a motif—should be perceptible as a consequence, as "musical logic." And, indeed, the impression of "musical logic" in the formation of variants touches first, of course, on the tonal consequence of the chord progressions that support the melodic-rhythmic changes; second on suggestive tendencies in the direction and course of the melodic or rhythmic derivatives—for example elongation or contraction; and, third, on the principle that the variants fulfill syntactical and formal functions that relate to each other in the same way as half and full cadences. The decisive element of developing variation, then, is not the mere dependency of a variant on a model, but rather the determination perceived by Schoenberg as "musical logic," whose premises can be described.

4. Some theorists understood the so-called "metrical" functions (the term is based on a false translation)—the gradations in weight of heavy and light beats, measures, and groups of measures—as an independent and fundamental element of music.[13] Since there clearly is not, nor need there be, a question of acoustic reality, "metrical" functions are a form of perception established in human nature. (To be sure, metrical emphases will sometimes, but not always, be marked with an acoustically real accent.) The antithesis would be that they represent a dependent phenomenon established through harmonic, rhythmic, and dynamic elements. But apart from the decision whether, or to what degree, gradations of weight must count as an independent or dependent feature (that the relationship between measures is analogous to the relation between beats is not certain), it can be shown that metrical functions are connected by correlation to other attributes of the musical work. There is, for example, an affinity between an upbeat, a melodic ascent, and a *crescendo* on the one hand, and the movement from dominant to tonic, from dissonance to consonance, and from a shorter to longer duration of sound on the other.

This affinity—in some features given by nature, in others developed historically—should not, of course, be misunderstood as a fixed norm to which a composer must submit; rather, the affinity represents an "ideal type" that provides a frame of reference for describing and characterizing individual cases that in part diverge.

Though presented in rough outline, this complex, which includes elements of tonality, tone, melody, rhythm, and meter, is the essence of what is called the "inner dynamic" of music. And it need not be laboriously demonstrated that the affinity among individual elements of music is in no way explicable as the mere meshing of the rules of operation, and thus as syntactical phenomena. On the other hand, it would hardly make sense to speak of meanings, thus of musical semantics. In any case, it is a matter of an intentional, not acoustically real, element: points of stress, as mentioned, are not always marked with points of emphasis; and the external *crescendo* can become sublimated into an inner increase in intensity that is certainly perceived, but not acoustically realized. Likewise, the dominant function of a chord is not necessarily prepared at the acoustic level, and functional dissonances—like the octave suspension to a seventh in measure 4 of the first movement of Mozart's Jupiter Symphony—are sometimes acoustic consonances. Nonetheless, the objectlessness of music makes it impossible to talk about meaning without the term itself fading into a metaphor. The objection that even language has meanings without an objective correlate is not cogent, for unreal representations, like those of a centaur or unicorn, have meaning by living off their relation to concepts which agree with a piece of reality.[14] In any case, it could be asked whether the "inner dynamic" of music is not connected to a piece of reality through its mirror relationship to the dynamic of feeling, which a formalist like Eduard Hanslick did not deny even once.[15] In this way, it could be asserted that the dynamic of feeling—the partial element of a feeling that is accessible to a musical representation—may be interpreted as an object, the "inner dynamic" of music interpreted as meaning, and the acoustic given as a sign. As attractive as it may be, the analogy is, however, flawed. First, as mentioned, it would be an exaggeration to characterize the "inner dynamic" of music as continuously expressive; second, it seems as if the meanings of the terms "significance" and "object" are too different—in the theory of language, as well as in this overview of music theory—to be able to sustain a parallel construction between music and language.

The conflict of metaphors: that one understood the stratum of the musical work at which a description was attempted as either "inner dynamic" or "logic" graphically illustrates how difficult it is to ascertain the phenomenon conceptually. Certainties can be stated only in the negative. Above all, it is not a question of acoustically real elements for which a

theory may be constructed as analogous to phonology. Furthermore, it would be crude to speak indiscriminately of musical syntax and nothing else, because the "inner dynamic," as its own stratum, stands apart from the system of norms that regulates musical syntax. That the subdominant should precede, and not follow, the dominant may be a syntactical rule; however, that a tendency toward the tonic results from the proximity of subdominant and dominant is a "dynamic" phenomenon not accounted for in the norms of operation. Finally, it would be inadequate and confusing to explain the function of a chord as its "meaning" in the sense of semantics. The divergence between saying that the *Tristan* chord "means longing desire" and "means secondary dominant" is too large for the concept of musical semantics to bridge.

Ultimately, what is sought is a question of a level which sustains both the syntactical and the semantic elements of music, one which therefore grounds their linguistic character without the existence of an analogy in language. It could be, however, that music theory is not of interest to linguistics, that it transfers linguistic categories into a musical context. This occurs, however, only to the extent that it is possible to uncover structures in musical phenomena that first can be interpreted as linguistic structures, but then recede from the familiar categorical apparatus of linguistics.

4

Although it is terminologically pointless to relate the "inner dynamic" of music to its "meaning" in a context where the categories of music theory are applied to linguistic ones, it is still possible to fashion a flexible vocabulary appropriate for musical and aesthetic usage. Thus the seemingly meaningless sentence that music "means itself"[16] means then, from a sober interpretation, nothing other than that the acoustically real layer of music is a symbol for intentional elements that are themselves music and nothing else. As a result, there exists an inherently musical relation between the sign and the signified, between the sounding fact and the "inner dynamic" or "musical logic" that it "means."

The concept of "musical logic," coined by Forkel in 1788,[17] was developed in tonal music of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, which is considered the only natural music. Despite Schoenberg's emphatic use of the term, it is also not absolutely certain whether or in what sense there can be discussion about "musical logic" in the New Music of the twentieth century. The "emancipation of dissonance"—Schoenberg's thesis that dissonances are comprehensible in themselves and do not need to depend on consonances—means an upheaval both of the necessity of

resolving to which dissonances yielded, and of the impression of stringency that resulted from the progression of dissonance to consonance. Furthermore, in abandoning tonal functions Schoenberg robbed himself of a means of establishing the connections which make a musical piece seem like sounding discourse.

Thus the question arises of how "musical logic," the correlative or "inner form" of musical syntax, is possible at all under the conditions of atonality—that is, after the "emancipation of dissonance" and the breakdown of tonal harmony. It is indeed undeniable that Schoenberg did not want to renounce traditional categories of syntax. Yet if that fact provokes an aesthetic objection, then it becomes a mere facade of a syntax that is not in consonance with the atonal or dodecaphonic structure of music. Still, the argument is irrelevant, even if it has made history as one of the prerequisites for the emergence of serial music around 1950. Rather, what is decisive is that Schoenberg thought primarily motivically—even in the twelve-tone works—and that he exposed motifs and themes in order to spin out musical discourse according to the principle of developing variation. Motivic development, not twelve-tone structure, created the musical coherence that the listener ought to perceive. And the motivic technique, which is basically traditional, easily converges with one of the essential features of traditional syntax.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, developing variation did not seem random and aimless, because, as mentioned, it was connected to the directional tendencies of melodic and rhythmic changes on the one hand and to tonal chord progressions on the other. Schoenberg preserved the melodic and rhythmic techniques; he gave up only the tonal support. And it seems as if the difficulty in deciding, without recourse to tonal support, why one and not another of the possible variants of a motif should follow was the question to which the twelve-tone row provided an answer. On the one hand, the ordering of pitches in a twelve-tone row is strict enough to inform the selection and joining of motivic variants; on the other hand, Schoenberg did not shy away from licenses when he needed them to realize—even against the letter of the law for rows—a motivic development that depends on directional tendencies. He was nothing less than a dogmatic supporter of his own ideas.

The serial technique is therefore both a counterprinciple to tonality and a means of enabling Schoenberg, under the conditions of atonality, to control a method of motivic development that has meaning for musical syntax as a foundation for "musical logic," a syntax that forms an essential element of Schoenberg's emphatically stated linguistic character of music.

* * *

NOTES

* The original German article, "Fragmente zur musikalischen Hermeneutik" was published in *Beiträge zur musikalischen Hermeneutik*, Studien zur Musikgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, 43, ed. Carl Dahlhaus (Regensburg: G. Bosse, 1975), 159–72. This translation is printed here with the generous permission of the Gustav Bosse Verlag. I am also grateful to Steven Slater for help in the initial stages of this translation.

[1] Nicolas Ruwet, "Contradictions within the Serial Language," *Die Reihe* 6 (Bryn Mawr, 1964): 65–76; Ruwet, *Langage, musique, poésie* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972).

[2] Gerbert, *Scriptores ecclesiastici de musica sacra potissimum* (St. Blasien, 1784; reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), I:152, 159.

[3] Johann Mattheson, *Der vollkommene Capellmeister* (Hamburg: Herold, 1739; reprint, Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1987), 224–25.

[4] Roman Ingarden, *Ontology of the Work of Art: The Musical Work, the Picture, the Architectural Work, the Film*, trans. Raymond Meyer (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989).

[5] These terms are borrowed from C. S. Peirce. See *The Philosphy of Peirce: Selected Writings*, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: AMS, 1978) [trans.].

[6] Christoph Hubig, "Zum Problem der Vermittlung Sprache—Musik. Versuch eines systematischen Problemaufrisses mit den sich daraus ergebenden Ansätzen zur Lösung," *Die Musikforschung* 26 (1973): 191–204.

[7] Hugo Riemann, in designating his *Harmonielehre* as *Musikalische Syntaxis* (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1877), intended to have the succession of harmonies recognized as the basis for building musical periods.

[8] Johann Nicolaus Forkel, "Einleitung," *Allgemeine Geschichte der Musik* I (Leipzig: im Schwickertschen Verlage, 1788; reprint, Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1967). Forkel, who distinguished between music as a "language of the heart" and as the "language of reason" (p. 2), constructed a pedantic and forced analogy between the conceptual meaning of a word, which becomes more precisely defined through other words, and the emotional significance of a pitch, which needs others for a more exact meaning (p. 5). "The main pitch would therefore be C; the musical adjective would be E; and the connecting pitch, D" (p. 7). The musical system should be considered on the one hand a parallel to the grammatical structure of language and, on the other, a sounding expression of a natural system of perception (p. 9): with Forkel, the opposing theses of Rameau and Rousseau are harmonized into one theorem. The tonal functions of pitches and of emotional content flow together into Forkel's concept of "meaning" (pp. 13–26), as if the structure of one element were the same mechanical correlate as that of the other.

[9] Kurt Huber, *Der Ausdruck musikalischer Elementarmotive: eine experimental-psychologische Untersuchung* (Leipzig: Johann Ambros Barth, 1923).

[10] Tibor Kneif, "Was ist Semiotik der Musik: Ein kritischer Überblick," *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik* 135 (1974): 351.

[11] Ernst Kurth, *Musikpsychologie* (Berlin: M. Hesse, 1931).

[12] Roland Harweg ("Kann man Musik verstehen?" *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music* 3 [1972]: 173–86), maintains "that the use of a particular chord in a particular position" is "a function of understanding or misunderstanding. . . . Such an understanding consists of a knowledge of the rules or code of rules governing the specific occasion—it could be, for example, a particular rule of harmony. Likewise, misunderstanding results from an ignorance of these same rules. In each case, therefore, the code that operates here is one of rules, not of meaning" (p. 182). Harweg's alternative to "understanding" is "pleasure" (p. 185). Yet the assertion that a listener who does not know the rules of harmony does not understand the harmonic progression, but rather perceives it as pleasure—or displeasure—is questionable. The impression of musical stringency which comes

from a chord progression is explained, but not produced, by theoretical knowledge; moreover, it is thoroughly compatible with feelings of displeasure.

[13] Moritz Hauptmann, *The Nature of Harmony and Metre*, 2nd ed. (London: S. Sonnenschein, 1893; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1991); Johann Theodor Wiehmayer, *Musikalische Rhythmik und Metrik* (Magdeburg: Heinrichshoven, 1917).

[14] Peter Faltin ("Die Bedeutung von Musik als Ergebnis sozio-kultureller Prozesse: Zu einigen Schwierigkeiten bei der Betrachtung der Musik als kommunikatives Phänomen," *Die Musikforschung* 26 [1973]: 435–45) proceeds from the assumption that there are signs that have "a meaning, but no denotation" (p. 439). This meaning is indeed established through "cultural unity" in Umberto Eco's sense of the word (p. 442). As an example Faltin names the use of "Baroque music" as a "refuge in the past" (p. 443). So widespread is the concept of meaning without denotation, whose scope includes fables, escapism, and clearly all elements in music that reach beyond the acoustic fact, that one wonders whether it outlasts its usefulness by being thus stretched. What meaning is there in calling cultural history semiotics?

[15] Eduard Hanslick, *Von Musikalisch-Schönen* (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1854; reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981), 13*ff.*

[16] Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, "Musik als Tonsprache," *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft* 18 (1961): 79.

[17] Forkel, 24.

Proportional Notation in the Music of Schütz and His Contemporaries*

By Paul Brainard

I. The theoretical background: Praetorius, Frescobaldi, Mersenne, and others

Chapter VII of the third volume of Michael Praetorius's *Syntagma Musicum* (1619) is justifiably regarded as the definitive text of its time on the subject of mensural signs and proportions.[1] One of Praetorius's announced aims is prescriptive: he would like to reform musical notation by ridding it of the bewildering variety of mensural signs then in use, many of them archaic carryovers from earlier practices. He recommends eliminating—and in his own music indeed eliminates—all but a single set of signs, to each of which he assigns tempo connotations. His recommendations are summarized in a table on page 79 of *Syntagma III*, reproduced in example 1.

Example 1.



This table reflects Praetorius's adoption of a convention already well established by this time, that of using the cut-time signature ¢ to signify not a literal *allabreve,* but a tactus *alla semibreve* whose minim subdivisions move at a somewhat faster (*celerior*) pace than those of the semibreve (*tardior*) tactus of uncut common time (𝐜). The diminution-stroke thus no longer has the meaning it would have in simultaneous usage with another signature; it connotes not a doubling of the size and concurrent halving of

the duration of the tactus unit but an acceleration of the minim beat by a ratio of greater than 1:1 but less than 2:1. Carl Dahlhaus believed the ratio to be an "irrational" one;[2] as we shall see, it may have been an exact proportion.

In regard to triple mensurations, it is particularly important to distinguish between Praetorius's prescriptive statements and those that are merely descriptive of notational practices he observed in his studies of (especially) Italian music. His table (example 1) belongs to the former category and makes it clear that he is recommending the use of the tripla of three semibreves, signed $\frac{3}{1}$ or **3**, to connote a *tardior* tempo in relation to the *celerior* sesquialtera made up of three minims and signed $\frac{3}{2}$. Since each of these mensurations is explicitly defined as a proportion in relation to a prevailing tactus,[3] the assumption quite naturally follows that the tactus is an unchanging unit governing both terms of each proportion. On this assumption, it would seem that Praetorius must be advocating the systematic linkage of sesquialtera notation to the "quicker" tactus of ¢, and of tripla to the "slower" **c**. The three semibreves of the tripla would correspond to one of **c**; the three minims of sesquialtera, having the same duration as two minims of ¢, would be quicker than the tripla to the same extent that ¢ is quicker than **c**.

Obvious though such a conclusion might seem, evident contradictions elsewhere in Praetorius's chapter undermine one's confidence in it. Among his further recommendations is that a consistent association be maintained between notational types and compositional genres. In this connection he advocates the use of the tripla "in Motetis & Concertis; Sesquialtera vero in Madrigalibus, praesertim autem in Galliardis, Courrantis, Voltis & aliis id generis Cantionibus, in quibus celeriori Tactu necessario opus est."[4] Most striking about this statement is its failure to bear out our initial interpretation of his remarks about proportional signatures. If we compare the recommended genre associations here with those of example 1, we find that they "match up" satisfactorily only in the case of the concerto, to which Praetorius assigns the "slower" varieties of both duple (**c**) and triple ($\frac{3}{1}$) mensurations, respectively. Yet the madrigal, for which Praetorius here prescribes the "quicker" sesquialtera, is associated elsewhere throughout Praetorius's chapter (including the prescriptive table of example 1) only with the uncut (and hence "slower") common-time **c**. The motet, here linked explicitly with the "slower" tripla, is elsewhere repeatedly described as calling for the "quicker" *tactus aequalis* of ¢ *alla semibreve*—the only exceptions being those "Motecten, und andere geistliche Gesänge, welche mit vielen schwarzen Noten [i.e., in 'madrigalischer Art'] gesetzt seyn"; these call for the sign **c**, "anzuzeigen, daß alßdann der *Tact* etwas langsamer und gravitetischer müsse gehalten werden."[5]

We thus find Praetorius advocating (by clear implication, at least) three different linkages:

Concerto	$\mathbf{c}$—$\frac{3}{1}$	tardior–tardior
Motet	$\mathbf{¢}$—$\frac{3}{1}$	celerior–tardior
Madrigal	$\mathbf{c}$—$\frac{3}{2}$	tardior–celerior

—the last two of which not only reverse the derivations of tripla and sesquialtera proposed above, but would appear to violate the very principle of tactus equivalence between duple and triple mensurations. Notable also is that a fourth linkage, $\mathbf{¢}$—$\frac{3}{2}$, the one we initially conjectured as an "explanation" for the quicker tempo of the sesquialtera, is never so much as implied by Praetorius's remarks, although it can be found occasionally in his works (of which more below).

An altogether different explanation of some of these apparent contradictions was proposed by Carl Dahlhaus.[6] His point of departure was yet another passage from *Syntagma III* (see example 2a) in which Praetorius describes the usage of the "modern Italians"—a passage that appears to draw heavily on the authority of Banchieri's *Cartella Musicale.*[7] Its cardinal feature is the application of the proportion 3:2 not only to the sesquialtera, but to the tripla as well. Given that relationship, as Dahlhaus ingeniously showed, one can plausibly account for the seemingly contradictory pairings given above for the madrigal and motet by postulating a shift from the semibreve to the breve as the unit of reference for the tactus, as is shown in example 2b. Derived thus, the tripla would indeed be "slower" than the sesquialtera despite its coupling with the "quicker" minims of $\mathbf{¢}$.

Closed and logical though it is, this explanation proves to be no less problematic than our initial one. First, it derives from a *description* that stands in no provable relationship to the system Praetorius was actually advocating. Second, it reconciles some, but not all of the contradictions we noted earlier. Third and most disturbing, it is predicated upon a proportional relationship that already had all but disappeared from actual use by the time Praetorius wrote, and one that is totally absent in his own music: the triplet of a breve under an *allabreve* tactus. Even Banchieri, after describing this 3:2 proportion of semibreves in the same terms Praetorius uses in example 2a, goes on to call it *impraticata* in simultaneous usage with $\mathbf{¢}$, since performers were then singing $\mathbf{¢}$ as well as $\mathbf{c}$ under a tactus *alla semibreve.* (This would require them to perform three semibreves in the time of four pulse-unit minims, which Banchieri deems impractical.)[8] As a viable alternative, Banchieri then mentions the use of another (non-simultaneous) proportion, that of three semibreves in the time of one instead of two, under the sign of uncut common time: $\mathbf{c}\frac{3}{1}$; the same description is

found in his *Conclusioni* of 1609.[9] Note that it replicates the pairing of signs given by Praetorius for the concerto.

