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articles

Performance and Social Meaning in the Lied: Schubert's *Erster Verlust**

By Lawrence Kramer

Conventional wisdom has it that the German Lied, which Schubert brought to maturity as a form, expresses in music the affective meaning of its text. Whereas earlier vocal music concentrates on expressing emotions in themselves, the Lied expresses the conjunction of emotions with moods and sentiments: that is, with general states of feeling in which particular emotions occur, and with thoughts prompted by moods or emotions. Most of the literature on the Lied grounds this expressive relationship in the character of the music as fixed by the score. I use the term "fixed" advisedly. The assumption is that what is expressive about the Lied, as opposed to what may be expressive about its performances, coincides with the elements of composition—melody, harmony, and rhythm—that may not be varied. Carl Dahlhaus even suggests that in order to give the Lied "pretensions to the status of a work of art," Schubert had to surmount a performance-centered aesthetic, the aesthetic of strophic song, in which the singer rather than the composer produces the expressive differences between strophes.[1] In what follows, I would like to question this assumption of unqualified compositional priority. The musical elements that vary with performance, both those the score indicates and those it does not, may not lie outside the expressivity of the Lied after all. On the contrary: they may be decisive in both shaping that expressivity and placing it in historical perspective. Given the still potent precept that emotion in music can be named but not defined or grounded, the availability of historical perspective is especially important.

This position on performance is meant to be strong but not radical. There is no question here of devaluing the compositional fixities of the

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* This paper was originally presented at the Aston Magna Academy at Rutgers University in June 1993. The presentation was accompanied by multiple performances of *Erster Verlust* (by Thomas Gregg, tenor, Maureen Balke, soprano, and Michael Zenge, piano) which realized the interpretive possibilities that the paper envisions.

[1] Carl Dahlhaus, *Nineteenth-Century Music*, trans. J. Bradford Robinson (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 98–99. Dahlhaus suggests that Schubert collapsed "the initial sharp distinction between through-composed and strophic songs" by combining the two.

Lied, only one of enlarging and complicating their field of action. Nonetheless, pursuing the question will require us to problematize our understanding of both the Lied in particular and musical expressivity in general. What exactly do we mean when we say that a Lied expresses affective meaning? Where and when does this expression arise during a listener's encounter with the Lied? To what conceptual or social order does affective meaning belong? How does this conceptual or social provenance affect the expressive process? And is the concept of "expression" really adequate for what a Lied does when we are *not* simply concerned with emotion—or even when we are?

The short answers to these questions will encapsulate my argument. A Lied expresses affective meaning either by juxtaposing more or less congruent forms of textual and musical expression, by extrapolating from an analogy between textual imagery and musical procedure, or both. The expression arises when the music provokes the listener to acts of interpretation, something that may just as well occur after as during the sensuous experience of listening. It is in this connection that the question of performance arises. Affective meaning belongs to the sociocultural order that fashions historically specific types of subjectivity, that normalizes identities and defines common sense—but does so most often in ways that leave its activity misrecognized, if recognized at all. The relationship between the music and this sociocultural order constitutes the expressive process. Or it would do so if the process were expressive, which—strictly speaking—it is not.

My topic in this article is the role of performance in the related processes by which the music of a Lied (1) provokes interpretation and (2) projects socioculturally conditioned patterns of subjectivity. For present purposes, the question of expression can be dealt with briskly. Although some Lieder are satisfied with a loose, conventional congruity between their texts and their music, many others concretize the text-music relationship by musically imitating a single textual detail or applying "tone-painting" to a few key words. The connection between the textual and musical parts seems to trigger a connection between the text and the music as wholes. In Romantic aesthetics, such a dynamic part-whole relationship is the nucleus of the symbol—the immediate, sensuous form in which intimations of transcendental value appear. In Goethe's words, the symbol is "a living and momentary revelation of the impenetrable"; in Coleridge's, "while it enunciates the whole, [the symbol] abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative."[2] Even the simplest Lied,

[2] Goethe's remark is from his *Maximen und Reflexionen*, Coleridge's from a notebook entry; both are quoted by Thomas McFarland, *Romanticism and the Forms of Ruin: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the Modalities of Fragmentation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 30–31.

therefore, can share in the "living unity" of the Romantic symbol, without itself being anything so portentous.

The text-music relationship, however, cannot be limited to a replication, an "expression," of poetic content by musical content, at the level of either the parts or the wholes. Because a Lied is always a reaction to a text, replication is only one among its available modes. A Lied can extend, narrow, (mis)appropriate, subvert, debase, exalt, eroticize, lyricize, dramatize, fragment, unify, analyze, sublimate, or sublate the text, and so on. With Lieder that set texts of serious literary consequence, these processes, as I have argued in detail elsewhere, typically serve as means of deconstruction, in the sense that the Lied seeks to differ systematically from the text that it also seeks in part to resemble. The Lied constitutes its "expressivity"—its vividness, emotional force, and meaningfulness—precisely by declining to be a simple (or even a complex) "expression."[3] Thus, just as even the simplest Lied can borrow the glamor of the Romantic symbol, the simplest Lied can also borrow the excitement of the symbol's undoing. Lieder are slight things, but they arise in the auratic haze of great ones. Perhaps that is why a moving performance of a Lied so often seems to turn a slight thing into a great one.

Performance, at any rate, is now to be the object of some philosophizing. To begin by dusting off an old philosophical distinction, the fixed features of the musical artwork occupy the plane of substance, the variable features that of accident. It is customary to analyze and evaluate a composition on the basis of its fixed features alone; the variable features are allowed to determine only whether an individual performance is boring, mediocre, exciting, transfiguring, revelatory, parodistic, eccentric, "authentic," and so on.

The authority of notated fixities is an institutional fact about Western art music. The historical trend since the Enlightenment has been for this authority to rise steadily, in tandem with the cult of original genius and the concomitant deployment of aesthetic appreciation as both a model

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[3] Lawrence Kramer, *Music and Poetry: The Nineteenth Century and After* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 125–70. Put more strongly: the song seeks to differ from the text by continually deferring a full resemblance to it. See also Kofi Agawu, "Theory and Practice in the Analysis of the Nineteenth-Century Lied," *Music Analysis* 11 (1992): 3–36. Although their interests and arguments diverge in several respects, both studies conceptualize the association of text and music as a dynamic process rather than a static relationship: "[T]he appropriation of the text by the music is not a *fait accompli* that is given to the listener with the sound of the first note. It must be enacted, must be evolved, during the course of the music itself" (Kramer, *Music and Poetry*, 127). "[What] has failed to be taken seriously by analysts [is] the elucidation of the specific technical means by which [the] transformation [of text into music] comes about" (Agawu, "Theory and Practice," 30).

and vehicle of social accommodation. Improvisation and ornamentation disappear; fidelity to the score becomes the performer's motto, justifying both adherence to traditional procedures and departures from them; notation itself grows ever more complex, exact, and exacting. Justifiably or not, Western art music since the mid-nineteenth century has trained people to act as if musical compositions had an ideal existence.[4] The classical masterwork has been implicitly defined as a score imparting transcendental value to any performance in which the variable elements adequately articulate the fixed ones. Hence the custom, among both musicians and reviewers, of highlighting the role of performance precisely where classical scores are thought to be aesthetically weak. Masterworks need executants; problem pieces need advocates.

This whole account, however, is skewed by a latent bias towards instrumental music, or at least toward a certain conception of instrumental music as autonomous art. Vocal music does not fit the mold so well. The practices of transposing for different voices and providing alternatives for extreme high or low notes make the distinction between fixed and variable elements hard to maintain. (Unlike arrangements of instrumental works, transposed songs are not considered second-best approximations.) The personal character of individual voices is not easy to disentangle from the expressivity built into the music they sing. And, most importantly, vocal music is always implicitly dramatic. Whether in the Lied or opera, the singer's musical interpretation always subtends a dramatic interpretation that can vary widely from performance to performance. Both the voice and the accompaniment contribute to this process, as the accompaniment shapes itself to the requirements of the voice's interpretive dramaturgy. This kind of variability is a constitutive feature of all song—substantial, not accidental—and as such it puts into question the very possibility of an authoritative, ideal form independent of performance.

An effective way to theorize the interpretive dramaturgy of song is to trace its typical evolution. The results will naturally vary with different types of song, as defined by such factors as the presence or absence of a fixed, fully-composed accompaniment, the degree of independent interest imputed to the text, and the degree of authority granted to the poet's and

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[4] Thus Carl Dahlhaus writes that the musical artwork is intended to be "an ideal object with an immutable and unshifting 'real' meaning." The aim of notation is to specify this object, the aim of performance to realize it. See Carl Dahlhaus, *Foundations of Music History*, trans. J. Bradford Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 150, 155. Various avant-garde composers in the second half of the twentieth century have, of course, diverged from the ideal of notated fixity, but its hold on the musical mainstream is if anything stronger than ever.

composer's intentions. The following model assumes the invariable presence of the accompaniment, moderate to high textual interest, and the expectation of dialogue or interplay between the poet's, composer's, and performer's intentions, which may nonetheless differ substantially. In other words, the model outlines the interpretive dramaturgy of the modern art song, of which the Lied is a prime example.[5]

A poetic text taken alone is open to a wide range of possible interpretations, the limits of which can never be drawn with certainty. To set the text to music is to narrow the range; the compositional scheme enhances some possibilities and excludes others. Different settings of the same text make different choices in this regard. To perform the composed setting is to narrow the range still further. By positioning itself in relation to the text, to the compositional scheme, and to other possible performances, a specific performance selects some possibilities—sometimes only one—and declines others. We might say that the compositional scheme engages dynamically with the text to set up a first phase of interpretive dramatugy, and that the performance engages dynamically with the compositional design to set up a second phase. The two phases of dramaturgy, moreover, may be in full agreement, partial agreement, or outright disagreement. What we call "the song" is usually a preferred imaginary trajectory running from text to performance.[6]

It follows that in performing a modern art song we are privileging one such trajectory. But it is important not to have an unrealistic idea about what that privileging accomplishes. Neither the first nor the second phase of interpretive dramaturgy is likely to produce a coincidence between

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[5] Other interpretive dramaturgies, of course, raise compelling questions that require separate study. How, for example, is musical meaning affected by utilizing (not "setting") texts of low interest or independence, especially (but not exclusively) in popular song? What are the interpretive dynamics of arrangement, both in popular and in art music (think of Schubert's *Erlkönig* in a nineteenth-century arrangement for soloists and orchestra)? What happens when a well-known song is transcribed (varied, ornamented, improvised on) instrumentally?

[6] For a different model of song interpretation based on the availability of a range of meanings, see David Lewin, "*Auf dem Flusse:* Image and Background in a Schubert Song," in Walter Frisch, ed., *Schubert: Critical and Analytical Studies* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 126–52. Lewin offers the useful suggestion that the (fixed, notated) music of a song stands to its text as an actor does to a script; the music comments on the text by selecting one among a variety of "plausible" realizations. The implied principles of singularity and plausibility, however, may both be questioned. An actor's realization of a script need not be univocal (even when it tries to be); the category of plausibility can be (and often is, though not by Lewin) used to rule out challenging interpretations. It is important to recognize that a text may specify only a small part, and authorize even a smaller part, of the range of meanings available for it. Meaning is not the basis of interpretation but its outcome.

hearing the song and intuiting a full, richly contextualized meaning. For most of us, I imagine, such coincidences are rarities. The song as we are likely to hear it, caught up in a keen but necessarily wavering attention, is likely to produce no more than a general impression, intelligible but indefinite. The character of the song's interpretive dramatugy can be grasped only by reflection. In other words, the interpretive dramaturgy must itself be interpreted.

The needed reflection requires knowledge of the text; it can begin before, during, or after we listen; and it may combine numerous acts of anticipation, listening, and recollection into a complex sum that no single performance can realize. Our engagement with a song, therefore, is not wholly determined by our listening to it and can never become fully present in any single act of listening to it. In some cases listening may even inhibit our grasp of the song. Both songs and performances, moreover, differ widely in the degree to which they acknowledge or dissemble the nonpresence in their midst. These claims can be broadened to cover the arts in general, but they are particularly telling when applied to music, the immediacy of which has traditionally been supposed to have special epiphanic powers. A poetics of performance is possible only when performance itself is not its only venue.

With this recognition in mind, we can return to the issue of interpretive dramaturgy. It will prove useful to invoke another part-whole distinction at this point. Both composition and performance can offer interpretive provocations on two levels, one general, the other particular. General provocations arise from among the continuously present or consistently recurring features of a composition or performance. Particular provocations arise from unique or infrequently recurring musical events. Both the features and the events vary too widely to be tabulated. Interpretive provocations in song evolve from concrete combinations of music and text; they can be offered by whatever accosts or perplexes the ear, whether at the instruction of the score or the decision of the performer.

The two levels of interpretive provocation may or may not be in agreement everywhere—or anywhere—in a given song or performance, and they may or may not be strictly separate. To the extent that they are separable, however, they advance separate interests even where they agree. The general level usually fulfils the traditional mandate of the Lied to express affective meanings. The results are customarily treated as universals, on the attractive but question-begging principle that feelings have no history. Critical reflection, however, may unsettle that principle by finding, or simply noticing, the historical conditions in which certain kinds of feeling and expression become possible or important. Provocations by particulars offer the opportunity to project these conditions of feeling

concretely, opening the song up to historicizing interpretations alert to the sociocultural construction of subjectivity. Hermeneutically marked particulars are the sites at which the contingencies of history sound through the universalizing claims of sensibility. The result is not to abolish the impression of affective universals, on which the Lied, like most art-music genres, depends, but to shift focus from the feelings signified to the process of signification.

* * *

For a case study of interpretive dramaturgy in the Lied, I turn to one of Schubert's Goethe Lieder, *Erster Verlust* (First Loss), D. 226, composed in 1815. The choice of this one song over so many others is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. The issues the song raises, however, go to the heart of Schubert's social milieu in unexpected ways, and the song itself, being simple as well as artful, focuses those issues with welcome clarity. In another respect, too, this song can claim an exemplary standing. Its text is one of Goethe's most frequently set poems, attracting Zelter, Mendelssohn, Wolf, and even Verdi as well as Schubert among the many who put it to music.[7]

Schubert's tempo indication for *Erster Verlust* fixes an unequivocal mood: "Sehr langsam; wehmütig" (very slowly; sorrowful). How does this mood position the song in relation to the text? In order to answer, we need to work with a reading of the text that the text itself can be said to sanction—with the proviso that this reading represents not the truth of the text, but a heuristic fiction by which we can imagine an interpretive dramaturgy for the song.

In this case, the title has implications that can be pondered even before the text is read. Despite its unpretentiousness, the phrase "first loss" is equivocal. On the one hand, it denotes a moment of pathos; on the other, it connotes a certain distance from that pathos. Being first, the loss is special; but being, inevitably, only the first of many, it is not as special as it seems. To speak of first loss presupposes a worldly-wise later perspective grounded in common experience. Someone who suffers first loss embarks on a path—perhaps a course of development or maturation, perhaps just a course of destiny—that many others have also learned to follow. First loss is both an end and a beginning.

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[7] Willi Schuh lists thirty-four settings in his *Goethe-Vertonungen: Ein Verzeichnis* (Zurich: Artemis Verlag, 1952).

This duality seems to soften the pangs of loss a little, or so the language of Goethe's poem suggests:

Ach, wer bringt die schönen Tage,
Jene Tage der ersten Liebe,
Ach, wer bringt nur eine Stunde
Jener holden Zeit zurück! (1–4)
[Ah, who can bring back the beautiful days, those days of first love,
ah, who can bring back only an hour of that sweet time?]

The terms designating what is lost are colloquial, almost commonplace: the beautiful days, that sweet time, those days of first love. There is no extravagance of Romantic passion here; there is not even an image or metaphor to mark the speaker's love as unique and irreparable rather than generic. The only urgency comes, almost subliminally, from the rhythmic effect of verbal repetitions and parallels. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the speaker must actually work to sustain the keenness of his loss:

Einsam nähr ich meine Wunde,
Und mit stets erneuter Klage
traur' ich ums verlorne Glück. (5–7)
[Alone I nourish my wound, and with ever-renewed lament mourn
over lost happiness.]

To nourish the wound requires attentive care, a negative version of the care required for healing. In a usage resembling Goethe's, and cited together with it in the Grimms' *Deutsches Wörterbuch,* Schiller is explicit on this point, writing of those "who nourish the wound they ought to heal."[8]

Both Schiller and Goethe play rhetorically against an older usage in which, in the context of a wound, *nähren* did mean to heal, and in Goethe's text the nourishing of the wound actually has a healing outcome. In taking the form of poetry, the ever-renewed lament that keeps the wound open acquires a new value; it yields aesthetic pleasure. Having described the process of lamentation, the speaker closes by acting it out:

Ach, wer bringt die Schönen Tage,
Jene holde Zeit zurück! (8–9)
[Ah, who can bring back the beautiful days, that sweet time?]

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[8] Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, s.v. "nähren," *Deutsches Wörterbuch,* vol. 7 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1889), col. 305. Schiller's original reads "(die) die Wunde nährten, die sie heilen sollten."

These lines, an abbreviated repetition of the opening statement, constitute both a renewal of lament within the poem and a formal means of achieving poetic closure. The pleasures of form thus mitigate the pains of content. The same mitigation also affects the poem as a whole, which is itself a member of the speaker's ever-renewed sequence of laments. (The repetition within the poem mirrors the repetition that is the poem.) But the language of lament, as mentioned earlier, is not anguished here; it is temperate, even abstract. Transformed into poetry, the renewal of lament objectifies and sublimates the loss that prompts it.

Schubert's *wehmütig* setting reverses this process. His song replaces Goethe's classical coupling of ethos and pathos with an unconditional Romantic pathos.[9] Whereas the text is at bottom a reflection on the healing power of art which takes itself as an illustration, the song is a demonstration that some wounds never heal. Compositionally, Schubert makes his point at the general level by combining the heavy-hearted tempo with a series of stabbing accents and dissonant inflections, with recurrent sob-figures in the vocal line, and with a texture marked by abrupt shifts in dynamics against a *pianissimo* baseline. (See example 1, which gives the song in full.) The dynamics also contribute to a pervasive sense of emotional strangulation. The loudest sustained level is *mezzo forte,* the only *forte* attacks being damped down promptly to *piano.* The emotions figured here are depressive; the stuff of what Coleridge, also lamenting something like first love, called dejection, they can find "no natural Outlet, no Relief / In word, or sigh, or tear."[10]

Among the song's compositional particulars, two are especially suggestive. The first is the vocal line for the words "traur' ich ums verlorne Glück" (I mourn over lost happiness): a descending phrase ending on a long low C at "Glück" (m. 16). The C marks the voice's registral low point, and it invests "Glück" with a special throaty darkness, partly because the phrase approaches this nadir by skip (f^1–c^1), and partly because elsewhere in the song the voice's lowpoint is considerably higher (usually $a\flat^1$, g^1 in m. 14 for "Klage"). The speaker's depressive self-alienation thus bears him to a lonely place apart. The harmony for this passage tells the same story: with "Glück" the voice goes to the dominant and prepares (in a pregnant

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[9] On Romantic pathos regarded as an inversion of Romantic irony, see my *Music and Poetry,* 160–61. The pleasure-tinged embrace of melancholy is characteristic of the culture of feeling in Biedermeier Vienna, a point emphasized by Jane K. Brown in her lectures on Romanticism at the 1993 Aston Magna Academy.

[10] "Letter to Sara Hutchinson," ll. 19–20. In its better-known version, published as "Dejection: An Ode," this poem edits out (represses?) the origins of dejection in lost or unachieved love.

Example 1. Schubert, *Erster Verlust* (op. 5, 4), D 226.



Example 1. (cont.)



pause) to renew its lament. The dominant belongs to a sectional half cadence; what follows is the reprise of the opening, with the voice, pointedly, still clinging to a plaintive C.

The second suggestive particular is the song's piano postlude, just one measure long. Overtly based on a transposition of the vocal phrase for "Zeit zurück" (mm. 9, 21), this postlude also loosely echoes the descent to "Glück" at pitch and answers its sectional half cadence with the final full cadence. The postlude reconfirms that lost happiness can and should have no remedy. *Erster Verlust* is in F Minor, but the vocal line ends with a would-be final cadence on the relative major, A♭, while asking who can bring that sweet time back ("jene holde Zeit zurück"). The major close carries Goethe's healing implication: perhaps the singer can regain a portion of lost sweetness in the very song of sadness. But the cadence is unsteady—the A♭ chord pointedly lacks its fifth—and the implication wistful. The postlude follows immediately with the real final cadence, correcting the key to F Minor and revoking the possibility of healing through art. As echoed in the postlude, the wistful phrase for "Zeit zurück" not only grows rueful, but also merges into the still more somber echo of the descent to "Glück."

The performers of *Erster Verlust* can either seek to convey Schubert's dejected resistance to consolation or try to edge the song back in a more

accepting Goethian direction. A "Schubertian" reading might take a morose basic tempo, almost too slow for comfort, and indulge in retards at the most important phrase endings. This would not only dramatize the speaker's almost autoerotic nourishing of his wound, but also yield accents on the key words "Liebe" (love), "Wunde" (wound), and, twice, "zurück" (back). A telling exception to this pattern of ritards could be made at "traur' ich ums verlorne Glück," where the vocal descent could be accelerated, only to be countered by a new ritard on the voice's low C at "Glück" and the associated dominant progression on the piano. This local provocation would confirm the general one with a climactic emphasis on what has been lost. The confirmation might be enhanced by giving "traur'" (mourn), which is positioned as an upbeat, a syncopated vocal accent. Meanwhile, the dynamics in this "Schubertian" performance would admit sharp *forte* attacks with prompt damping, but be careful to keep the *mezzo forte* passage, which includes the descent to "Glück," at its designated, deliberately unsatisfying level.

A "Goethian" performance of *Erster Verlust* would be far simpler. It would choose a dignified, not a morose, basic tempo and avoid tempo fluctuations. It would interpret the *forte* attacks with restraint but let the *mezzo forte* passage find some cathartic relief with a small dynamic wedge peaking at "traur'" and sinking swiftly to "Glück." Two measures of rolled right-hand chords, which lead up to "traur'," could be allowed some of the heaviness a "Schubertian" reading would have to deny them. Finally, where a "Schubertian" reading would emphasize the piano postlude with a big retard and a long final hold, a "Goethian" reading would treat the postlude as unceremoniously as possible, as a formal gesture of closure rather than as an interdiction of healing.[11]

* * *

But which of these performances to prefer? One way to decide is to ask what is at stake in them beyond unexamined matters of taste. And that question leads back to the text, or rather to the unstated cultural horizon against which the text must be read.

A first but not an only love implies a second. And contrary to another old song, love is not necessarily more wonderful the second time around. In mourning the departure of his first love, which belongs to the "sweet

[11] Schubert himself hesitated between these alternatves even after the first edition of *Erster Verlust* was in press. His original postlude lacked the melodic echo which became, in revision, its most important feature. See Franz Schubert, *Neue Ausgabe sämtliche Werke,* vol. 1a, *Lieder,* ed. Walther Dürr (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1970), xxii.

time" of youth, Goethe's lyric speaker defers the arrival of a second love belonging to the more exigent time of manhood—and implicitly to marriage. By his own account, Schubert did the same thing after failing to marry his own first love, Therese Grob, in 1815 or 1816.[12] The credibility of this story has been questioned in light of Schubert's possible homosexuality;[13] what seems unquestionable is the cultural authority of the (ready-made) first-love narrative that the story reproduces.

The idea that the joys of the first love are irrecoverable and that the second is necessarily a lesser thing has complex roots. By the early nineteenth century, the bourgeois husband and father had begun to outweigh his aristocratic counterpart as the value-defining model of Western masculinity. As Peter Gay has argued, however, bourgeois marriage was riven throughout the century by conflicts between love and practicality, passion and finance, personal autonomy and parental authority.[14] And although these conflicts, as Gay argues, may have found successful resolutions more often than legend records, the taint of compromise, not to mention corruption and hypocrisy, nonetheless stuck fast. There was a widespread feeling that, as Friedrich Schlegel put it as early as 1798, "A so-called happy marriage is to love as a correct poem is to an improvised song."[15] Just at the time when erotic love was being idealized as radically individualistic and free of worldly constraints, bourgeois marriage demanded the renunciation of that ideal. First love, real or imaginary, had to be set aside in order to consolidate one's masculine identity, even if the result was a possibly castrating wound.

Gay cites as typical the case of a Hamburg lawyer, Otto Beneke, who fell in love with Marietta Banks in 1841, found she loved him in return, and—as his diaries show in obsessive detail—did everything he could for the next four years to prevent the marriage both of them longed for. From the outset, Beneke perceived Marietta as usurping the place of an earlier love, and by 1844 the perception had worked its way into his dreams. He dreamt he married a bride who (he saw) was not Marietta but who looked like his dead sister. He dreamt Marietta came to him in his room; as he

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[12] See the statement by Anselm Hüttenbrenner in Otto Erich Deutsch, ed., *Schubert: Memoirs by his Friends,* trans. Rosamond Ley and John Nowell (London: A. & C. Black, 1958), 70.

[13] Maynard Solomon, "Franz Schubert and the Peacocks of Benevenuto Cellini," *Nineteenth Century Music* 12 (1989): 193–206.

[14] Peter Gay, *The Bourgeois Experience, Victoria to Freud: Volume II, The Tender Passion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 96–134.

[15] Friedrich Schlegel, *Philosophical Fragments,* trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), no. 268, p. 55; also cited by Gay, *Bourgeois Experience,* 58, in a different translation.

took her in his arms and kissed her he realized "it was another being in her form." Beneke himself interpreted this dream as an admonition or warning. He dreamt Marietta tore a white flower from his buttonhole and demanded he wear only colored flowers; he replaced the white flower with a dark red one, then awakened, saying, "It is the white flower which has grown so red in my heart's blood." He dreamt he became engaged to Marietta: "A vicious imp first insulted and later attacked him, leaving him with a painful wound. When Marietta seemed only too pleased to nurse him, a physician declared the wound beyond cure."[16] This last dream is particularly suggestive in the context of the others. The wound is Beneke's punishment for his engagement to someone he may have loved best, but not first: it is the white flower turned red, the guilt of betraying first love by accepting its loss, which no later love, however devoted, can remedy. The imp is harder to interpret without further evidence, but a vicious homunculus may suggest a hostile phallus, alienated from Beneke, on whom it nourishes, by reinflicting, the wound of first loss.

From Goethe's speaker to Beneke to those most famous of victims, Tristan and Amfortas, the fantasy of receiving such a wound finds psychosexual backing in revived traces of the young man's original "first love," his childhood love for his mother. The Oedipal background in Beneke's case is sufficiently indicated by his religious annual observance of three special occasions: Marietta's birthday, his wedding anniversary (for he married her in the end), and the day of his mother's death. More broadly, as Friedrich Kittler has shown, the German-speaking world in the early nineteenth century made the educative value of mother-son love a major pedagogical and cultural issue, while never leaving its mandatory loss in doubt.[17] And this is a love that is genuinely irrecoverable, because it follows the iron law of the Oedipus complex; it must be renounced in order for a boy to identify with his father and embark on the path to manhood. Bourgeois marriage in the nineteenth century demanded, among other things, a reenactment of the Oedipal sacrifice—what Freud calls the shock by which the boy's first love is "literally smashed to pieces"[18]—at the heart of the bourgeois family. This smashup supposedly allows the boy to feel he has escaped castration, but as Jacques Lacan in particular has emphasized, the

[16] Gay, *Bourgeois Experience,* 26–27, 29–30.

[17] Friedrich Kittler, *Discourse Networks: 1800/1900,* trans. Michael Metteer, with Chris Cullens (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 3–173.

[18] Sigmund Freud, "Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes" (1925), trans. James Strachey, in *Sexuality and the Psychology of Love,* ed. Philip Rieff (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 192.

escape is itself a form of castration.[19] Hence the imaginary wound, which Hans-Jürgen Syberberg, in his film version of *Parsifal* (1982), brilliantly made into an object separate from the body, carried around on a cushion.

Amid these affiliations, Schubert's setting of "Erster Verlust" takes on a whole new dimension. The speaker in Goethe's deceptively simple lyric is moved by an ambivalence he cannot acknowledge. Enmeshed in the equivocations of nurturing his wound, he simultaneously defers and prepares his surrender to the demands of fate or maturation. Insofar as he renews his laments, he refuses that surrender. But insofar as, in the very act of lamenting, he sublimates his loss through art, he has already moved on to resignation or maturity. His assimilation of the demands of desire to the instruments of culture turns his apparent resistance to Oedipal law into a refined form of compliance.

It is precisely this compliance that Schubert insists on refusing. The young man in his song will not buy masculine identity at the cost of renouncing his true desires; he would rather pay court to his wound.

The song makes this point compositionally by packing the seven measures devoted to the wound, which serve as a middle section, with musical signs of intense emotion, made all the more telling by their muffled expressivity. The voice passes through a chain of sobs at "nähr ich meine Wunde," the last of which the piano elongates at "Wunde" in a higher register; the voice enhances the abrupt dynamic change at "stets erneuter" (ever-renewed) with a florid melisma as the piano begins its passage of rolled right-hand chords; and the voice shapes each of its three phrases in this section as a dying fall while the piano sustains an agitated bass line slowly descending from the middle register until it sinks at last into the bass. The massing of these expressive signs suggests an effort, perhaps a failing one, to convey the full weight of the young man's sorrow. What they pointedly do not suggest is any effort at sublimation. If anything, a slowdown in harmonic rhythm during this section, culminating in a measure of diminished sevenths beginning with a sob on "Klage," suggests exactly the opposite. Here, as in the sobs on "nähr ich meine Wunde," the cultivation of the wound becomes as sensuous as it is painful. The young man could almost be recuperating his lost, ultimately maternal, love in the relationship between himself and his wound. In any case, his nourishing of the wound is reaffirmed when the piano postlude, in a "Schubertian" performance, exposes the aesthetic sublimation implied by the poem as a bogus ideal.

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[19] Jacques Lacan, "The Signification of the Phallus," in *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 281–91.

The oppositional character of *Erster Verlust* can also be concretized in a further particular, which coincides with the one point at which Schubert altered Goethe's text:

Goethe: Ach, wer bringt die schönen Tage,
Jene holde Zeit zurück?
[Ah, who can bring back the beautiful days, that sweet time?

Schubert: Ach, wer bringt die schönen Tage,
Wer jene holde Zeit zurück!
[Ah, who can bring back the beautiful days, who that sweet time!]

