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Three Pragmatists in Search of a Theory

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Editor's Note:

Musicology has experienced an order of reflection during the past decade or so that has inspired change in many facets of the discipline. The field has seen the emergence of new subdisciplines and the appearance of new journals or the restructuring of long-standing ones; there have been changes in the topics and formats of conferences; and graduate programs in many musicology departments have been revised. The present volume of essays holds to the premise that the contemplation of the activity of scholarship is in itself a vital component of academic endeavor. Its aim is in part to provide a forum for considering recent trends in the field: how they have shaped past discourse, and what their implications might be for the future directions of the field.

This volume reflects the range of topics and issues that engage many of its practitioners. Some essays consider areas where musicology intersects with other disciplines, among them biography, gender studies, and cultural studies. Others examine the premises behind some of the traditional divisions within musical scholarship, such as music theory and ethnomusicology, and where their objects of inquiry overlap or part. This volume also discusses aspects of music scholarship from recent developments to well established traditions. Several contributions, for example, investigate the role that postmodernism has played in shaping discourse in music historiography; others, in turn, reflect on the role of early music in the field-how the increasing scholarly emphasis on music after 1600 has changed its status, if at all, and how the particular methodologies in early music might profit from or enrich work in these later periods. Contributors come from the fields of ethnomusicology, music history, music theory, and performance, and in many instances their individual scholarly activity encompasses several disciplines or subdisciplines at once.

The authors often take up widely differing positions regarding the precise nature of musicology's relationship to its siblings in the humanities and social sciences. Some hold that adopting the methodologies of other disciplines opens up stimulating and revealing possibilities for musical scholarship, whereas others make the plea that musicology has much to offer its companion disciplines and that it produces the richest methodological yield by tilling its own soil. A central issue for all of the authors is how one approaches the musical work. What are the capabilities and limitations of language in capturing the musical experience, how does one effectively articulate the structure and syntax of music, and how one weighs the competing interests between the work as an object of analysis and as one element in a matrix of political, social, aesthetic, and intellectual forces are concerns running throughout these pages. It is a pleasure to acknowledge those whose labors went into this collection. Above all, warm thanks are due to the contributors for their enthusiasm and effort. Members of the editorial board and staff gave freely of their expertise and assistance. Finally, a special note of gratitude is owed to Walter Frisch, who was unfailingly generous with his advice and time at every stage of the preparation of this volume.

> Edmund J. Goehring 15 August 1993

Three Pragmatists in Search of a Theory*

By Harold S. Powers

When I was invited to hold forth on this occasion, it was delicately hinted that generalizations about whither musicology?---or, for that matter, whether musicology?---would probably not serve the purpose; our chairman thought I might prefer to talk about my own work, perhaps about "mode" in cross-cultural or cross-disciplinary contexts. But to me it seemed just as presumptuous to keep members of a captive audience away from the bar to listen politely to the professional reminiscences of an aging colleague as to subject them to pontifical speculation. The two parameters somehow got stuck in my mind, however, forming the dismal image of a vast moor of general musical discourse with a quicksand of pontification on the one hand and a quagmire of autobiography on the other. Finally a day came when I was asked to supply a title. The one you have on the program occurred to me then and there, evidently as a confluence of several things that happened to be on my desk and my mind at that moment, and I've been asked more than once what I meant by it. I've been trying to answer that question myself, and I do so now with a gloss on the title in the form of a charade: first the individual words, here in reverse order, then the whole thing.

Among the items on my desk when I sent in the title was a form letter signed by Jeffrey Kallberg and Anthony Newcomb, inviting interest in a new publication series. I quote from the second paragraph:

In the past few decades, other disciplines in the humanities have witnessed an outpouring of studies on what are often called "theoretical" issues. "Theoretical" work in this sense embraces a wider purview than its musical cognate; it means the elaboration of structures of explanation, interpretation, commentary, comparison, and criticism that make these domains intelligible, and that provide a basis for argument about judgments of their value. Until recently, musicology remained relatively unaffected by this intellectual trend.

It should come as no surprise that musicology remains relatively unaffected by intellectual trends that have recently affected other disciplines in the humanities: musicology almost always lags behind the latest intellectual trend. Musicology's first practical models were philology—the critical study of documents—and with their help, the study of history on the Rankean model: "wie es eigentlich gewesen ist." Then came connoisseurship and style study, for which a certain kind of art history was the guiding

light. Along came anthropology, linguistics, and analytic philosophy, to show us how to change comparative musicology into ethnomusicology, and how to do theory that might be something more than harmony and counterpoint. And now still newer canons have turned up in the nick of time, to show the way and save the day once again.

So why do we always lag behind? I see only two possible explanations. Maybe people who take up the academic study of music are just naturally a bit slower and duller than their quicker-witted colleagues in other humanistic fields. Perhaps I shouldn't dismiss this possibility: but I think it more likely that musical data are more resistant to verbal explication than the data in other humanistic domains. Indeed, musicology is really only partly one of the humanities, which otherwise deal with the visible and above all the verbal arts. Music is like painting or literature, in that you can respond to it without knowing how to talk about it; but it is like mathematics, in that, if you do want to talk about it, the language you have to use is esoteric; and to represent sounding music in visible form you have to use some sort of metaphoric symbols that necessarily represent it indirectly as well as incompletely. Yet precisely because our raw material is so much more ephemeral and abstract, if we could find a way to deal with music in its own terms that would be intelligible to our colleagues in other fields, we might even lead the way, for a change.

But there is certainly no harm in looking at our neighbors' gardens, as Kallberg's and Newcomb's form letter implicitly recommends. I am reasonably well acquainted at first hand with two lines along which a search for theory that will include discourse on music in a larger sphere is developing. Both of these lines rely on the connection of musical sound in performance with something outside itself, something that seems to make discourse about that music possible in a nonesoteric manner by impinging on more verbalizable domains. One way to explain the way music goes, for instance, is to deal with it in terms of a social, cultural, or religious context in which music is used, by which it is influenced, which it in turn influences, and with which it can therefore be paralleled. An excellent model with which I happen to be familiar is Regula Qureshi's study of the gawwal community in Delhi, their patrons and their music.¹ I myself have been accused in print, by my colleague Lorenzo Bianconi, of "delving into Verdian musical dramaturgy with the distancing, and therefore perspicacious, stance of the ethnomusicologist."² Perhaps this was because, having learned that Verdi was composing for particular audiences, I thought I ought to learn something about their particular horizons of expectation-though I wouldn't have thought one had to be an ethnomusicologist to do so.

Be that as it may, it brings up another promising line of search for new theory with which I am also somewhat familiar: the study of nineteenthand early twentieth-century European art music with overt or covert narrative or dramatic content, above all opera theory and criticism. In recent years we have seen a massive infiltration of non-guild members with fully humanistic credentials in other fields into repertory opera studies, and now similar studies with more substantial content are being produced by reputable guild members, too.³ Some of their most provocative work is devoted to elaborating structures of explanation modeled on recent literary theory, be it in its structuralist, poststructuralist, or deconstructivist modes. A fundamental stimulus to that series of explanatory modes originated in the reconstruction of a lecture series by Ferdinand de Saussure that was organized and published posthumously in 1916 by former students. Reactions and counteractions initiated by this work come under the general umbrella of Saussure's own term "semiology," whose central theses cluster around the notion that meaning, including musical meaning, is carried by codes made up of things called "signs."

Saussurian semiologic signs are dyads, comprising an indivisible mental coupling called "signifier" and "signified." Saussure's American contemporary Charles Sanders Peirce also constructed a theory of signification, also largely disseminated posthumously by devotees of later generations. Peirce's system, however, is triadic rather than dyadic: in addition to two elements called "sign" and "object," Peirce's so-called "semeiotic" requires a third element that he called "interpretant." Peirce described the "interpretant" element in various ways, depending on context, as for instance: "the proper significate outcome of a sign," or "its proper significate effects"; "the cognition produced in the mind"; "the idea to which [the sign] gives rise."⁴

Peirce's system is shot through at all levels with triads like "sign/object/ interpretant." Everyone is now distinguishing "icon" from "index" from "symbol," Peirce's triad of relationships between signs and their objects; but there are many more, including triads subsuming matters familiar from other modes of philosophy, such as the logical triad of "term," "proposition," and "argument." Less familiar is Peirce's semiotic triad relating signs to what he called their "final interpretants," a triad whose terms Peirce called, in his usual neologistic fashion, "gratific," "practical," and "pragmatistic." The "gratific" level of the triad of "final interpretants" subsists in the pleasurable reactions to which signs may give rise; Peirce himself cited the musical sign as an illustration.⁵ The "practical" level of the triad pertains to conduct that may be induced by signs. The third level, "pragmatistic," is the one least well defined by Peirce himself. Michael Shapiro has summarized the matter as follows:

in the hierarchy of signs relative to their final interpretants, the highest or ultimate purpose is reached in the dominance of critical

control over habits and beliefs. . . . Peirce regards deliberate selfcriticism to be the outstanding feature of interpretants whose signs are pragmatistic.⁶

In sum, the three levels of Peirce's "final interpretant" form a triad of behavioral attitudes responding to signs. These attitudes are, respectively, aesthetic, ethical, and critical.

In the domain of music, aesthetic attitudes, as we have already noted, are "gratific," denoting the pleasure we take in our responses to musical signs. What we do about those responses would constitute our "practical" attitudes: passive as listeners, whether naive or sophisticated; active as producers—performers, composers, whatever; or contemplative as scholars, in the investigation of music in or out of social or historical context. The ways we understand and evaluate what we do and what we feel—our "critical control over habits and beliefs," as Shapiro's summary definition has it—would constitute our "pragmatistic" 'attitudes. The spirit of "self-criticism" implicit in Kallberg's and Newcomb's call for critical self-renewal through other disciplines could certainly be deemed "pragmatistic" with respect to musical scholarship.

The word "critical" has a number of senses, however, pointing in more than one direction. In its most general and powerful sense, it simply desig-nates the so-called "scientific method." Both the natural and the human sciences entail the collection and organization of data, whether in observatory, laboratory, archive, library, or tribal village. But more than that, and uniquely in the Western tradition of learning since the Renaissance, they also entail the confrontation of diverse pieces of data with one another, forcing them to tell us more than is actually recorded or reported, turning them into evidence. Seen in historical perspective, "self-criticism" in search of theory need not and should not casually abandon traditional modes in favor of new ones taken over from easier fields. A true "selfcriticism" might also suggest that we acquaint ourselves more widely with what has been done in our own field, and analyze more carefully how some of it has been done. There are cases where pragmatic laboring with musical materials has resulted in methodological approaches and theoretical constructs that anticipate by many years their appearance in easier humanistic fields.7

In subjecting you to an amateur summary of Peircean triads and Peircean pragmaticism, however, it was not my only intent to admonish you to envy your neighbor's garden a little less and cultivate your own garden a little more. I want also to borrow Peirce's doctrine that signs include a responding element, call it what you will; he called it "interpretant." Whatever else it may imply, "self-criticism" does bring the notion of "self"—of the scholar

as a living human being—alongside the notion of "criticism," including "criticism" as "scientific method." This probably goes too far for an orthodox Peircean, though; Peirce himself was at some pains to distinguish what he rechristened "pragmaticism" from "pragmatism"—his own earlier term—which had become known and, he felt, misunderstood through the writings of his friend William James. Peirce wrote that

the meaning of a concept . . . lies in the manner in which it could *conceivably* modify purposive action, and *in this alone*. James, on the contrary, whose natural turn of mind is away from generals . . . in defining pragmatism, speaks of it as referring ideas to *experiences*, meaning evidently the sensational side of experience.⁸

When the chairman's request for a title reached me, I happened to be immersed in William James's Varieties of Religious Experience. What came to my mind was that very referral of idea to experience, and indeed the sensational side of experience, to which Peirce was objecting in James's variant of pragmatism. I thought of the varieties of musical experience, experience that Roger Sessions summed up forty years ago as nonetheless

essentially indivisible, whether it is embodied in the impulse to produce, or in the response, through reproduction, actual as by the performer or imaginary as by the listener, of the musical experience embodied in music already produced.⁹

William James's vision of the referral of idea to experience is summed up in two passages in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Near the beginning of his book, James described religious sentiments as "concrete states of mind, made up of a feeling *plus* a specific sort of object"; the stressing of the word *plus* is his. Returning to his stressed *plus* near the end, James concluded that

objects, so far as the experience yields them, are but ideal pictures of something whose existence we do not inwardly possess but only point at outwardly, while the inner state is our very experience itself; its reality and that of our experience are one. A conscious field *plus* its object as felt or thought of *plus* an attitude toward the object *plus* a sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs.¹⁰

That amalgam of field, object, attitude, and self-awareness was the subject of James's book *Pragmatism*. There he claimed that philosophically contrasted modes of coping with experience depended on differences in hu-

man temperament, making his famous distinction of "tender-minded" rationalists from "tough-minded" empiricists. James's pragmatism may sometimes seem synonymous with empiricism, as in his statement that "pragmatism is uncomfortable away from facts. Rationalism is comfortable only in the presence of abstractions."¹¹ Yet James was not opposed to abstractions in principle; he was proposing only that the variety of rational modes of thinking that do exist ought to

awaken a presumption favorable to the pragmatistic view that all our theories are *instrumental*, are mental modes of *adaptation* to reality, rather than revelations or gnomic answers to some divinely instituted world-enigma.¹²

In short, James wanted to have it both ways at once, experience and idea together, and so do I. I conclude this part of my charade by saying that for me and the varieties of musical experience, as for William James and the varieties of religious experience,

pragmatism, devoted tho she be to facts, has no such materialistic bias as ordinary empiricism labors under. Moreover, she has no objection whatever to the realizing of abstractions, so long as you get about among particulars with their aid and they actually carry you somewhere. Interested in no conclusions but those which our minds and our experiences work out together, she has no *a priori* prejudices.¹³

Having gone on at some length about the last three substantives in my title—pragmatism, searching, and theory—I'll not belabor the initial one. Older colleagues know that the trinity represented here at these meetings was once dualistic—indeed, it was a monad, for Charles Seeger was one of the founding fathers of the eldest member of the trinity, as well as a guiding spirit in its second member. But I'll not pursue the trinitarian metaphor further, for fear of real pontification. Let me pass on to the second part of the charade, where I'm to take up "Three pragmatists in search of a theory" as a whole.

* * *

My title is a calque on the title of Luigi Pirandello's play Six Characters in Search of an Author, as many colleagues have noted. Pirandello's play opens with a director and a group of actors about to start rehearsing. Six personages wander into the theater claiming to be characters created for a play whose creator has subsequently abandoned it, and them; they are searching for an author to write their drama into a script. By the end of Act I the director has been persuaded to do so. Act II concludes with the two principal personages of the six enacting—or is it re-enacting?—the approach to the climax of a crucial episode in their drama; meanwhile the prompter is taking it all down to be part of the script. Then the two leading actors of the company begin to rehearse that bit of the play, but the personages themselves are appalled: they claim that they and their drama are being ludicrously misrepresented.

Somehow the actors and director in the theater on the one hand, plus the characters in the drama abandoned by its author on the other, got mixed up in my mind with elements on the two sides of William James's emphasized plus: "conscious field plus its object as felt" and "attitude toward the object *plus* a sense of self." Or to use Peirce's terms decrying James, I saw the personages in the drama as enjoying "the sensation side of the experience" and the actors in the play as portraying "the meaning of the concept." And then I thought back to three musically inclined personages I had known in my college and graduate school days. One was an aspiring tenor, the acme of whose ambition was to sing Andrea Chenier on the stage of the San Francisco opera. Another was a would-be composer who managed to get from middle Strauss to middle Bartok during the years I knew him. The third was a piano major; a couple of months after his senior recital he went on the payroll of an import-export trader operating in Southeast Asia and Japan; he fell in love with the exotic East in the manner of Pierre Loti, and decided to give up music and do something socially significant. Unlike the personages in Pirandello's play, however, none of these young men succeeded in living out his personal drama to the end; each is now an actor in the play in which all of us here are also taking part. The tenor, whose top never developed properly, became a music historian specializing in opera. The composer had a problem many of us had in the serialized 1950s: what he composed that he liked, he didn't approve of; and what he composed that he approved of, he didn't like; he became a theory teacher. The Pierre Loti type eventually returned to America and went to graduate school, but not to take up something socially significant; instead, he became what is usually described as an ethnomusicologist.

But as some of my colleagues know, I didn't use to like being called an ethnomusicologist, and I used to insist that what I was doing was Indic musicology. Neither can I call myself a theorist, since I don't construct theoretical modes or do musical analyses merely to explicate how I hear music. Nor do I qualify as a proper music historian—this is beginning to sound like the tenor in Act I of *Die Walküre* explaining why he isn't named

Friedmund or Frohwalt—since I have never discovered or edited anything. But I do publish in three quite specific and seemingly unrelated fields— Indian music, the pre-history of tonality, and Italian opera studies—and have often been asked why I do so, whether they have anything in common. The invitation to speak at this joint meeting has driven me to try for an answer to that question, to find the "self" that lies within the "objects," to write a script that will impose some coherence on my own play.

In thinking about the way I operate in my three specific fields, I realized that I strongly incline to only two approaches to the materials, and that both approaches might loosely be designated with the single adjective "comparative." My work in Indic musicology is centered on the study of melodic types, in which one has to do with multiple representations of a single named musical entity, a *raga*, in diverse compositional and improvisational genres. I usually approach Italian opera in the same way, through the study of multiple representations, of variant forms of a single work. My interest in the *raga* systems of India has also drawn me into studies of the relationships between Indian musical theory and musical practice; theorypractice relationships are the focus of my interest in Medieval and Renaissance musicology as well. But for both these approaches the basic technique is Western; it is confrontation, of multiple representations one with another in Italian opera and Indian music, of tender-minded rational theory with tough-minded empirical practice in Indian music and Medieval/Renaissance music.

My work in Italian opera studies has proceeded almost exclusively through the study of different sources that in some sense represent a single "work," such as a draft or skeletal score and the so-called "definitive" version, or an "original" version and a "revised" version for another production. Extending the idea of multiple representation to comparison of different works with a significant constant thread, I would also include, as an aspect of this approach, different settings of the same libretto, and in particularly conventionalized contexts, even different treatments of the same subject. In the Verdi operas with which I have been occupied in recent years, there are several degrees of sameness in multiple representation. They range from the virtual identity of, say, Les vepres siciliennes and Giovanna di Guzman, through the near identity of the 1853 and 1854 versions of La traviata, to the 1857 and the 1881 versions of Simon Boccanegra, which despite extensive revision are still nonetheless "the same" opera; and on to the revision of Stiffelio as Aroldo, which, despite much common material and a common dramatic structure, I would regard as two different operas.¹⁴ Such comparisons in the domain of Verdian musical dramaturgy, which are basically "genetic" in method, I have been using analyti-cally, talking of aborted duets, of truncated interior finales, and of hidden aria scenes, in order to demonstrate "generic" gestural norms underlying seemingly unique entities.¹⁵

Multiple representation, as manifested in variant versions of an Italian opera, has been a central diagnostic device for me as a scholar, but it is hardly central to the aesthetic of the genre, or to the practice of European art music in general. In the practice of Indian classical music, to the contrary, multiple representation is overt and fundamental, in that melodic types-ragas-are the primary musical entities, manifesting their always recognizable and unique identities in a multiplicity of performable genres.¹⁶ In that respect the notion of *raga*, as music-theoretical and music-historical matter for investigation, plays the role in Indic musicology that the notion of "work" plays in the conventional musicology of European art music, including Italian opera. Yet a raga, like a psalm-tone, the Folia, or a standard Blues progression, is in no way a "work"-its renderings in performance are but shadows of a Platonic reality-so my penchant for looking into multiple representations in this case has turned outward rather than inward, toward cross-cultural comparison of melodic types themselves. Some years ago I noticed that North Indian and South Indian ragas having the same name reflect similar melodic contours and emphases even when their intervallic structures are completely different.¹⁷ More recently, I have been playing the game of cross-cultural melodic typology-I call it the game of "nominal equivalence"-in the Muslim musical world, with sometimes surprising and gratifying results: very recently, a seemingly anomalous Central Asian genre bearing the widespread "international" melodic-type name Segah turned out to be remotely referable to the general model after all.¹⁸

Mention of melodic types brings me now to my other line of approach based on confrontation of things that have something, but not everything, in common: congruences and contradictions between musical theory and musical practice. In a long-standing tradition in Western musicological scholarship, Indian ragas are often called "modes"; this extension of the earlier European concept, and others like it, grew out of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century studies of Christian chant and Arabic music. From these beginnings has evolved a terminological conflation of two quite different phenomena: open-ended heterogeneous networks of melodic types, on the one hand, and closed systems of music-theoretical categories, on the other, have both been designated with the single adjective "modal." Something called "modality" has become a reified property ascribed to the music of a widely and wildly varying number of musical practices, past and present; and in those cultures where learned music-theoretical traditions co-exist with the practical traditions, the writings of musical theorists are often adduced as evidence for so-called "modal" practices.¹⁹

I remember now that in my first published article I had already rejected the conflation of melodic type and modal category,²⁰ but there are passages in the infamous "Mode" article for *The New Grove* where I seem to have backslid momentarily. For the Gregorian antiphoner, for instance, I posited a simple and undifferentiated pair of levels: a superordinate closed and symmetrical system of modal categories based on pitch content; and a subordinate open-ended heterogeneous collection of melodic types, identifiable in the first instance through their psalm-tone *differentiae*.²¹ In Siegfried Hermelink's book *Dispositiones modorum*, I thought I was going to find a similar phenomenon in Renaissance vocal polyphony, since Hermelink's analysis of the *cantus* parts in Palestrina's output demonstrates a clear set of melodic-type constraints operating in what he called "tonal types." I was soon disabused; Hermelink himself pointed out that the "tonal types" he found in sixteenth-century compositional practice do not fit sixteenth-century modal theories at all well.²²

In those days I was also getting interested in Indian raga-mala painting, and was therefore looking critically at the welter of schemes for classifying *ragas* in the Indic theoretical traditions.²³ The same pattern emerged: most of the classification schemes are closed and symmetrical systems, from Rajasthani raga malas in which each of six male ragas has five female raginis, to the South Indian system of seventy-two scale-types, to one or another of which every melodic type in practice-every raga-is supposedly assignable. In all such schemes, moreover, serious discrepancies with melodic types actually in use have had to be explained away: perhaps there are more types in common use than a closed scheme can accommodate; or there may be types with turns of phrase or melodic emphases that cannot be described in terms of pitch level or interval.²⁴ And in fact, the Gregorian antiphoner presented exactly the same kinds of problems for the monks and clerics who tried to accommodate their Carolingian repertories to an eight-mode system inspired by the octoechos of the Eastern Churches. They, too, had to devise ways of dealing with the bad fit between a closed and symmetrical system of categories and a heterogeneous repertory of melodies and melodic types.

In short, in Indian classical music and in Gregorian chant, as in Renaissance polyphony, the distinction between the modal categories of theory and the melodic or tonal types of practice is not one of superordinated and subordinated levels in a single hierarchy. It is a distinction between rational idea and empirical experience, and those two need to be confronted one *with* the other, not just assimilated one *to* the other. Musical theories have cultural significance in their own right, as part of the history of ideas; music-theoretical traditions can be and should be investigated independently of practical traditions. Relationships between theory and practice are not *a priori*, they are *ad hoc*, so any eventual confrontations of theory and practice ought to be pragmatic, and on a case-by-case basis. We cannot naively adduce the writers on music in a given musical culture as straightforward testimony to musical practice. They, like we, are more likely to be handing on traditional theory, or making their own theories, rather than just objectively reporting what practical musicians are doing.²⁵

And with this second admonishment I conclude this charade of three pragmatists, two approaches, one technique, and no theory. I see that I have escaped neither the quicksand of pontification nor the quagmire of autobiography, so I must thank you, humbly at last, for indulging my selfindulgence. On to the bar!

NOTES

^{*} This paper is an annotated version of the plenary address for the joint meeting of the American Musicological Society, Society for Ethnomusicology, and Society for Music Theory, at Oakland, 9 November 1990.

¹ Regula Burckhardt Qureshi, Sufi Music of India and Pakistan: Sound, Context, and Meaning in Qawwali (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

² Lorenzo Bianconi, "Introduzione," in *La drammaturgia musicale*, ed. Lorenzo Bianconi, Problemi e prospettive, serie di musica e spettacolo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986), 40. Bianconi was referring to the typescript of an essay I wrote that has since been published as "La solita forma' and 'the Uses of Convention'," *Acta musicologica* 59 (1987): 65–90, and also in *Nuove prospettive nella ricerca verdiana: Atti del convegno internazionale in occasione della prima del "Rigoletto" in edizione critica/Vienna, 12–13 marzo 1983* (Parma: Istituto di Studi Verdiani, 1987), 74–109.

³ Outstanding among these are several essays by Carolyn Abbate: "Opera as Symphony, a Wagnerian Myth," in *Analyzing Opera*, ed. Carolyn Abbate and Roger Parker (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 92–124; "Wagner, 'On Modulation,' and *Tristan*," in the *Cambridge Opera Journal* 1 (1989): 33–58; "Erik's Dream and Tannhäuser's Journey," in *Reading Opera*, ed. Arthur Groos and Roger Parker (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 129–67, now reformulated as Chapter 3, "Cherubino Uncovered: Reflexivity in Operatic Narration," pp. 61–118 of her *Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Chapter 5 (pp. 156–205) of *Unsung Voices*, "Wotan's Monologue and the Morality of Musical Narration."

⁴ Cited after Michael Shapiro, *The Sense of Grammar: Language as Semeiotic* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1983), 46.

⁵ Ibid., 57.

⁶ Ibid., 58.

⁷ Cf. my "Language Models and Musical Analysis," *Ethnomusicology* 24 (1980): 8 and *passim.*

⁸ From a letter of Peirce's written in 1916 and quoted in H. S. Thayer's editor's introduction to his critical edition of William James, *Pragmatism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), xxiv.

⁹ Roger Sessions, *The Musical Experience of Composer, Performer, Listener* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 20.

¹⁰ William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (New York: Modern Library, 1902; reprint, New York: Penguin, 1985), 28, 449.

¹¹ James, Pragmatism, 38.

¹² Ibid., 94.

¹³ Ibid., 40.

¹⁴ Cf. my "Aria sfasciata, duetto senza l'insieme: le scene di confronto tenore-soprano nello Stiffelio/Aroldo di Giuseppe Verdi," in Tornando a Stiffelio. popolarità, rifacimenti, messinscena, effettismo e altre "cure" nella drammaturgia del Verdi romantico: atti del convegno internazionale di studi (Venice, 17–20 December 1985), ed. Giovanni Morelli (Florence: Olschki, 1986), 141– 88.

¹⁵ For duets, see my "'La solita forma'"; for interior Finales, "Simon Boccanegra I.10–12: A Generic/Genetic Analysis of the Council Chamber Scene," in 19th-Century Music 13 (1989): 101–28, and also "The 'Laughing Chorus' in Contexts," in Verdi: A Masked Ball/Un ballo in maschera, English National Opera Guide, 40 (New York: Riverrun Press, 1989), 23–38; for aria scenes, "Felice Varesi's Macbeth," in progress, summarized on pp. 32–35 of "Making Macbeth musicabile," in Verdi: Macbeth, English National Opera Guide, 41 (New York: Riverrun Press, 1990), 13–36. For the same approach applied to seventeenth-century opera, see especially my "L'Erismena travestita," in Harold S. Powers, ed., Studies in Music History: Essays for Oliver Strunk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 259–324; this is a demonstration, through multiple representation, of the origins of the Da Capo aria.

¹⁶ See, for instance, notated examples of several composed and (exemplary) improvisatory genres of the North Indian *raga Puriya* on pp. 100–1 and 111 of my article *India* (I and II), in *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians* (London: Macmillan, 1980), 9:69–141.

¹⁷ Harold S. Powers, "An Historical and Comparative Approach to the Classification of *ragas* (with an appendix on ancient Indian tunings)," *Selected Reports of the Institute of Ethnomusicology* 1 (Los Angeles, 1970): 1–78.

¹⁸ This was reported in a paper entitled "Segokh k vostoku ot Edema" (*Segah* east of Eden), given at the Borbad 1400-Anniversary Symposium, Dushanbe (Tajikistan), 25 April 1990. This material will eventually be published as part of one of a pair of essays on the entities called *Segah* and *Nava* in a number of musical cultures in the Muslim world; the other will be based on "Asavari and Nava in India, Kashmir, and Central Asia," a paper given at the Congress of the International Council for Traditional Music (ICTM), Schladming (Austria), July 1989.

¹⁹ See my "Modality as a European Cultural Construct," in *Atti del secondo convegno europeo di analisi musicale*, ed. Rossana Dalmonte and Mario Baroni (Trent: Università degli studi di Trento, 1992), 207–19.

²⁰ The last sentence of my "Mode and Raga," *Musical Quarterly* 44 (1958): 448–60, reads, "In short, for Christian church music the modal system is fundamentally an analytical scheme used for the classification of melodies, whereas for Indian concert music the raga system is the practical foundation of self-renewing spontaneous creativity."

²¹ Harold S. Powers, "Mode," in The New Grove Dictionary, 12:377, 383, 422-23.

²² Siegfried Hermelink, Dispositiones modorum (Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 1960), see his Einleitung, pp. 11–16. For further development of this position, see my "Tonal Types and Modal Categories in Renaissance Polyphony," Journal of the American Musicological Society 34 (1981): 428–70; and "Modal Representation in Polyphonic Offertories," Early Music History 2, ed. Iain Fenlon (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 43–86. These studies of mine, however, do no more than demonstrate the problem; they do not attempt to derive tonalities as such from the repertories discussed. The real breakthrough into the realities of sixteenthcentury tonal organization happens to have been first presented on the morning following the day when this plenary address of mine was delivered at the same joint AMS/SEM/SMT meeting. It is Cristle Collins Judd's "Modal Types and ut, re, mi Tonalities: Tonal Coherence in Sacred Vocal Polphony from about 1500," Journal of the American Musicological Society 45 (1992): 428–67. This forms part of a larger study entitled "Aspects of Tonal Coherence in the Motets of Josquin," her 1993 dissertation for the University of London. ²³ Harold S. Powers, "Illustrated Inventories of Indian Ragamala Painting," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 100 (1980): 473–93.

²⁴ For analysis and criticism of the standard modern North Indian scale-type classification, by a distinguished North Indian artist-scholar, see my "Reinterpretation of Traditions: Omkarnath Thakur contra V. N. Bhatkhande on sangita-sastra and sastriya-sangita," in *The Traditional Indian Theory and Practice of Music and Dance*, ed. Jonathan Katz, Panels of the Seventh World Sanskrit Congress, Leiden, 23–29 August 1987, vol. 11 (New York: E. J. Brill, 1992), 9–52.

²⁵ This point was developed in a paper entitled "Is Mode Real? The Arguments from Aron," read at the 1985 Society for Music Theory meeting in Vancouver. A revised version will appear in the proceedings of the Symposium *Modus und Tonalität* held at Basel in March 1991, with the title "Is Mode Real? Pietro Aron, the Octenary System, and Polyphony."

Musical Pasts and Postmodern Musicologies: A Response to Lawrence Kramer

By Gary Tomlinson

Early last summer, not long after I was invited by the editors of Current Musicology to contribute to this special issue, the inaugural issue of another music journal landed in my mail box. This was repercussions, produced by graduate students at the University of California at Berkeley. It opened with a position piece by Lawrence Kramer entitled "The Musicology of the Future"-a fitting beginning, given that the journal is devoted to fostering "critical & alternative viewpoints on music and scholarship" and that Kramer has emerged over the past decade as one of the shrewdest and most theoretically savvy of a younger generation of musical scholars. But Kramer's essay, on closer inspection, was disconcerting. "The Musicology of the Future" seems to me to linger over old viewpoints more than suggest new ones. It reveals patterns of thought that not only already threaten to harden into new orthodoxies of postmodern musicology but that have, at the deepest level, moved little from the putative truths they aim to leave behind. What follows is a brief rejoinder to Kramer's vision of the new musicology.

I should say at the beginning that I do not think Kramer is alone in his difficulty in escaping the old orthodoxies; if he were, my differences with his approach would have no broader resonance than that of a personal disagreement. I sense, instead, that all of us who work in the methodological realms he calls postmodern have experienced this difficulty, that we have all felt twinges of an unease that originates in our sense of the persistent proximity of our methods to those we thought we had moved away from. We have met the enemy and they is us. Kramer's (and our) difficulty touches the heart of our conceptions of the new musicology. For this reason it seems to me that a brief description of some methodological choices that (in my view) underlie his essay and a sketch of some alternative choices might help move the discussion forward.

Kramer rightly locates the origins of what we may call modernist musicology in nineteenth-century views of the signifying distance between music and words (pp. 7–8). Because of this gap, language was closed off from music; words were "denied access" to its transcendent expressive modes. Those who sought to put the study of music on a scholarly footing were left with two options: positivistic description of historical data around the music and analytic description of the workings of the notes themselves. In the first option the experience itself of music was separated off entirely from the scholarly endeavor, while in the second it was transformed, its quasi-religious transcendence sublimated in technical accounts of musical process. Neither option challenged the autonomy and "epistemologically self-contained" character of the musical experience.

But, Kramer notes, this maintenance of music's autonomy does not jibe with the worldliness and contextual contingency that postmodern scholars find in all utterance, musical or otherwise (p. 9). Therefore, "from a postmodern perspective, music as it has been conceived of by musicology simply does not exist." In order to reconceive music (and musicology) in postmodern terms we need not, however, reject the immediacy of its effects on us (p. 10); Kramer would not "show [his] love for music by ceasing to enjoy it." Instead we should abandon the myth of music's autonomy by broadening "the horizons of our musical pleasure" and welcoming the complex situatedness of musical utterances in webs of extramusical forces.

So far, so good. Kramer's diagnosis of the constraints enacted in modernist musicology is smart and eloquent, and his general recommendations are headed in the right direction: toward a new, more flexible contextualization of music and its histories. But in filling out the details of these recommendations Kramer begins to reveal the tenacity of modernist ideology in the new musicology.

Kramer betrays this modernism already when he dubs "criticism" the "rhetorical" and "subjective" language by which we might contextualize music (p. 9). This term, as I have suggested elsewhere, seems in all its many meanings destined to put an ahistorical, aestheticist, sometimes even formalist spin on what might otherwise be conceived as our rich *historical* encounter of others' musical utterances (see "The Web of Culture: A Context for Musicology," *19th-Century Music* 7 [1984]: 350–62). The evocation of criticism, in other words, tends to deal out from the start the most essential and richly problematic historicism of our experiences, musical and other. More on this historicism below.

Kramer reveals his modernism more fundamentally in his next move (pp. 10–11). He locates the context of music—"the densely compacted, concretely situated worlds of those who compose, perform, and listen" that he sees as basic to postmodern perceptions—in the music itself. "The emergence of a postmodernist... musicology," he writes, "will depend on our willingness and ability to read as inscribed within the immediacy-effects of music itself the kind of mediating structures usually positioned outside music under the rubric of context." Or again, countering Charles Rosen's reading of Mozart's Divertimento K. 563: "What if the music were heard,

not as the site where its contexts vanish, but precisely as the site where they appear?" Kramer's own example of an alternative musicology—his discussion of the special physicality he hears in K. 563 (pp. 11–16)—follows from this question.

This is for me a troubling maneuver. Its effect is to sweep away in a single stroke the epistemological and phenomenological quandaries attendant on the contextualization Kramer has just finished advocating. The many opportunities presented by such thick contextualism are likewise lost, leaving little more than an internalist engagement of the critic with the work. Indeed Kramer unreservedly identifies the "work" as the locus of the new musicology, even though it is one of the modernist categories contested most rewardingly in postmodern thought. In the very moment that he holds out hope for an extramusical broadening of the notes' signifying potential, he draws our attention back to the work, making it the primary (almost exclusive) matrix of its own meanings. Ultimately, I believe, he substitutes modernist internalism and aestheticism, both carrying still the potent charge of nineteenth-century transcendentalism, for postmodern contingency and localism.