Example 2a. *Syntagma musicum III,* pp. 52–53.



Example 2b. Example 2a, interpretated after Dahlhaus.



It is demonstrably this 3:1 proportion of semibreves, not the 3:2 ratio seen in example 2, that operates throughout Praetorius's musical oeuvre whenever tripla notation is used in alternation with common time. Any possible doubts about this have been eliminated by Gordon Paine in a recent study based upon all the surviving original sources of Praetorius's music—as well as most of those of Schütz, to whom the same conclusion applies.[10] Rest counts, tempora totals, tactus demarcations, and occasional mensural overlaps all confirm that the three semibreves of Praetorius's tripla are at least the "counting" equivalent of one tactus, i.e., one semibreve under duple mensuration. That they are the exact durational equivalent

as well—that the tactus speed remains constant at the change from duple to triple and vice versa—can be proved only in the comparatively rare case of overlaps between them; my reasons for this caveat will emerge presently.

Meanwhile, the question of the tripla's theoretical derivation remains unresolved. Frequently Praetorius either signs it ¢**3** or uses it medially (signed simply **3**) following ¢; but the pairing of tripla with **c** is almost equally common. Because the presence or absence of a diminution stroke was a matter over which Praetorius evidently had less than total control in the printing process, it is, as Paine points out, ultimately impossible to separate intentions from execution.[11] Thus we cannot be completely certain whether Praetorius meant to associate the tripla systematically with either common-time sign (**c** or ¢) to the exclusion of the other. Still, the combination of the notational evidence (inconclusive though it may be) and the descriptions in the *Syntagma* suggests that he did not; rather, it appears, he considered both pairings equally valid and, what is more, equally consistent with the system he was advocating. If that is so, we have been on the wrong track in our attempts to understand him.

* * *

The mistake, I believe, lies in our tendency to "read" the system one-dimensionally. Traditionally our assumption has been that ternary proportions are subsidiary phenomena, existing only by virtue of their derivation from a pre-existent *tactus aequalis,* either actual or implied. As applied to the seventeenth century, this notion departs from a pure *integer valor* concept only to the extent that ¢ no longer stands in a 2:1 relation to **c**. Otherwise the mode of thought is the same: a binary *(aequalis)* tactus is the progenitor, and the proportional tactus a dependent, under its aegis and governance. That single-track approach is, I suggest, not valid for Praetorius's time and constitutes the only real obstacle to interpreting his system as meaningful and consistent. When we find (a) tripla notation defined as "slower" but associated with ¢ as well as **c**, and (b) sesquialtera notation defined as "faster" but showing in practice the same relationship to **c**—three notes counted as the equivalent to one duple semibreve—as the tripla, it is only our insistence on relating the ternary mensurations first to duple counterparts ("horizontally"), and only then to each other ("vertically"), that leads us to diagnose irreconcilable contradictions. When once we postulate that the vertical dimension exists in its own right, that ternary proportions can constitute a primary as well as a secondary frame of reference, then the contradictions appear in a different light: they become, not illusory, but largely irrelevant.

The proposed reinterpretation is simply this: (1) in accordance with long-standing tradition, ¢ (in conjunction with larger note values) calls for a quicker minim pulse than c (in conjunction with smaller note values); (2) in relation *to each other*, tripla (three semibreves to the tactus) and sesquialtera (three minims to the tactus) connote slower and faster tempos, respectively; and (3) these tempo connotations exist without regard to the "horizontal" dimension. Where duple and triple mensurations alternate with each other, they may be, but are not necessarily, related to one another by conventional proportion. "Slow" duples may be joined not only with "slow" triples (c○–$\frac{3}{1}$○ ○ ○) but also with "faster" ones (c○–$\frac{3}{2}$𝅗𝅥 𝅗𝅥 𝅗𝅥). Only in the former case (or its "fast - fast" counterpart) does the tactus duration remain constant. The combination of a "slow" duple with a "fast" triple or vice versa presumes a change of tactus speed and hence rules out strict proportional equivalence.

At the heart of this seemingly radical conclusion lies the dualism between points (1) and (2) above: the system prescribes faster speeds for larger notes under duple time and faster speeds for smaller notes under triple. The second of these was a relatively new principle that was soon extended beyond the tripla-sesquialtera alternative to a full-fledged convention, under which the signatures $\frac{3}{1}$, $\frac{3}{2}$, and $\frac{3}{4}$ connoted successively faster tempos, which is the reverse of what they would mean if read as proportions measured against unchanging tactus units of common time. It meant, in effect, that proportional signs were on the way to being "read" as *fractions.*

So far as we now know, the principle of inversely graduated triple signatures, present only by implication in Praetorius, was first actually enunciated by Frescobaldi in 1624:

> E nelle trippole, o sesquialtere, se saranno maggiori, si portino adagio, se minori alquanto più allegre, se di tre semiminime, più allegre, se saranno sei per quattro si dia il lor tempo con far caminare la battuta allegra.[12]

My interpretation of these remarks, which differs slightly but unimportantly from that of Étienne Darbellay,[13] is summarized in example 3. In agreement with Praetorius, Frescobaldi describes the triple of semibreves as "slow," that of minims as "somewhat faster." But Frescobaldi now goes on to describe a triple of *semiminims* that is still "faster." These "semiminims," which frequently appear in fact to be colored minims, are signed in the print merely with a non-commital "**3.**" That they are neither the same as, nor an ordinary diminution of, the plain minims of *trippola minore*, is clear both from Frescobaldi's language and from the musical contexts within

the print. This "triple of semiminims" is not twice as fast as that of minims, but only faster to an unspecified degree less than double.[14]

Example 3. Interpretation of Frescobaldi's preface to *Il primo libro di Capricci* (1624).



There are two ways in which we might theoretically account for this series of successively faster triple mensurations. First, we can postulate a correspondingly graduated scale of tempos under binary mensuration. That would automatically generate different triple-time speeds *via* standard proportions (the "horizontal" dimension referred to above), but this reasoning would not account for the proliferation of different types and signs of triple meter, or for the strange duality pointed out earlier (speed varying directly with note size under triple, but inversely under duple signatures). In order to explain both plausibly, a second and, in a sense, opposite interpretation is called for. Underlying what we may call the "Frescobaldian" convention is the entirely new principle that different triple types are related proportionally *one to the other*, without necessary reference to binary equivalents.

The existence of such a principle can be deduced from a scattered but substantial body of notational evidence that goes back at least as far as Cavalieri's *Rappresentatione* of 1600. "Proof"—necessarily circumstantial but not therefore uncompelling—derives from those comparatively rare situations in which one type of triple mensuration is directly succeeded by another (I include the succession $\frac{3}{4}$–$\frac{6}{4}$ in this category). Example 4 is taken from a well-known treasure-trove of such cases, the so-called *Cento partite* appended to the 1637 re-edition of Frescobaldi's first book of toccatas.[15] It shows a change from tripla (three-semibreve) to sesquialtera (three-minim) groupings occurring simultaneously with an abrupt switch from minims to semiminims as foreground units. The only interpretation of the passage that seems conclusively ruled out is that of equivalence between the semibreves of the first section and the minims of the second; among other things, that would make the use of two different notations nonsensical. An alternative interpretation would be the "modern" one of assuming constant minims and hence an exact doubling of the tactus speed from tripla

to sesquialtera—implying that the notational change was a matter only of showing the altered minim groupings (2 x 3 in place of 3 x 2); otherwise the same *sounding* result could as well have been achieved using tripla notation throughout.

Example 4a. *Cento Partite sopra Passacagli.*



Example 4b. A proportional interpretation of example 4a.



Short of assuming that the two sections are not directly related by any constant factor at all, the only further alternative lies halfway between the first two, as example 4b demonstrates. It declares that the minims of sesquialtera stand in a 3:2 durational relationship to the semibreves of the tripla, and that the tactus speed therefore accelerates by a like ratio. This interpretation accounts more plausibly than any other for the necessity of switching notations; moreover, by defining the abrupt introduction of semiminims only as an *accelerando* rather than a doubling of speed, it both

mitigates the "optical" contrast and bears out the continuing validity of Frescobaldi's 1624 description of the *trippola minore* as "somewhat faster" than the triple of semibreves. Finally, as I shall show below, by reading this relationship as a *proportion* we are supplying the unstated theoretical underpinning not only for the Frescobaldian convention but for the closely related system of Praetorius as a whole.

* * *

We have more than mere circumstantial evidence for the existence of this new dimension of proportional thinking. There was at least one place in Europe where it was being explicitly discussed by the 1630s at the latest: the French-Dutch circle around Mersenne, Descartes, and Huygens. In a somewhat oblique passage first published in 1635, Mersenne prescribes a set of speed relationships couched partly in precise, partly in approximate numerical terms.[16] He is unequivocal about the tripla, whose three semibreves are declared equal to one of common time ("eandemque temporis durationem quam mensura aequalis sortitur"). Concerning the two principal varieties of duple mensuration, he states that the tactus of ¢ is "almost twice as fast" as 𝐜 ("duplo propemodum velocior mensura exigitur"); logically enough, the same relationship is said to prevail between sesquialtera and tripla ("[sesquialtera] proportio fere duplicat velocitatem Triplae"). Of a third triple mensuration, however, the *hemiola proportio* signed $\frac{3}{4}$ and consisting of three semiminims, Mersenne says without qualification that it is "twice as fast" as sesquialtera: "Haec proportio duplicat velocitatem sesquialterae, eiusque duratio tertia parte temporis aequalis aestimatur."

The second clause of this last sentence, relating the "hemiola" in a wholly unconventional way ($\frac{3}{4}\mathbf{\dot{o}} = \frac{\mathbf{co}}{3}$) to the units of common time (and, by direct inference, to the tripla derived from it), startlingly confirms our speculations about the tripla-sesquialtera relationship, even as it leaves us wondering why Mersenne chose the formulation he did. For if the hemiola ($\frac{3}{4}$) tactus has one-third the duration of the *tactus aequalis* (𝐜), and one-half the duration of the sesquialtera tactus ($\frac{3}{2}$), then

$$\frac{3}{4}\mathbf{\dot{o}} = \frac{3}{1}\mathbf{o} = \frac{3}{2}\mathbf{\dot{o}}$$

and sesquialtera is not "almost twice as fast" as tripla, but faster by exactly one-half.

The only other writer currently known to have propounded specific numerical ratios between triple tactus types is the Dutch cleric and self-taught composer/theorist Joan Albert Ban (d. 1644),[17] an intimate of Huygens's who maintained close contacts with Mersenne, Descartes, and

G.B. Doni, among others. In 1639 Ban addressed to Doni two versions—one in Latin, the other in Italian—of a set of musical precepts including the principles of tactus and proportion.[18] It has not yet been noticed that the Latin version is a near-verbatim (and unacknowledged) quotation of the passage from Mersenne just cited. Ban's only substantial addition to that text is a reformulation of Mersenne's "Sesquialtera proportio . . . fere duplicat velocitatem triplae" in precise numerical terms: "hoc est una tertia parte velociorem exigit mensuram ac motum." In place of the 3:2 ratio that can be deduced from Mersenne's remarks (see above), Ban apparently postulates a 4:3 relationship. The Italian version of the document confirms this: "la sesquialtera bisogna prononciarsi una terza parte più veloce che la tripla." But in a further and now explicit departure from Mersenne, Ban redefines the $\frac{3}{4}$ "hemiola" as *faster by half* (rather than twice as fast) in comparison to the sesquialtera: "la hemiolia si cantarà a meza parte più veloce che la sesquialtera."

Without exception, these are the same rules as those published by Ban in the Dutch-language preface to his *Zangh-Bloemzel* in 1642.[19] They result in the set of interlocking ratios found in example 5, to which the corresponding relationships from Mersenne have been added for comparison. It is the principle common to both of these systems, rather than their diverging particulars, that is of greatest interest and importance. Both lead to a conclusion unforeseen in most previous attempts to understand the workings of seventeenth-century proportional notation: depending on which ratio (4:3 or 3:2) one chooses, either the tripla or the sesquialtera stands in a 1:1 relationship to a pulse unit of duple time. Under Mersenne's scheme the semibreve of the tripla is the exact equivalent of the minim of ¢; under Ban's the minim of sesquialtera is identical in duration to the semiminim of **c**. In both systems, moreover, the other duple-triple pairing (¢—$\frac{3}{1}$ for Ban, **c**—$\frac{3}{2}$ for Mersenne) results in a near equivalence—specifically, a relationship of 9:8—so close as to be of little practical moment.

Subdivision equivalence between binary and ternary mensurations, as opposed to tactus equivalence, is the phenomenon to which Franz-Jochen Machatius gave the name *spielmännische Reduktion* more than thirty years ago.[20] Reasoning chiefly from practical evidence, Machatius declared that under certain notational conditions seventeenth-century musicians, in defiance of "theoretically correct" proportional relationships, must have disregarded the tactus as the unit governing tempo at the point where a switch from duple to triple mensuration (or vice versa) occurred. This would be particularly likely where small subdivisions of the tactus took on foreground prominence on either side of the switch, as in example 6 (taken from Machatius). It would be these subdivisions, rather than the larger tactus itself, that would remain constant in speed (here $\frac{3}{1}$ = **c**).

Example 5. The systems of Ban and Mersenne. Metronome indications are relative, for purposes of illustration only.



Example 6. Monteverdi, "Armato il cor," transcribed in *Tutte le opere,* IX:27.



While the idea of *spielmännische Reduktion* has not gone unchallenged,[21] some writers since Machatius have taken it virtually for granted, even extending its applicability to music of a much earlier time.[22] What has been generally overlooked in the process, and what our example 5 above reveals, is that subdivision equivalence is not a mere performing expedient lacking all theoretical sanction, but rather an inherent (though usually hidden) concomitant of the seventeenth-century proportional system itself. That system is in effect a "Pythagorean" one, founded on 3:2 ratios throughout and—unlike Pythagorean tuning—closing neatly without a comma. But inevitably, in employing conjunct "fifths" and "fourths" the system also generates not only "octaves" but Pythagorean "whole tones" as well. These last two are the result when a "slow" binary tactus is coupled with a "faster" ternary one or vice versa.

There is, I think, every reason to believe that such relationships are implicit in Praetorius's pronouncements about tempo, whether he was conscious of them or not. Certainly they are inferable from his music, as example 7 is intended to demonstrate. This work, from his *Polyhymnia Caduceatrix et Panegyrica* of 1619, contains a succession of alternating duple and triple mensurations. All of the triple sections are in sesquialtera notation signed $\frac{3}{2}$ except the last, which is a tripla signed $\frac{3}{1}$. All of the duple-time sections are signed ¢ and have the same range of note values, implying identity of tempo. We can surmise that that common-time tempo must be a very moderate one, in order to accommodate not only the quick melismas, but especially the rapid syllabic declamation in *fusae.* To suppose that this common-time tactus is durationally identical to that of the sesquialtera passages would mean that the latter must be correspondingly moderate in speed: a conclusion scarcely in accord with the *Syntagma's* prescription of a *celerior* tactus for that notation. The contradiction is compounded when the same moderate common-time tactus subsequently generates the proportion of three semibreves in the time of one (final portion of the example), a process now seemingly consistent with the *tardior* status of the tripla.

If the notational distinction in this piece is meaningful—and the whole thrust of Praetorius's pronouncements suggests that it must be—and if tripla and sesquialtera are indeed intended to connote different speeds, then at least one of the two proportions must be inexact. And unless *both* are inexact, one of the two—surely the sesquialtera—must be read as having subdivision equivalence with common time.

What I am suggesting is that this is not an aberrant instance of "mere" pragmatism overriding theory, but a solution fully in accord with the Praetorian system itself. Tacitly but unmistakably, that system incorporates the principle of interlocking proportions found in Mersenne and Ban; it

Example 7. Praetorius, "Gelobet und gepreiset," soprano, tenor, and continuo.



must be understood in the bidimensional sense described earlier. Praetorius himself seems to be confirming this indirectly in a little-noticed later passage from *Syntagma III:*

> Some do not approve of mixing motet and madrigal style in one and the same composition. I cannot agree with this opinion, since one can impart great beauty and grace to motets or concertos if one sets several tempora at the beginning very solemnly and slowly, letting several quick passages follow, then again [proceeding] now slowly, now once more quickly.[23]

It seems inevitable that such tempo changes must on occasion coincide with changes from duple to triple mensuration and vice versa. When that occurs, the conditions of example 7 are reproduced, and the same inescapable conclusion applies.

Only one proportion within the Praetorian system still eludes positive definition. It is the sextupla, for which Praetorius, on pp. 73–78 of *Syntagma III,* discusses several notational possibilities, including the $\frac{6}{4}$ of semiminims. Each variety calls for a *tactus aequalis,* each of whose two strokes embraces three notes (minims or semiminims). In his table (example 1) he confines himself to two varieties, signed $\frac{6}{1}$ and $\frac{6}{2}$ respectively, whose tactus speed is non-committally described as *mediocris.* It is unclear whether this means "intermediate," implying a tactus speed actually lying somewhere between the *tardior* $\mathbf{c}$ and the *celerior* $\mathbf{¢}$, or merely signifies that the sextupla can be either slow or fast depending on which of the two it is derived from (*mediocris* only in the sense of having dual or indeterminate status). In the former case, the "intermediate" or "moderate" tactus cannot be achieved *proportionally* by any means other than a 3:2 relationship to the sesquialtera tactus. (This would correspond to Ban's prescription for the $\frac{3}{2}$–$\frac{3}{4}$ relationship, but not to the remainder of Ban's scheme.)

Frescobaldi's *sei per quattro* (see example 3 above) is similarly ambiguous, calling as it does for a tactus that is described as "fast" without a *tertium comparationis.* I believe that the ambiguity in both cases may be intentional. The notational evidence shows that in relation to common time, the meaning of $\frac{6}{4}$ for Frescobaldi, as for all of his contemporaries, is unequivocal: six semiminims are the equivalent of four wherever the two signatures appear simultaneously or in direct succession.[24] Where $\frac{6}{4}$ immediately follows $\frac{3}{2}$, however, examples from Cavalieri to Frescobaldi and others (including Schütz) strongly suggest a "Bannian" proportional interpretation. The most persuasive instance I know comes from Monteverdi (example 8). At the change to sextupla, the reader is invited to verify with a metronome that a simple redistribution of minims, placing both $\frac{3}{2}$ and $\frac{6}{4}$

into their theoretically correct relationship to common time, will have catastrophic results in performance unless the starting tempo is exceedingly (in my view, intolerably) slow. Even more suggestive, however, is Monteverdi's introduction of a three-semibreve grouping (as marked in the example) at the cadence just preceding the change of signature. This surely implies that the semibreves generate semiminim triplets, each constituting a half-tactus under $\frac{6}{4}$, as illustrated in the second part of the example. Such a solution may commend itself not only on practical, but also on theoretical grounds, for it results in a sextupla tactus slightly faster (though admittedly only by the scarcely considerable ratio of 9:8) than the "slower" variety of common time that we might project from Praetorius's system. That may seem a farfetched way of accounting for the term *mediocris;* much likelier indeed is that neither Praetorius nor Frescobaldi had anything nearly so specific in mind. Still, that an "intermediate" sextupla is attainable systemically at all may be significant.