Schubert's interposition of an extra "wer" may seem slight enough, but its effect is considerable.[20] The original wording emphasizes the experience of former happiness and should probably be construed as asking the rhetorical question, "Who has the power to bring back lost time?" The new wording emphasizes personal agency, and can readily be construed as asking the nonrhetorical, if hopelessly wishful question, "What beloved can restore to me the happiness brought by my first!" In clinging to the *person* of the beloved, the song compounds its refusal to accept the psychosocial mandate of bourgeois masculinity. The young man cherishes not only his wound but also a fantasy of repetition, a return of the first love in the person of a second, that he knows, or says he knows, to be impossible.[21]

This fantasy should not be hard to intimate in performance. There are four occurrences of the word "wer" in the song. The first three belong to the original poem and are set off the beat to unaccented eighth notes. The fourth, unauthorized "wer" is set to a sensitive weak-beat quarter note—a note unaccented with respect to the downbeat that follows it, but accented in itself because it marks an uptick in dynamics. The singer in a

[20] There is an obvious formalist objection to placing undue interpretive weight on the extra "wer." The repetition, it might be said, is just a means of giving the voice an entry on the upbeat. The song, however, sounds just fine if the vocal upbeat is eliminated—and even if it didn't, there is no reason why a technical maneuver should not also be an interpretive crux. The problem with the objection is the network of exclusionary assumptions that underwrite the word *just*.

[21] The impossibility of return is suggestively embedded in the "ach" that begins both the poem and—without prelude—the song. As Ingrid Rieger-Botszeit observed at the 1993 Aston Magna Academy, the "ach" stands in the place of the unspeakable. Recognizing this, we might say that as the initiator of a retrospective speech-act, the "ach" casts the whole song or poem as a substitution, approximation, or failed repetition.

"Schubertian" reading of the song might progressively accentuate each of these apparently low-profile notes, building up to a decisive accent on the final, extra "wer," perhaps combined with a retard extending across the whole of m. 20. The accent would form an exact parallel to the earlier one recommended for "traur'" and by that means help focus the young man's mourning on a fantasmatic person rather than a remembered state of mind.

At this point one obvious performance element, so far ignored, may seem overdue for comment. By patriarchal convention, a speaker of unmarked gender in a poem signed by a man is presumed to be male. The presumption certainly makes sense for Goethe's "Erster Verlust," which, as I have tried to show, is deeply if tacitly bound up with the cultural construction of masculinity. But though Schubert's setting responds in kind, the song can be sung just as well by a woman as by a man. If a woman does do the singing, at least two new dramaturgical possibilities follow. We can accept the woman's voice as a surrogate for a man's, either by adopting an attitude of gender indifference or by identifying the timbre of the female voice with that of a youthful male on the model of an operatic trousers role. Either way, the "Schubertian" and "Goethian" readings envisioned here would retain the force ascribed to them, perhaps with a somewhat keener sense of life-crisis if the female voice is taken as a youth's. Alternatively, we can hear the song as the lament of a young woman, in which case the "Schubertian" and "Goethian" readings would reverse their original polarity. Where a young man's clinging to lost love may be resistant to gender norms, a young woman's can only be compliant; in the cultural milieu of Schubert and his contemporaries, women were understood to be childish and overemotional by nature, especially in matters of the heart. Or as Lord Byron put the principle in 1818, "Man's love is of man's life a thing apart, / 'Tis a Woman's whole existence."[22] A feminist appropriation of Schubert's *Erster Verlust,* therefore, might well reject the passionate "Schubertian" reading as tinged by a misogyny that the more self-possessed "Goethian" reading would resist.

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Despite ramifications like these, *Erster Verlust* is neither complex nor "important" music. Obviously a contribution to what Dahlhaus identifies as the *Biedermeier* culture of refined conviviality,[23] it invites amateur perfor-

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[22] *Don Juan* I.194, ll. 1–2, internal quotation marks omitted.

[23] Dahlhaus, *Nineteenth Century Music,* 168–78.

mance and lasts less than two minutes. Yet the interpretive dramaturgy of the song engages social issues that are complex indeed, and important both to Schubert the composer and Schubert the social being. Should the psychosocial contract behind the ascendant middle-class norm of masculine identity be accepted or rejected? A diary entry Schubert wrote about a year after *Erster Verlust* ponders the question in terms that have made it a crux in recent debates over his sexuality. "Take people as they are, not as they should be," reads one section. "It is a bad stage manager who gives his actors parts they are unable to play," reads another. And another, now notorious:

> Happy is he who finds a true friend. Happier still he who finds a true friend in his wife.
>
> To a free man matrimony is a terrifying thought in these days: he exchanges it either for melancholy or for crude sensuality.[24]

It is possible, even likely, that Schubert's assimilation of ideal marriage to the model of male friendship indicates that his own true desires, whether or not he has recognized them clearly at this point, are directed towards other men. It is certain, however, that he believes ideal marriage to be rare at best. That may be what makes the thought of matrimony terrifying to him. For he finds that although present-day marriage is rarely happy, there is nothing outside of marriage but loneliness and celibacy on the one hand and the emptiness of sex without friendship on the other.[25] One way of refusing to accommodate oneself to this system of unhappy alternatives would be to cling, on principle, to imaginary bliss, even if only through the wound made by its absence. First love is only one way to represent such bliss, but it is both a revealing and a compelling one. The step that Schubert takes in *Erster Verlust* eventually leads to *Winterreise.*

Schubert's songs, and his instrumental pieces, too, return often to the dilemmas of psychosocial compliance and resistance. When they do, the effect of performance is crucial. When the slow movements of the late A-

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[24] Otto Erich Deutsch, *Schubert: A Documentary Biography,* trans. Eric Blom (London: Dent, 1946, reprint, New York: Da Capo, 1977), 71. For the controversy over the diary entry, see Maynard Solomon, "Franz Schubert and the Peacocks of Cellini," *Nineteenth Century Music,* 194–97; Rita Steblin, "The Peacock's Tale: Schubert's Sexuality Reconsidered," *Nineteenth Century Music* 17 (1993), 5–8; and Maynard Solomon, "Schubert: Some Consequences of Nostalgia," ibid., 34–36.

[25] In a personal communication, Marshall Brown has suggested to me that Schubert's word *vertauschet,* generally translated as "exchanges [for]," serves in the diary entry as a loose synonym for *verwechselt,* "confuses [with]." If so, the gulf between real and ideal marriage is even more formidable; where exchange posits a marriage contrasted to bad alternatives, confusion posits a marriage *consisting* of bad alternatives.

Major Piano Sonata (D. 959) and the last String Quartet (G Major, D. 887) break up the flow of their lyricism with disruptive interludes, supercharged passages of a kind the "wound" section in *Erster Verlust* is not allowed to become, only the performers can determine how radical the disruptions are and whether the music can or should recuperate from them.[26] Or consider the important song *Ganymed,* the text of which uses erotic imagery to depict its youthful speaker's ascent from the bosom of maternal nature to that of a supernatural father. The climax of the song is a series of increasingly elaborate melismas on the phrase "all-liebender Vater" (all-loving father). Performed with a convivial voice and in strict tempo, these can suggest a celebration of the Oedipal turn from mother to father that normatively structures masculine identity in the bourgeois era. Performed in operatic voice and with expressive ritards, the same melismas can suggest a subversive, transgressive displacement of homosexual desire onto the father's name or image. Only the performers can make the determination.[27] Even in the ostensibly less drastic arena of *Erster Verlust,* social meaning can be realized only through a series of performance decisions that are more complex than the song itself.

Such decisions have always been made, of course, but tradition has left them to be made intuitively, as by-products of the normative musicianly concerns with feeling and form. Perhaps it is time to move from intuition to reflection: to develop, as performers and audiences alike, a keener, more explicit awareness of performance as interpretive provocation, and therefore of what is humanly at stake in the music we prize.

ABSTRACT

The Lied is customarily thought to express the affective meaning of a text by compositional means. Different performances of a Lied, however, may decisively affect its expressivity, provoking specific interpretations of the text-music relation and disclosing social meanings that may not be explicitly acknowledged by the text. It is possible to construct an interpretive dramaturgy running from the relation of text and composition through the relation of composition and performance. In Franz Schubert's *Erster Verlust,* D. 226, the trajectory of one such dramaturgy uncovers the song's implicit involvement with the perplexities haunting nineteenth-century bourgeois marriage.

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[26] On disruptive interludes, with some comments on the A-Major Sonata, see my *Music as Cultural Practice: 1800–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 93–97; see also Hugh MacDonald, "Schubert's Volcanic Temper," *The Musical Times* 119 (1978): 949–52.

[27] For an extended reading of *Ganymed,* see my "The Schubert Lied: Romantic Form and Romantic Consciousness" in Frisch, ed., *Schubert,* 224–33.

Reading and Misreading: Schumann's Accompaniments to Bach's Sonatas and Partitas for Solo Violin*

By Joel Lester

A recurring narcissistic feature of music theory, if not all human endeavors, is that each historical era sees its own image in the past. Rameau chided Corelli for his ignorance of fundamental bass.[1] Riemann saw the history of theory as the gradual discovery of his own ideas.[2] And Schenker argued that the music of the masters must have been composed according to his theories.[3]

None of us is immune to imposing our attitudes on the past. When we do so, it is often the aspects of which we are unaware that are most pernicious. For instance, when we analyze music, we usually are aware that we interpret various features differently than former generations did—indeed, we usually advertise our new perspective. But we do not often question whether the very features that we deem inherent in a piece have always been considered thus. If only we could compare our ideas and analyses with those of the past. The problem is that musicians of earlier eras did not produce analyses addressing our agenda. We can only compare our notions with theirs if we find substitutes for the analyses they so inconsiderately failed to leave for us.

Reworkings of compositions provide one such substitute. An added accompaniment or other changes can be read like an analysis, in that additions or alterations to a piece necessarily interpret compositional elements. J. S. Bach's *C-major Prelude* (*Well-Tempered Clavier*, I) was a finished composition for him. For Charles Gounod, it became a mere background to *Ave Maria*. Textural, registral, and rhythmic features crucial in the pre-

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[1] Jean-Philippe Rameau, *Nouveau Système de musique théorique* (Paris: Ballard, 1726), Chap. 23, "Exemples des erreurs qui se trouvent dans les Chiffres du cinquiéme Oeuvre de Corelly." This chapter is translated in Joel Lester, *Compositional Theory in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 305–19.

[2] Hugo Riemann, *Geschichte der Musiktheorie im IX.–XIX. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig: Max Hesse, 1898), vi.

[3] Heinrich Schenker, *Neue musikalische Theorien und Phantasien, Vol. 3, Der freie Satz* (Vienna: Universal-Edition, 1935), 2–3, *et passim;* English translation by Ernst Oster as *Free Composition* (New York: Longman, 1979), xxii.

lude recede to become insignificant details behind Gounod's added melody. Even notions of phrasing and form differ.[4] We can learn from such reworkings how generations of musicians heard pieces differently, leading us to reconsider what we hear and how we hear it.

This study explores these issues as they arise in Bach's solo violin works—a particularly apt repertoire, for not only did Robert Schumann, a major composer situated midway between Bach and us, provide piano accompaniments, but Bach and other eighteenth-century musicians also reworked several movements. Whereas Bach's arrangements and those by his contemporaries always maintain an eighteenth-century sound, Schumann's versions have an unmistakable nineteenth-century flavor.[5] This is remarkable: Schumann only wrote accompaniments, never touching a note in the violin part. The features of the violin part that musicians routinely deem crucial to the very identity of a piece—melodies, harmonies, rhythms, phrasing, motives, and form—remain unchanged. But his accompaniments transform each of these features. This is the focus of the present study: the ways in which Bach's violin solos and arrangements and Schumann's accompaniments affect the elements just listed, and the extent to which we, like Bach and Schumann, interpret those elements according to our stylistic biases.

Consider rhythm. Bach always creates a very active surface rhythm and links this local activity with larger metric units by articulating intermediate levels of the metric hierarchy. Schumann's accompaniments tend to flatten out the surface by emphasizing the swing of the meter. This is clearest in those movements with continuous sixteenth notes, such as the *Preludio* of the *E-major Partita,* BWV 1006, whose opening appears in example 1.

In Bach's violin part, the larger rhythms are regular. Measures are grouped in pairs by repeated or echoed patterns, as noted by the groupings over the score. Many measures feature a sarabande-like articulation of the second beat. For instance, in mm. 1 and 2, the eighths begin on beat 2. In m. 3 and elsewhere, the second beat is articulated because the moving melodic voice proceeds to a new chord member and stays there through the end of the measure. Indeed, stressed second beats characterize many later figures, including that in example 2.

Other rhythmic features spice up this regular meter and hypermeter. Because the first downbeat is empty, perception of the meter is delayed,

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[4] Joel Lester, *The Rhythms of Tonal Music* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 139–44 *et passim.*

[5] Robert Schumann, *Bach-Schumann, Klavierbegleitung zu den Sonaten für Violine solo* (New York: Edition Peters, n.d.). In musical examples below, the violin solo is also taken from this edition, which generally agrees with Bach's autograph (available in several facsimile editions), except that in his notation all notes in multiple stops are stemmed separately.

Example 1. Bach, *Partita No. 3 in E major,* BWV 1006, *Preludio,* mm. 1–17, with Schumann's accompaniment.



Example 2. Bach, *Partita No. 3 in E major, Preludio,* mm. 29–31, with Schumann's accompaniment and a melodic reduction.



and what is heard is less symmetrical than the series of two-measure groups implies. Melodic high and low points, pattern beginnings, and other accentuations tend to occur off the beats. For instance, in m. 3, the top note of the moving voice occurs on a metrically-weak eighth. In example 2, each ascent begins on the second eighth of a beat and ends on the second sixteenth of a beat. The interaction of the metric grid with these accentuations creates the imaginative rhythmic complexity that enlivens motor rhythms in much of Bach's music.[6]

In Schumann's version, powerful downbeats overshadow these local accentuations. A strong chord marks nearly every downbeat in mm. 1–12. The sarabande rhythm is absent: in m. 3, for instance, instead of initiating eighths on the second beat, Schumann begins them after that beat. Here and in many later measures, Schumann seems to have envisioned the accompaniment joining the violin in midstream primarily to lead strongly to the next downbeat, not to articulate any particular beat. After m. 12, Schumann does articulate each second beat, but because of the established metric swing, the effect is like an *oom*-pah-rest without a strong downbeat.

In his orchestration of the *Preludio* in the sinfonia to the cantata *Wir danken dir Gott,* BWV 29, Bach places chords on each beat in m. 1 (example 3), not solely on the downbeat as Schumann did. With the ingenious timbral and registral antiphony between the falling string/oboe arpeggios and the rising trumpet arpeggios, Bach brings to the fore two organizations of the beats within the measure: *1*–2–rest–*1*–2 and *1*–rest–3–*1*–rest. In mm. 9 and following, when Bach, like Schumann, doubles the moving part in thirds and sixths, Bach stresses the second beats.

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[6] On this aspect of Bach's rhythms, see Edward T. Cone, *Musical Form and Musical Performance* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), 59–72, and Lester, *Rhythms,* 127–45.

Example 3. Bach, Cantata *Wir danken dir Gott,* BWV 29, *Sinfonia,* mm. 1–12.



These multiple emphases on individual beats and their groupings recreate in a new climate Bach's highly articulated rhythms. His accompaniment emphasizes several levels of the metric hierarchy, granting each its own integrity. Schumann's accompaniment primarily stresses the measure level, omitting the intermediate levels that in Bach's version link the measure-level and the more local rhythmic vitality.

Bach's and Schumann's accompaniments to these opening measures also differ in phrasing, as shown in example 4. For Bach, the timbral and registral antiphony in mm. 1–2 recurs in mm. 7–9, marking m. 7 as a new beginning parallel in function to m. 1, and articulating the opening measures as two groups of six: a two-measure fanfare, a repeated two-measure group, then the same again. In Schumann's accompaniment, mm. 7–8 simply fill the gap between mm. 5–6 and 9–12, promoting regular four-measure groups: four measures of music in mm. 1–4, a two-measure echo and a two-measure link in mm. 5–8 adding up to a second four-group, and then another group of four.

Example 4. Phrasing of Cantata *Wir danken dir Gott, Sinfonia,* mm. 1–12, and Schumann's accompaniment to Bach, *Partita No. 3 in E major, Preludio,* mm. 1–12.



These differences in the articulation of beats, measures, and phrases predispose one to perform Schumann's version as a nineteenth-century perpetual motion with a swift surface and a swinging accompaniment. It is probably no accident that the fastest recording of the *Preludio* I know is the oldest, made by Pablo Sarasate (1844–1908) shortly after 1900, possibly reflecting a nineteenth-century tradition of realizing this and similar movements.[7]

These rhythmic features characterize Bach's and Schumann's approaches to all textures and tempos. In the *Andante* from the A-minor Sonata, BWV 1003 (see example 5), Bach maintains an eighth-note pulse in the bass. The melody interacts with this pulsation in ever-varied ways, with patterns starting on different beats and beat-divisions and dissonances both on and off the beat. In an eighteenth-century arrangement of this work for key-

[7] Sarasate recorded the *Preludio* on a flat disc; it was remastered on LP by the American Stereophonic Corporation around 1960.

board, which probably is by Bach (BWV 964), the only change in this passage is that the bass appears an octave lower to promote registral clarity. Schumann's accompaniment, with its syncopated quarters and new bass line, adds a lilt not present in any Bach version. The textural differences between the versions once again affect performance styles. Bach's intricate surface invites the performer to add more details by ornamenting the repeat. Such diminutions are unwelcome in Schumann's version, which focuses attention on the swing of the meter at the expense of local details.

Example 5. Bach, *Sonata No. 2 in A minor,* BWV 1003, *Andante,* mm. 1–4, with Schumann's accompaniment.



The differences between Bach's and Schumann's views of local and larger rhythms suggest that features frequently deemed fixed in the score in fact depend on one's stylistic perspective, including even basics such as the nature of meter and the interaction of measure-level and surface activity. Consider Schenker's foreground sketch of this *Preludio* (example 6). Rhythmically, Schenker agrees with Schumann's accompaniment to mm. 3 and 5, but is quite at odds with Bach's accompaniment, creating a swing rather than Bach's highly articulated metric levels. However much Schenker challenged nineteenth-century harmonic and formal theories, he reveals his nineteenth-century roots in his conception of the rhythm here.[8] This should warn us that we too carry our stylistic biases. If something as commonplace as the divisions of the notated meter depends on interpretation, unnotated aspects such as hypermeter and phrasing may be even more dependent on what we bring to the score than what exists there.

[8] The violinist Fritz Kreisler, who breathed the same Viennese atmosphere as Schenker, likewise initiates eighth-notes in these measures after the second beat in his published piano accompaniment: *Prelude in E for Violin and Piano [by] J. S. Bach* (New York: Charles Foley, 1913).

Example 6. Heinrich Schenker, graph of Bach *Partita No. 3, Preludio,* mm. 1–8.[9]



* * *

The remainder of this study explores such stylistic biases as they affect the hearing of harmony, tonality, and form by Bach, Schumann, and ourselves in the G-minor Sonata, BWV 1001. The primary focus is form. Essentially, I argue that whereas we often hear form in terms of sections that relate to one another, Bach, as an early eighteenth-century musician, heard music in terms of developmental processes, articulated by cadences and changes in design, but not broken into separate sections in the manner of later formal theories.

The last movement of the G-minor Sonata has two repeated sections—two "reprises," as the eighteenth-century called them. As in many of Bach's movements with two reprises, the second roughly follows the first thematically but is both longer and in many ways more developed. Early eighteenth-century theory discussed only the most superficial features of such binary forms, ignoring the marriage of tonal motion and thematic design that later ages concretize as theories of form or structure.[10]

But the music itself is not silent on these issues. A crucial structural determinant evident in many early eighteenth-century two-reprise compositions—especially those by Bach—is a perpetually increasing level of activity in numerous musical elements. In this movement, each of the parallel thematic elements is noticeably more active when it recurs in the second reprise. Appendix 1 aligns portions of the two reprises, between which bold-face numbers identify some parallel thematic elements. Number 1 in the first reprise is a descending tonic arpeggio, laying out the basic registral ambitus of the movement in a stable beginning. Underscoring this stability is a return to the sonata's "motto" voicing of the G-minor triad: the four-voice chord that opens and concludes the *Adagio* as well as its first phrase (shown in Appendix IIa), and that concludes the second-movement fugue and the *Presto.* After the B♭-major *Siciliano,* the *Presto* opens

[9] Heinrich Schenker, *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik,* I (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1925). Note that the first ***p*** belongs under m. 5.

[10] For example, some articles on various dance types (allemande, gavotte, and minuet) in Johann Gottfried Walther's *Musicalisches Lexicon* (Leipzig: Wolffgang Deer, 1732) recommend the most common number of measures found in the two reprises.

with each eighth in mm. 1–4 asserting one of the four pitches of the "motto" voicing for four measures, as shown in example 7. The parallel passage beginning the second reprise is anything but stable. The arpeggio now ascends, erupting into new registral territory. The chord is not tonic, but dominant.

Example 7. Bach, *Sonata No. 1 in G minor,* BWV 1001, *Presto,* mm. 1–5. Melodic deployment of the sonata's "motto" voicing of the tonic chord.



Thematic element 2 in the first reprise expresses a harmonically-closed progression of tonic-dominant-tonic. A Rameauian theorist would have explained that a potential full cadence is avoided because the soprano rises to $\hat{3}$ in m. 9; a thoroughbass theorist would have argued similarly that the progression is cadential, but not in the form that would appear as a conclusion to a section or piece. In the second reprise, the two-measure units expand to four measures, the scales drive upwards, chordal ninths and changes in chord quality intensify the dissonance level, and the progression is an open-ended modulation to a new key.

The figuration of the sequences of thematic element number 3 is more intricate than earlier patterns, reflecting a crescendo of activity within each reprise as well as between them. In the first reprise, the sequence descends diatonically, and all bass pitches are on the beat. In the second reprise, the sequence is longer, its internal patterning more irregular, and its bass rises with some chromaticism through the diminished octave E♮ to E♭. Likewise, thematic element number 4 begins as a dominant pedal in the first reprise but features a relentlessly rising bass in the second reprise.[11]

How does Schumann address these matters? In element number 1, he follows the contour of the violin part with rhythms emphasizing the swing of the meter. In element number 2, he does not highlight the two-measure groups of the first reprise; instead, the missing downbeat on m. 7 tends to make one hear a four-measure group, simply continuing the fours of mm. 1–4. This, along with the dynamics, makes the parallel passage in the second reprise sound like it is expanded due to the insertion of a new four-measure unit, not because of the units' increased length.

[11] To be sure, Bach could not have used a similarly rising bass in the register of the first reprise because it would have necessitated beginning below the G-string. But this simply confirms that Bach, like all accomplished composers, used the instrument's limitations as a compositional resource, not as an excuse for the "inevitable."

Schumann's recasting of the closing of each reprise diverges more sharply from Bach's conception. For element number 3 in the first reprise, Schumann does reflect the more active pattern by means of the staccato eighth-note harmonic rhythm; but changing the type of harmonic progression in each measure adds an unevenness that obscures the smoothness of the violin sequences. Whereas Bach composed the parallel passage in the second reprise to be more active, Schumann makes it less so: legato instead of staccato, a slower harmonic rhythm, and regular two-measure sequences. In element number 4, Schumann harmonizes Bach's dominant pedal in the first reprise with a moving bass, and replaces his driving bass ascent in the second reprise with a tonic pedal, again diminishing the growing climax within and between the two reprises of the original solo.

Bach's and Schumann's differences on the relationship between the two reprises also encompass their approaches to harmony and the expression of keys. Here too, Bach hears parallel reprises exploring materials in evermore complex ways. Consider how he uses conventional harmonic paradigms. The movement begins with the tonic chord in mm. 1–4, suggests an avoided cadence in mm. 5–8, and proceeds to a complete circle of fifths within the key. This continues past the change in pattern in m. 12 until a rising 5–6 sequence beginning in m. 17 leads towards B♭ major.

These harmonic paradigms are well-known to all early eighteenth-century theory. Arpeggios, cadences, circles of fifths, and 5–6 sequences are standard thoroughbass patterns. And cadences and circles of fifths are Rameau's basic harmonic paradigms. The 5–6 sequence is the very progression that inspired Rameau to invent double employment of the dissonance. Had Rameau seen this piece, he might have nodded in agreement at the series of events, with basic progressions followed by more advanced ones: the tonic chord, an avoided cadence, a circle of fifths, and then a sequence making explicit his notion of double employment. In many of Rameau's pieces, events unfold in a similar order.[12]

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[12] For instance, in Rameau's charming "Danse du grand calumet de la paix" from *Les Indes galantes,* the first four measures contain only tonic and dominant chords expressing a perfect cadence (what we call "i V^{-7} i"). The next four measures introduce the subdominant, which first alternates with the tonic (forming imperfect cadences, what we call "iv i iv-with-added-sixth i," in m. 6) and then moves, via double employment to the dominant ("iv-with-added-sixth = ii^7 V" in m. 7). These four measures end on a half cadence ("i V" in m. 8). The next eight measures repeat all this but end on the tonic, completing the refrain of this *rondeau.* The following sixteen measures, the first episode of the *rondeau,* are in the relative major, introducing the tonic, dominant, and subdominant of that key in the same way before exploring more complex progressions. The second episode of the *rondeau* goes much farther afield, adding considerable chromaticism, such as an E-major chord moving to a D-minor triad within the overall key of G minor. See Jean-Philippe Rameau, *Les Indes galantes,* nouvelle entrée/vi; in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Durand, 1902; reprint, New York: Broude, 1968), 363ff.

The music in B♭ forms a closed phrase (mm. 25–32). Thereafter, the music goes through the tonic key of G minor, changes to D minor via root progressions by fifth and then more complex sequences, and concludes with a formal cadence. From this quick overview, one can see why eighteenth-century musicians applied the term *modulation* to both harmonic motions within a key as well as those that change key.[13] The same sorts of progressions—cadential motions, root progressions by fifth, and sequences—both establish keys and move between keys. Sometime in the nineteenth century, the term *modulation* came to refer only to key changes, in accord with the notion of musical form as a series of discrete sections.[14]

In both reprises, there are three principal tonal areas: G minor, B♭ major, and D minor in the first reprise; and G minor (now centered around the dominant), C minor, and G minor in the second reprise. Bach and Schumann differ most strikingly in their treatment of the middle key. In the first reprise, Bach presents music clearly beginning and cadencing in B♭ major—although unlike the opening music in G minor, the harmonic rhythm is more active and the progressions more varied. In the second reprise, Bach, writing a more complex passage, has the music in C minor begin away from the tonic. In summary, for Bach, the increasing complexity of harmonic progressions incorporates local motions, key changes, and even the treatment of keys in the two reprises.

Schumann, hearing this music according to the norms of nineteenth-century forms, treated the middle key of each reprise quite differently. For him, the first reprise seems to have been a kind of three-key exposition. When he gets to B♭, he adds a bass pedal to slow down the pacing, as if to make it a lyrical second theme. Schumann also suppresses the cadence on B♭ in m. 32 with a chromatic deceptive progression that reduces its independence as a key. In the second reprise, Schumann ends the music in C minor in mm. 81–82 with a clear cadence, strongly demarcated by the two *fortes* on successive eigths. Once again, for Bach, the two reprises are parallel in structure, with the second more complex; B♭ major and C minor

[13] Lester, *Compositional Theory*, 2

[14] The latest published usage I know of the term *modulation* referring to progressions within a key occurs in Gottfried Weber's *Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst*, where he differentiates modulation within a key ("Tonart treue Modulation," p. 98) from modulation from one key to another ("ausweichende Modulation"). In contrast to eighteenth-century theorists, Weber uses the term *modulation* to denote chromatic progressions (e.g., what we call secondary dominants), not all progressions. See Gottfried Weber, *Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst*, third edition, vol. 2 (Mainz: B. Schott's Söhne, 1830–32), 97ff. This terminology remains in the English translation by James Warner under the title *An Attempt at a Systematically Arranged Theory of Musical Composition* (Boston: J. H. Wilkins & R. B. Carter, 1842–46), 328ff. ("modulation in the key" vs. "modulation out of the key").

stand in parallel positions, but C is less stable than B♭. For Schumann, the model for a large movement with two reprises is sonata form, in which the two reprises are not parallel: the first reprise exposits themes in two keys and includes transitions and other passagework, while the second reprise is a development (in which a foreign key may be established) and a recapitulation. Where Bach created progressive intensification within two parallel reprises, Schumann heard sections that corresponded to the musical forms of his age.

The same attitudes emerge just as strongly in Schumann's accompaniment to the first-movement *Adagio,* which functions as a prelude to the second-movement fugue. See Appendix IIa, which once again aligns parallel portions of the movement. Like many preludes, this *Adagio* features elaborate figurations over bass scales and cadences—the progressions that thoroughbass manuals suggest for improvising a prelude. Appendix IIb reduces the opening section to thoroughbass notation, making explicit the opening cadential progression, the descending bass scale, and the cadential progression in D minor.

Schumann generally follows Bach's bass line, but without the same degree of clarity (see Appendix IIa). For instance, in the descending bass scale in mm. 2–4, Schumann changes bass register twice; and he disrupts the descending bass scale in m. 7 by using A after the second beat to support an F chord, instead of Bach's C supporting a D-minor passing seventh. These are relatively minor details, but their quantity during the movement suggests that Schumann conceived of the bass more as a support for the harmony than as a generating force for the music.

Bach and Schumann differ most strongly in m. 14, the beginning of a figurally varied return of the opening measures transposed down a fifth. In m. 14 Schumann arrives on a cadential $\frac{6}{4}$ rather than on the tonic of C. Either he recognized that the thematic return begins in m. 14, and elided the sectional break, or (more unlikely) he failed to hear the return at all. Either possibility reveals a fundamental conceptual disagreement with Bach.

If Schumann intended to elide the return, he was following his practice in sonata-form movements like the first movement of the *Rhenish* Symphony, where the thematic recapitulation occurs over a cadential $\frac{6}{4}$. Such strategies view musical forms as standard constructions that original composers can alter.[15] From this perspective, eliding the moment of recapitulation simply blurs what is in other respects a clear sectional boundary.

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[15] See, for example, Schumann's comment, "It is enough for second-class talents to master the received forms; those of the first rank are granted the right to enlarge them. Only the genius may range freely." Robert Schumann, "A Symphony by Berlioz," trans. Edward T. Cone in *Hector Berlioz Fantastic Symphony,* ed. idem (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), 226.

But that attitude, applied to this prelude, denies the role of the bass as generator. From a thoroughbass perspective, eliding the thematic return by placing a cadential $\frac{6}{4}$ instead of a tonic under it is not a decoration or artistic touch—it removes the underpinning of the music.