In this sleight-of-hand that decontextualizes his contextualism, Kramer falls back on a central tenet of modernist musicology: the sweeping subjective powers of the composer to speak to the critic (analyst, listener in general) through the music. This retrenchment is evident in the example Kramer offers, where Mozart is repeatedly seen to be complicit in "foregrounding" the particular corporeality Kramer senses in K. 563. If we are skeptical, if we wonder where Mozart's music has disappeared to in the questions Kramer asks, we are assured that Mozart himself raises these questions "by making his music behave as it does, and trusting the listener to hear the music within a broader field of rhetorical, expressive, and discursive behaviors." The critic and the composer are perfectly attuned here, speaking to one another without difficulty through the music. Mozart's trust, it would seem, is well placed.

In reading this passage, I for one do not find myself wondering where K. 563 has gone. Mozart's music is simply with us, in one or another of its numberless performative realities, at any moment that we might choose to make it so, and serious thought about music, modernist and postmodern, has always been needlessly plagued by those who exaggerate the fragility of our cultural icons. I wonder, instead, where Mozart has gone—Mozart, a mysterious and elusive subjectivity whom (as Hildesheimer, Solomon, even perhaps Amadeus have begun to show us) we too easily come to believe we know well. Kramer evades the immense complexity of the historian's dialogue with past subjectivities. He offers as the goal of musicology the continuance of "the dialogue of listening," but he gives little hint as to

how we might begin to reconceive this dialogue in postmodern terms. Indeed, from his example we could only guess that his "dialogue" comes closer to modernist solipsism than to true conversation—to a ventriloquist's monologue in which the critic reacts to the music by throwing his/her voice into the body of the faintly imagined composer/other. It is, finally, Kramer's confidence in his bond with Mozart that rankles here. The inviolate security of his knowledge speaks the language of an older musicology. Instead of postmodern doubt, play, and problematizing of the communicative relation, Kramer offers a too-familiar modernist mastery.

If all this may seem a rather harsh reaction to an essay whose most general anti-modernist intent I certainly applaud, I should repeat by way of melioration what I said at the outset: Kramer's difficulties seem to me to be emblematic of a more general methodological conundrum, of the struggles of a growing number of scholars to forge a musicology genuinely distanced from modernist premises. We are, all of us, in this mess together, notwithstanding the individual differences of method and emphasis that distinguish an Abbate from a Feld, a McClary from an Agawu, a Bianconi from a Subotnik.

The struggle should not discourage the endeavor, of course. It reflects in part the inevitable persistence of well-molded patterns of thought, of disciplinary premises and practices that will only gradually erode. More fundamentally, it reflects the contestatory and self-problematizing stance of postmodernism itself in the face of modernism, a stance that will (we may hope) increasingly decenter and destabilize postmodern musicological discourse even as the nature of this discourse grows clearer. In broad terms, a postmodern musicology will be characterized most distinctively by its insistent questioning of its own methods and practices.

This self-questioning might arise in many areas of our thought. I will suggest four such areas that seem to be, at most, little evident in Kramer's view of the new musicology. These are interrelated places where we might envision musicological premises different from those of modernism or at least find a productive and clarifying tension between those older presumptions and postmodern ones. They are *topoi*, in other words, that might help to inch us past the gravitational pull of modernist method.

First, we might seek alternatives to the internalism and formalism that have dominated musicology. This is ostensibly Kramer's primary goal. But his insistence on close reading of the notes and his locating of context in them undoes his good intentions. I would go farther than Kramer here and suggest that we need to move away from the whole constraining notion that close reading of works of music, of whatever sort, is the sine

* * *

qua non of musicological practice. This notion has repeatedly pulled us back toward the aestheticism and transcendentalism of earlier ideologies. (I have felt the pull in much of the nascent postmodern musicology I have read and written.) It is not enough to cast our close readings in the light of new methods—narratological, feminist, phenomenological, anthropological, whatever. For it is the act of close reading itself that carries with it the ideological charge of modernism. These new methods, instead, need to be linked to new approaches to music that have distanced themselves from such analytically oriented reading. They need, indeed, to be allowed to engender such new approaches.

Finding alternatives to close reading without forgoing entirely the specific discussion of music they have habitually enabled is a ticklish task, as Kramer's attempt should warn us. Such alternatives might well emerge, I think, from all three of the remaining topoi I will summarize below. But in the most general way I believe they will be discovered in a kind of contextualization different from Kramer's. This contextualism will not circle back narrowly to the notes but instead will resolutely historicize musical utterance, exploding it outwards through an imaginative building of contexts out of as wealthy a concatenation of past traces as the historian can manage. Such contextualism will aim to describe a local set of meanings in as full a volume as possible. It will not pose as a reconstruction of some putative and unitary "original" situation the music inhabited but will recognize the myriad situations we as historians might construct around a musical utterance and the plurality of meanings the music might thus engage. This contextualism will be, like Foucault's archaeology/genealogy, Geertz's anthropology, or Ginzburg's or Chartier's history, a localizing rather than a universalizing strategy. And, in the act of its seeking out its own locale within a plurality of potential meanings, it will incorporate the very "rhetorical" and "subjective" character that Kramer sought in the old haunts of criticism.

Second, we might become more sensitive to realms of musical culture-making beyond the ken of individual, subjective agency. Such agency maintains the modernist myths of genius and inspired, empowered, heroic individualism and supports the reflection of these myths in the omniscient critic (again Kramer's discussion of K. 563 is a useful caution). We cannot successfully challenge these myths while we remain bound to models of culture that see it as made exclusively through the conscious and subconscious intents of historical actors. Neither can we do so while we adhere singlemindedly to conceptions of subjectivity that grant it unrivaled culture-making powers.

The different, metasubjective level of cultural formation that I have in mind moves beyond the reach of individual subjectivities even as they are continually implicated in shaping it and being shaped by it. It inhabits the collective, kaleidoscopic, and dialogical realm of subjectivities opened out to one another. It is nothing like the nineteenth century's transcendental Zeitgeist and is distinct even from Annales-school *mentalités*, because its impact is local, fragmented across larger cultural spaces. Various postmodern methods have aimed to delimit this metasubjective place of cultural formation and to provide a means for describing it: some New Historical writings, Hayden White's tropologies, and, again, Foucault's archaeology/genealogy.

Third, we might try to see more clearly that categories such as "work" "art," "the aesthetic," even "music" itself are not truths given us by the world through which we and others must always conceive musical utterances but rather are themselves cultural constructions darkly tinted for us with modernist ideology. They are concepts that—in the versions of them we habitually and often tacitly deploy—have little currency in the historico-geographical world beyond nineteenth- and twentieth-century westernism. In questioning them we might begin to carry to the heart of our method the limitations of the music-versus-language epistemological model that Kramer identifies as a foundational premise of modernist musicology. It, too, is no monolithic, given truth, but rather a single point, privileged by modern western perceptions, along a spectrum of conceivable relations among music, words, and the world.

In this endeavor the methods employed by post-Foucauldian histories of sexuality and gender might well be revelatory, since such histories have worked hard to show the ways in which some of our most basic, apparently "natural" categories are local cultural constructs. In this endeavor, also, a crucial leverage might come from our exposure to more distant musical others than most of us usually encounter. Our difficulty in seeing beyond modernism is, after all, in part a result of our concentration on the musical adumbrations, avatars, and artifacts of modernism. We need to make central to our studies not only the most familiar musics we come across but also those that seem to us stranger, less tractable. Moreover, we need to bring them into our thoughts not by possessing them as newly minted canonic objects of study-a common enough strategy in the expansion of the observed musical universe that has marked musicology in recent yearsbut by leaving them at a distance and coming into contact with them through the befogged, ambivalent dialogical medium between them and us. We need, in other words, to think hard about what we do as we bring cultural others into our line of vision: how can we construct ways of seeing them that do not aggressively familiarize (colonize, terrorize) them?

Ethnomusicology might seem to be the obvious place to look for help in this endeavor, except that ethnomusicologists have often defined their

project by transferring onto the musics they study precisely the western presumptions—of internalism, formalism, aestheticism, transcendentalism that we need to question. (It is significant in this regard that Kramer could turn to a founder of American ethnomusicology, Charles Seeger, in order to exemplify the word/music schism that gave rise to musicological formalism and positivism; see page 7.) With some notable exceptions ethnomusicologists have been less shaken than we might expect by the epistemological revolution that has taken place over the last twenty years in their kindred discipline of anthropology. In ethnomusicology as in musicology, when it comes to constructing postmodern alternatives the enemy seems once more to be us.

Fourth and finally—and perhaps, indeed, most fundamentally—we might begin to interrogate our love for the music we study. This is not to say we should try to stop loving it—I would want this no more than Kramer. It is instead to urge that we dredge up our usual impassioned musical involvements from the hidden realm of untouchable premise they tend to inhabit, and that we make them a dynamic force—to be reckoned with, challenged, rejected, indulged in, whatever—within our study. The nature of our commitment to the works of a Beethoven or a Monteverdi or a Brahms cannot be allowed to lie uninvestigated, for then it imposes its own hegemony, welcoming musics that move more or less like theirs but at the same time foreclosing by invisible action commitments of a similar strength to a thousand other, different musics. This hegemony should be brought to light, examined in order to enrich and complicate our already complex relations with the others we encounter.

In the process we might shift the focus of musicology away from musical utterances all told toward the people who make them, away from Kramer's mastering dialogue between a work and the musicologist toward the less compliant but, I believe, infinitely richer dialogue between people. Then the primary stimulus for musicology, instead of our love for this or that music, might more luminously be our love of, concern for, commitment to, belief in, alienating distance from—choose your words—the others who have made this or that music in the process of making their worlds. Then the study of music-making might open out on the study of world-making.

And then—who knows?—we might even find that Beethoven and Mozart are not so like ourselves—in their conceivable expressive intents, their musical and non-musical desires, their made worlds—as we once thought. At bottom Kramer seems to offer a musicology still conceived as a means to illuminate our own aesthetic experiences. But this it has been for a century now; I am not alone, clearly, in chafing at its constraints. Why not try a musicology that aims instead to problematize the knowledge of others we come to through their musics?

Music Criticism and the Postmodernist Turn: In Contrary Motion with Gary Tomlinson

By Lawrence Kramer

The problem Gary Tomlinson finds with current efforts to frame a postmodernist musicology is a version of the Cubbins Conundrum. The eponymous hero of Dr. Seuss's classic children's story *The Five Hundred Hats of Bartholomew Cubbins* is in serious trouble. After taking off his hat to the king, Bartholomew finds himself ordered by the king to—take off his hat. But no matter how often he does so, another, identical hat, a bedraggled old thing with a lame excuse for a feather, keeps appearing on his head. So, too, the musicological Bartholomew (me, in this case) may try to take off the old hat of modernism with the best of intentions, but no better luck.

Tomlinson spots the Cubbins Conundrum in scholarship that seeks a postmodernist end, a "thick contextualism" in the understanding of cultural phenomena, with modernist means. High on the list of such means is criticism, glossed as "close reading" and associated with "internalism," "aestheticism," "formalism," "transcendentalism," and "westernism." Tomlinson claims that criticism trades in concepts, including "[the] work," "art," "the aesthetic," and "even 'music' itself," that are "darkly tinted for us with modernist ideology" (p. 23). In place of a critical program, he advocates what we might loosely call an ethnographic one, aimed proximately at "describ[ing] a local set of meanings in as full a volume as possible" (p. 22), and ultimately at knowing, in nonappropriative, nondominating ways, the other people, including our own ancestors, "who have made this or that music in the process of making their worlds" (p. 24).

As Tomlinson acknowledges, he and I share in a desire, fast evolving across our discipline, to uncloister music, to understand it as a worldly activity. No one caught up by that desire could fail to find something appealing in the ethnographic program. But the program as Tomlinson formulates it fills me with misgivings.

First, it depends on a hard-and-fast distinction between criticism and ethnography that may be neither necessary, nor desirable, nor even possible: a programmatic phantom. If so, arguments for either program over the other could easily degenerate into sectarian (or worse, careerist) squabbles.

Second, though it might seem hard to quarrel with the ideal of a knowledge free of tendentiousness, scholars do not have the minds of angels; we are driven to knowledge by more things than we know. The very claim to have such an ideal knowledge might be the surest sign that its absence is

still the one thing we can be sure of. Even supposing that knowledge and virtue could somehow be reconciled, can we really mistake the prescriptions and proscriptions of any single epistemic program for a panacea that will reconcile them?

Third, even if the break between modernism and postmodernism is radical, something I think likely despite Jürgen Habermas's arguments to the contrary,¹ that does not constitute the postmodern as a moment of absolute novelty, a complete rupture with a failed intellectual past. Ironically, the call for such a rupture is a classically modernist maneuver, epitomized by the memorable slogan from Rimbaud's *A Season in Hell*, "One must be absolutely modern" [II faut être absolument moderne]. I would say rather that the *post-* in postmodernism designates the moment of disengagement from the very idea of such absolutes, and of the consequent proliferation of intellectual projects that undo what Jean-François Lyotard calls the "grand metanarratives" and Habermas the "unfinished project" of modern, which is to say post-Enlightenment, reason.²

Nonetheless, Tomlinson's critique of criticism cannot merely be written off as a caricature, nor his ethnographic program as a blown-up special interest. On the contrary, the program reflects the pressing need to find the apparent collapse of modernism's cognitive paradigms enabling rather than paralyzing. It is important to work out the possibilities and spot the difficulties of doing this. Similarly, the critique can be taken to spell out exactly what is wrong with one familiar mode of modernist criticism, and even exactly what happens when any mode of criticism goes wrong. And that makes it important to counter the underlying, far more drastic claim that no criticism can ever go right. Perhaps Tomlinson has found the right problems but the wrong solutions. Perhaps he has misconstrued the character of criticism and its relation to a possible musical ethnography. Perhaps he has formulated the ethnographic program itself in terms that will quickly prove their own undoing. And perhaps there is no perhaps about it.

Tomlinson's complaint against criticism is that, *in principle*, it passes off personal response as knowledge and blinds itself to the otherness for which it presumes to speak. Criticism inevitably sets a reified object before a solipsistic subject. It inflates the authority of both the critic and the artist and establishes a spurious transparency of communication between them, a relay of (pseudo-)knowledge that also acts as a network of disciplinary and social power. The locus of knowledge is the artwork—in this case the music—in which criticism corrals too much of our attention. Fetishizing the work, criticism withdraws us from the real, scants the weight of history, creates a kind of transcendental museum or mausoleum of canonical masterpieces. The locus of power is the figure (person and trope) of the critic. "Close reading" supposedly proceeds from a discursive position that involves the *a priori* assumption of coercive authority: the (im)posture of mastery, an appropriation by the critic of the composer's voice(s), a falsification of knowledge by the denial of the differences between the knower and the known. Tomlinson, accordingly, asks us to lay down our scores. We must no longer "circle back narrowly to the notes but instead . . . *resolutely historicize musical utterance*, exploding it outwards through an imaginative building of contexts" (p. 22, italics in original).

Tomlinson focuses his objections to criticism on my proposal that we learn "to read as inscribed within the immediacy-effects of music itself the kind of mediating structures usually positioned outside music under the rubric of context."³ Arguing that any such effort is doomed by the blindness inherent in criticism, which "tends to deal out from the start the most essential and richly problematic historicism of our experiences" (p. 19), Tomlinson in effect asks for the reverse, the dispersal into context of what we usually grasp as the immediacy of music. What he wants, if we take him at his word, is music under erasure: a music so decentered, so bought out or bought off by the entrepreneurial historian's "wealthy . . . concatenation of past traces" (p. 22) that we can no longer claim to know it, or claim it as ours to know. In this dispensation there would be no criticism because there would be nothing to criticize; the death of criticism would follow on the death of what we currently think of as music. For some of us that might seem a steep price to pay.

If Tomlinson's terms of understanding are translated into terms of listening, their relentless negativity becomes obvious—and punishing. What would happen if we gave up listening with the kind of deep engagement, the heightened perception and sense of identification, that both grounds and impels criticism? We might avoid a certain amount of ideological mystification—assuming, that is, that mere exposure to ideologically charged representations renders us helpless against them. (Plato thought so, and said we need guardians.) Meanwhile, the materiality of the music, the dynamic sensuous fullness that arguably offers a major site of resistance to ideological pressures, would be put at risk. Can we really *hear* a music constituted only by its continual flowing outwards into the conduits of world-making? In our unwillingness to fetishize music as an aesthetic object, should we rush to dismantle it into a pure concatenation of signifiers? In pursuit of a credibly modest ethnographic attitude, should we throw the baby out with the bathwater?

If we can avoid an aesthetic ideology only by swapping *musica practica* for a modern-day *musica mundana*, if a postmodernist musicology can develop only as a musicology without music, then our situation is pretty grim. On the one side, participation mystique, ideological muddle, cock-sure myths of mastery; on the other, the thickets of thick contextualism,

the Pythagorean mysteries of the ethnohistorian supplanting those of the ethnocentric close reader.

Whatever its failings, criticism at least allows more light and air than that. Criticism is the public record of our sustained, thoughtful involvement with some of the music we find moving, enlightening, provoking, oppressive, ambivalent, and more. Talking about music, old or new, whether under the aegis of individuated works, genres, occasions of performance, improvisation, or social ritual, is a means of investing that music with the very cultural value(s) we also want to comprehend through it. Such talk may risk being solipsistic in practice, but in principle, *pace* Tomlinson, it is dialogical. As Mikhail Bakhtin argued tirelessly,

Any utterance, in addition to its own theme, always responds (in the broad sense of the word) in one form or another to others' utterances which precede it. The speaker is not Adam, and therefore the subject of his speech itself inevitably becomes the arena where his opinions meet those of . . . other viewpoints, world views, trends, theories, and so forth.⁴

If we take *postmodernism* to name an affirmative spirit of diversity, a contestable rather than merely a leveling pluralism, then criticism can serve that spirit best not by falling silent, but by foregrounding its own inescapably dialogical and interdiscursive character. Tomlinson complains that Mozart's music is too much with us, but that Mozart, that "mysterious and elusive subjectivity," has (been) disappeared. Granted, the music is very much with the dwindling "us" who still quixotically harbor a love of "classical" music, but is that really because Mozart criticism has continually falsified and appropriated the composer's "musical utterance?" Or is it because Mozart, through his music, has continually provoked dialogical responses that inevitably refigure both "him," each other, and "us?" We may need to recognize that much of our Mozart-talk has been too introverted and too cozy with an imaginary Mozart, but that is no reason either to dismiss it out of hand or, worse yet, to stop talking.

That brings us to the problem of mastery. There can be no denying that criticism has historically promoted a fantasy of instruction in which the critic poses as the master of truth. Tomlinson's forceful, eloquent warning on this point can be only to the good. Not doing criticism, however, is hardly enough to free one of the mastery pose. Certainly neither Tomlinson in his rhetoric nor his discursive models in theirs are free of it; indeed, Michel Foucault, Clifford Geertz, and Hayden White are old hands at mastery, real master masters. And while Tomlinson's positive program for thickly describing the worldly place of music is not only unobjectionable, but exciting, his use of that program to proscribe thickly describing the place of worldliness in music is a hegemonic gesture, a gesture of mastery, not of distance or reflection. If Tomlinson really wants to avoid establishing "new orthodoxies of postmodern musicology" (p. 18)—a goal hardly anyone would disavow—he has an odd way of going about it.

Not that this is Tomlinson's problem directly, any more than the Cubbins Conundrum is mine. As he rightly says, we are all in this mess together. The problem is that knowledge and power are in it together, too, as Foucault above all has insisted:

Perhaps . . . we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands, and its interests. . . . We should admit rather that power produces knowledge, . . . that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.⁵

Tomlinson is not to be faulted for promoting a certain mode of knowledge, but for imagining that this mode, and this mode only, can transcend power relations. Underlying this imaginary *episteme* is the apparent conviction that power always translates into an abusive or appropriative claim of mastery. The conviction is not to be lightly dismissed, given the frequency with which power has done just that. But power and mastery are not necessarily the same thing; the ability to *pro*pose knowledge is not necessarily the ability to *im*pose it. There should be—must be—ways of keeping them apart.

Certainly it is questionable whether the critic's discursive position automatically, in and of itself, reproduces the mastery scenario. And even where the scenario occurs, it may include the implicit or explicit acknowledgment of its own fictitiousness. Indeed, one type of postmodernist musicology might be conceived precisely as an attempt to engage musical works, genres, and so on dialogically, to write about them either without assuming the pose of mastery or by deliberately assuming it as a rhetorical position, a discursive trope and not a social or institutional force.

Such an attempt requires a rethinking of what it means to say that the critic "speaks for"—that is, has the power to speak for—a composer or a musical community. Tomlinson conceives this speaking-for as inherently appropriative and ventriloquistic: I speak for myself while pretending to speak for the other. But there are other ways to conceive the process, other "speech genres" within which to situate the critical discourse. In

speaking of a work by, say, Mozart, I may candidly be speaking for him as an actor speaks for a character in a classic role. I speak for the other precisely in speaking for myself, but always under the possibly resistant impress of the other. Or I may be speaking for Mozart the way a narrator speaks for a character in a novel: again speaking for the other in speaking for the self, but only from a moral or temporal distance that in principle limits my claims to certainty and authority.

Unless I give myself the latitude to speak for the other in some such way, I cannot approach the work (genre, etc.) as an "utterance" at all except as the passive recipient of messages that mean too much or too little. On the one hand I can refer to the most mastery laden concept of all, the paternal word, the authoritative voice of the author. On the other, following Tomlinson, I can depersonalize the utterance altogether, replacing the author with the "metasubjective level of cultural formation . . . beyond the reach of individual subjectivities" (p. 22). That would leave me with a cultural version of the discredited high-structuralist notion that it is language, not the person, which "speaks." Granted, there would be little call to dwell "internally" on utterances not genuinely exchanged between subjects. Such utterances would need thick description to compensate for their wafer thinness. But neutralizing the communicative process does not seem very promising as a means of understanding other people in their world-making.

Tomlinson's will to depersonalization pretty clearly reflects the decentering of the subject that is so prominent a feature of poststructuralist and postmodernist thinking. Even supposing that we can justify the critic's role as dialogical and not ventriloquistic, it is questionable whether we can justify any discursive practice that depends on one unitary, autonomous self speaking for another. Criticism, however, does not require such a dependency. We have already seen that the critic's voice is invested with a certain fictitiousness that can, and perhaps should, be made candid. And the other for whom the critic speaks may be equally provisional, equally embedded in a multiplicity of roles and discourses that no one can hope to master.

For Tomlinson, criticism is simply incapable of these recognitions, as if, paralleling the case with music, the mere representation of "individual, subjective agency" (p. 22) in critical discourse paralyzed our capacities for distance and reflection. Hence Tomlinson would argue that I cannot "close read" music, even for its social character, because in doing so I privilege both the composer as author(ity) over the sociality of musical utterance, and myself as master—a higher author(ity)—over all. We cannot, he argues, challenge "the modernist myths of . . . heroic individualism" (p. 22) in a discourse that perpetuates it. But criticism can do more than merely

perpetuate the myths of authorship and authority. Precisely because it is historically and rhetorically engaged with those myths, it can also destabilize them, undo them, and experiment with alternatives. Criticism can interrogate both its own myths and the myths of art. And that is something an ethnographic contextualism cannot do by trying to steer around them.

Suppose we were to rely on Foucault's celebrated demystifying thesis that authorship is something produced in and by discourse rather than by an individual subject? Authorship, by this account, is a function, not an ontological privilege.⁶ There is nothing here to derail criticism, but plenty to redirect it. The person who writes (or composes) may at once perform and resist the author-function. And since that function is to personify the conjuncture of discourse and society, the "utterances" produced in its name will everywhere implicate social practices. In that case, I can assuredly make de-authorized social readings of those utterances (say musical ones). Indeed, I can read them prolifically, conceiving their sociality as extending into culture on the one hand and the psyche on the other. Far from privileging me as a master, Tomlinson's "omniscient critic," the presence of such a readable sociality calls me into dialogue with unmasterable realities.

On reflection, then, the opposition between criticism and ethnography proves to be a mirage. Nor is that all. Further reflection will suggest that we cannot even carry out the ethnographic program of thickly contextualizing musical works, styles, or genres without some understanding of their meaningfulness. The knowledge-claims of a dialogical criticism are prerequisite to those of musical ethnography; if either project bans the other, it will suffocate itself.

For if music is really what Tomlinson calls it, "musical utterance," then it must have the speech-act character of utterance.⁷ It must, that is, be able to perform or imitate a social action in the act of being uttered. It must further be able to do this in an indefinite number of different circumstances, and must accordingly be subject to a semantic variability that requires it to be interpreted rather than merely decoded. Only through such interpretation, which is to say, through criticism, the putting into discourse of the dynamic interplay of speaker, utterance, and reply that Tomlinson misleadingly calls internalism, can we make knowledge-claims about musical utterance. And if we decline to make those claims in order to avoid the supposed pitfalls of criticism, we will forgo the chance to recognize the various worldly claims that music makes on *us*—and makes precisely through the pleasure that Tomlinson's version of the ethnographic program, in its anti-aesthetic rigor, elides.

In sum, we cannot understand music "in context," thick or otherwise, if we have no means of representing concretely what the music does as utterance. Unquestionably, there are political and moral problems with the aesthetic ideologies that have historically furnished those means, but that is no reason to write off the aesthetic, the valorization of perceptual pleasure as knowledge, *tout court*. One possibility for a postmodernist, which is to say a worldly, aesthetics, is to trace out the interrelations of musical pleasure, musical form, and ideology. Not to pursue that possibility is tantamount to denying—ascetically if not cognitively, but perhaps both—the two cardinal, historically grounded truths that music (or art) is meaningful and that music (or art) gives pleasure.

Tomlinson surely has no wish to make these denials, but his discourse leads implacably in their direction. The reason, I think, is the aversion to old-fashioned subjectivity that everywhere impels his text, and that overlaps imperceptibly into a profound distrust of human agency itself. Schooled in the postmodernist distrust of unitary selfhood and its delusions, Tomlinson's text projects a sense that agency always engrosses too much power, that the subject in action always seeks mastery over something or, worse, someone, as object. Hence his curious assumption that the best means to appreciate someone else's subjectivity is to depreciate one's own. Yet if postmodernism has taught us anything, it is that we do not need to conceive of subjectivity in such Hegelian terms as a force of opposition, inner to outer, private to public, value to fact. We can instead conceive of the subject as a position within a continuous process of communicative exchange, the character of which is simultaneously psychical, social, and cultural. And unless we leave room for this postmodernist subject in the discourses of knowledge, we risk falling back into the worst, most autocratic excesses of instrumental reason.

That is, of course, the last thing Tomlinson wants, but again, his discourse has a will of its own. Despite his sophisticated talk about metasubjectivity and the plural construction of knowledge, Tomlinson's version of musical ethnography is at bottom positivistic. His program appeals to discovery procedures and modes of knowledge uncontaminated by "individual, subjective agency"; it presupposes an oppositional relationship between subjectivity, that is, precisely the partial or localized modes of knowledge that an ethnographic postmodernism is supposed to cultivate, and truth; and it assumes possession of a transparent-enough metalanguage to make good on its epistemic promises.⁸ There are no clear means by which to distinguish this program from what Donna Haraway tartly calls the godtrick of modern epistemology.⁹ Underneath the invocation of a "collective, kaleidoscopic, and dialogical realm of subjectivities opened out to one another" (p. 23), I sense, with discomfort, a will to truth that is also a will to both intellectual property and purity. Here those metaphors of a historicism "essential" in character and "rich" in problematicity, of "wealthy" concatenations set beyond concepts "darkly tinted" by ideology, make a haunting return. And from these the program reads its proscriptive bias along the ameliorative lines of classic quest romance.

With this turn of argument, I might seem to have thrown Tomlinson's critique back on him in a predictable and somewhat dreary way: You think I'm a crypto-modernist? You're another! But the *tu quoque* game is not the point. Rather, the point is discovering the best means to carry out the overarching musicological project to which we both want to contribute, the understanding of music in its worldliness. From this standpoint the problem with Tomlinson's version of the ethnographic program is that its distrust of subjectivity sets its conceptual mechanism on self-destruct. The knowledge the program seeks is impossible on the terms it sets.

This is clearest, perhaps, in relation to the problem of otherness. I share Tomlinson's desire not to confuse appreciation with appropriation, but I am not ready to identify the necessary limitations of any one person's discourse, his included, with an appropriative solipsism. Unlike Tomlinson, I am not interested in respecting, not to say reverencing, otherness but in deconstructing the opposition of self and other. For that opposition always posits a superior self-a master. Tomlinson can judge that a critical reading appropriates the otherness of a Mozart or a Monteverdi or a Leadbelly only if he can claim a sure knowledge of that otherness. But since, by his own account, he can arrive at such knowledge only from a position external to the otherness, the claim to knowledge is both a hermeneutic claim and a claim to mastery. Only if Tomlinson could himself be the other could he venture a decisive claim to the knowledge he seeks from the thick context that surrounds the other. But then, since the rest of us remain in a position external to the other, this other Tomlinson would not be able to communicate his claim to us. Of course not: being the other, he would not be empowered to speak for himself, at least to us, and none of us could credibly or transparently speak for him.

At best, I suppose, one might approximate the knowledge Tomlinson seeks by so immersing oneself in the signs of otherness as to identify with it, and then to produce a text that would allow a reader to identify with it. But the text, being a text, would unavoidably be subject to the slippages and metamorphoses of interpretation. And the underlying process of identification would, just as inevitably, lead both the writer and reader into the confusions, alienations, and always questionable jubilances of fantasy, the register of the signifying process that Jacques Lacan calls the Imaginary, and in which desire, not knowledge, is paramount.

Criticism, of course, runs just the same risks, a point that underscores the continuity of criticism and ethnography but also brings us round to the question of conceptual means from a final perspective. How can we

write criticism without falling afoul of Tomlinson's critique? From my position as a postmodernist critic, the chief value of Tomlinson's argument is that it forces an explicit answer to that question.

How, then, can one write criticism as an agent, a subject empowered to claim knowledge, rather than as a master, a subject privileged to impose knowledge? Or, failing that, how can one write as a literal agent and only a figurative master? I offered one answer (only one, an instance, not a paradigm) in my reading of Mozart's K. 563. In his essay, Tomlinson declines to consider the content of this reading. He does so pointedly, of course, true to his critique of critical interpretation as such, but nonetheless with an indirectness that conceals the problematicity of the gesture. And it is indeed odd, if you consult my piece, to speak of internalism, aestheticism, or mastery in relation to a critical discourse that makes no attempt to account comprehensively for form and structure in K. 563 and that continually refers musical events not only to each other but also to the social construction of the body, to labor, to manners, to heterosexuality and homosociality, to the Rousseauvian concept of civil society, and more. This is certainly not close reading in anything like its original literary sense, which defines the "aesthetic object" as a restricted, semi-sacralized field of inquiry and tries to stay wholly within its borders. The critical effort is manifestly to grant no more than provisional authority to any border, to encourage multiple border crossings, and to efface, in the process, the distinctions between inside and outside, work and frame, text and context. One might even suppose that I was resolutely historicizing the musical utterance, exploding it outwards through an imaginative building of contexts-except that I wasn't interested in exploding anything.

Granted, some of the differentness of K. 563 will necessarily be lost in my discourse. But the loss might have its compensations in insight, and, in any case, if I do not write critically, *all* of the differentness of K. 563 *as* discourse will be lost. There is no musical utterance without an interlocutor; there is no context without a text. Jacques Derrida made this same point with the famous dictum that there is no outside the text. But we should remember that the dictum is credible only because there is no inside the text, either. With luck, each critical effort that puts this recollection into practice will count as a step toward collapsing the ideal(ology) of appropriation, disrupting the trade in authority, mastering the seductions of mastery.

These goals are reachable, if no more than asymptotically, only by writing onward. In other words, the solution to the Cubbins Conundrum is to play it out to the end. When Bartholomew does that, he saves himself, and incidentally triumphs over arbitrary authority, by taking off so many hats that a metamorphosis happens. After 450 doublings, his hats spontane-

ously begin to blossom; the poor excuse for a phallocratic feather exfoliates into lush ambiguous plumes and gorgeous gems. But Bartholomew, good postmodernist that he is, refuses to fetishize his new headwork. He produces splendid hats at last, but keeps none of them.

NOTES

¹ Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

² Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Theory and History of Literature, 10 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*.

³ "The Musicology of the Future," repercussions 1 (1992): 10.

⁴ Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Later Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Vern McGee, University of Texas Press Slavic Series, 8 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 94.

⁵ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 27.

⁶ Michel Foucault, "What is an Author," in his *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 113–38.

 7 For a fuller account of the speech-act character of music, see my *Music as Cultural Practice: 1800–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 6–15. J. L. Austin's term *speech-act* can be taken to indicate both the class of "performative" utterances, those that do something in being said, and the performative dimension (or "illocutionary force") of utterance in general.

⁸ Tomlinson is aware of the metalanguage problem, but tries to dispose of it in a single sentence: "In the act of its seeking out its own locale within a plurality of potential meanings, [ethnographic contextualism] will incorporate the very 'rhetorical' and 'subjective' character that Kramer sought in the old haunts of criticism" (p. 22). This statement is problematical at best. The contextualist discourse is said to be both inside its locale (the locale is its own) and outside it (the locale must be sought out). The externality gives the discourse the status of a metalanguage. The internality is somehow supposed to mitigate this status without disrupting it; hence the figure of incorporation. But the mitigation goes too far. On what terms can the discourse incorporate rhetoricity and subjectivity without being constrained and impelled by them?

⁹ Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," in her *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 193.

Gary Tomlinson responds:

I resist the many imperatives, the either/or dualisms, the all-or-nothing propositions, and the implacable teleologies Kramer folds into my views. In the face of so systematic a rigidification of my ideas I will be brief but needfully repetitive.

Kramer writes of my "hard-and-fast distinction between criticism and ethnography" (p. 25). I wrote of criticism as a force that "tends to deal out from the start the most essential and richly problematic historicism of our experiences" (p. 19). Music criticism and music history have in my view been countervailing but intersecting *tendencies;* they admit no absolute distinction.

Kramer would avoid "sectarian (or worse, careerist) squabbles" (p. 25) while still somehow—mysteriously, by my lights—taking full cognizance of the play of power in discourse. I see criticism as a set of approaches whose structures of institutional validation push it in certain methodological directions more forcefully than in others. What Kramer dismisses as sectarian squabbles are, it seems to me, at the center of our differences. Which is only to say the obvious: Kramer's choice to pursue "criticism," like mine to pursue "history" or "ethnography," carries heavy ideological/institutional/disciplinary baggage along with it. We might profit by looking deeper into the baggage.

Kramer imputes to me the "drastic claim that no criticism can ever go right" (p. 26). Again, I spoke of tendencies, not absolutes: I suggest that because of its institutional history criticism tends to pull us away from the rich inherent dialogism of all utterance (on which Kramer and I agree; no need for poor Bakhtin to sit up nights) in the direction of a narrowed dialogue or even solipsism.

Kramer sees me as depicting, in "classically modernist" fashion, "the postmodern as a moment of absolute novelty" (p. 26).¹ I spoke instead of anything but a sharp break between modernism and postmodernism: of a widespread "unease" I sense at "the persistent proximity of our methods to those we thought we had moved away from" (p. 18) and of "the contestatory and self-problematizing stance of postmodernism . . . in the face of modernism" (p. 21). I use "postmodern" the way Terry Eagleton uses "post-Romantic": we are products of modernism "rather than confidently posterior to it."²

In Kramer's reading I seek "music under erasure" and pursue a relentlessly negative "postmodernist musicology . . . without music," even "the death of what we currently think of as music" (p. 27). This is not the first time that challenges to conventional analytic and critical approaches to music have been branded anti-aesthetic (read: anti- or unmusical). The knee-jerk response itself says a lot about our inability to disengage ourselves even a little from, not all "deep engagement" (p. 27) with music, but a particular kind of an aesthetic engagement defined and created in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. The ideology of this engagement still weighs too heavily, in my estimation, on the academic study of musics.