Example 8a. *L'Orfeo,* Act I (after the 1609 ed.).



Example 8b. *L'Orfeo,* Act I, suggested relationships.



II. The music of Schütz

One of Heinrich Schütz's few explicit statements about notation is found in the preface to the second book of the *Symphoniae sacrae* (1647), where he complains about the unfamiliarity of German musicians with the "heutige Italianische Manier," and in particular with the manner of time-beating (*Mensur*) appropriate for the "black notes" found in this style—by which he means semiminims, *fusae*, and *semifusae*. He strongly advises those who are inexperienced with the "black" notation to seek instruction before attempting to perform works from his collection.[25]

Schütz had, of course, first definitively adopted the new *concertato* style with its "black" notation much earlier in his Latin *Symphoniae sacrae* (Book I, 1629). The absence of a similar warning in that collection is quite simply explained by the fact that it was published in Venice and thus presumably addressed primarily to a more sophisticated readership. In any case, it is with Book I that we encounter the first significant complications in Schütz's oeuvre involving tactus, tempo, and proportion. (The *Madrigali* of 1611, also published in Venice, and the *Beckerscher Psalter* of 1628, are minor exceptions to this statement.) Up until the 1629 collection, Schütz's notational practice is predominantly (though obviously not exclusively) a "white-note" one in which, as with Praetorius, the smallest unit of syllabic declamation is the *fusa*. The prevailing mensural signs in the relevant earlier collections are given in example 9.[26] The triple signs all signify the same proportion, a proportion that can be confirmed on occasion by simultaneous usage, as Paine has shown, and as example 10 illustrates. The discarding of the diminution stroke under common time in *Cantiones sacrae* apparently has no tempo significance; Schütz merely discontinued its use in this print. He reintroduced it (*with* explicit tempo significance) in 1628, but then dropped it entirely from 1629 on.

Example 9. Mensurations in principal Schütz collections before 1629.



With the shift to a preponderance of "black notes" in the *Sinfoniae sacrae*, a new situation arises in Schütz's music. The problems of *Mensur* to which he refers are plainly those of adjusting the speed of the tactus to a range of note values that has been heavily reweighted towards the bottom end. Not only are semiminims and *fusae* more prominent, but *semifusae*, hitherto limited to melismas and brief ornaments, now even figure as carriers of syllabic declamation, as is shown in example 11. We must now reckon, then,

Example 10. "Spes mea," SWV 69, from *Cantiones sacrae,* voices only.



Example 11. "Hütet euch," SWV 351, from *Symphoniae sacrae II* (1647), voice and continuo.



with the addition of a new tactus that is considerably slower than those prevailing in the prints of 1619 through 1628. As the *semifusa* declamation of this example suggests, it is probably a tactus *alla minima*—that is, the equivalent of modern $\frac{4}{4}$ in place of the usual $\frac{4}{2}$ under a tactus *alla semibreve.* Parenthetically, I would suggest that this particular passage implies a change from a semibreve tactus at the beginning to a minim tactus for the *semifusae,* with the pulse units (semiminims) of this new section taken not twice as fast, but only somewhat faster then the minims of the segments on either side of it. This extension of the Praetorian "relativity principle" beyond the actual limits of his system is obviously conjectural; but to gauge the speed of the opening by that of the *semifusa* declamation would in my view produce highly questionable musical results.

Whatever our verdict on this particular question, it is clear that Schütz, in his *concertato*-style music from 1629 on, calls for a duality if not a multiplicity of tempos under one and the same mensural sign. This is not only implicit from wide variations in his choice of note values, but is also made explicit through his use of Italian or Latin tempo indications: *presto, praesto, cito, celeriter, allegro, tarde, lente, adagio,* introduced here in quantity for the first time in his oeuvre. Like all such markings in this period, Schütz's appear not to have absolute meanings: *presto* is not inherently quicker than *allegro, adagio* no slower than *lente.*[27] Each signifies merely a tactus somewhat slower or faster than a performer would be likely to deduce from the context if the tempo indication were not there. As example 12 shows, the new tempo is not always marked in all the parts at the point where the change actually occurs. Should a part be resting at the time, its tempo marking is delayed until its next entrance. On occasion, as we see with the non-simultaneous *adagio* markings toward the end of this piece, tempo indications are linked with motivic content in a way that creates at least minor problems of coordination.

What of the effect of these notational developments upon proportional relationships? It is worth pointing out, first, that there is a further widening of the gap in unit size that had already existed between duple and triple mensurations in earlier usage. The shift in favor of ever smaller "black notes" is confined to binary mensuration alone. The undiminished semicircle, which is the only sign Schütz now uses for duple time, requires a tempo range for the minim that is noticeably slanted toward the slower end, and that includes a tempo apparently lying below anything found before 1629. Triple mensurations, on the other hand, remain visually unchanged. With but a tiny handful of exceptions, Schütz still uses only the tripla signed **3** or $\frac{3}{1}$ and consisting of three semibreves per tactus. As the "black notes" proliferate on the one side, the "white notes" persist unaltered on the other. Were we to insist on an unchanging rule of strict

Example 12. "Veni di Libano amica mea," SWV 266, from *Symphoniae sacrae I* (1629).



proportion between the two, we would have to conclude that Schütz's tripla, other things being equal, proceeds at a much slower average pace from 1629 on than it did previously.

That conclusion seems palpably absurd. If we reject it, however, we must also abandon the widely held assumption that triple proportions in Schütz are always to be taken literally, unless a tempo word like *presto* intervenes to modify the (presumed) normal 3:1 relationship. To pursue this further, let us consider what the practical alternatives are when such tempo markings do occur, as in example 13. Since the *allegro* marking here almost certainly rules out an exact 3:1 proportion, we have at our

Example 13. "Invenerunt me custodes civitatis," SWV 273, from *Symphoniae sacrae I,* voices and continuo.



disposal a range of conceivable tempos extending up to and possibly including a doubling of the theoretically normal relationship. If an actual doubling of speed were intended, however, we might well ask why Schütz used this proportion at all, when he might more logically have resorted to "black-note" triplets of the minim under the sign $\frac{6}{4}$, which he uses elsewhere (albeit very infrequently) to achieve just such a result.[28] On balance, the likeliest interpretation of the $\frac{3}{1}$ *allegro* appears to be that of a tempo lying somewhere between the two extremes: faster, but not twice as fast as that of an exact 3:1 proportion.

It is also worth noting that the *absence* of a tempo indication in connection with a proportion is not necessarily meaningful. Those markings that do occur are frequently not found in all the parts. The *allegro* in example 13, for instance, appears only in the continuo partbook, not in the upper parts which are necessarily equally affected by it. In more than a few cases a tempo marking can be confidently inferred from the context even if not present in any part. "Iß dein Brot mit Freuden," SWV 358, from *Symphoniae sacrae II,* for example, contains two common-time passages lying on either side of a segment under *proportio tripla.* Only the second duple section is explicitly marked; it reads *tarde* in three of the five systems. The absence of a tempo indication in the first passage is unremarkable, since this is the

opening segment of the piece; seventeenth-century openings are seldom marked for tempo, any more than they are for dynamics (we infer *forte* beginnings only from the presence of *piano* later on). All appearances suggest that the *tarde* marking makes no sense except as the cancellation of a previous (implied) *presto* or *celeriter*. Since a quick tempo for the opening seems out of the question, we have little choice but to infer an acceleration at the point where the tripla is introduced. The sign $\frac{3}{1}$ must therefore almost certainly be treated as an inexact or pseudo-proportion in relation to common time, despite the absence of an explicit direction to this effect.

* * *

If such is our conclusion here, it is but a short step to the further supposition that unmarked pseudoproportions may be far more common in Schütz than we have realized.[29] I have tried to show in the first part of this study that the evidence for such a hypothesis, though indirect, is by no means exclusively subjective. Given the almost universal acknowledgment by seventeenth-century theorists of the existence of "slower" and "faster" varieties of both binary and ternary time, and given only a relative difference, rather than a doubling, of tempo between them—even if this is something other than Mersenne's (implied) 3:2 or Ban's 4:3—pseudo-proportions between different mensurations are demonstrably inherent in the resulting system. That Schütz used *at least* two different tactus types and tempos under common time can be established beyond reasonable doubt, as a comparison between example 14 and the earlier example 11 should suffice to illustrate. His reliance after 1629 almost entirely on differences of note size to communicate information which, in the "ideal" world advocated by Praetorius, would be signalled by the systematic use of different signatures (𝄵 *vs.* 𝄴), is without bearing on the issue; it merely places him in the camp of the Italians who, from Cavalieri on (and including both Frescobaldi and Monteverdi), rarely used the diminution stroke at all in duple time.

In Schütz's use of the tripla, the notational distinctions are not quite so clear and obvious. (He is unlike Monteverdi in this respect.) It would be difficult in his music to adduce any pair of contrasting passages in $\frac{3}{1}$ semibreve notation whose performance at one and the same tempo—provided it were a moderate one—would be physically out of the question. The comparative rarity of alternative notations (the $\frac{3}{2}$ of minims and the $\frac{6}{4}$ of semiminims) in Schütz is unhelpful, since it might conceivably be taken to mean that these are the only instances (except those marked *allegro* or *presto*) where he intended to depart from a uniform tripla speed. (That by

Example 14. "Der Herr schauet vom Himmel," SWV 292, from *Kleine geistliche Conzerte I* (1636).



itself would of course rule out a consistent and exact proportional relationship between the tripla and all of its differing common-time counterparts.) But such uniformity seems patently unlikely in light of the demonstrable differences of Schütz's tempos under common time. It would, moreover, imply an indifference toward text scarcely imaginable in this of all composers. To give an example, *Sinfoniae sacrae II* contains similarly notated tripla passages, all unmarked for tempo, on "Harre auf Gott" as well as "Ich will dem Herren singen," on "ein geruhig und stilles Leben" as well as "Alleluia."[30] It seems impossible that such contrasts were without implications for tactus speed.

Given an extreme range of tempos for common time and a clear presumption of at least some variability under the *proportio tripla,* one need only compare passages like examples 14 and 15 to verify our hypothesis that the $\frac{3}{1}$ proportion itself must have a wide latitude of meaning for Schütz. In example 14, as in the earlier example 10, that meaning is probably a literal one; but to apply the same reading to example 15 would result in a tempo so slow as to be beyond reasonable belief. I suggest that this last example perfectly illustrates the time-beating problems that occasioned Schütz's warning to his German contemporaries.

Example 15. "Der Herr ist meine Stärke," SWV 345, from *Symphoniae sacrae II,* soprano and continuo.



The only "genuinely proportional" alternative to a literal 3:1 reading in such cases is to suppose a concurrent diminution of note values by one-half, meaning that the tripla would be taken twice as fast as the proportion implies. As I indicated earlier, the chief objection to such a reading is that it could just as well have been made explicit by using sextupla ($\frac{6}{1}$, $\frac{6}{2}$, or $\frac{6}{4}$) notation. Other composers, however, appear to use it almost as a matter of course (Cavalieri and Monteverdi are two of them), and it would seem rash to rule it out in Schütz on abstract theoretical grounds alone. Finally, as is implicit from all of the foregoing, outright *spielmännische Reduktion* must surely be included among the musically acceptable—and, as I have

Example 16. "Cantate Domino canticum novum," SWV 81, soprano and continuo.



argued, theoretically justifiable—resolutions of the dilemma posed by slow duples conjoined with visually slow triples. (Three-semibreve notation is not intrinsically, and certainly not unchangingly, slow except in relation to sesquialtera or sextupla notation, whose infrequency in Schütz contributes nothing to the argument.) Subdivision equivalence may even recommend itself on occasion in music not in the "heutige Italianische Manier," such as that of example 16, from the *Cantiones sacrae,* where it seems at least conceivable that the *fusae* under common time are simply a continuation of the minims under the preceding $\frac{3}{1}$. Admittedly, however, this proportion can also be resolved literally, with results that are equally satisfying to the ears—the only tools we can bring to bear in settling objectively unprovable cases. If we conscientiously school those ears in the light of seventeenth-century theory, we need have fewer qualms about accepting their judgments in practice.

NOTES

* I am indebted to Alexander Silbiger for information and suggestions that have contributed materially to the reworking and amplification of this study from the paper delivered at the Schütz Festival-Conference at Urbana on October 18, 1985.

1 *Syntagmatis Musici . . . Tomus Tertius* (Wolfenbüttel: Elias Holwein, 1619; reprint, Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1958), 48–79.

2 "Zur Entstehung des modernen Taktsystems im 17. Jahrhundert," *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft* 18 (1961): 223–40.

3 *Syntagma III,* 52. Praetorius's tactus-based explanation of the sign $\frac{3}{2}$ is striking and (so far as I know) unconventional: "Sicut enim in Tripla proportione $\frac{3}{1}$ indicat tres Semibreves ad unum Tactum referendas esse: ita in Sesquialtera $\frac{3}{2}$ tres Semibreves ad duos Tactus referendas esse denotat."

4 Ibid., 53.

5 Ibid., 50. This remark has a significant echo almost three decades later in the words of Schütz: see note 25.

[6] In addition to the article cited in note 2, see Dahlhaus, "Zur Taktlehre des Michael Praetorius," *Die Musikforschung* 17 (1964): 162–69, and my "Zur Deutung der Diminution in der Tactuslehre des Michael Praetorius," ibid., 169–74.

[7] Adriano Banchieri, *Cartella Musicale nel canto figurato,* 3d ed. (Venice: Giacomo Vincenti, 1614), 28–33; the passage in question first appears in the second edition of 1610. Praetorius cites no authority for the statement reproduced in example 2a.

[8] Ibid., 32.

[9] Banchieri, *Conclusioni nel suono dell'Organo* (Bologna: G. Rossi, 1609), 37.

[10] Unpublished paper delivered at the Schütz Festival-Conference at Urbana in October, 1985.

[11] From the foreword to *Polyhymnia Caduceatrix & Panegyrica* (Wolfenbüttel: Elias Holwein, 1619), § 27: "Daß die *Signa Tactus Aequalis* ¢ *&* c untereinander, ohne mein verursachen, vermenget seyn, wolle sich niemand irren lassen: Besonders jedes nach seinem *Tact,* nach dem es ihme gut deuchtet, *dirigieren.*"

[12] "And in triples or sesquialteras, if they are major [three semibreves per tactus], they must be played slowly; if they are minor [three minims per tactus], somewhat quicker; if they are of three semiminims, quicker; if they are six for four, let their tempo be given with a quick beat." *Il primo libro di Capricci . . . et Arie in Partitura* (Rome, 1624), preface, "a gli studiosi dell'opera."

[13] Frescobaldi, *Opere complete IV,* ed. Étienne Darbellay (Milan: Edizioni Suvini Zerboni, 1984), xx.

[14] I am intentionally reserving the interpretation of Frescobaldi's *sei per quattro*—and of Praetorius's Sextupla in example 1—for a separate discussion below.

[15] Concerning the notorious notational difficulties of the *Partite* as a whole, see Darbellay's discussion in the *Opere complete,* vol. II and in the companion volume *Le Toccate e i Capricci di Girolamo Frescobaldi* (Milan: Edizioni Suvini Zerboni, 1984); also Frederick Hammond, *Girolamo Frescobaldi* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 215–21.

[16] Marin Mersenne, *Harmonicorum libri* (Paris, 1635), Book VII, Proposition XIX, p. 53; the passage recurs unaltered in the expanded reprint *Harmonicorum libri XII* (Paris: Guillelmi Baudry, 1648), p. 53.

[17] See Frits Noske, "Ban, Joan Albert," in *Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart,* vol. 15, ed. Friedrich Blume (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1973), 445–46; Randall H. Tollefsen, "Ban, Joan Albert," *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians,* ed. Stanley Sadie (New York: Macmillan, 1980), 2:103–4; and D.P. Walker, "Joan Albert Ban and Mersenne's Musical Competiton of 1640," *Music and Letters* 57 (1976): 233–55.

[18] Quoted by Darbellay in Frescobaldi, *Opere complete,* vol. IV, p. xxxi from *Correspondance du P. Marin Mersenne religieux minime* vol. 8 (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1963), letters 716 and 721.

[19] Amsterdam, 1642, fol. **4r-v. The preface to Noske's facsimile edition in *Early Music Theory in the Low Countries,* vol. I (Amsterdam: F. Knut, 1969) slightly misinterprets Ban's prescriptions.

[20] Franz-Jochen Machatius, "Über mensurale und spielmännische Reduktion," *Die Musikforschung* 8 (1955): 139–51; the article is based on Machatius's 1952 Berlin dissertation, published twenty-five years after its completion as *Die Tempi in der Musik um 1600* (Laaber: Laaber-Verlag, 1977).

[21] Arthur Mendel, "Some Ambiguities of the Mensural System," *Studies in Music History,* ed. H.S. Powers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 137–60; on Machatius, see pp. 150–53.

[22] Wolfgang Osthoff, *Monteverdistudien I. Das dramatische Spätwerk Claudio Monteverdis,* Münchener Veröffentlichungen zur Musikgeschichte, vol. 3 (Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 1960), 211–19; Stefan Kunze, *Die Instrumentalmusik Giovanni Gabrielis,* Münchener Veröffentlichungen

zur Musikgeschichte, vol. 8 (Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 1963), 167–73; Walther Dürr, "Zwei neue Belege für die sogenannte 'spielmännische' Reduktion," *Quadrivium* 2 (Bologna, 1958): 76–87 (with reference to Gafori, Aron, and Josquin).

[23] Ettliche wollen nicht zu geben, daß man *in compositione alicujus Cantionis* zugleich Motettische und Madrigalische Art untereinander vermischen solle. Deroselben Meynung ich mir aber nicht gefallen lasse; Sintemahl es den *Motecten* und *Concerten* eine besondere lieblich- unnd anmütigkeit gibt unnd *conciliiret,* wenn im anfang etliche viel *Tempora* gar pathetisch und langsamb gesetzet seyn, hernach etliche geschwinde *Clausulen* daruff folgen: Bald wiederumb langsam und gravitetisch, bald abermahl geschwindere umbwechselung mit einmischen. *(Syntagma III,* 80)

[24] See also Darbellay in the *Opere complete,* vol. IV, p. xx.