It is conceivable that Schumann simply did not perceive a thematic return in m. 14. After all, instead of the multiple-stops of m. 1, measure 14 features a single line, and the figurative details differ. Ironically, this possibility leads to the same conclusion as if he had intentionally evaded that return. Of crucial importance is the role of the bass in generating the music. If the bass C initiates the music after that point (in Bach's conception), its omission removes the very rationale for the music.

* * *

I have been spending much time on local issues. In doing so, I am following the point-to-point focus of almost all early-eighteenth-century thoroughbass, counterpoint, and harmonic theory. It is therefore not surprising that both Bach pupils who published analyses of his music—Christoph Nichelmann and Johann Kirnberger—concentrated on chord-to-chord progressions.[16] Nichelmann in particular repeatedly stresses the affective criteria for chord-to-chord connections.

From this perspective, the changes Schumann made—eliding the return in the *Adagio*, changing harmonies, or evading the B♭ cadence in the *Presto*—alter the affect as well as the structure. Schumann, influenced by nineteenth-century formal theories, may well have been unaware of these affective details (despite the frequent criticism that he is a miniaturist). And we in the twentieth century, influenced by Schenker, also tend to interpret details in relation to the larger structure instead of the other way around. For instance, return to mm. 5–9 of the *Presto* of the G-minor Sonata (Appendix I). From a Schenkerian perspective, the rising soprano line from G to B♭ is an ascent to a structural goal (arguably the ascent to the beginning of the structural line), supported by the tonic-dominant-

[16] Analyses of fugues from the *Well-Tempered Clavier* appear at the end of Johann Kirnberger's *Die wahren Grundsätze zum Gebrauch der Harmonie* (Berlin and Königsberg: Decker & Hartung, 1773); English translation by David Beach and Jürgen Thym in "The True Principles for the Practice of Harmony by Johann Philipp Kirnberger: A Translation," *Journal of Music Theory* 23 (1979): 163–225. The analyses may have been prepared by Kirnberger's pupil Johann Adam Peter Schultz. Christoph Nichelmann analyzes several Bach pieces in *Die Melodie nach ihrem Wesen sowohl, als nach ihren Eigenschaften* (Danzig: Johann Christian Schuster, 1755); English translation of his partial analysis of the Sarabande from the French Suite in E in Lester, *Compositional Theory*, 221–22.

tonic progression. From a thoroughbass or Rameauian perspective, the progression is an evaded cadence. Cause and effect are reversed (or, one might say, the cause of the affect is reversed): Schenkerians explain a span moving towards a goal; eighteenth-century theory explains an evasion of a cadential goal. We hear the affect in the overall progression; they heard the affect in the details.

I do not mean to imply by any of this that early-eighteenth-century musicians were unaware of larger structural issues. I have discussed elsewhere how notions of structural prolongation exist in all eighteenth-century theoretical traditions.[17] Rather, I believe that musicians of the time viewed many large-scale issues in different terms, often invoking rhetorical concepts. I do not mean this in the narrow sense in which Mattheson pasted rhetorical labels onto musical constructions. Rather I mean the sense in which theorists applied concepts that are related more to rhetoric and oratory than to theories of musical form or Schenkerian ideas.

Thus even though Fux and Marpurg differ in their approaches to fugue, both argue for increasing variety in many ways while a fugue proceeds: early subject entries occur at simple harmonic relationships in adjacent voices, later entries at more distant relationships; literal repetitions should be avoided; and contrapuntal complexities should occur later.[18] Indeed, these compositional principles were discussed mostly in terms of fugues. The result is the progressive intensification of many compositional elements in Bach's fugues. And as I have been arguing here, those procedures are the guiding light in all Bach's compositional genres.

Nineteenth-century composers certainly understood how to create climaxes. But notions of musical form drew their attention in different directions. Thematic returns and contrasting materials were often deemed blocks of music in a formal structure or narrative; they were not deemed primarily part of the continuing processes of an articulated movement. It should therefore not be surprising that the fugue of the G-minor Sonata is where the differences between Bach's and Schumann's perspectives are most prominent. We are fortunate in this movement to have not only Schumann's accompaniment, but also eighteenth-century realizations for organ (BWV 539) and for lute (BWV 1000) that may or may not be by Bach himself.

The fugue of the G-minor Sonata is long and complex. As in all Bach fugues, this complex structure carefully deploys compositional elements

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[17] Lester, *Compositional Theory*, 36–41, 63–68, 119–22, 218–24, 261–70, 285–93, *et passim.*

[18] Johann Fux, *Gradus ad Parnassum* (Vienna: Joannis Petri van Ghelen, 1725); English translation of the portions on fugue in Alfred Mann, *The Study of Fugue* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), 75–138. Friedrich Wilhelm Marpurg, *Abhandlung von der Fuge* (Berlin: Haude und Spener, 1753–54); abridged English translation in Mann, *Fugue*, 139–212.

so that each passage has something new to say in many ways, especially key and harmonic, contrapuntal, and violinistic complexity.[19]

Of the many passages in the fugue through which one can trace its increasing contrapuntal complexity, I will restrict my remarks to multiple subject entries, including fugal expositions and some imitative passages. The first exposition has entries of the subject starting on D and G (example 8a, mm. 1–14). There is a rudimentary countersubject. The next multiple entrances widen the pitch scope by an imitative circle-of-fifths sequence with subjects starting on D, G, C, and F (example 8a, mm. 14–18). The countersubject remains the same.

The subsequent multiple entrances constitute the fugal exposition following the first formal cadence on D minor (example 8b). The voices enter on D, G, and C. With three transpositional levels, the tonal range is wider than in the opening fugal exposition, recalling the preceding circle-of-fifths sequence, but now laid out as three voices. In addition, a new countersubject (the rising melodic-minor-scale tetrachord $\hat{5}$–$\hat{6}$–$\hat{7}$–$\hat{8}$) makes a conspicuous appearance.

The next exposition, after the formal cadence in C minor, also follows the circle-of-fifths idea, with entries on C and F leading to the *tutti* texture on B♭ (example 8c). Here the rising countersubject is present, but transposed during the second entry to new scale-step levels. The registral sweep is wider than in any earlier exposition.

The last two subject entries are back in G minor (example 8d). This passage includes ascending and descending chromatic scales that mimic and intensify the two countersubjects. Both entries are lengthened by sequences that extend the basic $\hat{5}$–$\hat{4}$–$\hat{3}$ motion of the original subject—with weak cadences on each of these scale steps in mm. 83–84.

One can sympathize with Schumann's daunting task in trying to figure out what to do with these passages. Quite simply, he is often at a loss. In the opening exposition, he keeps the piano silent for the first three subjects, and then enters with a bland reinforcement of the chords. The dynamic *piano* sufficiently indicates his unease.

By contrast, both of the eighteenth-century arrangements of the fugue have a lot to say about this exposition, now that the technical limitations of the violin are no longer an issue. For instance, in the violin exposition

[19] In terms of violin technique, for instance, it is no accident that the final subject statement of each large section of the fugue is always the only subject statement below at least two other voices: mm. 20–21 before the cadence in D minor, m. 52 before the cadence in C minor, and mm. 82–83 before the cadence in G minor. Whatever bowing technique Bach envisioned for producing triple and quadruple stops, placing the subject in the lowest voice (or in the tenor of a four-part texture) is the most difficult.

Example 8. Bach, *Sonata No. 1 in G minor, Fuga,* with Schumann's accompaniment.



Example 8a (cont.)



Example 8b.



Example 8c.



Example 8d.



it is hard to tell whether Bach intended a three-voice or a four-voice texture. The first three voices enter, beginning on D, low G, and high G, in mm. 1–3. But in the middle of m. 4 there is a fourth entry beginning on D. Is this a fourth voice, necessarily in this register because of the limitations of the violin? Or is this simply the top voice, which assumes its proper register at the end of m. 5 as the B♭ is transferred up an octave?

According to the organ exposition (example 9), the fourth entry properly belongs in the top register. The first four entries do not include the pedals, which leads to the bracketed fifth entry on the pedals, before the fugue resumes the course of the violin version. The lute transcription (example 10) adds a bass entry beginning on D in m. 3 and a brief stretto

before the top-voice entry beginning on D in m. 6. Because of these changes, the organ exposition is one measure longer than the violin version; the lute exposition two measures longer. It is clear that Schumann was not going to make such major alterations to the pieces; but that is the point. In eighteenth-century terms, a fugal exposition must be adapted to the performing forces; Schumann's is not.

Example 9. Bach (?), *Organ Fugue in D minor,* BWV 539, mm. 1–7, transposed here to G minor.



Example 10. Bach (?), *Lute Fugue in G minor,* BWV 1000, mm. 1–8.



More troubling than Schumann's failure to adapt the exposition to the performing forces is what he added elsewhere. For the imitative section in example 8a, mm. 14ff., he accompanies the first entry with Bach's rising countersubject. Bach saved this countersubject for the next large section of the fugue, the exposition after the first formal cadence. Bach would never introduce a new countersubject and then abandon it after one hearing. But that is what Schumann did. For Schumann, planting a new idea and then letting it flower later was a common thematic technique, as in his *Fantasy,* op. 17, where subtle hints at the *An die ferne Geliebte* theme precede its full statement at the end of the first movement.[20] In situations where the suggested theme later becomes quite prominent—very common in the mid and late nineteenth century—one has the feeling that it is familiar, even though it was barely noticed earlier. This thematic technique is predicated on narrative models underlying forms, or on imaginative tinkering with standard forms—notions not pertinent to Bach.

Schumann also introduces the fugue subject at inappropriate points. For instance, at the beginning of the extended sixteenth-note episode in example 11, Schumann adds the subject, partially doubling the violin part at the unison. To be sure, the subject is implicit in this figuration (hence, the unison doublings where the figuration most closely follows the subject). But Bach clearly uses these sixteenth-note episodes as sections of relief from both the subject and its rhythm, which appear several dozen times during the fugue. There are no such inappropriate additions in the eighteenth-century organ and lute arrangements of the fugue.[21]

Example 11. Bach, *Sonata No. 1 in G minor, Fuga,* mm. 42–44, with Schumann's accompaniment.



[20] Anthony Newcomb discusses such thematic evolutions in "Once More 'Between Absolute and Program Music': Schumann's Second Symphony," *19th-Century Music* 7 (1984): 233–50.

[21] If an eighteenth-century musician other than Bach was the arranger of one or both of these versions, it strengthens the argument that the matters being discussed here are stylistic aspects common to the entire historical period, and not merely Bach's personal habits.

Likewise in his arrangement of the *Preludio* from the E-major Partita, Schumann places the opening motive in his accompaniment to the passage in example 2. Bach, in his orchestration, does not use the opening motive in this or similar passages. Bach's avoidance of the fugue subject in the episodes of the G-minor Fugue and his avoidance of the opening motive in the contrasting passages in the E-major *Preludio* remind one of the way contrasting thematic materials are displayed in *concerti grossi.* Schumann's persistent insertion of motives at these points shows how the essence of *concerti grossi* had faded from consciousness by his generation. Thus he also misses hints at *solo* and *tutti* writing in the fugue: after the relatively independent writing in mm. 1–10 of the first exposition, Bach brings the large section to a conclusion by hinting at a *tutti* chordal texture in mm. 11–12, just before the cadence in G. Schumann's accompaniment takes no notice of such hints.

* * *

If I have been rather hard on Schumann, I nevertheless do not intend my critique to be negative. My point is that Schumann read Bach in his own context, which is what often—if not always—happens when musicians read another age's creations. If time's arrow ran in reverse and Bach had arranged some of Schumann's compositions, Bach surely would have done so within his own context.

Furthermore, Schumann and his generation simply could not have known Bach's music the way we do. Whereas for us, Bach has been a central figure, and his solo violin works a standard part of violin pedagogy since time immemorial, the Bach revival began in earnest after Schumann's formative years, and violinists of his generation could not have known these pieces in that manner.[22] Schumann probably did not hear many violinists dealing with these pieces much. His diaries indicate only that he heard the *Chaconne* and occasional other movements a few times over the years, and that he invited the concertmaster of the Düsseldorf orchestra to his quarters to play through each one of his accompaniments as he completed them.[23]

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[22] The first publication of more than an isolated movement from the sonatas did not appear until 1802 in Bonn, and the first edition produced by a major violinist was that by Ferdinand David in Leipzig in 1843.

[23] For instance, Schumann reports hearing Ferdinand David play entire sonatas or partitas, or single movements in diary entries of 7 August and 20 September 1836, and then on 21 January 1841; see Robert Schumann, *Tagebücher II, 1836–1854,* ed. Gerd Nauhaus (Leipzig: VEB Deutscher Verlag für Musik, 1987), 23, 26, 142. And on 13 January and 13 February 1853, Schumann reports trying out some of his accompaniments with Ernst Carl Becker (1830–87, concertmaster of the orchestra in Düsseldorf in 1852–54); see Robert Schumann, *Haushaltbücher,* ed. Gerd Nauhaus (Leipzig: VEB Deutscher Verlag für Musik, 1982), 614, 617.

We should not, however, feel smug about our position in all this. As I suggested earlier about rhythm, meter, and affect, our attitudes towards harmony, tonality, and form also probably reflect Schumann's nineteenth-century attitudes more than Bach's eighteenth-century concepts. It is very hard to forget later musical forms in favor of Baroque compositional processes when we hear the *Presto* to the G-minor Sonata, or to remember that for Bach the tonal plans of the first and second reprises could not have been reminiscent of a sonata-form that was not to be formulated in words for nearly a century. Additionally, the very topic of a presentation like mine is predicated on historical investigative attitudes and procedures that both Bach and Schumann might well have found strange.

When I come to the end of the eighteenth century in my history of theory seminars, we explore hearing an eighteenth-century piece from the perspective of thoroughbass, counterpoint, and Rameauian harmony. A harpsichordist in this course once asked me if we would soon have to deal with historically informed analytic approaches, just as she dealt with historically informed performance styles. I don't think this is the necessary conclusion of the points I have been making here. Our era has its own interests in earlier music—interests that need not coincide with those of earlier ages. Furthermore, we have many sources of knowledge that the eighteenth century could not have known: we have historical perspective, and we have the advantage of knowing the work of two hundred years of musical thinkers unknown to the eighteenth century. At the same time, seeing the differences between the approaches of Bach and Schumann to this repertoire, and knowing that each was a major creator of his time, can only raise our own sensitivity insofar as we assume that features of the music we love are universal, when many of those features may well result from our own blend of reading and misreading.

ABSTRACT

The piano accompaniments Robert Schumann wrote for J. S. Bach's solo violin works can be read as a commentary by one major composer on another's works. These accompaniments misread Bach's intentions in obvious ways (e.g., that solo violin is not a viable performance vehicle), and interpret rhythmic, harmonic, thematic/motivic, and formal structures in a manner clearly at odds with early eighteenth-century conceptions. Comparing these works with Schumann's accompaniments, eighteenth-century arrangements of some movements (including some by Bach), and keeping in mind the theoretical frameworks of various eras allows us to gain insights into how our own stylistic biases affect what we hear in music of past eras.

Appendix I. Bach, *Sonata No. 1 in G minor, Presto* (excerpts), Bach's original with Schumann's accompaniment.



Appendix I (cont.)



Appendix I (cont.)

First reprise:



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

Appendix I (cont.)



Appendix I (cont.)

First reprise:



Second reprise:



Appendix II. Bach, *Sonata No. 1 in G minor, Adagio.*
a. Bach's original with Schumann's accompaniment.



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

Appendix II (cont.)



b. A thoroughbass rendering of mm. 1–9.



The Prelude from Bach's Suite No. 4 for Violoncello Solo: The Submerged Urlinie

By Carl Schachter

Although I don't usually begin articles by quoting from reviews of my work (especially bad reviews), I will do so here, for I recently received one that expresses rather well what I shall be trying to accomplish with this study. A musicologist, writing about a recent volume of essays on Mozart, had this to say:

> For European readers, less typically fluent in the analytical methods of Heinrich Schenker, Carl Schachter's contribution will prove uneasy to negotiate in all its particulars. Basic to the analysis is the notion that the identification of an underlying pattern worked out during the composition process may permit deep insights not only into technical but also, as it were, into intellectual aspects of a work. In relation to the *Jupiter* Symphony and Beethoven's First Symphony, Schachter is able to draw out a series of structural parallels in terms of their harmonic disposition, but it remains unclear to what extent this technical 'evidence' for the character of Beethoven's movement is of real significance to, as Arnold Schoenberg would have said, his musical idea.[1]

As a perhaps typical North American, I propose to identify underlying patterns worked out in the Prelude from Bach's Suite No. 4 for Violoncello Solo, in the hope that this will permit insights—whether they are deep is not for me to say—into the technical and intellectual aspects of the piece. In any case, I believe that the technical and intellectual in music are not completely separable. I also hope to shed light on what I think Arnold Schoenberg might have called the Prelude's "musical idea," though my analytic approach is by no means Schoenbergian. In what is probably his best-known explanation of the notion of "musical idea," Schoenberg seems to include in it the identification of an underlying tonal pattern. Schoenberg writes:

> Every tone which is added to a beginning tone makes the meaning of that tone doubtful. . . . In this manner there is produced a state of unrest, of imbalance which grows throughout most of the piece, and

[1] Ulrich Konrad, review of *Mozart Studies*, ed. Cliff Eisen, in *Notes* 50, no. 1 (September 1993), 135–38.

is enforced further by similar functions of the rhythm. The method by which balance is restored seems to me the real *idea* of the composition.[2]

The Musical Idea

As a glance at the score will reveal (example 1), the second melodic tone over the Prelude's initial pedal point is the D♭ of mm. 3 and 4, which, in Schoenberg's words, "produces a state of unrest, of imbalance"; it destabilizes the tonic, makes it active in the direction of the subdominant, and constrains the upper voice to descend to C. Balance might be restored in several ways, but the most effective would surely be to juxtapose the descent D♭–C with a rise from the C to D♮ and E♭ and to lead the subdominant into a dominant-tonic resolution. In mm. 7–9, Bach gives us the harmonic closure, but the melodic line does not stabilize itself, for the D♮–E♭ is obscured by a transfer down into a lower octave and a middle voice. Thus, as with Schoenberg's notion of idea, the imbalance begins to grow as the piece proceeds. In a brilliant stroke at the end of the piece, however, Bach quotes the opening pedal point for two measures, but he stops the literal repetition with a magnificent improvisatory flourish that raises the D♮ into its rightful register and resolves it to the high E♭. In this way the problem proposed at the beginning of the Prelude reaches its ultimate solution at the very end, in the coda. It is the events of the main body of the movement, however, that work through the problem to the point where this triumphant conclusion becomes possible.

Even at a preliminary stage of thinking about the Prelude, it is obvious, I think, that this process of working out reaches a turning point with the fermata on C♯ in m. 49. Not only is this tone an enharmonic transformation of the problematic D♭, but also it receives the greatest possible emphasis through its appearance in the lowest register and through the totally unexpected changes in rhythm and contour that it initiates. Although such changes often occur near the end of Bach's arpeggiated preludes, this disruption of established patterns midway through the movement is as unusual as it is unexpected and disorienting. Through the remainder of the Prelude, the improvisatory sixteenth-note runs appear side by side with the original eighth-note arpeggiations, culminating in the passage that brings in the D♮–E♭ at the very end, a passage whose contour closely resembles that of the first sixteenth-note flourish over C♯ (mm. 49–51).

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[2] Arnold Schoenberg, "New Music, Outmoded Music, Style and Idea," in *Style and Idea*, ed. Leonard Stein, trans. Leo Black, paperback edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 123.

Example 1. Bach, Suite No. 4 for Violoncello Solo, Prelude.



Example 1. (cont.)



Example 1. (cont.)



The Opening Tonic Pedal and Underlying Shape: mm. 1–10

Before sketching out a view of the Prelude as a whole, I should like to take a closer look at the opening passage, for it forms the main subject of the Prelude. Much of what happens later on in the movement grows directly or indirectly out of the contents of these opening ten measures. The harmonic and melodic pattern that Bach begins to suggest (but achieves fully only at the end) is shown in example 2; it is one of the several conventional formulas that appear over countless pedal points by Bach and other composers, usually to serve as the initial announcement or final affirmation of the key. In the chapter on diminution in *Free Composition,* Schenker cites the melodic aspect of this particular idiom, together with other related figures, as an example of "boundary play."[3] He identifies it by a string of intervallic symbols 8–♭7–6–♮7–8 and two slurs, as I show in example 2.

Example 2. Bach, Suite No. 4, Prelude, mm. 1-10. Underlying Shape.



[3] Heinrich Schenker, *Free Composition,* trans. and ed. Ernst Oster (New York: Longman, 1979), Fig. 124/1.

In this idiom, the beginning and end points of the motions through thirds do not represent an interval of the governing tonic chord (though the descending third does belong to the subdominant chord into which it moves). In most cases we might think of the thirds as directed to and from $\hat{6}$ as an inner-voice neighbor note (example 3a); but the connection of the neighbor note to its main note is not made explicit by the melodic diminution. Thus the progression is one of several common formulas in which $\hat{6}$ as upper neighbor gravitates to $\hat{5}$ only in the middleground voice leading. Two other interpretations are also sometimes possible: since $\hat{6}$, together with $\hat{7}$, can pass between $\hat{5}$ and $\hat{8}$ instead of serving as upper neighbor to $\hat{5}$, individual features of a passage might lead to the inference of a rising fourth-progression $\hat{5}$–$\hat{6}$–$\hat{7}$–$\hat{8}$ (example 3b); or, less often, a falling fourth $\hat{8}$–$\flat\hat{7}$–$\hat{6}$–$\hat{5}$ (example 3c) as a component of this idiom (the inference of a falling fourth usually requires $\flat\hat{6}$ as a chromatic passing tone on the way to $\hat{5}$).

Example 3. Bach, Suite No. 4, Prelude, mm. 1-10. Concealed Neighbor Notes and Fourth Progressions.



The register break in m. 7 of the Prelude is related to the disposition of the initial tonic chord in mm. 1–2. As example 4a shows, the high E♭ arpeggiates down to G both in an immediate, note-by-note succession and in a free augmentation that is produced by the ascending leaps to high notes. This double descent to G is mirrored in the larger contour of the upper voice, which begins on E♭ and reaches G in mm. 9–10 (example 4b). Of course, the large descent of a sixth is achieved not through a simple tonic arpeggiation, but rather through the descending register transfer of m. 7, which exposes an inner strand of the texture—A♭–G—and transforms it into the upper voice. I believe that the G thus exposed represents the $\hat{3}$ of the Prelude's Fundamental Line; if I am right, it is a Fundamental Line that is introduced in the middle of the texture rather than on top. This rather unusual disposition characterizes the Prelude as a whole, submerging the Urlinie in the midst of a complex contrapuntal web. To facilitate tracing the strands of this web, I shall refer to the one from E♭ as "x," the one from B♭ as "y," and the one from G as "z" (example 4c).

Example 4. Bach, Suite No. 4, Prelude. Opening Tonic Arpeggio and Larger Top-Voice Contour.



The Large Structure: An Overview

At this point it will be helpful to attempt at least a preliminary overview of the larger harmonic and melodic structure, to provide a context for later discussions of detail. The main outlines of the harmony are quite clear. After the fermata over C♯ in m. 49, a long improvisatory passage follows, elaborating an extended V–I cadence in G minor, III of the home key and the goal of the Prelude's main modulation. The G arrives in m. 62 and initiates a move toward its expected goal, B♭ as structural dominant (example 5). Thus, the harmonic structure would almost certainly seem to be I–III–V–I, the III tonicized by an elaborate cadence. This reading is partly confirmed by the close resemblance between the cadence into G minor and the final V–I cadence of mm. 81–82, which draws the two cadences into a single, inclusive structure. Note that the melodic resolution above III is to G, $\hat{3}$ of E♭ major, and that the parallel resolution at the end is to E♭, the $\hat{1}$. There is no literal $\hat{2}$, but D, the leading tone, provides an effective and indeed almost obligatory substitute (obligatory because D♮–E♭ is the missing part of the Prelude's governing melodic idea).

Example 5. Bach, Suite No. 4, Prelude. Overview of Structure.



The fact that the strand beginning on G—strand z—resolves to the final melodic tonic in a progression coordinated with the harmonic movement of the entire Prelude is very strong confirmation, I think, for regarding it as the Fundamental Line. That it is a Fundamental Line in the middle of the contrapuntal fabric, however, is brought home by the fact that the notes G and E♭ appear in the obligatory register only as anticipations before the downbeat; when the cadential goal arrives in the bass, the locally primary melodic line skips up to a higher region. Thus, the triadic space between 5 and 8 remains charged with activity even during the resolution of the Fundamental Line.

Example 5b gives some preliminary orientation to this activity. In it we see a rising fourth-progression leading from B♭ to E♭; as we shall see, it is this progression that forms an upper counterpoint to the Urlinie. Thus, strand y becomes an important contrapuntal element made unusually prominent by its position above the Fundamental Line. In example 5c, we can see a continuation different from the one Bach composes—one might call it the voice leading of least resistance—to show by contrast how active the middleground counterpoint is.

The C-Minor Prolongation and Parallelisms: mm. 11–28

The Prelude proceeds in an unbroken surface rhythm of continuous eighth notes from the beginning up to the fermata of m. 49. Although this long stretch of music might seem to lack interior punctuation, it is, in fact, articulated by harmony, voice leading, and motivic design. As shown in figure 1, a two-level graph with the main subdivisions of the through-composed form identified by boxed numbers between the staves, the first ten measures at [1] make an obvious inner grouping, held together by the tonic pedal and the I–IV–V–I progression above it. Although the pedal persists only through m. 9, the tenth measure forms part of this initial phase, for the D in the bass is a passing tone that leads into the next group of measures, [2]. The link thus provided is motivic as well as contrapuntal,

Figure 1.


a.
x
y
z
1
2
3
4
z: 8
(y:) 5
6
(27) 6
#6
b.
9
19
37
45
59
nn
3
8 ♭7 6 ♮7 8
5
6
4th prog.
arp: C – E♭ – G
E♭: I
(VI)
= g: IV
#IV7
V
I
* = chromatics: A♮
B♮
E♮
F♯
C♯
I
III

Figure 1 (cont.)



for the bass's E♭–D♮–C is an echo and, as it were, a reproof of the E♭–D♭–C that we had just heard in the highest voice. Example 6 shows us that this is not an isolated connection between top voice and bass, for the descending sequential passage that begins in m. 11 takes up the contour—a descending triadic contour partially filled in by a passing tone—of the top voice in mm. 1–8.

Example 6. Bach, Suite No. 4, Prelude. Parallelisms.



A curious and noteworthy feature of this next passage is that at m. 11 the upper voice begins repeating, almost note-for-note, the melodic contents of mm. 1–10, but over a prolongation of C minor rather than E♭ major. Only the D♮ of m. 15 is new, and it changes to D♭ as soon as it is decently possible to do so.[4] This new juxtaposition of D♮ and D♭ intensifies the destabilizing effect of the latter sound, and keeps alive the basic "problem" of the piece—the need for a compensating ascent of D♮ to E♭. This time, however, the upper voice does supply the D♮ and E♭ in their proper register, but in a C-minor cadence, where they cannot create an effect of definitive resolution (mm. 26–27). Incidentally, C minor becomes definitively tonicized only at the cadence, but it has been prolonged throughout the passage. Note that the upper-voice C (mm. 19–20) now belongs to the locally governing chord (as it did not in mm. 5–6) and that the disposition of the C-minor chord in mm. 27–28 is exactly the same as the one in mm. 11–12, forming a perfect continuation of the opening tonic. In relation to the large-scale voice leading, the B♭ of tonic harmony has moved up to C (strand y); the other notes above the bass, E♭ and G (strands x and z), have remained stationary. The motion of B♭ to C accomplishes the first step of the rising fourth shown in example 5b.

[4] The D♮–D♭ inflection of mm. 15–16 occurs in Anna Magdalena's copy, but not in Johann Peter Kellner's, which brings in the D♭ only in m. 17. The more drastic confrontation between the natural and flat in the Anna Magdalena version produces a better reading, in my opinion, than the smoother Kellner version, which is the one more often heard nowadays, probably because August Wenzinger adopted it for his widely used edition, *Sechs Suiten: Für Violoncello Solo, BWV 1007–1012* (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1950).

The Chromatic Move C–C♯–D: mm. 27–52

Although the C-minor cadence marks an important tonicization, it is not the main modulation of the Prelude, but only a step along the way to the massively prepared cadence in G minor—III (Figure 1 at 3). From the G (m. 62), the bass then proceeds to the V of the final structural cadence. By far the most striking moments of the Prelude are those that prepare the G minor, and a chief feature of that preparation is the intense and rhapsodic passage elaborating a diminished seventh chord on C♯. The C♯, as mentioned earlier, is a transformation of D♭, now functioning as the leading tone to D as V of G minor. Figure 1 at 3 shows how Bach moves into this C♯ diminished seventh, which represents the C-minor chord, now chromaticized and made active in the direction of D.

Beginning in m. 31, the arpeggiated surface becomes somewhat agitated. Until now, all the broken chords have maintained the same one-bar duration and wavelike contour, rising from the bass, cresting on the second note, and gradually descending to the bass note that begins the next bar. Although this basic pattern is by no means abandoned, it no longer occurs with complete uniformity. The F-minor arpeggio of mm. 31–32, for example, takes two full bars to complete its descent into the bass, and starting in m. 37, rising motion begins to take over. These changes result in a less predictable surface pattern that fluctuates, sometimes quite abruptly, in intensity. The tonal substructure fluctuates with it, creating far greater difficulties in orientation for the listener. In my view, neither the E♭ triad of m. 39 nor the G minor of m. 45 should be understood as representing a structural harmony. In other words, the E♭ is not a continuation of the initial tonic, and the G is not yet a structural arrival on the mediant. Rather, both the E♭ and the G minor are offshoots of the preceding C minor, forming a large-scale arpeggiation C–E♭–G. The G minor, then, acts as the dividing upper fifth of C rather than as a goal in its own right. In particular, the prior emphasis on F minor (in mm. 31–35) tends to keep the G minor within the C minor/E♭ major orbit and prevents it from sounding like a temporary tonic.

In the upper voices, the G of strand z has remained stationary, retained from the opening E♭ and the C minor that follows it into the C♯ diminished seventh. The C over C minor—the continuation of strand y's B♭—moves down to B♭ over the diminished seventh. This B♭ does not connect structurally with the B♭ that begins strand y; it is a passing tone that will resolve into the V of G minor in m. 52. At more or less the same time, a C♯ reaches over the B♭ to form a long-range continuation of strand y's C. The highest tone of the opening tonic and the C minor, E♭, has the most unusual continuation, moving to D in m. 44, where it abruptly breaks off, at least in its original high register. The D continues, however, in a lower octave as part of the G-minor chord of mm. 45–48.