The erasure of music I advocate—that is, *musique sous rature* in a truly deconstructive rather than Kramer's merely destructive guise—might allow us to unfold the cultural experiences we gather under the rubric "music" as a patchwork of divergences supporting and simultaneously undermining our presumptions rather than as a monolothic sameness. It might begin to expose ways in which our musical languages and our languages about music bear within themselves, to speak in Derridean terms, a call for their own critique. It might help bring to light deep metaphysical myths on which our musical and musicological practices have been based. The dearest price musicology can pay is not a decentering of our current notions of music—this ought to be its steadfast aim—but the continued sacrifices of musical invitations to a broad engagement in human difference.

The erasure of music I have in mind, by the way, would not militate against all close study of scores but only against the preeminence it claims in most current varieties of musicological research and pedagogy. I believe that dislodging this close study from its position as what I called "the sine qua non of musicological practice" would help us to a fuller awareness of the premises it usually entails. More generally, I don't wish to "proscribe" (Kramer's word, p. 29) any approaches but rather to apply new pressures, to scrutinize marginal traces, to look sometimes elsewhere.

Kramer is apparently troubled by my notions of metasubjective historical exploration. He devotes a good portion of the midsection of his response to the refutation of my putative "will to depersonalization" (p. 30), to the "aversion to old-fashioned subjectivity that everywhere impels" my text, and to my "profound distrust of human agency itself" (p. 32), suggesting in the process that I adopt "high-structuralist" ideas. Here Kramer confuses any notions of metasubjective cultural formation with an aggravated Lévi-Straussianism that sees nothing but metasubjectivity. The confusion is old hat by now; Foucault needed to combat it already in the late 1960s. Indeed Foucault's archaeological/genealogical project as it evolved around 1970 may be conceived from this perspective as an effort to strike a precarious balance of subjective and metasubjective modes of cultural formation and analysis in the face of exacerbated structuralist/ anti-structuralist polarities around him. (In any case, Kramer's rejection of metasubjective historical inquiry is ironic in light of the precisely metasubjective "will of its own" he ascribes to my discourse on p. 32.)

In my own brief discussion of metasubjective research aims I urged that

we loose ourselves from models that see culture as the *exclusive* product of conscious and subconscious subjectivity (p. 22). This point is one of four suggestions I offered for a revised musicology (pp. 21–24); all the other three are intricately implicated in models of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. I have never shied away from analyses of human agency in my work. Indeed I have argued repeatedly that invocations of the intentional fallacy and other interpretive stances that place out of bounds questions of historical subjectivity are simplistic, misleading, and limiting. And my recent book *Music in Renaissance Magic* is largely concerned with reconciling certain subjective (hermeneutic) and metasubjective (archaeological) analyses.

subjective (hermeneutic) and metasubjective (archaeological) analyses. Neither have I ever relinquished "the latitude to speak for the other" Kramer discusses on page 30. In fact I believe we might well take, as a baseline characterization of our interpretive speech-acts, Kramer's formulation that we speak for the other in speaking for ourselves, "but always under the possibly resistant impress of the other" (the echo resounds here of latter-day hermeneutic formulations like Paul Ricoeur's famous "comprehension of the self by the detour of the comprehension of the other").³ Except that I'm disturbed by the potential slippage from Kramer's "always" to his "possibly." The resistance of others in our speech is indelible and inevitable, hard-wired into language, so to say. (Wake up, Mikhail!) The problem, then, is how to take greater cognizance of this ubiquitous resistance, how to carry language's play of *différance*, of unmasterable traces, to the heart of our historical method as an ongoing critique of our strategies of mastery. My suggestions for revising our musicological project aim briefly, generally, and preliminarily, to be sure—in this direction.

So when Kramer ascribes to me "the ideal of a knowledge free of tendentiousness" (p. 25), when he argues that I ignore my own masterful moves or those of Foucault, Geertz, et al., when he accuses me of advancing my "ethnographic" mode of understanding as the only one that "can transcend power relations" (p. 29), I can only doff, Cubbins-ish, another hat in the hope that my head will be more clearly revealed. So let me be as clear as I can: My suggestions are all predicated on the idea that we are exercizing our powerful and "rancorous will to knowledge" (Nietzsche/ Foucault) whenever we speak or teach or set pen to paper or fingers to computer keyboard. In this I disagree with Kramer (p. 29): I think the subject-positions we find as scholars do automatically "reproduce the mastery scenario," and I do not find Kramer's "speech genres" responsible answers to the ethical problems entailed in these masterful claims. I seek an ethnographic historicism that, in Foucault's words, "is capable of liberating divergence and marginal elements-the kind of dissociating view that is capable of decomposing itself, capable of shattering the unity of man's being through which it was thought that he could extend his sovereignty to the events of the past."⁴ I want a historical method that, instead of clamoring ever louder, will undermine and moderate its own voice through its clearer (but never full) hearing of others; a method in which the subject-position we adopt is not an a priori and little-conscious presumption subsequently ignored but the conscious, problematized material medium we inscribe at every moment of making history. I believe we might move toward such a historicism through the specific reorientations I suggested in my response to Kramer, among others, and, more generally, through an intricate construction of webs of historical traces (musical and extramusical) aided by genealogical, dialogical, deconstructive and postdeconstructive, feminist, and postcolonial conceptions of culture, knowledge, and power.

If Kramer's criticism is really an intersubjective practice of "putting into discourse . . . the dynamic interplay of speaker, utterance, and reply" (p. 31); if it aims in its historicism and rhetoricality to destabilize our myths (p. 31); if its "effort is manifestly to grant no more than provisional authority to any border, to encourage multiple border crossings, and to efface, in the process, the distinctions between inside and outside, work and frame, text and context" (p. 34); then perhaps I have little substantive quarrel with him.

The trouble is that his *practice* of criticism, along with the practices of many other scholars, seems to me rarely to square with these ideals. It does not seem to be destabilizing of itself, rather the reverse. It does not sufficiently put its own world in jeopardy, to paraphrase James Clifford, as it depicts the worlds of others.⁵ In this it threatens to efface more than the distinctions of work and frame or text and context; it threatens to efface the distinction of self and other all told. Kramer writes: "I am not interested in respecting, not to say reverencing, otherness but in deconstructing the opposition of self and other" (p. 33). But there is a danger in such an approach, the danger that even deconstruction's powerful critique of western language metaphysics will serve only to bolster or reinstate old patterns of dominance; the danger that, as Homi Bhabha warns, "the place of otherness [will be] fixed in the west as a subversion of western metaphysics and . . . finally appropriated by the west as its limit-text, anti-west."6 Postmodern thought at its most challenging, it seems to me, pursues something else: the extraordinarily complex and problematic maintenance of a space for others' escape from our patterns of meaningfulness at the very moment in which we, interacting with them, masterfully map out those patterns.

Enough. More than enough. We both, Kramer and I, write books, and have published ones recently that, if not the last words on our approaches, at least give a clearer sense of their differences in practice than will be had

from this exchange. Readers who care to follow these differences might well turn to *Music as Cultural Practice* and *Music in Renaissance Magic. Censeat lector.*

NOTES

¹ Cf. Andreas Huyssen's warning: "Where postmodernism simply jettisons modernism it just yields to the cultural apparatus's demands that it legitimize itself as radically new, and it revives the philistine prejudices modernism faced in its own time." "Mapping the Postmodern," in *After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 185.

² Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 18.

³ Paul Ricocur, Le conflit des interprétations. Essais d'herméneutique (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1969), 20.

⁴ Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 153.

⁵ James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 2 (1983): 133.

⁶ Homi K. Bhabha, "The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism," in *Literature, Politics and Theory: Papers from the Essex Conference 1976–84*, ed. Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iversen, and Diana Loxley (New York: Methuen, 1986), 151.

In Defense of Close Reading and Close Listening

By Stephen Blum

Alan Lessem in memoriam

Whatever we write about music is informed (in more ways than we can recognize) by our responses to works, genres, theories, performances, performers, and to many other factors, some of which we treat as "extramusical." As musicians and as writers, we enact our interpretations of prior interpretive acts. As scholars, we also reflect on the history of our modes of interpretation and compare them with other ways of responding.

These points offer one approach to a question posed by the organizers of this symposium: "With a life that extends well beyond the historical era in which it had its genesis, does the musical work (or any artistic work) require a special kind of historiography?" At the very least, the production and reproduction of music require a historiography that enables us to discover some of the prior interpretive moves that have eluded our consciousness. A number of these moves, but by no means all, will have involved responses to works. We have no good reason to isolate histories of our interactions with works from histories of our interactions with (for example) musical instruments, musicians, spirits, patrons, melody types, stories, and aesthetic theories.¹ A Persian musician who continues to discover new aspects of Segāh and Chahārgāh has established a relationship to these dastgah-s (systems of melodic models) that may well resemble the relationship of a German or a Korean pianist to the Beethoven sonatas and Das wohltemperierte Klavier. In both cases, the relationship between the musician and the models or works is the product of a very long series of social interactions, and the most exhaustive histories can represent only a small proportion of these interactions.

Music histories are histories of performances and of modes or styles of performance. Every act of composition is an act of performance, whether or not the composer draws up a detailed plan for use in future performances. Because there are so many variables in all aspects of performance (the resources and instruments, purposes and consequences, etc.), we should not take a small selection of these as the "primary concerns" or the "central problems" of music historians. One of our special tasks as music historians is to trace the changing relationships between the knowledge and actions of musicians in various times and places, and the theories and practices of people who followed other vocations and avocations. As products of these changing relationships, musicological disciplines help us to register and interpret the changes.

It has often happened, of course, that a fund of terms, metaphors, and

stories elaborated with respect to music has been adopted and transformed by critics and practitioners of literary, visual, or kinetic arts. For example, the language of Chinese texts dealing with the criticism of poetry and painting is deeply indebted to earlier Chinese musicology.² Similarly, when Jacques Derrida speaks of texts in which "the labor of writing is no longer a transparent ether" but "catches our attention and forces us . . . to work with it," his words may remind us, once again, of the indebtedness of modern European poetry and painting to modern European music and ideas about music.³

A Musical View of the Universe, the title of Ellen Basso's excellent monograph on Kalapalo myth and ritual performances,⁴ would serve equally well for books on many other subjects, as would An Unmusical View of the Universe (not yet used as a title, so far as I know). In the late twentieth century few of us expect to find "a musical view of the universe" at the centers of political and economic power. It is difficult even to imagine what such a view might entail for those who hold power, other than "a radical aestheticizing of the political consciousness or subconscious" and a fascist "transfiguration of brute force through intoxication born of the spirit of music."5 In many familiar myths, the powerless are represented as "more musical" than the powerful. It is no secret that people who seek to live a musical life may find it virtually impossible to reconcile the demands of music with those of political or economic interests. We now have ample evidence of the consequences for professional and amateur musicians when music is relegated to an area of "power-protected inwardness." We also have more than enough experience to compare many histories of musical practices that have been politicized or commercialized in different ways. We do not have, and do not need, general criteria that would enable us to distinguish between "musical" and "non-musical" actions in all known societies and civilizations.

Arguments about what is or is not "extra-musical" are necessarily specific to particular sets of circumstances, as interpreted by various interested parties. Whatever may be true of some of us as individuals, the full "population" of musicologists does not constitute a sect, living mainly within what Max Weber called the "aesthetic sphere of value."⁷ Our incentives for musicological research arise from conflicts between several valuespheres or "life orders," and musicological writing is heavily dependent on terms, metaphors, and stories that also occur in accounts of religious and political conflicts. We can easily ignite sectarian disputes that develop into bad imitations of religious and political quarrels.

Unless we decide to cancel our lectures and stop producing books and papers, we will continue to retell some of the stories that have already been told: each critique of one myth will reproduce another myth, by the process that Peirce described as "translation of a sign into another system of signs."⁸ For musicians, "another system" is whatever configuration of signs they deem pertinent on a subsequent occasion: for example, a later moment in the same performance (or process of composition), a different performance, or a discussion of what happened in a given performance. In each case, "the meaning of a word [or of a musical cue, a gesture, a touch, etc.] really lies in the way in which it might, in a proper position in a proposition believed, tend to mould the conduct of a person into conformity to that to which it is itself moulded."⁹ Since so many types of translation are possible, it is not surprising that musicologists continue to argue about which translations produce the "real" or "true" meanings. Such arguments could be settled only by imposing a religious or political orthodoxy (one with more powerful tools for suppressing dissent than the world has yet seen).

In the "Afterword" to his *Musikgeschichte im Überblick*, Jacques Handschin underlined the difference between music historians who live in specific times and places and the utterly imaginary creatures who do not:

Our possibilities are unlimited only in the final instance, not in the first; for were we capable of apprehending aesthetically every type of music—music from all epochs and music of all peoples—we would not be human beings in a specific (temporal, national) location, but we would be "humankind in itself."¹⁰

If "humankind in itself" remains unknowable, we can hardly claim that "aesthetic apprehension" (however defined) is the normal human response to music. Neither musicians nor musicologists can avoid making claims about how one should respond in particular situations. Yet everyone realizes, to some extent, that others make different claims: "A concurring *yes* . . . is not only a dissenting *no* to a different set of *yeses* but may also be a modification or adaptation that rephrases an implicit, perhaps unrecognized, question."¹¹ Historical and ethnographic studies of musical practices can direct our attention toward some of these implicit questions, even if we could only recognize all of them by becoming "humankind in itself."

For obvious reasons, it is not uncommon for musicologists working in the late twentieth century to adopt "an aesthetic which is essentially consumer-orientated in that music is treated as a kind of commodity whose value is realized in the gratification of the listener."¹² The aesthetic that Nicholas Cook describes in these terms is not equally available (or, at least, not available in the same way) to rich and poor alike: the earth has not yet become a giant shopping mall where everybody enjoys unlimited reserves of cash and credit. We can observe that a considerable number of affluent consumers attend performances of music that would not have

been described by the performers and composers as commodities designed for the gratification of listeners. Is it our task, as musicologists, to lecture consumers relentlessly until some of them attempt to hear the music in what we claim is an appropriate manner? For what proportion of listeners does some kind of musicological knowledge (however diluted or otherwise transformed) serve as "cultural capital" in Pierre Bourdieu's sense, increasing their sense of participation in the music by enabling them to feel that they know how to appreciate it?¹³

Cook approaches this problem by distinguishing between "musical" and "musicological" listening: "If by 'musical listening' we mean listening to music for purposes of direct aesthetic gratification, then we can use the term 'musicological listening' to refer to any type of listening to music whose purpose is the establishment of facts or the formulation of theories" (p. 152). Why should the "musical" listener be concerned with facts or theories? Bourdieu's answer is that members of the dominant class use them in the process of "aesthetic distancing" through which they lay claim to "distinction." Cook argues that, for "normal" listeners, "the experience of music is not problematical at all; it is, in a sense, the one thing we can be sure of" (p. 230). Since his own discussion of "normal listening" is highly problematical, it is quite useful in a number of respects. Of particular relevance to this symposium on *Approaches to the Discipline* is the question of what will happen to musicology should the experience of more and more listeners become "unproblematical" in Cook's sense. How would we reinterpret the classic texts of our discipline and the large ethnographic literature to which we now have access?

The answer, I fear, is that these texts would be ignored even more than they are at present. Cook has little use for the many writers who have treated "the work of music as a moral rather than a perceptual entity" (p. 227). The normality of his normal listeners could be more easily sustained if no one agreed with Richard Kuhns that "interpretation, when exercised upon human products, discovers an unconscious domain which is a necessary condition for, and an inevitable accompaniment of, a conscious domain."¹⁴ No sociologist investigating the production and sale of certain commodities would be so naive as to deny the potential significance of the consumers' desires, as understood and manipulated by the producers and distributors. A musicology that adopted Cook's view of normal, "unproblematic" listening would abolish itself as a scholarly discipline.

"unproblematic" listening would abolish itself as a scholarly discipline. Kuhns's impressive *Psychoanalytic Theory of Art* is an important book for musicologists, in part because his interpretation of Freud's theory in relation to Hegel and others offers an excellent point of departure for rereading musicological texts—those of August Halm, for example, which are briefly discussed below. Musical performances (including, as already mentioned, acts of composition), are "enactments" that "organize and focus objects in highly cathected ways"—as are (in some instances) the writings and lectures of musicologists: any act of performance or writing may produce representations that can be enacted on a subsequent occasion.¹⁵ The performances of musicians and listeners, writers and readers "possess a latent content whose translation to manifest content will be at once sought and resisted" (p. 28). However relentlessly we may attempt to disclose our motives (or, more often, the motives we attribute to others), we can also expect to find conjunctions of seeking and resistance in scholarly work, inasmuch as "the risk of being exposed to forced disclosure itself becomes part of the ground for the creation of enactments, since they subtly represent delicate matters requiring hiddenness, and are able to disclose the otherwise inexpressible" (p. 74).

An important consequence of Kuhns's argument about latent and manifest content is the need for a "multiplicity of interpretations and responses" (p. 32); fortunately, many interpretations of the latent or manifest content of music and dance rely more on sounds and gestures than on verbal argument. Kuhns has good things to say about the "interpretative reorganization" of enactments in artistic manifestoes (p. 72), recognizing that "each interpretation draws a boundary around the variables that can be considered in making an interpretation" (p. 80). All of us have good (and not-so-good) reasons to dispute and transgress some of the boundaries that various authorities seek to enforce. (Kuhns's short book does not examine the uses of manifestoes as tools of intimidation.)

In the past few decades, musicologists have begun to investigate the literary genres and conventions employed by writers of artistic and scholarly manifestoes, and more generally by theorists, historians, and educators. I have not seen any history of musical thought or musical pedagogy described as "a parable of the history of all sciences, a novel of European thought through the millennia"—Thomas Mann's apt phrase for Goethe's *Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre*.¹⁶ Carl Dahlhaus, among others, insisted that the music historian's choice of appropriate distancing devices needs to be informed by considerable experience with literature. He often drew attention to novelistic aspects of music histories, expanding upon Handschin's critique of "the general ego" (quoted above):

We need to question the naivete that recognizes "humanity pure and simple" in every historical agent (seen, like the protagonist of a novel, as an appropriate object of empathy); but no less disabling is the skepticism that can satisfy its [overly] sensitive historical scruples only when every semblance of understanding has been destroyed and the past lies before us in inaccessible otherness.¹⁷

Dahlhaus, who worked for several years as a *Dramaturg*, used a number of dramatic techniques (particularly in his writings on the history of music theory) as he sought to avoid the extremes of naive empathy and unbridled skepticism. In the first chapter of *Untersuchungen über die Entstehung der harmonischen Tonalität*, for example, we see Hugo Riemann (like the characters in the opening scenes of many plays) making a number of mistakes, with consequences that are worked out later.¹⁸ Dahlhaus first dramatizes the differences between the theories of Fétis and Riemann (pp. 9–18), noting that one should not rule out the possibility of reconciling them. Before the chapter concludes with a confrontation between certain ideas of Riemann and Helmholtz (pp. 51–54), several other theorists are drawn into the action: Riemann misinterprets Rameau (pp. 28–29), Sechter makes an adaptation of Rameau's theory (pp. 29–33), several writers develop theories of the cadence (pp. 33–40), and Riemann misinterprets Hauptmann (p. 41).

Although his own practice may seem somewhat more dramatistic than novelistic, Dahlhaus endorsed the suggestion of Hans Robert Jauss that historians have much to learn from the narrative techniques of Joyce and Proust; in my opinion, those of Musil are even more relevant to music historians.¹⁹ Our choices as writers on music are not so much among literary genres as among different approaches to the genres. Despite the claims advanced in numerous manifestos, musicology as a whole has never followed the model of a pseudo-historical pageant in which the confusion and errors of the past are dissipated by the "blessèd assurance" of a brighter future.

As musicologists, we can participate in dramas that continue to enjoy long runs, and we can stage revivals of older and allegedly outmoded types of drama and storytelling. Some of us may prefer not to renew the ritual denunciations of "formalism" that have loomed so large in many parts of the world for most of this century. Sooner or later, "formalism" (like any other *-ism*) will lose its effectiveness as a term of abuse, and the dramas in which evil formalists conspire against "the people" will be deleted from the repertoire or rewritten. Historians can ask (even now) how the socalled formalists were able to create "a dissenting *no* to a different set of *yeses.*" Such creative acts are possible only when one manages to resist demands to keep step with the "progress" of history. No series of attacks on "formalism" could possibly serve everyone's interests.

Lawrence Kramer's manifesto on "The Musicology of the Future" includes an account of his experience at a recent performance of Mozart's Divertimento K. 563: he perceived "the performer's (and by proxy the composer's) body shuttling, with ambiguity and constraint, between labor and pleasure."²⁰ Compare Hermann Abert's account of this work, in which

he heard a "healthy, youthful feeling of vitality, which knows how to laugh with good humor as well as to be full of enthusiasm"; "all three players are equals, and even where one individual takes over the lead, several ideas, agreeing or contradictory, spring up in the others, so that we always have the impression of the most animated life."21 The differences between the two interpretations are considerable, yet Abert's reference to players who "rouse" one another's "own thoughts" in agreement and in contradiction, presenting the listener with "the impression of the most animated life," is to some extent compatible with Kramer's image of bodies "shuttling between labor and pleasure." Kramer objects to Charles Rosen's perception of a "transference of divertimento form . . . into the realm of serious chamber music, making purely intimate what had been public."22 For Abert, the tone of the divertimento was "weit intimer und zarter" in comparison, not with "serious chamber music," but with the last three symphonies, which are the main subject of his chapter. Abert (though not, of course, Cook's normalized listeners) might well have agreed with Kramer that "Mozart raises [questions] by making his music behave as it does, and trusting the listener to hear the music within a broader field of rhetorical, expressive, and discursive behaviors" (p. 17).

I have no quarrel with Kramer's thesis that "listening is not an immediacy alienated from a later reflection, but a mode of dialogue" (p. 17). Recalling Kuhns's discussion of manifestoes as instruments for the "interpretative reorganization" of enactments, I can readily imagine that manifestoes announcing a "postmodernist perspective" are helpful to Kramer and others as they "continue the dialogue of listening." As a historian and ethnographer, I must acknowledge that earlier manifestoes on the "relative autonomy" of works have been no less helpful to many musicians and listeners as they engaged in dialogue with one another as well as with whatever additional presences the performance awakened in their imaginations. There are many names for such presences and for aspects of the complex relationships people entertain with them: the composer's persona, the performer's magnetism, the spirit of an age or a people or a locale, blind faith in genius, idolatry, and fetishism, to name but a few. The terms are not identical with the relationships that people enact.

We have much to learn about the ways in which people talk about the dialogues in which musicians and listeners are engaged. All of the talk relies on tropes, as Goethe recognized: "We think we are speaking in pure prose and we are already speaking in tropes; one person employs the tropes differently than another, takes them farther in a related sense, and thus the debate becomes interminable and the riddle insoluble."²³ Human beings lack the ability to "fully articulate, in words, either the objects [of our attention] or ourselves."²⁴ I have not yet understood the difference

between the "postmodernist perspective" that Kramer advocates and the various "modern" (or modernizing) critiques of "purity," of which Goethe's is one. Whatever the differences, we can perhaps recognize more of what happens in our own dialogues as listeners by comparing what we say about the dialogues with what others have said about *their* experiences. The tropes used in Kramer's account of listening to K. 563 are well represented in the extensive written records of responses to Mozart and his music.

Those who share Kramer's interest in "strategies that are radically antifoundationalist, anti-essentialist, and anti-totalizing" (p. 5) can only smile (as may well be his intent) at the definite articles in his title, "The Musicology of the Future." The narrative strategies that consign earlier writing and discourse to a repertoire of *-isms*, while urging us forward to a necessary future (usually named with a new *-ism*), are as totalizing as narrative strategies can become. One can't have much of a dialogue with an *-ism* or a paradigm, unless the dialogue questions the ways in which the *-ism* was named or those in which the paradigm was constructed. Many of the other ghosts who still bend our ears (the ghost of Mozart, for example) talk back to us more forcefully than paradigms are wont to do (although we can *make* them talk back by challenging their right to exist).

In his remarks on Kramer's discussion of K. 563, Gary Tomlinson conjures up the specters of "internalism," "formalism," "aestheticism," and "transcendentalism" (p. 20, above)—a formidable quartet of ghosts, which makes another appearance as he objects to the "western presumptions" of many ethnomusicologists (p. 24). Evidently, these demons will continue to wreak havoc for as long as Kramer, or anyone else, imagines a "bond with Mozart" (p. 21). One may share Tomlinson's desire "to problematize the knowledge of others we come to through their musics" (p. 24) without wishing to join a campaign against "cultural constructions" that are "darkly tinted for us with modernist ideology" (p. 23). The uses that Tomlinson finds for such constructs as "nineteenth- and twentieth-century westernism" (p. 23) can produce a "ventriloquist's monologue" (p. 21) just as easily as any listener's "conceptions of subjectivity that grant it unrivaled culturemaking powers" (p. 22).

No doubt all of us are capable of self-deception, whether we are interpreting the decisions of a composer-performer or the demands of the situation we imagine to be our own (or that of our family, tribe, guild, profession, region, nation, epoch, or "culture"). Kramer's (or anyone's) close listening to Mozart's music may or may not endow an imaginary "Mozart" with "sweeping subjective powers . . . to speak to the critic (analyst, listener in general) through the music" (p. 20): listeners who sense that the processes initiated in performances of this music elude our efforts to participate fully in them do not always seek refuge in myths of "subjective powers." In any case, we should not place a permanent (or even a temporary) ban on all illusions of understanding "Mozart." Musicologists can learn to tolerate many varieties of love—including some that may strike guardians of our morals as fetishism, idolatry, or some other "perversion."²⁵

August Halm was critical of what he called an *ausgeprägte Geniegläubigkeit* in the writings of Heinrich Schenker. He nonetheless conceded that this "in no way blind, but downright clairvoyant belief in genius" revealed itself in Schenker's work as "a valuable heuristic principle, an incentive to make discoveries that do not stand or fall with his faith."²⁶ This is a good criterion with which to assess our reactions to beliefs and loves we do not share: do our prejudices against the belief or the love prevent us from recognizing it as an incentive to acts that are "valuable" from one or more perspectives? Halm's remark also points to an enduring dilemma faced by musicologists: we may have little choice but to understand many beliefs and loves as "heuristic principles," but this is not how they are experienced by the believers and lovers. Nietzsche's "philosophizing with a sledgehammer," recalled in Kramer's paper, is not always the right response to this dilemma.

In a helpful and provocative paragraph, Tomlinson expands on his recommendation that we "interrogate our love for the music we study" (p. 24). His language immediately brings to mind Foucault's discussion of Bentham's Panopticon, in which humans are "object[s] of an investigation [*information*], never subject[s] in a communication."²⁷ Tomlinson does not suggest that we should interrogate our love for music and for musicians in this manner. It is entirely possible to "dredge up our usual impassioned musical involvements from the hidden realm of untouchable premise they tend to inhabit" (p. 24) without enacting a drama of interrogation in which the style of questioning prevents the answers from altering the questioner's initial stance.

Without knowing what writings Tomlinson regards as "bound to models of culture that see it as made exclusively through the conscious and subconscious intents of historical actors" (p. 22), I fully agree with him that these are by no means the only factors to be considered in writing history and ethnography. Many ethnomusicological monographs of the past decade pay close attention to questions of political economy—which, of course, require some "western presumptions" that Tomlinson might find no less "disconcerting" (p. 18) than Kramer's "confidence in his bond with Mozart." His insistence that "the act of close reading . . . carries with it the ideological charge of modernism" (p. 22) places a strong restriction on Tomlinson's earlier statement that "art works inscribe in one fashion or another cultural concepts, assumptions, aspirations, etc., that govern their reception."²⁸ How can we hope to know in *what* fashion the concepts, assumptions, aspirations have been "inscribed" if we must sacrifice "close reading" in order to exorcise the ghost of modernism and all its cousins?

Polemicizing elsewhere against what he heard as a call for "greater engagement in decontextualized musical sound" in studies of African music, Tomlinson maintains that "musicology has trodden this path for a hundred years now, with an ever-increasing arrogance of the Same as the most pervasive result."²⁹ One can read musicological writings of the past century without arriving at this impression. What we can gain from acts of close reading and close listening is, above all, the possibility of rereading and rehearing, increasing our recognition of the limitations of paradigms, "ideal types," and other constructs. Conversation without close listening is pointless. Ethnomusicologists may have acquired more experience than Tomlinson is prepared to acknowledge in learning how not to impose our conceptions and fantasies about what is or is not "western" on the musicians with whom we interact, and in learning to listen, read, and write dialogically.³⁰

Toward the end of his life, Halm published a remarkable account of his responses to the music of Beethoven, whom he had once regarded as an "enemy" without allowing himself to confess this in so many words.³¹ He was concerned with the consequences of a situation in which "we involuntarily take [Beethoven's] music as the symbol of a definite way of being human": specifically, the satisfaction that "the mass" of listeners derives from Beethoven's music is based on an attitude of self-importance.³² The syndrome of "involuntary" attachment to a symbol must be broken if one is to respond to the "real" (*wirklichen*) Beethoven, or to any other musician. Inasmuch as a composer's musical technique is symptomatic of his "underlying desire" (*untergründliche Trieb*), the technique (when properly understood) indicates the desired response: "a genuine artist's way of working offers direct testimony about his convictions, about his attitude toward art, and, hence, about the kind of response that he wants!"³³

Discussion of technical issues enables us to recognize and alter our habitual responses; Halm did not suggest that an appropriate response must conform to one's interpretation of the composer's desires. Whatever causes us to mistrust our perceptions and habitual responses is to be welcomed as the necessary first step in replacing a culture that is "narrow" and "exclusive" with a culture worthy of human beings.³⁴ To the extent that we experience music as symptomatic or representative of "an existing culture," the music does not "itself become culture or lead to a culture.³⁵

Halm's approach to dramatizing "the history of music" (in his book Von zwei Kulturen der Musik and elsewhere) was based on the model of the

Bildungsroman: the protagonist (humanity in its engagement with "the spirit of music") grows older and wiser, learning how to retain and renew some of the energy of youth (the *Kraftgefühl* that Abert heard in K. 563). The culture of fugue, fully acknowledging and developing youthful energies, had been followed by the culture of sonata, allowing for coordination and control of formal processes but imposing excessive limitations on the "autonomy" of themes, composers, performers, and listeners.³⁶ With the advantages of hindsight, we can read Halm's text in relation to texts by his contemporaries, overhearing but also dramatizing his conversations with himself and with his colleagues.³⁷

The language of Halm's writings is that of a "secularized theology" due in part to his training in theology but also, more significantly, to the conditions of music, musicology, writing, and scholarship in his time and place.³⁸ These are not as different from our own local conditions as we might like to imagine. When we are willing to recognize points at which our own techniques of storytelling and dramatizing overlap significantly with those employed by "others," we can no longer relegate the so-called others to a "backward culture" or an "outmoded paradigm." Those who learn to read well learn to listen well, and good listeners can also become good readers.

NOTES

¹ For one attempt to outline "instruments and agencies of musical communication," see Stephen Blum, "Music History," in *International Encyclopedia of Communications*, ed. Erik Barnouw (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3:104.

² See Kenneth DeWoskin, "Early Chinese Music and the Origins of Aesthetic Terminology," in *Theories of the Arts in China*, ed. Susan Bush and Christian F. Murck (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 187–214; and *Early Chinese Texts on Painting*, ed. Susan Bush and Hsio-yen Shih (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

³ Jacques Derrida, *Acts of Literature*, ed. Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992), 114, from an essay on Mallarmé first published in 1974.

⁴ Ellen B. Basso, A Musical View of the Universe: Kalapalo Myth and Ritual Performances (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985).

⁵ Carl Dahlhaus, *Die Musik des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Laaber: Laaber Verlag, 1980), 285–86: "Der schlimmste Schaden, den der Wagnerismus in der Politik anrichtete, bestand . . . in einer tiefgreifenden Ästhetisierung des politischen Bewußtseins oder Unterbewußtseins, . . . deren fatale Konsequenz die Verklärung von Gewalt durch einen Rausch aus dem Geist der Musik war." This sentence echoes the penultimate sentence of Walter Benjamin's celebrated essay, "Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit," first published in 1936: "So steht es um die Ästhetisierung der Politik, welche der Faschismus betreibt." The first and second versions of the essay are printed in Benjamin's *Gesammelte Schriften*, I (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974), 431–508.

⁶ Georg Lukács adopted the phrase machtgeschützte Innerlichkeit from Thomas Mann's "Leiden und Größe Richard Wagners" (1933; reprint in Mann, Gesammelte Werke, 2d ed. Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1974), 9:419.

⁷ Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1920), 1:554–56.

⁸ Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), par. 127.

⁹ Ibid., vol. 1 (1931), par. 343.

¹⁰ Jacques Handschin, *Musikgeschichte im Überblick* (Lucerne: Räber, 1948), 386. Handschin's remark ("denn wären wir imstande, jegliche Art Musik—Musik aus allen Epochen und Musik von allen Völker—künstlerisch aufzunehmen, so wären wir nicht Menschen mit einem bestimmten (zeitlichen, nationalen) Standort, sondern wir wären 'Mensch an sich'") is a critique of Johann Gustav Droysen's concept of the "general ego" (generelles Ich), discussed by Carl Dahlhaus in *Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte* (Cologne: Hans Gerig, 1977), 122.

¹¹ Albert Murray, *The Omni-Americans: Some Alternatives to the Folklore of White Supremacy* (New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1970; reprint, Da Capo Press, 1990), 1. The subtitle (which was different in the first edition of 1970) indicates exactly why this point is so important for citizens of the United States.

¹² Nicholas Cook, *Music, Imagination, and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 7–8.

¹³ Pierre Bourdieu, La Distinction: critique sociale du jugement (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1979), especially 10–16 and 128–35.

¹⁴ Richard Kuhns, Psychoanalytic Theory of Art: A Theory of Art on Developmental Principles (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 7.

¹⁵ Ibid., 57. Since the viewer of a painting (or the reader of a musicological work) must "go through a specific set of responses, judgments, interpretations," it is appropriate to speak of the viewer's [reader's, listener's] "performance." Hence, "representation and performance are closely related though not coincident."

¹⁶ Mann, ed., The Permanent Goethe (New York: Dial Press, 1948), xxvii.

¹⁷ Dahlhaus, *Grundlagen*, 122: "So fragwürdig aber eine Naivität ist, die in jedem geschichtlich Handelnden 'den Menschen schlechthin' wiedererkennt—als Gegenstand romanhafter Einfühlung—, so lähmend wirkt eine Skepsis, deren empfindliches historischen Gewissen sich erst beruhigt fühlt, wenn jeder Schein von Verständnis zerstört ist und das Vergangene sich in unzugänglicher Fremdheit präsentiert."

¹⁸ Dahlhaus, Untersuchungen über die Entstehung der harmonischen Tonalität (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1967), Ch. 1, 9–56.

¹⁹ Dahlhaus, *Grundlagen*, 23, 80–81. James Hepokoski ignores Dahlhaus's specific acknowledgment of Jauss (p. 80) when he writes that this "extraordinary suggestion . . . may be his own idea"; see Hepokoski, "The Dahlhaus Project and Its Extra-musicological Sources," *19th*-*Century Music* 14 (1991): 237.

²⁰ Lawrence Kramer, "The Musicology of the Future," repercussions 1 (1992): 5-18.

²¹ "Ein gesundes, jugendliches Kraftgefühl, das ebenso zu schwärmen wie mit gutem Humor zu scherzen weiß": "Alle drei Spieler sind gleichberechtigt, und auch da, wo ein einzelner die Führung übernimmt, regen sich bei den anderen, zustimmend oder widersprechend, eigene Gedanken, so daß wir stets den Eindruck bewegtesten Lebens haben." Hermann Abert, W. A. Mozart, 6th ed. (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1924), 2:604.