[25] From the preface *Ad Benevolum Lectorem:* "Und hat es zwar bißher die Erfahrung mehrmals bezeuget, wie dieselbige heutige Italianische, und auff derer Art gerichteten Composition, nebenst dero gebührlichen *Mensur,* über die darinnen angeführten schwartzen Noten . . . uns Deutschen disseits zum guten theile, und so viel derer hierbey nicht erzogen, weder recht fügen, noch gebührlich abgehen wollen . . . . Also ist an die andern, bevorab aber die jenigen, welchen der rechtmässige *Tact* über vorgedachte heutige Music, und die schwartzen Noten, nicht bekand noch in übung ist . . . mein freundliches bitten, sie wollen, ehe und zuvor sie sich unterstehen, eines oder das andere dieser Stücken, offentlich zugebrauchen, sich nicht schämen, deswegen zuvor eines Unterrichts, bey solcher Manier Erfahrnen zu erholen."

["And indeed experience has thus far repeatedly shown that this same modern Italian music, and music composed after the same manner, along with its measure proper for the many black notes introduced therein, . . . is uncongenial to most of us Germans on this side (of the Alps), so many of whom are not trained for it, and will not turn out becomingly. ... Hence to the others, especially those who neither know nor have practiced the proper beat for the aforementioned modern music and its black notes, ... this is my friendly request: that before they undertake to use one or another of these pieces in public, they will not be ashamed first to seek instruction from those experienced in these matters." Translation adapted from *Source Readings in Music History: From Classical Antiquity through the Romantic Era,* ed. Oliver Strunk (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), 436–37.]

[26] This information and all of the musical examples in this section are based on the old Sämmtliche Werke edited by Philipp Spitta, who, unlike the editors of the new Schütz edition, retains original note values and mensuration signs.

[27] See Irmgard Herrmann-Bengen, *Tempobezeichnungen,* Münchener Veröffentlichungen zur Musikgeschichte, vol. 1 (Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 1959), especially 40–72.

[28] Paine (see note 10) lists five instances, three of them from *Sinfoniae sacrae II:* SWV 75, 349, 350, 355, and 456.

[29] Herrmann-Bengen (p. 71) reached the same conclusion in 1959.

[30] Found in nos. 13, 5, 15, and 22, respectively.

Gottschalk's "The Banjo," op. 15, and the Banjo in the Nineteenth Century

by Paul Ely Smith

Louis Moreau Gottschalk first performed "The Banjo, Grotesque Fantasie, An American Sketch," op. 15 in New Orleans in March 1855, about two years after his return from Europe.[1] No documentation survives indicating the specific musical inspiration for the composition of the piece—whether it was inspired by African-American banjo players whom Gottschalk surely must have encountered in New Orleans (he grew up within a few blocks of the Place Congo), or influenced by minstrel banjo players he no doubt heard in his extensive traveling. From Gottschalk we have only a cryptic remark about critics dismissing the piece as "a melody for the Negroes," and the biographer Vernon Loggins refers to the piece as "the most enduring of his Negro compositions."[2] Some evidence, then, points to the influence of African-American rather than minstrel sources.

If the piece were indeed drawn from African-American sources, it would take its place as one of the few surviving representatives of a musical tradition that, in spite of its enormous influence on American music as a whole, has itself almost entirely disappeared. Though the names and music of generations of influential African-American banjo players may never be known, I wish to argue that Gottschalk's op. 15 is not only a remarkably accurate representation of this banjo tradition, but also the most detailed and complete surviving contemporaneous record of mid-nineteenth-century African-American banjo music—in no other source has such a variety of techniques been preserved. Significantly, many of these techniques provide a previously missing link between West African plucked-lute performance practice and twentieth-century banjo and blues guitar styles. Although this connection has been suggested by numerous researchers, they have lacked, however, conclusive evidence of a transitional nineteenth-century African-American plucked-lute performance practice.

The banjo and its music figure prominently in much of the important research on nineteenth-century American vernacular music, not only because the banjo represents one of the few clearly African-American musical influences for which substantial documentation exists, but also because it was central in the beginnings of American popular music and later became a major influence on ragtime and jazz. Hans Nathan devotes an entire chapter to the banjo in *Dan Emmett and the Rise of Early Negro Minstrelsy*, and Dena Epstein's landmark 1975 article, "The Folk Banjo: A Documentary History," formed a central part of her book, *Sinful Tunes and Spirituals: Black Folk Music to the Civil War*.[3]

The haunting problem in this research is the absence of information about the sound and performance practice of the banjo. Epstein's work is a triumph of musicology in the information she was able to glean from the documentary evidence, but period descriptions are woefully inadequate for reconstructing the actual sound of the music, and her work is concerned with instrumental transmission, not style. Nathan provides numerous informative, detailed musical analyses, but since his discussion relies heavily on notated banjo music, his work excludes a consideration of the gestural components of banjo playing, which would have been transmitted orally and which defy the conventional notation used in the minstrels' tune books.

The actual sound of nineteenth-century banjo music remained a mystery until the important research of Robert Winans, in a series of articles beginning in 1976 and leading up to his 1985 recording of a reconstructed minstrel show band for New World Records, and Eugenia Conway, in her 1980 dissertation "The Afro-American Traditions of the Folk Banjo."[4] Both Winans and Conway supplemented documentary evidence of nineteenth-century banjo music with a thorough analysis of surviving banjo playing traditions, supplying gestural and musical components lacking in the documentary evidence alone. Winans concluded that the original minstrel banjo style was exclusively a "brushless," non-chordal downstroke style, since it survives in current traditional playing in Appalachia and is the only style represented in the earliest minstrel methods and tune books.[5] Conway found essentially the same style in her study of surviving banjo-playing traditions among African-Americans in the North Carolina Piedmont, research which supports the minstrels' claims that they learned their music directly from African-Americans. In fact, the minstrel banjo-player Frank Converse transcribed a piece he claims to have learned in his youth (probably before 1850) from an African-American banjo-player that demonstrates many of the features of the brushless downstroking style.[6]

* * *

The first step in establishing Gottschalk's op. 15 as an accurate representation of mid-nineteenth-century banjo music is to demonstrate that the piece depicts styles for which we already have evidence. The brushless downstroking style discussed by Winans and Conway is in fact present in several places, for example, in measures 39–42 and 55–58 (examples 1 and 2). As is the case with much of the piece, these passages translate easily into actual banjo performance, once allowances are made for the banjo's idiosyncrasies (especially in example 2) and for various pianistic effects such as octave displacement and doubling.[7] I have transposed the banjo versions into C major, for "double-C" tuning (g^2-c^1-g^1-c^2-d^2), and have given the banjo

music in both standard musical notation and tablature, since tablature includes important gestural information left out of conventional notation and is also familiar to most banjo players.[8] An explanation of the tablature system and tuning used here appears in the Appendix at the end of the article.

Example 1. Measures 39–42.



Example 2. Measures 55–58.



Brushless downstroking is not the only technique present in "The Banjo," however; in fact, representations of more chordal styles of downstroking clearly predominate. Since brushing and other chordal techniques are also very much a part of surviving traditional banjo performance practice, their presence in Gottschalk's piece suggests that they do not necessarily arise from later developments, as Winans and Conway argue.

The basic downstroking right-hand pattern that most beginning banjo players start with is demonstrated in example 3, from a recent banjo instruction book, Miles Krassen's *Clawhammer Banjo* ("clawhammer" is one of several terms for the downstroking banjo technique).[9] After the eight-measure introduction, "The Banjo" proceeds with a texture that unmistakably represents the same technique (example 4). That this texture is present in "The Banjo" and yet not represented in methods and tune books of the early minstrel era does not necessarily refute the hypothesis that these styles are truly representative of earlier practices. Conway noticed, for example, significant omissions in the minstrel-era methods, which she cites as proof that white folk musicians learned directly from African-Americans:

> In their banjo playing, the North Carolina mountain whites and Piedmont blacks and the early minstrels all share a common position and motion of the right hand and also certain principal movements: the strike and its variations, the pull-off, the hammer-on, and drop-thumbing. Dink Roberts even uses the distinctive minstrel technique of the "triple strike," one also known to southern mountain banjo players. However, Piedmont blacks and mountain whites also share preferences for the pull-off on an unsounded string, for the hammer-on when the first note is played open, and for variations of drop-thumbing, which many folk call "double-noting." Since none of these tendencies is emphasized by the early minstrel instructors—Rice, for example, does not describe all of them—they seem to have been transmitted from Afro-Americans to mountain whites without the minstrels as intermediaries.[10]

Example 3.



Example 4. Measures 9–12.



Evidently the minstrels had not mastered all the elements of the African-American style, or perhaps these techniques were considered too advanced for beginners' instruction methods. They could even have been considered "professional secrets."

Another explanation is that the minstrels knew of these styles but were limited by their transcription techniques—a common problem in trying to apply conventional music notation to an oral music tradition. In the downstroking style, for example, there are countless gradations between bringing down the index finger on only one string, i.e., "brushless," and allowing adjacent strings to sound as well. When attempting to notate a banjo piece, it is often easier to represent the main melody note and leave the subtleties of the adjacent strings to the individual player's taste and experience. Moreover, downstroking banjo music has always been transmitted by oral tradition; to learn a tune or technique only from notation without a thorough familiarity with the gestures and sound of the music is virtually impossible. Consequently, it is not surprising that Gottschalk, who was attempting to capture the actual sound of banjo music, would create a more accurate reproduction in his piano "transcription" than that contained in the surviving documents we have of notated banjo music.

Banjo methods and tune books were never intended as literal and complete representations of actual performances. Rather, they either presented outlines of tunes already learned by ear, or provided a simple starting version of a tune, with the assumption that the player would supply the gestural and aural information necessary to complete the musical performance. The

notation itself would therefore not be a reliable indicator of the actual sound of the music. Piano music, on the other hand, even though it, too, relies on gestural and aural information, is much more reliably conveyed via traditional notation.[11] A good example of this kind of effect captured by Gottschalk but ignored in notation of banjo music is the sustained C sharp that appears in the right hand of measure 11 (example 4). Such a sound, though never notated, is common in banjo music, since it occurs naturally through the vibration of the open string.

* * *

Up-picking, though it appears as early as the 1850s among minstrel banjo players[12] and is also used by the African-American banjo players studied by Conway,[13] is considered by Winans to be a later development influenced by European guitar music:

> The early, or "stroke," style was gradually replaced by the "guitar," or "classical," style of playing, which . . . is essentially the application of classical guitar techniques to the banjo.[14]

Up-picking is present, however, in the performance practice of the banjo's West African ancestors, according to Michael Coolen, the only researcher who has explored in depth the relationship of the banjo to West African plucked-lutes. This connection had been suggested by many writers, including David Ames, Harold Courlander, Gene Bluestein, Paul Oliver, Dena Epstein, and Samuel Charters, but Coolen, who actually learned to play the "khalam" from griots in the Senegambia, discovered aspects of the West African traditions that had been overlooked by other observers. Significantly, he found not only the use of a downstroking style, but also the frequent combination of up-picking and downstroking:

> Except in very fast passages, the index finger uses a downward stroke on the strings. . . . The thumb also plucks in a downward fashion, while the middle finger usually plucks upward.[15]

Coolen also has noted the use of strumming by West African khalam players:

> There is also occasional use of strumming, although the musicians with whom I worked were quite adept at finger picking techniques. Strumming can also be found in "kora" [harp-lute] performance, where the strum is used as a kind of ostinato going over the basic repetitive pattern.[16]

From this research and the evidence presented in Gottschalk's op. 15, Winans's thesis asserting the chronological priority of non-chordal styles of banjo playing can no longer be maintained. Rather, it seems that more chordal varieties of downstroking arose simultaneously with the brushless style, and must date back at least to the early 1850s. Gottschalk, moreover, also represents banjo techniques which have not been documented elsewhere in the surviving evidence of mid-nineteenth-century banjo music, and these mirror the various aspects of West African plucked-lute performance practice discussed by Coolen. This presence is strong evidence that Gottschalk's sources were African-American.

The most significant example is the sextuplet ornament that first appears in measure 25 (example 5). Unlike the triplet that first appears in measure 55, which has been documented in the minstrel-era methods (called a "triple strike"[17]) and can be executed within the context of the downstroke style, the sextuplet cannot be realized without a momentary switch from downstroking into an up-picking technique. A different inversion of the arpeggiated chord is required—the banjo is much more limited in this regard than the piano—but the sounds are clearly analogous. The right-hand pattern used is one that will be immediately familiar to bluegrass-style banjo players as the "forward-backward roll," and its presence represents the earliest documented use of an up-picking technique in banjo music. What is even more remarkable is that this combination of up-picking and downstroking in the same context is an essential aspect of West African khalam technique—precisely the type of "very fast passage" that would require the index finger to switch from its usual downward picking into an upward motion. This use of up-picking techniques in nineteenth-century African-American banjo styles suggests that later up-picking banjo styles, rather than demonstrating a European influence, may well be derived from an earlier banjo style that mixed up-picking and downstroking, one closely related to West African performance practice.[18]

In positing that a technique such as up-picking on the banjo would have African rather than European sources, it is worth pointing out an unfortunate pattern in research on American vernacular music: the assumption of a European or white American source when the existing information is inconclusive. Though virtually all the recent scholarly literature recognizes the banjo's West African origins, the myth of a European or white American source for the banjo has been persistent.[19] A similar myth, based on claims by early minstrels such as William Whitlock and Daniel Emmett of the "Virginia Minstrels," credits the invention of the banjo/fiddle and the banjo/fiddle/percussion ensembles to the minstrels.[20] Conway, having found no evidence to contradict the claim, has passed on this questionable information.[21] J.H. Kwabena Nketia, however, in his *African Music in Ghana,* cites the

Example 5. Measure 25.



frequency of bowed-lute, plucked-lute, and percussion ensembles in Ghana,[22] and Michael Coolen finds similar ensembles to be common in the Senegambia:

> Furthermore, the "nyanyaur" [a bowed-lute] was played not only in ensemble with a plucked-lute, but with a third instrument, a tapped calabash. This trio of nyanyaur, plucked-lute, and tapped calabash was paralleled strikingly by the fiddle, banjo, and tambourine ensembles so popular in the United States in the 19th century. Such American trios must have seemed quite familiar to any slaves taken from the Senegambian region.[23]

Indeed, the influence of African bowed-lute performance practice on the evolution of American fiddle music is an area ripe for exploration and will surely call into question the assumption that African-Americans' early adoption of the European violin is necessarily an indication of acculturation.

The only section of "The Banjo" that has heretofore received attention from scholars regarding its correspondence to actual banjo music is the closing thirty-eight measures of the piece, which imitates "the characteristic strumming of the instrument in a boisterous and realistic manner" (example 6).[24] Ironically, though strumming may be characteristic of twentieth-century four-string banjo performance practice, it is not at all part of traditional five-

string banjo technique and has generally been regarded as a later development along with the four-string tenor and plectrum banjos, which were developed around the turn of the century. Hence, a strumming texture in the midst of an antebellum five-string banjo piece is provocative, especially considering that references to strumming turn up in the documentary evidence collected by Dena Epstein[25] and that strumming is also present in West African performance practice.

Example 6. Measures 187–190.



This texture does not necessarily represent strumming, however. The simpler version of the piano texture which appears in these closing measures above the more difficult version is easily rendered within the context of downstroking. If this banjo texture is played very fast (in this section of the piece, Gottschalk does indicate a quickening of the tempo to "piu presto" and finally to "prestissimo"), with a very loose right hand and wrist, the resulting sound is more accurately represented by the more difficult piano version. Significantly, an untrained observer would be hard pressed to distinguish this downstroking banjo texture from strumming, but the player has most flexibility with regard to rhythmic and melodic emphasis using this downstroking technique.

* * *

The accuracy of the banjo imitations in "The Banjo" invites an inquiry into Gottschalk's sources. I would argue that such sensitive renditions of banjo textures on the piano could be the result only of an intimate knowledge of banjo techniques, and, since there is no evidence that Gottschalk himself played the banjo, he must have worked with someone who did.

Was this hypothetical banjo player a white minstrel show performer or an African-American? All the evidence indicates that this player must have been an African-American, for the minstrels' style lacks many of the techniques represented in op. 15.[26] Such a player could easily have been found in New Orleans, where Gottschalk spent a significant amount of time in the two years leading up to the composition of "The Banjo."[27] Not only was New Orleans a center for African-American music in the nineteenth century (as it would continue to be in the twentieth), but Conway's study of records of the period suggests that New Orleans was the geographical center for one of two regional African-American banjo styles.[28] In New Orleans in 1853–55, Gottschalk not only had the time, but also the access to a thriving tradition of African-American banjo music from which to derive his piano piece.

In fact, op. 15 is best regarded as the culmination of a series of efforts to capture the banjo's style at the keyboard. In 1853–54, Gottschalk composed the so-called "Second Banjo" (published posthumously as op. 82) that demonstrates some of the textures that would appear in his op.15 and indicates that an interest in transcribing banjo music had occupied him for several years.[29] Banjo imitations similar to those in op. 15 can be found in his earliest published compositions as well, such as his op. 2 "Bamboula" (1844–45), which are indisputably derived from African-American music (example 7).

Example 7. "Bamboula," measures 17–20.



The evidence suggests that "The Banjo" is the most complete document we have of the nineteenth-century African-American banjo tradition. By using the piano and a notation system well-suited for the preservation of piano music, Gottschalk avoided the considerable difficulties the minstrels had in trying to notate the nuances of banjo music directly. Out of his ongoing interest in the banjo, Gottschalk has provided us with a unique document of the instrument's techniques and styles, one far richer than that left by the minstrels. As a result, our understanding of nineteenth-century African-American banjo music is much more complete. In particular, chordal styles and up-picking techniques, previously thought to have been later developments influenced by European music, are aspects of a performance practice brought to this country from Africa along with the banjo itself. This tradition continues to resonate in the vast spectrum of American plucked-lute performance practice, from the banjo styles of the North Carolina Piedmont and the chordal textures of jazz-era four-string banjo music to the fingerpicking blues guitar styles of the Mississippi Delta. As a final note, however, it is important to point out that while Gottschalk preserved the practice of a significant and influential musical tradition that would have otherwise been lost, many other aspects of the tradition—the names of the musicians and their experiences—will unfortunately remain a mystery, as Gwendolyn Brooks so powerfully relates.

Gottschalk and the Grande Tarantelle

[Gwendolyn Brooks, 1988][30]

My Black brothers and sisters.
Nimble slaves in New Orleans,
dancing to your own music,
loving your wild art,
your art, vertical, winnowy, willful—
you did not know that Gottschalk was watching, was hearing.
Slouched in the offing, he was.
Crouching most shamefully, he was.
Stealthy. Heavy breathing.
He fell in love with your music.

Died at forty.
But before that he Created
Le Banjo (An American Sketch).
He Created
piano pieces based on "tunes he heard in the Congo."

Early he stole
the wealth of your art.
Wrongfully
he bore it away to the white side of town—
you never knowing—
and there he doctored the dear purity.
He whitened your art,
and named it his own.
He traded it for money
in Great Halls of whiteness.

He sold it to thronging white company.