The arrival on the bass C♯ and its eventual resolution to D form the culmination of the initial phase of the Prelude's chromaticism. From the beginning through the G-minor cadence, all chromatically altered pitches other than the D♭ have resulted from upward inflections, mostly producing applied leading tones: A♮ to B♭, B♮ to C, E♮ to F, F♯ to G, and finally C♯ to D. The order in which accidentals appear corresponds to the rising circle of fifths, except that B♮ precedes E♮; note in particular that the two sharps appear last. As example 7 shows, this process fills in a complete chromatic scale; by moving up in naturals and sharps, Bach arrives at the enharmonic equivalent of D♭, the initial chromatic disturbance, and the enharmonic reinterpretation directs the sound to an upward resolution to D. These leading-tone chromatics replicate in transposition the upward drive of the missing step D–E♭, which is now almost within view.

Example 7. Bach, Suite No. 4, Prelude. Rising Chromatics.



The G-minor Cadence: mm. 49–62

The B♭ at the top of the diminished seventh chord (mm. 49–51) could descend immediately to A and G, over a V–I cadence in G minor, but Bach chooses a far more extravagant procedure. The basic idea, as I suggested earlier, is for the C♯ to reach over the B♭ in m. 56 as a kind of free indirect suspension above the bass D (figure 1 at 4). In this way, it can occupy the same register as the D♭ of m. 3, clarifying its role as the alter ego of that original chromatic sound. In addition, it can repeat the bass C♯'s rise to D, but displaced in time, so that no parallel octaves result. The D appears in the uppermost voice in m. 60, following the expressive ninth, E♭, which further strengthens the association with the beginning of the Prelude and its D♭. After this, the contrapuntal strand containing it breaks off, not to reappear until after the G-minor cadence. The move C♯–D in the one-line octave has important implications for the large-scale voice leading. As I try to show in figure 1a, the C♯ forms a large-scale connection with the C over C minor, and this connection brings strand y up from C to D. At the same time, the B♭ of the big diminished seventh chord is free to resolve to A over V of G minor, and the A, in turn, moves to G, the $\hat{3}$ of the structural upper voice.

From G Minor to the End: mm. 62–91

As we have seen, Bach gradually introduces naturals and sharps in the first half of the Prelude until all five raised chromatics have been introduced. In this final phase, a reverse procedure occurs: a descending chromatic collection is brought about by the introduction of the five lowered degrees. This time, the new accidentals are mostly associated with mode mixture, an aspect of chromaticism completely absent from the Prelude until after the G-minor cadence. The accidentals appear in full correspondence with the descending circle of fifths; thus we have D♭ again in m. 64, G♭ in m. 68, C♭ in m. 70, F♭ in m. 73, and B𝄫 in m. 80 (see example 8).

Example 8. Bach, Suite No. 4, Prelude. Falling Chromatics.



The last alteration appears over a ♭II chord, an F♭ major $\frac{6}{3}$ that introduces the final cadential dominant in m. 81. This Neapolitan sixth bears a heavy weight of chromatics, for the chord itself is formed by two of our flatted notes, F♭ and C♭, while two others, G♭ and B𝄫, appear as passing tones; thus all the lowered chromatics except the original D♭ appear as part of the Prelude's final cadence. Partly because the Neapolitan represents the culmination of an important process of chromatic elaboration, I consider it the hinge on which the harmonic motion from III to V turns. Thus, I see a large-scale bass motion G (m. 62), A♭ (m. 80), B♭ (m. 81), and I do not regard the prominent B♭ chord in m. 70 or the $\frac{6}{4}$ over B♭ in m. 78 as representing the onset of the structural V (see Figure 1, 5).

The hard task Bach set himself here is to create a transition from the G minor cadence, with its prominent C♯s, F♯s, and A♯s, to E♭ minor, with its plethora of flats increased further by the emphasized Neapolitan harmony. That harmony makes a particularly difficult problem for the voice leading of strand z—the structural top voice—in that a motion from $\hat{3}$ in major to $\flat\hat{2}$ creates a most unattractive augmented second unless mediated by other pitches. Bach's approach to the final cadence is best understood, I think, in the light of these considerations (Figure 1, 5 and 6). As I see it, the bass executes an unfolding G–B♭–C♭–A♭; the B♭ of m. 70, therefore,

functions as the upper third of G rather than as a structural V. It is at this point that the shift to minor begins. Note that the C♭ is inflected to C♮ in mm. 76–77, before moving down to the A♭.

Strand z elaborates the Urlinie with an ascent from G to its upper neighbor, A♭, over the C♭ of the bass unfolding (mm. 74–75). From this A♭, strand z moves in sixths above the bass to the Neapolitan's ♭$\hat{2}$. Typically, the leading tone substitutes for ♮$\hat{2}$ at the final cadence. As in the move to G minor, the melodic goal appears only as an anticipation before the downbeat; here the reprise of the opening bars prevents a literal resolution in the Urlinie's obligatory register. Meanwhile, strand y, which broke off on D in m. 60, just before the G-minor cadence, resumes immediately thereafter. A motion in tenths above the bass arrives at D again in m. 70. That D moves to E♭ in m. 74, above the bass C♭, and the E♭ might be expected to return to D over V in the final cadence. Two factors prevent this: the appearance of the Neapolitan chord, which constrains the E♭ to move to F♭, and the resolution of the Urlinie (strand z) in its proper register, which transfers the move from E♭ to F♭ into the next lower octave. Thus, the rising fourth-progression has once more interrupted its course at a cadential point, giving way to the descending impulse of the Urlinie. The coda completes this unfinished business: the sixteenth-note flurry that lifts the D into the higher octave corrects the previous downward transfer and makes possible the splendid resolution of the D to the final E♭.

As Figure 1 shows, I read the voice leading over the final tonic pedal somewhat differently from the beginning of the piece, despite the fact that it is essentially the same music. The prominent C♭ over the Neapolitan leads into the fifth of the final tonic, giving it far more prominence than at the opening. This, combined with the massively emphasized D♮–E♭ at the end, strongly suggests that the guiding linear idea is a rising fourth $\hat{5}$–$\hat{6}$–$\hat{7}$–$\hat{8}$ as in example 3b. This rising fourth would be a diminution nested within the big fourth (strand y) that spans the whole Prelude.

The Submerged Urlinie

In view of the importance of the rising fourth in the Prelude, why regard the $\hat{3}$–$\hat{2}$–$\hat{1}$ as the structural line? First of all, because it, rather than the rising fourth, is the primary melodic constituent of the big harmonic cadences, and these cadences clearly shape the tonal movement of the piece. One certainly hears the resolution into the final tonic at m. 82, not m. 91, despite the importance of completing the ascent to the high E♭. Second, the G is a far more prominent constituent of the opening tonic prolongation than the B♭. And third, in this piece, the $\hat{3}$–$\hat{2}$–$\hat{1}$ line is representative of the melodic structure that characterizes the tonal repertory at

large. In that repertory the relation of background to middleground and foreground will vary, sometimes enormously, from piece to piece. There are pieces whose structural dominants are prolonged for a hundred bars and other pieces (like this one) whose structural dominants last half a bar or less.

So too there are pieces whose melodic design is largely an exfoliation of the Urlinie and others (like this one) where the contrapuntal interplay between several upper voices is important enough to reduce the explanatory power of inferring a two-voice framework. This Prelude is not a unique case. Many years ago, Ernst Oster pointed out to me that in the first movement of Mozart's A-minor Piano Sonata, an upper-voice line G–F–E spans the second key area of the exposition and the entire development, overarching the Urlinie's $\hat{4}$–$\hat{3}$–$\hat{2}$–$\hat{1}$, which becomes a kind of inner voice (example 9). Recognizing what the Mozart Sonata or Bach Prelude have in common with the repertory as a whole in no way diminishes our recognition of what makes them unique. If anything the differences stand out more clearly when measured by a common standard.

Example 9. Mozart, Piano Sonata in A minor, K. 310, first movement, after Ernst Oster.



Oppositions

In the Prelude, the interplay between the falling Urlinie and the rising fourth above it forms part of a larger compositional issue—the opposition of ascending and descending motion—that is an inescapable constituent of any music with organized pitches. This opposition plays an inordinately great role in the design and structure of the Prelude. Indeed if the musical idea of the Prelude involves the restoration of equilibrium after an initial disturbance, it is largely in terms of the opposition of descending and ascending that the idea seems to be conceived. The first and primary constituent of that idea is the D♭/D♮ conflict, which is resolved only in the last two bars. Derived from that initial impulse is a systematic exploration of raised accidentals in the first half of the piece until a turning point is

reached as the D♭ appears transformed into a C♯; in the second half, lowered accidentals predominate, moving down the circle of fifths and culminating in the cadential Neapolitan chord. The initial lack of a D♮ commensurate in impact with the D♭ of mm. 3–4 results from a transfer of the upper line into a lower octave and inner voice; at the end, the D♮ transfers up from that lower octave to arrive at the high E♭. The downward transfer, foretold by the contour of the initial E♭ arpeggio, exposes the $\hat{3}$ of the Urlinie with its descending resolution. At the same time, this transfer sets up the need for D♮ and E♭ in the higher octave, a need that motivates the rising fourth $\hat{5}$–$\hat{6}$–$\hat{7}$–$\hat{8}$ and situates it above the $\hat{3}$–$\hat{2}$–$\hat{1}$. Thus, the Urlinie, like a tenor cantus firmus, appears within a contrapuntal complex, rather than dominating it from above; and the down/up contrast involves both location in musical space and direction of motion.

Symbolism?

In working on the Prelude, I have been tempted from time to time to translate its tonal events into the language of Christian symbolism. The down/up dichotomy seems to be worked out with such consistency and the transformation of D♭ into C♯ occurs in so dramatic and unexpected a manner as to suggest to me the possibility of a hidden program. Therefore, I shall offer one, though I am not completely convinced of its validity, and I usually refrain from swimming in such sharp-infested waters. Briefly, the change of D♭ into C♯ may symbolize the redemption of fallen humanity through the crucifixion. The German word for "sharp" is, of course, "Kreuz," and Bach does sometimes use sharps as cross symbols, the best-known instance being Versus V of the cantata *Christ lag in Todesbanden,* BWV 4, mm. 28–30. In the Prelude, the elaborated fermata also has a melodic contour with several crosslike changes of direction, and the climactic C♯–E♭–D in the upper voice of mm. 56–60 makes a particularly vivid chiastic shape, with its overlapped resolutions to D from below and above.

In the music of mm. 1–10, the jaggedly descending arpeggios, the D♭ falling to C, the downward transfer of the initial upper voice, and the consequent lack of a D♮ rising to E♭ in the proper high register might then all stand for the fall of sinful humanity. The systematic introduction of rising accidentals that permeates the next phase could represent steps in the believer's path toward salvation. This spiritual journey involves a contemplation of the Cross, symbolized by the advent of C♯, which transforms the initial falling chromatic sound into one that rises. After the G-minor cadence, the music introduces lowered accidentals, a process that culminates in the cadential Neapolitan chord and the downward resolution of the Urlinie. These tonal events might suggest mortality and physical death,

but they are mitigated by the final rise to the high E♭, the saved soul's ascent to heaven.

Quite apart from theological hermeneutics, the contrast between the opening and closing pedal points is a contrast between the disruption of a musical process and its completion, between musical frustration and fulfillment. And the tonal events between the two pedal points are what makes the music achieve completion and fulfillment in so overpoweringly convincing a way. At the beginning of this paper, I quoted a review that questioned whether the awareness of an underlying pattern worked out in the course of a composition sheds light on more than the technical aspects of that composition. Actually, I think that understanding the technical aspects of a piece is valuable in and of itself, and that producing an analysis that increases such understanding is not cause for shame. But I know that not everyone agrees with me. There is a gulf—often one that cannot be bridged, I fear—between musicians who find notes and the sounds they represent worthy objects of close study, and those who do not. Certainly there is more to music than structure, and that something more is also worthy of close study. But to deny the relevance of structure to the intellectual aspects of a composition or to its cultural context is ultimately to diminish one's conception of music.

ABSTRACT

The contrapuntal texture of the Prelude from Bach's Suite No. 4 for Solo Violoncello involves a quick-moving and active bass line above which all three factors of the tonic triad initiate important linear strands: $\hat{8}$ forms a cover tone that begins and ends the Prelude; $\hat{5}$ is the first note of a rising fourth-progression that culminates in the final $\hat{8}$; $\hat{3}$ descends to $\hat{1}$ at the structural cadence before the coda. These three strands interact with each other and with the bass in complex ways; among the complexities is a carefully elaborated introduction of chromatic elements, centering on a contradiction between D♭ and D♮ whose resolution helps to direct the Prelude's large-scale harmonic structure.

In the opening tonic arpeggio, $\hat{3}$ lies below $\hat{8}$ and $\hat{5}$, and a disposition that characterizes the Prelude as a whole. Thus the descent from $\hat{3}$ to $\hat{1}$ occurs in the middle of the texture rather than at the top. This structural line is embedded within a contrapuntal complex in a way that gives it a somewhat unusual character. The "melodic" foreground sounds less like the exfoliation of the Urlinie than like the composite of elements from the three primary strands, the Urlinie being first among equals rather than the governing upper voice. This suggests that the inference of a two-part outer-voice counterpoint has less explanatory power for the Prelude than it does for most of the tonal repertory.

viewpoint

Centers; Dissenters (Music, Religion, and Politics)

By John Rahn

There is a story about the situation of art and music in society that runs something like this:

> Once upon a time, music was connected with ritual and religion. As described by René Girard, art embodies both the essential violence of mimetic rivalry and its resolution (or deferral) in societal order through the designation of a scapegoat. In Girard's hypothetical originary scene, a crowd of proto-humans surrounds an object desired by each of them. The potential violence of this periphery is defused, this time, by what constitutes the beginnings of human culture: the selection of an "emissary victim" on whom the violence of the whole group is concentrated serves to establish a community and defer conflict.[1] As Eric Gans describes the scene, "The group of murderers surrounding the body experience[s] a sudden release of tension, their violence spent, and they contemplate the body as the source of this miraculous transformation of violence into peace. The body of the victim thus becomes for Girard the object of 'the first noninstinctive attention,' which turns it into a *sacred* object, the first signifier and the source of all signification."[2] Jacques Attali has adopted and elaborated the Girardian model for music, asserting that noise, the raw material of music, is violence, and that music is both "threat of death" and "pure order."[3] In a variant of Girard's thesis that Gans constructed and applied to music, the violence of the originary scene is deferred by an act of communal designation or reference (the emphasis is on representation rather than the murder of the emissary victim), delaying violence and the appetitive and allowing a moment of contemplation that constitutes the central

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[1] René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977). This description is glossed from John Rahn, "What Is Valuable in Art, and Can Music Still Achieve It?," *Perspectives of New Music* 27, no. 2 (1989): 6–17.

[2] Eric Gans, "Art and Entertainment," *Perspectives of New Music* 24, no. 1 (1985): 24–37. Quote from p. 31.

[3] Jacques Attali, *Noise: The Political Economy of Music,* trans. John Cumming (New York: Seabury, 1972): 30–31.

object as sacred, partly by virtue of that very deferment of conflict and constitution of community. This model is supposed to underlie Western culture from its beginnings through the Middle Ages, and to persist, perhaps less fundamentally, in later epochs as an important mode of explanation for behavior.[4]

The story continues: As religion was displaced by Reason during the Renaissance and Enlightenment, music and art in general gradually assumed the burden of the Sacred in secular culture. This process flowered at the end of the eighteenth century in a Romanticism that poured the Sacred, or sublime, into Nature, reaffirming a secular kind of mystical or ecstatic experience (and emotion) as against or alongside Reason. Art was the essential medium of that ecstasy, which was (as always) a very personal thing. Art assumed some of the status of religion along with the burden of its transferred experience.

This all was not unconnected to historical developments in economics and science. The creation of a commercial middle class during the Renaissance supported the movement from a centralized religion to Protestant variations and to a Reason that was available to every person and made all things comparable, hence exchangeable, pointing to the commodity; and of course, the beginnings of industrialization in the late eighteenth century created a bourgeoisie for whom Romanticism, had it not existed, would have to have been invented.

Industrialization progressed through a number of stages. Its most important features for art were mass production and the technologies of replication (photography, sound recording, etc.). Eventually, we arrive at the present, "postmodern" culture, where information and replication have changed the face of economics and of society. Television and computer technology, what the French call "infor-

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[4] See Eric Gans, *The End of Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); idem, "Art and Entertainment," *Perspectives of New Music* 24, no. 1 (1985): 24–37; idem, "Mallarmé, Wagner, and the Power of Music," in *Proceedings of the Music and Power Symposium,* ed. John Rahn (Seattle: Center for Creation and Interdisciplinary Study of Music, School of Music, University of Washington, 1991), 86–110; and idem, "The Beginning and End of Esthetic Form," *Perspectives of New Music* 29, no. 2 (1991): 8–21. It is possible to criticize the model as sexist, parochial, and violence-centered, but the model has wide currency in critical circles. It is particularly useful here in that it ties up in one package an origin myth for religion, human culture, and language, and in that it is a theory of the center and periphery that can be used for both religious and political discussion. I believe that my use of this model later in this essay to talk about music does not entail those aspects of it that may give rise to such objections.

> matiques," have brought all cultures (including cultures of the past and of most areas of the globe) and all technical information into a web available to and manipulable by anyone. In fact, TV force-feeds much of this information to practically everyone, though the information is filtered through the medium in a way that excludes what is difficult. TV broadcasts a fine spray of surfaces. Multi-national corporations preside over a world in which the nation-state is being pulverized and dissolved in the global triumph of capitalism, and the rise of ethnic loyalties fails to compensate for the massive production of consumers and the fatal attraction of identity in the homogeneous world of the simulacrum. MTV celebrates the rites of the ecstasy of nondifferentiation, dancing to the whip-beats of consumer culture. Depth and individuality have faded away, and high art can no longer motivate itself as the vicar of a universal religious impulse that has etiolated and finally dispersed, even in its bourgeois avatar.

Thus endeth the story.[5] It leaves us in a position to ask the following questions: What can an artist or composer do today? How can a composer situate the sources of her art with respect to her societal matrix, and in particular, with respect to religion and politics? How can art be possible any longer, or, what kind of art is now possible? This essay will explore the area of these questions, rather than attempting to answer them. It will first biopsy the traditions of religion and politics in Western culture, peering through a lens made of two concepts: the center, and dissent.

* * *

The Western tradition of the relation of a person to his cultural matrix, of a citizen to the city, crystallizes out in Greek civilization, and is nowhere better epitomized than in the paradox of Plato and Socrates. I will speak

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[5] It is not a very true story, if only because it oversimplifies so much—for example, "religion" is collapsed into some hypothetical proto-society as model for all societies, ignoring the variety of religious practices in the world over time and geography. However, the storyteller has at least tried not to embody a number of the current faiths about history. The story takes neither the (Marxist) position that economic and material "substrates" determine culture, nor the position that cultural innovation sparks development in material relations, nor the position that musical developments, while determined to some extent by economic ones, nevertheless precede and announce them, nor any position—such as those of Platonism or Marxism or Hegelianism or Liberalism or various religions—about the possible causes of historical change within whatever stream (if any) is deemed the most relevant or master discourse. The story does not even contain any faith in causality as such.

as though "Plato" and "Socrates" could be clearly disentangled from the Dialogues and attributed each to a separate historical person. In fact, although the two personae are indeed useably distinct, it is not possible to know with certainty to what extent they may have coexisted in one or the other historical person, Socrates or Plato.

We know of Socrates through Plato's brilliant and attractive documentation in the Dialogues, yet the two personae are radically distinct when viewed politically. Plato, whose views surface in works such as the *Republic,* is an authoritarian, totalitarian centrist who would so like to control all things for the good that he advocates a genetically controlled secular hierarchy—a sort of Brave Old World—and would exile or regulate music and art as potentially disruptive. Plato's utopian "aristocracy," the rule of the best, is also communist, with community and State control of property, procreation, children, and education.[6] *Control* above all. Historical societies that have approached Plato's degree of centralism, without attaining its degree of control, include various kinds of theocracies, such as ancient Egypt or pre-Columbian Peru (two water monopolies); the Aztecs and the Nazis (warrior cultures based on human sacrifice); and, perhaps the closest approximation, China during the Cultural Revolution. This is the position of the Center.

Yet it was Plato who has seduced generations of readers with art—his fluid and lucid prose—into utter admiration for Socrates. Socrates the gadfly; Socrates who, if you met him in the street, would ask you uncomfortable questions, and would ask you to question what you took for granted; Socrates who thought and felt *apart from* his role in the city-state; Socrates the sower of contagious dissent, who was executed after conviction in a State trial for blasphemy and corrupting the youth. Socrates who pursued the goal of knowing oneself (*gnothi s'auton*). We may ask: What self? Where is its substance? Whatever it may be, it is a self apart from society's roles, a non-cog in the machine, though Socrates faithfully performed his duties within his society, serving for instance as a foot soldier in the Athenian army. It is a non-reactive and non-political kind of apartness. Socrates is so far from being a rebel, so devoted to duty, honor, country, that he chooses to die in obedience to the State rather than to go into exile. Socrates insists on self-definition, in an almost existentialist way. He is always *looking in,* looking for an "in," what the East Germans called "Innerlichkeit." Even

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[6] Plato's ranking of types of societies is: aristocracy or regency (merit), oligarchy, timocracy (wealth), democracy, tyranny. On the community of wives and children and education, see *Republic* V, 457 and VIII, 543; genetic regulation, III, 415; V, 459; VIII, 546–47. Interestingly, Plato's "government of the best" goes much against the grain of his own society in admitting women to power (V, 451, 455, 456).

if there is nothing in, the project of looking for an in or looking inwards-for-oneself—not to society—is definitive.

Although the life of Socrates was a basically secular project, there were religious elements: Socrates's "daemon" appeared to him from time to time, immobilizing him during its occupation and by its appearances encouraging his sense of self. But personal daemons were not common among the Greeks, and his was a curiosity to his circle.[7] Socrates constructed an idea and experience of the contemplative that had no parallel in Greek religions: the Delphic oracle is an anomaly—the Pythoness was the mystic *for all* (so that no one else need be mystical)—and the Eleusinian Mysteries were non-contemplative, organized ritual more akin to Masonic Rites than to, say, Jain or Christian mystical contemplation or to the tradition of "humanist" personal contemplation that sprang from Socrates and endures to this day.

From a centrist perspective, Socrates represents dissent, a "feeling apart from" that separates him from his matrix, even a flight from the center, a *bad seed.* But for Socrates, it is not the center or matrix that determines (as a mold determines what is molded) a dissent-as-reaction, dissent-as-negative. He is not a negative of society. He has made society's norms *irrelevant* in principle to his thoughts, while remaining fully engaged with that society. Socrates as apolitical non-religious dissent; Plato as political "reactionary," Plato-the-center as the negative of dissent, Plato as that which is molded by dissent—control. This is the foundational *Moment*—Hegelian tension—for Western philosophy and "humanism."

* * *

If Socrates and Plato, dissent and reactive centrism, are two sides of one half of the coin, the *symbolon,* the Judeo-Christian tradition provides the other half of the symbol of Western culture. Of course there is a broad parallel between the lives of Jesus and Socrates: Jesus was one with God but, like Socrates, "apart from" society without reacting to it as its negative, and executed for his apartness. (This is the home of the Girardian model.) In the case of Job, we have a complex situation involving God's negative reaction to Job's faith—almost as if God, tempted by Satan, were dissenting from His own worship. The locus is no longer society but faith in God, no longer political but religious, and God's perverse dissent is a negative of Himself.

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[7] Socrates's daemon may have been *petit mal* epilepsy, like Julius Caesar's, the affliction of many another eminent personage. If so, the *petit mal* seems to have been an intense part of their lives, and one which may have been helpful or formative for these people. Any medical description cannot trivialize the experience.

But it is the Fall that is definitive here, rather than the Girardian Jesus or the Case of Job. John Milton, that genius of a culture so occupied by Original Sin, asks the Heavenly Muse to sing

> Of Man's First Disobedience, and the Fruit
> Of that Forbidden Tree, whose mortal taste
> Brought Death into the world, and all our woe. [*Paradise Lost* I, 1–3]

God, who

> from the first
> Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread
> Dove-like satst brooding on the vast Abyss
> And madest it pregnant. [I,19–22]

This God describes himself as he orders his Son (*ho logos*) to create the world with a word. He says to His Son:

> bid the Deep
> Within appointed bounds be Heav'n and Earth,
> Boundless the Deep, because I am who fill
> Infinitude, nor vacuous the space.
> Though I uncircumscrib'd myself retire,
> And put not forth my goodness, which is free
> To act or not, Necessity and Chance
> Approach not mee, and what I will is Fate. [VII, 166–73]

A pervasive Center with a singularity in it allowing dissent. The Apple is the power of dissent—as invoked by the Serpent:

> O Sacred, Wise, and Wisdom-giving plant,
> Mother of Science, Now I feel thy Power
> Within me clear, not only to discern
> Things in their Causes, but to trace the ways
> Of highest Agents, deem'd however wise. [IX, 679–83]

Without this dissent, there would be no human story, no history. Whereas the dissent of Socrates was the mold filled by Plato's Center, here the omnipotent, omnipresent God is the mold, Sin and the Fall its negative, dissent molded by the Center: a double obverse. In each case, dissent takes the form of self-knowledge, *gnothi s'auton,* knowledge of Good and Evil: *autonomy.*

In later Christianity there arises another kind of dissent: faith as self-knowledge. Faith, oneness with God, is dissent, from society and from the Church. The implicit model is Jesus. St. Francis of Assisi, for example, was a troublemaker, a problem for the Church, who could stand over against the Church within the Church because of the inner authority of his faith. Change within the Christian religion has been catalyzed by this kind of dissent-through-faith, this affirmation of autonomy with respect to society and institutions such as the Church, through the individual relation to God. So the question is not Church versus State. These are merely two societal institutions squaring off or relating or even merging. The question is one of the possibility of individual autonomy, giving law to oneself (or taking law directly from God to oneself). The dissenter is "apart from" culture and society and the secular or religious institutions. The opposite of dissent is compliance.

Art is dissent. Issues of elitism, "high" or cultivated versus "low" or popular art, mechanisms of patronage and support (by Church or aristocracy or bourgeoisie or State)—all these are basically red herrings. Art is dissent, autonomy, feeling apart from, taking responsibility for one's own foundations, then putting forth that autonomy in an object designed to engage others. Entertainment and folk art are often mere compliance, working within given norms and rules, crafting objects that reaffirm their place and the place of the crafter in an unquestioned regime. The entertainer is not an agent. Autonomy is an Archimedean place to stand, from which an act is possible.

* * *

We have seen that dissent is not necessarily rebellion or violence: Socrates the good citizen, Francis the good Catholic. What is music's relation to violence? Sound is inherently invasive—one cannot turn one's ears away from a sound—but sound is not necessarily violent in itself. Think of soothing noises. The violence music may have, or be, is composed into it. Violent music, the beat, is especially apt for that originary scene. The beat exemplifies the dangerous focus of the periphery on the center and its resolution either in violence or in an act of reference. Music, dance, and ritual all function to celebrate as well as to exemplify that deferral of actual violence through the constitution of a community. Music that has pronounced beats facilitates the coordination of the movements of the crowd in the dance, stamping and jerking, bobbing and weaving together to the beat in kinetic camaraderie. Here is an indifference preserved from mimetic rivalry by the reference of the beat to reference, and to the emissary victim; preserved by the reference of the beat to the moment of sacrifice. Blissful identity in community.

So one of the most violent things a musician can do is to compose music without a beat. With a reduced presence of the beat, music can be construed as reverting to a reference to the moment of the originary scene *prior to* the constitution of religion, language, and community, or to its analog in society; the periphery thus unstructured is prey to violence among its members. From Webern's floating palindromes, to the watercolor washes of Boulez (the *maitre sans marteau*), the intricated implications of Milton Byron Babbitt (a beat like a "bush, with frizzled hair implicit" [*Paradise Lost* VII, 323]), some pieces by Ligeti, such as the Cello Concerto, *Volumina,* or *Atmosphères,* some electronic music—these are radical and revolutionary proposals, in that the music to some extent cuts loose from the reassurance of the beat, freeing the crowd from the ritual violence that affirms identity in community, and making possible the renewal of an individuality in nonhierarchical indifference that may dangerously revalidate the original mimetic rivalry. This music at least no longer celebrates the deferral of violence.

The beat is not the whole story. Xenakis's clouds of sounds, especially in stochastic pieces such as *Metastasis* and *Pithoprakta,* are beat-free and decentered, but this music so explicitly embodies crowd violence (which Xenakis has traced to his youth during the civil war in Greece) that it always refers to peace. The Minimalists, especially Philip Glass, conjure away the beat by stroking it to death. Under the surface of a Glass opera, under the superficially sweet tonal sounds and iterated patterns, lies anarchy barely restrained by a neofascistical rage for order—compare *Einstein on the Beach,* for example, with the monumental, repetitive architecture of Il Duce's *Esposizione Universale di Roma.*[8] John Cage shuns syntax as a military metaphor, encouraging a gentle, depersonalized anarchy, approaching anarchy not from the neofascist angle but from a Zen minimalism of the self that eludes structure from without by opening the self.

If in medieval chant we have a free-flowing, beatless art music that is communal, centrist, and nonviolent (because in that culture the emissary victim is consumed daily), in contemporary rock we have a music—mostly a trade rather than an art—decked out with all the trappings of violence and individuality, which slavishly serves identity and the Center, snarling and fawning, aping the gestures of dominance and submission. Black leather and the lash of the backbeat. Watch them dance! This music-commodity

[8] I am by no means accusing anybody of fascist political convictions; Glass in particular would seem from his libretti to be rather liberal. It is the music in itself that seems to have this character, which is part of the fascination it has for me. For a devastating feminist critique of power relations in Minimalist visual art, see Anna Chave, "Minimalism and the Rhetoric of Power," *The Arts Magazine* (January 1990): 44–63.

needs to mass-produce its consumers. It is so effective at this, and at promoting the ecstasy of identity and submission, that there is always the possibility of a backlash. But such impulses of individuality and rebellion—even those of the performers as they are inducted into the system, and even MTV's own self-mocking and autopastiche—are siphoned off into their simulacra and resold to the consumer, reinforcing the instrumentality of the music and its performers, the submission of the consumer, and the dominance of the system that links them. The chant that is packaged for today's popular audience is no doubt partly a soothing "new age" narcotic, partly a renaissance of appreciation for the musical qualities of chant, but would also (at night, so to speak) share with Webern and Boulez an individualizing potential for mass violence, no longer, as it was in its native culture, defused by the Mass. However, we already see the emergence of a totally debased popular-music chant *style* that deflects individualization by Disneyfication.