²² Kramer quotes this remark from Rosen's Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, rev. ed. (New York: Viking, 1972), 281.

²³ Goethe, Die Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft, I/10, Aufsätze, Fragmente: Studien zur Morphologie, ed. D. Kuhn (Weimar: H. Böhlhaus Nachfolger, 1964), 398: "Man glaubt in reiner Prosa zu reden und man spricht schon tropisch; den Tropen wendet einer anders an als der andere, führt ihn in verwandtem Sinne weiter und so wird der Streit unendlich und das Rätsel unauflöslich." ²⁴ Goethe, Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft, I/11: Aufsätze, Fragmente, Studien zur Naturwissenschaft im Allgemeinen, ed. D. Kuhn and W. Engelhardt (Weimar, 1970), 56: "Durch Worte sprechen wir weder die Gegenstände noch uns selbst völlig aus. Durch die Sprache entsteht gleichsam eine neue Welt, die aus Notwendigem und Zufälligem besteht."

²⁵ Marcel Proust spoke of a "fetishism" that carries few dangers so long as one can "pass from one symbol to another, without being immobilized by the differences that lie on the surface" (*Contre Sainte-Beuve*, Pléiade ed. [Paris: Gallimard, 1971], 117). "Fetishism" in this sense avoided the faults of the "idolatry" that Proust criticized in Ruskin; its consequences resemble those of the "admiration" that continually recreates beauty "because at every instant it evokes the desire" of beauty (pp. 139–40).

²⁶ August Halm, "Heinrich Schenker," reprint in Halm, Von Form und Sinn der Musik: Gesammelte Aufsätze, ed. Siegfried Schmaltzriedt (Wiesbaden: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1978), 273. Essay first published in 1917–18.

²⁷ Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 202.

²⁸ Gary Tomlinson, "The Web of Culture: A Context for Musicology," 19th-Century Music 7 (1984): 358.

²⁹ Tomlinson, "Cultural Dialogics and Jazz: A White Historian Signifies," *Black Music Research Journal* 11 (1991): 239.

³⁰ Ethnomusicology cannot be adequately described (or undertaken) as a flight from "western presumptions"; one of the many recent discussions of this point is that of Francesco Giannattasio, R concetto di musica: contributi e prospettive della ricerca etnomusicologica (Rome: La nuova Italia scientifica, 1992), 22–23.

³¹ Halm, Beethoven (Berlin: Max Hesse, 1927), 9: "Mein Gefühl sah ihn als Feind; nur verbot mir besonnene Überlegung ihn so zu nennen." In a discussion of Halm's Von zwei Kulturen der Musik, Dahlhaus comments on his "covert challenge to the veneration of Beethoven, which was paramount and inviolable at the time"; see Dahlhaus, Die Idee der absoluten Musik (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1978), 125. In a letter of 3 April 1924, Schenker urged Halm not to forget that in his youth he, too, must surely have held Beethoven close to his heart; the letter is quoted by Hellmut Federhofer, "Anton Bruckner im Briefwechsel von August Halm (1869–1929)—Heinrich Schenker (1868–1935)," in Anton Bruckner: Studien zu Werk und Wirkung (Tutzing: H. Schneider, 1988), 39.

³² Halm, *Beethoven:* "daß wir sie unwillkürlich als das Symbol einer bestimmten Art von Menschentum nehmen" (p. 68); "Sagen wir es mit aller Offenheit: es war in erster Linie das Sich-selbst-wichtig-nehmen, was dem Zuhörer Beethovens, ich meine der Menge als Zuhörer, Genuß bereitete" (p. 70); "Ich habe selbst eine längere Zeit über Beethovens Musik also vorzugsweise oratorisch empfunden, und zwar peinlich empfunden" (p. 200).

³³ Halm, Beethoven, 199: "die Arbeitsweise eines echten Künstlers sagt ganz direkt etwas aus über seine Gesinnung, über seine Stellung zur Kunst—und also auch über die Art des Wirkung, die er will!"

³⁴ Halm, *Beethoven*, 20. In "Musikalische Jugendkultur," *Neue Musik-Zeitung* 41 (1919): 150, Halm distinguished between "bourgeois music" and "human music." He is one of the first music theorists whose work was significantly affected by Freudian theory.

³⁵ Halm, *Beethoven*, 72: "Wie kann Musik, ohne an einer vorhandenen Kultur teilzunehmen, ohne Symptom und Exponent einer solchen zu sein, selbst Kultur werden oder zu einer Kultur führen?"

³⁶ Halm, Von zwei Kulturen der Musik (Munich: Georg Müller, 1913), 32–33: "die Fuge wird im Grund von einem Gesetz beherrscht: dieses ist eben ihr Thema; dessen individuelle Eigenschaften, seine Tugenden sollen durch jene zur Geltung und Entwicklung kommen; . . . überdies sich bedeutenden Gefährten zu gesellen: sie sollen in ihr zum Wachstum kommen. Die Sonatenform weist dagegen mehr einen Gang der Handlung auf; diesem

dienen die Hauptthemen und die Art, wie sie verarbeitet werden; ... kurz alles Geschehen ist hier viel mehr als in der Fuge, ja es ist in erster Linie eine Funktion im Ganzen. ... Die Fuge hat mehr Struktur als Aufbau, sie gleicht eher einer gesonderten Existenz, einem Lebewesen, etwa einem Baum, wenn man konkrete Vorstellungen wagen will; sie ist die Formel einer Individualität. Die Sonate dagegen ist die Formel des Zusammenwirkens vieler Individuen, ist ein Organismus im grossen: sie gleicht dem Staat." Halm's use of these metaphors is discussed at greater length in my "Conclusion: Music in an Age of Cultural Confrontation," in Music-Cultures in Contact: Collisions and Convergences, ed. M. J. Kartomi and S. Blum (Sydney: Currency Press, 1993), 256–84.

³⁷ Halm's metaphors express an opposition between "individuality" and "authority" that turns up again and again in writings on the subject of culture. Ivan Nagel's juxtaposition of texts written by Franz Kafka and Carl Schmitt in the years 1912 to 1922 is highly pertinent to a reading of Halm's Von zwei Kulturen der Musik; see Nagel, Autonomy and Mercy: Reflections on Mozart's Operas, trans. Marion Faber and Ivan Nagel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 147–48.

³⁸ The dependence of modern European musical thought on "secularized theological concepts" is briefly mentioned by Dahlhaus in "Schönbergs ästhetische Theologie," *Bericht über den 2. Kongress der Internationalen Schönberg-Gesellschaft 1984* (Vienna: Internationale Schönberg Gesellschaft, 1986), 14. His claim that this state of affairs "has never been underestimated" seems to me an exaggeration, especially when one considers North American as well as European musicology.

Changing the Subject*

By Ruth A. Solie

I do think in this earlier part of your life there should be some mysterious or undefined reference to some faint suffering love affair. . . . Nothing could be more agreeable to me than to weave a sentimental chapter entitled, for instance, "The Romance of Susan B. Anthony's Younger Days." How all the daily papers would jump at that!

-Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Susan B. Anthony

The difficulty with writing a woman's life is that your readers may be predisposed to disbelief. Everybody already knows that she can't have done those things, or not all by herself, or at any rate not for very healthy reasons—and everyone from Sigmund Freud to *Playboy* already has an explanation of her aberrant behavior. The reason, of course, is that everybody already knows what women are like and what they're capable of—it's been one of the most thoroughly discussed topics in humanity's history. The only wrinkle is that the discussion has been conducted almost exclusively among men.¹

Interestingly, the quotation in my epigraph concerns Stanton's preparation of her own memoirs.² Acknowledging that Anthony would play a strong supporting role in the book, as she had in Stanton's life, the autobiographer here shares with her friend their all-too-clear understanding of what the reading public both wanted and expected to learn: that prominent women, strong women of exceptional accomplishment—women who "act like men"—have a frustrated love affair somewhere in their pasts.

Storytelling

Biography is a genre like any other, with its own codes and conventional procedures; part and parcel of those procedures is the familiar repertory of stories by which we are accustomed to represent and understand lives. All biographers—like historians in general—are to some degree at the mercy of the stories that happen to be available in the time and place in which they are working. In conventional political or military biography, for example, there is the modern version of the quest narrative: the picking up of the thrown gauntlet, the overcoming of foes, the triumphant achievement of the goal. Judith Tick has reminded me that the traditional Western rendition of the "myth of the artist" has come to share several of the stereotypical characteristics of this story, particularly

its portrayal of a heroic, larger-than-life overcoming of odds (and philistines), its pervasive sense of struggle.³

The result for musicology is overdetermining: on top of the cultural stories by which "great men's" lives are lived and written, there's the genius story as well. Musical biographers have dealt with this variously, as their own temperaments and interests and the intellectual style of the moment moved them.⁴ They may choose to heroicize or de-heroicize their subjects, to humanize or "geniusize" them; to take the olympian or the back-fence perspective; to focus relatively more on the life or on the work, on the public or the private aspect of the career. But whatever spin is put upon the story, on the level of cultural myth it remains irremediably a male story.

And what are the available female stories? Again at that mythic level, there are but two: "happily ever after" or "she came to a bad end." Both of these stories focus tenaciously on the appropriateness of the heroine's behavior—she is either rewarded for virtue (with marriage) or punished for transgression (with death);⁵ neither story is of the slightest use in explaining or evaluating a life whose very triumphs result from the refusal to behave in "appropriate" ways.

The overwhelming power of these stories has bedeviled biographers of women from the beginning. Carolyn Heilbrun reminds us of a typical case:

Elizabeth Gaskell, until recently the most salient of female biographers, did not celebrate Charlotte Brontë's genius, but rescued her from the stigma of being a famous female writer, an eccentric. Carefully, Gaskell restored Brontë to the safety of womanliness.⁶

And perhaps most poignantly, Jill Conway has found that a generation of prominent American women habitually misunderstood and misrepresented their own achievements in the (subconscious?) effort to make their autobiographies conform to available female stories, producing accounts violently at odds with their own diaries as well as with external historical evidence.⁷ No wonder that feminist biographers have taken it as a central part of their mission to "protest against the available fiction of female becoming."⁸

"The only kangaroo among the beauty"

With this forlorn phrase, Emily Dickinson elliptically expressed her sense of her own oddity.⁹ Having refused, or been unable, to order her life according to the standard story, she found no alternative story available except that of the outcast, the misfit. The misfit story, of course, is enticing and thrillingly variegated, and it remains a terrible temptation to biographers and to critics of biographies as well. The outrage that has in some quarters greeted Blanche Wiesen Cook's new biography of Eleanor Roosevelt is a good example. Patriots of many stripes have been offended by Cook's forthright account of Roosevelt's lesbian relationship with Lorena Hickok; what the biographer offered as an illumination of one of her subject's most important sources of strength, an explanation of her ability to thrive even in view of her husband's philandering neglect, these critics have read as an effort to tarnish her reputation.¹⁰

Furthermore, as Judith Tick has observed, gender isn't necessarily on the surface of these accomplished lives. Among the most frustrating stories to disentangle are those of women whose aspiration is that their works should be indistinguishable from men's, or who place their faith in the gender-neutrality of "excellence," or who do in fact behave just like their male counterparts. Whatever the critical fate of their literary or artistic output, at least until very recently their lives have continued to be found wanting in "womanhood"—thus Gaskell's "rescue" of Brontë—because they tried to "act like men." Not to belabor the point, most "great" women will turn out to have been "bad" women, according to one or another of society's dictates. The biographer's job is not to protect her subject from such charges, but to redefine "bad."

Because of the "kangaroo factor," there will have to be a certain political awareness in the insightful reconstruction of a woman's life story. I do not mean to argue that we should reconstruct women of the past as "feminists" avant la lettre, but that a woman of public accomplishment before the mid-twentieth century virtually had to have rebelled against the behavioral standards set for her, with some degree of consciousness or other. (This is not to say, of course, that she wanted to be seen in that light; many such women have worked hard to cover their tracks!) Critics sometimes complain that feminists render their subjects in too "political" a way, but it is hard to see how such lives can be explored and illuminated without the acknowledgement of political consciousness and resistanceor, failing those, either extraordinary pain or extraordinary good fortune. Any of these will call for comment and analysis on the biographer's part. Heilbrun puts it this way: "Where should [her story] begin? With her birth, and the disappointment, or reason for no disappointment, that she was not a boy?"¹¹ In male lives the question doesn't arise.

For example, Adrienne Block has found in her work on Amy Beach that the very extraordinariness of Beach's situation has become a center not only for the biography itself but for her whole research agenda. "I have to ask," she says, "how [it is] that despite Social Darwinist attitudes

about women, family and social pressures for her to marry and be a private person, [and] received attitudes about women's inferior abilities as creative artists, Beach was able to succeed as well as she did." The serendipitous sources of support that Block has unearthed in answer to these questions make perfectly clear that Beach's life simply could not be understood in another, "gender-blind," context—however much Beach herself would surely protest against this assertion.

Finally, understanding the "kangaroo phenomenon" underlines the potential importance of looking beyond canonic subjects and canonic genres, a perhaps counterintuitive assignment for musicologists since, as Katherine Reeve has recently pointed out, "weighty biographies stand with published correspondence, thematic catalogues, and monumental editions of Complete Works as our twentieth-century certifications of greatness."12 Traditionally, feminist practice has been somewhat less interested in those certifications and more interested in what the lives of women have to tell us about felicitous ways of navigating treacherous waters-about what we might call, at the risk of flippancy, the diversity of successful kangaroo lives. Elizabeth Wood observes that the music of such necessarily eccentric composers may be eccentric itself; one of the most interesting challenges for musicology, as it continues in the coming decades to wean itself from its excessive devotion to "greatness," will be to contrive both analytic sys-tems and critical methods that can deal with "different" musics without simply finding them wanting for lack of resemblance to familiar masterworks.13

Biography under postmodern conditions

In the wake of postmodern critical theory, and indeed of Marx and Freud themselves, reactive concerns have begun to arise about the so-called "death of the subject": have we gone so far in the direction of "context" in history, Foucauldian archaeology, or cultural critique—that individual subjectivity and agency have disappeared altogether?¹⁴ Such a turn of events, needless to say, would make the writing of biography at best difficult and at worst quixotic. In Diane Middlebrook's words,

the very genre of biography requires that there be a person, a consistently represented self at the center of the book. Yet as the discipline of semiotics so compellingly demonstrates, language is fundamentally non-representational: the materials of a biography are not life, but documents, and all the documents refer within systems of language, within different discourses.¹⁵

As theoretical questions, the status and viability of subjectivity and agency

have crucial import primarily on two accounts: the ethical need for a locus of moral and political resistance to ideological systems, and the desire to understand the source of creativity and aesthetic production. The former question is in the forefront of debate right now, most recently and authoritatively in Paul Smith's *Discerning the Subject*, written explicitly to put forth the claims

that current conceptions of the "subject" have tended to produce a purely *theoretical* "subject," removed almost entirely from the political and ethical realities in which human agents actually live and that a different concept of the "subject" must be discerned or discovered.¹⁶

The second—which seems likely to take shape as the postmodern version of the "intentional fallacy" debate—has received less attention to date; since the questions (though in more classic form) of creative process, compositional method, and authorial intention have long interested the biographers of famous composers, perhaps this is a theoretical juncture at which musicologists have important contributions to offer.

In terms of the methods used by biographers, a similar concern can be expressed as finding the right balance between "internal" and "external" evidence, between the essence of the self (as Leon Edel might put it) and the social contexts in which that self operated. Current biographical theory thus concerns itself, in particular, with the relation between postmodern theory and psychoanalysis, which has been so influential in biography writing during the past few decades. There is, perhaps, a certain tension between acknowledging the pull of large-scale structural societal forces on the one hand and making use of the intra-psychic insights of psychoanalysis on the other; nonetheless, many have also made Patrick Brantlinger's point that

Freud can be said to have helped cause the "death of the subject" by revealing the internal conflicts, fragmentation, and irrationality of the individual. But he did not therefore abandon reason or the perspective of the "knowing subject": that remained crucial—indeed, all the more crucial given the problem of achieving self-understanding by a basically irrational self. And despite its focus on the [singular] self, psychoanalysis turns introspection into dialogue between analyst and patient and treats self-formation as a social process, at least within the family.¹⁷

Among feminists, there has been a certain suspicion of all the parties involved in the present debate. Alison Booth writes, with a trace of cyni-

cism: "That post-modern proclamations of the death of the author should coincide with the 'second wave' of feminism and a burgeoning interest in female authorship is perhaps no accident."¹⁸ And while it is impossible here even to outline the interactions of feminist and psychoanalytic theory, they can be aptly characterized as interminable, multifarious, and edgy. On the whole, feminist writers have recognized the impossibility of proceeding without taking psychoanalytic insights into consideration;¹⁹ but at the same time they insist that even the most private aspects of life are societally inflected, not entirely matters of individual negotiation and personal dysfunction, as some versions of psychoanalysis may appear to suggest.

In any event, the inside and outside perspectives need not be in conflict, as feminist film theory in particular has brilliantly shown.²⁰ Variations upon this tension and its resolution will continue to ground the best biographies, as authors pursue the most profound insights into creative lives. After all, an individual subject's social positioning (woman/wife/ mother, to choose just one familiar complex) crucially conditions not only her personal choices and decisions but the satisfactions she is able to derive from the societal context in which she finds herself. Sharon O'Brien, a biographer of Willa Cather, suggests a working solution to the problem: "keeping in mind the inadequacy of 'unitary selves' while at the same time attempting to speak of women's different 'social treatment' or psychological experience."²¹ My own sense would be that what we are after is to recover what Jameson, following Foucault, calls the "conditions of possibility" of both the life and the work of our biographical subject; if so, then surely we need to consider both the internal and the external evidence.²²

The question that has perhaps most plagued musicological biographers is a related one: how should "life" and "works" be understood together? To what extent, if any, does our understanding of the one illuminate the other? Although it seems abundantly clear to common sense that the connection is intimate, we have not made as much progress as we might have wished in understanding its mechanism.

A feminist writer may usually be expected to have an *a priori* tendency toward integrating these two aspects of her subject, because the recognition that "the personal is the political" represents a commitment to lowering the barrier between public and private life. (Besides which, the public/private dichotomy has long been analogized to a male/female dualism in ways that a feminist scholar would be at pains to deconstruct.) Thus, Judith Tick is working out a form of "integrated testimony" in which Ruth Crawford's music may give evidence concerning her psychological life while evidence about the latter may simultaneously help to explicate the music. Elizabeth Wood has used a similar method, considering music, correspondence, and autobiographical writing as three parallel and equally revealing discourses, in an essay about Ethel Smyth's experience as woman, lesbian, and composer.²³ An aspect of this process that seems to have wider implications for musicology as a discipline is the experience of many biographers that their involvement in one composer's life makes an impact on their other musicological work. All three of my "biographer-informants" have written historical, analytic, or critical essays deeply influenced by the methods they have developed for understanding the life/works continuum.²⁴

Whatever we may or may not be learning about an artist's work from studying her life, in any event the person must surely be seen whole in order for any real insights to occur. In a recent biography of Anne Sexton, Diane Middlebrook took the daring step of including (with the permission of the literary executors) material from tapes of Sexton's psychiatric treatment. She reasoned, convincingly in my view, both that it was impossible to understand Sexton's life or work in the absence of this intimate evidence, and that Sexton's own poetry made it abundantly clear that she wished to share the darkest aspects of her experience with her readers. Reaction has been strong, centering both on the breach of confidentiality imputed to the doctor who gave Middlebrook the tapes, and on Sexton's continuing right to privacy after death. But Alicia Ostriker, commenting upon the hue and cry, dismissed the latter argument and asked a pointed question: "is it then the public that needs to be protected, needs not to know about the pain behind the veil of normal American family life?"25 Or, we might add in order to generalize the point, the pain of any "normal" woman attempting to live a life beyond the boundaries of the script she was handed? Surely, on the contrary, this is precisely what we need to learn. Nor can we understand any aspect of a public life without seeing the whole person clearly. In particular, there will be something empowering in the private aspects of life-in Roosevelt's relationship with Hickok, in Sexton's with her therapist-that helps to make the public accomplishments possible.

There is one final aspect to this complex of problems that I have been skirting: does the composer have a privileged relationship to her work? (Do we have to accept what she tells us about it, or about what it means?) Here the "theoretically correct" answer of postmodernism is an unequivocal negative. Yet I think it both possible and desirable to complicate the matter a bit, by distinguishing between two kinds of questions a scholar might be posing, and two different answers that might result.

From the analyst's or critic's perspective, the postmodern "no" appears appropriate. The composer, if not "dead," nonetheless cannot forever be appended to her creation, like an explanatory footnote. The reception history of any composition will reveal changing patterns of understanding and interpretation, many of which will not necessarily be sympathetic to the composer's original vision. Pieces may frequently become meaningful to listeners in ways that the composer could not have imagined, or indeed lose meaningfulness in the same way. Furthermore, certain habitual or subconscious formal features may be apparent only to a third party: during the 1960s we heard one anecdote after another about unwitting composers whose works were discovered after the fact (usually by eager theory students) to conform to the twelve-tone method.

The truth of such claims is one thing, their relevance another. The biographer or historian, that is, will need to take the composer's own account more seriously, as evidence about the person herself, her life experience, her historical environment, and her artistic intentions. Since listeners too can be multiple, divided, and "bi-auditory," relishing certain aspects of a piece on one hearing and entirely different ones on another, I see no reason to insist upon one face of this coin to the obliteration of the other.

Difference and method

I am not a believer in essentialism—for one thing, it undermines the kind of historical specificity that I value highly—and in my view the problem of women's biography has less to do with the categories male/female than with the distinction "standard/other." As Susan Bell and Marilyn Yalom have commented, "white men tend to look at themselves with a normative eye, conflating the masculine viewpoint with universal vision, as if it were the eye of God."²⁶ The methodological question is simply, what stories are available that are relevant and enlightening?

As we have observed, the often painful and even shaming life scripts of those kangaroos are quite different from what psychiatrists would call the "ego-syntonic" plots of many men's biographies, where personal aspiration is generally consonant with societal expectations and exhortations—the story of "my son, the doctor" warms a mother's heart, while "my daughter, the doctor" may be a source of heartache and bewilderment. (This is not to claim, of course, that outstanding achievement is ever effortless.) Interestingly, however, the situation in which aspiring male artists find themselves (as opposed, for instance, to political or military leaders) may have more resonance with women's experience, particularly in the United States where, as Adrienne Block observes, "real men do not become musicians."

In any event, if there do need to be methodological differences in the writing of men's and women's lives, it is not because of essential differences between them or in their works. Rather, it is because of the ways in which women's life experiences have necessarily been radically different from men's just in order for them to get to the same place: the place in which they look like apt subjects for biographies. That is, the "conditions of possibility" differ, in ways that will be systematic and (to an experienced hand) predictable, albeit strongly conditioned by both time and place. These differences are, for the most part, familiar enough: marriage or its absence has been a more significant variable for women than for men, and parenthood a far more determinative condition; historically, female friendships and access to communities of women have been crucial factors in women's success, and not always easily come by; the culture's very definition of "woman" is a specter of which women, especially rebellious ones, have been made constantly aware. Bell and Yalom summarize a broader differential agenda: "Special attention to the prevailing ideological infra-structure and its system of signification often provides a fruitful method with which to isolate the sexual and sexist threads of the cultural fabric enveloping these scripted lives."²⁷

But, finally, all of this may apply as well to biographies of men, and in the long run we may not wish to preclude the desirability of studying in men's lives the same (or counterpart) frequently-neglected areas: relationships, parenthood, mentoring, marriage or its absence, social positioning, role expectations, and the culture's definition of "man." Above all, any feminist will insist on this last—that *gender* as a category of understanding ought to be taken into consideration. Although women have traditionally been marked as "having gender" (just as blacks are marked as "having race" in a way that whites are not), in fact the system that encompasses the genders and controls their interactions prescribes equally, though not similarly, for both.²⁸

As literary theory, cultural theory, and feminist theory continue to develop, the concerns that preoccupy musicological biographers will continue to shift and evolve as well. Questions about subjectivity, ideology, resistance, and difference seem likely to be at the center of debate for some time to come; in the meantime, the working writer will want to proceed both thoughtfully and imaginatively amidst new methodological challenges and opportunities. Ultimately, in Elizabeth Wood's words, the biographer's goal is to make her readers "want (in the case of a composer) to return to rehear the music once we have heard the personal voice in its historical, cultural, social and musical time, place and milieu." Theoretical questions aside, this strikes me as an entirely apt summary of what most readers of musical lives are after, and an admirable and commonsensical description of what we are about in writing them.

NOTES

* My thinking about this topic owes much to three superb informants, all feminist musicologists who are presently engaged in writing the lives of women; I am most grateful to

them for taking precious time from their work to consider these issues so thoughtfully with me. Adrienne Fried Block is preparing a life of Amy Beach for Oxford University Press; Oxford will also publish Judith Tick's *An American Woman's Life in Music*, a biography of Ruth Crawford Seeger; Elizabeth Wood is completing a study of Ethel Smyth for Bloomsbury Publishers of London. I have also profited from conversation with my colleague Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz, who is at work on a biography of M. Carey Thomas.

¹ The classic response to this curious phenomenon is, of course, Virginia Woolf's A Room of One's Own.

² I take the quotation from Kathleen Barry, "Toward a Theory of Women's Biography: From the Life of Susan B. Anthony," in *All Sides of the Subject: Women and Biography*, ed. Teresa Iles (New York and London: Teachers College Press, 1992), 23.

³ My quotations of Judith Tick, Adrienne Fried Block, and Elizabeth Wood, if not otherwise identified, are from personal communications undertaken for the purpose of preparing this essay. As illustrations of some of the points discussed in this essay, see Nancy B. Reich, *Clara Schumann: The Artist and the Women* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Eva Rieger, *Nannerl Mozart* (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1990).

⁴ Of course, the nature of the available research sources also plays a significant role in determining the character of a biography. On general matters of musical biography, see Hans Lenneberg, *Witnesses and Scholars: Studies in Musical Biography* (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1988).

⁵ And note that these two, oddly, represent alternative *endings* to her story. In tragedy, of course, the heroine's death (Ophelia's, Desdemona's) will be presented as undeserved; but note that in such cases she is merely an accessory to the character whose story is really being told.

⁶ Carolyn Heilbrun, Writing a Woman's Life (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), 22. Heilbrun has been the most eloquent and influential exponent of the particular considerations involved in writing women's lives. Her latest novel written as Amanda Cross, *The Players Come Again* (New York: Random House, 1990), is concerned with the same issues.

⁷ Jill Ker Conway, "Convention versus Self-Revelation: Five Types of Autobiography by Women of the Progressive Era," talk given for the Project on Women and Social Change, Smith College (Northampton, Mass.), 13 June 1983.

⁸ Nancy Miller's words, quoted in Heilbrun, Writing a Woman's Life, 18.

⁹ "An ignorance, not of customs, but if caught with the dawn, or the sunset see me, myself the only kangaroo among the beauty, sir, if you please, it afflicts me, and I thought that instruction would take it away." Emily Dickinson to Thomas Wentworth Higginson, July 1862. In *Letters of Emily Dickinson*, ed. Mabel Loomis Todd (New York: Harper & Bros., 1931), 276. My thanks to Susan Van Dyne for this pertinent reference.

¹⁰ For Cook's own attitude toward these questions, see her review of Doris Faber's biography of Hickok, in *Feminist Studies* 6 (1980): 513–16.

¹¹ Heilbrun, Writing a Woman's Life, 27.

¹² Katherine Reeve, in a review of two new biographies of Berlioz, Journal of the American Musicological Society 45 (1992): 131.

¹³ It has very often been pointed out, of course, that the application of "greatness" as a disciplinary criterion has been sporadic at best. About my own graduate training—which never invited the study of any music composed by women, presumably on grounds of insignificance—I still find it instructive to ponder why I was expected to learn quite so much about the frottola.

¹⁴ For strong postmodern objections to the assumed coherence of the authorial self, see for example Michael Sprinker, "Fictions of the Self: The End of Autobiography," in *Essays Theoretical and Critical*, ed. James Olney (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 321– 42; and Paul John Eakin, *Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

¹⁵ Diane Wood Middlebrook, "Postmodernism and the Biographer," in *Revealing Lives: Autobiography, Biography, and Gender,* ed. Susan Groag Bell and Marilyn Yalom (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 159.

¹⁶ Paul Smith, *Discerning the Subject*, Theory and History of Literature, vol. 55 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), xxix.

¹⁷ Patrick Brantlinger, Crusoe's Footprints: Cultural Studies in Britain and America (New York: Routledge, 1990), 17.

¹⁸ Alison Booth, "Biographical Criticism and the 'Great' Woman of Letters," in *Contesting the Subject: Essays in the Postmodern Theory and Practice of Biography and Biographical Criticism*, ed. William H. Epstein (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1991), 87.

¹⁹ This literature includes work by Jane Gallop, Jessica Benjamin, Jane Flax, Juliet Mitchell, and many others.

²⁰ See, for instance, Christine Gledhill, "Pleasurable Negotiations," in *Female Spectators:* Looking at Film and Television, ed. E. Deidre Pribram (London and New York: Verso, 1988), 64–89.

²¹ Sharon O'Brien, "Feminist Theory and Literary Biography," in *Contesting the Subject*, 129.

²² I resort to this bifurcation largely for purposes of clarity; needless to say, it vastly oversimplifies the real state of current cultural and feminist theorizing, most of which, far from simply denying the existence of subjectivity, insists upon its construction by means of the ideological and discursive practices of society. Even in this more problematized form, though, the question still remains how an individual may find purchase for resistance to those very practices, whether political, moral, or aesthetic—something which individuals (perhaps artists especially?) demonstrably do. The phrase "conditions of possibility" encapsulates one of the principal themes of Fredric Jameson's *Postmodernism: Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991).

²³ Elizabeth Wood, "Lesbian Fugue: Ethel Smyth's Contrapuntal Arts," in *Musicology and Difference: Gender and Sexuality in Music Scholarship*, ed. Ruth A. Solie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 164–83.

²⁴ See, for example, Adrienne Fried Block, "The Child as Mother to the Woman: Amy Beach's New England Upbringing," in *Cecilia: Exploring Gender and Music*, ed. Susan C. Cook and Judy S. Tsou (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, forthcoming); Judith Tick, "Ruth Crawford's 'Spiritual Concept': The Sound-Ideals of an Early American Modernist, 1924– 1930," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 44 (1991): 221–61; and Elizabeth Wood, "Sapphonics," in *Queering the Pitch: The New Gay and Lesbian Musicology*, ed. Philip Brett, Elizabeth Wood, and Gary Thomas (New York and London: Routledge, forthcoming).

²⁵ Alicia Ostriker, review of Diane Wood Middlebrook, Anne Sexton: A Biography, in The Women's Review of Books 9 (1991): 3.

²⁶ Bell and Yalom, editors' introduction to *Revealing Lives*, 8.

²⁷ Ibid., 6–7.

²⁸ In a more expansive forum, I would draw out by analogy the implications of my argument for other aspects of a biographical subject's identity, such as race, social class, or sexual orientation; in the present limiting context I must leave readers to make those inferences for themselves. In particular, however, note that increasing appreciation of gender identity has already begun to sharpen our awareness of the powerful impact of sexuality on those "conditions of possibility."

Gender and the Field of Musicology

By Marcia J. Citron

The rise of studies in music and gender numbers among the most recent and significant developments in the field of musicology. Gender has come into its own as an analytical category in music only in the last ten years or so, and even though issues that would now fall under the topic of gender were discussed early in the 1980s, especially in work on women, the conscious and deliberate use of the term itself is even more recent. In its relatively brief existence, however, gender has had a profound impact on the field. As a major area of critical theory, gender has linked musicology with other humanistic disciplines and many in the social sciences. Even more important, gender has raised and responded to new questions in the history of music and broadened the sweep and complexity of the discipline. It has helped to redefine categories and methodologies and opened up new possibilities for understanding musical works. What I would like to consider below is the present status and influence of gender studies within the discipline, and the ways in which gender might continue to be a major force in the field in the years to come.

Before the early 1980s, musicology was mainly a positivist discipline. Critical, speculative studies, to which gender studies belong, were few and far between, and in this respect the discipline lagged behind other fields. For all practical purposes, the concept of gender did not exist in the study of music. The working, albeit unarticulated, assumption was that the object of study was male and usually undifferentiated as to class, race, sexuality, and other social factors. Yet because these variables were unstated, such studies tended to lay claims to universality. Consequently, important differences were papered over and other groups marginalized, especially women.

By 1985, the appearance of Joseph Kerman's *Contemplating Music* seemed to reflect, if not initiate, a change of attitude in the field. Critical studies appeared more frequently and provided an environment in which the study of music and gender was capable of flourishing. Musicologists looked to other fields, especially history, literature, and anthropology, for methodology and content, and feminism and gay and lesbian studies became some of the most important beneficiaries of this interdisciplinary theory. In fact, musicological models have been modified to the extent that many practitioners have had to re-educate themselves in the ways of other fields almost like switching careers in midstream. For musicology as a whole it has meant an expanded array of subject matter and new possibilities for traditional areas.

Since my own research experience involves gender and its relationship with women, I will steer my remarks mostly in this direction. At the same time, it is important to recognize that gender is a rich, complex category, one not limited exclusively to this issue, and that there is much work to be done in sorting out the theory and its practical implications. Generally described as the social constructedness of the cultural meanings of male and female, gender encompasses many issues, including sexuality. There is a fair amount of controversy, however, over the relationships among internal categories. For example, are male and female dualistic concepts? Oppositional? If there is a continuum within gender, then what are the end points? Are they male and female? How would sexual orientation figure into such a scale? Approaches run the gamut from constructivism to essentialism, with most practitioners somewhere in between. Some even find the very concept of gender problematic, especially recent feminists; while recognizing gender's value for women's issues, they worry that its appropriation for issues concerning men could lead to the marginalization of women.¹ This is ironic, given that feminists found gender useful in the first place as a means of ultimately removing women from the margins.

This is not the forum to explore in detail the problematic nature of gender, but it is important that the tensions be acknowledged. Tensions need not be negative factors, however; in this case, they suggest a flexibility that can accommodate diverse perspectives and approaches in music. Indeed, I prefer to see gender as an analytic category that infuses many kinds of musicological work rather than as some separate area cordoned off under the label "gender studies." Of course, there are individuals who focus on issues of gender in their work, and their specialty might be called gender studies. Yet their collective work covers the gamut of topics, from Medieval to contemporary, performance to reception, sociology to aesthetics, historiography to sexuality. This breadth suggests that the value of gender runs throughout much of the discipline and that one risks misunderstanding its place and undermining its usefulness by forcing gender studies into a separate niche.

Inherent in this discussion is the implication that gender does not fit neatly into traditional categories of musicology. Like other concepts taken from social theory, it upsets the neatness of the old models, if indeed they were that neat in the first place. Gender is obviously not comparable to a historical period, nor a blueprint for gathering objective data about a person or a work. It is neither biography nor style analysis. Instead, it is a means of structuring problems and issues and how one interprets them, and thus has the potential to modify the field significantly. Gender is already affecting the major categories of musicology, and I suspect that it will continue to do so. It is no longer easy to categorize the field mainly in terms of historical periods, or areas like biography, sketch studies, or archival work. Too many scholars are doing work that cuts across such categories, and gender has been instrumental in this reconfiguration. It has helped to foster an emphasis on music-as-practice, for example, with practice now a more heterogeneous concept than mere process. The composer remains an important agent but now shares the stage with others, including performers, patrons, critics, audiences, and individual listeners. Furthermore, the sociology behind practice helps to dismantle the walls between art music and other kinds of music, among them pop, jazz, and world music. As a result, the boundaries between musicology and other structures for discussing music begin to erode, and the possibilities for musical discourse expand.