The patrons went MAD.
Loving odd music (embroidered savagery),
women wept and wilted.
They cut off and wore his hair.
He became the Lapel-piece Composer.
His concerts and conquests multiplied, he handled many a money,
and he died at forty, an over-musicked man.

He rose across you, Black Beauties.
He stole your art.
He never passed you a penny.
Nor painted your name on a page.

But *hark!*
He inherited slaves from his father and freed them.
All hail the Debt-payer.

NOTES

[1] Robert Offergeld, *The Centennial Catalog of the Published and Unpublished Compositions of Louis Moreau Gottschalk* (New York: Ziff-Davis, 1970), 13.

[2] Louis Moreau Gottschalk, *Notes of a Pianist,* ed. Jeanne Behrend (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 212; Vernon Loggins, *Where the World Ends* (Baltimore: J. H. Furst, 1958), 141.

[3] Dena J. Epstein, *Sinful Tunes and Spirituals: Black Folk Music to the Civil War* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977).

[4] Eugenia Cecelia Conway, "The Afro-American Traditions of the Folk Banjo," (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980; Ann Arbor: UMI, 1980). Other discussions of performance practice can also be found in Jay Bailey, "Historical Origin and Stylistic Developments of the Five-String Banjo," *Journal of American Folklore* 85 (1972): 58–65; and Gene Bluestein, "America's Folk Instrument: Notes on the Five-String Banjo," *Western Folklore* 23 (1964): 241–48.

[5] Robert B. Winans, "The Folk, the Stage, and the Five-string Banjo in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of American Folklore* 89 (1976): 435. "Downstroking" refers to the technique of sounding the strings: the right hand, cupped somewhat like a loose pistol grip, appears to bounce up and down on the strings. Normally, the back of the index finger strikes or plucks on one or more of the long four strings in a downward motion; the minstrel-era methods called this technique a "stroke" or "downstroke." The thumb also comes down on the strings (often, but not always, on the short fifth "thumb" string), but while the right hand finger is performing the stroke, the thumb rests on the string it is about to play and plucks it with a somewhat downward and outward motion as the hand bounces back up. A "brush" in downstroking banjo technique involves stroking more than one string with the right hand. "Brushless" is therefore a non-chordal, single-note style.

[6] Unfortunately, he did not recall the name of the banjo player. Frank B. Converse, "Banjo Reminiscences," *The Cadenza* 11 (1901): 4. Cited in Lowell H. Schreyer, "The Banjo in Ragtime," in *Ragtime: Its History, Composers, and Music,* ed. John Edward Hasse (New York: Schirmer Books, 1985), 57. Schreyer reproduces the entire transcription.

[7] Gottschalk, "The Banjo," *Piano Music of Louis Moreau Gottschalk,* ed. Richard Jackson (New York: Dover, 1973), 26. All of the Gottschalk examples in this article come from this edition. An example of the banjo's idiosyncrasy can be seen in the first example with the offbeat sixteenth notes that appear as F sharps in Gottschalk's version, but are G's (instead of C's) in the banjo transcription. Offbeat notes such as these are always played by the thumb in downstroking, and the fifth string, tuned in this case to g and never fretted in this style, is the only string that could be played in this circumstance, since the fourth string has just been stroked by the index finger. The effect on the actual sound of the passage is not as dramatic as the appearance in notation might suggest.

[8] The actual tuning of the nineteenth-century African-American banjo probably varied a great deal, but was in any case significantly lower than the modern tuning. Robert Winans has noted that the minstrels tuned their banjos a third or fourth below modern pitch (see Winans, "Early Minstrel Show Music, 1843–1852," in *Musical Theatre in America,* ed. Glenn Loney, [Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984], 71, 73). I tune my gourd banjo down a fourth and play this piece in G; however, most banjo players using modern instruments will be more comfortable with the standard C tuning.

[9] Miles Krassen, *Clawhammer Banjo* (New York: Oak Publications, 1974), 12. The tablature comes from Krassen's book, but his example is intended for G tuning (gDGBd), which would produce G chords using this pattern. I have transcribed the pattern as if it were being played in the double-C tuning being used elsewhere in the examples.

[10] Conway, 132–33. "Drop-thumbing" refers to the practice of bringing the thumb down to play on one of the long strings; this becomes "double noting" if it used extensively. The "triple strike" is demonstrated in example 2—the triplet ornaments are played by a rapid succession of a downstroke, a left-hand pluck, and another downstroke. The other terms, "hammer-on," etc., are defined in the appendix of this article and may also be found in Larry Sandberg, *Banjo Styles* (New York: Oak Publications, 1978), 9.

[11] Aspects of nineteenth-century banjo music not transmitted by the traditional notation are immediately apparent in most performances of "The Banjo." With the image of the brilliant, metallic sound of modern bluegrass or four-string plectrum banjo music in mind, modern performers generally ignore the "moderato" tempo indicated by Gottschalk; they prefer an excessively brisk tempo with a mechanical staccato attack, devoid of the bounce and swing typical of good downstroking banjo players. The African-American banjo of the mid-nineteenth century was itself very different from the metal-strung, twenty-pound, brass-and-maple behemoth that was developed during the first few decades of the 1900s and still the instrument favored by most modern players. In contrast, the African-American banjo sound chamber was usually fashioned

from a gourd with animal skin stretched over the opening cut in the top. Tuned significantly lower than modern banjo tuning and fretless, it had a richer and arguably more expressive sound than modern instruments (see note 8 above, Dena Epstein, "The Folk Banjo: A Documentary History," *Ethnomusicology* 19 [1975]: 349, 358, and elsewhere). Winans's recording of a reconstructed minstrel show band, *The Early Minstrel Show,* New World Records NW 338 (New York: New World Records, 1985), does not feature a gourd banjo, but his sound chamber of animal skin stretched over a wooden frame is also authentic and demonstrates many aspects of the mid-nineteenth-century style and sound.

[12] Winans, "The Folk, the Stage," 428.

[13] Conway, 110.

[14] Winans, "The Folk, the Stage," 428. It is worth pointing out that several up-picking styles of banjo playing survive among folk musicians, the most famous of which is "bluegrass style." I have found no evidence in my research to support the assumption that these styles are necessarily European in origin.

[15] Michael Theodore Coolen, "Senegambian Archetypes for the American Folk Banjo," *Western Folklore* 43 (1984): 129–30.

[16] Coolen, letter to the author, Nov. 1, 1989.

[17] Conway, 132, 230.

[18] Thus, it is also likely that early blues guitar styles, representing an adaptation of banjo techniques to the European instrument, also demonstrate the survival of West African instrumental performance practice in to the area of recorded blues.

[19] See, for example, Bruno Nettl, *Folk and Traditional Music of the Western Continents,* 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1973), 214.

[20] Hans Nathan, *Dan Emmett and the Rise of Early Negro Minstrelsy* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), 116–17.

[21] Conway, 37.

[22] J. H. Kwabena Nketia, *African Music in Ghana* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962), 106.

[23] Coolen, "Senegambian Archetypes," 119.

[24] John Godfrey Doyle, "The Piano Music of Louis Moreau Gottschalk (1829–1869)," (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1960; Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 1960), 137.

[25] See Dena Epstein, "The Folk Banjo: A Documentary History," *Ethnomusicology* 19 (1975). For example, from page 356: "When all was ready for the dance, one of them . . . tuned a large guitar, made from a calabash strung with catgut, and began to strum as on a Moorish mandolin" (Pavie 1833: II, 319–20).

[26] Melodic analysis of the piece has been inconclusive; in his 1960 dissertation, John Godfrey Doyle finds hints of Stephen Foster's "Camptown Races" in the introduction and closing measures and cites Jeanne Behrend's suggestion of traces of the spiritual "Roll, Jordan, Roll," but "the common use of the pentatonic scale, the similarity of melody and rhythm in all three examples, makes it practically impossible to describe an influence" (p. 136).

[27] Loggins, 127–41.

[28] Conway, 5–7.

[29] Doyle, *Louis Moreau Gottschalk 1829–1869: A Bibliographical Study and Catalog of Works,* Bibliographies in American Music, 7 (Detroit: Information Coordinators, 1982), 267.

[30] Gwendolyn Brooks, "Gottschalk and the Grande Tarantelle," reprinted, by permission, from *Gottschalk and the Grande Tarantelle* (Chicago: The David Company, 1988), 9–10.

Appendix
A Note on Reading Banjo Tablature

The staff represents the five strings of the banjo as they appear to the player looking down on them from playing position, with the bottom line indicating the highest-pitched string (the short string). The tuning used in the examples in this article is "double-C" tuning (g^2-c^1-g^1-c^2-d^2):



"Double-C" tuning

The numbers on the staff represent the frets (or on a fretless banjo, where the fret positions would be). Parentheses around a number indicate that the string is stopped by the left hand at that point, but not sounded. The letters underneath the staff represent various ways of sounding the strings.

T = thumb (right hand)
D = index finger, downstroke (right hand)
I = index finger, up-picking (right hand)
M = middle finger, up-picking (right hand)
B = brush (a downstoke with the right-hand finger(s), stroking two or more strings)
P = pull-off (a left hand pluck on a string previously sounded)
PL = pluck with left hand
H = hammer-on (bring a left hand finger down on the fingerboard hard enough to sound the string at that point)
R = run (play a second distinct note as part of a single right hand index finger downstroke)

reviews

The Politics and Poetics of Listening

Nicholas Cook. ***Music, Imagination, and Culture.*** Oxford: Oxford University Press / Clarendon Press, 1990. 265 pp.

"Kant," wrote Nietzsche in *The Gay Science,* "wanted to prove in a way that would dumbfound the common man that the common man was right; this was the secret joke of his soul."[1] Nicholas Cook's *Music, Imagination, and Culture* has little use for Kant, but what Nietzsche called Kant's joke is the centerpiece of this intelligent, meticulously argued, and profoundly retrogressive book.

Cook's topic is the relationship between musical experience—specifically the experience of Western art music since the mid-eighteenth century—and musicological discourse. His starting point is the fact that many people who know little or nothing about this music nonetheless take intense pleasure in it. He cites empirical studies suggesting that what might be called the listener's working ignorance of the music is no hindrance to such pleasure, and that working knowledge is no help. For many listeners, formal elements as simple as literal repetition and tonal closure go unrecognized, leaving dim hope for the recognition of large-scale tonal relations and complex structures like sonata form. Even musically knowledgeable listeners, one study suggests, tend to listen knowledgeably only when they have some explicit reason to do so.

All this untutored musical pleasure, whether founded on absent or absentee knowledge, spells trouble. As Cook observes, the practice of listening for pleasure is culture-specific, taking its impetus from the development of aesthetics in eighteenth-century Europe. Consistent with this origin, it operates on the basis of two cardinal assumptions: (1) that "the significance of music lies in what we perceive as we listen to it," and (2) that "to perceive something aesthetically is to perceive it as an integrated whole" (p. 5). But if a listener's aesthetic pleasure in music can arise without reference to the formal design of the music, then these two assumptions clash. Either the significance of music must lie in something not perceived, in which case it is not aesthetic, or the aesthetic value of the music has nothing to do with the perception of integrated wholes, in which case it makes no sense to base aesthetic judgments on the grounds of musical design. In the second case, the practical irrelevance of design may also constitute an epistemological irrelevance. For if design (form, structure) is of little or no aesthetic consequence, then it is hard to see in what sense understanding musical design constitutes understanding mu-

sic, or, for that matter, in what sense music can be understood at all.

There are several obvious solutions to this dilemma. One, sanctioned by figures like Hanslick, Schenker, and Adorno, is to regard untutored musical pleasure as something passive and sentimental, a kind of *Lumpen* pleasure that, if it cannot be eradicated, can at least be looked down on. Cook is rightly dismissive of this position, and has some trenchant things to say about its watered-down incarnation as "music appreciation." Surely the notion that listeners must distrust their responses to music unless some musicological Vergil appears to guide them through the underworld of formal design is both foolishly elitist and blandly question-begging.

A second solution is to contest Cook's claim that the formal design of music has little or no bearing on its aesthetic effect. Cook is certainly vulnerable to such contestation. His argument consistently turns on the fact that the elements of formal design go unrecognized by listeners. But I do not necessarily fail to perceive something just because I fail to recognize it, or, more exactly, just because I cannot give an explicit retrospective account of my perception of it. A host of human transactions, from seductions to political campaigns (assuming there's a difference) depend on the effectiveness of unrecognized or marginally recognized perceptions. Most movie-goers know nothing at all about film editing, yet it would be strange indeed to suggest that their responses have not been profoundly shaped and even manipulated by the way a movie has been edited. Sonata form may be no different; musical for musicians, it may work for most people in silence. And to the likelihood that formal design in the arts can work as well, or better, in hiding as in the open, we must add the possibility that some designs work unconsciously, in the psychoanalytic sense of being fended off, not simply overlooked, by the listener.

Yet Cook may still have a point. To show that formal patterns *can* shape aesthetic response is not to show that, in every case, they *do*, or that every formal pattern in a given work, or during a given performance, is aesthetically active. There is assuredly *some* degree of disparity between formal design and aesthetic pleasure, and we do need to confront the issues that this raises.

Cook confronts them by forthrightly endorsing the radical separation of formal design (or the knowledge of it) and aesthetic pleasure. The formal side of what he calls "the musical fabric," the side on which musicological knowledge is embroidered, he assigns to the culture of professional musicians engaged in the production, by which he primarily means the performance, of music. "Productional" knowledge enables professionals to imagine, and therefore to make decisions about or, in Roland Barthes's term, to "operate," the music they produce.[2] Although it may serve to enhance the listening pleasure of "connoisseurs," its more impor-

tant function is to enhance the effectiveness of performance. "A performer," writes Cook,

> who has grasped an extended piece in Schenkerian terms may be able to bring to his performance a higher degree of large-scale rhythmic or dynamic shaping just because he has a reflective awareness of the music's structure that exceeds anything that is ordinarily experienced by the listener (p. 4).

As to the listener "himself" (Cook's sexist usage is consistent), he need be concerned only with the "receptional" side of the musical fabric; the arcana of production can take care of themselves. All the listener has to do is—just listen.

Cook's reception-production duality is correlated with two modes of listening that he calls the "musical" and the "musicological." These modes are not created equal. Musical listening is direct, immediate, unreflective, and pleasure-oriented; musicological listening is distanced, mediated, reflective, and knowledge-oriented. Musical listening is based on involvement with the music. Even if it at times incorporates an awareness of formal patterns or "extramusical" connections, such awareness cannot be "foundational" to it (pp. 158, 167). Musicological listening is tendentious. Its purpose is "the establishment of facts and the formulation of theories," and it usually finds exactly what it is looking for. To be sure, Cook reassures us that there is nothing wrong with musicological listening, and he obviously indulges in it himself; like his earlier book *A Guide to Musical Analysis* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1987), this one is full of interesting formal observations that purely "musical" listeners will find hard to follow. But Cook clearly thinks that musicological listening does more harm than good unless it is firmly subordinated to musical listening on the one hand and to the culture of production on the other.

Cook's impatience with a kind of hard-core musical formalism will strike a sympathetic chord in many readers; certainly it strikes one in me. But if the hegemonic regime of musical formalism is a problem, so is Cook's solution to it. In fact, it is exactly the *same* problem. Irrationalism and hyperrationalism are merely two sides of the same coin; morphologically, a populist insistence on the spontaneous pleasures of just listening is no different from an elitist insistence on musical erudition as the prerequisite of true listening. The same binary hierarchy of emotion and thought, intuition and reason, spontaneity and mediation, underwrites each position; each position is made rigid and hyperbolical by the need to police the musical domain against its counterpart. The only difference concerns which end of the seesaw is up.

What Cook fails, crucially, to recognize is that the terms by which he opposes the regime of formalist aesthetics are themselves the historical product of formalist aesthetics. Only with the development of the normative concept of aesthetic pleasure—a higher pleasure structured by the formal design of an artwork—does the concept of a deviant, lower, unstructured pleasure become thinkable. Reversing the hierarchy, so that the unstructured pleasure is idealized as a primary, vital force and the structured pleasure demoted to a pedantic illusion, only perpetuates the regime that it means to oppose.

One sign of that perpetuation is the hectoring tone that surfaces in some of Cook's most forceful statements of his position:

> What the listener is basically concerned with is not the meaning of the [musical] work but its effect; and this is something that requires no mediation and indeed brooks none (p. 173).

> To think that one can understand music in some abstract, symbolical sense that can be separated from . . . aesthetic participation is simply to misunderstand the whole nature of the enterprise. . . . [T]here is only reading [music], memorizing it, performing it, composing it, and listening to it—in short, loving it. . . . [Thus testified] Igor Stravinsky . . . when he remarked, "I haven't understood a bar of music in my life; but I have felt it." Further comment seems superfluous (p. 186).

Rather than mediation, what well-placed people usually do not "brook" is opposition, and the unspoken term resonates harshly in Cook's first statement. (His occasional praise of F.R. Leavis, the vitalist literary critic who in 1948 announced that there had been five, and only five, great novelists in English, adds to the resonance.) As for the second statement, Stravinsky's calculatedly arrogant remark notwithstanding, further comment on the "musical-musicological" duality is anything but superfluous.

As Cook avows, this duality articulates a more basic hierarchical opposition between primary, unreflective experience and secondary, discursive reflection. The reflection both derives from the experience and inevitably falsifies it. In its aesthetic applications, including Cook's, this familiar post-Cartesian opposition is typically invoked to invest art with the power to overcome the alienating effects of reflection. Works of art, like Keats's Grecian urn, are expected to tease us out of thought. That they largely fail to do so, as Keats made a point of showing about the urn, has not done much to alter the expectation, nor has the inner logic we encountered with Cook's musical-musicological duality: the logic by which the "immedi-

ate" term appears only as a retrospective posit of the "mediated" term.

One thing, however, that *has* dented the expectation of a redemptory aesthetic immediacy is some twenty years of anti-foundationalist thinking by literary theorists, cultural theorists, and philosophers. Deconstruction, neopragmatism, Foucauldian theories of discourse, some versions of feminism, psychoanalysis, and ideology critique—all have radically questioned, not to say scourged, the binary opposition of immediacy and reflection. On the one hand, the immediacy of experience is understood from these new perspectives to be discursive and reflective through and through; immediacy, as Jacques Derrida once put it, is *derived.*[3] On the other hand, this derivative character of experience presents no hindrance to pleasure, intensity, or even "spontaneity." Accordingly, the whole question of "experience" needs to be rethought. Or, more exactly, the weight of recent theorizing has done what nineteenth-century expressions of self-doubt like Keats's could not do, and made this re-thinking in some sense imperative.

To all of this, Cook is oblivious. And this deeply undermines his position, not because he fails to be obligingly postmodernist but because he fails to see that any credible defense of the duality on which he depends so much must take account of postmodernist critiques. The redemptory status of art may yet be redeemed (shades of *Parsifal*!) but only by someone who understands why it is in tatters.