* * *

These permutations need to be rethought from the perspective of feminist theory. Has violence been gendered? Is violence in fact male, in some sense that is prior to the constructions of gender? If so, would this suffice to condemn violence in all contexts? Can one coherently condemn Beethoven's Ninth for violence while maintaining a posture of approval toward violent rock such as Heavy Metal?[9] Both promote community by celebrating violence. But in the case of Beethoven, it is a violence of personal struggle against adversity, more intimate, more constructive, and more meaningful than the violence of rock, which is therefore less threatening than Beethoven. Neither is subversive, except that Beethoven's art is dissent, while most rock is compliance. (Not all: think of Jimi Hendrix.) Are such notions as hierarchy, the Center, reference and the symbol as such, and the Lacanian Symbolic all phallogocentric, as many theorists maintain? Is there in music (as I have suggested elsewhere) a way out of the semiotics trap, a way to render irrelevant not only the symbol, the referent, the sign, and signification, but even the theory behind the sig-

[9] Against Beethoven, see for example Susan McClary, *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), particularly the essay "Getting Down Off the Beanstalk," 112–31; for Beethoven and against McClary, see Pieter van den Toorn, "Politics, Feminism, and Contemporary Music Theory," *The Journal of Musicology* 9, no. 3 (1991): 275–99 (especially pp. 285ff.); and replying to van den Toorn, Ruth A. Solie, "What Do Feminists Want? A Reply to Pieter van den Toorn," *The Journal of Musicology* 9, no. 4 (1991): 399–411.

nifier?[10] If this complex is indeed escapable, why should one try to escape? If it is escapable, and if it is desirable to escape it, how can such concepts as the symbol, or hierarchy, be replaced with feminist or alteritive constructions? What would be the criteria guiding such construction—what kinds of structuration are either nongendered or nonmale, and what values might operate during this reconstruction? For example, would dominance give way to anarchy, or to some tribal solid block of interrelatedness, embedding its members like flies in amber? Should violence be courted and recuperated, or avoided entirely, and what consequences would this have for society—without violence, what about order, what about change? Is some kind of individualism possible, or desirable?

Does autonomy imply a "centered subject," or even a "subject"? Does dissent incorporate center—swallow it—so that there would be a proliferation of individual centers, mini-Mussolinis? Just as Plato in the *Republic* approaches the character of people through the character of the State, then reflects the qualities of each kind of State back into the character of its citizens, so dissent can be recursed into the person. There is a politics of the body and psyche. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have advocated (in the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*) an anti-oedipal indiscipline of schizoanalysis, a nonstructure of the rhizome, the individual as the swarm, the pack, and the machine.[11] They will tell you how to make yourself a body without organs—the person as machinic assemblage, nonhierarchized *objets partiaux* or desiring intensities which are unlinked by any semiosis, non-totalized.[12] Such partial objects exemplify

> the exact criterion of real distinction in Spinoza and Leibniz: they do not depend on one another and do not tolerate any relation of opposition or contradiction among themselves. The absence of all direct links guarantees their common participation in the divine substance. Likewise for the partial objects and the body without organs: the body without organs is substance itself, and the partial objects, the ultimate attributes or elements of substance.[13]

These notions of substance and the Body Without Organs will recall Julia Kristeva's construction of the "chora," a primordial flux or cosmic

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[10] John Rahn, "Differences," *Perspectives of New Music* 31, no. 2 (1993): 58–71.

[11] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (New York: Viking Press, 1977), and idem, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Volume 2,* trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

[12] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* chap. 6, "November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?," 149–66.

[13] Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus,* 309, unnumbered footnote.

egg of the infant psyche, a turbulence of Freudian "drives" not yet subjected to the order of the symbolic, or even to the regime of the posited and therefore of the subject as such, a "place" which fertilizes with its creative anarchy the revolution that is poetic language. Kristeva's semiotics is of the creative *énonciation* rather than the packaged *énoncé,* and her *chora* is a possible construction of music.[14]

Judith Butler's recent study *Gender Trouble* repudiates the subject and substance by radically historicizing personhood in an austere neo-Foucauldian framework of exoskeletal discourses of power:

> when the subject is said to be constituted, that means simply that the subject is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses that govern the intelligible invocation of identity [and of gender]. The subject is not *determined* by the rules through which it is generated because signification is *not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition* that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of substantializing effects. In a sense, all signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat; "agency," then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition.[15]

Butler's attempt "to locate the political in the very signifying practices that establish, regulate, and deregulate identity"[16] relies on signification, which would seem to tie it uncomfortably to some of the discourses she as agent is averting, but does point a way to the possibility of subjectless (but rather musical) agency as a dynamic balancing act (without an actor, the deed without the doer) among a multiplicity of jostling discourses of power, a scene that resonates powerfully with the feeling of "postmodernism."

Dissent and autonomy may have started life in a world of discourse that produced Plato's Center as the reaction to them, but the dissent of Socrates, like the act that creates art, depends only on the possibility of agency, of an act that is not compliance. Dissent is not cast in terms of freedom, because determinism is irrelevant to it. If "face" is the surface a person presents to the world, and an "interface" is two or more faces in full or

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[14] Julia Kristeva, "La sémiologie: Science critique et/ou critique de la science," *Théorie d'ensemble* (Paris: Éditions du seuil, 1968); idem, *La révolution du langage poétique* (Paris: Éditions du seuil, 1974); and idem, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection,* trans. Leon Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

[15] Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 145.

[16] Butler, *Gender Trouble,* 147.

partial contact, then "compliance" is the plastering of one face over the surface of the other, more or less completely or tightly adhering to each wrinkle and fold of the other facial surface. A superfacial theorist might even say that consciousness is hidden away in the facial fold, sheltered in *le pli* that constitutes it: the face is it.[17] So that one face can, with the cooperation of another, act as a template for it. The consumer in the face of TV: passive compliance as the active revenge of the masses.[18] The extent to which a theory adheres only to surfaces, exports the person to the face in a characteristically postmodern way, is its degree of superficiality, which amounts in the case of postmodernism to superfaciality: for example, Butler's notion of agency as eclectic compliance. Even in such an agentless world *sur faces,* agency makes dissent and autonomy possible. The demands of a particular person's discourse may produce a theory of the person that is radically multiple, a theory that also constructs personality as fugitively multiple, as in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* yet without forfeiting agency and dissent: it imports dissent. The idea of an "in" may be problematic, even sexist, and is certainly polar. The idea of a "subject" may be repugnant because of its phallogocentrism; or because of its "substance" (for those who can believe in a subject that has substance); or because of its transparent origin in the subject-object grammar of languages such as Greek, whereas it would be only an interestingly perverse idea within Hawaiian (which has no verbs corresponding to "be" or "have,"[19] and so cannot easily hypostasize a subject-place) or within the predicate

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[17] Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Paris: Minuit, 1986); and idem, *Le pli* (Paris: Minuit, 1988). See also idem and Felix Guattari, "Faciality," *A Thousand Plateaus,* 167–91.

[18] As I have put it elsewhere: "Why is MTV so popular? Jean Baudrillard (Baudrillard 1988) has suggested that 'the masses,' to which each of us belongs (this is not some term of alienation or condescension), have adopted the strategy of the appearance of passivity under the importunities of a media complex which has hypertrophied in an age of 'information,' transforming itself from communication to the hyper-reality of the simulacrum. The territory is the map, which has no other reference; the feigned *is.* Just as strategies of becoming, such as vigorous intellection and the actualization of self, and the whole project of philosophy, resist the demand that we be objects, and thus are a response to oppression and repression, so do strategies of being-object resist (in the middle voice) the demand for speech, for the maximization of production of meaning and participation in an increasingly rapidly changing social milieu of which the media are at once sign and simulacrum. The deceit practiced by the couch potato is its revenge. It is a vegetable *by strategy.*" John Rahn, "Repetition," *Contemporary Music Review* 7 (1993): 49–58.

[19] Mary Kawena Pukui, Samuel H. Elbert, and Esther T. Mookini, *The Pocket Hawaiian Dictionary* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1975), "Grammar," 253. Imagine a Platonic metaphysics in a language where "Beauty is good" is rendered "Maika`i ka nani," a noun, an article, and a noun, without any copula. See Samuel H. Elbert, *Spoken Hawaiian* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1970), 34.

calculus (in which there are only predicates and variables). Or the idea of the subject may be repugnant because it is captive to what I have called the tradition of "optical separation" from Plato to Hegel to Lacan, a separation bound up with the theory of the sign and signification in language in a way that may or may not be otiose, but to which music is an alternative.[20] Dissent and autonomy depend on none of these constructions.

Theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari, Kristeva, and Butler are all dissenters. As theorists, they are artists, "putting forth their autonomy in an object designed to engage others," as I put it above. The work of such contemporary artists in the literature called critical theory, or simply "theory," is exciting and promising partly because, like Marxism and Freudianism, the most effective of the philosophies originating in the nineteenth century, this new work combines theory with praxis. "Theory," especially that which engages the intimate politics of gender, is an intellectual pursuit that involves a way of living one's life. Like religion, and like art, it brings each everyday action and thought into a grand arena in which very complex and subtle structures contend for the quotidian.

Art is part of life. Dissent in art is dissent in life. The autonomy of a composer is also autonomy within music. A composer cannot choose to affirm the musical Center while remaining an artist. The Center in art is its death. The Center is not tradition, any more than the Center is History in society in general. One may choose to affirm tradition, even in a reactionary way, like George Rochberg; this can still be an artistic choice, a perilous act of dissent, based in apartness and autonomy. Every minutest compositional choice that is a choice requires that cool and merciless apartness. The composer who falls too closely and precipitously in love with her work in progress falls prey to sentimentality, convention, automatism—anything but art—and the work dies. The composer's engagement with the work in progress makes it the world of the composer, that grand arena in which very complex and subtle structures contend from moment to moment. Most intimately, it is from this world of the artwork that the composer must dissent while participating in its creation. Assuming for the moment a Lacanian view of the Symbolic, the artist (of any sex) is the father of the work, stepping into an intellectual hyperconsciousness for its creation. Reciprocally, the work is the mother of the artist, a daughter (of any sex) who must wean herself at every continuous suckle, absorbing and being absorbed, but finding autonomy even within total sensuous and sensual involvement.

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[20] Rahn, "Differences," 63.

Composing music is a way of living one's life. That very intimate apartness from the work while creating the work, the dissent that makes it art, is itself the engagement of the work (and of the artist) with the world. The music is an object available to others in all its *Sichselbstgleichheit,* because apartness is built into it.

Without this engagement between the work and the world, there is no possibility of dissent, of autonomy of the artist within the world, because such dissent is not indifference. It is a difference that requires participation. And for all of us, only such participatory dissent and engaged autonomy between the artist and the world make possible acts of art that move us towards the Center, or away—that, like Circe, bind us ever more closely to compliance, or that accompany our Penelopean autonomy.

ABSTRACT

To explore the question "How can someone create art now?," the essay first sketches a broad historical framework, and continues by peering through a lens made of two concepts: the center, and dissent. It explores the Greek influence (Plato the centrist, Socrates the dissenter; dissent as apartness, the center as control molded by dissent) and Christianity (dissent in Job, the Fall, and St. Francis). Whereas the dissent of Socrates was the mold filled by Plato's Center, in Christianity the omnipotent, omnipresent God is the mold, Sin and the Fall its negative, dissent molded by the Center: a double obverse.

The essay talks about contemporary music and violence: the beat and the originary scene (Boulez), other strategies (Xenakis, Cage); commodification; rock promoting the ecstasy of identity and submission; Disneyfication. It explores feminism on violence; critical theory on the subject; the Deleuzian Body Without Organs and Kristeva's *chora;* and Judith Butler on subjectless agency, signification as a regulated process of repetition. Finally, the essay touches on the relations among dissent, autonomy, agency; superfaciality; insignification; theory as praxis as art as life; and intimate apartness built into the *Sichselbstgleichheit* of the work of art.

reviews

Musicology and Difference: Gender and Sexuality in Music Scholarship, ed. Ruth A. Solie. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993. ix, 355 pp.

Like Serenus Zeitblom, the hopelessly incompetent narrator in Thomas Mann's *Doktor Faustus,* I feel singularly unequipped for the task at hand. With topics ranging from Mozart to Mapuche healers, from musical cross-dressing to the Hasidic codes regulating women's singing, *Musicology and Difference*—closely edited and cogently introduced by Ruth A. Solie—is sure to challenge even the critically nimblest readers. The authors of the volume's sixteen essays comprise a correspondingly diverse group: musicologists (three of them doubling as a sociologist, novelist, and English professor) and ethnomusicologists; senior scholars of established reputation; and members of a younger generation of writers already at the vanguard of the New Musicology. Their work, as represented here, is often illuminating, sometimes aggravating, but almost always stimulating.

The diversity of subject matter, orientation, and approach aptly reflects the "difference" proclaimed in the book's title, a Derridean difference no doubt, though oddly enough, few of the authors draw directly on the work of the French philosopher and cultural critic. For Derrida, difference (or more properly, that combination of radical alterity and perennial postponement he calls *différance*) amounts to no less than the structure of the psyche. The elements in such binary oppositions as subject and object, signifier and signified, or Self and Other are not merely opposites, for on Derrida's view, each of the paired terms only acquires meaning in relation to its antithesis.[1] Although *Musicology and Difference* is concerned largely with differences relative to gender and sexuality (and their role in the musical world), it is nonetheless clear that the structure of difference *per se* informs the thinking and mode of argument of the volume's authors.

Ostensibly an attempt "to chart the terrain of the difference debate" (p. 3), Solie's thoughtful "Introduction: On 'Difference'" does considerably more. In effect a critique of the entire book, her essay goes a long way toward sparing critics of their labors. Indeed, among the book's most

[1] For a critique of Derrida's position, see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's "Translator's Preface" to Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), xix–xx, xliii–xliv.

intriguing features are the moments of self-critique embedded within it. Leo Treitler's "Gender and Other Dualities of Music History," for instance, pointedly questions the key assumptions that many of the other authors in the volume adopt less critically. The writing of Western music history, Treitler argues, has been characterized by gender duality practically from the start. While twentieth-century scholars such as Bruno Stäblein have drawn freely on gendered rhetoric to describe the chant melodies of the (so-called) Old Roman tradition—its "femininity," for example, is encoded in terms on the order of "soft, elegant, charming and graceful"—even medieval writers attributed "masculine" qualities, including strength, power, and virtue, to the chants of the Gregorian repertory (pp. 26–27). Similarly, the view of Beethoven's style as the epitome of masculinity in Western music—in contrast to which the style of, say, Chopin, represents the feminine Other—had already taken hold by the middle years of the nineteenth century. But for Treitler, the binary opposition of masculine and feminine traits in music-historical discourse speaks primarily to an archetypal duality embedded in Western thinking, and only secondarily to political or ideological agendas. He goes so far as to ask the potentially damning question: "Is it now to be a task of gender studies in music to reinforce the long practiced role of gender duality in critical and historical discourse by developing a more explicit essentialism of gender?" (p. 41). Although he does not want to rule out the possibility that gender and sexuality play an important role in the musical imagination, Treitler remains skeptical of the possibilities for their embodiment in the musical products of culture, nor is he convinced by arguments in favor of the ineluctable links between the nature of humankind and the nature of its music.

Solie too is keenly aware of the dilemmas posed by difference and its attendant concepts, though she locates them elsewhere. Different or discriminatory treatment can stigmatize an individual or a group, but similar treatment for all can also stigmatize by failing to take into account extenuating circumstances that may require an awareness of differences. A slippery concept, difference can work to the benefit or detriment of oppressed and oppressor alike. One response, Solie suggests, would have us consider not only the differences *between* the terms in an antithetical pair (male/female, gay/straight), but also the differences *within* these terms. Nancy Reich adopts just this strategy in "Women as Musicians: A Question of Class." The women musicians of the nineteenth century, she relates, were hardly a monolithic group but rather a highly diversified one: some of them were "artist musicians" who supported themselves through their musical activities; others, in contrast, were nonprofessionals from the bourgeois aristocracy. Of course, the binary opposition between men and women contributed to the difficulties faced by both groups of female musicians.

Although conservatories opened their doors to women of all classes, we learn how differently—and often prejudicially—they were treated in comparison with their male colleagues. (Ernst Rudorff, deputy director of the Berlin Königliche Hochschule für Musik in the 1880s, strongly objected to the presence of women in orchestras, for "With only a very few exceptions, they do *nothing* but exchange looks with the men and chatter" [p. 145].) Neither female artist-musicians, frequently engaged at disgracefully low wages, nor bourgeois aristocrats, their ambitions held in check by small-minded fathers, brothers, and husbands, had an easy time of it. The brave figure who dared cross over from amateur to professional status, like Fanny Hensel, was the exception and not the rule.

One of the volume's chief goals, as articulated in Solie's introductory essay, is to show "what pieces of music can express or reflect of the people who made and use them, and thus of the differences between and among those people" (p. 3). Among the salutary effects of this attitude is its embrace of areas generally ignored by traditional musical scholarship—namely gender, race, class, and sexuality. The New Musicology, in other words, promises to redress an imbalance: the concentration of historical writing (and Western musical culture) on the achievements of white male artists, a largely middle- or upper-class, (seemingly) heterosexual group. (Madame de Staël's ironic commentary on the position of women writers *vis-à-vis* their male counterparts indicates that the outlines of current debates on difference were already drawn in the early nineteenth century: "It would be no doubt . . . preferable for women to devote themselves entirely to the domestic virtues," for unfortunately men "are much likelier to forgive women for neglecting these duties than for attracting attention by unusual talent."[2]) Scholars sensitive to difference will thus help to bring marginalized repertories and musical practices to the fore, and at least on this issue, students of European-American art music will have something to learn from their ethnomusicological colleagues. As Carol E. Robertson demonstrates in "The Ethnomusicologist as Midwife," a fascinating study of Argentina's Mapuche shamans and Hawaii's *mahu* (mixed-gender individuals known for their key roles as dancers, chanters, teachers, and drummers for the *hula*), both groups negotiate complex and shifting relation-

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[2] See the chapter entitled "On Women Writers," in Germaine de Staël, *On Literature Considered in Its Relationship to Social Institutions* (1800); trans. by Vivian Folkenflik in *An Extraordinary Woman: Selected Writings of Germaine de Staël* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 201. Writing two years earlier, Friedrich Schlegel addressed a similar predicament in *Athenäum* Fragment 49: "Women are treated as unjustly in poetry as in life. If they're feminine, they're not ideal, and if ideal, not feminine." See Peter Firchow, trans., *Friedrich Schlegel's Lucinde and the Fragments* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 167.

ships between the periphery and the center of their respective cultures. And as Ellen Koskoff shows in "Miriam Sings Her Song: The Self and the Other in Anthropological Discourse," the ethnographer can restore to prominence a particular practice, in this case the singing of Lubavitcher women, that such intracultural codes as the Hasidic doctrine of *kol isha* (according to which men are proscribed from hearing the voice of "forbidden" women) have consigned to the margins of society.

Nonetheless, several of the contributors to *Musicology and Difference*—John Shepherd, Mitchell Morris, Philip Brett, Lawrence Kramer, Susan McClary, and Ruth Solie—protest too much in insisting that the investigation of music as a reflection of human concerns has for too long remained on the periphery of musical scholarship. For isn't this only a variation on a venerable critical theme: the nature of the relationship between Art and Life? Whereas Philipp Spitta, Otto Jahn, and Arnold Schering were convinced of the mutual reflectivity of these (very different) terms, later writers on the life and work of Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven have been considerably more skeptical. Already by the early years of the twentieth century, the notion that lived experience is the stuff of art (a doctrine made intellectually respectable by Wilhelm Dilthey's so-called *Lebensphilosophie*) came under fire in literary-critical circles. Walter Benjamin led the attack in essays on Friedrich Hölderlin's poetry (1914–15) and Goethe's *Wahlverwandschaften* (1921/22), where he argued against the traditional comparison of the move from Life to Art with passage over a bridge, opting instead for the Hölderlinian image of a leap over an abyss.[3] Will the New Musicology restore the now (somewhat) tarnished Diltheyan perspective?

For Elizabeth Wood ("Lesbian Fugue: Ethel Smyth's Contrapuntal Arts"), the answer is, I fear, yes. Composers, she claims, may "use music as a sound-form of narrative: as a way to tell truths about life" (p. 164). And in Wood's view, Ethel Smyth (1858–1944) employed the art of fugue and fugal counterpoint to this end during her earlier years to "reveal and con-

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[3] Walter Benjamin, "Goethes Wahlverwandschaften," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, I, no. 1, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974), 155–58; and idem, "Zwei Gedichte von Friedrich Hölderlin," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, no. 1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977), 105–26. For a summary of Dilthey's point of view (as articulated in his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* [1883]), see R. G. Collingwood's classic study, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 171–76. On Dilthey's view, not only art, but historical knowledge itself was a reflection of immediate experience. A number of thinkers (Hans-Georg Gadamer among them) have continued to draw intellectual sustenance from the experiential aspect of Dilthey's theories. For a recent account of the relationship between Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophie* and early twentieth-century musical hermeneutics, see Lee A. Rothfarb, "Hermeneutics and Energetics: Analytical Alternatives in the Early 1900s," *Journal of Music Theory* 36 (1992), 50–56.

ceal lesbian experience" (p. 165). To be sure, the fugal metaphor is not inappropriate for Smyth's at times farcically complicated personal life, which the composer herself likened to a "contrapuntal struggle among conflicting themes" (p. 168). But aren't most lives comparable at some level to fugues, if not to the thundering *St. Anne* fugue that was Smyth's life, then at least to the *Little G-minor* fugue? Moreover, it is difficult to know how Smyth's fugues might have encoded a specifically lesbian experience: Wood provides few clues in her cursory discussion of the handful of fugues dating from Smyth's student days (pp. 181–82).

Philip Brett is more successful in traversing the abyss that separates Life from Art in "Britten's Dream," a sensitive account of the British composer's engagement with homosexual themes—sometimes latent and frequently subversive—in his chief operatic works from *Peter Grimes* (1945) to *Death in Venice* (1973). Focusing on *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (1960), Brett shows how, paradoxically enough, the stage afforded Britten with a covert medium for the expression of an otherwise inexpressible gay thematic. And indeed, several aspects of Shakespeare's play readily lend themselves to a gay reading: its ludic, carnivalesque side becomes a metaphor for the unruly world of the senses; its ghosts and dreams suggest the homosexual's closet; and its central relationship, that between Oberon and Puck, harbors clear homosexual overtones. But again, Brett's argument falters on the question of a musical encipherment of homosexuality. Britten's camp portrayal of Thisby, Bottom's temporary "usurpation" of Oberon's falsetto, and a timbral palette suggestive of the "Other" for the scene of Tytania's bewitchment at the end of Act I are, according to Brett, the principal manifestations of a "gay" music in Britten's opera. The list, in my view, is not impressive.

Another sticking point for observers of gender and sexuality in music is the question of essentialism, the notion that specific characteristics are constitutive for specific individuals or social groups. I have already alluded to Treitler's concern that gender criticism, insofar as it is founded on an arguably essentialist distinction, runs the risk of promoting precisely those oppressive differences that a liberal humanist scholarship would rather obliterate. One such distinction—less oppressive than just plain silly—informs the nineteenth-century practice of ascribing masculine and feminine qualities to musical themes. Certainly it is important for us, as cultural historians and critics, to understand the nuances in the development of this practice. Hence Gretchen Wheelock, in "*Schwarze Gredel* and the Engendered Minor Mode in Mozart's Operas," shows that some eighteenth-century theorists also viewed tonal areas and modal inflections in terms of the masculine-feminine duality. But whereas the theoretical literature tended to associate the "feminine" minor mode with such affective quali-

ties as gloom, tenderness, and sweetness, Wheelock argues for its role "as a more robust agent of instability" (largely through chromatic alterations and modulatory excursions) in Mozart's dramatic works (p. 202). For McClary ("Narrative Agendas in 'Absolute' Music: Identity and Difference in Brahms's Third Symphony"), the gender ideology of sonata form—an ideology that Brahms subjects to a critique—requires a "masculine" first theme to triumph over the "feminine Other" represented by the second. It seems to me that, to borrow one of Thomas Mann's favorite turns of phrase, the gendering of themes and tonalities is "bad" eighteenth-century, worse nineteenth-century, and positively deplorable twentieth-century criticism. Both Wheelock and McClary could have made their chief points regarding Mozart's operas and Brahms's symphony without recourse to the notion of gendered keys and themes. Why not, then, return it to the dustbin of received ideas where it belongs?

Solie also addresses the problematic inherent in an essentialist stance. The solution, she argues, is to remain sensitive to questions of difference without lapsing into a "cozy" essentialism (p. 6). Those who nurture such sensitivities will, for example, realize that universal standards of criticism may devolve into "coercive standards of valuation" (p. 10). Most of the contributors to *Musicology and Difference* tacitly subscribe to this view (as do I). But at the same time, it may account for the curious slighting of aesthetics in the book as a whole, for the aesthetics most of us know is a "classically" oriented straight-white-European-male construct; it will simply not do justice to Ethel Smyth's fugues or the *nigunim* of the Lubavitcher, repertories for which we cannot turn to ready-made evaluative standards. Still, I would have hoped for a better idea of the general shape that such standards might take.

If the New Musicology requires a new aesthetic, then it will have to commit itself with greater urgency to an engagement with the workings of music. It is a telling fact, I think, that of the sixteen articles in *Musicology and Difference,* only five have musical examples. And if finals and confinals, antecedents and consequents, and first and second themes no longer suffice, then among our primary desiderata should be a determination of what *will* suffice. Otherwise even the most impassioned rhetoric will ring hollow indeed. In "Difference and Power in Music," for instance, Shepherd asserts: "Genres that are valued [in industrial capitalist societies] tend to have stylistic characteristics regarded as less challenging to the established social and moral order" (p. 59). Although he mentions no specific compositions, we can infer (from his argument that those with power and influence have treated popular and folk music pejoritavely [p. 60]) that the genres alluded to in the quotation are those of the "classical" repertory. But if Shepherd would really consider Ravel "less challenging"

than the Red Hot Chili Peppers, then he should give us a clearer idea of the "stylistic characteristics" upon which his observations are grounded. In Carol Robertson's article, Carolina Milliapi, the Mapuche healer whose practice shuttles between the periphery and the center of Argentinian society, is portrayed as a master of the "song codes"—combinations of "tones, durations, and magical texts"—that can unleash the medical and spiritual secrets of rivers, clouds, mountains, and plants (p. 111). As musicians, however, we will want to know more about the relationship between these rhythmed chants and their hermetic texts than Robertson divulges.

For Shepherd, Robertson, and most of the other authors represented in *Musicology and Difference,* music is not the solipsistic phenomenon described by mainstream Western musicology. On the contrary, it is seriously implicated in larger social contexts, the analysis of which should be the business not only of the cultural critic, but also of the music historian. Kramer's "*Carnaval,* Cross-Dressing, and the Woman in the Mirror" places in relief the methodological difficulties faced by a critic who takes off from the reasonable premise that music is "a dynamic part of social practice" (p. 305). As a part of his demonstration of Schumann's engagement with the cultural and psychological aspects of carnival festivity, Kramer tries to establish that the composer "was strongly drawn to fantasies of gender mobility and feminine identification" (p. 309). One of the items adduced in support of this claim is drawn from a letter of 17 March 1838 from Schumann to Clara Wieck, which Kramer quotes in Peter Ostwald's translation: "I've put on my frilly dress and composed the 30 cute little things from which I've selected about twelve and called them 'Scenes from Childhood'" (p. 309).[4] My curiosity piqued by the striking image of Schumann donning his "frilly dress" (and his apparent willingness to share this fantasy with the young woman who would soon be his wife), I felt a glance at the original was in order. The passage reads as follows: "es war mir ordentlich wie im Flügelkleide und hab da an die 30 kleine putzige Dinger geschrieben, von denen ich etwa zwölf ausgelesen und 'Kinderscenen' genannt habe."[5] The opening clause is not easily translatable, but one thing is certain: it cannot be rendered as "I put on my frilly dress," in

[4] Peter Ostwald, *Schumann: The Inner Voices of a Musical Genius* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1985), 140.

[5] I have reproduced the passage as it appears in the source from which Ostwald quotes, Berthold Litzmann, *Clara Schumann: Ein Künstlerleben,* vol. 1 (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1902), 194. Cf. also Robert and Clara Schumann, *Briefwechsel: Kritische Gesamtausgabe,* vol. 1: 1832–1838, ed. Eva Weissweiler (Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld/Roter Stern, 1984), 121, which gives "Flügelkleid" instead of "Flügelkleide," and "ihrer" instead of "etwa."

which case Schumann would have written something like "Ich zog mein Flügelkleid an." A literal translation might read: "It actually felt as though I were in a little girl's dress with hanging sleeves";[6] but the sense of the clause is more along the lines of: "I actually put myself into a child's frame of mind." Indeed, the previous sentence in the letter reads "[While composing] I seemed to hear an echo of the words you once wrote to me: 'Many times you would have thought me a child'."[7] Moreover, a look at the entries for *Flügelkleid* in the Grimm brothers' *Deutsches Wörterbuch*—an indispensible source for investigating nineteenth-century German cultural contexts—indicates that the term was frequently used as a metaphor for youthful innocence or efflorescent nature. Consider, for example, this excerpt from the *Hesperus* of Schumann's favorite novelist, Jean Paul: "My eyes leapt about from the nearby foliage to the buds, those *Flügelkleider* of burgeoning springtime."[8] Hence Ostwald's translation is tantamount to misrepresenting "Things are going great guns" as "I got out my rifle."

Kramer's source for his assertion that in late February 1830 Schumann went to a "masked ball dressed as a woman" (p. 310) is again Ostwald's biography. Ostwald in turn culled this tidbit from Frederick Niecks's *Robert Schumann* (1925). Writing to his brother Julius from Heidelberg on 11 February, Schumann reports that he, along with other members of a sledding club called the "Saxo-boroussia," enacted a "travelling peasants'-wedding" (one imagines the club's sled done up like a float), and that he "took the part of the mother of the bride" ("ich stellte die Mutter der Braut vor").[9] Whether he was "dressed up for" ("verkleidet") the part (like the Hanseatic sledders, who were "dressed up in sailors' outfits" ["verkleidet in Matrosentrachten"]), we cannot know. Regardless, there is a difference between appearing at a masked ball in drag and participating in a group effort sponsored by an all-male student club. (It is perhaps worth mentioning here that none of the men wears *Flügelkleider* in a representation of the masquerade that Schumann knew very well: the penultimate chapter [*Larven-Tanz*] of *Flegeljahre,* his favorite among Jean Paul's novels). The establishment of a cultural context—especially when nineteenth-century diction and a composer with literary pretensions are involved—is undeni-

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[6] For a nineteenth-century definition of *Flügelkleid,* see Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, s.v. "Flügelkleid," *Deutsches Wörterbuch,* vol. 3 (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1862), col. 1842.