Gender as an analytical category can be viewed as a challenge to some of the basic assumptions of the field. While I do not believe that this is the fundamental reason why practitioners choose topics that utilize gender, it is at the least a consequence of such work. Like other categories of social construction, gender explodes the insularity of music. It underscores the idea that music relates to real human experiences and to aspects of identity and social location. It emphasizes the notion that socialization as male or female, and one's sexuality, do matter in artistic expression. Gender further challenges the conventional wisdom of the field by raising questions about the ideology of art music as an ennobling art form representative of universal human experience; in other words, it challenges the moral authority of "classical" music. Consequently some might find gender uncomfortable or even threatening, and this is one reason why it engenders resistance.² The field is gradually acclimating itself to such deconstructive strategies, but additional time is probably needed before gender moves into a more central position in the discipline. Understandably, some advocates might view such a transformation with concern, since one of the strengths of a gendered approach, it might be argued, resides in its capacity for viewing conventions from a position outside the center. But making such a stand at the borders of the discipline might prove impractical. Gender will probably be most effective when it can infuse disciplinary discourse from a position of authority, which implies some location in or near the center (or centers). Furthermore, it is a questionable premise that one has to be on the outside to mount critical challenges. Positioning that enables fluid movement between inside and outside might prove more successful in effecting change.

As one might expect, gender is more pertinent to certain areas than others. Pursuits that grow out of the positivist tradition of musicology archival studies, sketch studies, and the preparation of editions—are less likely to benefit from gender, for example. In contrast, gender can be of great use to the many areas that consider social factors—which does not mean, however, that gender ought to serve as the only approach. That might be appropriate for some topics, of course, as in a study of how a composer's sexual orientation could influence reception. But for others, gender could function as one factor among many to be taken into account. A word of caution is necessary here, however: gender should not be associated merely with historical outsiders. While they might seem the most obvious focus of a gendered approach, it is crucial that mainstream figures and institutions also be subjected to social analysis, and that means, among other things, gender. Indeed, one of the goals of social analysis is the deconstruction of the constructedness of the conditions surrounding those figures and institutions that make up the mainstream. Without such analysis, the mainstream seems natural and inevitable—a distortion that masks the complex relationships between music and culture, as well as the importance of process in the conventions behind the mainstream.

Gender can be extremely useful for biography.³ It locates the individual within a specified social group or groups and also views the individual as an individual, though one operating within specified bounds. Thus gender works the spaces between the individual and group, and this proves to be one of its most attractive features for biography. In the case of a woman, for example, gender can highlight contradictions in socialization that are caused by her upbringing in dominant institutions. It can underscore the likely possibility of what literary critic Judith Fetterley calls immasculation: identification with men, against herself as a woman.⁴ It can reveal the psychological costs of such situations and the ambivalence that often results from this identification. One need only read some of the statements of women like Fanny Hensel and Clara Schumann, or various contemporary composers,⁵ to realize that factors directly related to gender affect their cultural position. Overall, gender as an analytical category affords a valuable vehicle for accessing issues critical to an understanding of a woman's life and historical position, issues that might otherwise be ignored because of an absence of methodology for identification and interrogation. Such methodology owes a great deal to feminist theory, of course, which itself is heavily indebted to the theory and methodology of various disciplines. In any case, the biographical potential offered by the category of gender should not be reserved exclusively for the study of women's lives; comparable approaches can also be used for biographical studies of men.

Gender also has much to offer historiography, that sprawling category that encompasses many others. As mentioned above, gender helps to reshuffle the categories, and this itself is beneficial to the field. Of the diverse topics in historiography, one of the most important is canon formation, an area of particular interest to me.⁶ Here gender is critical: it provides an analytical category that can expose many of the assumptions and ideologies behind seemingly value-free conditions that have promoted the Western canon (or canons). For example, gendered ideologies behind creativity and professionalism tell us a great deal about why and how women composers have been excluded from mainstream practices in art music. They also reveal many of the conventions that led to the inclusion of certain works and composers. Thus, gender is not confined to marginal groups but has the ability to probe the central tradition and how it became that way.

Gender could also be useful for critiques of periodization, an important component of historiography. It might show that some of the bases for coherence within periods and division between them are inflected by considerations of gender, especially female gender. Works by women might suggest other bases for categorization, such as a greater emphasis on function and site. There is also the problem of the appropriateness of the names. The Renaissance, for example, did not necessarily mark a rebirth of women's artistic fortunes, and the Romantic period did not mean the kinds of existential utterances found in many works by men.⁷ Of course, the present array of periods is problematic even when one leaves aside considerations of gender; questions remain about labels, about placement of boundaries, and about the identification and ranking of defining musical characteristics. But whether or not we ultimately decide on replacements for the current system, categorical exploration via gender raises questions that go well beyond gender itself and touch on some fundamental issues in musicology.

* * *

As important as gender is for biography and historiography, however, perhaps the most burning question regarding gender is whether it is present in a piece of music. I hear this question frequently: from students, laypeople, and professionals. Although it is relatively easy to answer in the affirmative, from that point on the details of how, where, and under what circumstances become difficult. One problem is that "presence" may be taken to mean literal presence in the sense of being readily perceivable. That suggests something that can be heard and identified as gendered, or something that a performer or analyst could visually recognize in the score as gendered. Yet while there may be elements of a text accompanying a musical work that readily refer to gender, as a general rule one cannot hear gender in musical language or musical gestures in and of themselves. To put it another way, there is no such thing as an inherently gendered interval, chord, or musical line. But the situation is not that simple. Many features of musical language have been ideologically associated with gender at various times, and this means that music can become a vehicle for the representation of ideologies of masculinity or femininity, or sexuality, that have been constructed in society. These are not inherent or universal meanings; they are socially contingent references. The challenge in historical work is to identify such references and to find out what they meant at the time they originated and what they came to mean through the various stages of their history. And even if we do not have obvious evidence of their longevity, some may have been incorporated into other kinds of conventions, musical or otherwise. Part of the difficulty is that it is likely that many associations were unwritten yet perfectly understood at a given time. Given the discipline's traditional emphasis on the written document, many musicologists may find themselves at a loss without written evidence and consequently assume that nothing significant is at stake. Obviously, we need to expand our methodologies to deal with such conventions, and ethnomusicology probably has a lot to offer in this regard.

Speculation about unwritten codes may sound tenuous or fanciful, yet it is important to bear in mind the power of the written gendered musical associations we do know about. There are the gendered descriptions of the themes of sonata form that apparently began with A. B. Marx in 1845 and extend past the middle of the twentieth century.8 There are masculine and feminine cadences and masculine and feminine rhythms, and the association of the major mode with the masculine and the minor with the feminine. In each case the masculine refers to musical characteristics deemed strong, active, and independent, while the feminine alludes to characteristics that are weak, passive, and dependent: qualities associated with man and woman in contemporary ideology. This does not mean that real men and women actually exhibited such traits. What it does mean is that contemporary ideals delineated this behavior and that they could affect real people; for instance, behavior beyond prescribed norms could lead to ambivalence and contradiction. To be sure, if these ideological references were evident in only one musical convention, we might be tempted to discount it as an aberration. But given a pattern of such associations, we cannot. What is more, the pattern strongly suggests the existence of unwritten codes we may not know about yet. Though some might argue that gendered codes of representation in music should be ignored because they are obsolete or repressive, we must remember that these ideologies were indeed real in the history of ideas and had the potential to affect practice. To ignore them is to distort the past.

There is another aspect of representation we need to consider: a strategy of representation deployed by a composer in a given work. In instrumental works this can mean manipulating understood codes, as in the case of inflections on the ideologies behind the gendered codes of sonata form. In texted works it can mean musical language that comments on ideologies of masculine and feminine conveyed by the text and that constructs images of masculinity and femininity vis à vis those ideologies. While most research on gendered representation has focused on texted works, probably because of the obvious narrativity and the availability of models from literary theory, gendered representation in instrumental music holds out great promise. With the formidable methodological obstacles such work presents, the analyst may find him- or herself on shaky ground. But short-term risk may be the necessary price for staking out new territory that will be of great importance in the long term.

Representation should not be confused with the gender of the maker; a composer of either gender is capable of deploying compositional strategies that involve gender. Nonetheless, this theoretical democracy might break down in actual practice because of subject positioning. It can be argued, for example, that because a woman is the subordinate member in Western ideology, the female composer comes to composition and to the gendered codes of musical conventions in a potentially different subject position from a man. I do not mean some essentialist subject position that all women share; it can vary from individual to individual, just as it would from man to man. But there might be a greater likelihood for a woman to feel positioned outside the mainstream-this even though she was herself nurtured in mainstream traditions. Potential contradiction might express itself in strategies of representation that renegotiate the ideological relationships between masculinity and femininity, such that they might amount to a critique of the ideological dominance of man. Let me repeat that such strategies are available to a male composer as well as a female. But the realities of subject positioning suggest that with regard to compositional strategy, a woman may be more likely to critique female objectification than would a man.

While it is clear that I believe that analysis according to gender is extremely important, I do not necessarily view it as a replacement for other kinds of musical analysis such that other approaches should be categorically eliminated from consideration. Nor do I see it as an approach that should always function as the main analytical approach. What I do believe is that gender is one of many possible methodologies for providing meaning about a composition, and as regular practice it should be considered an important option for understanding a composition. Unless the analyst is a die-hard adherent to a particular system, decisions as to what kinds of approaches are suggested by the work, composer, historical context, and particular aims of the analysis are made early in the project, and the possibilities offered by gender should be considered at this stage. I am also suggesting that gender, like any other single approach to analysis, cannot possibly provide all the "answers" to the meaning of a composition. If it does represent the sole analytical approach in a given project, the analysis should be understood as a partial exploration of the richness of the work. Yet the more likely and useful scenario is that gender will be deployed in combination with other approaches. I am not implying an ideal of the totalizing analysis, only that gender can work well with other approaches, and their interaction may provide insights that are otherwise not evident. Because gender exposes layers of meaning beyond the framework of the score, it can be especially useful in the classroom, as we attempt to place music in its cultural context.

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My remarks on analysis probably represent a projection for the future as much as a description of current practice. At present gendered analytical approaches are utilized mainly by specialists in gender. Much of the discipline is ignorant of its possibilities for musical analysis, and even many who are aware of these possibilities are still resistent to them. Yet attitudes can change over time, and I prefer to be moderately optimistic about the long-range prospects for gender. If one considers its astonishing progress over the past ten years, it is not difficult to envision comparable strides in the next decade and beyond.

I see several factors motivating these changes. First, as time passes, more work will be done, and the category will not seem so radical. Presentations on gender are already a commonplace at the annual meeting of the American Musicological Society, as are books and conferences devoted specifically to gender. Second, graduate programs in musicology are increasingly incorporating critical theory into their curricula. While it is less clear how much attention is devoted to gender, the modifications suggest that future scholars will at least be familiar with much of the theory behind gender studies and better prepared to handle a broader range of methodologies. I expect to see many more dissertations that deal with gender. Indeed, the abundance of topics aired at the first and second Feminist Theory and Music Conferences (1991 and 1993), especially by younger scholars, attests to a vigorous ground swell of interest. Of course, we cannot assume that students exposed to interdisciplinary theory will necessarily embrace it wholeheartedly or decide to incorporate it into their work. But they will understand its potential as an analytical category alongside other options at their disposal. One caveat, however: at present there are very few schools with specialists in gender on the faculty. Al-

though a specialist in a given area is not essential for a dissertation project, practically speaking the absence of one would tend to keep down the number of students that pursue such a course of study.

A third reason behind the changes is demographics. Women are populating the field in proportionally greater numbers, including leadership positions. Although it would be foolish to posit a direct correspondence between presence and subject matter, a diversity of practitioners nonetheless suggests greater attention to women as historical subjects. This in turn suggests utilization of gender as an analytical category. Societal interest in multiculturalism also encourages the diverse perspectives that gender can offer.

Fourth and last, musicology in general is becoming less insular and more connected to society at large. Already underway are efforts at outreach, aimed at forging links with the community and other professional organizations. Although change over time is inevitable in any organization, musicology seems to be in the midst of a self-conscious redefinition—witness this collection and others—and part of the process involves moving away from the field's elitist origins in late nineteenth-century Germany. As social forces expand the range of subject matter and practitioners, the inviolability and intangibility of art music are being challenged. Gender is both a cause and an effect of such changes, and I believe that we can expect many more in the coming years.

Gender and its relationship to musicology may boil down to a matter of identity. How does the field wish to see itself? Does it yearn to hold on to its elitist status as protector and proponent of the traditional canon and its European values, or does it wish to be something else? Of course the issues are not that simple, nor can there be an expectation of unanimity. The expansion of musicology to include critical theory has introduced, or rather brought to the surface, tensions and contradictions that are palpable. While some might prefer the supposed simplicity of old, I consider the tensions extremely healthy, especially for the future. As for the present and near term, I believe that the discipline is much more interesting because of the expanded range of categories and methodologies. Conference papers and journal articles are much more engaging, for example, and there is a sense that the controversies do matter. Gender can claim some of the credit for the change. Another benefit is that musicology has jumped into the intellectual mainstream of the humanities and social sciences.

Of course there are risks. We could become as factious and politicized as literary criticism. We could become so wrapped up in critical theory that we lose sight of the *raison d'être* of our efforts: music itself. Many believe this has already happened with literature. One hopes that our roots in musical performance and the sheer aesthetic pleasure of music will temper any disciplinary tendencies toward theoretical excess.

I expect that by the end of the decade the kinds of possibilities I have sketched for gender will be joined by others as yet unimagined. Let this be a prediction in itself. Gender and other social issues force musicologists to examine their desires for the discipline and their relationship to the discipline. While there may be a fair amount of debate, the very process of selfexamination will strengthen practitioners and music alike. Like others, I look forward to a vital future for the discipline in the coming years.

NOTES

¹ See, for example, Tania Modleski, *Feminism Without Women: Culture and Criticism in a "Postfeminist" Age* (New York: Routledge, 1991). Judith Butler critiques the essentializing tendencies of recent usage of the category of gender in *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

² See especially Pieter C. Van Den Toorn, "Politics, Feminism, and Contemporary Music Theory," *The Journal of Musicology* 9 (1991): 275–99; and the response by Ruth Solie in the next issue of the journal, "What Do Feminists Want? A Reply to Pieter Van Den Toorn," 399– 411.

³ See Ruth Solie's essay in this issue.

⁴ Judith Fetterley, *The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American Fiction* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978).

⁵ See the responses of several women composers to a survey conducted by Elaine Barkin in *Perspectives of New Music* 20 (1981–82): 288–329.

⁶ See my study *Gender and the Musical Canon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

⁷ For a model of how women's history can be reconfigured see Bonnie S. Anderson and Judith P. Zinsser, A History of Their Own: Women in Europe from Prehistory to the Present, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Row, 1988).

⁸ For a fuller discussion, especially in connection with absolute music and an analysis of an actual piece, see chapter 4 of my *Gender and the Musical Canon*.

Musical and Intellectual Values: Interpreting the History of Tonal Theory

By Scott Burnham

For many years, the history of music theory seemed most useful as a source for dissertation topics, the models of choice being the critically annotated translation of some little-read treatise, "book report"-style coverage of a wider range of a theorist's work, or sometimes the tracing of a concept or category through several generations of theorists (sonata form, or the $\frac{6}{4}$ chord). The unstated assumption that there would be little overwhelming relevance in such topics guaranteed their suitability as journeyman demonstrations of scholarly aptitude. Students could safely work in distant tributaries, away from the roaring cataracts of central issues. Intellectual investment would be limited to showing a consciousness of the relationship of such tributaries to the main stream, either by locating originary traces of modern theories or by indulging in the compensatory satisfaction of being able to appraise earlier theories as primitive and unenlightened. But as more and more theorists have been brought to light in this manner and the list of critical editions grows, there is an equally growing apprehension that the history of our theoretical assumptions has moved closer to the center of our concerns in musicology. For as we become increasingly self-aware of the ways we talk about music, as talk about music eclipses music itself as the most fascinating object in the academic firmament, the history of such talk suddenly assumes a luminous relevance.

If music claims any place at all in academic discourse, it is as a cipher whose history is one of ever changing investiture. The study of the history of music theory enjoys the closest view of the parade route of authorities that have been vested in music and allows for an examination of the intellectual and ethical motivations behind them. Nature, Reason, Physiology, Psychology, Theology, and Human Cognition stand among these authorities, each variously appealed to in various ages. Music is alternately a force of nature, a product of reason, or an expression of the transcendent; it is a human practice, a product of cognition, and an expression of the creative psyche. What remains throughout any combination of these attributions is the invariably unshakable yet variably supportable belief that music is of fundamental importance to the human condition, and the history of its theory is largely the history of underwriting this belief in music's value through analogies with other currently meaningful human activities. We clearly feel the substantiality of music and yet, like Chamisso's Peter Schlemihl, it casts no shadow. As a hedge against the abiding fear that music has no communicable meaning that can be the subject of reasoned discourse (and consequently the fear that it may in fact have no "real" importance), music theory strives to give music back its shadow.¹

Highly valued but equivocally grounded, music becomes a magical presence inviting both awe and anxiety.² As a natural response to this view of music, music theorists have sought time and again (with all the earnest demeanor of blind, or perhaps bad, faith) to attach musical practice to esteemed cultural ideals: the agenda behind the construction of a music theory is very often one of fitting an existing practice to some sort of idealized intellectual model. This is increasingly found to be the case in medieval and renaissance theories, which up until recently have been examined primarily for clues about performance practices. Accounts of practice in the treatises of those periods reveal puzzling anomalies when attempts are made to reconstruct the moribund traditions they presumably expound.³ For music theory is never purely an act of codification, as it is sometimes portrayed (Fux as the codification of Palestrina, or, closer to home, A. B. Marx as the codification of Beethoven); mixed with the urge to account for what is vital in any given composer or style is the urge to idealize musical practice in ways congruent with one's world view.

In fact, the perception of just what *is* vital in a musical practice is often dictated by what is vital to one's value system (that which appears to be alive in one's necessarily selective field of vision). To take but one example, J. P. Rameau's entire theoretical oeuvre hums with the tension between empirical practice and the assumption of Cartesian ideals; vital to Rameau in the burgeoning tonal practice of his age is the susceptibility of harmonic syntax to generalization. He noticed that a pervasive aspect of musical practice, the dominant-tonic cadence, could act as a model for all other harmonic progressions and as a musical/empirical representation of the nature of pitch itself (the fifth returning to its source), thus allowing the semblance of a deductive system.⁴ An element of practice and an intellectual model attract each other, and an inevitable host of adjustments are made to preserve the marriage.

This continued tension between musical practice and intellectual model claims central importance in the history of music theory. Equal consideration to both factors is rarely granted in studies of the history of theory: either an earlier theorist's effectiveness in accounting for a particular musical practice is gauged by the nearest available lights, namely the perceived effectiveness of one's own theory, or the nature of his theory is explained primarily as a result of intellectual influences. These latter explanations are often based on similarities in language between a theorist and some philosopher, for example. Once such similarities are detected,

the works of the theorist in question are then ransacked for other such evidence, and an interpretation based on influence arises. This kind of interpretation is then employed either to explain what is inadequate about a theorist (as in interpretations of A. B. Marx as a contradictory mix of Hegel and Goethe) or to show how a favored theorist is grounded in a venerable philosophical tradition (as in depictions of Schenker as Goethean or Kantian).⁵ Academically feasible evidence is found for pre-existing value judgments.

One way to avoid a premature or prejudicial assessment of influence as well as to keep in one's sights the mutually interactive confluence of praxis codification and intellectual model is to investigate first and foremost what a theorist in fact *does* rather than what he says he is doing or what one wishes he had done. The surest way to determine what a theorist does is to determine how he engages musical practice-what kinds of things are ascribed to that practice? how is the practice conceptualized?⁶ Only after a theorist's intellectual engagement with practice is understood in some internally logical way can that theorist's work stand open for an investigation of influence. As Allan Keiler puts it, in a discussion of philosophical influence on the different stages of Schenker's theory: "the whole question of influence can be confronted squarely only when each stage is understood synchronically in some coherent (or not coherent) way and when a comprehensible internal logic of development of such stages points the way to just those problematic areas whose understanding can come only from the outside."7 In short, to echo Roman Jakobson (and Saussure before him), you have to know what the points are before you can draw lines between them.

An understanding of synchronic "internal logic" in a theorist's work is facilitated when the music under examination is still part of a viable tradition. The history of tonal theory is thus of particular interest to us today, for its object of study is a music not only with which we are abundantly familiar, but which continues to bear the main argument of musical tradition in the modern West. Our study of the history of this music's theory is not directed toward reconstructing an unavailable musical experience, as has been the case with some branches of early-music history of theory (the efficacy of which is questioned above). We can instead approach earlier tonal theorists with our own internalized assumptions about the music they are attempting to understand—we are thus in a better position to gauge the shape of their endeavors, for we have the shape of our own as a ready comparison.

Of course this reliance on a shared tradition as *rapprochement* will easily lead to unproductive assessments of earlier theorists if the shape of our own concerns is treated as the desired standard against which earlier work is measured. There is no surer way to guarantee a complete misunderstanding of a theorist working from another standpoint than to measure it against one's own in this way. The model for this procedure is of course the now outmoded essentialist view of the history of science: the shared tradition of music is treated like a product of the natural world, the understanding of which is increasingly refined by subsequent generations of scientist-theorists. Thus we read about what Rameau got right (inversion theory) and what he got wrong (suspensions); or what Riemann got right (harmonic function), and what he didn't (dualism).


We need to be more concerned with understanding the history of music theory as an intellectual and cultural history than with constructing the pre-history of today's theory. This shift in emphasis would involve treating all theories as systems of thought with their own integrity and as cultural/ historical products with their own ways and means. Our present theoretical prejudices can start a dialogue with the earlier theory, in the manner of a hermeneutic exchange. Such an exchange would take the shape of a questioning, starting (most profitably, according to Thomas Kuhn) with those aspects of the earlier theory which seem to stand in greatest contradiction to our own views.8 The hermeneutic exercise then involves arriving at an understanding of the other theory that makes any apparently refractory aspects necessary, or at least relevant, to that theory. We thus move away from "why does Riemann insist on dualism?" as a rhetorical question along the lines of "why does he continue to bet on a lame horse (when he has a stable of winners)?" to "why does Riemann need dualism?" as a real question with the possibility of a revealing answer. Our question would then take the form of "why does his horse seem lame to us and a winner to him?" leading to "on what kind of race track would such a horse prove a winner?"⁹ Every test of an earlier theorist's assumptions is thus at the same time a test of our own assumptions. The result would be a more integrated view of ourselves as historical beings: instead of living within a disconnected present in need of a constitutive past we would be part of a present vitally connected to the past. Our own assumptions thus relinquish the role of a prescriptive template and become as historically conditioned as those of earlier theorists. This is in fact what we share, nolens, with those who have preceded us: we too attempt to understand music from a specific vantage point along the same historical continuum.

A few examples may illuminate the opportunites afforded by an interpretive study of the history of theory. The first takes the form of a vignette on the subject of Rameau and the suspension, in which an attempt will be

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
made to counteract the standard type of assumption about earlier theorists made from the essentialist standpoint. Rameau's explanation of the suspension, taken from his first and most influential theoretical work, the *Traité de l'Harmonie* (1722), offers a clear case of an explanatory strategy that would never occur to us today. In the *Traité,* what we would deem a melodic suspension is for Rameau the result of the supposition (sub-position) in the continuo bass of a supernumerary tone *beneath* the fundamental bass. The rule behind such a reading states that in accordance with the so-called *senario* there can be no chord which exceeds the octave; therefore, the existing bass note cannot be the true fundamental. And the assumption behind this rule is that any simultaneous combination of tones found in a piece of music is perforce harmonic in nature, because nature, in music, is harmonic. The demonstrable relation of a major triad to the physical properties of regularly vibrating sound makes harmony a workable bottom line for a Cartesian deductive process.

Example 1. From Jean-Philippe Rameau, *Treatise on Harmony*, trans. Philip Gossett (New York: Dover, 1971), 90.



In Example 1, Rameau's notion of a supposed bass is useful in that it allows him to generalize about the other parts. The three upper parts of the chords at A, B, and C, when construed as forming a stack of three thirds with the fundamental bass, behave like the voices of a dominant seventh chord. Here Rameau, as a would-be deductive theorist, meets the challenge of showing how the apparently melodic practice of suspension can be harmonically generated—his explanation preserves normative fundamental bass harmonic syntax (root motion by fifth). Yet even if we accept Rameau's explanation for chords A, B, and C, we may have more trouble with the chord at D, where we find what we would clearly deem a cadential suspension. Rameau places it in the same class as the other chords by supposition, stating that for reasons of undue harshness this particular chord omits some of its natural chord tones (G and B, the remaining tones of a seventh chord built on E). Since it is not divided in thirds like the other chords, Rameau labels the chord at D a heteroclite, an anomaly.¹⁰ The theoretical 'behavior of this chord, as an e⁷ progressing to A7, is more abstract than in cases A, B, and C-there is less evidence on the musical surface of the underlying seventh chord. Here we see the strength of Rameau's allegiance to his intellectual model: he willingly considers as a morphological anomaly that which in practice is an extremely common occurrence (the 4-3 cadential suspension). If we view his explanation from the standpoint of this allegiance, we can understand why he would so construe a musical phenomenon that seems to us so transparently otherwise.¹¹

In subsequent treatises Rameau appears to come closer to a melodic concept of suspension. In his *Génération Harmonique* (1737), after declaring that the suspension is a dependent consequence of supposition,¹² Rameau nonetheless describes the suspension as follows: "The suspension consists in holding over [literally: conserving] as many harmonic tones of a chord as one wishes, in order to make them heard in the place of those which would sound in the following chord, the root of which is generally employed at the same time in the Basso Continuo, on condition that the held tones can move diatonically to those that they suspend while the root of these latter tones continues to sound."¹³ And in the following example (which accompanies these passages in the treatise) Rameau remarks that the case at letter J must be regarded as a suspension rather than as a supposition.¹⁴



Example 2. From Rameau, Génération Harmonique, ex. XXIII.

Yet what is interesting in this example is not that Rameau finally seems to approach our own melodic view of a cadential suspension but that he felt the need at all to distinguish between supposition and suspension immediately after he had defined the latter as a dependent symptom of the former. In other words, whereas before all cases of suspension were explained as symptoms of supposition, it now appears that one can distinguish some cases as suppositions and others as suspensions. What lies behind this inconsistency?

I would argue that it is indicative of a tension between the analytical roles of the Basso Continuo (BC) and the Basse Fondamentale (BF). Rameau's recognition of the suspension is really an acknowledgment that some musical passages are best understood in terms of the BC. In the Traité example, and in cases C and H of the Génération Harmonique example, the BF allows an analysis of each passage showing it to be in conformance with generalized harmonic behavior. The supposed bass note in the BC is described as a supernumerary sound (yet related to the chord that follows as an anticipation). At letter J, the BC (D), according to Rameau's above description of the suspension, acts as the root-yet there is an A in the BF (which results in a root progression rare for the BF, that of a rising second). Rather than say that BC and BF are one here, Rameau says that the root is employed in the BC-while the BF hangs on as a less significant placeholder, a theoretical root from a different conceptual dimension. Thus the BC is clearly taking on an analytical role, as Rameau now distinguishes between cases that are best explained by the BF and those best explained by the BC. Suspension is a BC phenomenon, supposition a BF phenomenon. For Rameau, letting the BC determine the nature of the progression at J allows that progression to be understood as a normative dominant-to-tonic cadence with a slightly prolonged and decorated dominant.¹⁵ By leaving the A in the BF, he seems to argue that while what is happening at I is *primarily* a suspension, it is still in some secondary sense a supposition, thus reversing his previous position.

These equivocations mark Rameau's struggle with two different levels of his analytical method: an analytical bass that shows the fundamental derivation of the sounds on the musical surface in relation to a deductive system of harmony contends with an analytical bass that generates the simplest practical descriptions of the linear behavior of those sounds.¹⁶ This is a central tension in Rameau, one that would be missed were we to comb his later work for clues to a closer propinquity to our own views about suspensions (and then rely on a crassly applied evolutionary model to support Rameau's "improving" views). The tension between BC and BF is the most visible manifestation of the underlying tension between musical practice and Cartesian deduction as available epistemological bases in Rameau's theoretical work.¹⁷ In terms of intellectual history, this reading of Rameau links his work to an age when systematic thought tacked a sometimes ambiguous course between the perceived tidal forces of deduction and induction, the age of both Descartes and Newton.¹⁸

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After sketching just one symptomatic complexity of the issues Rameau was dealing with, it will be a bracing contrast to jump to a view of Rameau from the opposite end of the tonal theory spectrum, namely to Heinrich Schenker's version of Rameau's role in the history of theory. Here our emphasis is not on how a theorist engages music but how he engages the history of theory. An attempt to understand Schenker's fashioning of that history can reveal much about his own theory and its value system. At the same time, our discussion will mark the growing trend to address what is perhaps the most immediately pressing need in the history of tonal theory, namely, the formation of a historical perspective on Schenker.¹⁹ Such an approach would register as self-examination, for we still live in the Age of Schenker—his teachings have filtered into our daily talk about Western art music as pervasively and imperceptibly as those of Freud in our talk about human behavior.

In his essay "Rameau oder Beethoven? Erstarrung oder geistiges Leben in der Musik?" Schenker interprets the history of theory as that of a fall from grace. "Before Rameau," Schenker claims, "theory and composition were still a unity: both exclusively embraced voice leading."20 Rameau's theory brought on a schism; his ill-conceived theory of harmony led to mechanical torpor. At the same time, however, music itself began to partake of spiritual life: "Suddenly an art form grew up, which, while appealing figuratively to the motions of the human soul by means of the material [sinnlich] living motion of the horizontal spans that are uniquely its own, certainly had to rank as the most autonomous and most sublime of all the arts."21 Echoing Riemann's primary objection to Rameau, Schenker cites Rameau's notion of chord structure by thirds as the scion of a misbegotten race of mechanical theories of vertical chord structures. The vertical in music is Erstarrung; the horizontal is geistiges Leben-note the association Schenker makes between horizontal Züge and the motions of the soul. French theory leads to death; German music is the life of the spirit. But Schenker's target is larger than French theory. In a strikingly Marxist interpretive move, Schenker relates Rameau's theory of inversion to the French Revolution ("Unten ist oben und oben ist unten!"), and dismisses both, along with the entire French Enlightenment, as evidence of "französisches Mittelmaß" over and against "deutsche Genie." France's vaunted rationality clearly plays the serpent in Schenker's Garden of Eden,

turning man away from natural genius toward a specious Tree of Knowledge.

Schenker then positions himself as a Messianic figure who will heal the schism and once again unite theory with art, who will bring the word of Genius to Man after the Fall.²² This is why he needs to view the history of tonal theory as a schism. His simplistic dichotomies of theory and musical art, mechanical chord structure and living voice leading, French mediocrity and German genius—they all work to the end of articulating a crisis to which his theory provides a synthesizing answer. Not a little of Schenker's fervor could be dismissed as the consolatory ravings of a failed composer in an age of failed composition; he is thus easily attracted to a Romantic notion of recovering a lost and glorious past, and of showing his citizenship rights in the realm of genius. Now that theory has again become an art, theorists can take up residence alongside musical genius. Schenker's synthesis of the schism between theory and musical art is treated as a creative breakthrough very much like the artistic synthesis he so admires in the great composers.

But why the distasteful political framework; why is genius German, mediocrity French? Is this dichotomy simply a dire result of the post-World War I political atmosphere in Germany, or are there other factors that make this equation so automatic for Schenker²⁴ Any complete answer would entail nothing less than a cultural history of Germany from at least the eighteenth century to the twentieth. This is a history characterized by the interweaving of the ideas of genius, spirit, universality, and national identity. German intellectuals in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were in the process of building a cultural nation based on spiritual affinity, a kind of spiritual Heimat whose ancestor was the Hellenic Golden Age. By about 1800 music became a leading metaphor for spirit, the cultivation of music a metaphor for spirituality. As the primary locus of German profundity and universality, German music was the heart of a spiritual nation felt to be not only universal but distinctly ethnic at the same time.²³ Exultantly possessed by this thought, Schenker quotes these words of Schiller: "Every nation has its day in history, but the day of the Germans is the harvest of the whole."25

But music wasn't always the mode of this universal spirit. In the Goethezeit it was much more clearly the German language itself that bore that spirit witness the emancipation from French letters mounted in the age of Lessing, the subsequent translations of Shakespeare and the Persian poets, the agenda behind journals such as Goethe's *Propyläen* and the famous *Athenaeum*, and other attempts to associate German culture with the revered culture of ancient Greece (culminating latterly in Heidegger's linguistic speculations on the close relation between German and Greek as agglutinative tongues). Germany inherited from Greece the model for its self-imposed role as a universal culture, or at least as the epitome of Western culture.

Thus the attachment of these ideas to German nationalism is not just the result of post-World War I nationalist fervor, but is constitutive of German cultural history from at least the Deutsche Klassik, the age of Goethe and Schiller, Herder and Winckelmann. Perhaps the luridly emotional form this trend takes in Schenker's essay is engendered by the feelings of betrayal in Germany after the war (and by the latitude allowed such feelings, even in intellectual circles), but the basic assumption of a spiritual homeland that is associated with German culture is in place long before any militaristic manifestations of nationalism (which are often deemed its natural consequences) and serves far different purposes. Only the close association of cultural spirit with German national identity could ensure the ease with which enemies of the state become for Schenker enemies of the spirit. And France, with its history of rational prowess (its tongue long reputed to be the very language of rational thought), makes perhaps the readiest antithesis to the mysteries of German spiritual profundity, mysteries most closely preserved in its music.

These issues—the German question, canon formation, and spirituality in music—are central to the recent history of tonal theory and to our continued engagement with that history. The praxis that theorists such as Riemann and Schenker attempt to account for is fraught with valuations of spirit and culture that remain acutely alive and exposed in the late twentieth century. We as musical academics in the age of Schenker are fully implicated; we need to look at ourselves in just the ways that an interpretive study of the history of theory makes possible. We do so not to turn away in disgust from the tradition of the canonic masterpiece and its theories but to learn why we have loved this tradition, and what we can continue to love in it, in the manner of children who have just learned to see their parents as fallible humans, that is, as real historical beings rather than timeless entities. It is thus that we as a humanistic discipline may begin to grow up, take the measure of our abiding tradition, and assume our place, for better or worse, in the history of the Western world.

NOTES

¹ This analogy is made more interesting by the fact that legendary figures who lose their shadows (or their reflections) do so as a pledge to the Devil in exchange for some sort of power (as in E. T. A. Hoffmann's *Die Abenteuer der Silvesternacht* or, more broadly, in vampire legends). Music thus figures, and is treated, as a powerful force that cannot be safely anchored in the normal world of objects, light, and shadows. Its propinquity to evil in writers as diverse as Plato and Thomas Mann is no coincidence.

² In this light, the role of philosophy as an intermediary between man and the external

world seems a nearer analogy to music theory than that of science, for music shares with philosophically conceived reality the same paradoxical combination of otherness and relatedness, exteriority and interiority. This is to distinguish a philosophical relation to the world from the largely dichotomous, subject/object relationship of science and the real world, defined by the ever present elements of technology and control. Philosophical assessments of the world are more likely to engage what it means to "be" in the world rather than what it means to "have" a world at one's disposal. Of course recent science has changed in this regard, but the science that is commonly associated with music theory is a more classical model.

³ The relation of theoretical prescriptions and intellectual models in early medieval theory is discussed by David E. Cohen in "Metaphysics, Ideology, Discipline: Consonance and Dissonance in the Theory and Practice of Western Polyphony," a paper read at the Princeton University Music Department Colloquium on 7 May 1993.

⁴ See Thomas Christensen's impressive "Science and Music Theory in the Enlightenment: D'Alembert's Critique of Rameau" (Ph. D. dissertation, Yale University, 1985) for a more in-depth view of Rameau's alleged Cartesianism.

⁵ Although a dauntingly relentless and impressively thorough study, Kevin Korsyn's "Schenker and Kantian Epistemology," *Theoria* 3 (1988): 1–58, seems motivated primarily by the need to overturn common objections to Schenker.