In the meantime, one way out of the impasse between untutored musical pleasure and unanchored accounts of musical form might be to regard music in other than aesthetic terms. I am thinking particularly of recent efforts to understand music as one of the energies or agencies of culture, as both a means by which people are acculturated and a means by which culture is (trans)formed.[4] For Cook, however, this possibility does not arise. He considers "reflective" forms of musical hermeneutics to be just another variety of the "musicological" and dismisses attempts to understand music in relation to "social or personal values" or "expressive or representational content" as "not very important" (p. 171). The rare works such as Mozart's *The Marriage of Figaro* and Beethoven's Ninth Symphony that "demand" an "interpretative stance" from the listener are relegated to a hybrid category that makes them "literary as well as musical" (p. 168). More broadly, no interpretative stance can be granted a "foundational" role in my experience as a listener (p. 166); a piece like the third movement of Bartok's *Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta* will "make sense" whether, or not, I hear it as "night sounds" (p. 171).

This position is so dyed in the aesthetic wool that contesting it seems like a fool's errand. You either have to take it or leave it. Leaving it, however, might be easier for undecided readers if its full implications are spelled out, and luckily Cook goes far enough at one point to make that

possible. Contrasting literary with musical works, he argues that the former put substantial constraints on freedom of thought in the reader while the latter largely enfranchise that freedom in the listener. (The distinction is dubious on several grounds, but let that go.) "I can think," he continues,

> of Till Eulenspiegel's merry pranks or listen to Strauss's symphonic poem as absolute music; I can track the evolution of the work's form or see shapes moving in space; I can listen to the E flat clarinet or listen to nothing in particular (p. 170).

For that matter, one might add, I can fall asleep or enjoy a train of sadomasochistic fantasies. But so what?

My answer is that I could do all of these things indifferently if my relationship to Strauss's music were purely private and appropriative. But I will simply not *want* to do most of them if I think of myself as living in history, as having a relationship to a past which is in some measure my own prehistory, and as being dialogically involved with persons and positions, past and present, that differ from me and mine. If Strauss's music means nothing to me but what I narcissistically want it to mean, then it means little more than nothing. Know-nothingism is know-nothingism, even if it is refined enough to notice the E flat clarinet. To be sure, I want to listen to music for pleasure, but I do not demand that my pleasure be ignorant or idealized, or that it be modeled exclusively on perception as opposed to, say, cultural, social, sexual, or discursive interaction.

Music, Imagination, and Culture is, as I said at the head of this review, an intelligent and meticulously argued book. Ironically, given its argument, it is at its best in discussing esoteric matters like fingering and notation; Kant's joke casts a long shadow. But taken as a whole, the book is, or should be, a source of consternation. It sets itself squarely against the malaise that increasingly bedevils the culture of Western art music, but is itself a symptom of that malaise. To paraphrase Karl Kraus's famous wisecrack about psychoanalysis, this book is the sickness of which it believes itself to be the cure.

—*Lawrence Kramer*

NOTES

[1] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science,* trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), Aphorism 193, pp. 205–6.

[2] Roland Barthes, "Musical Practica," in *The Responsibility of Forms,* trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 265.

[3] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology,* trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 157.

[4] For an overview, with bibliography, see Joseph Kerman, "American Musicology in the 1990s," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 9 (1991): 131–44.

Jeremy Yudkin, ed. and trans., *De Musica Mensurata: The Anonymous of St. Emmeram.* Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990. 385 pp.

Now that this new edition and translation of the St. Emmeram Treatise is in hand after a substantial delay in the process of publication, it is assured its place amid the wealth of critical editions and translations of thirteenth-century treatises on measurable music that has accumulated within just the last few decades.[1] The support for this project, which Yudkin graciously acknowledges at the beginning of this volume, is as impressive as it is enthusiastic, and the editor's credentials as a Classical scholar are exceptionally suited to dealing with possibly the most difficult and enigmatic medieval music treatise that has survived to the present day. Libraries, however, should certainly retain Heinrich Sowa's previous critical edition of the St. Emmeram Treatise for its influential "Vorwort" and because significant secondary literature often cites its page and line numbers.[2]

The major contribution of Yudkin's edition is the provision of what I think should be called a "usable" text, the result of a commendable editorial policy that merits consideration in light of other editions of medieval texts. This is a matter addressed in the editor's "Introduction," and we shall return to it later. Of great relevance to his approach is the treatise's composition: it is actually three texts in a single source. Among medieval music treatises, there are didactic poems conveying theoretical principles, such as the *Regulae rhytmicae* of Guido d'Arezzo; there is a didactic poem with interlinear glosses in the *Carmen de musica cum glossis* attributed to Alexander Villa-Dei; and there are treatises comprising mostly commentary, such as the anonymous *Commentarius in Micrologum.*[3] Yet, of all extant theoretical sources, only the St. Emmeram Treatise includes all three types of text—didactic poem, interlinear gloss, and commentary—in a page layout that accommodates all of them (reproduced in a facsimile of the *verso* of the first folio on page 2 of the edition).

Yudkin has firmly and laudably established that the leonine verses, a compilation largely composed from previous prose writings on measurable music, have chronological precedence vis-à-vis the glosses, which he describes as "the second layer of compositional activity" (p. 25). These leonine verses have long perplexed musicologists, and there has been a crucial need for someone of Yudkin's qualifications to examine them. His conclusion that "the innermost layer of writing is of course represented by the poem itself, the implied original text, or *littera*" (p. 21) is most persuasive and an important improvement on Sowa's view of the verses as gloss, amplification, or commentary upon the prose sections of the treatise.[4] The leonine verses twice refer to derivation of *metra* (the verses) from

prosa (72/25 and 288/33).[5] That the author of the leonine verses transformed *dicta* of *auctoritates* into verse is stated in the commentary gloss of the treatise (78/43–45): "Standing by his opinion on the matter, whatever he knew to be useful in prose that *actor* compiled as metrical verse for the use and convenience of posterity."[6] Some scholars have taken this passage to mean that the verses were based upon the prose glosses within the treatise itself, but this is simply not the case.

Yudkin suggests that a metaphor put forth in verse—chicks protected by a mother hen (for the verse protected by prose)—refers to "protection" provided by Johannes de Garlandia's treatise (p. 25). In a line of verse in the St. Emmeram Treatise, a direct borrowing from Garlandian theory is characterized as *prosa* (246/9): "Describit prosa pausam quis cernere glosa" (Prose describes a pause that you can discern in the gloss). The interlinear gloss just above this line of verse gives the prose, "pausa est divisio soni facta in debita quantitate" (a pause is a division of sound made in due quantity). The use of *pausa* rather than *pausatio* keeps it from being a verbatim quotation from the *De mensurabili musica.*[7] However, a similar borrowing from Anonymous 7 is also described as *prosa* (220/3–6): "For, as the prose says, equivalent things should be understood in all the modes. Equivalent things, I say, since if a long is not encountered or a breve is not found in its place, then that which is there should have the value of the breve or long."[8] Thus, it appears hasty to single out Garlandia. There is to my knowledge only one extant concordance to any leonine hexameters of the St. Emmeram Treatise, the quotation of a couplet (272/38 and 274/1) at the end of an anonymous treatise known by the incipit *Quicum vult quintare* (the two manuscript copies of this treatise postdate the St. Emmeram Treatise).[9] This concordance has apparently eluded the editor.

The distinction between *actor,* referred to constantly in the commentary glosses of the treatise and clearly identifying the compiler and author of the leonine verses, and *autor* or *auctor* is more important to understanding the organization of the St. Emmeram Treatise than one might perceive from this edition. Vincent de Beauvais states in his *Speculum maius* that his own opinions and those of *doctores moderni* are introduced by the term *actor.*[10] It should be noted that in the seventh book of his *Speculum musicae,* Jacobus de Liège refers to the author of certain passages he quotes (passages now identified as being from the *Musica speculativa* of his contemporary Jehan de Murs) as *actor.* He refers to authors of previous generations as *auctores.* In the explicit of the seventh book, he refers to himself as both *compilator* and *actor.*[11] As pointed out by Alastair J. Minnis, an *actor* is "an agent in a specialized literary activity which has an integrity all its own," and that activity resulted in a *compilatio.*[12] The *actor* of the St. Emmeram Treatise is thus distinguished from an *auctor* because the *actor* was

(1) contemporary with the glossators of the verses and because (2) his verses comprise a compilation dependent upon the authoritative prose texts of his predecessors.

A new standard for codicological study of medieval music treatises pursued from this side of the Atlantic has been set by Yudkin's "History of the Codex and of the Manuscript." Umberto Eco could not have rustled through Colomann Sanftl's 2400-page catalog of the library of the monastery at St. Emmeram with a surer eye for details or a finer intuition for inference from them. Rare is the scholar who can secure a reader's attention with a host of reiterations: "Item Alexander. Item Statius Achilleidos. Item opus super primam partem Prisciani minoris." Stretching into the dim past of some seven centuries, these codices, now rare treasures of European national archives and libraries, evoke even by their titles the extraordinarily literate society that flourished within the confines of monasteries and abbeys during the Middle Ages and well beyond that time.

Yudkin's evident relish for this task and the care and attention given to this part of the "Introduction," however, may have brought about a misnomer for the treatise as *De Musica Mensurata* (Of measured music), which he has apparently taken from a catalog entry dated 1347 (p. 55). *Cantus tempore mensuratus* and the passive form of the verb, *mensuratur,* appear in thirteenth-century treatises. Although Grocheio (*ca.* 1300) distinguishes simple or vulgar music from composite or ruled music by calling the latter *musica mensurata,* a title of a treatise referring to *musica mensurata* does not arise until the fourteenth century. The treatises of the thirteenth century invariably turn to the phrase *musica mensurabilis* (measurable music) as distinct from *musica plana.* In short, there may be a distinction between *musica mensurabilis* and *musica mensurata* that is as telling and appropriate as that between *ars antiqua* and *ars nova,* and we should be cognizant of it. The edition might have been better served by the title *De Mensurabili Musica,* especially given Yudkin's opinion that the treatise is modelled on the work of Johannes de Garlandia, but this detail should not detract from the more substantive contributions offered by this edition.

* * *

Establishing a "usable" text from thirteenth-century manuscripts is a highly specialized task. The text of the St. Emmeram Treatise is lengthy, and it is written in a hand that more generally has been described as "'écriture microscopique' which is not easy to date or localize."[13] It is exceeded in the density of abbreviations of words (a kind of medieval shorthand developed as a set of scribal conventions that perhaps reaches an apex in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries) only by the

earliest extant manuscript copy of Anonymous 4 (*GB-Lbl* Royal 12 C. VI.), in which almost seventy-nine percent of the words are abbreviated. Given such a manuscript and the objective of reconstructing the text it transmits, it would seem inevitable that there are different readings of that text. In general, Yudkin's reading of the text is reliable and praiseworthy, but there is one abbreviated word which I have read differently and, since it is important to understanding the treatise, I offer it here as an alternative.

There is a line in the facsimile on page 2 that includes an error of transcription that truly cannot be attributed to the editor, for it has proved to be a red herring for quite some time. Counting down from the top of the facsimile on page 2, the reader will find the problematic phrase in the nineteenth line; Yudkin has transcribed this line (beginning with the "etc." in line 36) on page 68. The phrase *divisio leoninis,* repeated at numerous points throughout the treatise, instead should read *divisio lectionis,* the abbreviation being a standard one and available in the most widely known handbook for such matters, Adriano Cappelli's *Dizionario di abbreviature latine ed italiane.* It was no doubt Heinrich Sowa's enthusiasm for the leonine verses of the treatise that initiated this mistranscription in his critical edition in 1930, and it was this same mistranscription that partially led Luther Dittmer to offer a "reconstruction" of a verse-treatise around which the prose of the St. Emmeram Treatise was later devised, and which he attributed to a Leoninus of the generation of Robert de Sabilone.[14]

It is no small difference that this *divisio* divides a *lectio,* or "reading," rather than Sowa's *leoninis* or "the leonine verse." Readings were formalized or institutionalized in a *lectio,* which is succinctly defined in Hugh of St. Victor's *Didascalicon* as follows: "A *lectio* is when we are informed of rules and precepts from those which are written."[15] This reading may bring into question the integrity of the "fictive" *opus* that the editor has hypothesized, and which will be discussed below. There are a few more details in the transcription that one might quibble over, but, in general, they would not alter the substance of the reading the editor has provided. Even when he (justifiably) simplifies a passage, such as on page 106, lines 24–26, Yudkin offers the original text in the critical apparatus.

The "Detailed Description of Libellus IV" (pp. 47–50) lives up to its title in its separate treatment of each of the four gatherings of the manuscript. It is the second of these four gatherings that is of greatest importance, for the scribal hand differs from that in the rest of the manuscript, as do conventions of abbreviation and correction, and the parchment and ruling. Moreover, there is an overlap of what is written at the end of the second gathering and the beginning of the third. This overlap is not addressed in the critical apparatus, but it may be found in "Appendix I" (pp. 338–39), where it is described as "Material Duplicated by Gatherings

1 and 2." (It should, of course, read "Gatherings 2 and 3!") Although Yudkin notes (p. 48) that in the first gathering openings were closed so quickly after the rubrication that a mirror-like stain of the rubricated *paragraphi* may be found on facing folios, he does not mention that this also happens at the opening formed between the first and second gathering (141*v* and 142*r*), such that the rubricated *paragraphus* (¶) at the bottom of 141*v* has "bled" onto the bottom of 142*r*. This means that the second gathering was a part of the manuscript when it was rubricated, which could have been a number of years after it was inscribed, conceivably when the treatise became integrated into the collection at the monastery of St. Emmeram, possibly in the third decade of the fourteenth century (see pp. 56–57).

Regarding the last gathering, the editor indicates that the interlinear gloss on 158*v* is perhaps in different hands, and that the *verso* of the last folio, 159, has musical staves in red ink that were never filled in with music, as has the remnant of what would have been folio 160. But what can these visible elements of the manuscript tell us? Was the manuscript perhaps intended to have an "appendix" of musical works such as we find in *F-Pn* lat. 11266, the earliest extant source for Lambertus? Possibly the second gathering is the work of a second scribe not working side by side with the first scribe but rather supplying additional material or a substitution for something taken away or missing. Yudkin never probes this evidence.

I suggest that the second gathering is indeed an addition, substitution, or revision of some kind, possibly of some lines of verse but certainly of the commentary. It is an expanded discussion of ligatures. One piece of evidence that leads to this conclusion is the *divisio lectionis* on 140*r–v*, just before the second gathering that begins with folio 142. It divides the *lectio* among verses found in the first and third gatherings and only at the very end cites verse lines found in the second gathering. The verses in this *lectio* specifically have to do with the propriety and perfection of ligatures. Much of the commentary in the second gathering concerns the concept of *reductio*. One argument is presented in which ligatures of more than three notes must be with propriety and with perfection (138/33 ff.), otherwise they are not "reducible" to three-note ligatures as they should be. Another argument (140/12 ff.) states that ligatures of more than three notes figured without propriety and with perfection are possible, and it provides a manner of interpreting them. It was, of course, the mensural notation that we find in Franco's *Ars cantus mensurabilis* that rendered the modal doctrine of *reductio* expendable.

Another topic presented in the second gathering is the ligated figure with opposite propriety, that is, with an initial ascending *tractus*. According to one argument presented in the commentary glossing, a binary ligature

with the initial ascending *tractus* indicating opposite propriety (ligated semibreves) cannot be perfect because it is equivalent to a *recta brevis,* and therefore should be drawn with imperfection. This seems to take for granted that perfection of a ligature indicates that the last note is a long, a fundamental premise of Franconian theory. Another argument given is that it should be perfect because it is the *fundamentum* of other ligatures (ligatures of three, four, and more notes) with opposite propriety. An extended commentary on this topic takes up considerable space in the treatise, and almost buried within it is the following: "Also, elsewhere theory says, 'Concerning breves and semibreves, the discernment is the same in their arrangement'" (148/26–27).[16] A variant passage is found in Franco's *Ars cantus mensurabilis,*[17] and it appears to convey the same doctrine, namely that the set of rules or conventions for treating semibreves is essentially the same as that for breves. It would be rash to conclude that Franco was the source of the idea, as it is now generally agreed that the *Ars cantus mensurabilis* postdates this treatise.[18]

The final issue in this second gathering concerns the plication of a ligature. This occurs in commentary that is attached to verses at the beginning of the third gathering. A plica attached to a ligature that ascends from the penultimate to the last note cannot be attached to that ligature if its end is perfect (*e.g.,*). Thus, the plica is attached to such a ligature which is drawn imperfectly but which "retains the nature and effect that perfect figures retain" (*e.g.,* ; 156/30–32). Although Franco resolved the ambiguity inherent in this notation by providing for a plicated imperfect ligature that was drawn obliquely (*e.g.,*) and thus distinct from the end that was "imperfect in form and perfect in effect," there is nothing in Garlandian theory that points in the direction Franco took.

My point in this *Exkurs* on the second gathering is that almost all of the discussion it contains, framed as *disputatio* or *questio-responsio,* turns on issues that lead up to or are related to Franconian theory—perhaps more so than anywhere else in the manuscript. Does this gathering reflect more timely and contentious issues than other parts of the manuscript? What influence did these issues and the manner in which they are addressed here have on Franconian theory? Did Franconian theory arise from the revision of theoretical principles to be attributed to Johannes de Garlandia alone, or did it emerge from a *fornax studii* (furnace of study) such as that alluded to at the beginning of the St. Emmeram Treatise? Is the *controversia antiquorum et aliquorum modernorum* that Franco sought to restrain immediately reflected here? Yudkin's assessment that this treatise is largely a defense of prose writings on measurable music has brought us closer to the reality of what underlies this grand and mysterious body of writings. But what motivated such a defense of these doctrines, mostly ascribed by mod-

ern scholarship to Johannes de Garlandia? Was there a reform movement in liturgical practice or a suppression of polyphony? Why is Johannes never mentioned in this treatise while the apparent threat to these doctrines, Lambertus, is? These are questions that we shall have to address before we can lay claim to an adequate understanding of this treatise.

* * *

The editor advises us that the style of the St. Emmeram Treatise is unlike that of any other important treatise on music and that this style "captures the essence of a long tradition of medieval thought and exegesis" (p. 1). Style, as meant in this context, is literary style, and there follows an elucidation of the three textual elements that, together, make this treatise unique among extant writings on music during the thirteenth century. It is perhaps disappointing to discover that, despite the model of biblical exegesis that Yudkin invokes and the "pervasiveness of this technique" (by which is meant commentary and interlinear gloss attached to a text), he considers the format of the treatise "deceptive" and the form "deliberately fictive." It is puzzling that a medieval writer should have worked with a "fiction of separate authorship" and a "façade" such as Yudkin proposes (pp. 27, 33). If Yudkin's idea that the format of the treatise is "deceptive" and the form "deliberately fictive" is correct, why should this author have embarked upon the exceedingly imaginative enterprise of parodying a didactic poem and penning his own commentary, thereby violating one of the central conventions of the era by fictionalizing an "authoritative text," in defense of the theoretical doctrines of Johannes de Garlandia? Yudkin's answer is apparently "reconciliation."