[7] Robert and Clara Schumann, *Briefwechsel* 1, p. 121.

[8] Grimm, s.v. "Flügelkleid," cols. 1842–43.

[9] See Ostwald, *Schumann,* 61; Frederick Niecks, *Robert Schumann* (New York: Dutton, 1925), 87; and *Jugendbriefe von Robert Schumann,* ed. Clara Schumann, 4th ed. (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1910), 103.

ably a tedious affair, but we had better resign ourselves to that fact lest we mistakenly map our own cultural context onto Schumann's.

Kramer's discussion of musical cross-dressing is similarly suspect. In his view, *Coquette,* the seventh miniature in *Carnaval,* is suggestive of a female impersonator, the argument resting on the claim that the characteristic rhythm of this piece () states the rhythm of the earlier *Arlequin* () in reverse (p. 313). But while the *Coquette* rhythm is a variant of the dotted pattern  , the rhythm of *Arlequin* isn't really dotted at all. Hence the reverse of the former is the Scotch snap (), which figures not in *Arlequin* but in the later *Valse allemande.* (At this point I'd be hard-pressed to know how to interpret the cross-dressing metaphor.) Kramer is certainly justified in arguing for the "subversive" embodiment of the idea of carnival festivity in Schumann's *Carnaval,* but a convincing account of this subversion will have to rest on a more careful reading of the musical facts.

Works of art, Solie writes, are "perhaps the most valuable belongings of a civilization. . . . It matters about whom *they* speak, and what they say" (p. 20). Here she touches on what is probably the principal leitmotif of the volume: the question of signification. As Barbara Engh points out in "Loving It: Music and Criticism in Roland Barthes," music began to play a role in Barthes's critical enterprise precisely when he sought "to loosen the fixity of meaning, to pluralize it" (p. 71). Music, in other words, becomes an apt metaphor for the infinitely signifying, "plural" text.

But in spite of the potential infinity of meanings embodied in a text—musical or otherwise—it is worth remembering that there are no more than two significative modes. Either signifier and signified partake of the same essence and substance, in which case we are dealing with a *symbolic* mode, or the two terms are discontinuous, the signifier an arbitrary or *allegorical* sign for the signified. The first mode is well represented by the rhetorical trope known as *synecdoche,* where the part stands for the whole (e.g., "threads" for "clothes"); the second by the figure called *metonymy,* where the part is conventionally associated with the whole (e.g., "crown" for "royalty"). Music and musical discourse know both types of signification. When we speak of motivic or harmonic relationships (that is, of music's self-referential qualities), we address a symbolic mode. The association of music with determinate meanings (from joy to gender, serenity to sexuality), on the other hand, belongs to the realm of allegory.

Many of the writers in *Musicology and Difference* have a peculiar outlook on these relationships and the distinctions between them. In the first place, late twentieth-century scholars have not been the first to ponder the significative potential of music. On this count, at least, the New Musicology may not be as new as some of its practitioners claim; issues of meaning have been fundamental to discourse on music for well over two centuries,

perhaps only ignored by Anglo-American musicologists of the 1940s–60s.[10] Allegorical readings were the norm for rhetorically inclined seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers such as Joachim Burmeister, Christoph Bernhard, and Johann Mattheson. Even after the rhetorical tradition began to wane in the nineteenth century, interpretations along these lines were hardly uncommon. (Schumann's famous review of Berlioz's *Symphonie fantastique* prefaces its analytical, "symbolic" reading of the work with an allegorical narrative of its content). Second, it is difficult to concur with assertions such as the following from John Shepherd's essay, which in effect confuses the discontinuous, allegorical mode with its continuous, symbolic counterpart: "[sound can] act as a homologous means of signification [i.e., a symbol] in relation to phenomena which themselves are not composed of sound [i.e., phenomena discontinuous with the sounding signifier]" (p. 50). It seems to me that eighth notes and high Cs simply cannot share in the substance of the things they might represent. And third, it is a mistake to value one significative mode over the other. Mid-twentieth-century musicologists and music theorists may have focused overzealously on the self-referential, symbolic properties of music, but it does not follow that observations of this type are mere stepping-stones to determinate readings. Here we would do well to take counsel from our literary-critical colleagues. Paul de Man devoted a fair amount of his deconstructive energies to demonstrating that, contrary to a more than century-old critical tradition, the symbolic aspects of a literary text are neither higher nor truer than its allegorical dimensions.[11] As students of an art form whose semantic potential is debatable at best, we should therefore guard against embracing a position that squares ill with the material of music itself. We will have to accept the troubling but inescapable conclusion that, so far as music is concerned, the move from one significative mode to the other, or from signifier to signified within the allegorical mode, represents a Benjaminian leap over an abyss.

To be sure, the leap will be a comparatively short one in cases dealing with texts *about* music. Hence in "Charles Ives and Gender Ideology,"

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[10] *Pace* Susan McClary's comment: "Musicologists have tended to practice different modes of criticism for these various repertories [instrumental music, opera, song, and program music], addressing texted or programmatic music according to the terms set by the verbal or referential component but restricting their observations of string quartets or symphonies to whatever can be discerned through formal analysis alone" (p. 326).

[11] See in particular the opening section of "The Rhetoric of Temporality," in Paul de Man, *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, 2d edn, revised (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 187–208; and the chapter on Proust in Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), 57–78.

Judith Tick comes to the plausible conclusion that the misogynist salvos in the composer's writings, offensive as they may be, ultimately had little to do with gender *per se.* Heir to a "social grammar of prejudice," Ives used sexist rhetoric as a means of empowering a radical musical language whose value early twentieth-century critics neither recognized nor appreciated. His reaction to a performance of the Kneisel Quartet as recorded in the *Memos*—"Every phrase, line, and chord, and beat went over and over the way you'd exactly expect them to go . . . trite, tiresome awnings of platitudes, all a nice mixture of Grieg, Wagner and Tchaikovsky (et al, ladies)"—reflects a nineteenth- and early twentieth-century gender ideology that associated the music of the European classical tradition with such "masculine" qualities as originality, power, and vitality. By portraying the chief exponents of that tradition as a gaggle of carping old women, by "rendering the patrimony . . . suspect on its own terms" (p. 104), Ives found a means of validating his own little-understood brand of musical modernism.

Given their interest in musical meaning, it is little wonder that many of the contributors to *Musicology and Difference* focus on texted genres, where meanings are (ostensibly) ready to hand. Written before the publication of Wayne Koestenbaum's controversial musings on opera queendom,[12] but covering some of the same ground, Mitchell Morris's "Reading as an Opera Queen" analyzes the irreverent vision of a group for whom opera is not just a passion but a "ruling metaphor for life" (p. 185). In Morris's view, the alternately histrionic and hysterical rhetoric of the opera queen can function both as a challenge and as a complement to traditional readings of the operatic canon. For underlying the playful, campy, ironic surface of this rhetoric is a pointed critique of, among other things, our preconceptions concerning musical unity. The opera queen, for whom the character of the diva is more important than the character of the drama in which she participates, and for whom the individual moment counts for more than the larger whole of which it is a part, unmasks the organic unity of the musical canon's most unruly genre as illusory. Most readers will be thoroughly amused by Morris's account of a hypothetical opera queen's iconoclastic vision of Wagner's *Parsifal* (pp. 198–99). As a work whose quasi-religious thematic serves to cover an underlying dialectic between part and whole, fragment and totality, this apparently unlikely candidate for a queenish critique turns out to be peculiarly suitable for such treatment. I only wonder why Morris's hypothetical observer, fixated

[12] Wayne Koestenbaum, *The Queen's Throat: Opera, Homosexuality, and the Mystery of Desire* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1993).

as "she" is on the music drama's striking moments, does not comment on its supreme moment: the spot in Act II where Parsifal becomes "cosmically clear-sighted" through the agency of Kundry's kiss.

Like Morris's hypothetical opera queen, Carolyn Abbate, in "Opera or the Envoicing of Women," is also concerned with unmasking an illusion, in this case our tacit assumption that the "authorial voice" in opera is that of the (usually male) composer. Abbate argues, with her characteristic intellectual bravado, that the genre's authorial voice proves to be that of a woman, whose "musical speech drowns out everything in range, [while] we sit as passive objects, battered by that voice" (p. 254). For Abbate, "No single (and, in opera, all-knowing) composer's voice sings what we hear. Rather, the music seemingly has other sources; it strongly encourages listeners to split the sonorous fabric into multiple originating speakers, whose bodies exist behind what is heard" (p. 235). Similar in this regard to the Flaubertian novel, opera thus discloses multiple perspectival layers. But aren't the various points of view in a novel, or the many voices in an opera, in fact configured, set in motion, and controlled by a single authorial voice, that of the author/composer? Although Abbate aims to unmask an illusion, her argument at the same time rests on one. She speaks of operatic characters as if they were somehow real, thereby forgetting, or lulling us into forgetting, that when we say "Donna Elvira does this or that," "Donna Elvira" is an ellipsis for "the singing-acting character created by Mozart and da Ponte and called Donna Elvira. "She," like all other characters in opera, is first and foremost an aesthetic construct, "her" flesh-and-blood qualities and aspirations to authorship no more than illusions that as listeners at an actual performance we are supposed to forget but that as critics we must recognize.

Likewise, Abbate's argument runs aground when we attempt to coordinate it with a repertorial sample broader than that upon which she draws. She makes the sweeping assertion that women are the "*makers* of musical sonority" in *all* operas, though their authorial ambitions are underscored with particular intensity in the dramatic works of Richard Strauss (p. 232). One of the chief means geared toward the "unmanning" of the authorial voice in *Salome,* for example, is the technique Abbate calls "acoustic delusion" (p. 242). Thus during the scene of Jochanaan's murder, we are made to hear—or rather *mis*hear—what Salome herself hears (or mishears). Eschewing clichéd musical depictions of Jochanaan's groaning or the thud of his severed head, Strauss instead concocts one of his eeriest and most bizarre orchestral effects: high B♭s in the double bass over a low E♭ tremolo and a drum roll. The composer, in Abbate's view, therefore "coaxes the listening ear into occupying a female position," and "in effect relinquishes male authority" (pp. 247–48). Abbate's position, as provoca-

tive and compelling as it may be, is difficult to sustain as a universal proposition. Consider, for instance, the final scene of Act II of Wagner's *Siegfried.* Here we are forced to hear like Siegfried, who, having just tasted of the slain Fafner's blood, is able to "hear through" Mime's flattering words to the treachery that underlies them. By coaxing our listening ear into a male position, does Wagner, to apply Abbate's metaphor in this case, relinquish his "female" authority? Or take the great love duet from Act II of *Tristan und Isolde.* In that we perceive Brangäne's anxious words of warning to the lovers just as the lovers do—that is, as a sumptuous wash of sound—our listening ears are arguably coaxed into both female *and* male positions. The point should be clear: it is problematic to associate an operatic composer's perspectival strategies with gender. We hear less from male or female positions than from the positions of the opera's characters, who are, at bottom, *neither* men nor women, but representations thereof.

There can be no doubt over the gender of the composer, if not the authorial voice, of *La liberazione di Ruggiero dall'Isola d'Alcina* (1625), the focus of attention in Suzanne G. Cusick's "Of Women, Music, and Power: A Model from Seicento Florence." But issues of voice are of less moment in this discussion than those of signification, for which the formalized allegorical plots of seventeenth-century court operas in general—and of Francesca Caccini's court opera in particular—provide a rich area of inquiry. If early operas such as the Monteverdi/Striggio *L'Orfeo* play on a "masterplot" in which a lost paradise is regained through the potency of a male hero's speech-song, and in which the authority of the gods serves as a cipher for that of their earthly representatives, the predominantly male patrons who commissioned these operas, then the Caccini/Saracinelli *La liberazione* subjects the masterplot to a gendered twist—and little wonder, for the ruler whose power it was meant to confirm was one of Florence's two female regents, the archduchess Maria Maddalena of Austria. Based on an episode in Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso* where the knight Ruggiero is delivered from the wiles of the sorceress Alcina by her rival Melissa, Caccini's opera thematizes the various ways in which a woman's power can motivate a benevolent outcome in a traditionally patriarchal masterplot. While Cusick offers a thorough and sensitive account of the allegory embedded in the opera's libretto, some of her views on the musical support for this allegory are open to debate. In Saracinelli's reworking of Ariosto's tale, the sorceress Alcina is more willing to accommodate herself to Ruggiero's world than he to hers. For Cusick, Caccini's music mirrors this relationship between the characters: she notes that in scene ii the sorceress's music freely modulates to one of "Ruggiero's finals" (G), although Ruggiero's music never appropriates F, one of Alcina's several tonal realms (p. 291).

Cusick posits, in other words, an associative tonal (or modal) system for Caccini's opera, even though our understanding of the idiosyncratic workings of tonal relationships in the dramatic music of the seventeenth century is not yet at the point that would allow for such a system. Not surprisingly, musical allegories turn out to be even more slippery than their verbal counterparts.

McClary's foray into sociomusical meaning poses a particularly thorny challenge, for the composition at the heart of her discussion, Brahms's Third Symphony, has neither verbal cues nor programmatic trappings. In McClary's view, Brahms's symphony is not the bastion of absolute music it outwardly appears to be. Indeed, she proceeds from the premise that the supposedly autonomous instrumental music of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—by which she means, primarily, that portion of the repertory in sonata form—relies on two interdependent "narrative schemata." I have already alluded to one of these, the encipherment of gender differences in thematic contrasts, earlier in this review. The other schema locates comparable differences in the realm of tonality. According to McClary, the large-scale tonal planning of a sonata-form work suggests a conflict between the Self, represented by the tonic of the piece, and the Other, located in the key (or keys) to which the tonic modulates and which must be "purged" before the composition can end with a reaffirmation of the Self in the tonic (p. 331). But while McClary's tonal allegory might have some resonance for late eighteenth-century instrumental music, it seems too simple to encompass the directional tonal schemes frequently encountered in Wagner's music dramas and Mahler's symphonies (and already a feature of some of Schubert's songs and Schumann's keyboard works). How are we to interpret the fact that the first movement of Mahler's Third Symphony, for instance, begins in D minor but closes in F? Does the Self absorb the Other, or the Other the Self? Are we perhaps dealing with a divided Self?

The tendency to oversimplify an admittedly complex situation likewise mars McClary's actual analysis of Brahms's Third Symphony, which she reads, in part, as a critique of Beethovenian heroicism (pp. 335–37). What I miss is a sense for the nuanced dialogue with the post-Beethovenian symphonic tradition in which Brahms engaged. The motion from F, through D♭, and to A major in the exposition of the symphony's first movement, for instance, hearkens to a typically Schubertian strategy (Brahms's descending major thirds replace Schubert's large-scale arpeggiation of the tonic minor triad in, e.g., the exposition of the C-major String Quintet, D. 956). Echoes of Schumann are even more numerous: Brahms's opening theme plays on an idea from the first movement of the "Rhenish" Symphony; his web of intermovement thematic connections

recalls a similar network in Schumann's Fourth Symphony; and the prominence of chorale *topoi* in the slow movement and finale of Brahms's work suggests Schumann's Second Symphony (the first important work from the symphonic repertory in which a secular genre is effectively sanctified) as a model. Brahms's Third Symphony can doubtless be read as a critique (or at least as a reinterpretation of the strategies of its predecessors), but a critique more densely argued than McClary suggests.

Commenting on the first movement of Brahms's symphony, McClary writes: "the principal tension is not between the first and second theme . . . but, rather, between a first theme that is dissonant with respect to the conventions that sustain its narrative procedures and those conventions themselves" (p. 341). In order to make a strong case for this and similar claims, we would first have to develop a more sophisticated reading of the (presumably Beethovenian) conventions to which McClary alludes. If, like McClary, we want to interpret the D-major recapitulation of the A-major second theme as an affront to the sonata-form tradition (she maintains that the second theme is thereby withheld "from the control of the 'patriarchal' tonic," and thus remains ungrounded and unresolved [p. 340]), we would have to account for the fact that Brahms's affront is firmly grounded in a paradigm encountered already in the first movement of Beethoven's G-major Piano Sonata, Opus 31, no. 1. In short, the case for an "allegorical" substrate in a piece of "absolute" instrumental music will have to rest on a close analysis of the "symbolic" relations informing that piece and binding it to other representatives of its genre.

Since the essays in *Musicology and Difference* are apt to strike a personal chord in many readers, I will take the liberty of closing on a personal note. These reflections were triggered by a comment in Brett's essay on Britten's operas: "music as many of us have studied it . . . has been presented most rationally to us both as a symbolic system with no connotations and as a series of works of transhistorical significance. As gay scholars we ought constantly to interrogate this training and its implications" (p. 259). As a musicologist who happens to be gay (and who, though convinced that music does indeed have more than self-referential connotations, is profoundly skeptical that they reveal themselves directly), I began to wonder whether my pursuit of "straight" topics (the music of Schumann and Brahms, and its relationship to nineteenth-century aesthetics) represented a betrayal, or even a denial, of my own inclinations and those of the gay community of which I am a member. But then I also wondered whether as an Italian-American musicologist I wasn't also denying my ethnic background by concentrating on the music of German composers. I intend neither to be flippant, nor to allow my epilogue to degenerate into a Personals Ad, but only to say that I am a long way from resolving these

questions. Nonetheless, I owe the contributors to *Musicology and Difference*—even when I disagree with them—my gratitude for having caused me to ponder these issues seriously in the first place. No doubt other readers will have occasion for similar ruminations.

—John Daverio

Jean-Jacques Nattiez, ed. (with Francoise Davoine, Hans Oesch, and Robert Piencikowski), *The Cage-Boulez Correspondence*, tr. and ed. Robert Samuels. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. xvii, 168 pp., cloth.

Historians of twentieth-century music largely agree that the two most significant compositional approaches to emerge in the early years following World War II were integral serialism and indeterminacy. They also agree that, despite apparently diametrically opposed technical and aesthetic ends, one approach offering a systematic conception premised on absolute control, the other a belief that sounds should be themselves, untouched by human intervention, the two had something essential in common. As listeners were quick to point out, the music engendered on both sides tended to sound remarkably similar—and predominately indeterminate.[1]

A close connection was further indicated by the large number of integral serialists, especially among the Europeans (including such major figures as Karlheinz Stockhausen, Pierre Boulez, and Luciano Berio), who eventually adopted some degree of indeterminacy in their own work. There was little drift in the other direction, however. None of the early indeterminists seemed to have any interest in experimenting with integral serialism.

Perhaps the most intriguing association between the two schools, however, was that two of the most important composers of the post-war period, John Cage and Pierre Boulez, each representing one of the two sides, were in personal contact with one another in the early 1950s and demonstrated considerable interest in each other's work. This strikes one as surprising, given these composers' obvious dissimilarities in musical background and compositional taste, to say nothing of their fundamentally different personalities. Cage, while considerably older at age thirty-seven, was less self-assured and less intellectually and musically precocious (at least measured by usual standards). Boulez, on the other hand, just in his early twenties, was already widely recognized as an *enfant terrible* of the European new music scene and renowned as a musician equipped with a

[1] Some telling analytical work has been undertaken to suggest why this is so. The best-known and most influential study is György Ligeti's "Pierre Boulez: Decision and Automation in *Structures 1a*," *Die Reihe* 4 (1960), 36–62. See also Ernst Krenek, "Extents and Limits of Serial Techniques," in Paul Henry Lang, ed. *Problems of Modern Music* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1960), 72–94.

prodigious ear, a pianist (largely untrained) of considerable technical facility, capable of performing his own staggeringly difficult music, and a composer of an unusually rigorous and uncompromising persuasion.

But it has not been widely known that Cage and Boulez's friendship, though informed by little personal contact, was quite close and evolved mainly through an extraordinary epistolary exchange. During the brief period their relationship flourished, from summer 1949 to early fall 1952, coinciding exactly with the coming of age of both integral serialism and indeterminancy and the movements' most extreme compositional manifestations, the two composers were linked by mail, Cage writing from New York and Boulez from either Paris or one of the numerous cities to which he then travelled as musical director of Jean-Louis Barrault's theatrical group (the influential *Compagnie Renaud-Barrault*).

The correspondence came to scholarly attention in 1980, when the French-Canadian music theorist and critic Jean-Jacques Nattiez accidentally discovered Cage's letters to Boulez while working in Bayreuth on the editing of a collection of Boulez articles. Nattiez soon located the other half, Boulez's letters to Cage, in the Northwestern University Music Library, where Cage had recently deposited them along with a large body of his materials. An original-language edition, compiled and edited by Nattiez, was published in 1990.[2] The language of the original letters was retained, with both Boulez and Cage writing sometimes in English, sometimes in French, and not infrequently in both in a single communication. Errors resulting from use of a foreign language, as well as orthographical mistakes, were also preserved. For the present edition, the French portions have been translated into English and errors retained for the passages originally in English. (The latter are differentiated by italics.) Cage's French was considerably better than Boulez's English, so that approximately two-thirds of the material originally appeared in that language.

* * *

Cage and Boulez first met in 1949 when Cage was in Europe for a six-month stay spent largely in Paris, where he was conducting research at the Bibliothèque Nationale on the life and music of Erik Satie. Through mutual friends (Virgil Thomson according to some, the French conductor Roger Désormière according to others) he met Boulez, and the two felt an

[2] The volume was published by the Paul Sacher Foundation, which had subsequently acquired Boulez's manuscripts (*Pierre Boulez, John Cage. Correspondance et documents,* Veröffentlichung der Paul Sacher Stiftung, no. 1 [Winterthur, Switz.: Amadeus, 1990]).

immediate personal, intellectual, and artistic bond, quickly becoming friends. Boulez introduced Cage to a small group of colleagues with whom he was in close personal contact: the painter Bernard Saby, the playwright Armand Gatti, the novelist Pierre Joffroy, and the music critic and writer Pierre Souvtchinsky. Shortly thereafter, Cage introduced Boulez to the three musicians with whom he was then most closely associated: the composer Morton Feldman, the pianist David Tudor, and the composer-classicist Christian Wolff.

A brief but close sense of community developed among the small band of French and American artists and intellectuals clustered around the two composers. Both Feldman and Wolff sent copies of their compositions to Boulez (who wrote to Cage of Feldman: "Much too *imprecise* and too *simple*" [p. 103]), while Tudor gave the first United States performance of one of Boulez's major compositions of the period, the Second Piano Sonata.

Despite the friendship and mutual support evident throughout these letters, Boulez and Cage were in personal contact during only two relatively brief periods, the first during the summer of their original meeting in Paris in 1949, and the second near the end of their association, in the fall of 1952, when Boulez visited Cage in New York following a series of appearances with the Barrault troupe in Canada and the United States. Thus they relied mainly on letters, and even here the count is not large. Of forty-eight items included in this volume, forty-two are letters, the other six being excerpts from published writings by Cage or Boulez that date from the period and deal explicitly with the other composer.[3] Of the letters, moreover, two of the longest—both by Boulez—consist almost entirely of material subsequently incorporated within articles in virtually identical form.

Those looking for personal revelations, confidentialities, or gossip will be disappointed. Although the letters communicate a warm sense of shared respect and comradeship, they focus overwhelmingly on professional concerns. This is most obviously so in the articles and the letters incorporated into articles, but it is only somewhat less the case for the other letters. The emphasis tends to be on current compositional work, performances prepared or attended, talks given, and so forth.

The friendship, in other words, was predominantly a musical and intellectual one; and it is all the more engrossing for being so. Anyone concerned with the development of new music in these critical years will be

[3] The only exceptions are two brief statements by Morton Feldman and Christian Wolff, collected by Cage in 1952 for publication together with statements by Boulez and himself in the journal *Transformation: arts, communication, environment.*

fascinated by the shop talk of these remarkably different, yet equally gifted (if according to very different standards) composers, whom time would reveal to be of such historical importance. Although the letters contain much material that is exceedingly—even excruciatingly—technical (the correspondence dates from a period when matters of technique and structure were very much at the forefront of musical considerations),[4] they nevertheless produce an impression of great energy and excitement.

Indeed, it is difficult today to imagine two composers not only so totally wrapped up in their work but so completely convinced of its rightness, even necessity—and thus of their own personal "mission." The Romantic notion of the artistic creator as prophet and seer, though curiously transformed, remains very much alive in these letters, whose authors seem committed to forging an entirely new musical universe based on novel ways of thinking about sound and sonic relationships.

This is heady stuff, epochs removed from current laissez-faire attitudes of permissiveness and pluralism, where one feels that almost anything seems to go but not much seems to matter. The Cage-Boulez letters communicate a sense not only of music history in the making, but of a life-and-death struggle over fundamental aesthetic issues: relationships between rule and choice, freedom and determination, form and content, sound and silence. Boulez: "I am thinking of writing a little book based on the principle that sound material can only be organized serially, but widening the principle to extreme conclusions" (p. 86); "You see all the richness which it is possible to exploit! That will require time and is a question of montage (like cinematic montage)" (p. 123). Cage: "All this brings me closer to a 'chance' or if you like an un-aesthetic choice. . . . Composition becomes 'throwing sound into silence'" (p. 78); "I have the feeling of just beginning to compose for the first time. . . . The essential underlying idea is that each thing is itself, that its relations with other things spring up naturally rather than being imposed by any abstraction on an 'artist's' part. (see Artaud on an objective synthesis)" (p. 96).

Though it soon turned out that both radical serialism and radical indeterminacy were dead ends, their very existence, and their ultimate failure, had a profound impact on musical conceptions, and in ways that we are still only beginning to understand. Indeed, the few brief years of the Cage-Boulez correspondence can be said to define a critical historical moment:

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[4] Cage's apparent determination to match Boulez's level of technical discussion results in his providing much more specific commentary on his own compositional methods than one is normally accustomed to finding in his writings. For that reason alone this volume is of special interest.

the final provocation that brought down the house of traditional Western music under the weight of its own accumulated past. From this perspective, such turn-of-the-century manifestations as Debussy's arabesques, Schoenberg's atonality, or Satie's parodies marked only the beginning of the end, the opening lines in a final paragraph that Cage, Boulez, and their contemporaries would ultimately bring to a close.

Within the period of this correspondence Boulez composed *Polyphonie X* (eventually withdrawn, yet an important milestone in his compositional evolution), *Structures 1* for Two Pianos, and the opening stages of *Le marteau sans maître,* works in which he established and then passed beyond the most rigorous stages of integral serialism. Cage composed his String Quartet, the Concerto for Prepared Piano and Chamber Orchestra, *Imaginary Landscape No. IV* for Twelve Radios, *Music of Changes,* the tape piece *Williams Mix,* and (unmentioned in these letters) the quintessential *4'33"*, progressively raising the level of indeterminacy in both composition and performance until he finally arrived at total silence and the "happening." Whatever view one takes regarding the main currents of twentieth-century music, these were years of extraordinary focus, giving the art a fundamentally new perspective; and Boulez and Cage did as much as anyone to redefine that brief era's compositional landscape.

But what did the two composers see in each other? For his part, Boulez was interested in—and acknowledged influence by—Cage's reliance on frequency complexes as opposed to pure pitch, his rejection of the notion of the octave, and his overall "experimental" approach. He liberally praises his American colleague, referring to Cage's music for a film about Alexander Calder as "marvelous, the synthesis of music and image quite perfect" (p. 86), and particularly compliments a long letter providing technical information about the compositional methods used in several of Cage's pieces, notably the Concerto for Prepared Piano and Chamber Orchestra (p. 99). He also stresses the common ground linking his own work to Cage's: "Everything you say about the tables of sounds, durations, amplitudes, used in your Music of Changes is, as you will see, along exactly the same lines as I am working at the moment" (p. 112); "Thank you for the Music of Changes. Which I *liked a lot* . . . I was absolutely charmed by this development in your style. And I am with you all the way" (p. 133); and in an article that is included, "The direction pursued by John Cage's research is too close to our own for us to fail to mention it" (p. 129).

Cage is equally enthusiastic concerning Boulez: "Since knowing you, our music sounds feeble to me" (p. 48); "I am delighted with your charts [for *Structures 1a*]" (p. 110); "I am full of admiration for the way in which you are working and especially for the way in which you have generalized the concept of the series" (p. 133). At times his tone becomes almost

obsequious: "The day I show you my new works, I shall be full of dread" (p. 56); "I have not written sooner, for I was concerned to write a letter worthy to be read by you, and I didn't feel able" (p. 92).

To be sure, there are disagreements as well. In his very first discussion of Cage's music, written shortly after their initial meeting, Boulez comments on the "dangerous ambiguities" resulting from Cage's combination of formal and rhythmic structures "which belong to two entirely different worlds" (p. 31). And as the relationship develops, he increasingly expresses concern about Cage's growing commitment to indeterminacy: "The only thing, forgive me, which I am not happy with, is the method of absolute chance (*by tossing the coins*)" (p. 112). Cage, with the "unfaltering delicacy typical of his side" (Nattiez's felicitous phrase, p. 6), generally avoids stating reservations about Boulez's music, yet he does not hesitate to inform Boulez of his growing attraction to chance and of his commitment to "the paradoxical nature of truth" (p. 41).

Eventually, as differences increased and affinities declined, the composers drifted apart. There was apparently some tension during the second visit in the summer of 1952 in New York, after which the correspondence dropped off radically. Boulez, writing in June 1953 for the first time in almost a year, begins his letter:

> This is a small harbinger of news. I am breaching the wall of silence—one must live against the times—It is useless to make excuses. I am deeply ashamed for not having written since leaving New York, so ashamed that I have been having nightmares!. . . . I was aware that this could not go on much longer without the silence between us becoming intolerable (pp. 144–45).

There is also a change in content: no more technical information, no more shared ideas, only mundane—if still professionally oriented—news. Following two brief notes written in the summer of 1954, there is but one additional Boulez communication: a witty, conciliatory letter written in 1962, partly to congratulate Cage on his fiftieth birthday. (Symptomatically, only one of the letters written by Cage was saved by Boulez after the New York visit.) And thus this remarkable epistolary association reaches its quiet, if cordial close.