⁶ A brilliant example of this type of assessment is provided by Joseph Dubiel in "When You Are a Beethoven': Kinds of Rules in Schenker's Counterpoint, *Journal of Music Theory* 34 (1990): 291–340. Dubiel shows the central and abiding importance of the concept of the passing tone for Schenker's theory and does so with close readings of many examples from Schenker's counterpoint treatise in which he attempts to find out why Schenker sees things the way he does rather than instantly interpreting everything as either leading to or hindering the development of Schenker's "mature" theory.

⁷ Allan Keiler, "The Origins of Schenker's Thought: How Man is Musical," *Journal of Music Theory* 33 (1989): 274.

⁸ "When reading the works of an important thinker, look first for the apparent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person could have written them. When you find an answer, . . . when these passages make sense, then you may find that more central passages, ones you previously thought you understood, have changed their meaning." Thomas Kuhn, *The Essential Tension* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), xii.

⁹ I sketch a possible answer to this specific question about Riemann in "Method and Motivation in Hugo Riemann's History of Harmonic Theory," *Music Theory Spectrum* 14 (1992): 9n.

¹⁰ This is originally a Greek word meaning "inclined differently." It was used in grammars to denote a word of irregular declension or inflection, and from there has assumed the general figurative meaning of exceptional or anomalous.

¹¹ The reaction to Rameau's explanation of suspension that is precluded by a hermeneutic approach is exemplified in the following passage from David Beach's "The Origins of Harmonic Analysis," *Journal of Music Theory* 18 (1974): 282: "Rameau's explanation of suspensions reflects his conception of harmony as being separable from counterpoint. The chord, as isolated from its context, is considered synonymous with 'harmony'; this is a fundamental error in his approch to musical syntax."

¹² "La Supposition prend sa source dans l'un des Sons de la proportion Arithmétique ajouté au-dessous de la proportion Harmonique; la Suspension n'en est qu'une Suite." Génération Harmonique ou Traité de musique théorique et pratique (Paris, 1737), 158.

 13 Ibid., 161–62. "La Suspension consiste à conserver autant de Sons Harmoniques que l'on veut d'un Accord, pour les faire entendre à la place de ceux qui doivent exister dans

l'Accord suivant, dont pour lors le Son fondamental est généralement employé dans la Basse continue, pourvù que ces Sons conservés puissent arriver Diatoniquement à ceux qu'ils suspendent, pendant que le Son fondamental de ces derniers existe toujours."(Translation mine, as are all that follow).

¹⁴ "Le cas de J. doit être plutôt regardé comme Suspension, que comme Supposition." Ibid., 161.

¹⁵ By preferring a simpler syntactic explanation of the sounds at J (V to I rather than II to V to I), Rameau could be said to be wielding Ockham's razor, an intellectual reflex (and—significantly—an *inductive* reflex) which may well have justified for him the discrepancy between BC and BF.

¹⁶ Just for the record, Rameau defines suspension in linear terms already in the Traité but he does so in Book III, the practical section of the treatise. See *Treatise on Harmony*, 298: "Chords by supposition serve only to suspend sounds which should be heard naturally. . . . This will be found wherever these chords occur, if you examine them with respect to the basso continuo and not to the fundamental bass, which always represents the perfect harmony." Here the linear view of the suspension is recognized as a strictly practical conception and associated explicitly with the BC, whereas the theoretical conception involves the supposition and the BF. Also notable is the implication that here the suspension is the desired effect, and as such is served by the supposition; in the theoretical explanation the supposition is prior and the suspension dependent. For the practicing musician, the melodic view of suspension is the conceptualization that is most directly conducive to playing such things oneself.

¹⁷ The confusion between BC and BF in Ramcau is the subject of Allan Keiler's pioneering interpretation of Rameau's fundamental bass. See Keiler, "Music as Metalanguage: Rameau's Fundamental Bass," in *Music Theory: Special Topics*, ed. Richmond Browne (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 83–100. Keiler discusses the theoretical constraints which arise as the result of fashioning the BF both as musical part and as metamusical paraphrase, and he characterizes Rameau as "the first theorist to be confronted, in the area of harmonic analysis, with the fact that the surface details of a piece often obscure the extent to which any piece conforms to the general musical language" (p. 100).

¹⁸ For a study of Rameau reception highly sensitive to the complex pull of these currents in French intellectual history see Thomas Christensen, "Music Theory as Scientific Propaganda: The Case of D'Alembert's Élémens de Musique," Journal of the History of Ideas 50 (1989): 409–27.

¹⁹ Exceptional recent work in this regard includes Allan Keiler, "The Origins of Schenker's Thought," and Leslie David Blasius, "Evading Psychology: The Epistemology of Schenker's Kontrapunkt," a paper read at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the Society of Music Theory in Austin, Texas. Stephen Hinton is also at work on a forthcoming book dealing with the Americanization of Schenker.

²⁰ "Vor dem Auftreten Rameaus waren Schaffen und Lehre eine Einheit immerhin: beide bekannten sich ausschließlich zur Stimmführung." Heinrich Schenker, "Rameau oder Beethoven? Erstarrung oder geistiges Leben in der Musik?" *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik*, vol. 3 (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1930), 14.

²¹ "Auf einmal wuchs eine Kunst heran, die ... mit der sinnlich-lebendigen Bewegung der ihr eigenen horizontalen Züge auch die Menschenseele in ihren Bewegungen gleichnishaft ansprechend, unter sämtlichen Künsten wohl als die unabhängigste und erhabenste gelten dürfte." Ibid., 15.

²² "Nur ein Christus konnte Tote erwecken—nur Geist allein könnte die Menschheit noch einmal zur Genie-Musik, dem einzig wahren Leben in Musik erwecken." Ibid., 19.

²³ In an unpublished paper entitled "On the Task of the Music Historian: The Myth of the Symphony after Beethoven," Sanna Pederson develops the idea of Germany as a cultural

nation in the context of a striking critique of Carl Dahlhaus and the myth of the symphony.

²⁴ The effects of World War I on Schenker's view of Rameau are discussed by Harald Krebs in his article, "Schenker's Changing View of Rameau: A Comparison of Remarks in Harmony, Counterpoint, and 'Rameau or Beethoven?'," in *Theoria* 3 (1988): 69ff.

²⁵ "Jedes Volk hat seinen Tag in der Geschichte, doch der Tag der Deutschen ist die Ernte der ganzen Zeit." Ibid., 23.

Does Music Theory Need Musicology?

By Kofi Agawu

Understood as a search for "the abstract principles embodied in music and the sounds of which it consists,"¹ music theory casts a wide net: it calls for a comparative sample and insists on a systematic methodology. As "the scholarly study of music, wherever it is found historically or geographically," musicology casts an even wider net.² In practice, however, it has not been possible to transcend historical and geographical boundaries. (How often have you read an article on contemporary rock in *JAMS* or on Asian music in *19th-Century Music*?) Obviously, any attempt to explore the juncture between music theory and music history—my particular brief from the editors of *Current Musicology*—will not get very far on definitions alone. Are not disciplinary boundaries convenient tags sanctioned by a certain distribution of economic, political, and intellectual power? Better, then, to focus on what some theorists and some historians do than to dwell abstractly on the purviews of music theory and music history.³

There are two professional organizations in this country that mirror the theory/history dichotomy: the Society for Music Theory (SMT) and the American Musicological Society (AMS). Though it is no secret that some theorists "do history" while some historians "do theory," the task will be greatly simplified if, instead of dealing with such interesting hybrids, a normative representation of each group is assumed: SMT is to theory as AMS is to history/musicology.

Let us immediately take note of some differences in professional situations and habits. In numbers alone, historians hold stronger claims to hegemony-for every five historians there is only one theorist. Many were the voices that lamented the divorce between the newly formed SMT and its parent organization, the AMS, in 1978. Yet a decade and a half later even the most ardent critic of the break-up would have to concede that the formation of the SMT and the subsequent publication of its journal, Music Theory Spectrum, have brought considerable gains in consolidating the practice of Anglo-American music theory and analysis.⁴ The search for music's organizing principles remains the primary concern of theorists, but only an uninformed critic would claim that the profile of contemporary theory is by any standards narrow. There is no shortage of work of a formal or mathematical nature; there are translations of, and commentaries upon, earlier treatises; and there are empirical investigations of the nature of music perception, analyses informed by linguistic or literarytheoretical principles, fresh approaches to pedagogy, and several experimental mergers of methods and techniques.

Historians, by contrast, have had trouble isolating a collective purpose. Because the subject of music history remains unspecified, we are encouraged to think pluralistically: style, genre, social history, criticism, biography, among many others, are all legitimate subjects. One result of this is a practical shift from history in the grand sense to various local histories. Although the community of theorists, too, is in some ways fragmented, the overriding focus on "the music itself"—overlooking ontological problems that, however interesting in themselves, rarely undermine our commonsensical intuition that we are dealing with specifiable objects ensures a communality of vision that historians have yet to achieve.

Some historians will remind us that they, too, deal with "the music itself." They include makers of editions and practitioners of criticism, with the latter's stock-in-trade characterized by an avoidance of systematic or formal theory. It goes without saying, however, that critics who shun "hard" theory, or who are not particularly self-conscious about using theory, often end up either trafficking in an older theory or simply reinventing the wheel. It is disheartening to encounter critical writings that refuse to incorporate the results of the purely technical advance of music-analytical method. One could, of course, dispute the significance of what I am calling "technical advance," but it would be more productive if such disputation took concrete and comparative forms instead of consigning demonstration to the untouchable category of "formalism." Few academic disciplines can get away with such facile rejections of technical achievement.

Still, some historians remain unimpressed by the theorists' appeal to rigor and to systematization, processes that can easily grow in narrowness and abstraction, quickly leaving the realm of ordinary musical experience. For them context (historical, social, political, economic, and above all cultural) is so basic that its suppression in theoretical work undermines the theoretical project right from the start. In the very year in which the SMT was formed, a *JAMS* editorial felt the need to justify the intention to exclude certain kinds of work from its pages. The offending category included "articles which analyze individual pieces of music merely as abstract patterns of notes or sounds, without reference to their cultural context."⁵ No one complained about this policy, so I assume that readers of *JAMS* considered this a perfectly reasonable exclusionary tactic. But what is this "cultural context" that historians insist on seeing in any analysis of a musical work?

Context is simply more text, and in any research venture, one has to draw the line somewhere. Moreover, the decision as to when and where to draw the line can be a purely pragmatic one, determined perhaps by the next deadline. In any case, no theoretical or analytical work stands outside a context. If the musicologists' context is understood broadly as comprising levels of composition and reception, as well as a neutral level, then the usual argument for attending to context needs to justify its evident privileging of one of the three levels. Moreover, it is no use insisting on context if you cannot specify its units and a set of procedures for discovering relationships embedded in context-to-music or music-to-context approaches. Could it be that the appeal to an ill-defined context is a strategy for avoiding the more technical aspects of analysis? Is it not conceivable to write meaningfully about the *Rite of Spring* without mentioning the riot that attended the first performance, about the *Eroica* without referring to Napoleon, or about the Violin Sonata in G major, K. 301 without mentioning the death of Mozart's mother earlier in the year in which it was composed (1778)? The challenge for advocates of context is to show how such writing might be improved by greater attention to context. But perhaps it is too much to ask historians for something as mundane and "formalistic" as a technical demonstration.

The context of a musical work subtends a potentially infinite number of constituent events. To list events a, b, c . . . n as being coeval with the creation of a given musical work is to state the obvious. More pertinent is to demonstrate how events a, b, c . . . n, either singly or in various combinations, determine the nature of the musical work. How, in short, can we create a syntax of networks?⁶ It seems unlikely that context-mongers will be able to provide us with an answer to this question if, as often happens, the invocation of context engenders a retreat from hard analysis. There is more than a dash of irony in the possibility that as theorists move beyond structuralism, they and not the historians will take on the challenge of theorizing context explicitly.

By now the continued use of "theorists" and "historians" (or "musicologists") will seem deeply problematic, perhaps even irritating, to some readers. Individual cases that contradict the normative profiles attributed to each group can be easily cited. But to allow this resistance to generalization to blind us to the profiles that have emerged as scholars have exercised power amounts to either turning a blind eye to, or being idealistic about, the politics of the academy. For better or worse, *MTS* and *JAMS* powerfully symbolize the contemporary practices of music theory and musicology respectively. In order to focus on some further differences between the approaches of the two groups, I will comment briefly on three striking moments in recent discourse about music.

(1) A few years ago, an interesting little drama unfolded in the world of Stravinsky studies. With scores and tables in hand, and working mostly independently, Pieter van den Toorn, a theorist, having sensed the importance of octatonic writing in Stravinsky (an earlier study by Arthur Berger provided important pointers⁷), embarked on a comprehensive search for

octatonic patterning in Stravinsky's oeuvre. The result was a monumental taxonomy of Stravinsky's octatonic vocabulary, *The Music of Stravinsky*, published in 1983, and running to over five hundred pages.⁸ Any suspicion that this is simply mindless note-counting is quickly laid to rest in two ways. The first is the author's concern to chart differences of strategy in Stravinsky's manipulation of pure and not-so-pure octatonic collections. The second is a subtle discussion of these routines in often vivid and complex prose, a discussion in which questions of influence, intention, perception, and intertextual resonance are raised, provisionally answered, set aside, retrieved, answered again and again—always from a different perspective. It is a book so rich in lessons about meaning and method that it cannot be summarily consigned to a formalist heap and thus dispensed with by the historian.

In this case, however, a historian actually found much to admire in van den Toorn's work. Richard Taruskin set out to provide a historical confirmation of Stravinsky's octatonic routines by searching for earlier (nineteenth-century) uses of the scale or constructs referable to the scale.⁹ From the works of Stravinsky's teacher, Rimsky-Korsakov, back through the music of Liszt, Glinka and even Schubert, Taruskin was able to provide the missing historical link and thus to corroborate as well as complement van den Toorn's findings. Indeed, the triumphant way in which Taruskin announced the corroborative status of his findings suggests an extraordinary meeting of theoretical and historical minds.

But the significance of this corroboration remains dubious. Van den Toorn's work provided comprehensive internal evidence of a particular lexical usage in Stravinsky. What if the search for precedents had yielded nothing significant? Would we then have been skeptical of van den Toorn's findings? How would we justify our doubting when confronted with the massive evidence from Stravinsky's scores? Is it merely "heartening" (to use Taruskin's word) that work in theory is "confirmed" by work in history? Since when did theory need such "confirmation?" The point, I should stress, is not that the historical precedents unearthed by Taruskin are in any way uninteresting in and of themselves. What is less certain is the significance of those precedents as corroborative evidence for patterns observed in Stravinsky's scores.

(2) The year 1991 marked the bicentenary of Mozart's death. You could not escape the excessively programmatic emphasis on his life and music even if you wanted to. Yet at the countless symposia and festivals that brought together experts on Mozart from around the globe, one listened in vain for as much as a passing reference to an article published in 1971 in *Perspectives of New Music* by a composer and theorist, John E. Rogers. Of course, music historians do not normally turn to *Perspectives* for insights into Mozart's music. Even if they did, they would most likely skip over an article entitled "Pitch Class Sets in Fourteen Measures of Mozart's 'Jupiter' Symphony," with its promise of a formidable technical language.¹⁰

What exactly did Rogers set out to do, and why did Mozart scholars overlook his contribution during 1991? Rogers's article offers an analysis of fourteen bars of intricate counterpoint from the finale of the "Jupiter" Symphony. According to him, Mozart's handling of the set-class formed by the first four notes of the movement, C--D-F-E (set class 4–11 in Allen Forte's nomenclature¹¹), is "so thorough-going that it points ahead to the compositional procedures of many composers of the 1960s."¹² After demonstrating the manifold occurrences in unsuspected guises of this *cantus firmus*, Rogers responds creatively by offering a recomposition of Mozart's music. Included at the end of the article are the concluding bars of his own Trio for Flute, Cello, and Piano. This is no passive or detached reception of Mozart; it is an aggressively interested one.

Unlike some theorists, musicologists do not normally respond to the music of the past by recomposing it within the confines of a new "linguistic" context. So it comes as no surprise that they were able to ignore Rogers's twenty-year old study during the very year in which the world was ostensibly celebrating the continuing relevance of Mozart's music. When I mentioned not just the lack of any reference to Rogers's study but a more general paucity of references to "hard" theoretical and analytical studies in our bibliographies for the Mozartjahr at a London conference, one respondent suggested that my Rogers example was a "spoof" and imagined that it was "possibly intended to demonstrate the absurdity of pitch class set analysis." Since Rogers's article can be looked up in any standard library, I will forgo comment on its possible status as a "spoof." But the implicit charge-often made by historians-that Rogers's study is somehow anachronistic, needs to be refuted. Is it anachronistic in a way that an attempt to understand the historical past with today's conceptual tools is not? This seems unlikely. Nor will it do to insist-another topos of musicological criticism-that, by virtue of chronological proximity, composition treatises from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries constitute a far better source of information about Mozart's counterpoint than Rogers's set-theoretic or motivic method. There may well be a missing historical link from Rogers's argument-perhaps he needed van den Toorn's Taruskin-but that in itself should not sanction a refusal to grant that, in certain specific areas of theory, there has been a technical advance, both conceptually and representationally, over the eighteenth century. Rogers's economical description of the life of a single four-note set may not be the most persuasive instance of this advance, but even a cursory comparison of Schenker to Kirnberger (or rather to aspects of

Kirnberger), or a comparison of Rosen, Ratner, Dahlhaus or Rothstein to Koch and his contemporaries should leave one uneasy about granting a privilege to old thought.

(3) It is in the practical activity of interpreting musical works that the greatest potential resides for a fruitful exchange of ideas between theorists and musicologists. In recent years, some of the most innovative work undertaken by musicologists involves close readings of particular works or portions thereof. Whenever musicologists analyze music, we might expect that their perspectives will be broader than those of theorists, insofar as historical, biographical, or cultural information is readily included. In principle, the broadening of the boundaries of analysis is a turn to be welcomed, but only if it does not lead to an impoverishment of older ways of reading or hearing. It is far too soon to be able to predict the future of this new impulse in musicology, but we can at least take note of the sort of problem that it breeds.

In her provocative study of the first movement of Mahler's Second Symphony, Carolyn Abbate lays great store by the otherwordly nature of the so called Gesang theme or second subject beginning in bar 48 (example 1).¹³ Crucial to her interpretation is the technical means of discontinuity. Abbate considers this moment an "interruption"; it is "a radically *different* musical gesture" (her emphasis). From earlier commentaries by Specht, Bekker, Reilly, Floros, and Vill, a characterization of this moment as "a deep sonic break" is distilled. Abbate identifies "sites of hyperbolic musical disjunction" and notes that "cracks fissure the music at the entry of the 'Gesang'."

Few listeners are likely to disagree that the onset of the Gesang theme is an arresting moment. But how does difference become disjunction in Mahler? It is perhaps not insignificant that Abbate, in reminding the reader of this remarkable moment, quotes only the actual onset of the Gesang theme, not the music that immediately precedes it. Example 2 restores this context, from which it becomes immediately apparent that the triplet figure that accompanies the Gesang theme is heard throughout the preceding five bars in unmistakably preparatory mode.¹⁴ For those who follow this figure's course, and for others who understand the bass note C-flat/Bnatural as a neighbor to the principal C, the onset of the Gesang theme would support metaphors opposed to Abbate's breaks, disjunctions, and discontinuities.

The point here is not to chide Abbate for failing to establish the technical limits of disjunction; it is rather to urge its sharper definition as a musical device, perhaps within the modest confines of Mahler's musical language. Abbate's study well exemplifies the self-awareness that high-level critical writing demands, but it is curious that certain music-technical op-



Example 1. Abbate's quotation of "The first 'Gesang' interruption" (bars 48–51) from Mahler's Second Symphony, first movement

Example 2. The music preceding Abbate's quotation





positions are not subjected to her usual scrutiny. At the onset of the Gesang theme some may choose to hear not a "sonic break" but a tension between motivic and voice-leading conjunction on the one hand and textural, registral, and affective disjunction on the other.

A not dissimilar interpretive moment occurs in Susan McClary's challenging reading of the middle movement of Mozart's Piano Concerto in G major, K. 453.¹⁵ McClary divides up the opening ritornello into two segments, bars 1–5 (the "motto theme") and bars 6–29 (example 3). In order to discern an individual/society dialectic at work in the movement and to suggest ways in which Mozart problematizes this opposition, McClary needs to claim early on in the analysis that there is a disjunction between the motto theme and what immediately follows it. According to her, "the two [passages] seem to have little to do with one another. . . . Indeed, the most important event in the ritornello—the one most in need of explanation—will turn out to be the fact of juxtaposition of the two units." Later, bar 6 is described as "musical material entirely unrelated affectively or thematically to the opening."

Here, too, we might insist on a contextual definition of unrelatedness in Mozart's music, or at least in this movement. For a listener who has internalized the harmonic expectations generated by a half-cadence in eighteenth-century music, the onset of bar 6, despite—or rather because of—the intervening silence, fulfills the promise of resolution; it is a rebeginning as well as the resolution of an unresolved dominant. In these terms it is more conjunct than disjunct. Similarly, a listener interested in the grand melody of the movement will most likely follow the line mapped out by $\hat{5}$, a line that is prominently (but only partially) transferred up an octave to the oboe's G in bars 6ff. These listeners will disagree with McClary's reading of the two passages as disjunct because they are unable to agree with her note-to-note technical characterization.

I should point out, again, that the issue here is not so much one of disagreeing with McClary's view that "dilemmas posed by the enigmatic motto prove to be too much—and rather than addressing these issues—the piece turns into something completely different," but of insisting on a more secure delineation of a central device. Had she, perhaps in a parenthesis, offered the reader a formulation such as "Events A and B are considered disjunct whenever. . . ," there might have been stronger grounds for evaluating her interpretation of Mozart's music.

I have chosen these particular moments in recent writing about music to illustrate what I perceive to be fundamental differences between the concerns of theorists and musicologists. In letting the SMT and AMS repre-



Example 3. McClary's quotation of two contiguous passages (bars 1–5 and 6–10) from Mozart's Piano Concerto in G, K. 453, second movement

sent the two groups, I have, of course, misrepresented the work of some scholars. But it is impossible to intervene in this long-standing debate without doing violence to the far more refined contributions of particular scholars. The apparent narrowness of the theoretical project, the preoccu-

pation with wholes (including fragments conceptualized as provisional wholes), the lack of restraint in making generalizations, and the insistence that the musical text, however defined, together with an explicit methodology for its understanding, form the basis of theorizing: these present something of a contrast to the more heterogenous and diffuse historical project. Historians are in general more receptive to fragments, more cautious about certain kinds of grand characterization, and frequently appeal to orders of authority other than the notes and an attendant methodology.

It is nice to imagine a time in the future when theorists and historians will shed their disciplinary allegiances and become one. There is, however, absolutely no evidence that such a merger will enhance the work of the new group. Has not the most influential historical work always needed theory, whereas the best theoretical work rarely depended on the insights of conventional history? On present showing, we might say that theory is theory and history is history, and that although they may meet or clash sometimes, they remain separate disciplines. To this writer at least, that ain't such a bad thing.

NOTES

¹ The New Harvard Dictionary of Music, s.v. "Theory."

² The New Harvard Dictionary, s.v. "Musicology."

³ For reasons that will become clearer later, the terms "music history" and "musicology" are used interchangeably throughout this essay.

⁴ In rating the contribution of *Music Theory Spectrum* to the current practice of theory, I do not mean to underplay the equally significant contributions of the older *Journal of Music Theory*, the newer *Music Analysis*, and several theory journals too numerous to list here. Similarly, the focus on *JAMS* is merely symbolic; there are, of course, numerous other publications that disseminate important musicological work.

⁵ Nicholas Temperley, "Editorial," Journal of the American Musicological Society 31 (1978): 1.

⁶ Here I echo remarks about context made in the course of a critique of writing about African music. See my "Representing African Music," *Critical Inquiry* 18 (1992): 245–66.

⁷ Arthur Berger, "Problems of Pitch Organization in Stravinsky," *Perspectives of New Music* 2 (1963): 11-42.

⁸ Pieter van den Toorn, *The Music of Stravinsky* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).

⁹ Richard Taruskin, "Chernomor to Kaschei: Harmonic Sorcery; or Stravinsky's 'Angle'," Journal of the American Musicological Society 38 (1985): 72-142.

¹⁰ John E. Rogers, "Pitch Class Sets in Fourteen Measures of Mozart's 'Jupiter' Symphony," *Perspectives of New Music* 9–10 (1971): 209–31.

¹¹ Allen Forte, The Structure of Atonal Music (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

¹² Rogers, "Pitch Class Sets," 210.

¹³ Carolyn Abbate, Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 119–55.

¹⁴ Robert P. Morgan makes this point in his review of Unsung Voices in the Journal of Modern History 64 (1992): 580.

¹⁵ Susan McClary, "A Musical Dialectic from the Enlightenment: Mozart's Piano Concerto in G Major, K. 453, Movement 2," *Cultural Critique* 4 (1986): 129–69.

The Seeds of Notation and Music Paleography*

By Sandra Pinegar

In a recent critical essay by Kent Devereaux, the phrase "seeds of notation" was eve-catching because it referred to medieval music, something of a "find" in literature on CD-ROM.¹ The point was that medieval notation was planted as a mnemonic aid from which ultimately sprang the analytical tools and abstract language of modern formalistic analysis. Even the best generalists tend to regard anything medieval as seminal, proto-, inchoate, pre-, incipient; and this was not disquieting simply because it appears so often and because Devereaux's article, directed towards composers rather than musicologists, showed a knack for encapsulating some rather large and difficult issues in engaging if terse prose. Rather, it communicated an assumption, also frequently encountered these days, that music notation conceals or suppresses perception of music as sound, "the original language." No medieval mind, thoroughly cognizant of man's and music's temporal, mortal being, could have planted that seed. From a medieval perspective, what was written endured. True, St. Augustine deduced that angels had no use for literacy in order to know God, and one might suspect they had none for music notation either, but man's knowledge consisted of transitory, fleeting images passed from memory to memory and then lost unless collected into monuments of authoritative and archaic texts that suspended the opaque cloak of reality and revealed truth beyond memory, beyond contradiction, and often beyond change.

Nevertheless Devereaux is right. The snake has long been in the garden. For example, music paleography, our major inheritance from nineteenth-century "musical archaeology" and a fundamental research skill until only recently required of *all* students of musicology, often became an exercise in the "correct reading" of a "pre-modern" music text.² So the solution now before us is to ignore paleography and hope it will just go away when it no longer has low-level problem solving to feed upon. Leave us to what Chaucer once called "the naked text." Give us the truth, the original! Devereaux has illuminated an issue that is close to my heart, and that is that paleography has become a symbol of positivistic orthodoxy in musicology's race to incorporate and legitimize the voices of radical dialectics. I have a high respect for those voices, and I hope they prosper. But, as a medievalist whose musical interests have been genuinely stirred, I also think that neither Medieval nor Renaissance music was responsible for musicology's lapses into scientific positivism taken in the pejorative. Moreover, I think that American musicology has gotten caught up in larger issues affecting the entire academic community and its relationship to society, and thus we need to widen the scope of admissible evidence before delivering any verdict on paleography within the course of studies in musicology. Taking up Devereaux's organic metaphor, I would like to argue here a case for replanting.

Transcription has always been an uncertain enterprise—occasionally even a dangerous one if we recall that the (accidentally) lethal duel between Pierre Aubry and Johann Baptist Beck in 1910 concerned which of them had solved how rhythmically to transcribe chansons of the troubadours and trouvères. Transcribing is now no longer confined to ink and paper either conceptually or literally, and I think we all know the reasons why. Max Chop, a German composer and journalist, addressed the notion that music as sound was concealed or suppressed in transcription when he wrote critiques of the products of the Victor Talking Machine Company and others like it for Die phonographische Zeitschrift from 1906 to 1914. Arguing for "the original orchestration," Chop considered the replacement of string basses and cellos by low winds and brass a necessary concession to the technology of recording, but supplanting the violins with flutes, clarinets, and trumpets was arbitrary-it just lacked artistic understanding and was sure to "embarrass the[ir] perpetrators in the end." Never the exclusive dominion of musicologists, transcription (interpretation recorded in any medium, if you will) is a natural part of music-making. Whether it is Toscanini on Red Label or Roger Norrington with authentic instruments in digital, it is a transcription. Whether we read Philippe de Vitry's Garrit gallus/In nova fert from a facsimile of F-Pn 146 or we read it from Leo Schrade's edition, the presence of any sound that might be termed "the original language" is nine parts imagination and one part what is on the page, and every musicologist should possess the tribal instinct to relish it.

Given the recorded transcriptions now available, it is sometimes difficult fully to grasp that the paradigm for paleography was once the *Historical Anthology of Music* and, if the sound did not immediately ring in your head, access to it was a piano! Some professional performers, and many amateur singers like myself, feel more comfortable nowadays with facsimiles of original notation, and as a researcher I am truly dissatisfied when only transcriptions are available. When needed, I produce them with software, which ten years ago would have been unthinkable. I now have time to deal with *ficta*, to explore not only text undersetting but translation *and* pronunciation, and to consider questions of manuscript transmission and notational variants, all of which got more or less sidetracked in paleography because they would have been too specialized for the class in general. So I can muster sympathy for those who know they will spend the rest of their careers with questions regarding Romantic harmony, Baroque vocal ornaments, or Schoenberg's *Grundgestalt* and are required, ruler and pen in hand, to fulfill the requirement in paleography. Like the Victor Talking Machine, it was designed to meet special demands, ones that no longer suit the everyday work of musicologists in general or indeed that of potential Medieval and Renaissance specialists. The demands were not misguided in their day, or at least I am reluctant to think they were, but there are now new needs to be met.

Many of us, whether we deal with the music of Pérotin, of Beethoven, or that of northern Ghana, have taken to examining the meaning of musical works and activities within the culture and values of the societies from which they arose rather than in the context of our own analytical and aesthetic expectations. The ethnomusicologist Charles Seeger, who developed a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive notations, showed a concern for this as early as 1958 when he wrote:

First, we single out what appears to us to be structures in the other music that resemble structures familiar to us in the notation of the Occidental art and write these down, ignoring everything else for which we have no symbols. Second, we expect the resulting notation to be read by people who *do not carry the tradition of the other music.*⁴

Even the dove who whispered in St. Gregory's ear might have hesitated. Seeger's solution was the melograph, which electronically records a temporally scaled graph of acoustical characteristics of a sung melody in pitch frequencies and amplitudes. This, of course, creates a visual image "descriptive" of a performance. Sightsinging from such a graph would probably not reproduce precisely the melody, and no teacher has sought, as far as I know, to teach music from one. If several hundred such melodies were known to a performer, the graphs could become *aides-mémoire*, and this would be much the same process we have in mind when we think of the function of perhaps the earliest chant notations as mnemonic.

The melograph is reported to have a variety of filters: one for overtones, another for extraneous noises such as breathing or coughing, and a third one for preconceptions. That is, it focuses and concentrates certain aspects of music-making and suffers no distractions. It is truly a useless machine for a medievalist, but I admire the paradigm. Naked text it certainly is—the original without any room for equivocation. In fact, some of my colleagues in ethnomusicology employ this paradigm to berate my persistence: "we deal with music and you deal with artifacts." Opera arte facta, I quibble, and recounting Jacques Derrida's heralded critique of Levi-Strauss's Structuralism at the Johns Hopkins University in 1966 may have further effect. Ethnomusicological methods, however, offer a sensible distancing from one's object of study. The tonsured clerics who created most of the reper-

tories which I study had a very different world view than my own, and I have acquired a substantial literature to draw upon for dealing with it.

On the other hand, many historical musicologists nowadays wish to concentrate their efforts on the pinnacles of the past. Joseph Kerman espouses a musicology more firmly based in criticism, but Manfred Bukofzer also associated "a dearth of up-to-date special studies on the masterworks" with the observation that "nothing is easier than to amass new musical facts in a vacuum."⁵ It was with this voice of spiritual reform that Kerman placed paleography among the "crippling projects of a mechanical kind" from which musicology must be liberated.⁶ His conscientious objections took a direction determined by larger issues, being partly swept up in unanticipated and often budget-driven concerns for higher education in American universities. What began as an impassioned movement to guide American musicology into a framework of critical and mature insight into both the method and substance of its scholarship sometimes became redirected by zealous appeals to disenfranchise a perceived lofty, unreflective, and uncommunicative elitism. In adopting strategies for stimulating media, curricula, enrollments, and boards of trustees, paleography is now seen as the primary manifestation of recidivism.

As a medievalist, I am more aware than most initiates that paleography usually omitted much that now seems foremost in medieval studies. Following Bruno Stäblein's hypothesis in 1950 regarding the chronological precedence of Old-Roman to Gregorian chant,⁷ research in plainchant has been in the most enviable state of resurgence since the foundation of the Solesmes School in the 1880s. To the many questions raised by Stäblein's theory, responses from Kenneth Levy, Peter Jeffery, and Leo Treitler, to name a few, should stand beside Dürr's and Dadelson's revision of the chronology of Bach's works in a series entitled Masterworks in Twentieth-Century Musicology. Where, why, and when the "seeds of notation" were first planted is still far from clear, but despite the fascinating issues to be dealt with in the study of plainchant notations, traditional paleography courses in American universities rarely gave them any attention at all. Of course, there was more to medieval monophony than plainchant, but paleography rarely dealt with that either, for it was directed towards rhythm in polyphony more than anything else. Breaking the ice with the clearest notational example of a Notre Dame discant clausula to be found, it often wound up with a tour de force ballade or virelai of the ars subtilior and a demanding example of proportional notation from Canonici 213 or Bologna Q 15. Å test of sincerity as much as skill, paleography acquired a moral imperative of preparing independent, self-reliant scholars for original research.⁸ It tended to skew perception of the "musical object" with a notational transliteration into modern score and an analytical translatio, effectively marginalizing many of the qualities and much of the stylistic coherence of the music within its grasp. Yet American paleography was by no means always barnstorming positivism. It produced a generation of topnotch scholars who deserve our respect and esteem. One area that flourished in their hands was the Notre Dame School, and William Waite's controversial transcription of the W₁ Magnus liber organi, for example, captured both the curiosity and the imagination of many music scholars with its unrelenting conviction and monumental scale.

Uncritical "scientific objectivity" is, I wholly agree, a narrow, dogmatic, and uncertain path-as Ruth Solie has stated, "a tyrannical insistence upon universal experience that hears no dissenting voices."9 Like the smiling "Wise Virgins" sculpted on the Paradise Portal of Magdeburg Cathedral around 1245-and Houdon's Voltaire-it wears a certain face. Obviously, paleography practiced within the confines of late Medieval and early Renaissance music should not serve as a standard by which to measure each and every graduate student in musicology and theory. At the same time, every music scholar should be fully prepared to deal with the textual problems and notational characteristics of music that interests him or her. As long as performance and scholarly investigation remain "aspects of the same search,"¹⁰ some form of paleography will prove a powerful interpretive tool, an intellectual leap into the past that enunciates its music's present disposition. It represents how we read and thus interpret a music text, and most recent criticism of musicology addresses how we interpret not just the music but its historical and aesthetic contexts as well.

The notational innovations of twentieth-century composers alone could fill a paleography course.¹¹ It is just as important for a nineteenth-century specialist to be trained to work with sketches, autographs, short scores, publishers' plate numbers, and other such matters as it is for a medievalist to be instructed to work with manuscripts. Renaissance scholars need to know incunabula, watermarks, chansonniers, tablatures, and all the textual problems incumbent to them. Baroque and Classical scholars should be able to improvise a realization of a figured bass, to create a score edition from parts, to recognize the various hands of composers and important copyists, and to know some of the technical aspects of engraving. It is fine for these folks to know their hollow red minims and dragmas but it would be even better if their time were devoted to honing skills they will need to contribute to their own areas of expertise. And that is partly what I have in mind when I suggest replanting. Textual-critical methods, interpreting notations, and examination of physical records such as codices, printings, sketches, and autographs need investigation in different areas of specialization, and it is within those contexts that these skills should be taught.

