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articles

Froberger in Rome: From Frescobaldi's Craftsmanship to Kircher's Compositional Secrets*

By Claudio Annibaldi

If the lack of information on Froberger's life is undeniable, so too is the lack of scholarly research in this area. Indeed, all the documents concerning his two visits to Rome were found accidentally by scholars researching other subjects. One such example is the financial records testifying to Froberger's service at the Viennese court. What has enabled reference books to tell us that he studied in Rome with Frescobaldi between September 1637 and April 1641 is the disappearance of his name from the Viennese records during that time.[1] However, the records in question were discovered more than a century ago, not by a Froberger biographer but by a scholar researching the history of the imperial music chapel in Vienna—Ludwig von Köchel, author of the Mozart catalogue.[2] Another example is the two extant letters from Froberger to Athanasius Kircher, a learned German Jesuit living in Rome who included Froberger's fantasy *super ut re mi fa sol la* for harpsichord in his gigantic musical treatise *Musurgia universalis* (1650).[3] From a biographical standpoint, these letters

* An earlier version of this article was read at the Colloque International Jean-Jacques Froberger: au carrefour des musiques européenne du XVIIème siècle, Montbéliard, France, 2–4 November 1990, and a shorter version at the conference La musica a Roma attraverso le fonti d'archivio, Rome, Italy, 4–7 June 1992. I wish to thank the former archivist of the Pontificia Università Gregoriana, Father Vincenzo Monachino, for allowing me to study and photograph the items of the Carteggio kircheriano discussed below; my colleagues Yvonne Ekman and Norbert Dubowy for their helpful comments; and my student Natalina Gammelli for her research assistance.

[1] See e.g. the Froberger entry for *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians,* ed. Stanley Sadie 6 (London: Macmillan, 1980), 859.

[2] Ludwig von Köchel, *Die kaiserliche Hof-Musikkappelle in Wien von 1543 bis 1867 nach urkundlichen Forschungen* (Vienna: Beck'sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1869; rpt Hildesheim: Olms, 1976), 58.

[3] This fantasy, which was the only piece of Froberger's published during the composer's lifetime, appeared in Athanasius Kircher, *Musurgia universalis sive Ars magna consoni et dissoni* (Rome: Corbelletti-Grignani, 1650), rpt ed., Ulf Scharlau 1 (Hildesheim: Olms, 1970), 466–75. The encyclopedic contents of the ten books into which Kircher divided his treatise are detailed in Scharlau's foreword to the facsimile edition, particularly pp. iv–x. Partial transcription and photographic reproduction of the two letters are included in Scharlau, "Neue

are of critical importance, as they testify that another extended absence of the musician from the imperial music chapel between October 1645 and April 1653 included many trips to Italy, Germany, France, England, and the Netherlands and that one of these journeys led him back to Rome before September 1649. These letters, however, were discovered and first interpreted by a scholar interested not in Froberger's life but in Kircher's theories of music—Ulf Scharlau—who concluded from the first letter, if with some caution, that Froberger spent his second stay in the papal city studying with Giacomo Carissimi, an interpretation that has been adopted in a number of summaries of Froberger's life in dictionaries, monographs, and editions of his music.[4]

The present study aims to ascertain, through Roman archival sources, whether Froberger actually studied with Frescobaldi in 1637–41 and with Carissimi in 1645–49. On one hand, in fact, thus far we have lacked any evidence verifying Froberger's presence in Rome before Frescobaldi's death in 1643. The Viennese sources testify only that the former was allowed to go to Rome to study with the latter, not that the teaching in fact ever took place; nor can hard evidence be found in the well-known passage from Kircher's *Musurgia* in which Froberger is mentioned as "an organist of the Emperor and a former student of the famous organist Girolamo Frescobaldi," for the *Musurgia* was written almost a decade later—after Froberger's second visit to Rome in the late 1640s.[5] On the other hand, an apprenticeship with Frescobaldi is thoroughly consistent with Froberger's career as virtuoso keyboard player and composer of instrumental music, whereas an apprenticeship with a master of the Roman oratorio such as Carissimi would be inconsistent with not only his career and musical output but also the long-standing separation of vocal and instrumental music.[6]

Quellenfunde zur Biographie Johann Jakob Frobergers," *Die Musikforschung* 22 (1969): 47–52, and *Athanasius Kircher (1601–1680) als Musikschriftensteller. Ein Beitrag zur Musikanschauung des Barock* (Marpurg: Görich & Weiershäuser, 1969), 348, 350–51, tables 16a–b, 17a–c. For a full transcription and facsimile reproduction, see Howard M. Schott, "A Critical Edition of the Works of J. J. Froberger with Commentary" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oxford, 1977), 85–98.