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Nattiez supplies a valuable and detailed introduction, in which he sets the correspondence in historical context, traces the course of the friendship, examines the musical issues interwoven with it, quotes relevant passages from other documents, and speculates on the dissolution of the

association after just three years. Yet by stressing the widening gap that opened between Boulez and Cage, mainly due to differences in their attitudes toward indeterminacy, he misses something essential, I believe, about the relationship. Following a discussion of the composers' increasing alienation, Nattiez closes his introduction: "To sum up, it would seem that the tangential encounter between Boulez and Cage was based on a misunderstanding explicable by the context of the period."[5] He then adds a passage drawn from a letter he received from Boulez in 1990:

> At that time, there really wasn't anything apart from the asphyxiating academicism of Leibowitz. Messiaen had taken me to a certain point, and it was necessary to go beyond. And on the other hand, it is difficult to imagine today what attraction there was then in North America. Indeed, it was the same for Cage; the attraction of a continent to discover. The war had shattered its remoteness, and brought an immense prestige for whatever had to do with the future. USSR stood for ideology, US for modernity. Seen in retrospect, what a curious pair of alternatives! (p. 24)

Rather than suggesting a misunderstanding, Boulez's words seem to acknowledge that he and Cage, no matter how greatly their paths subsequently diverged, shared a common mission—"the attraction of a continent to discover." One can still detect echoes of the belief, so much a part of the early post-war atmosphere, that music should be created anew, reconceived from the ground up. Writing in 1949 in an article included in this volume, Cage remarks on the significance of "the disintegration of tonality": "The problem of a composer in a musical world in this state is precisely to supply another structural means, just as in a bombed-out city, the opportunity to build again exists" (p. 40). Looking back from 1971, Boulez similarly observes: "In 1945 or 1946 nothing was finished, everything was still to be done. We had the privilege of making those discoveries, and that of finding nothing in front of us, which may sometimes be testing, but which facilitates a lot of things."[6]

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[5] Nattiez's opinion has been echoed by certain reviewers of this book, among them Paul Griffiths, whose perceptive appraisal appeared in the *Times Literary Supplement* (27 May 1994), 16.

[6] Pierre Boulez, "Où en est-on?," *Revue musicale,* nos. 276–77 (1971), 7. Quoted from Paul Griffiths, *Modern Music. The Avant Garde Since 1945* (New York: George Braziller, 1981), 13.

Cage and Boulez recognized in one another kindred spirits joined "at the limit of fertile land."[7] However different their ends, they came to believe jointly that the only effective and efficient means for breaking away from the past was through a rigid constructivism, the adoption of formal processes carefully devised to inhibit an inadvertent relapse into old compositional habits. For Boulez these procedures were intended to achieve absolute control, for Cage to create space for the unplanned and inadvertent; but the impulse was at some basic level fundamentally the same: a longing for the abstract and impersonal.

In retrospect, the trajectories of Boulez and Cage can be seen as coming together and joining in a moment of unexpected synchronization, crossing temporarily in a common, if unlikely, endeavor. The fact that they again drifted apart does not detract from the significance of their momentary confluence. Indeed, the Boulez-Cage "breakup" can be said to mirror a more general historical development of the time: the widespread fragmentation and dispersion of musical attitudes beginning in the mid-1950s, following serialism and indeterminacy's climactic peak, initiating a process that would become fully realized in the following decade. The Cage-Boulez correspondence, together with the friendship it chronicles, offers a literal and symbolic representation of this instant of compositional extremity and sudden rupture.

—Robert P. Morgan

[7] This phrase is taken from a Paul Klee painting and borrowed by Boulez for an article written in 1955, "À la limite du pays fertile," included in *Relèves d'Apprenti,* ed. Paule Thérenin (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966), 205–21.

Anna Maria Busse Berger. ***Mensuration and Proportion Signs: Origins and Evolution.*** Clarendon Press, 1993. xiii, 271 pp.

> Granted the masters instructed us in [the] noteshapes and also in the four principal mensurations. . . . Yet they did not teach us how we ought to discant perfect tempus of minor prolation over imperfect tempus of minor prolation (and conversely), and so on for the individual tempora that will clearly and individually be shown below. Because it would be very incongruous for that which can be performed not to be able to be written down, I took care to organize this little treatise.[1]

Explaining the necessity for his own book, the anonymous author of the late fourteenth-century *Tractatus figurarum* quoted above was prescient in articulating the main rhythmic notational problem for the next two centuries: how to combine different mensurations in a single composition, thereby expanding the range of available rhythmic durations and proportional relationships between notes. Yet his solution, which was to codify a new set of strangely-shaped note forms to represent proportional shifts within different mensurations, was obsolete by the second decade of the fifteenth century; the contemporaneous practice of using signs to indicate proportions, while leaving the note shapes unaffected, became the method of choice for ensuing generations of composers. The author of the *Tractatus* furthermore could not anticipate the myriad ways different mensurations would be combined and the degree of variation in interpretation that was possible.

Five hundred years later, the theorist's justification for his own work eloquently argues the cause of Anna Maria Busse Berger's recent treatment of the subject. Her excellent book offers a full account of mensuration signs from their beginnings in the fourteenth century, and of their use and interpretation during the following two centuries. This is a topic for which, despite a number of important studies treating particular problems or individual composers' uses of mensuration signs, there has been

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[1] "licet magistri instruxerunt nos in his figuris ac etiam in quatuor mensuris principalibus. . . . Tamen non docuerunt quomodo super tempus imperfectum minoris discantare deberemus perfectum minoris, et e converso, et sic de singulis temporibus quod clare singulariter inferius patebit. Quia essens multum inconveniens quod illud quod potest pronuntiari non posset scribi et clare ostendere tractatum hunc parvulum ordinari curavi." Anonymous [Phillipoctus Andrea?], *Tractatus figurarum,* ed. and trans. Philip Schreur (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 70–73.

no comprehensive study until now.[2] Berger has examined every available treatise on the mensural system from between ca. 1300 and 1550, amounting to an impressive 149 treatises listed in her bibliography. Furthermore, she provides historical context for the development of the mensural system by looking at developments in other medieval and Renaissance measuring systems, so that she not only explains what every proportion sign might mean in every possible context—already an achievement of considerable dimensions—but also attempts to understand why the particular proportional relationships of the mensural system developed as they did. The book is as much about cultural history as it is about music theory, and what emerges from her account is a rich and intriguing picture of a culture that measured things in ways fundamentally different from our own.

Berger does not coddle her reader, and it is unlikely that anyone unfamiliar with the basics of mensural theory will be able to tackle the book easily, despite an introduction that lays out the vocabulary and structure of the system. The chief difficulty in understanding the system stems in part from the vast conceptual difference between the mensural system and the modern system of rhythmic notation, a difference that extends beyond the merely terminological. As Berger points out, the mensural system differs from common-practice rhythmic notation in that it allows certain note shapes to be divisible into either two or three parts, with no way of distinguishing visually between a binary or a ternary division (pp. 1–2). If we were to come upon a group of modern note shapes—quarter notes, half notes, eighth notes, etc.—we would be able to count them in relation to one another even if we had no meter sign or measures informing us how they were organized, because all the note values are in a binary relationship, that is, with each note always worth two of the next lower in value. Given a series of mensural note shapes, however, we would not be

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[2] A recent, concise survey of mensuration signs, geared toward performers, is Alejandro Planchart, "Tempo and Proportions," in *Performance Practice: Music Before 1600,* ed. Howard Mayer Brown and Stanley Sadie (London: MacMillan, 1989), 126–44. Of the numerous circumscribed studies of individual mensural problems or individual composers, see Charles Hamm, *A Chronology of the Works of Guillaume Dufay Based on a Study of Mensural Practice,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Arthur Mendel, "Some Ambiguities of the Mensural System," in *Studies in Music History: Essays for Oliver Strunk* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 137–60; Philip Gossett, "The Mensural System and the *Choralis Constantinus,*" in *Studies in Renaissance and Baroque Music in Honor of Arthur Mendel,* ed. Robert Marshall (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1974), 71–107; Alejandro Planchart, "The Relative Speed of *Tempora* in the Period of Dufay," *Royal Music Association Research Chronicle* 17 (1981), 33–51; Eunice Schroeder, "The Stroke Comes Full Circle: ⌽ and ⌾ in Writings on Music, ca. 1450–1540," *Musica Disciplina* 36 (1982), 119–66; Richard Taruskin, "Antoine Busnoys and the *L'homme armé Tradition,*" *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 39 (1986), 255–93; and Rob Wegman, "What is *Acceleratio mensurae?,*" *Music and Letters* 73 (1992), 515–24.

able to perform its rhythm without first determining the mensuration in which the note shapes were to be performed. Each mensuration was represented graphically by a sign, and it is to the usage and interpretation of these signs that the book is devoted.

There would be no problem, and hence no need for a book—either by the author of the *Tractatus figurarum* or by Berger—if all musical compositions remained in one mensuration throughout. But beginning in the final decades of the fourteenth century, composers began to juxtapose different mensurations within individual pieces, both horizontally (in a single line of music) and vertically (simultaneously in different polyphonic voices). The result was that one voice might be in perfect time, minor prolation, while another was in imperfect time, minor prolation, and the difference between the two needed to be represented visually. It was not always clear, moreover, from the context either of the music or of the theoretical discussion of mensuration signs, what the speed of the corresponding note shapes in each mensuration should be with respect to one another. Berger has isolated three major theoretical issues within this general problem, each comprising a chapter: the juxtaposition of perfect and imperfect time (chapter three); the juxtaposition of major and minor prolation (chapter four); and the problem of diminution (chapter five).

As Berger explains in chapter three, when perfect and imperfect time are combined, such as in example 1a, there are two possible results: either the minims of perfect and imperfect time are made to be equal (minim equality), causing a proportional change at the level of the breve, or the imperfect and the perfect breves are taken to be equal (breve equality), causing a proportional change in the duration of the semibreve and minim. To think about this problem in modern terms, if one wishes to combine a $\frac{2}{4}$ measure with a $\frac{3}{4}$ measure, either the eighth and quarter notes could be constant, causing a change in the length of the measure (example 1b, where one measure is worth two quarter notes and the other three) or the measures could be made equal in duration (example 1c), causing a change in the value of the quarter and eighth notes.

Example 1. Juxtaposition of perfect and imperfect time.



Berger contends that while both possibilities, breve equality and minim equality, had supporters from the mid-fourteenth through the mid-sixteenth centuries, breve equality was preferred at first, in the late fourteenth through late fifteenth centuries. Gaffurio and Tinctoris, who have been taken as canonical in their preference for minim equality, were in fact early reformers who advocated minim equality against the prevailing theoretical preference for breve equality in the late fifteenth century. By the early decades of the sixteenth century, minim equality was the standard both in theory and in practice.

Chapter four concerns itself with the even thornier problem of the relationship between major and minor prolation, that is, where semibreves worth two minims are juxtaposed with those worth three minims. In a masterfully lucid discussion, Berger identifies seven possible relations between the two, including minim equivalence, semibreve equivalence, and augmentation of various kinds (where the minim of major prolation is made equal either to the semibreve of minor prolation, or to some other duration). Given a line of music such as in example 2a, a transcription could look like any one of those in examples 2b–d.

Example 2. Juxtaposition of major and minor prolation.



In proportional changes involving prolation, a new issue comes into play, namely that of the tactus, the external "beat" against which the durations of mensural music are measured. The tactus by convention falls on the semibreve; thus whether the *tempus* is perfect or imperfect, the semibreve, and therefore the tactus, is always the same duration. But when the prolation is changed from major to minor, and minim equivalence is maintained so that the duration of the semibreve changes, the question of what happens to the tactus arises. Does the speed of the tactus change in real time along with that of the semibreve or does it keep the original duration, "against" the speed of the new semibreve? Berger's chart shows

that theorists are not in agreement on this very important issue (p. 101). Although our intuition tells us that the tactus should change to conform with the semibreve, Tinctoris and some others advocate a tactus that remains on the imperfect semibreve even when the mensuration has changed to ¢, so that the tactus is beaten "against" what we consider to be the "strong beats" of the mensuration—the equivalent in modern terms of beats 1, 3, and 5 in $\frac{6}{8}$. Tinctoris even stipulates that when major prolation follows minor, the rules of dissonance treatment change so that the third minim of the semibreve (corresponding to the third eighth note in $\frac{6}{8}$) should be consonant, where normally it need not be.

The discussion of signs of diminution in chapter five focuses on how to interpret diminution signs—either circle-slash or circle-plus-number (*modus-cum-tempore*) signs—when they follow perfect *tempus.* Berger summarizes the various possibilities for circle-slash mensurations: diminution by one-half, by one-third, and by two-thirds—then goes on to demonstrate convincingly that although many musicologists have believed that these signs indicated diminution by one-third, the vast majority of Renaissance theorists advocated diminution by one-half. Berger offers a credible hypothesis as to the origins of the idea of diminution by one-third, suggesting that it was the result of a collective misreading by a small group of northern theorists of a passage from the early fourteenth-century *Libellus cantus mensurabilis* of Johannes de Muris.

* * *

Most interesting and ambitious in the book are two extensive forays into cultural history that offer insight into the intellectual and cultural context of the mensural system. In chapter two, "Origins of the Mensural System and Mensuration Signs," Berger examines other medieval measuring systems—for distance, time, money and so forth—to place into context the system that was developed for measuring music. The medieval European system of counting, we learn, originated with the Babylonians and was adopted in ancient Rome. Berger notes that the Roman system of computation relied exclusively on division and multiplication by two and three, creating a hierarchy of values analogous to that found in the medieval mensural system of notation. Time was (and still is) measured duodecimally: twelve months in a year, twelve times two hours in a day, and so forth. The Roman monetary system contained the *as,* comprised of four *quadrans,* themselves each divided into three *unciae.* Furthermore, written signs for the fractions of the *uncia* bore an unmistakable similarity to the mensuration signs of music: the *uncia* was represented by a circle, the *semiuncia* by a semicircle, and one-quarter of an *uncia* by an inverted

semicircle. The *uncia,* Berger suggests, played an analogous role in the Roman measuring system to that of the breve in the early fourteenth-century rhythmic system: both were at the center of the measuring hierarchy and were multiplied and divided to obtain other values. Thus the structure of the mensural system, with its capacity for duple and triple division and multiplication between note values, clearly reflects a wider cultural practice of counting and measuring.

Berger's account in chapter six of the influence of arithmetic on mensural proportions in the fifteenth century is equally thought-provoking. While Boethius and Euclid were required reading in every university curriculum, their approach to mathematics was entirely theoretical and not useful to those needing knowledge of arithmetic for commercial or other practical use. To fill that need there was another world of numerical training, its textbooks mostly in the vernacular, and schools that taught computation for commercial purposes.[3] One of the subjects covered in these textbooks was the "Rule of Three," a practical system for calculating proportional relationships where three numbers are known and the fourth is unknown (an example taken from a fifteenth-century textbook is: if one lira of saffron is worth seven lire of pizoli, how much will twenty-five lire of saffron be worth? [p. 202]). Berger argues convincingly that the increasing use and perfection of proportional relationships in music reflects the widespread teaching of the "Rule of Three" in the fifteenth century. She suggests, for example, that Tinctoris' censure of a proportion sign in Dufay's *Missa Sancti Antonii* arose because the proportion did not conform to the "Rule of Three," and she documents connections between music theory and commercial mathematics in other cases: Martin Agricola's discussion of musical proportions explicitly uses the language and techniques of the Rule of Three; Gaffurio taught in Milan with the mathematician Luca Pacioli and owned his mathematics treatise; and Glareanus himself was a mathematician who wrote a commercial mathematics treatise. Once again, as in chapter two, Berger has described an important link between ways of thinking about music-theoretical issues and about other, more worldly matters.

* * *

[3] The fascinating subject of computation in the middle ages and the Renaissance is treated in *Reason and Society in the Middle Ages* by Alexander Murray (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), chap. 7, "The Emergence of the Arithmetical Mentality," and chap. 8, "Men and Mathematics"; and Paul F. Grendler, *Schooling in Renaissance Italy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Unversity Press, 1989), esp. chap. 11, "Learning Merchant Skills."

The book's lucid presentation of the expansion of the mensural system in the Renaissance allows a number of formerly murky issues to be clarified, and undoubtedly will provoke much new thinking about a variety of topics related to the mensural system. I was drawn to one particular issue, that of breve versus minim equality in proportional changes. The issue has its origins in the early fourteenth-century theories of *musica mensurabilis.* As Berger explains, before the fourteenth century, the breve was the central note value in the mensural system, and was divided first in three, then at the end of the thirteenth century in various ways to create smaller note values. In the early fourteenth century, French *ars nova* theory, especially that of Johannes de Muris, reversed the relationship between the breve and the smaller note values so that the breve was a result of the multiplication of smaller values, rather than the smaller values being a result of the division of the breve. Italian fourteenth-century theory and practice retained the thirteenth-century primacy of the breve as the generator of smaller note-values, admitting the possibility of the co-existence within the system of minims that were one-fourth of a breve and minims that were one-sixth of a breve and thus not equal to one another.

During the course of the fourteenth century, the Italian system gave way to the French in practice. Berger suggests, however, that the central breve of the fourteenth-century Italian system survived in Italian theory and provided the foundation in the fifteenth century for the theorists who advocated the proportional relationships under an equal breve. This hypothesis is ingenious and thought-provoking, although there might be another explanation for the genesis of these proportions. If we consider the structure of the minim-based French system of the fourteenth century, it is obvious that only a limited number of proportional relationships can be created within that system—those that juxtapose perfect and imperfect breves or semibreves but keep the minim constant, creating a $\frac{6}{8}$ to $\frac{3}{4}$ kind of relationship (as in "I like to be in A-me-ri-ca" from Bernstein's *West Side Story*). If composers wanted to expand the range of durational possibilities of the system, they needed to create proportions that changed the value of the minim (for example, $\frac{3}{4}$ in $\frac{2}{4}$ as in example 1c above). In this situation, a note value other than the minim had to remain constant in order for the proportion to work—namely the semibreve or breve (in many cases, semibreve equality amounts to breve equality). Thus the expanded proportional relationships made possible by breve equality in the fifteenth century may not have resulted exclusively from a continuation of the centrality of the breve in Italian fourteeenth-century theory, but additionally (and independently) from a pragmatic need to override minim equivalence as it had been adopted nearly universally by the end of the fourteenth century.

If this is true, it gives rise to certain possibilities beyond those addressed by Berger. For example, it might affect the interpretation of theorists' views about the relationship between perfect and imperfect tempus that is offered in chapter three. The vast majority of theorists whom Berger consulted do not make overt reference to their preference for breve or minim equality when perfect and imperfect tempus are juxtaposed, and their views on this must be ferreted out of their discussions of other issues. Berger has done this by proposing that theorists who use certain mensuration signs to express certain proportions are *de facto* advocates of equal breve in general. For example, if a theorist states that O after C results in *sesquialtera* proportion (of the semibreve) this means that he advocates breve equivalence between the two mensurations. This is certainly correct. But if a theorist says that ↄ after 𝐂 or O indicates *sesquitertia,* a different situation may obtain. The sign ↄ produces diminution, most often *tempus imperfectum diminutum,* and most commonly appears in the context shown in example 3.

Example 3. Modern transcription of ↄ after 𝐂.



This proportional relationship is dependent on an equal breve between the two mensurations (reflected in the transcription by equality of the measures), and Berger suggests that theorists who advocate the use of this sign must also be *a priori* advocates of equal breve between mensurations. However, as Berger herself points out later, in musical practice of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, ↄ was used by composers who in every other case assumed minim equivalence between mensurations—that is, it was the one mensuration sign that consistently overrode minim equivalence, which was otherwise the norm. Berger notes that Ciconia's *Sus une fontayne* uses ↄ but also C and 𝐂 with minim equivalence between them (p. 172). But *Sus une fontayne* is not the only piece in the late fourteenth-century repertory for which ↄ is the only mensuration sign to be performed under equal breve; at least four others in late fourteenth-century sources use the signs in the same way.[4] An additional ten pieces use a

[4] Philipoctus da Caserta's *En attendant soufrir m'estuet,* Anthonello da Caserta's *Tres nouble dame,* the anonymous *En un vergier,* and Sozoy's *Prophilias* by Suzoy. These and all subsequent works mentioned are edited in *Polyphonic Music of the Fourteenth Century* (hereafter *PMFC*), vols. 18–24 (Monaco: L'Oiseau-lyre, 1981–89).

variety of mensuration signs, though not ↄ, under equal minim.[5] Only four pieces in the *ars subtilior* repertory use the four standard mensuration signs (𝄵, C, ⊙, O) alone to create a proportional change under equal breve, and each of these pieces uses the signs in an eccentric way.[6] Thus, ↄ in this repertory seems to function as an exception to the rule of minim equivalence, which is in general maintained even when other mensuration signs are used.

Berger's grouping of theorists who support equal breve on the basis of indirect evidence (table 1 on page 58) in fact seems to emphasize similarities among quite divergent viewpoints. Prosdocimo de' Beldemandi and Guilielmus Monachus are placed there because of their discussion of ↄ, the only mensuration sign they use to create a proportion; their viewpoint thus seems to follow that of the *Sus une fontayne* model, where ↄ is the exception to the rule of minim equivalence. Another theorist, Anonymous XI, uses a variety of signs to achieve proportional relationships under equal breve, but none of the signs he uses is among the four standard mensuration signs: in addition to ↄ, he uses ⊙ and ↄ. He thus seems to shy away from using the common mensuration signs to create proportional relationships under equal breve, suggesting that for him breve equality is not the norm. Finally, Johannes Boen's *Ars* is listed among the group because mensuration signs accompany a figure in the text that shows the various Greek proportions long associated with pitch—diapente, diapason, and so forth. Yet the figure is found in the context of a discussion of harmonic, not rhythmic, proportions, calling into question its relationship to the mensural system. Rather than place these four theorists in the equal- breve camp, perhaps at least the first three of them might better be labeled advocates of "equal minim except under special circumstances."

The issue of breve versus minim equivalence resurfaces in chapter six, where Berger discusses the fourteenth-century origins of rhythmic proportions. She points out that the proportions advocated by theorists at the turn of the fifteenth century, the earliest to discuss proportions, were only those proportions that could also be shown by combining mensuration signs under an assumed equal breve. This, logically enough, turns out to

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[5] Anthonello da Caserta's *Du val prilleus, Beaute parfaite* and *Dame d'onour c'on ne puet esprixier,* Jacob Senleches' *Tel me voit,* Franciscus's *De Narcissus,* Solage's *En l'amoureux vergier,* Suzoy's *Pictagoras,* Philipoctus da Caserta's *Il n'est nulz homs,* and two anonymous pieces, *Sans vous ne puis* and *Plus ne puet musique.*

[6] The pieces are Matteo da Perugia's *Dame qui j'aym* and *Le greynour bien;* the anonymous *Ung lion say;* and Baude Cordier's *Belle, bone, sage;* for a further discussion of the eccentric uses of the signs, see Anne Stone, *Writing Rhythm in Late Medieval Italy: Notation and Style in the Manuscript Modena Alpha.M.5.24* (Ph.D diss., Harvard University, 1994), chap. 2.

be arithmetic multiples of two and three: 2:1, 3:1, 3:2, 4:3, 9:8, 9:4, and less frequently, 4:1 and 8:3. It is hard, in fact, to imagine any other proportions being used within the mensural system. As chapter two so compellingly demonstrates, the mensural system is grounded in a larger way of conceptualizing measurement that is duodecimal, and therefore concerned with multiplication and division of twos and threes. When the system was expanded in the late fourteenth century, it was done by juxtaposing various twos and threes (and their multiples) to create rhythmic proportions. This overrode minim equality and established breve equality, but also remained conceptually within the duodecimal framework. Once again, the concept of breve equivalence does not seem to be essential to explaining the proportions that developed.

Furthermore, at least in the repertory of the late fourteenth-century *ars subtilior,* the first generation of musical compositions to experiment with rhythmic proportions, proportional relationships do occur that override minim equivalence but do not result in breve equality. One example of a relatively common proportional change is found in the cantus part of Anthonello da Caserta's *Beauté parfaite,* where the use of a mensuration sign plus coloration in m. 6 forces a *sesquialtera* change at the minim level, but also causes the value of the breve to grow by one-half (from two dotted quarters to three dotted quarters in the transcription) (example 4).

Example 4. Anthonello da Caserta, *Beauté parfaite,* opening.



The proportion created here is based on the equivalence of a major and a minor semibreve, something that, as Berger points out, late fifteenth-century theorists would criticize using the terminology of the "Rule of Three" (pp. 74, 208).[7]

Berger's account of the fourteenth-century origin of proportions in music points to two possible sources of the interest in proportions that began in the late fourteenth century: first, a passage from Muris' *Notitia artis musicae* stating that the breve can be divided into anywhere from two to nine parts, not just into multiples of two and three, and second, the Italian mensural system of the fourteenth century, where *sesquialtera* (3:2) and *sesquitertia* (4:3) proportions were permitted. Thus "one can well imagine that composers in the second half of the fourteenth century were inspired to use proportions by the writings of Johannes de Muris and, in part, by the Italian notation system" (p. 179).

The well-known Muris passage that Berger cites, from Book Two of the *Notitia,* can be interpreted in two ways, only one of which supports the use to which Berger puts it:

> Ninth conclusion: that *tempus* can be divided into as many equal parts as you please, as is clear from this. Every continuum is divisible into any number of parts of the same proportion, thus in two or three or four et cetera. Time is a continuous thing, therefore it can be divided into any number of equal parts.
>
> Therefore, a song is made of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 equal semibreves of the same shape. It is not moreover possible to exceed this last in the voice. [A song] is sung from three equal and two [semibreves]; two and three are five, two and two are four, three and three are six. four and three are seven, four twos are eight, three times three is nine. All these are equal. Thus from all equal [semibreves] a song can be made.[8]

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[7] Berger identifies the relationship as ☾◆◆ = ⌜◆◆◆⌝ (p. 170); it is more accurately and thoroughly summarized as



[8] "Nona conclusio: Quod autem tempus possit dividi in quotlibet partes aequales, patet ex hiis. Omne continuum divisibile est in quotlibet partes eiusdem proportionis, sicut in duas vel tres vel quatuor et cetera. Tempus est de genere continuorum, ergo potest dividi in quotlibet partes aequales.

Fiet igitur cantus ex 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 semibrevibus aequalibus eiusdem figurae. Non est autem multum bene possibile voci ulterius pertransire. Canitur ex tribus aequalibus et ex

Berger takes this passage to mean that the breve can be divided into different numbers of temporally equal parts so that the semibreve has no fixed value, but can be $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{5}$, etc., of a breve. If this interpretation of the passage is correct, it theoretically allows all kinds of proportions between one divided breve and another, using integers from 1 to 9—for example, 4:7 or 3:5. But the passage as Berger interprets it does not explain the emergence of the specific proportions that came into use at the end of the century; the passage only provides a source for the idea of proportions in general, which on this view were developed in accordance with the central breve theorized in Muris' writings.

Berger disagrees with Michael Long's interpretation of the ninth conclusion of the *Notitia*'s Book Two, in which he argues that the term "equales" refers to the shape of the semibreve, not to its temporal value (p. 179).[9] On Long's interpretation, semibreves that divide a breve are treated exactly like breves with respect to longs, so that three semibreves within a breve are equal, while two undergo alteration to form a perfection. The breve can still be divided into up to nine parts, but the parts themselves are not temporally equal; rather, the note shapes that represent them are visually identical. Taking Long's reading one step further, this passage of Muris supports a minim-based, rather than breve-based, mensural hierarchy.

Long's reading, in my opinion, is supported by earlier chapters in the *Notitia,* where it is clear that Muris orients his system mathematically from the minim up. In chapter five of book one, a table of note shapes and their value (table 1) shows three different values for the semibreve: a *semibrevis minima* is given the value 1, a *semibrevis minor* is 2 and *semibrevis parva* is 3. Likewise, three different-sized breves are assigned numerical values, as are longs and *maxime,* up to the largest note-value, equal to 81 *semibreves minimae.*

The structure of the mensural system as laid out in Table 1 is clearly at odds with the "ninth conclusion" quoted above; the former implies a system based upon a central minim, while the latter makes the breve the central note value. Although it is difficult to say why or how such a contradiction came about in the texts of the *Notitia,* it is worth pointing out that the ninth conclusion borrows heavily from Aristotelian terminology and concepts regarding the nature of time, a subject that was much debated in

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duobus; duo et tria sunt quinque, bis duo "sunt" quatuor, bis tria sunt sex, quatuor et tria sunt septem, bis quatuor sunt octo, ter tria sunt novem. Haec omnia sunt aequalia. Igitur ex totidem aequalibus potest fieri cantus" (Johannes de Muris, *Notitia artis musicae, Corpus scriptorum de musica* 17 [1972], ed. Ulrich Michels, 104–05).

[9] Michael Long, *Musical Tastes in Fourteenth-Century Italy: Notational Styles, Scholarly Traditions, and Historical Circumstances* (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1981), 35–47.

Table 1
Note Values from Johannes de Muris, *Notitia artis musicae*

note shape	numerical relationship	value in minims	note name	grade of perfection[10]
	3	81	longissima	primus gradus
	2	54	longior	
	1	27	longa	
	3	27	perfecta	secundus gradus
	2	18	imperfecta	
	1	9	brevis	
	3	9	brevis	tertius gradus
	2	6	brevior	
	1	3	brevissima	
	3	3	parva	quartus gradus
	2	2	minor	
 [11]	1	1	minima	

[10] For an explanation of the intellectual context of the term "gradus" (grade), see Dorit Tanay, *Music in the Age of Ockham* (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1989), 50–62.

[11] It is worth noting that although the edition from which this chart is copied represents this as a minim, a facsimile of one source reproduced in the edition shows the table with this note shape as a semibreve, further supporting Long's suggestion. I have not been able to examine all the sources of the treatise to see how they present this figure.

this period.[12] The focus of the debate was whether time was a continuous, infinitely divisible quantity as described by Aristotle, or whether time was a substance made up of atoms that had magnitude. This issue, debated since antiquity, had philosophical, metaphysical, religious, and also practical consequences. The consequences for musical practice are found in the construction of the hierarchy of rhythmic values. A system that took the breve as its central value and divided it up into various equal parts, as described by Muris in the ninth conclusion, imagined time to be infinitely divisible, thus conforming to Aristotelian doctrine. A system that took the minim—the smallest possible note value and thus analogous to the "atom" of time—as its starting-point was concepually linked to a view of time as composed of indivisible atoms. A relationship between these philosophical ideas and the nuts and bolts of musical practice was provided by theorists themselves, who appealed to one or the other theory of time for justification of their theories of musical mensuration.[13]

Muris seems to have wanted to have his definition of time work both ways. His presentation of the hierarchy of mensural note values was based on the central minim as the "unit" or "atom" of the system. The "ninth conclusion," however, described time to be an infinitely divisible continuum, just as described by Aristotle in the fourth book of the *Physics.* The ninth conclusion may be Muris' attempt to add Aristotelian lustre to his theory of *musica mensurabilis* by describing his system of musical *tempus* using Aristotle's definition of general time, even though the latter contradicts musical practice as well as the system outlined by Muris himself earlier in the treatise. This reading of Muris may serve as an example of how the opposition between central breve and central minim in music

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[12] Aristotle's discussion of time is found in Book four of the *Physics,* an English translation of which is found in Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 289–300. For discussions of the natural philosophy of time in the fourteenth century, see Richard Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), and Norman Kretzmann, ed., *Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982). The relationship between philosophical discussions of the nature of time and music theory in the fourteenth century is explored in Tanay, *Music in the Age of Ockham,* chap. 3 and 4, and Stone, *Writing Rhythm in Late Medieval Italy,* chap. 6. For an explanation of the importance of Aristotelian language and concepts to treatises on *musica mensurabilis* generally, see Jeremy Yudkin, "The Influence of Aristotle on French University Texts," in André Barbera, ed., *Music Theory and its Sources: Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 173–89.