Paleography long adhered to specific textual problems within repertorial

limits because it was practical training in a methodology as much as an investigation of the music. Bruno Nettl recounts that, for the ethnomusicologist, transcription is not just an end in itself but a means of gaining control over recorded or live music for which no notation had been devised.¹² Margaret Bent suggests that "the better the scholar, the sooner his interaction with the material begins to shape it."¹³ What both appear to address is that musicology is and should be essentially a dialogue with the music. But, in relation to notation, these are two divergent dialogues. One selects the surface identity of music, masters the space and time it needs to occupy, and creates for it a visible shape, an outline measured in cents or microtones, pulses or seconds. It is captured from sounding experience as if by a snapshot in a moment of unwary innocence. The other begins with a representation or similitude that suspends the immediate presence of sounding music with a system of symbolic referents, a set of defining attributes determined by convention. It stands prior to the surface realization as performance, analysis, or criticism. We tend to regard one of these processes as the reversal of the other, the ethnomusicologist ever searching for the attributes by which he or she may determine the significance of the music being heard and observed, the historical musicologist ever inquiring after the surface identity wrought from the physical evidence in hand. In short, we are persuaded to believe that the Music of Man is a stable foundation of some pre-Copernican universe and one's perception of it depends upon one's methodological and ideological orientation. Unconvinced, I find Nettl's and Bent's dialogues diverge because the music to which they are committed is not one and the same, not because they contradict one another "ideologically," and thus the distinction can be dismissed by a "neutral" critic.

With this in mind, let us return to Devereaux's initial point that there is ultimately something medieval about modern formalistic analysis, which he considers, as do many others, an ideological stance. My first inclination is that by "medieval" he more properly intends something like "abandonment of immediate experience at the phenomenological level." Nothing seems to remove us quite so far from the immediate presence of music as sounding experience as a medieval manuscript, and thus his use of "medieval" is metonymic. CD-ROM storage of sounding music is his remedy to the category termed formalistic analysis by which I assume a wide variety of tools, systems, techniques, models, and vocabularies that have identified Music as Science since the days of Pythagoras. Accepting the post-structuralist assertion that primary and secondary texts maintain equal authoritative rank, I would argue that a sounding musical work stored on anything since the Victor Talking Machine is a secondary text and that the primary text is, in music of the Western tradition at least up to the 1950s, the notated musical work enveloped in historical conditions, descriptive or analytical texts, and other musical works to which it is related. Music, like language, is not constructed by individuals alone but by historical and cultural processes as well. We are born into specific musical practices just as we are born into linguistic and kinship systems, economic and political customs, and philosophical and religious mores, and it is within a flux of events that music acquires much of its signification.

This may suggest to you, as it does to me, that musicologists, like performers, conductors, and even composers, are products of their own texts. As in Foucault's interpretation of Cervantes's Don Quixote, the book is not so much existence as duty to which we are bound by being "constantly obliged to consult it in order to know what to do or say."¹⁴ Don Ouixote, of course, is compelled to live out the medieval romans he has read, and the apparent absurdity of his resulting behavior (which Cervantes never fails to oppose to a dull but undeceived reality) not only brings to light the fragility of the human condition for which the novel is noted but more specifically addresses the dilemma of historical consciousness and the texts it creates. Musical archaeology dealt with this dilemma by suppressing it. It rescued music from the past and preserved it as specimens for posterity. Our own historical consciousness differs significantly. We delve into aesthetic, sociological, and intellectual issues as well as performance practice, theory, and notations from the past because of the intrinsic interest and value of the music. The Old Hall Manuscript, for example, is no longer just a "significant historical document" but an accessible and vital repertory, as are Haydn's keyboard sonatas and Rossini's Semiramide. Certainly this is not the type of work to be condemned as positivistic orthodoxy and uncritical scientific objectivity! The hue and cry is directed, I think, largely towards our general histories of music. Musicologists have never been true historiographers,¹⁵ and much (but by no means all) of what has been produced has tended to be dogmatic, dryly factual, relatively enigmatic to the non-musician and even to the musician, and occasionally outrageous. The greatest strength in American musicology, at any rate, resides in monographs, editions, and articles, with the qualified exception of what Paul Henry Lang called "a chronicle of the participation of music in the making of Western civilization."16 There is a disjunction between musical scholarship and music historiography, and the latter may prove to be one of the most promising areas of endeavor by the year 2000.

Our discontent should not be with Medieval or Renaissance music, but rather with the dilemma of historicism now perceived quite differently. The expectation that paleography should shed antiquarianism, mechanical tasks, and a moral imperative offers fresh and positive new directions. There will always be mundane mechanical tasks in musicology, just as

there is low-level problem solving in rehearsals, publishing, and, dare it be said, even teaching. Eliminating early music and paleography will not obviate that and, after all, plurality and diversity have long been the touchstones of American intellectual life, and a medievalist or two in academe insures, if nothing else, their preservation. The crux of the issue, however, is not that early music has become less popular and something of an academic dinosaur but rather that our dialogue with the "textuality" of music generally and our sense of the historical should be strengthened, widened in scope, and methodologically updated. The "demise" of paleography is not so much linked to the subject it explored as to the history of musicology in the United States. We should not be surprised that its heydays have passed with a generation of expatriated European scholarship that flourished in a post-war boom. But, as the scope and values of our discipline have inevitably altered with a strong drive to emphasize and incorporate American music and music of non-European provenance, and as new intellectual frameworks are sought both for musicological research and for the manner in which this research finds its way into the larger academic context of the humanities as offered at American universities, the purpose and significance of paleography also should change. Rather than functioning as a test of the will and competence of every graduate student, it should concentrate upon the notational and musical issues that make working with those repertories unique, challenging, and worthwhile.

According to Foucault, the characters in the second part of El ingenioso hidalgo Don Quixote de la Mancha "have read the first part of his (Don Quixote's) story and recognize him, the real man, as the hero of the \tilde{book} ." Critics hounding musicology as ultimately "medieval" have leapt into the novel among those characters. And as I fasten closed that book, I shall think of them there, especially when I am trying my hand at a transcription or two. Like Wagner's diminished sevenths that Hector Berlioz quipped might escape the scores lent him and nibble at the furniture, they may be delivered another day. The restraints currently imposed upon certain didactic values and assumptions in paleography argue for greater freedom within the discipline. Rarely has the field opened up so widely, so generously, or so honestly to new formations of specialization, new designs for historiography, and new approaches to theoretical issues. It is a time for renewal, an opportunity to reimplement, a season for replanting. Far from fragmenting a monolithic musicology into ever more isolated streams of specialization, changes in paleography predict prosperity and productivity based upon an assemblage of interests and significant though divergent dialogues. The textual and interpretive problems with which paleography will deal will be more clearly focused, and its mechanical tasks (one hopes) will be relegated to the computer. Liberated, it may, in fact, thrive like a weed.

NOTES

^{*} I wish to acknowledge the many helpful suggestions given me by Mark DeBellis and Julian Treves who read drafts for this paper. I alone am responsible for the views expressed.

¹ Kent Devereaux, "The Signifying CD," *The Minnesota Composers Forum* 18 (1992): 1, 6. There is much in Mr. Devereaux's all-too-brief essay with which I wholeheartedly concur, namely that discourse about music should not be left to a specialist whose primary vocabulary is analytical and "scientific," and that recent attempts to redefine such discourse in various critical and multicultural approaches are positive and promising. I do, however, take issue with his notion that music writing—notation—is "a hermetic act" that reduces music to the formal and quantifiable, that formalistic analysis has been the sole basis of musicological inquiry, and that technology will ultimately provide us with musical meaning hitherto "suppressed" by dealing with music in the abstract. He does not deal with whether academic instruction in music paleography should remain a part of every musicologist's training, which is my purpose to address, but he articulates many of the issues that surround this question. By doing so, he has provided a means for rapprochement among what might otherwise prove to be irreconcilably conflicting interests with which we all must deal.

² Johannes Wolf's *Handbuch der Notationskunde* (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1913) was the first textbook on notation. Willi Apel, *The Notation of Polyphonic Music 900–1600*, 5th ed. (Cambridge: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953) has been the vademecum for paleography students in the United States.

³ Roland Gelatt, *The Fabulous Phonograph 1877–1977*, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1977), 175.

⁴ Charles Seeger, "Prescriptive and Descriptive Music-Writing," *The Musical Quarterly* 44 (1958): 186 (italics Seeger's).

⁵ Joseph Kerman, Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 143–50; Manfred Bukofzer, The Place of Musicology in American Institutions of Higher Learning (New York, 1957; reprint, 1977), 34.

⁶ Kerman, Contemplating Music, 46.

⁷ Bruno Stäblein, "Zur Entstehung der gregorianischen Melodien," Kirchenmusikalisches Jahrbuch 35 (1951): 5–9; Helmut Hucke, "Gregorianischer Gesang in altrömischer und fränkischer Überlieferung," Archiv für Musikwissenschaft 12 (1955): 74–87; Willi Apel, "The Central Problem of Gregorian Chant, Journal of the American Musicological Society 9 (1956): 118–27.

⁸ In the original 1941 "Preface" to his *Notation of Polyphonic Music 900–1600*, Willi Apel quoted Waldo S. Pratt in defining his purpose. Pratt had stated, "Every such effort toughens the muscles of the reasoning faculties, and helps to set us free from the bondage to mere tradition and the idolatry of mere authority, which debilitates the mind like insidious poison."

⁹ Ruth Solie, "What do Feminists Want?" Journal of Musicology 9 (1991): 402.

¹⁰ Arthur Mendel, "The Service of Musicology to the Practical Musician," in Some Aspects of Musicology (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957), 11.

¹¹ See Erhard Karkoschka, Notation in New Music: A Critical Guide to Interpretation and Realization, trans. Ruth Koenig (New York: Praeger, 1972); and Carl Dahlhaus, "Notenschrift heute," Darmstädter Beiträge zur neuen Musik 9 (1965): 9–34.

¹² Bruno Nettl, "I Can't Say a Thing until I've Seen the Score," in *The Study of Ethnomusicology* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 65–79.

¹³ Margaret Bent, "Fact and Value in Contemporary Scholarship," in *Fact and Value in Contemporary Scholarship* (Boulder: College Music Society, 1986), 2.

¹⁴ Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 1973), 46.

¹⁵ For a survey of general histories of music up to 1939, see Warren Dwight Allen, *Philoso-*

phies of Music History (New York: American Book Company, 1939; reprint, New York: Dover, 1962).

¹⁶ I am also a devotee of Richard Crocker's *History of Musical Style* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966). Like most undergraduates, my spontaneous reaction upon encountering it was "it's actually about the music!" Both Lang's and Crocker's very different purposes are met with certain convictions that require judicious perusal, but the ideological readings in which they have been recently cast obscure their fundamental value in Leo Treitler, *Music and the Historical Imagination* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

From the Ivory Tower to the Marketplace: Early Music, Musicology, and the Mass Media

By Paula Higgins

1

Petrification is the state of all art which no longer affects us, even though it has proved its historical importance. . . . There are too many preliminary requirements before one can "get the feel" of a Dufay chanson, a Josquin motet, a Gombert mass, a Lasso madrigal, of Monteverdi's Orfeo or Incoronazione di Poppea.

-Alfred Einstein (1941)¹

The art of Machaut, Josquin, and even Monteverdi is petrified; the attempt to revive this art beyond small circles is likely to be futile, unless remoteness in history is enjoyed as an esthetic titillation and archaic austerity is accepted as picturesque, and this means accepted by mistake and misunderstanding.

—Carl Dahlhaus (1967)²

The lynchpin of the curriculum in those days was the seminar in the notation of medieval and Renaissance music . . . , focused not on music but on rather low-level problem-solving. . . . Dropping the notation course from the required list, some of us felt, was a first step in the liberation of musicology.

—Joseph Kerman (1985)³

Within the last couple of decades, there has, of course, been a great musicological leap forward. A number of scholars working on the Middle Ages and Renaissance began to concentrate more of their own efforts (and those of their students) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

-Don Michael Randel (1992)⁴

Metaphors of constraint and freedom, regression and progress, stasis and motion, riddled with signifiers of death, decay, austerity, and archaism, characterize the scholarly rhetoric that has pitted the study of early music against that of the traditional canon.⁵ Dire forecasts about the future of medieval and renaissance music in particular predict that its remoteness in time, aesthetic inaccessibility, and outmoded scholarly methodologies will inevitably consign it to the status of a cultural dinosaur. At a time when the musicological canon has opened up to embrace all kinds of

musics and methodologies, critics gleefully applaud the alleged flocking of early music scholars to the study of later music as "a great musicological leap forward."⁶ Stereotyped as a recondite, hyper-specialized domain absorbed with "low-level problem-solving" (epitomized by edition-making and the ritual paleography course), early music scholarship—once the pride of the discipline—has become the last bastion of the musicological Other.

What triggered this curious anxiety about early music and its scholarly practitioners? Sandra Pinegar singles out paleography, a "symbol of positivistic orthodoxy in musicology's race to incorporate and legitimize the voices of radical dialectics," as one of the guilty culprits.⁷ Pinegar mounts an admirable defense of notation courses as invaluable aids to the interpretation of music, but advocates making them more relevant to the specific paleographical problems posed by neatly circumscribed chronological repertories:

I can muster sympathy for those who know they will spend the rest of their careers with questions regarding Romantic harmony, Baroque vocal ornaments, or Schoenberg's *Grundgestalt* and are required, ruler and pen in hand, to fulfill the requirement in paleography... it was designed to meet special demands, ones that no longer suit the everyday work of musicologists in general or indeed that of potential Medieval and Renaissance specialists....

It is fine for these folks to know their hollow red minims and dragmas but it would be even better if their time were devoted to *honing skills they will need to contribute to their own areas of expertise.*⁸

This ostensibly innocuous formulation conceals a number of troubling implications. Pinegar seems to assume that by the end of the decade and beyond we will be dealing with the human approximation of programmable cyborgs, who will "know" from the outset of graduate school how they will "spend the rest of their careers" (not an entirely unwarranted assumption if the disturbing pre-professionalist trend in undergraduate education continues). But the current economic climate suggests (unduly optimistic predictions of the past twenty years notwithstanding) that the scarcity of academic jobs in music will continue through the end of the century and beyond, thereby precluding many talented Ph.D.'s from obtaining academic employment of any kind. With the liberal arts curricula of many colleges and universities engaged in fiscal struggles and heated debates that challenge their very existence, can we realistically continue to advocate the cultivation of narrowly conceived specializations, either in our teaching or research? And is it really in our best interest to endorse the notion, implicit in Pinegar's proposal, that there should be discrete limits to the kinds of knowledge musicologists should be expected to know merely to carry out some highly circumscribed, hypothetical future job whose acquisition can no longer be taken as a *donnée*? "How," as Joseph Kerman asks, "will students who have been programmed to be 'nothing but specialists' turn into scholars with broad, original, humane horizons?"⁹ Pinegar's paradigm, subtly prizing later music over early music, becomes patently unthinkable in its inversion: that those who "know" they will be "spending the rest of their careers" deciphering "hollow red minims and dragmas" should be spared the study of "Romantic harmony, Baroque ornaments, or Schoenberg's *Grundgestalt*."

Such recommendations come uncomfortably close to promoting a kind of musicological vocationalism, symptomatic of the national trend of the past decade or so, that measures the value of higher education purely by its eventual workplace utility and seeks to enhance teaching efficiency with computerized technology.¹⁰ Complicity with these questionable anti-humanist agendas, to my mind, strongly undermines the liberal arts tradition that has sustained and nurtured the very existence of musicology in the academy. By failing to resist the powerful agenda of those who would make us even more specialized, efficient, and useful, we may be naively collaborating in our own self-destruction. Because music departments (which still employ the majority of working musicologists) typically reside at the bottom of most totem poles of academic priorities and are considered by many to be superfluous to the educational experience to begin with, they are the least likely to survive the budgetary ax of administrative bureaucracies increasingly attuned to the strident voices that would transform the life of the mind into the mind of the workplace. And of all the "periods" of specialization in musicology, early music is undoubtedly the one most vulnerable to questions of "utility" and "relevance" precisely because of its historical imbrication in the currently beleaguered liberal arts tradition. To suggest that paleography is the main preoccupation of medievalists and even to hint that the routine aspects of teaching notation could easily be consigned to computers is, I fear, a first step towards the irrevocable elimination of the medievalist position in the music department.

Paradoxically, the much-maligned notation seminar is unique in its capacity for providing an unusual chronological and topical sweep because it usually crams into a semester or two the survey of a broad range of notational systems, the changing musical styles and repertories that spawned them, and a wide variety of theoretical, historical, and text critical problems posed by the study of their development over three hundred years. At their best, notation courses deal, at least tangentially, not only with the

"low-level problem-solving" of transcriptions, but with the religious, social, political, and cultural circumstances that led to the production and transmission of the music encoded therein, with the historical context and circumstances of creation of the manuscripts embedding the notation, and with the ideas of contemporary society reflected in the texts set to music. Are these not crucial aspects of past musical cultures that all musicologists ought to be able to reflect upon critically and discuss intelligently (if only superficially) in their explorations of music from different times and places? If something occasionally goes awry, the cause may lie in differing pedagogical approaches to the material rather than in the inherent irrelevance of music paleography and the broader historical issues that arise from it.

Although early music in general, and notation in particular, appears to be the principal scapegoat of the anti-positivist agenda so forcefully outlined by Joseph Kerman, his recommendations have become largely divorced from their original context and needlessly distorted.¹¹ Similarly, the much-discussed stampede to the study of later music need not necessarily be interpreted as the sign of a wholesale mutiny on the part of early music practitioners. In addition to those suggested by Kerman, there are other fairly logical explanations for the ease with which certain scholars seem to negotiate the two fields.¹² Familiarity with the standard canon is assumed for all musicologists, regardless of period of specialization. Unless it results from a fairly atypical concentrated study at the undergraduate level, the serious musicological study of medieval and renaissance music usually begins in graduate school. For many of us, exposure to pretonal music represented a journey into fascinating terrae incognitae that opened up vast panoramas of unfamiliar musics and historical problems. Because, alas, not all working musicologists have the luxury of teaching in Ph.D. programs, those "specializing" in early music often have the opportunity as well as the obligation to teach within a broader chronological spectrum of music than do scholars of later periods. Their de rigueur familiarity with the standard canon and their teaching responsibilities in later periods may partially explain why many early music scholars feel no particular discomfort venturing into later periods of research. And if musicology has yet to see many scholars of music post-1750 dabbling in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, it is undoubtedly because research in early music seems to presuppose prior training in a complex array of linguistic, paleographical, and historical problems that may not have been the special focus of their graduate study.

Whatever our musicological persuasion, I think we all need to exercise caution in espousing ideas of "relevance" that insidiously promote everincreasing specialization and narrowness, whether of historical periods, ideological approaches, or critical methodologies. We all need to foster ever-broadening strategies for musicological thought in general and about early music in particular. I would be happy to see more cross-fertilization between "periods of specialization" (not to mention rethinking musicology in terms other than historical periods) and would be especially encouraged by signs of retrograde motion through the centuries. (I was recently heartened by the comments of one young colleague working in the eighteenth century who confessed that he would "love to become a medievalist some day.") Many of the recent interpretive, critical, and analytical studies that now characterize much nineteenth-century scholarship, for example, offer potentially fresh viewpoints from which to approach the study of earlier repertories.

I also welcome the exhilarating infiltration of pan-disciplinary critical theories into the field. Scholars of early music stand to benefit greatly from theoretical reflection about their music as social, political, religious, and cultural discourses. But I do worry that, in the race to stay current with ever-shifting critical fashion in allied disciplines, we risk overlooking some of the equally insightful work of our fellow musicologists. I suspect that I have some company in my general observation that musicologists as a group, and medieval and renaissance scholars in particular, have always gravitated towards more truly interdisciplinary scholarship than many of our colleagues in sister disciplines. Historians, for example, who, until recently, were especially fastidious about insisting on the "economic," "intellectual," "cultural," "political," or "social" orientation of their work, are now absorbed with interdisciplinary, "new historicist" topics of patronage, orality, memory, printing and the history of the book—none of which is likely to strike many early musicologists as substantially "new."

Much of the more critically interesting and original recent work in medieval and renaissance musicological studies, while assuming mastery of textual and musical paleography as a basic research tool, have much broader historical and interpretive agendas in mind. Christopher Page, for example, has drawn on a wide array of mostly unedited, non-musical sources-sermons, manuals for confessors, theological treatises and encyclopedias, and vernacular romances-for his richly nuanced contextual history of musical life and ideas in France from 1100-1300.13 Michael Long's work on the music of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, by interrogating seemingly trivial musical commonplaces, uncovers disparate strands of social, cultural, and liturgical evidence and weaves them into stunning historical and musical exegeses of individual pieces.¹⁴ Taking regional chant variants as her point of departure, Jennifer Bloxam's similarly subtle and elegant work seeks to demonstrate the layers of biographical, religious, and symbolic intertextuality embedded in composers' seemingly arbitrary choices of specific cantus firmus melodies in their Masses and motets.¹⁵ Cristle Collins Judd, a rare music theorist who devotes seri-

ous attention to early music, has developed an all-encompassing theory of renaissance tonality by close scrutiny of contemporaneous theoretical rhetoric in conjunction with its contingent musical repertories.¹⁶ In my own recent work with women's history and feminist criticism, I have tried to explore how creative subcultures of poets and musicians among the ladies-in-waiting of female magnates coexisted and interacted with the officially sanctioned public cultural discourse of their male consorts.¹⁷ These studies, merely the ones with which I am most familiar, represent a sampling of the many new approaches that have not only transformed our picture of early music but could also have broader applications for the study of later repertories.

2

The time is more than ripe, in my view, for the professional cadre of American musical scholarship to do what it can to strengthen its influence on the communication of knowledge about music in the public media, at whatever level.

-Lewis Lockwood (1987)¹⁸

Medieval music is not exactly the stuff of "Greatest Hits" CDs and marketing dreams—yet. But the joyful, stereotype-busting sounds of Anonymous 4 and the Medieval Strings . . . could well make the breakthrough in these multi-cultural times.

-John Henken, The Los Angeles Times (1991)¹⁹

It all started the evening you were at that classical concert and the supercilious guy in the espresso line at intermission was nattering on and on about the merits of Machaut and Dufay. Who were Machaut and Dufay? Some French law firm?

-Melinda Bargreen, The Seattle Times (1992)²⁰

New musical configurations are even more apparent in the mass media. Radio and recordings now provide easy, instantaneous access to a worldwide compass of "musics," including a full range of Western art music from the medieval period to the latest generation of contemporary composers, a generous sampling of non-Western art music, and folk music and popular music from throughout the world. This ready availability has markedly increased the types of music about which we have direct (if not firsthand) knowledge and has made us "literate" (if not "native speakers") within a range of musical languages inconceivable even a short time ago.

-Robert P. Morgan (1992)²¹

Musicology has recently seen a remarkable and much needed resurgence of interest in the music of later periods and even in the varieties and approaches to music studied within traditional chronological parameters.²² The unprecedented expansion of the musicological canon, the range and implications of which have been so eloquently articulated by Robert P. Morgan, creates a somewhat misleading impression that the influence of and interest in earlier music must, by default, be dwindling. And yet even a cursory survey of the articles published in the last twenty years in the Journal of the American Musicological Society reveals that the perceived trend away from early music is purely illusory.²³ For those who would regard JAMS as an unlikely place to track innovative musicological trends, the papers read at the annual meetings of the Society may reflect a more accurate barometer of changing scholarly tastes.²⁴ Surprisingly, the percentage of papers on early music topics has actually risen between 1972 and 1992. And while it is certainly true that there has been a proliferation of increasingly specialized journals in the past decade or so, some of them aimed at the growing audience for post-classical music, a number of others continue to treat, either exclusively or at least in part, topics in early music.

Far from becoming an endangered species, early music has never flourished as widely at any other time in history. In 1993 it is now impossible—indeed unthinkable—to consider the music of Machaut, Dufay, Josquin, and Monteverdi, or even Perotin, as "petrified." The combination of technology and an ever-burgeoning number of early music groups has resurrected all kinds of previously "dead" music as vital parts of our everyday soundscape. Astonishing numbers of new compact discs continue to bring the most remote and formerly inaccessible music to life with the touch of a digital keypad. Not long ago, the general music-loving public thought that the only music pre-Bach was "Gregorian chant." Now, at least for some, the names of Hildegard of Bingen, Perotin, Machaut, and Josquin trip off their tongues as lightly as those of their more illustrious counterparts of later centuries. In England, performances of Perotin's organa and Machaut's Mass have become such warhorses that one critic recently described them as the "'Messiah'(s) of the middle ages."²⁵

Even in the United States, where the tradition of early vocal music is far less ingrained in the culture, something is surely in the air when Machaut and Dufay become topics of idle conversation in espresso lines.²⁶ Ironically, it was not a musicologist but a music critic of a major metropolitan daily, quoted in the epigraph above, who recognized the possibility that early music could become a commercial commodity. As I am writing this essay, two early music recordings occupy slots on the Billboard Top Ten Classical recordings. The soundtrack of Alain Corneau's film *Tous les mat*-

ins du monde (1992),27 featuring music by Marin Marais, Monsieur de Sainte-Colombe, Lully, and François Couperin, arranged by Jordi Savall and now in its thirty-first week on the charts, has clearly done for seventeenthcentury music what Amadeus did for Mozart.²⁸ Rivaled on the French charts only by the music of Michael Jackson, the CD broke all kinds of sales records throughout Europe as well.²⁹ The recent recording An English Ladymass by the all-female vocal group Anonymous 4 is in its twenty-first week on the charts,³⁰ rivalling CDs by the likes of opera demi-gods Luciano Pavarotti and Cecilia Bartoli.³¹ The ubiquitous national daily USA Today recently featured an article on Anonymous 4,32 and several months earlier National Public Radio interviewed its members about medieval music treatises, parchment manuscripts, and early music performance practice.³³ Similarly, two recent compact discs by the Baltimore Consort, which specializes in popular music of the late Renaissance and early Baroque, have appeared in the "Top Crossover Albums" category for 23 weeks.³⁴ Though probably owing in part to the X-rated lyrics (complete with parental warning label), the commercial success of the recordings has much to do with the appeal of the music itself.³⁵

The growing presence of medieval music in particular, both on the concert stage and in the commercial recording industry, is mirrored in the avant-rock music scene as well. Recent art-rock ensembles from Great Britain and Australia such as Enigma and Dead Can Dance, labeled as "gothic rockers" in the popular press, feature electronic recastings of European medieval and renaissance music, as well as Eastern European and other ethnic folk musics. The music of Enigma, featured in the film 1492, incorporates the plainchant Kyrie XI on the track "Mea Culpa" and chants from the Requiem on "Sadeness" (named for the Marquis de Sade), much to the consternation of the Benedictine monks of Solesmes (whose recordings they appropriated), who are apparently incensed by the blasphemous exploitation of chant for libidinous purposes.³⁶ "Thus saccharined religion becomes the bourgeois cloak for a tolerated pornography," as Adorno would undoubtedly sneer.³⁷ Less racy, but equally illustrative of the gothic-rock phenomenon is Dead Can Dance's A Passage in Time,³⁸ which features a rousing version of a well-known fourteenth-century Italian saltarello, as well as eclectic syntheses of other medieval music and a wide variety of ethnic folk music.39

These popularizing trends recall those from the 1920s through 1950s, which made lucrative commercial hits out of the music of Chopin and Tchaikovsky (among others); from the 1960s, when J. S. Bach became a household name through the mediation of the Swingle Singers,⁴⁰ Wendy (née Walter) Carlos's *Switched on Bach*,⁴¹ The Toys 1965 hit "A Lover's Concerto,"⁴² and Procol Harum's 1967 chartbuster "A Whiter Shade of

Pale";⁴³ from the 1970s, which brought a Beethoven symphony and a Musorgsky tone poem to the discotheque;⁴⁴ and from the 1980s, when heavy metal guitarists began openly acknowledging their indebtedness to the music of Bach, Vivaldi, and others.⁴⁵ At least one critic suggests that we are now witnessing a similar phenomenon with medieval and renaissance music in the 1990s:

Interest in the excavation and re-creation of "early music"—European church and court music, mainly, from the end of the Dark Ages through the Renaissance, more or less, performed on antique instruments, or meticulous reproductions thereof—has grown in this century from a cult among classical musicians into a semipopular demivogue now in its third decade, and threatens to turn the quaint racket of sackbuts, shawms, and plinking psalteries into a rich musical chablis for condo cocktail parties.⁴⁶

Only time will judge the accuracy of such a prediction, but it seems clear nevertheless that in their quest for new and unmined musical quarries, popular and serious musicians alike are drawing upon older music more than ever before.

Of course the history of fascination with pre-tonal music dates back at least to early nineteenth-century revivals by figures like Fétis, Kiesewetter, Baini, Mendelssohn, and Brahms.⁴⁷ In the early twentieth century, music of the Middle Ages and Renaissance was the elitist academic preserve of certain modernist composers like Anton Webern (an erstwhile musicologist who wrote a Ph.D. dissertation on Heinrich Isaac) and Igor Stravinsky, whose indebtedness to the music of Gesualdo and others is well known. In particular, British composers of the post-War generation, such as Harrison Birtwistle and Peter Maxwell Davies of the Manchester experimental school, like the American composer Charles Wuorinen, have not only absorbed medieval styles in their original compositions but have arranged music by Machaut and Ockeghem, as well as pieces from the fifteenth-century Glogauer Liederbuch. Machaut in particular seems to be the medieval man of the hour these days, judging from recent performances in the United States and Great Britain of pieces like Wuorinen's "Machaut mon chou," a reworking for orchestra of the Messe de Notre Dame,48 Bruce Adolphe's "Machaut is My Beginning," a recomposition of the famous retrograde canon;49 Eve Beglarian's "Machaut in the Machine Age," including pop-inspired recompositions of Machaut motets and ballades,⁵⁰ Patrick Cardy's "Virelai," a theme and variations based on a Machaut tune;⁵¹ Salvatore Sciarrino's arrangement of Rose liz; and Dominic Muldowney's reconstruction of the Hoquetus David.52

Indeed, as Robert Morgan and Harry Haskell have observed, the line between "old" and "new" music continues to blur as the twentieth century progresses.⁵³ Nowhere is this more manifest than in the growing numbers of performers of medieval and renaissance music, one of whom called Perotin "the first minimalist composer,"⁵⁴ who are now regularly program-ming contemporary music on their concerts and recordings. Without wishing to overstate the case, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that early music, much of it medieval, is becoming an integral part of the vastly expanding postmodern musicological canon. I like to think of this as a belated symbolic payoff (or poetic justice?) to generations of earlier scholars (and teachers of notation courses, no doubt) whose careful, painstaking, and unglamorous work in locating the manuscripts and preparing the editions has begun to yield substantial returns. As Joseph Kerman pointed out, "any scholarly edition is an invitation to a performer,"55 and if the number of RSVPs that continue to trickle in is any indication, we had better expect more guests than originally planned. I think the phenomenon has much to do with the unprecedented number of scholars collaborating in the practical realm of musicology-as performers, conductors, and expert advisors to fledgling performing groups.⁵⁶ It also has to do with the high caliber and performing standards of many ensembles,⁵⁷ with technical advancements in the playing of early instruments, and a recording technology that produces pristine, flawless sound. The music simply sounds better and audiences like what they are hearing-indeed, even the uninitiated are finding it irresistible.⁵⁸ Subtle clues to the changing status of early music, both on the concert scene and in the recording industry, will inevitably reflect itself in the choice of concert dress as early music performers exchange their down-home, artsy, or Bohemian garb for tuxedos and evening gowns.59

Precisely why at this time in history early music, and medieval music in particular, seems to have captured the imagination of a broader musical public than ever before (not unlike the current fascination with dinosaurs) is a question that needs to be raised. Is it a reaction against the over-saturation of the music of "common-practice period" that has long dominated the concert halls, the air waves, and the film soundtracks? Is it a desire to retreat to an era of perceived timelessness and spirituality in a world beset by social, economic, and military tensions? Is it a curiosity about our own historical past, touched off by quincentenary celebrations of the New World Encounter? Is it a response to the growing multiculturalism that will surely intensify as we enter the twenty-first century? The latter possibility seems particularly suggestive as comparisons between ethnic folk musics and medieval music recur like leitmotivs in the critical responses of reviewers who hear reminiscences of an "Appalachian mountain ballad" in a song of Machaut,⁶⁰ similarities with Bulgarian folk music

in the "vocal drones and poignant dissonances" of works from the twelfthcentury Codex Calixtinus,⁶¹ and links between traditional American quadrilles like "Old Joe Clark" or "Turkey in the Straw" and French Renaissance dances.⁶²

Whatever the confluence of social, political, mystical, or multicultural trends, it seems clear that there is a growing appetite out there for "classical" music, the definition of which, as Robert Morgan has shown, is becoming increasingly nebulous.⁶³ In the years to come, early music scholars both within and outside the academy will be faced with a multitude of options for an increasingly heterogeneous and eclectic kind of "cultural musicology"⁶⁴ that will examine cross-fertilizations between early music and the esoteric discourses of the late twentieth-century avant-garde, and explore the common ground medieval and renaissance music shares with a wide variety of ethnic, folk, and popular musics of all times and places.

Joseph Kerman's prescient warning that if "musicologists do not write the contextual history of Western art music, someone else will write it for them"⁶⁵ has recently been born out by a spate of recent books destined for wanna-be aficionados of classical music that are having serious market appeal.⁶⁶ If present signs are any indication, the public appetite for an understanding of the less familiar music of earlier periods may well follow suit before long. Taking Kerman to heart, and reflecting on Lewis Lockwood's similar exhortation to enhance our role in the propagation of musical knowledge in the public media,⁶⁷ I hope that in the future we will no longer content ourselves to leave such important cultural work to, among others, a petroleum industry executive who also happens to be the former Assistant Secretary of Defense.⁶⁸

It does not at all surprise me that things are changing for early musicat least beyond the walls of the academy if not within them-because I and many of my colleagues, thanks to receptive and even enthusiastic classroom audiences over the past decade, have always had perhaps overly optimistic notions of the potential of early music to charm the masses. In closing, I would like to recount an especially memorable incident that took place in Paris in the early 1980s at the Centre Georges Pompidou. One afternoon, while transcribing a Busnoys chanson from a film of the Wolfenbüttel chansonnier on the microfilm reader, I was distracted by hushed whispers behind my back. I turned to find some dozen curious strangers (on a tour of the Centre) peering over my shoulder and staring at the fifteenth-century manuscript on the screen. Having caught my attention, one of them asked what I was doing and I explained briefly. Several persisted in asking questions, and an impromptu mini-lecture on white mensural notation ensued. Diffidence prevented me from truly exploiting the situation, but it left me nevertheless with a sense that I had somehow made a tangible, if minuscule, contribution to raising interest in

and awareness of early music. It also made me wonder how greatly enriched our cultural landscape might be were we each to commit ourselves, even in seemingly small ways, to broadening our intellectual and musical horizons beyond the sheltered groves of the ivory tower.⁶⁹

NOTES

¹ Alfred Einstein, *Greatness in Music* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941; rpt. New York: Da Capo Press, 1986), 9.

² Carl Dahlhaus, *Esthetics of Music* (1967), trans. William W. Austin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 98–99. Originally published in German in 1967 as *Musikästhetik*.

³ Joseph Kerman, Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 46.

⁴ Don Michael Randel, "The Canons in the Musicological Toolbox," in *Disciplining Music: Musicology and Its Canons*, ed. Katherine Bergeron and Philip V. Bohlman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 14.

⁵ For the purposes of this essay, "early music" will refer to music prior to 1700.

⁶ Randel, "The Canons in the Musicological Toolbox," 14. Randel's remark, which occurs early in his essay, seems implicitly to set up a binary opposition that champions later music over early music. This is curious in light of his perceptive and sensitive critique later in the essay of the "whole set of binary oppositions in which we frame so much of our discourse" (p. 19).