[4] Scharlau, "Neue Quellenfunde," 50–51, and *Athanasius Kircher,* 39, 335, 550–51. Scharlau's hypothesis has been adopted in Buelow's Froberger entry for *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians,* p. 839; in Henning Siedentopf, *Johann Jakob Froberger. Leben und Werk* (Stuttgart: Stuttgarter Verlagskontor, 1977), 15; and in Froberger, *Oeuvres complètes pour le clavecin,* ed. Howard Schott 1 (Paris: Heugel, 1988), iii, vi, x.

[5] Kircher, *Musurgia,* I: 465.

[6] On the origin of this separation, which continued through the Middle Ages and Renaissance into the Baroque period, see the excerpts from Aristotle's *Politics* and Boethius's *De institutione musica,* translated in Oliver Strunk, ed., *Source Readings in Music History* (rpt ed., London: Faber & Faber, 1981), 17, 21, 85–86.

I first studied two series of manuscript sources, each covering the years 1637–41 and 1645–49, and integrated the data of one series with those of the other. I perused the *avvisi di Roma,* the semiweekly newsletters from Rome sent by specialized reporters to important clients in Italy and abroad, and the so-called *stati d'anime,* the sketchy volumes in which the Roman parish priests recorded the inhabitants of their districts each Lent.[7] I then collated two sets of musical compositions in order to document the possible stylistic influences during his first Roman stay: his autograph keyboard pieces located in the Nationalbibliothek, Vienna,[8] and the Chigi keyboard tablatures in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome (a set of manuscript volumes deriving from the legacy of Frescobaldi's student Leonardo Castellani, which includes pieces composed by the master for teaching purposes).[9] Finally, I went through two additional archival sources in an attempt to document Froberger's relationships with Carissimi and Kircher during his second visit to Rome—the small Carissimi archive and the letters of Kircher, which are held, respectively, in the Roman archives of the Pontificio Collegio Germanico Ungarico de Urbe and the Pontificia Università Gregoriana. As I had foreseen, I found no reference to Froberger in the former source, but my findings in the latter led me to a thorough revision of the current hypothesis on Froberger's apprenticeship with Carissimi.

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[7] I did not peruse the *stati d'anime* of 1637, because in Lent 1637 Froberger was still in Vienna. I did, however, peruse the *stati d'anime* of 1641, because Easter that year fell on 31 March, and he could well have been in Rome during Lent before returning to Vienna in April.

[8] See the facsimile reproduction of *A-Wn,* Mus. Hss. 165560, 18706, and 18707 in *17th-Century Keyboard Music,* vol. 3, ed. Robert Hill (New York: Garland, 1988). Modern editions are available in Froberger, *Orgel- und Klavierwerke,* ed. Guido Adler (Vienna: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1893–1903; rpt, Graz: Akademisch Druck- & Verlagsanstalt, 1959), and in Schott's edition cited in n. 4 above. The verity of the autograph of the Viennese manuscripts has been deduced so far from secondary details, such as the locution "by his own hand" ("manu propria") appearing at the end of most pieces.

[9] See the facsimile reproduction of these invaluable sources in *17th-Century Keyboard Music,* vols. 1 and 15, ed. Alexander Silbiger (New York: Garland, 1988–89). Modern editions of many pieces are included in Girolamo Frescobaldi, *Keyboard Compositions Preserved in Manuscript,* ed. Richard W. Shindle (Rome: American Institute of Musicology, 1968), and in *Seventeenth-Century Keyboard Music in the Chigi Manuscripts of the Vatican Library,* ed. Harry B. Lincoln (Rome: American Institute of Musicology, 1968). For a reconstruction and history of the Castellani archive, see Claudio Annibaldi, "Musical Autographs of Frescobaldi and His Entourage in Roman Sources," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 43, no. 3 (1990): 393–425.