Yudkin's single-author hypothesis sometimes leads him to adduce contradictory evidence. At one point he states that the opening of the St. Emmeram Treatise is a "deliberate imitation" of the opening of the *Tractatus* of Lambertus (p. 8), even though he advises us that such a "Quoniam" opening was "a favorite device of thirteenth-century [liberal] arts treatises" (p. 8 n. 23). It is indeed a frequent opening for medieval treatises and *quodlibet* disputations, and to describe its use as "deliberate imitation" is therefore tenuous at best. Both Johannes de Grocheio's *Ars musicae* and the *abbreviatio* of Petrus Picardus of the thirteenth century begin with "Quoniam," but this hardly argues for their being a deliberate citation of either Lambertus or the St. Emmeram Treatise. The first chapter of Walter Odington's *Summa* begins "Quoniam de musica presens est pertactatio" and that of Jehan de Murs's *Notitia* "Quoniam musica est de sono relato ad numeros." It is simply a frequent turn of phrase for the beginning of a treatise.

The treatment of the form of the treatise is indecisive. At one point Yudkin describes it as "fictive" (p. 3), at another as "a *prosimetrum* in the tradition of Boethius's *The Consolation of Philosophy*" (p. 9), and at yet another as being "modelled upon that of Johannes de Garlandia" (p. 16). The St. Emmeram Treatise does not have quite the same ordering of topics as that found in the *De mensurabili musica,* because it first considers notational "figures" and then the rhythmic modes. That the form of the St. Emmeram Treatise is "fictive" or that it is a *prosimetrum* is not entirely convincing.

The evidence that Yudkin adduces concerning an author for this *prosimetrum* cum *tractatus* is first that he was trained at a university. This much would seem certain, for in the commentary of this treatise there is an incredible range of literary allusions and quotations from Ovid to Adam of St. Victor. The editor does not mention the omission of any reference to Aristotle, which may have resulted from a hesitancy attributable to the decade in which it was written, since Stephan Tempier, Bishop of Paris, twice condemned the "heresy" of Aristotelian philosophy in the 1270s.[19] On account of the condemnations of Aristotelianism in this decade, the community of the university had an unusual opportunity to turn to music, perhaps in part as a topic upon which logic could be exercised without rousing the wrath of the church's censors, or even as a demonstration that logic and faith, university and cathedral, were not so distant from one another. This development may have had profound repercussions for the Western tradition of music. Christopher Page's idea that practical musical teaching was not part of the formal curriculum at the university, especially among the generation that Anonymous 4 identifies as the *antiqui,* is wholly convincing, but if we search for a reason for the "great incursion of discursive literacy" that Page posits for 1270–1300,[20] we may concur that we will find our path leading us to the university.

Yudkin states that Garlandia and Lambertus were *magistri* at the same university. His sole support for this conclusion is the title *magister,* which he associates with the university. Though this information was not available to Yudkin at press time, Page has established that the title *magister* "was widely used to denote a cleric who had mastered any art of moment to the Church and was equipped to teach."[21] I am convinced that Garlandian theory belonged to Anonymous 4's *antiqui,* as there is no evidence to support measurable music having been a topic considered at the university during that time. Yudkin writes that "the treatise is described in terms of a university text" (p. 43). If by this he means that a didactic poem was often glossed and accumulated commentary, this was indeed characteristic of education in general in the Middle Ages, though more so of elementary education than of university texts.

The poet Johannes de Garlandia's hexametric *Morale scholarium,* which Louis J. Paetow dates 1241, might support Yudkin's hypothesis, for it is a parallel worth considering in light of the treatment of Lambertus in the St. Emmeram Treatise. Its incipit is "I write a new satire" (scribo novam satiram), and it accumulated anonymous commentary that reads, "*Satyra* is an oration of a reformer for the purpose of chastising the vices of men, just as such deeds are detestable; moreover, because of this, that which is called such an oration excludes the censorious sermon that may be malicious in purpose." There is a distinction between the medieval concept of a "satire" and the classical concept as defined in the Menippean satire, which uses the medley of prose and verse specifically called *satura,* and which is the tradition that Yudkin invokes in describing this treatise. Yudkin supports his single-author hypothesis largely by recourse to Boethius's *De consolatione philosophiae* and Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis philologiae et mercurii,* yet, had these been models for the St. Emmeram Treatise, the verses of this treatise would not have been uniform leonine hexameters throughout but rather of varying meters and patterns of rhyme such as we find in these *prosimetra.* Moreover, there are significant differences between the rambling potpourri of prose and verse in Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis* and the philosophical synthesis apparent in Boethius's *Consolation* that are swept away by oversimplification. Why turn to these works as models for the St. Emmeram Treatise when later medieval works, such as the *Morale scholarium* and *Ecloga theoduli,* more aptly set a precedent for its poetic form, didactic and moralizing character, and even page layout?

Although Yudkin mentions Alexander de Villa Dei's *Doctrinale* as a precedent for the verses of the St. Emmeram Treatise, there are other medieval "textbooks" in leonine hexameters that should be mentioned. The *Ecloga Theoduli,* for example, is now generally ascribed to a tenth-century anonymous author referred to as Theodulus.[22] Comprising 352 hexametric leonine verses, it is a rhetorical contest between a pagan shepherd Pseustis, who draws upon mythology for his argument, and a Christian shepherdess Alithia, who in turn draws upon the Old Testament for hers, and it was called a *satiricum* (defined in the same sense as that in the commentary to Garlandia's *Morale scholarium* given above) by Bernard of Utrecht before the end of the eleventh century.[23] Of medieval lists of *auctores* upon which school curricula were based,[24] the *Ecloga Theoduli* appears in all but one. Even the mention of Theodulus in Rabelais's *Gargantua* testifies to the hardy endurance of its exposition and contrast of pagan *fabulae* with religious moral doctrine in education.[25] And what is particularly striking is that the page layout in many sources is the same as that found in the St. Emmeram Treatise, with large, bold script for the hexameters of the original poem, groupings of which are separated by didactic commentary gloss

by later writers.

That the opposition of Christian verity and pagan falsity presented in the *Ecloga Theoduli* is analogous to the opposition of the musical doctrine of the St. Emmeram Treatise to that of Lambertus—or as he was apparently known to Jacobus de Liège, "Aristotle"—is transparent though circumstantial. If indeed the *Ecloga Theoduli* was ubiquitous in medieval classrooms, as the lists of curricula suggest, it may well have provided the general theme of moralizing leonine verse, namely the righteous defeat of false doctrine or those who promulgated it.

There are ample medieval precedents for the leonine verses of the St. Emmeram Treatise, both regarding their didactic function and their apparent moralizing purpose in the manner in which Lambertus is addressed. Furthermore, there is precedent for commentary by others becoming attached to such verses and even for the page layout that occurs in the St. Emmeram Treatise, when such commentary is transmitted in the same source as the object of its commentary. Still, there is no medieval precedent known to me for an author of Latin verses having also provided an extensive commentary to them as a "fictive façade." (Dante, of course, provides some important self-commentary in his *Il Convivio,* but this is in Italian and not at all "fictive.") Yudkin raises a suspicion that John of Salisbury commented upon one of his own works and Gerald of Wales "at several points" did something of the same (p.10 n. 31), but this seems very slight evidence.

Yudkin suggests that the author of the St. Emmeram Treatise was both a *magister* at the university and a singer at Notre Dame or another local church, in part because the only *magister* mentioned in the commentary of the treatise, Henricus de Daubuef, was a canon of the diocese of Paris. Yudkin's archival research on this *magister* indeed has been productive, and he has contributed further documentation to ascertain the activities of Henricus, who appears in the cartularies of Notre Dame as Henricus de Tuebuef. His retrieval of this information has successfully narrowed the date of the treatise, which Michel Huglo questioned in 1980.[26]

Yudkin's archival work has uncovered a likely candidate for Lambertus as well, a dean of the Cathedral at Soignies who died in 1270 and whose executor was Robert de Sorbon. This link with Robert de Sorbon suggests that Yudkin could be on the right track, for Palemon Glorieux lists Henricus de Tuebuef as an early associate of the Sorbonne on the basis of a document dated 1297.[27] Now if Henricus is quoted in the St. Emmeram Treatise as *venerablis magister noster,* it is not improbable that the Sorbonne was the *fons et origo* of this magnificent compilation of didactic verse and commentary upon it, and one might surmise the verses to have been contrived to put these students through their paces. I think that may well be why the

treatise "reflects the use of the *disputatio* genre in its argumentation over several controversial issues," as Yudkin points out (p. 7). That is also why we see such a dependence upon *auctoritates,* often to the point of near verbatim quotation, and the lavish display of literary knowledge and vocabulary. Conceivably, students at the Sorbonne literally, not just figuratively or fictively, "responded" to the challenge put before them in the form of leonine verses in one (or perhaps more) of those formal affairs that no longer characterize university training, the *disputatio* or responsion.

* * *

Let us return to the idea of a "usable text." What precisely is a critical edition of a medieval treatise on music, what are its goals, and most especially what are the attributes of this publication that make it a critical edition? Those who will put Yudkin's new edition and translation to effective use will not find the usual exhaustive *apparatus criticus* that often expends most of a page of a critical edition and generally intimidates the non-specialist. The reason is that we have here but a single manuscript source, and instead of variants and stemmata in the Lachmannian tradition of textual criticism, the editor has focussed on different matters. Yudkin states that the purpose of his critical apparatus is "to indicate every aspect of the original state of the text, including scribal errors, corrections, deletions, or additions; to record manuscript idiosyncrasies (marginalia, for example); and to provide the alternative readings given in the Sowa edition" (p.59).

But what then, the reader may inquire, makes this a "critical edition" as distinct from an "edition," if there are no sources to collate and variants from which to determine an "authentic text," or at least an archetype? What has happened to the scholarly tradition of the critical edition with the specific goal of retrieving a so-called "authentic text" from a number of copies that are presumed to contain errors of transmission, of which Erich Reimer's *Johannes de Garlandia: De mensurabili musica* is perhaps the most significant (and unfortunately perhaps a misleading) contribution? Has Yudkin espoused Joseph Bédier's textual-critical methods in dealing with Jean Renart's *Le lai de l'ombre,* or perhaps the newest "new philology?"[28]

These matters the editor does not address, but he does state that he would have preferred to have followed a *nouvelle vague,* a preference confounded by a perception that "musicology, however, is by no means on the cutting edge of literary or scholarly fashion" (p.58). This ideal consists of "critical editions of works from the middle ages in versions as close as possible to the originals, with all their inconsistencies of spelling, irregu-

larities of syntax, vernacularized grammar, and period structure far from Classical purity" (p. 58). Such an edition might best be utilized by the specialist who would prefer to have a facsimile. The "cutting edge" was a blunted cliché before this edition went to print, and the aspersion its use casts does not make scholarship fashionable. A "usable" text has now been made available to less philologically inclined musicologists who may comment in depth regarding the contents of the treatise.

* * *

Indiana University Press offers a volume that is perhaps sturdier than it is handsome. The cover is attractive but the typeface could have been better. There are some typographical errors (*e.g.*, 80/19 "kiura" for "iura"; 118/41 in the critical apparatus "pinxi" for the first "punxi"), and a marginal addition to the text has been misplaced (164/26-29 belongs at 164/17 between *abusivas* and *Item*), but on the whole Yudkin has reconstructed the text in a modern format that is reliable and readable.

Translation is inevitably compromise. There is no English equivalent that can fully restore the rich contextual premises of such words as *convenientia* or *modulatio*. Yudkin sometimes translates *ars* as "treatise" and sometimes as "art" (see for example p. 135 and his own statement on p. 61), and this is greater flexibility than one might hope for; at the same time he gives us "equipollently" for *aequipollentialiter*, which is too rigid. One aspect of Yudkin's translation may prove awkward for many readers, and that involves the lemmata, that is, the quotations of beginnings of verses as headings for sections of commentary. Often we find a situation such as that at 138/17 and 139, where "Quatuor, etc." appears in the translation on the facing page as "This precept, etc." The separate courses of transcription and translation thus collide on occasions rather than orbit around a central premise of clarity, but this is largely due to difficulties among the leonine verses, which finally, in many cases, have been rendered accessible by Yudkin's translation.

A particularly happy occurrence in this critical edition is the inclusion of a Latin index (volumes in the series *Corpus Scriptorum de Musica* most regrettably lack this feature). The St. Emmeram Treatise has about 5,000 word tokens, but this is not an accurate reflection of its vocabulary, since Latin is such a highly inflected language.[29] Suffice it to say that that is about twice the number of word tokens in the treatise of Anonymous 4, which, among thirteenth-century music treatises, comes closest in sheer length to this one, but which is notoriously repetitive in phrasing in at least its first two chapters. Since *quidam* is so important for tracing the various issues raised in the treatise, it is unfortunate it was not included in

the index, which is otherwise sufficiently large and most helpful. And special recognition should go to Andrew Hughes, who was responsible for the computerized reproduction of the musical examples—they are superb. It perhaps should have been noted in the edition that the hocket example of "Amen" (pp. 226–27) is incomplete in the manuscript, and the edition is accurate at this point.

It will take some time for this immensely interesting project to be absorbed by the international community of scholars and performers to whom it has been addressed. This is a complex and important treatise, and the discussions that this edition should generate ought to bring us closer to an understanding of *musica mensurabilis,* the relationship between theory and practice during the thirteenth century, and a viable set of principles for interpretation of the repertories with which it deals. In that respect, Yudkin and all those who contributed to this edition deserve a warm round of applause.

—*Sandra Pinegar*

NOTES

[1] See for example, *Der Musiktraktat des Anonymus 4,* ed. Fritz Reckow, Beihefte zum Archiv für Musikwissenschaft [BAMw], 4–5 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1967); *Johannes de Garlandia: De mensurabili musica: kritische Edition mit Kommentar und Interpretation der Notationslehre,* ed. Erich Reimer, BAMw 10–11 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972); *Die Quellenhandschriften zum Musiktraktat des Johannes de Grocheo,* ed. Ernst Rohloff (Leipzig: Deutscher Verlag für Musik, 1972); *Franconis de Colonia: Ars Cantus Mensurabilis,* ed. Gilbert Reaney and André Gilles, *Corpus Scriptorum de Musica* [*CSM*] 18 (Rome: American Institute of Musicology, 1974).

[2] *Ein anonymer glossierter Mensuraltraktat 1279,* Königsberger Studien zur Musikwissenschaft, 9 (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1930).

[3] *Scriptores ecclesiastici de musica sacra* [GS] (St. Blasien, 1784; reprint 1963), 2:25 ff.; Alexander de Villa Dei, *Carmen de musica cum glossis,* ed. Albert Seay (Colorado Springs: Colorado College Music Press, 1977); *Expositiones in Micrologum Guidonis Aretini: Liber argumentorum, Liber specierum, Metrologus, Commentarius in Micrologum Guidonis Aretini,* ed. Joseph Smits van Waesberghe (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1957).

[4] Sowa, xii–xiii.

[5] References are to page and line.

[6] "In cuius rei opinione consistens actor iste quicquid utile in prosa cognovit compilavit metrice ad usum et commodum posterorum." Translations of this and subsequent quoted passages are my own.

[7] *Johannes de Garlandia,* ed. Erich Reimer, BAMw 10, 64. *I-Rvat* lat. 5325 has *dimissio* ("omission") rather than *divisio,* while *F-Pn* lat. 16663 has *divisio.* Since it is incomplete, *Bruges 528* does not contain the definition.

[8] "Nam ut dicit prosa, equipollenta in omnibus modis intelligenda sunt. Equipollenta dico ut si non inveniatur longa vel brevis suo loco accipiatur illud quod loco brevis vel longe repertum est." The statement by Anonymous 7 in both *F-Pn* lat. 6268, folio 13*v*a, and *Bruges 528,* folio 58*r*a, reads: "Equipollentia enim intelligenda est in omnibus modis. Equipollentia dico, ut si non sequantur post unam longam due breves per ordinem, accipiatur illud quod

loco duarum brevium invenitur, quia quandoque pro duabus brevibus ponuntur tres breves vel quatuor, vel si post duas breves non sequatur longa trium temporum accipiatur suum equipollens, quia aliquando pro una longa trium temporum ponitur brevis et longa que valent unam longam."

[9] Klaus-Jürgen Sachs provides a transcription of the treatise in "Zur Tradition der Klangschritt-Lehre," *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft* 28 (1971): 261–63.

[10] Alastair J. Minnis, "Late-Medieval Discussions of *Compilatio* and the Role of the *Compilator*," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* 101 (1979): 389.

[11] *Jacobi Leodiensis Speculum Musicae,* ed. Roger Bragard, *CSM* 3 (Rome: AIM, 1955–73), 7:15–16, 66, 98.

[12] Minnis, 390.

[13] R.W. Hunt, "Studies on Priscian in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries," in *The History of Grammar in the Middle Ages,* ed. G.L. Bursill-Hall (Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 1980), 2.

[14] Luther Dittmer, *Eine zentrale Quelle der Notre-Dame Musik* (Brooklyn: Institute of Mediaeval Music, 1959), 88–95.

[15] *PL* 176:741A; Jerome Taylor, *The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 44. Also see John W. Baldwin, *Masters, Princes and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and His Circle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), I:91.

[16] "Item alibi dicit ars: brevium et semibrevium idem est in ordinatione iudicium."

[17] Reaney and Gilles, *Franconis de Colonia: Ars Cantus Mensurabilis,* 38/21.

[18] See Wolf Frobenius, "Zur Datierung von Francos *Ars cantus mensurabilis,*" *AMw* 27 (1970): 122–27. For different conclusions regarding the dating, see Gordon A. Anderson, "Review," *ML* 54 (1973): 454–55; Kenneth Levy, "A Dominican Organum Duplum," *JAMS* 27 (1974): 184, n. 3.

[19] See Gordon Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), 229 ff.; Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages,* ed. F.M. Powicke and A.B. Emden (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), III:363. The documents are available in *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* ed. Heinrich Denifle and Emile Chatelain (Paris: Frères Delalaine, 1889–97), I:486 (no. 432) and 543 (no. 473).

[20] Christopher Page, *The Owl and the Nightingale* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1989), 152.

[21] Christopher Page, 146.

[22] There is a critical edition by Joannes Osternacher in *Fünfter Jahresbericht des bischöflichen Privat-Gymnasiums am Kollegium Petrinum in Urfahr für das Schuljahr 1901/02* (Urfahr, 1902). See also August A. Beck, *Theoduli eclogam* (Sangerhusiae: Ed. Dittmarium, 1836).

[23] R.B.C. Huygens, *Accessus ad auctores* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970), 62. Conrad of Hirsau (d. *ca.* 1150) gives a similar definition in his *Dialogus super auctores, idem,* 76.

[24] Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages,* trans. W.R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 49–51. There are lists by Conrad of Hirsau (early twelfth-century), Alexander Neckham (late twelfth-century), Évrard de Béthune in his *Laborintus* (between 1212 and 1280), and Hugo of Trimberg in the *Registrum multorum auctorum* (1280).