⁷ Sandra Pinegar, "The Seeds of Notation and Music Paleography," earlier in this volume, p. 99.

⁸ Ibid., 100–1, 103, emphasis added.

⁹ Kerman, Contemplating Music, 46.

¹⁰ For an overview of the problem see the incisive essays in the anthology *The Liberal Arts in a Time of Crisis*, ed. Barbara Ann Scott with the assistance of Richard P. Sloan (New York: Praeger, 1991), and especially the recent article by Patricia Kean, "Building a Better Beowulf: The New Assault on the Liberal Arts," *Lingua Franca* (May/June 1993): 22–28.

¹¹ Kerman, Contemplating Music, 31–59 and infra. Kerman's objections to notation and edition-making in particular were raised in the context of his observation that they have tended too often in the past to become all-consuming objectives in themselves, rather than the means to a larger historical or critical understanding of the music and its context. It is clear from Kerman's largely overlooked chastisement of music theorists who habitually neglect medieval and renaissance music (p. 72) that he bears in principle no particular grudge against its study.

¹² Ibid., 145.

¹³ Christopher Page, Voices and Instruments of the Middle Ages: Instrumental Practice and Songs in France, 1100–1300 (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1987); Christopher Page, The Owl and the Nightingale: Musical Life and Ideas in France 1100–1300 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989).

¹⁴ Michael Long, "Landini's Musical Patrimony: A Reassessment of Some Compositional Conventions in Trecento Polyphony," in *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 40 (1987): 31–52; and "Symbol and Ritual in Josquin's *Missa di Dadi*," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 42 (1989): 1–22.

¹⁵ M. Jennifer Bloxam, "In Praise of Spurious Saints: The Missae Floruit Egregiis by Pipelare and La Rue," Journal of the American Musicological Society 44 (1991): 163–220.

¹⁶ Cristle Collins Judd, "Modal Types and Ut, Re, Mi Tonalitics: Tonal Coherence in Sacred Vocal Polyphony from about 1500," Journal of the American Musicological Society 45 (1992): 428-67.

¹⁷ Paula Higgins, "Parisian Nobles, a Scottish Princess, and the Woman's Voice in Late Medieval Song," in *Early Music History* 10, ed. Iain Fenlon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 145–200.

¹⁸ Lewis Lockwood, "President's Message," AMS Newsletter, 17/2 (August 1987), 3.

¹⁹ "Medieval Pleasures from Anonymous 4," The Los Angeles Times, 28 February 1991, p. F6

²⁰ "Help in Exploring the Complex World of Classical Music," The Seattle Times, 27 December 1992, p. D1.

²¹ Robert P. Morgan, "Rethinking Musical Culture: Canonic Reformulations in a Post-Tonal Age," in *Disciplining Music*, 56-57.

²² Joseph Kerman, "Musicology in the 1990s," Journal of Musicology 9 (1991): 131-44.

 23 In fact, slightly more studies of music before 1600 have been published in the last ten years than had been in the previous decade. Of 111 full-length articles published between 1983 and the spring of 1993, 51 dealt with music prior to 1600 (45.9%). In the previous decade spanning 1972–1982, *JAMS* published 125 full-length articles (excluding Studies and Abstracts), 51 (40.8%) of which focused on music before 1600.

²⁴ Kerman, "Musicology in the 1990s," 133-34.

²⁵ Paul Griffiths, "Flamboyant Pages of Ancient Choirbooks," *The Times* (London), 28 December 1991.

²⁶ Bargreen, "Help in Exploring the Complex World of Classical Music," p. D1.

²⁷ Valois V4640/Harmonia Mundi.

²⁸ One of the rare reviewers criticizing the music was John Simon of the *National Review* (14 December 1992, p. 54) who wrote: "I know of no sounds less bearable than those of baroque music, unless it be baroque music played on one, two, or three bass viols, than which I can think of nothing more base and vile. Since the two-hour film seems to go on for centuries, I kept hoping we would get to Berlioz, where French music gets bearable, but no such luck. Jordi Savall and his consort of musicians just kept fiddling away on the soundtrack; not since the unendurably 'umble Uriah Heep has there been such bowing and scraping."

²⁹ Clifford Terry, "Oh! Viols! How a Film about Baroque Music Became a Smash," *The Chicago Tribune*, 20 December 1992, p. C6; Jack Garner, "'Tous' Probes the Heart of an Artist," *Gannett News Service*, 15 April 1993.

³⁰ Harmonia Mundi (France) 907808. The recording is a reconstruction of a service in honor of the Virgin Mary as it might have been performed in Salisbury Cathedral, and includes thirteenth- and fourteenth-century songs, motets, hymns, and Mass fragments from an edition by Ernest Sanders.

³¹ Jamie James, "Record Briefs," The New York Times, 2 May 1993, p. 40.

³² David Patrick Stearns, "Anonymous 4: Ancient Music, Eternal Appeal," USA Today, 20 April 1993, p. D8.

³³ Transcript of radio interview with Anonymous 4 by Susan Stamberg "Medieval Music Resounds with New Vibrations," National Public Radio, Saturday, 6 February 1993.

³⁴ Joseph McLellan, "Consort's 'Rocque' of Ages," *The Washington Post*, 18 January 1993, p. C10.

³⁵ "The Art of the Bawdy Song" (Dorian 90155) and "The Daemon Lover" (Dorian 90174).

³⁶ Enigma, *MCMXC a. D.* (Virgin Records V2–86224). See Marc Weidenbaum, "Anonymous Enigma Plays Pop Anti-Christ, Asks 'Voulez-Vous Couchez Avec Moi?'" *Pulsel*, May 1991, p. 41, who describes "Sadeness" as "a carnal morsel of producer-pop that grafts Gregorian chants over some sweaty beat-box percussion."

³⁷ Theodor W. Adorno, "Commodity Music Analysed," in *Quasi una fantasia: Essays on Modern Music*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (New York: Verso, 1992), 37. The essay was written from 1934–40. Enigma's Michael Cretu insists that he is making "sensual" and not "sexual" music. See Michael Azerrad, "Enigma," *Rolling Stone*, 2 May 1991, p. 18.

³⁸ Dead Can Dance, A Passage in Time, Rykodisc 20215.

³⁹ Jon Pareles, "Harmonies of the Middle Ages Used by Dead Can Dance," *The New York Times*, 22 November 1990, p. C17. And these are only the most recent manifestations of a phenomenon that has been quietly underway for at least twenty years. The Paul Winter Consort, reincarnated in the 1990s as a purveyor of New Age Music, featured a jazz version of Dufay's *Ave maris stella* on its 1970 LP *Road*. John Renbourn and Pentangle made several LPs in the 1970s, mingling medieval and renaissance music with traditional European folk idioms and instruments, none of which, however, had any resounding commercial success.

⁴⁰ The group's earliest hits featured the music of Bach on albums like *Bach's Greatest Hits* (1963), *Jazz Sebastian Bach* (1963), and *Going Baroque* (1964). They later expanded their repertoire to include Handel, Vivaldi, and Mozart on the albums *Anyone for Mozart*? (1965) and *Anyone For Mozart, Bach, Handel, Vivaldi*? (1986). A subset of the group (Swingles II) gave the first performance of Luciano Berio's *Sinfonia* in New York in 1973, as well as other works by that composer. See "Swingle Singers," *Guinness Encyclopedia of Popular Music*, ed. Colin Larkin (Chester, CT.: New England Pub. Associates, 1992), 3:2432.

⁴¹ For Switched on Bach (1968) Carlos collaborated with Dr. Robert Moog, inventor of the Moog synthesizer, as well as with musicologist Benjamin Folkman. The recording occupied the classical charts for 94 weeks, sold more than a million copies, and won three Grammy Awards (Best Classical Album, Best Engineered Recording, and Best Performance by Instrumental Soloist). Other albums featuring music by Bach include The Well-Tempered Synthesizer (1969), Switched on Bach Volume 2 (1974), and Brandenburg Concertos 3–5 (1976). "Carlos, Wendy (Walter)," in The Guinness Encyclopedia of Popular Music, 4:416.

⁴² The Guinness Encyclopedia of Popular Music, 4:2522. The song is a pop vocal arrangement of the Minuet in G from the Anna Magdalena Bach Book.

⁴³ Based loosely on the Air from the Orchestral Suite in D major ("Air on the G String"), the single sold more than ten million copies worldwide. Phil Hardy and Dave Laing, *Faber Companion to 20th-Century Popular Music* (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1990), 647. The song "Repent Walpurgis," on the same eponymous original album featured Bach's C-major Prelude from the first book of the *Well-Tempered Clavier*.

⁴⁴ "A Fifth of Beethoven" (1976) and "Night on Disco Mountain" were featured on the (mostly) Bee Gee's album *Saturday Night Fever* (1977), RSO 4001 [2], which, as of 1985, was the best-selling soundtrack of all time (25 million copies), remaining on the charts for 120 weeks, 24 of them at number 1. *Joel Whitburn's Top Pop Albums 1955–1985* (Menomonee Falls, WI: Record Research Inc., 1985), p. 33.

⁴⁵ Robert Walser, "Eruptions: Heavy Metal Appropriations of Classical Virtuosity," *Popular Music*, 11 (1992): 263–307.

⁴⁶ Kurt Loder, "A Passage in Time," Esquire, March 1992, p. 55.

⁴⁷ Harry Haskell, *The Early Music Revival: A History* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1988), 13–25.

⁴⁸ Richard Dyer, "Comet's BSO Debut: Grace Under Pressure," *The Boston Globe*, 16 November 1990, p. 77.

⁴⁹ John Henken, "A Solid Program by Da Capo Players," *The Los Angeles Times*, 2 December 1992, p. F3.

⁵⁰ Henken, "Basso Bongo Duo Offers an Engaging Concert at Museum," *The Los Angeles Times*, 24 March 1993, p. F4.

⁵¹ William Littler, *The Toronto Star*, 23 February 1991, p. H4.

⁵² Paul Griffiths, "Composers Ensemble Asbury," *The Times* (London), 14 January 1992.

⁵³ Morgan, "Rethinking Musical Culture," pp. 54–55; Haskell, "The Early Music Revival," 174.

⁵⁴ Haskell, "The Early Music Revival," 174. The performer quoted is Paul Hillier, founder of the Hilliard Ensemble. Similarly, clarinettist Richart Stoltzman's recording *New York Coun*-

terpoint (RCA 5944-2-RC) includes Perotin's *Viderunt* along with works by Steve Reich and others. My thanks to Michael Long for the latter reference.

⁵⁵ Kerman, Contemplating Music, 185.

⁵⁶ Kerman notes that "musicologists have been known to press such invitations quite hard, lobbying, consulting, and masterminding early-music concerts when they are given a chance" (*Contemplating Music*, p. 185), though he minimizes their direct role in historical performance itself. But the situation has changed dramatically in the barely eight years since Kerman's book was published. Among a number of musicologists currently involved in directing medieval and renaissance vocal ensembles I am thinking of Stevie Wishart of *Sinfonye*, Christopher Page of *Gothic Voices*, Alexander Blachly of *Pomerium Musices*, Peter Urquhart of *Capella Alamire*, Mary Ann Ballard of the *Baltimore Consort*, and Warwick Edwards of the *Scottish Early Music Consort*, all of whom have released a series of compact discs on major international labels. Others, like David Fallows, Rob Wegman, and Barbara Haggh have collaborated with, among others, the *Ensemble Gilles Binchois*, *The Orlando Consort*, and the *Schola Hungarica*. Similarly, American ensembles like *The Waverly Consort* have a resident musicologist and regularly call upon other musicologists as well to write program notes and deliver public lectures in connection with their concerts.

⁵⁷ One should not underestimate the extent to which the caliber of performances can influence the appreciation of early music. For example, Richard Taruskin has pointed out the likelihood that Rimsky-Korsakov's strongly negative reaction to the music of J. S. Bach might have had much to do with the way it was performed in the early twentieth century. See "The Pastness of the Present," in *Authenticity and Early Music*, ed. Nicholas Kenyon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 196–97.

⁵⁸ One reviewer claimed that listeners hearing Anonymous 4's recording (cited earlier) will find "no more beautiful music on this earth." John von Rhein, *The Chicago Tribune*, 14 March 1993, p. C26.

⁵⁹ Bruno Nettl, noting that "clothes make the musician," describes the differing concert attire sported by performing groups which invariably reflect the "hierarchical structure of musical life." See "Mozart and the Ethnomusicological Study of Western Culture: An Essay in Four Movements," in *Disciplining Music*, 150–51.

⁶⁰ John von Rhein, "Newberry Is Closing Out Its 10th Season in Fine Style," *Chicago Tribune*, 10 April 1993, p. C5.

⁶¹ John Henken, "Medieval Pleasures," p. F6.

⁶² McClellan, "Consort's 'Rocque' of Ages," p. C10.

⁶³ Morgan, "Rethinking Musical Culture," pp. 59-62.

⁶⁴ I am using the term coined by Kerman, Contemplating Music, 181.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 180.

⁶⁶ Phil G. Goulding, Classical Music: The 50 Greatest Composers and Their 1000 Greatest Works (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1992); Joan Kennedy, The Joy of Classical Music: A Guide for You and Your Family (New York: N.A. Talese/Doubleday, 1992); David W. Barber, Bach, Beethoven, and the Boys: Music History as It Ought to Be Taught (Toronto: Sound and Vision, 1986).

⁶⁷ Lockwood, "President's Message," 3.

⁶⁸ The dust jacket publicity for Goulding's book identifies his official capacities and states that his "avid love of classical music led him to write this book."

⁶⁹ My thanks to Michael Long, Claire Fontijn, and Edmund Goehring for stimulating conversations during the writing of this essay.

Cinderella; or Music and the Human Sciences. Unfootnoted Musings from the Margins

By Leon Botstein

It has become fashionable among scholars to wax autobiographical with the reader, presumably to shed any remnant of the illusion (suggested implicitly by the conventional apparatus of a scholarly text and footnotes) that one might be speaking with an objective voice, or with an argument whose merits can be considered and even accepted without reference to personal and therefore circumstantial prejudice. Today's penchant for presumed full disclosure of one's subjective standpoint, however, is more likely either a species of authorial vanity masquerading as methodological scrupulousness or evidence of a greater interest in oneself than the subject one is writing about. In this case, the reader who wishes to distill the prejudices of the author and speculate on their origins must begin with the author's notion that one can talk effectively about the character and value of arguments by using procedures of reading and research that hold up under scrutiny and require no subjective apologetics.

We are witnesses to a distortion of the fin-de-siècle's singular contribution to the methodology of the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*)—a common term in German scholarship that encompasses what in the United States is called the humanities and the social sciences. Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber, for example, each illuminated in his own way how the perspective of the investigator in the *Geisteswissenschaften* functions in a crucial manner. In the *Methodenstreit* from the early twentieth century involving such distinguished figures as Wilhelm Windelband and Ernst Troeltsch, the task was to define the logic of human sciences, much as John Stuart Mill had sought to do, without sacrificing all claims to truthtelling contained within the acts of scholarship and argument.

For these thinkers it seemed evident that the human sciences were in some decisive sense subjective in a way that the natural sciences were not. The framing of the problem, the choice of evidence, and the mode of argument—the fundamental tasks facing the scholar in the human sciences—were influenced by the person doing the work in a manner far more profound and potentially arbitrary than was the case in the natural sciences. Yet it appeared possible to argue for criteria of validity in explanation and description that could lend scholarship in the human sciences an authority then considered characteristic of, if not self-evident in, scientific research. Indeed, the generation of Dilthey and Weber still clung to the notion that evidence and logic in the human sciences could be developed and applied, rescuing a useful cross-cultural understanding grounded in a universal sense of objectivity. The delineation of a "value-free" dimension within scholarship, even with respect to the choice of subject, was acknowledged, no matter how complex the achievement of that appropriate scholarly self-discipline might be. One could still speak reasonably, therefore, about whether something was true, plain false, or merely plausible, particularly in terms of the writing of history. Shared ideas regarding the mode of generalization, the nature of causal or descriptive adequacy, and the grounds for reliability in explanation all might be articulated.

This confidence in the possibility of widely accepted methods and language in scholarship has eroded considerably since 1945. Although the utilization of novel methods of analysis (almost exclusively drawn from post-war French thinkers) in literature and in the study of society has been significant among scholars in the United States since 1945, the new methods have maintained their allure and drawn considerable impetus in part from a profound methodological suspicion and skepticism inherent in the approaches themselves.

It should come as no surprise that in the relatively young disciplines of musicology and music history (historically speaking the products of German scholarly traditions from the mid- and late nineteenth century) this skepticism and suspicion have taken a harsh toll. Perhaps in part owing to its relative youth, the study of music has not contributed in an autonomous fashion to the shared methods of the human sciences. Unlike art history, in which the interpretation of visual images, forms, and techniques (e.g. iconography) lends itself easily to verbal translation and therefore generalized use, the integration of methods specific to music, even so-called style analysis, into the methods of history and sociology, for example, has proved singularly elusive. When issues beyond the artificial confines of the musical text come into play, scholars of music have resorted to borrowing methods from others. Given the current methodological crisis, stylized virtuosity, fashion, and guirkiness-perhaps even plain entertainment value-have become marks of recent scholarly success in music. It is as if scholarship has become its own kind of performance art, an act of improvisation on a subject whose definition as recognizable and whose transformation into the unrecognizable are marks of genius otherwise the province of great entertainers.

The reigning assumption behind today's scholarly consensus argues that the construct of perspective—how the scholar defines his or her place in his or her own time—creates the subject and legitimates the resultant analysis. The arrogance hidden in this contemporary procedure is the claim that the investigator-scholar can know his or her own subjectivity in any useful way. The typical categories of subjectivity, including gender, class, nationality, and race, become all too easily employed (as opposed to being used in a seriously illuminating manner) as explanatory and causal rubrics. They are used in a reductive manner, as simplistic kinds of essentialist signs that manage only to trivialize otherwise potent concepts. To make matters worse, a brittle and harshly moralistic politics lurks on all sides of today's scholarly community in the human sciences. Scholarly decisions and activities, stripped of the veneer of professionalism or objectivity, are translated almost mechanically into fixed and reductive ideological positions within contemporary politics. In such an environment it is difficult to talk well, critically, and searchingly; inquiry, curiosity, and love of subject all seem at risk.

The Delphic admonition to "know thyself" is a daunting, elusive, charge. It sees the conduct of everyday life, including, of course, scholarship, as a dynamic part of one's coming to terms with oneself. "Unpacking" one's own views and prejudices (to use a wicked but fashionable phrase perhaps more applicable to the post office than to research) is the hardest of all enterprises. Yet substituting "from an x perspective" and utilizing reductive assessments of subjectivity with respect to context or method do not fulfill the demand for serious self-examination. Indeed, self-declaration or the overt assertion of allegiance to a particular point of view or methodological procedure may camouflage and mislead more than reveal and illuminate.

The irony is that the skeptic—the critic of inherited procedures—rarely applies the same degree of harsh analysis to the grounds behind the skeptical attack itself. How does the skeptic know he or she is right? Either there is a new hidden or overtly "objective" yardstick in use (that is, the skeptic is telling us something we ought to know that would end the skepticism by introducing a surrogate ideology), or the skeptical critique carries no serious weight and is as much an expression of mere taste as the object of the critique.

It may be that the old-fashioned criterion of scholarly distance and the illusion of critical neutrality, linked to a notion of getting things historical right in a way that transcends opinion, were useful conceits. If nothing else, they might remain helpful routes to coming to terms with the subjective. Far less attractive is an embrace of what some literary scholars have apparently now termed "standpoint epistemology." It is preferable to resist facile theories that not only attempt to justify the equivalence of anything that is said but also eliminate the need to characterize and understand the construct of one's own standpoint. If one concedes that a standpoint is a useful category, is it functionally static and describable in some ideal or typical manner? To assert that all scholarship is ultimately ideological is to assert nothing at all, for it begs the question of what constitutes ideology and its definition, its dynamics, and its functions.

* * *

The above prologue (or perhaps peroration), with its decidedly oldfashioned tone, is a plea for music historians and musicology to seize the opportunity inherent in today's fiery methodological turmoil as a means to resist imitating some of the practices of its sibling disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. The rush away from old habits indeed may be justified, but the embrace of new fashions from other disciplines may not be, and at the very least requires scrutiny. Today's methodological disarray of doubt should signal to students of music that our colleagues possess few answers. Imitation no longer will work. In fact, the history of the discipline of music in the university could turn out to follow the story of Cinderella. Having served in the shadow of our siblings, and been filled with envy and admiration for them, we discover that our time has come: the shoe (so to speak) of the times may fit only our particular subject. For the first time the study of music might lead the way in the human sciences. The other disciplines might learn from us, defer to us, and imitate us, for a change.

Though the study of music now has a chance to contribute to the way culture and society might be understood and studied, it is clear that we are still courting the danger to which the first generations of musicologists fell prey a century ago: the imitative appropriation of methodological conceits from other disciplines. For all their virtues, Guido Adler and Hermann Kretzschmar, for example, were not methodologically innovative. And, ironically, Theodor W. Adorno's writing on music, despite its impressive jargon, ranks among the least self-critical and methodologically powerful aspects of his work. The embrace of Adorno here and in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s was a symptom of the poverty of a differentiated and subtle sociology of knowledge with respect to music and its role in culture. Thus, despite the insights about music that have come from anthropology, history, and literary studies, that impoverishment remains unalleviated.

In more recent decades, musicology has continued to yield the lead to its sister disciplines in the adoption of the latest intellectual fashions. Musicologists are now acting the way scholars in literary studies, history, and anthropology acted two decades ago, and what looks new to us is already under siege elsewhere. Those who write about music as historians, instead of continuing to defer methodologically to the older disciplines for an adequate theory, might find greater reward in fashioning not only their own theory, but a general theory from within musical culture itself. The time has come to make a jump in front of the other disciplines, whose modes of operating, despite their greater degree of historical and institutional advancement, are in shambles. As the Viennese satirist

Friedrich Kürnberger put it more than a century ago, in order to become literate one must first learn to read music.

One way that musicology might achieve this new status is through embracing one of Max Weber's most compelling ideas: that any agenda or scholarship laying claim to significance must be tied to and therefore derived from some profound commitment to a contemporary predicament. The affective intensity of scholarly pursuits that drives curiosity must be strong and rooted in the present. It comes as no surprise, then, that the contemporary interest in the status of women and the significance of gender has opened many of the most powerful new avenues of inquiry. Antiquarianism, no matter how brilliant, is rarely just fanatical professionalism rooted in a biographically explicable fastidiousness. It, too, is a resolution of an individual's engagement with his or her own time.

Some of the most serious of these predicaments facing culture and society today are located within the realm of music. In the musical world in European and American contexts they pertain to the divergent evolutions of popular and concert music and the role music plays in new media and the formation of norms, particularly within modes of sound reproduction and within visual formats such as film and video. The relationships among sound, sight, and speech—and therefore the significances attached to them-may be changing dramatically. Furthermore, within and without the university, the canonic center with which traditional musical studies have been occupied is under siege. The distinctions between musicology and ethnomusicology are eroding as the aesthetic and socio-cultural priority of one kind of music against another is challenged. It is likely that in both practical training and theoretical or historical analysis, the category of music in the university and among so-called consumers (those who consciously partake of musical culture at a given time and place) will be far more catholic, encompassing a range of times, places, and categories well outside the ones reflected in the current distribution of resources within the university. Even in comparison to the study of literature or art, the shock of change in the content of what is studied under the heading of music within the university is going to be striking.

We should neither lament these circumstances—themselves the result of a political evolution in Europe and the Americas—nor exploit them. Rather, we might profit by using the intellectual opportunity offered by the cultural politics of the moment. This opportunity has two critical components. First, we could now consider music as a generic category of existence—a form of life, as Wittgenstein suggested, much like the way we might view language or fundamental economic or social habits and activities. This opens up the possibility that music might be treated as a species of fundamental social action. It is not a subsidiary anthropological ritual. Music is instead more akin to a poorly understood nexus of communication (perhaps reaching beyond the sphere of language) in the sense suggested by the work of Jürgen Habermas. Following the footsteps of Weber, Adorno, and Karl Mannheim, Habermas (along with others in his generation in Germany and France) has sought to carve out the process of transaction and exchange through language among human beings as a category of social action. Habermas's ambition was to make it susceptible to structural and historical analysis as well as to a normative critique with regard to ethics and politics.

The second compelling circumstance that ought to drive the study of music is the continuing decline in traditional musical literacy and culture. We participate, through scholarship, in the effort to preserve, if not rescue, the significance of the canon as it is now understood, as well as the repertoire to which the discipline of music has been until recently committed. However much one wishes to embrace new, esoteric developments, the academic study of music cannot remain oblivious to the decline in audiences and the erosion of appreciation for the canon and tradition.

One way to carve out a stable place for Western concert music in a successful manner within the university and in the outside world of entertainment (whether in truly popular ways or more museumlike formats) may be to reconsider how we understand music-making and its significance from the Middle Ages to the present. If we interpret and study music in ways that effectively recast the general historical and cultural analysis of the past, the interest in the performance of music from the past might increase. In order to attract audiences without substantial musical literacy, a so-called extramusical dimension has begun to play a larger role, as, for example, in the program notes to concerts, or in concert formats that decorate musical performances by asserting linkages to history and art. But here again, one is confronted with mere parallelism and surface comparisons. Music and its function and culture are still not considered indispensable primary sources of historical generalizations of interest to the wider public.

Indeed, even the most *au courant* general analyses and specific interpretations of Western culture and society have been distilled with music considered as, at best, a peripheral or illustrative phenomenon. Perhaps if we start with music, a range of new insights beyond the realm of music might emerge. The call for "interdisciplinary study" in the case of music, therefore, should not be considered another species of tendentiousness. Rather, it is a call to reject the implicit parochial separation and segmentation that set music apart, with its own interior history and significance, from life and therefore history in general.

Take, for example, the continuing interest in Schubert. Are we using

research into his private life, career, and development as a composer as starting points to reconsider the notions of Biedermeier Vienna, romanticism, or social change, or are we still trying to adapt analytical frameworks from other disciplines, thereby reducing the musical phenomena to illustrative roles? The question is not simply a matter of integrating the immense volume of research about social history, economic history, and literary and theatrical activity into the consideration of music. Rather, we might use music to recast the way these other facets are understood and thereby accomplish the creation of a different historical context in a way that ultimately can shed more light on both music and its historical and social framework.

In taking on this grander task, which is to use music to guide the wider cultural and historical analysis, much more than biography, textual analysis, and reception history would be required. Music history and musicology can be directed at the task of trying to extract from musical culture and activity in human society something that defines and reveals the human condition in a fundamental manner, as opposed to merely in a manner that adds to or fills out our grasp of the past and present. What we as scholars should seek is that which otherwise would be inaccessible without music.

This goal is not contingent on a simple philosophical notion that music, in some neo-Hanslick-like or neo-Schopenhauerian sense, is autonomous, deeper, and structurally distant (and therefore implicitly irrelevant) from other activities. Rather, it holds that within any given context, however defined, the complex dynamics around musical activity—including the way music is thought about and responded to—can yield insights that recast what we can learn from ordinary language, visual creations, religious rituals, and so on.

Consider a case in the history of philosophy. Increasingly, writers on music have sought to utilize Wittgenstein's insights about music as a way of understanding how music functions. This is happening much the way it occurred with Adorno's work. From the *Tractatus* on, Wittgenstein used music as example, analogy, and metaphor; he employed what he later termed the family resemblance between language and music as a way of probing the nature of language. Yet what Wittgenstein had in mind when he talked of music is hardly clear. Furthermore, how did he hear it? Why, for example, was he profoundly conservative and hostile to modernism? Why was Brahms for him the last of the greats? What function did music play (and in what manner) in anthropological terms, in the day-to-day course of his childhood and adult life? It is difficult to assemble a coherent, comprehensive picture of his view of music from the texts alone, for the bits and pieces of his explicit claims, including commentary on composers and on music, are strewn throughout his writings. What might be suggested is that getting to the heart of what Wittgenstein meant when he spoke about music constitutes a complex and comprehensive quasi-anthropological and socio-historical task with music at its center. Understanding how Wittgenstein thought about music could yield clues about the core of his thoughts otherwise unexplored by philosophers and historians, who have generally paid scant attention to the issue of music in Wittgenstein. Instead of using language as a metaphor for how music works, then, we could reverse the inquiry and study music as a route to clarifying the nature and function of language not only in Wittgenstein's thought but in history in general. Such a procedure might yield powerful results for socio-linguistics, social history, and psychology.

Likewise, apart from using the suggestive insights Adorno had about particular works and composers, unraveling his fierce rhetoric about music in relation to the musical culture and world he inhabited tells us unique things about him and his colleagues in the Frankfurt School during the 1920s and 1930s. This might lead to new perspectives on the way social dynamics were constructed by Adorno and his colleagues, which in turn might trigger a revisionist view of the way historians and critics deal with the traditions of critical theory. The task in these cases remains in the widest sense a historical one.

This approach, however, does not involve the transfer of insights about an extramusical "context" into the discourse of music; it cannot be an enterprise of the appropriation of cliches and generalizations. Rather, the development of a subtly textured, comprehensive analysis of musical culture and activity (including musical texts and the modes of their consumption, along with their acoustic realization)—within any given cultural and historical moment—helps to shape and define the meaning of context right at the outset. Using music as a primary source can test and perhaps profoundly revise our sense of the past. And if this is true, why relegate music, in relationship to the linguistic or the visual, to a peripheral status? Why explain mental habits in the past primarily through other modes of thought? Why not instead assume the centrality of music?

Such a path has not been taken because our sense of the past—whether within the European framework or elsewhere—invariably has been constructed without reference to music. Take, for example, the Central European fin de siècle. For all that has been written about the art, architecture, literature, philosophy, and politics of the time (except for some passing efforts to integrate benign and glib references to Gustav Mahler and Arnold Schoenberg that quote usually from the latter's prose writings), works of music and the musical world are cited and discussed with considerable ease, at best to confirm and complement a prior general picture and interpretation. The texts of music (without any subtle or complex analysis), musical life, or the character and function of hearing, performance, and other modes of reception (e.g. reading about music or reading music) are all described in terms borrowed from literary or visual analyses. Within the field of music, the works of music are still cast by theorists and scholars of musical texts generally within a framework, however modified, of an autonomous historical logic specific to music itself. It is as if the artisan-craftsmanship tradition (in terms of who musicians are and how they work) and the nineteenth-century ideology of music's independent formal essence still hold a sort of collaborative sway.

Equally unexplored is the character of daily music life, from the home, to the street, to the concert hall. Within the nineteenth century, for example, even a look at composers of secondary rank—not in a search of neglected aesthetic values but for historical insights—has not begun. Research on music education, musical institutions, music in the private and public arenas, and the interrelationship of the many forms and rituals of music-making to one another and to other aspects of culture and society, particularly within the fin de siècle, still has not taken hold.

The ultimate goal is to gain an understanding of musical culture that accounts for issues of place, gender, and class and that probes the dynamics of significance with respect to music, but which does not operate on the basis of a restrictive definition of music or its role in society and culture. This, in turn, necessitates the development of methods of analysis—whether of the acoustical environment, the use of time, or the ways music was encountered and talked about—that require skills uniquely held by the musicological and music-historical profession. No other branch of the human sciences, not even those that deal with experiences of the visual and the spatial, such as art, architecture, and design, has unique access to so vital and unexplored an area of human experience, whose decoding requires special skills apart from a command of ordinary language. If one accepts the idea that musical culture is not subordinate, then the study of music gains a significance accorded only the archaeological discovery that changes the understanding of lost civilizations.

The reason discussions of the fin de siècle are impoverished by the virtual absence of the contribution that music might make (even a Schenker-Wittgenstein comparison, an obvious, albeit limited, subject, has yet to be undertaken) is that by training and predilection most professionals outside of music cannot deal with music. Not only do they lack the skills to talk about a musical text, they are unable to ask and answer questions even about the significance of how music was understood through speech. To answer, for example, questions about reception and, in the cases of Wittgenstein, Freud, Schnitzler, the role of music, their connection to a musical culture and their apparent absence of engagement need to be

outlined and described. The crucial cultural exchange with music can illuminate a wide range of issues well beyond the confines of music. Freud's relationship to music—indeed, the minor place it seemed to occupy constitutes as powerful a choice as his overt interest in antiquity. The two, in fact, may be related. Within Freud's framework resistance, like silence, needs to be understood. Otto Weininger's suicide in 1903 in Beethoven's last residence in Vienna represents merely the surface of this unexcavated historical territory in the Viennese fin de siècle. But beginning this work requires the skills of musicologists and music historians.

A suggestive analogy to the task faced by musicology and music history can be made by reference to the history of science and technology. One might have thought that art history would provide the greatest resemblance. (It is indeed striking how little attention is paid to music in the training of art historians, and to art among musicologists.) Although scholars outside of science have looked to Thomas Kuhn and the dynamics of shifts in paradigms within science as a helpful model for the process of historical change (e.g. style shifts in music), the vital link lies elsewhere. The history of science has revealed dimensions of what, for lack of a better term, can be described as mental structures. The theory of explanation, patterns of observation, and the dissemination of ideas-the dialectical tension between theory and practice-in science, as in music, provide further useful hints as to how the history of music, like the history of science, can be placed at the center of the historical narrative. The consequences of science-in technology, for example, in the intersection between the various types of science and their institutionalization and economic and social activity-all have suggestive parallels in the world of music. For the history of science to make its contribution to our grasp of culture and society, scholars with the capacity to deal with the scientific, mathematical, and technical material are crucial. The same would be true for music.

Two more arenas offer hints as to what music historians and musicologists might accomplish. Both economic and social history and the history of theater (as another arena with shared issues of text and performance practice) possess issues and approaches that merit attention, not necessarily imitation. All this points to the need to train future scholars of music in new ways and to encourage them to ask the sorts of sweeping questions of historical interpretation, description, and analysis that music historians traditionally have ceded to their peers from other disciplines.

No matter how new much of today's work in musicology and music history seems, it appears still to concede a fundamental marginality to

musical phenomena. Music has yet to produce—from within itself, so to speak—the kind of contribution to our understanding of the past, in terms of culture and society, achieved by the great historians and interpreters of religion, science, art, and literature.

If this claim is correct, then the questions raised by scholars in music demand reconsideration. Even though the core of training should be the capacity to use the materials of music passively and practically, the context in which those skills are placed must change. For example, the vestiges of a snobbishness against performance must be set aside simply because the scholarly study of music per se is a study of performance in time and space. As is the case for all scholars in the human sciences, it is impossible not to carry forward our instincts about the nature of reading and how we read when we interpret texts, and it is also imperative to attempt critically to understand reading as a differentiated social-historical phenomenon (its link to speech, writing, religious ritual, daily discourse, use of memory, and so forth). For these reasons, a scholar of music must also have the contemporary experience of performance-contact with acoustic sound made by oneself and an audience, private or public-in order to be equipped to guard against the assumption of facile comparisons or continuities. The use of performance experience is indirect but essential.

Beyond these active musical skills, the scholar of music would benefit from more thorough training in the general research methods of history. Training in the task of interpretation in non-musical issues and materials within each particular segment of time is needed if music is to be used as a fundamental constituent of the historical narrative. The musical scholar, therefore, requires a much more extensive education in art history, in social, cultural, and economic history, in anthropology, and in the philosophical critique of methods than heretofore considered.

The definition of future methods of analysis, including the setting of the research agenda, cannot be undertaken from within the current traditions of music history or musicology. If one laments the fact that one is asking for more and not less, then so be it. Otherwise, the study of music will remain of interest primarily to those who accept and embrace a philosophical prejudice about music and therefore a familiar social and historical segmentation of the musical from the extramusical. Music will remain merely illustrative of historical claims, still rooted in a secondary and subsidiary place. This would be a shame, since the opportunity—in part as a result of the methodological travails and exhaustion in other fields of the human sciences—presents itself for us to use the study of music as a primary vehicle for the reinterpretation of culture and society.