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Froberger's wish to study with Frescobaldi in Rome is made apparent by a detailed account of the conversations that the *Obersthofmeister* of Emperor Ferdinand III had in June 1637 with two personages of the imperial court in Vienna—Father Johannes Gans, the emperor's confessor, and Duke Federico Savelli, a Roman nobleman who in 1641 would succeed Prince Scipione Gonzaga as imperial ambassador to the pope.[10] Father Gans was required by the *Obersthofmeister* to try to convert Froberger to Catholicism, and he soon began this attempt.[11] Duke Savelli was asked for information on two practical matters—how to pay Frescobaldi for his lessons to Froberger, and where the latter could be lodged in Rome. The duke's answer to the first question is somewhat uncertain: he suggests that Frescobaldi would be content with periodically receiving a gift from the emperor but offers to write to his nephew in Rome, Prince Paolo Savelli, asking him to arrange a more suitable agreement with the master. The duke's answer to the second question is more precise: Froberger's lodging in Rome might be supplied by Frescobaldi, Prince Gonzaga, or the Savelli, if the ambassador's household could not accommodate him.

The *stati d'anime* of the parish of San Lorenzo ai Monti, which recorded Frescobaldi's family in 1638–41, do not include names of any of his students,[12] and the *stati d'anime* of San Nicola in Carcere, the parish of the

[10] The document, which is held in the Vienna State Archive, has been published in La Mara [Marie Lipsius], *Musiker Briefe aus fünf Jahrhunderten nach den Urhandschriften erstmalig herausgegeben (. . .) mit den Namenzügen der Künstler* 1 (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1886), 107; Paul Nettl, "Zur Geschichte der kaiserlichen Hofmusikkappelle von 1636–1680," *Studien zur Musikwissenschaft* 16 (1929): 74; Herwig Knaus, *Der Musiker im Archivbestand des kaiserlichen Obersthofmeisteramtes (1637–1705)* 1 (Vienna: Bölhaus, 1967), 90–91.

[11] According to the Froberger entry for *Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Allgemeine Enzyklopedie der Musik,* ed. Friedrich Blume 4 (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1955), 985, the musician's conversion to Catholicism was a condition for his obtaining a leave to go to Rome and may well have been accomplished there. This assumption, however, has no support but the well-known anecdote told in Johann Mattheson, *Grundlage einer Ehren-Pforte* (Hamburg: Mattheson, 1740; rpt, ed. Max Schneider, Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1969), 87–88, where Froberger's conversion is ascribed to "N. Kappeler," a German musician who would have been among his comrades in study in Rome. Furthermore, no "Kappeler" is recorded in the surviving archival sources concerning the German community in seventeenth-century Rome, such as those held in the archive of Santa Maria dell'Anima (a church near Piazza Navona, that enjoyed for centuries the emperors' protection as the national German church in Rome), which I was able to consult thanks to the courtesy of Dr. Johannes Nedbal, rector of the church, and of the archivist Mrs. Hildegard Speciale.

[12] Frederick Hammond, *Girolamo Frescobaldi* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 81.

Savelli palace at the Teatro Marcello, seem to be lost. I therefore focused on Prince Gonzaga's palace, whose location in Piazza Navona is testified by an *avviso di Roma* of January 1640 concerning the wedding of the prince and a Roman widow,[13] and I succeeded in both identifying the palace with a building that still exists in this famous square (figures 1 and 2)[14] and discovering in the *stati d'anime* of a church nearby a 1640 list of residents in the imperial ambassador's palace, which includes a "signor Giovan Jacomo from Germany," who is most likely Johann Jakob Froberger.[15]

I then sought to reconstruct some of the musical events that Froberger might have attended in Rome in 1640. The *avvisi* reporting on Prince Gonzaga's wedding mention a concert that took place on 1 January 1640 in honor of the married couple.[16] Although they mention only the hiring of the celebrated sopranos Loreto Vittori and Marc'Antonio Pasqualini, the reference to "various symphonies of sound" ("varie sinfonie di suoni")—a phrase usually referring to instrumental music—suggests that the concert included a number of instrumentalists. If so, it is possible that Froberger, a virtuoso player as well as a member of the bridegroom's household, not only attended the concert but also participated in it.