[13] See Fabrizio della Seta, "*Utrum musica tempore mensuretur continuo, an discreto*: Premesse filosofiche ad una disputa del gusto musicale," *Studi musicali* 13 (1984), 169–219, and Tanay, *Music in the Age of Ockham,* 65–95.

theory can be mapped onto a larger philosophical issue that preoccupied fourteenth-century thinkers.

It should be obvious that the issues raised above about breve versus minim equivalence constitute no criticism of the book's content and scope. As is the case with any pathbreaking work, Berger's study, organization, and lucid presentation of an enormous amount of material has enabled questions like those above to be raised at all. Her book has set out to fill two enormous voids: our understanding of mensuration signs and their interpretation in the Renaissance; and the conceptual origins of the mensural system itself. It has unquestionably fulfilled its ambitions, and it will be both required reading for scholars and performers of late medieval and Renaissance music, as well as a starting point for more investigations into the complex cultural background of the early development of musical notation.

—Anne J. Stone

Gregory Butler. Bach's Clavier-Übung III: The Making of a Print. With a Companion Study of the Canonic Variations on "Vom Himmel Hoch," BWV 769. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990. 139 pp.

When I read Gregory Butler's *Bach's Clavier-Übung III: The Making of a Print*, I could not help but think of a remark made by Arthur Mendel at the first meeting of the American Bach Society some twenty years ago. At the conclusion of a round table on post-World War II developments in Bach research, a long session in which the manuscript studies of Alfred Dürr, Georg von Dadelsen, and Robert Marshall were discussed in some detail, Mendel quipped, with a wry smile: "And if the original manuscripts have revealed a lot about Bach's working habits, wait until we take a closer look at the original prints!" The remark drew laughter, as Mendel intended, and struck one at the time as facetious, for how could the prints of Bach's works ever show as much about chronology and the compositional process as the manuscripts? The surviving manuscript materials, written by Bach and his copyists, display a wealth of information that can be unraveled through source-critical investigation: revisions, corrections, organizational second thoughts. The prints, by contrast, appear inscrutable. Uniform and definitive in appearance, made by engravers rather than Bach or his assistants, they seem to be closed books, telling little—if anything—about the genesis of the texts they contain.

In the earliest volumes of the *Neue Bach-Ausgabe* (*NBA*), the original prints were viewed in precisely that way. They were taken at face value, with no decipherable prehistory. In 1957, Hans Klotz dispatched the original print of the Canonic Variations on "Vom Himmel hoch," BWV 769, in two pages.[1] It was not long, however, until matters changed considerably, proving Mendel to be—as usual—quite correct. Since 1970, research has illuminated three critical aspects of the Bach prints.

First, as work on the *NBA* continued, it became clear that the individual copies of a given print are *not* all the same. Careful comparison of the texts reveals layers of corrections. In some cases, the corrections reflect changes made in the engraved copper plates after an initial "run." More common are changes entered by hand into copies of the print as they were dispensed to buyers. These seem to have been made by Bach himself.

[1] J. S. Bach, *Neue Bach-Ausgabe* (hereafter *NBA*), vol. 4, no. 2, *Die Orgelchoräle aus der Leipziger Originalhandschrift*, ed. Hans Klotz (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1957).

In addition, close inspection of watermarks in the extant exemplars of a particular print sometimes reveals the use of different papers, pointing again to a number of different runs, or to the use of different presses for a single run. The Critical Report of *Dritter Teil der Klavierübung,* issued in 1974, includes a systematic list of correction strata.[2] The Critical Report of *Erster Teil der Klavierübung,* issued in 1978, notes both corrections and varying paper types.[3]

Second, as such investigatory work unfolded, it became evident that Bach often retained *Handexemplare,* or "personal copies," of his printed works, in which he notated corrections and revisions, either for his own use or possibly for incorporation into a second edition, should one materialize. This line of research reached a remarkable climax in the mid-1970s with the resurfacing of Bach's annotated copy of the Schübler chorales (known to the famous Bach biographer Philipp Spitta a hundred years earlier but inaccessible even then)[4] and, to an even greater extent, with the discovery of Bach's *Handexemplar* of the Goldberg Variations in Strasbourg. The Goldberg *Handexemplar* contains not only corrections in Bach's hand, written mainly in red ink, but also a previously unknown series of enigmatic canons, since dubbed the "Goldberg Canons" and assigned the BWV number 1087. In his report on the discovery, Christoph Wolff summarized the *Handexemplar* phenomenon for the first time and discussed the four personal copies that remain extant.[5]

Third, the engraving and printing procedures themselves were scrutinized with remarkable intensity. This approach was explored mainly by Butler, who, in a series of articles from the 1980s, examined Bach's Leipzig and Nuremberg engravers and outlined the sometimes disorderly manner in which the original prints were assembled and proofed.[6] In a number of instances, Butler was able to make out "footprints" in the printed texts—changes whose original readings, still discernible from traces left on the

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[2] *NBA,* vol. 4, no. 4, *Dritter Teil der Klavierübung,* ed. Manfred Tessmer (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1974).

[3] *NBA,* vol. 5, no. 1, *Erster Teil der Klavierübung,* ed. Richard Douglas Jones (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1978).

[4] See Christoph Wolff, "Bachs Handexemplar der Schübler-Choräle," *Bach-Jahrbuch* 63 (1977): 120–29.

[5] Christoph Wolff, "Bach's *Handexemplar* of the Goldberg Variations: A New Source," *The Journal of the American Musicological Society* 29 (1976): 224–41.

[6] Gregory Butler, "Leipziger Stecher in Bachs Originaldrucken," *Bach-Jahrbuch* 66 (1980): 9–26; idem, "J. S. Bach and the Schemelli Gesangbuch Revisited," *Studi musicali* 13 (1984): 241–57; idem, "The Engraving of J. S. Bach's *Six Partitas,*" *Journal of Musicological Research* 7 (1987): 3–27; and idem, "*Clavier-Übung II* and a Nuremberg-Leipzig Engraving Connection," in *Essays in Honor of William Scheide,* ed. Paul Brainard (forthcoming).

engraved copper plates, illuminated in part the history of the *Stichvorlagen*, the manuscripts from which the plates were made. Butler demonstrated the full potential of this type of research in a remarkable essay on the print of *The Art of Fugue*, in which he showed that from detectable alterations in page numbering, one could reconstruct Bach's unfulfilled final concept of the work, in terms of both contents and order.[7] Butler's solution to the structure of *The Art of Fugue*—the collection would have contained a series of sixteen fugues, beginning with Contrapunctus 1 and ending with the quadruple fugue on BACH, followed by a series of four canons, beginning with the octave canon and ending with the augmentation canon—makes more sense than any other,[8] and made one wonder what other secrets the original prints might yield.

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Bach's Clavier-Übung III: The Making of a Print is Butler's attempt to reconstruct the history of one of the most challenging cases. *Clavierübung* III seems to have appeared out of the blue: no extant manuscripts hint at its prehistory, no event clearly explains its conception. The one source that might have clarified the origins of *Clavierübung* III, the handwritten copy owned by C. P. E. Bach in 1774 and described by him as "my late father's manuscript" ("des seeligen Mannes Manuscript"), disappeared in the eighteenth century. Eighty pages from cover to cover, *Clavierübung* III is Bach's largest printed collection and most probably presented the greatest challenge both in its composition and in its engraving. Contemporary documents reveal that there was a delay in the printing. Writing to a friend in January 1739, Johann Elias Bach (Sebastian's cousin and occasional secretary) described the *Clavierübung* III print in some detail (He knew how many pages it would contain) and mentioned that it would be ready for sale at the upcoming Easter Fair, which took place in April. The print did not appear until half a year later, however, in October, at the St. Michael's Fair.

The absence of early manuscripts and the printing delay have led scholars to believe that Bach composed the music of *Clavierübung* III in a relatively short stretch of time, immediately preceding the appearance of the print in 1739. Butler presents a very different view. In the opening chap-

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[7] Gregory Butler, "Ordering Problems in J. S. Bach's *Art of Fugue* Resolved," *Musical Quarterly* 69 (1983): 44–61.

[8] Certainly more sense than the solution recently proposed by Ulrich Siegele, who calls for eight more pieces, to make a total of twenty-four fugues. See Ulrich Siegele, "Wie unvollständig ist Bachs 'Kunst der Fuge'?," in *Bericht über die Wissenschaftliche Konferenz zum V. internationalen Bachfest der DDR* (Leipzig: Deutscher Verlag für Musik, 1988): 219–25.

ter, "Genesis," he suggests that Bach worked on the music at a leisurely pace for four years, beginning soon after the publication of *Clavierübung* II in 1735. As evidence, he points to similarities between the Prelude and Fugue in E♭ Major ("St. Anne"), BWV 552, the framing work of *Clavierübung* III, and an overture (I) and fugue (IV) from the second part of Conrad Friedrich Hurlebusch's *Compositioni musicali*, for which Bach served as Leipzig agent in 1735. Moreover, Butler believes that the large "Allein Gott in der Höh' sei Ehr" trio, BWV 676, of *Clavierübung* III was inspired by Johann Gottfried Walther's chorale variations on the same text, which Bach submitted to a Leipzig engraver on behalf of his Weimar colleague, around 1735 as well. Also pointing to the mid-1730s, according to Butler, is the use of *stile antico* in the large Kyrie settings, BWV 669–671, and the *pedaliter* "Aus tiefer Not, schrei ich zu dir," BWV 686. The entire *Missa* layer, Butler states, might be linked with Bach's renewed appeal in 1736 for a position at the Dresden court and seen as a "keyboard pendant to the vocal *Missa*" that Bach had submitted three years earlier (p. 13). The *pedaliter* catechism chorales were composed next: in "Vater unser im Himmelreich," BWV 682, Butler sees the influence of the *Livres d'orgue* of Grigny and Du Mage, which Johann Abraham Birnbaum mentioned with regard to Bach in the Scheibe controversy of 1737–38. Most important, Butler feels that Bach's original conception of *Clavierübung* III included only the *Missa* settings (large and small) and the *pedaliter* catechism chorales. As the time for engraving approached, Bach decided to expand the collection, adding the already completed Prelude and Fugue in E♭, and the *manualiter* catechism chorales and the four duets, written at the very last minute.

As for the engraving, Butler detects the work of four hands. Balthasar Schmid of Nuremberg engraved the title page. The music text was entrusted to the Leipzig engraver Johann Gottfried Krügner, Sr. and his two assistants, whom Butler tentatively identifies as Krügner's wife Rosine Dorothee (née Boètius, daughter of the Leipzig engraver Johann Theodor Boètius and manager of his shop between 1722 and 1726) and Krügner's son Johann Gottfried, Jr. But this scheme ran amok when Krügner's workshop proved unable to handle the expanded collection. As proof that Bach changed his plans, Butler points to the title page, which fails to mention the Prelude and Fugue in E♭ and the four duets, but, more important, to altered page numbers—the same clue he utilized in his study of *The Art of Fugue*. In the *Clavierübung* III print, Butler perceives five page changes: page 13 was changed to page 22, and pages 31–34 were changed to pages 40–43. To judge from the closeup photographs of the page numbers included in the book, this observation is correct. Butler interprets the alterations to mean that Bach submitted *two* manuscripts to

the printer: the first, lacking the Prelude and Fugue in E♭, the small catechism settings, and the duets, contained forty-nine pages of music. The second consisted of inserts for the additional pieces and brought the musical text to seventy-seven pages. The expanded version included nine new pages inserted before page 22—hence the displacement by nine in the page numbering from page 22 onward. Page 22 is the last page of the first "Allein Gott in der Höh sei Ehr" setting, BWV 675, and one might assume, logically, that the nine pages added before it contained the Prelude in E♭. But since the Prelude encompasses *ten* pages, Butler looks for another source. In a discussion whose neopositivist complexity would make Joseph Kerman blanch, Butler settles on the idea that Bach not only added the Prelude but also wrote out a number of new pages for the *Missa* section, compressing the text here and there in order to accommodate the newly planned *manualiter* settings.

With the Easter Fair approaching, and only half the collection engraved, Bach turned for help to Schmid, who stepped in to engrave the revised *Missa* pages, the Prelude in E♭, the final twenty-one pages, plus a number of other pages. Schmid carried out part of his task while in Leipzig for the Easter Fair. These plates, according to Butler, remained in Leipzig, where they were united with those of Krügner. The remaining plates Schmid engraved back home in Nuremberg, where they stayed. As a consequence, part of *Clavierübung* III was printed in Leipzig, and part in Nuremberg (the existence of two different paper types of the extant corrected exemplars supports this idea). The pages were then united in Leipzig in time for the collection to be sold at the October St. Michael's Fair. Butler summarizes the distribution of engravers and papers in an elaborate, four-page chart (pp. 22–25).

The picture that emerges from Butler's study is somewhat unsettling. Rather than moving to press with music in hand, Bach initiates the engraving process before his ideas are fully formed. He plans to expand the collection beyond its *Missa* and large catechism settings, but he is slow to finish the additional music. It is not simply the engravers who hold up the completion of the print, but Bach himself, whose vision of the *manualiter* catechism chorales becomes more ambitious as the works take shape. The first settings are modest in size and can be squeezed into space left over from *pedaliter* settings: "Wir glauben all' an einen Gott," BWV 681; "Vater unser im Himmelreich," BWV 683; and "Christ unser Herr, zum Jordan kam," BWV 685. But as Bach composes, he raises his sights. The *manualiter* settings become longer and more intricate, concluding with the "Fuga super Jesus Christus unser Heiland," BWV 689, which occupies almost three full pages in the print and is more than three times as long as the initial three settings. Butler believes that the "Fuga super Jesus Christus

unser Heiland" and the four duets were not composed until after the Easter Fair, since they were engraved by Schmid and printed in Nuremberg. Bach appears, then, as an eccentric, even indecisive composer, whose irrepressible creative energies overshadow practical considerations. This is a remarkable portrait.

Remarkable, that is, if one believes it. Without question, Butler knows more about the *Clavierübung* III print than anyone else alive. Quite possibly, he knows even more about certain aspects than Bach, Schmid, and Krügner, who most certainly did not keep track of the watermarks of the papers used for the various exemplars. Butler presents his case in detail, and with conviction. But it is a case constructed largely on hypotheses, and the hypotheses are often presented with fewer counterarguments than one might expect. Moreover, during the course of the book, many hypotheses undergo a mysterious transmogrification: they begin as theory and, without additional evidence, emerge as fact.

To return to the "Genesis" chapter, for instance: The linking of works by Hurlebusch, Walther, Grigny, and Du Mage with *Clavierübung* III is illuminating, but can it be used reliably as evidence for chronology? It is indeed likely that Bach saw the Hurlebusch and Walther pieces in 1735. But does that mean that he sat right down and wrote pieces styled after them? Surely Bach was familiar with J. C. F. Fischer's E-Major Fugue from *Ariadne musica*, printed in 1702, for quite some time before he crafted his own Fugue on the same subject and in the same key around 1740 for the second volume of *The Well-Tempered Clavier*. The Hurlebusch and Walther pieces are dilettantish compared to Bach's mature works, and Bach had mastered the techniques they display many years earlier, in Weimar. Such music might have stimulated him in 1710. But in 1735, after he had composed *Clavierübung* I and II? As it is well known, C. P. E. Bach stated that his father, in his last years, esteemed highly "Fux, Caldara, Handel, Kaiser, Hasse, both Grauns, Telemann, Zelenka, Benda, and in general everything that was worthy of esteem in Berlin and Dresden."[9] Walther and Hurlebusch are missing from the list, and with good reason. By 1735, Bach would have been lukewarm about their works, at best.

Or take the case of Grigny: Bach copied out Grigny's *Livre d'orgue* in Weimar, around 1712.[10] By the mid-1730s, the manuscript would have

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[9] Hans-Joachim Schulze and Werner Neumann, ed. *Bach Dokumente 3* (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1972), no. 803.

[10] There is little question about this, since both the watermarks and handwriting of Bach's manuscript (Frankfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, *Mus.Hs. 1538*) point in that direction. See Bach, *NBA*, vol. 9, no. 1, *Wasserzeichen-Katalog*, 43, and idem, *NBA*, vol. 9, no. 2, *Bachs Notenschrift*, 44–45.

been sitting on his shelf for more than two decades. It does not seem unreasonable to think that Bach might have drawn inspiration from Grigny, perhaps the most sophisticated and refined of the French Classical organists. One suspects that unlike Hurlebusch and Walther, Grigny was "Bach's kind of composer," even in 1735. But how can we possibly know if Bach pulled out Grigny's collection in 1737 or 1738 or 1739? What Birnbaum said, around 1737, was this: "From among a mass of composers whom I could cite in this respect [the writing out of every ornament], I will mention only Grigny and Du Mage, who in their *Livres d'orgue* have used this very method." It is likely that Birnbaum was mouthing Bach's words. But the words imply no more than the fact that Bach was familiar with Grigny's and Du Mage's music. They do not suggest, at least to me, that Bach was mulling over the music at the very moment that Birnbaum was writing.

What is worrisome is not that Butler suggests that the music of Hurlebusch, Walther, Grigny, and Du Mage influenced aspects of *Clavierübung* III. He could well be right, and even if he isn't, the comparisons draw attention to conventions that were in the air. What makes one apprehensive is that Butler tries to read more into the evidence than is there, and in his eagerness to do so, he sometimes misleads. How would the unwary reader interpret this sentence?:

> Johann Abraham Birnbaum, Bach's official spokesman in the Scheibe controversy, in his "Impartial Comments" (Dok 2:304) written toward the end of 1737 or early in 1738, cites in his refutation of Scheibe's criticism . . . two French organ collections, Nicolas de Grigny's *Premier livre d'orgue* (1699) and Pierre Du Mage's *Premier livre d'orgue* (1708), so that Bach would seem to have been studying these works (he made a copy of the de Grigny print) at about this time (p. 19).

It seems to say that Bach made a copy of the de Grigny print "at about this time"—that is, toward the end of 1737 or early in 1738. That Bach actually made the copy in Weimar is not mentioned, even though it is common knowledge among Bach specialists.

The comparison of Hurlebusch's Overture and Bach's Prelude in E♭ includes a musical example (p. 4), printed like this:



If one looks at the pitches alone, the two themes do indeed seem to be extremely similar. But the rhythmic spacing of both has been distorted to make the notes line up. In m. 1, the third beat of the Bach is placed under the last quarter of beat 2 of the Hurlebusch. In m. 3, the trochaic rhythm of the first beat of the Bach has been given an iambic spacing to fit with the iambic syncopation of the Hurlebusch. In m. 4, the third beat of the Bach has been placed under the last quarter of the second beat of the Hurlebusch. The meter of the Bach, too, has been changed, without mention, from ¢ to C, to bring it into line with the Hurlebusch. The themes, as presented in this example, look closely related. But if one plays them with their correct rhythms, the kinship disappears.

Despite the understandably imprecise nature of the Hurlebusch-Walther-Grigny-Du Mage evidence, by the conclusion of the book, the long genesis of *Clavierübung* III, derived from the influence idea, is offered as fact: "The prepublication history, then, is a long, drawn-out affair stretching over almost four years" (p. 85). In addition, it is used as the basis for a comparison with *The Art of Fugue:* "Both collections had a protracted genesis" (p. 86). Such overstatements make one nervous about the conclusions that are drawn in the chapters on the engraving procedure, where the discussion is so intricate that it is difficult to know whether or not evidence has been weighed evenly. And there are others. For instance, could the *Missa* settings of *Clavierübung* III truly serve as a pendant to the *Missa* of the B-Minor Mass? The *Clavierübung* III settings are clearly Lutheran. Unlike the *Missa* of the B-Minor Mass, they are based on German texts and contain tropes outlawed by the Council of Trent. They would have been inappropriate for the Catholic rite practiced at the Dresden court.

A few red flags should be raised, at least: Butler sees the compression of works in the print—that is, the crowding of measures, especially toward the ends of pieces—as a sign that Bach changed his plans. Butler reasons that Bach at first calculated a more leisurely spacing. Then, to accommodate the *manualiter* catechism chorales, he redrafted certain pieces. In the large Kyrie settings, for instance, the spacing of "Kyrie Gott Vater in Ewigkeit" is much more gracious than that of "Christe aller Welt Trost" and "Kyrie Gott heiliger Geist" that follow it. The last shows marked compression on its last page (page 17 of the print). Butler appears to take for granted that Bach normally counted the measures of a piece in advance of writing out a fair copy and calculated a smooth, even spacing. But a look at *The Well-Tempered Clavier* or the French Suites does not confirm this. Bach occasionally miscalculated space and rectified the error by compressing the concluding measures or by adding another system at the bottom of the page with a smaller rastral. For the *Clavierübung* III print, where

appearance counted, Bach could not rely on smaller systems to bail himself out. Compression was the only answer.

Like a good detective, Butler seeks a logical reason for inconsistencies in the print. But one can never rule out happenstance. For instance, Butler sees as telling the fact that page 49 of the print was engraved by Krügner Assistant I and page 50 by Krügner Assistant II, and that the directs at the bottom of page 49 were added by Krügner himself:

> What happened here is that Krügner Assistant I in Phase 2 came to the end of page 49 and stopped. She stopped without adding the directs at the end of the page, even though for once there was ample room, and without engraving the conclusion of BWV 684. She failed to include the directs not out of haste or carelessness but because she had no reference to the following page, page 50. There must have been a break of some duration between the engraving of page 49 and page 50. Otherwise, surely Krügner Assistant I would simply have gone on and completed page 50. She must have broken off work here for the simple reason that Bach had not yet prepared the *Stichvorlage* for page 50. I submit that the *Stichvorlage* for this particular page was not yet ready when Krügner Assistant I came to engrave it because Bach had not yet composed, or was in the middle of composing BWV 685 [the *manualiter* setting of "Christ unser Herr, zum Jordan kam," which begins on p. 50] (p. 62).

Maybe. But suppose Bach *had* already composed BWV 685, and Krügner, to save time, asked Assistant II to begin engraving page 50, since Assistant I was working meticulously but slowly. Assistant I would thus be working on page 49 as Assistant II worked on page 50. As Assistant I approached the bottom of page 49, the lunch bell sounded downstairs. She completed the page, but rather than walk across the room to get a reading on the directs from Assistant II's manuscript page or engraved plate, she—being quite hungry—went directly downstairs and had lunch. After lunch, she set to work on her next plate, forgetting to add the directs to the bottom of page 49. Krügner later discovered the omission as he proofed the page, and wrote in the directs. Is it being facetious to suggest such a scenario? Surely such things occur in life now and then.

Or: In the first measure of the *manualiter* setting of "Kyrie Gott heiliger Geist" there is a perceivable change: in the soprano voice, a c'' has been covered by a dotted quarter-note rest. Noting the still visible staff lines underneath the title, Butler suggests that originally the title was omitted and the music started farther to the left (p. 52):



Butler interprets this to mean that Bach originally intended to link the *manualiter* Kyrie, Christe, and Kyrie together in one unbroken chain, and that the music that stood underneath the title was a passage organically joining the Christe with the final Kyrie. The fact that the Christe ends on the second half of the beat becomes a vital clue for Butler:

> It is significant that of the three concluding cadences in this complex, that of BWV 673 [the Christe] is unique in that the resolution occurs on the second half of the measure rather than on the downbeat as in the other two cases. In its original version, this cadence would certainly have been organized in such a way that it resolved on the downbeat (pp. 53–54).

This sounds fairly convincing until one thinks about it a bit. The two Kyries are set in $\frac{3}{4}$ and $\frac{9}{8}$ time, respectively. In those meters, a Baroque composer had little choice but to end on the downbeat (unless the $\frac{3}{4}$ represented a sarabande, which is not the case here). The Christe is in $\frac{6}{8}$, and in that meter, Bach commonly concluded pieces on the second half of the measure, as a quick glance at his works shows.

Is it not easier to suppose that the engraver mistakenly engraved, too far to the left, the first measure of the music just as we have it? The last note of that measure would be c′′—precisely the note we see imperfectly eliminated. That would explain the mistake without conjuring up a vision of lost bridges. A glance at the end of the first Kyrie shows a normal, dotted half-note, closed ending, with no signs of second thoughts. Yet in this case, too, hypothesis becomes fact in the conclusion, and the *manualiter Missa* settings are likened to the three simple fugues of the manuscript version of *The Art of Fugue:* "In both groups of works, concluding cadences that in the original versions were open are closed in the final versions, thus rendering the pieces more conclusive" (p. 87).

It may be that Butler is right, that his more complicated explanations of events are correct. It *does* makes sense that the *manualiter* catechism chorales were composed on an almost *ad hoc* basis, to judge from their unsystematic ordering and uneven quality. But that does not necessarily mean that Bach did not envision them in the collection from the beginning. If, as Butler proposes, Bach included *manualiter* settings for the Kyrie and Gloria from the start, that would mean that the composer intended to provide the modestly gifted organist—the *Liebhaber* mentioned on the title page, presumably—with material that was distinctly easier to play than the *pedaliter* settings. It would only make sense to plan such pieces for the catechism chorales, too. Otherwise, the collection would include only five short *manualiter* pieces for the *Liebhaber*—not much for the three-Taler price. It was not unusual for Bach to commit himself to the structure of a large project before composing the music: after all, during the first Leipzig years, the texts of many of his cantatas were printed weeks before the music was written. Bach could well have planned *Clavierübung* III in its full form without having all the music in hand. That would still explain, in a simpler way, the basic chain of events as Butler describes it.

The four duets *do* seem to be an insertion. Viewing the inclusion of the Prelude and Fugue in E♭ as a second thought, however, is less convincing. The E♭ key signature seems to imply a preconceived linkup with the *Clavierübung* III chorales. Would Bach have written such a large prelude and fugue, his first in ten years or so, in the unusual key of E♭, without the motivation of the *Clavierübung* III project? That it was inspired solely by Hurlebusch's music seems less plausible than the idea that Bach wrote the piece specifically for *Clavierübung* III as the time for publication approached. If he wrote out the Prelude and Fugue in a separate manuscript (free pieces were normally segregated from chorale preludes in manuscripts of the time), and if the Prelude initially encompassed nine pages rather than ten (which it would have if Bach had used a *del Segno* for the last ritornello, as he frequently did in other ritornello works), then the nine-page displacement of page numbers could be explained without a "first version-second version" theory of *Clavierübung* III. It could be explained by Bach's writing out the Prelude and Fugue in one manuscript and the chorale settings in another.

The precise scenario for the decisions surrounding the production of *Clavierübung* III is difficult to discern. Phrases such as "Bach must have" and "Krügner must have" abound in this book. One would be more comfortable if "may have" had been used instead. At the distance of over two hundred years, it is hard to reconstruct the motives of the participants.

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That said, Butler deserves a great deal of credit for tackling such a project and handling it in such a remarkably diligent fashion. His study reopens the entire matter of how Bach's prints were produced. It puts to rest once and for all the more straightforward views of earlier writers such as Hans Klotz and Georg Kinsky.[11] It shows that the treatment of the prints in a number of *NBA* volumes is embarrassingly amateurish. It provides new insights into the engraving procedure and destroys the notion that Bach and his printers worked in an orderly, systematic manner. Toward the end of the discussion, Butler summarizes his investigation with a stemma of the sources that he perceives to have existed in the production of *Clavierübung* III. The stemma contains one extant source—the original print—and eleven hypothetical, missing manuscript sources. That makes for 8 percent fact and 92 percent hypothesis. Those are tough odds, even for Sherlock Holmes.

Whether or not all the details are correct, the general picture that emerges from *Bach's Clavier-Übung III: The Making of a Print* resembles to a remarkable degree the new portrait of the aging Bach that has been taking shape little by little in recent research.[12] Freed from the pressures of church-cantata production in the last twenty years of his life, Bach appears to have been able to give greater rein to his compositional ambitions. In *The Art of Fugue,* this resulted in a major revision and enlargement of the collection. In the B-Minor Mass, it resulted in significant alterations to the "Crucifixus" and "Et in unum Dominum" movements and in the last-minute composition and insertion of the "Et incarnatus." The Bach of the late Leipzig years appears to be different from the Bach of the early Leipzig years. The Bach of the early Leipzig years, drawn with a sure hand by Robert Marshall some twenty years ago,[13] composed quickly and decisively, rarely departing from his initial thoughts. Marshall contrasted that Bach with Beethoven, a composer given to constant changes. The Bach of the late Leipzig years appears to be, paradoxically, much like Beethoven, after all. In the 1730s and 1740s, with far fewer external deadlines, Bach

[11] See Hans Klotz, "Die 'Kanonischen Veränderungen' in Entwurf, Reinschrift und Druck," *Die Nürnberger Musikverleger und die Familie Bach,* ed. Willi Wärthmüller (Zindorf: Bollmann, 1973), 11–15; Georg Kinsky, *Die Originalausgaben der Werke Johann Sebastian Bachs* (Vienna: Reichner Verlag, 1937).

[12] See especially the reappraisals of Christoph Wolff, "'Die sonderbaren Vollkommenheiten des Herrn Hofcompositeurs': Versuch über die Eigenart der Bachschen Musik" in *Bachiana et alia musicologica,* ed. Wolfgang Rehm (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1983), 356–62; and Alfred Dürr, *Bachs Werk vom Einfall bis zur Drucklegung* (Wiesbaden: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1989).

[13] Robert Marshall, *The Compositional Process of J. S. Bach, I,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 234–41.

altered and revised more freely, often reconsidering original designs in an almost indecisive way. Butler wishes to add *Clavierübung* III to *The Art of Fugue* and the Mass in B Minor, making it another product of the new, more temperamental Bach. Given the detours in the printing process, that seems to make sense. Butler sees *Clavierübung* III as another example of Bach's remarkable self-criticism—self-criticism that became so strong toward the end of the composer's life that it interfered with the smooth completion of works.

—George B. Stauffer