[25] Theodulus appears in chapter 14 of *Gargantua,* named by the diminutive "Theodelet."

[26] Michel Huglo, "De Francon de Cologne à Jacques de Liège," *Revue belge de musicologie* 34–35 (1980–81): 48.

[27] Palemon Glorieux, *Aux origines de la Sorbonne: 1. Robert de Sorbon,* Etudes de philosophie médiévale, 53 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1966), 13. It appears that Yudkin did not consult volume 53 of this series and missed this important part of Glorieux's research.

[28] Joseph Bédier, "La Tradition manuscrite du *Lai de l'ombre,* réflexions sur l'art d'éditer

les anciens textes," *Romania* 54 (1928): 161–96; 321–56. I call attention to volume 65/1 (January, 1990) of *Speculum,* edited by Stephen G. Nichols. Under the common title "The New Philology," each article addresses a number of issues that are important to defining scholarly methods in dealing with medieval textuality.

[29] The St. Emmeram Treatise actually has about 37,000 words, the *De mensurabili musica* close to 6,000, Lambertus as transmitted in *F-Pn* lat. 11266 almost 8,900, and Anonymous 4 as transmitted in *GB-Lbl* Royal 12 C. VI. under 20,000. Yudkin's figures for these treatises, given on p. 1, are inaccurate.

John Caldwell, Edward Olleson, and Susan Wollenberg, eds. ***The Well Enchanting Skill: Music, Poetry, and Drama in the Culture of the Renaissance.*** Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. x, 275 pp.

Anyone conducting even rudimentary research into the role of music in Shakespeare's plays will encounter F. W. Sternfeld's *Music in Shakespearean Tragedy,* first published in 1963 and still a classic in the field. Peter Ward Jones, at the end of the book under review, offers a list of 230 works by Sternfeld, whose interests clearly extend to music and literature of many times and many lands. Yet the Renaissance has repeatedly captivated his attention, and *The Well Enchanting Skill,* a festschrift for Sternfeld to which seventeen distinguished musicologists and literary scholars have contributed, will serve as partial repayment for the intellectual pleasure he has given his readers for decades. Of course, like most other festschrifts, this one has its rough spots; nevertheless, the collection as a whole—in which research, imagination, and readability join in rare harmony—delivers an impressive array of approaches to Renaissance culture.

Part One, focusing on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italy, opens with an essay by Howard Mayer Brown on Francesco Corteccia's madrigals from the 1530s and 1540s. How, Brown asks, can we distinguish madrigals written for theatrical productions from madrigals composed for nondramatic performances? By sifting through Corteccia's madrigals and examining their texts, Brown offers some tentative guidelines for identifying potential music for the theater. Jane Glover moves us ahead a hundred years with her brief discussion of the effect that popular taste had on seventeenth-century Venetian opera (plots became increasingly unbelievable, and recitative gave way to the aria as the favored vehicle for impassioned expression). The Italian cantata, the subject of Carolyn Gianturco's essay, has been accused of giving poetry a negligible role in "determining musical form and style" (p. 42); Gianturco, however, demonstrates a clear relationship between poetic and musical form in the cantata. Eleanor Selfridge-Field, writing on seventeenth-century theory and practice, comments chiefly on the shift from "music as a context for intellectual exercise" to "music as an aural experience" (p. 54). Closing the first set of essays is Silke Leopold's persuasive argument that Merulo's "Curtio precipitato," through its musical allusions, playfully parodies Monteverdi's style.

Although they deliver their information clearly, the opening selections, gathered together under the heading "Music, Theatre, and Text in the Italian Renaissance," will disappoint some readers. Leopold's is the only essay with a clear thesis and a well-developed argument; the others are either sketchy or inconclusive (Brown's and Gianturco's look like promising works-in-progress). Some of the broad statements are too general to be useful or

enlightening. Glover, for example, writes that the "combination of spectacle and intimacy . . . characterized Venetian opera throughout the seventeenth century" (p. 32), but surely spectacle and intimacy characterize *Orfeo, Pygmalion, Die Walküre*—almost any opera you can think of. And Selfridge-Field tells us that, because of the "alliance . . . of music and nature" in seventeenth-century Venice, "collections of sacred music with titles referring to a *giardino* or a *ghirlanda* . . . are very much in character with the intellectual climate" (p. 58); yet given the enormous number of similar names for collections in every era—indeed, any *anthology* ("a gathering of flowers") qualifies—one hesitates to make special claims for the seventeenth century based on the word *garden* or *garland* in a title.

"Music and the Theatre in Seventeenth-Century England," the next set of essays, begins with David Lindley's reassessment of music in Shakespeare's works. Lindley's concerns are largely those of new historicism—subversion and containment, the patriarchal socio-political system versus a female or effeminate "other" (a category into which music was often forced)—and his essay, offering genuinely new readings, covers a large number of plays with enviable economy and insight. The role of music in the Jacobean masque is the focus of Christopher R. Wilson's contribution, which gives particular attention to the masques of Campion and Jonson. In Wilson's view, Campion "gave music a theatrical function . . . which, had he possessed the musical language, might have led on to opera . . . ," but he eventually "fell victim to . . . its overemphasis on lavish scenic design and conflicting artistic aims" (p. 105). Peter Walls also considers masque conventions; he argues that the unconventional middle section of Milton's *Comus,* which does not deliver the allegory of virtue triumphing over vice that one might expect, dramatizes "the kind of moral uncertainty and danger that is often encountered in real life" (p. 110). Another essay on Milton, by Elizabeth Mackenzie, traces the operatic element in *Paradise Lost* from Milton's early drafts (when he seriously considered writing a dramatic rather than a narrative work) to Dryden's *The State of Innocence,* a libretto—never furnished with music—based on Milton's epic. Turning from the quintessential Puritan to the quintessential Restoration rake, Part Two concludes with Peter Holman's apparent discovery of the music for Rochester's *Valentinian* in Louis Grabu's *Pastoralle,* a collection of instrumental works published in 1684.

This second set of essays, whether by chance or by editorial method, has more unity and direction than the first set and is, on the whole, more satisfying. The piece by Walls, though somewhat skimpy and probably the weakest of the five, nevertheless has a point to make and makes it well. One of Lindley's statements—that in Spenser's *Faerie Queene* "the same birds sing in the corrupted Bower of Bliss as accompany the harmonious vision of the Garden of Adonis" (p. 84)—might lead us to believe that birds actually *sing*

in the Garden of Adonis; but Spenser writes that they "tell" (*FQ* 3.6.42), not sing, of their true loves, and the speechlike communication of the birds in the Garden contrasts strikingly with the seductive music of the birds in the Bower (*FQ* 2.12.70-72). Mackenzie blurs the facts when she writes, "Normally, the story of the masque would not be sung, though as Jonson tells us in his *Lovers Made Men* (1617) 'the whole Maske was sung (after the Italian manner) *stylo recitativo*'" (p. 119). That statement does appear in the preface to the masque, but not before the 1640 folio edition, and modern scholars have questioned Jonson's accuracy on this point.[1] Despite these cavils, though, the essays in Part Two, taken as a group, nicely complement one another and consistently shed new light on the works under discussion.

The last and longest section concentrates on "English Music and English Poetry." *Orpheus and Eurydice,* as told by the fifteenth-century Scottish poet Robert Henryson, comes under scrutiny in John Caldwell's opening essay. Orpheus and his rhetorical skill (his "harp of eloquence") become, in Caldwell's opinion, symbols of *musica humana,* which Henryson seems to rank higher than *musica mundana* and *musica instrumentalis.* Two essays center on Sir Philip Sidney, whose assertion that the poet "cometh to you with words set in delightful proportion, either accompanied with, or prepared for, the well enchanting skill of music" (p. 153) gives the festschrift its title. In the first, John Stevens speculates on Sidney's knowledge and possible use of pre-existing melodies—several of which have surfaced only recently—and concludes with the suspicion that "far more" of Sidney's lyrics "were in fact sung than we know about" (p. 169). In the second, Katherine Duncan-Jones, Sidney's most recent biographer, examines the relationship of William Byrd and Thomas Watson to Sidney. She regards *Italian Madrigals Englished* (1590), a publication on which both Byrd and Watson collaborated, as a "wedding present" for the Earl of Essex, who had married Sidney's widow—hence the "extraordinarily sprightly tone" we find in the collection's tributes to the deceased Sidney (p. 178). Following the pair of essays on Sidney is a pair tracing the fortunes of two English songs: John M. Ward charts the history of "Greensleeves" from sixteenth-century manuscripts to a recording by John Coltrane, while David Greer studies the reception and transformations of Robert Jones's lute-song "Farewell Dear Love." Reassessing the social function of music at the time of the Commonwealth, Mary Chan, through an examination of texts and manuscript settings of songs, suggests that "public concerts were an important part of social life in London in the late 1640s and early 1650s . . ." (p. 232). And John Carey, drawing Part Three to a close, proposes (against received opinion) that "Milton had serious misgivings, moral and intellectual, about music . . ." (p. 254).

As this brief description probably indicates, the last section, like the first, has something of a grab-bag quality to it, though chronological ordering of

the subjects provides a semblance of cohesion. But these are essays in a festschrift, and it would be churlish to expect a unified picture to emerge at the end. Chan's essay, though fascinating, raises the largest number of doubts and ultimately does not convince me that the frequency of public musical performances in Cromwell's England has been underestimated. Too much of her argument hinges on a few manuscripts. When she writes that an "audience is implied . . . by songs with veiled political reference, for such songs lose their point unless sung before an audience . . ." (p. 238), is she suggesting that individuals, in private, could not appreciate these allusions or sympathize with the sentiments expressed? And, as a lutenist, I find it hard to imagine a musician copying down, however sloppily, even two measures of melody and tablature during the performance of a song (p. 237). John Carey's theory, in contrast, rings true and regrettably calls to mind several other Miltonic passages in which music or musical instruments have a dubious function. At the raising of Pandaemonium, for instance, molten gold enters "each hollow nook" of a mold prepared at the building's foundation,

> As in an Organ from one blast of wind
> To many a row of Pipes the sound-board breaths.
> Anon out of the earth a Fabrick huge
> Rose like an Exhalation, with the sound
> Of Dulcet Symphonies and voices sweet. . . .
>
> (*Paradise Lost* 1.707-12)

The touches of sweet harmony accompanying this hellish vision seem odd coming from Milton the supposed music lover, but not from Carey's Milton.

In the Foreword by Sir Michael Tippett, we learn that Sternfeld, who has suffered from eye troubles, may still present us with another major study, one on the origins of opera. This attractive prospect will raise high expectations among Sternfeld's admirers. For now, however, they will find much to contemplate and enjoy in this homage to a modern-day Renaissance man.

—*Erik S. Ryding*

NOTE

[1] See, for example, Winifred Maynard, *Elizabethan Lyric Poetry and Its Music* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 136–37.

Maynard Solomon. ***Beethoven Essays.*** Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988. xi, 375 pp.

Some scholars attain so great an authority in their chosen fields that evaluation of their work becomes presumptuous and praise almost supererogatory. Maynard Solomon, in writing on the life of Beethoven, has earned this position, and the contents of the present *Beethoven Essays* confirm this standing. In fact, the very existence of this collection attests to his stature.

The volume comprises fifteen essays plus an annotated English translation of Beethoven's Tagebuch. Most of these studies have been published elsewhere over the course of the last twenty years; five have done duty as papers given at professional meetings. Two essays are new, and others have been expanded. Harvard University Press may have been generous to a fault in reprinting three items already available in books devoted wholly to Beethoven, since these books will undoubtedly sit beside the *Beethoven Essays* in many personal and institutional libraries.[1] But reprinting brings its benefits; everything here that is making a second appearance has been revised, with both fact and style being subjected to correction. Nor has Solomon flinched from excising substantial passages where these have been absorbed into other writings of his.

In 1972 Solomon published the article that successfully established Antonie Brentano as Beethoven's "immortal beloved," and his full biography of the composer came five years later.[2] These two projects displayed his scholarly gifts to a wide public. Readers could see how deft he was in sifting evidence, how persistent in seeking out the patterns that control details, and how rigorous in applying his interpretative skills. Solomon belongs to a tradition of Beethoven scholars whose endeavors resist being ensnared by the power of their composer's music or by its aesthetic demands. One thinks of A.W. Thayer and of Gustav Nottebohm and more recent sketch researchers such as the authors of *The Beethoven Sketchbooks.*[3] Exploring inaccessible areas that lie somewhat apart from music, these writers, like Solomon, are nevertheless Beethovenian in a special way; in their grandly conceived undertakings they re-create a cluster of qualities—pertinacity, self-discipline, perfectionism—that Beethoven brought to his musical calling.

In only one essay, namely, "The Ninth Symphony: A Search for Order," does Solomon plumb the meaning of an artwork. He shows the Ninth to be a quest in both a mythic and a psychological sense. Richard Taruskin has pronounced this essay to be "especially rich and pregnant,"[4] and one cannot escape being impressed by the range of the author's reading and

by the intellectual sensitivity and rhetorical finesse with which he sets forth his speculative arguments. Could this essay, which intertwines mythological, religious, psychological, and musical-technical knowledge, become a model for decoding other masterpieces? This may be a doomed hope, so close does the "Choral" Symphony come to being a genre in and by itself and so specifically does the mythic element enter it through the agency of Schiller's words. Yet in the last ten years or so several authors have delved, for example, into the Promethean significance that lies within the *Eroica* Symphony.[5]

The two new studies in the Beethoven Essays find Solomon on his home territory. In "Recherche de Josephine Deym" he decisively concludes that Countess Deym-Stackelberg is an impostor when cast in the role of the "immortal beloved," though some writers have recently favored her for the part.[6] In the other new essay, "The Posthumous Life of Ludwig Maria van Beethoven," Solomon ventures a fresh psychoanalytical interpretation by tracing how Beethoven's older brother, who died in April 1769, figured in the composer's inner life. The internalized Ludwig Maria, functioning as a twin of sorts, is thematically linked to the birth-year delusion, the nobility pretense, and the fantasy of illegitimacy, all of which burdened Beethoven. Specialized studies in the *Beethoven Essays* deal directly with these topics, but Solomon's work is everywhere infused with psychological awareness. It is the thread that binds the collection together. Through it, diverse aspects of Beethoven's life, ranging from his career choices to his political and religious thinking, are made more understandable.

Biographers can draw up a psychological portrait of an artist, and they can narrate the events of a lifetime, but to connect these matters to their subject's creative output is to touch upon some much-disputed issues: to what extent does knowledge of the artist's intentions of proximate or distant personal motivations, of social inducements and institutional requirements, and of ideological and political contexts illuminate a work of art? In an essay entitled "Thoughts on Biography" Solomon weighs these questions, with frequent though not exclusive reference to Beethoven. When describing critics who see no value in the "biographical or psychological exegeses" of artworks, Solomon speaks of those who "maintain that the significant determinants of art are an artist's conscious responses to the tradition, inherited materials, and technical demands of the medium, and that it is to these areas that study should be directed" (p. 112). But if the word *conscious* is struck from this characterization, there emerges the possibility of rapprochement between such areas of study and the realm of psychological interpretation. A belief in the primacy of artistic tradition

need not be abandoned in order to gain this result. Even a psychologist might concede, for instance, that a musical composition derives its shape from—and in a sense has as its subject—the already existing works whose genre, style, and form make up its ancestry. At the same time, inquiries founded on this premise could still try to determine what psychological forces move the composer to appropriate to himself particular components of his musical inheritance. Thus, justice may be done to both musical and psychological causations.

These paired notions might be enlisted in Beethoven studies, say, in a thorough account of the influence of Haydn and Mozart on their successor. This topic suggests itself because Beethoven's response to the earlier composers' music seems at heart contradictory. Here was a musician who surpassed all of his generation in comprehending the thematic cogency and strong tonal substructures in works by Haydn and Mozart, yet was impelled with a vengeance to differentiate his music from theirs, perhaps especially in the rhythmic sphere. This type of investigation would acknowledge the innumerable choices that the artist has to make as he grasps the accomplishments of his predecessors. For him the operative traditions are internal constructs; to this extent the mind of each composer creates its own past. What a contrast arises, for example, between the Mozart who makes himself felt in Beethoven's music and him who appears in the works of Carl Maria von Weber.

The psychobiographical slant of Maynard Solomon's writings challenges the professional music historian. That the field of musicology appreciates Solomon's contribution is evidenced by a recent action of the American Musicological Society; it awarded the *Beethoven Essays* its annual Kinkeldey prize for the most distinguished book on music by an American or Canadian author. Yet in honoring Solomon, the musicologists may have inadvertently testified to shortcomings in their own discipline. That is to say, conventional academic training in musicology, which Solomon lacks, does not appear to be a *sine qua non* for the achievements that music historians currently value most.

A work receiving the Kinkeldey award can be assumed to have literary as well as scholarly merit. Certainly the *Beethoven Essays* exhibit exceptional craft in this regard, and on this basis alone the book deserves to attract every reader interested in Beethoven the man. Scholars in their turn will peruse Solomon's findings and employ them for their specialized purposes. Pondering Solomon's accomplishment, they may also want to consider new paths for themselves and for their field.

—Christopher Hatch

NOTES

[1] "Beethoven and Schiller," in *Beethoven, Performers, and Critics,* ed. Robert Winter and Bruce Carr (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1980), 162–75; "Beethoven and His Nephew: A Reappraisal," in *Beethoven Studies 2,* ed. Alan Tyson (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), 138–71; and "Beethoven's Tagebuch of 1812–1818," in *Beethoven Studies 3,* ed. Alan Tyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 193–285 (this article contains a transcription of the Tagebuch, which the *Beethoven Essays* omits).

[2] "New Light on Beethoven's Letter to an Unknown Woman," *The Musical Quarterly* 58 (1972): 572–87 (this article has not been included in the present collection); *Beethoven* (New York: Schirmer Books, 1977).

[3] Douglas Johnson, Alan Tyson, and Robert Winter, *The Beethoven Sketchbooks: History, Reconstruction, Inventory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

[4] Richard Taruskin, "Resisting the Ninth," *Nineteenth-Century Music* 12 (1989): 248.

[5] See, for example, Constantin Floros, *Beethovens Eroica und Prometheus-Musik: Sujet Studien* (Wilhelmshaven: Heinrichshofen, 1978); Peter Schleuning, "Beethoven in alter Deutung: der 'neue Weg' mit der 'Sinfonia eroica," *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft* 44 (1987): 165–94.

[6] See, for example, Harry Goldschmidt, *Um die "Unsterbliche Geliebte"* (Leipzig: Deutscher Verlag für Musik, 1977), and Marie-Elisabeth Tellenbach, *Beethoven und seine "unsterbliche Geliebte" Josephine Brunswick: ihr Schicksal und der Einfluß auf Beethovens Werk* (Zurich: Atlantis Musikbuch Verlag, 1983).