More certain is his attendance at Frescobaldi's performances, which in 1640 included the weekly services of the musical chapel of San Pietro in Vaticano as well as the Lenten oratorios patronized by the Arciconfraternita del Santissimo Crocifisso. The importance of the art of improvisation for any instrumentalist of the time, as well as the well-known ability of Frescobaldi in such an art, suggests strongly that attending his performances was a part of Froberger's apprenticeship with the master. Indeed, André Maugars, a French viola player who heard Frescobaldi improvising at the Crocifisso oratorios during these very years, wrote enthusiastically that all French organists should come to Rome to listen to his improvised toccatas "full of contrapuntal devices and admirable inventions."[17]

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[13] *I-Rvat*, Ottob. lat. 3342, fol. 2v.

[14] The feature that enabled me to locate the Gonzaga palace in modern Piazza Navona was the covered balcony that has distinguished the building from the surrounding ones since the seventeenth century. See *Piazza Navona. Isola dei Pamphilj* (Rome: Spada, 1978), 247–67.

[15] Rome, Archivio storico del Vicariato, S. Biagio della Fossa, St. d'An. 8 (1633–40), fols. 104–05. The volume also contains the lists of the residents in the ambassador's palace during Lent in 1639 and in 1641, but neither mentions any "signor Giovan Jacomo tedesco." It should be noted, however, that the ambassador left Rome after Easter 1640. Thus, the list of 1641 concerns only the entourage of his wife. The loss of the *stati d'anime* of San Nicola in Carcere precludes us from excluding the possibility that at some time around Lent 1640 Froberger had dwelt in the Savelli palace at the Teatro Marcello.

[16] *I-Rvat*, Ottob. lat. 3342, fols. 10–10v (undated).

[17] Hammond, *Frescobaldi*, 91–92

Figure 1: An engraving of Piazza Navona, Rome, in the 1630s along with the relevant caption describing the building no. 7 as Francesco De Cupis's palace, which was rented by the imperial ambassador to the pope (photograph by the Biblioteca Vaticana from Pompilio Totti, *Ritratto di Roma moderna* [Rome: Mascardi, 1638], 232–33)



We can gain further insight into Frescobaldi's relationship with his students in general and with Froberger in particular from the financial records of 1640 for San Pietro in Vaticano and the Crocifisso—especially those referring to musical events requiring more than one keyboard player, such as the magnificent music for five choruses that was performed in San

Figure 2: A view of Piazza Navona, Rome, in 1990. On the right, the fifteenth-century De Cupis palace (photograph by Marzio Marzot)



Pietro on 29 June, festival day of St. Peter and St. Paul.[18] In such cases, Frescobaldi played with one or more of six organists and harpsichordists—Castellani, Alessandro Costantini, Giovan Battista Ferrini, Margarino, Francesco Mutij, and Pellegrino Scacchi—whom Froberger was most likely to have met or at least heard during his first visit to Rome. As three of them (Castellani, Ferrini, and Mutij) are associated with the master as composers or scribes of the Chigi tablatures, these sources may be regarded as an example of the repertories assimilated by Froberger during the years in question.[19]

Particularly relevant to his apprenticeship with Frescobaldi is the Chigi tablature Q.IV.25, the title page of which reads *Sonate d'intavolatura del signor Girolamo Frescobaldi* and which was apparently used by the master at the end of the 1630s.[20] Probably compiled by Nicolò Borboni—a former student of Frescobaldi and the engraver of his two books of toccatas—the volume consists of several independent sections, the last of which includes one musical example written by Frescobaldi for teaching purposes and three toccatas.[21] The strong affinities of these pieces with Froberger's style has led some scholars to claim his authorship for at least one of them.[22]

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[18] *I-Rvat,* Archivio del Capitolo di S.Pietro. Cappella Giulia, 93, fol. 66r. For Frescobaldi's performances at the Crocifisso during Lent 1640, see Rome, Archivio segreto vaticano, Archivio del Crocifisso, F.XIX.26 (item not numbered, headed "Musici pagati da me Jac.o Rubieri secr.o li Venerdi di Quadragesima per la musica fatta nel Oratorio del S.mo Crocifisso"). On the musicians hired for these performances, see Hammond, *Frescobaldi,* 90.

[19] Annibaldi, "Musical Autographs of Frescobaldi and His Entourage in Roman Sources," 405.

[20] For the facsimile edition, see the first volume of *17th-Century Keyboard Music* mentioned in n. 9 above. I identified the hands recurring in this source as those of Frescobaldi, his son Domenico, and Nicolò Borboni in "Ancora sulle messe attribuite a Frescobaldi: proposta di un profittevole scambio," in *Girolamo Frescobaldi nel IV centenario della nascita,* ed. Sergio Durante and Dinko Fabris (Florence: Olschki, 1986), 125–50.

[21] For a reproduction of Frescobaldi's autograph page, see Annibaldi, "Musical Autographs," 397 (table 2). On the dating of the volume from circa 1638–41, see idem, "Ancora sulle messe," 135–36. On Borboni's apprenticeship with Frescobaldi, see Arnaldo Morelli, "Nuovi documenti frescobaldiani: i contratti per l'edizione del primo libro di *Toccate,*" *Studi musicali* 17 (1988), 257–58.

[22] Gustav Leonhardt, "Johann Jacob Froberger and His Music," *L'organo* 6 (1968): 28; Silbiger, *Italian Manuscript Sources of 17th-Century Keyboard Music* (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1980), 164, and "The Roman Frescobaldi Tradition c. 1640–1670," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 33, no. 1 (1980): 68. In his introduction to *17th-Century Keyboard Music,* vol. 1, chap. 11–13, and "Tracing the Contents of Froberger's Lost Autographs," *Current Musicology* 54 (1993): 20–21, Silbiger has reevaluated the authorship of Frescobaldi, though not excluding that of Borboni's as suggested by my identification of the latter's hand in the source in question (see n. 20 above).

The point, however, is that, from an analytical standpoint, such toccatas cannot be regarded as free toccatas in the style of those included by Frescobaldi in his printed books, but rather cantus-firmus toccatas, like those included by the master in the Chigi tablature Q.IV.19 as well as by Froberger in the autograph volumes of 1649 and 1656.[23] These analytical remarks seem to confirm a hypothesis that I have made elsewhere: that Frescobaldi's relationships with his students were based on the transmission of models inspired not from the idiosyncratic pieces gathered in his printed books but from the teaching tradition of the North Italian organ school, which valued the craftsmanship required for more standardized models such as those based on the cantus-firmus technique.[24] If this is correct, it seems likely that the reason for the lack of information on Froberger's first visit to Rome is not only the lack of initiative of his biographers but also, indirectly, Frescobaldi's teaching method, the nature of which allowed it to be assimilated rapidly by his more gifted and experienced students, as Froberger undoubtedly was. In other words, if the only purpose of Froberger's first visit to Rome was to study with Frescobaldi, his apprenticeship probably lasted far less than the four-year period suggested by the payrolls of the imperial chapel in Vienna—which has thus far been taken for fact by most biographers of each of the two musicians.

* * *

The supposition that Froberger's stays in Rome coincided exactly with the gaps of the payrolls of the Viennese court is even more doubtful in regard to his second stay. His name disappears from the payrolls beginning in October 1645, and his first letter to Kircher, which was written on 18 September 1649 from Vienna, testifies that three years later Froberger

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[23] On Froberger, see Murray C. Bradshaw, *The Origin of the Toccata* (n.p.: American Musicological Institute, 1972), 79–81. On Frescobaldi, see Annibaldi, "La didattica del solco tracciato: il codice chigiano Q.IV.29 da *Klavierbüchlein* d'ignoti a prima fonte frescobaldiana autografa," *Rivista italiana di musicologia* 20 (1985): 70–71. Here I rely on Bradshaw's notion of a silent, or ideal, cantus firmus—that is, a melody derived from a psalm tone that underlies a toccata throughout without being incorporated there in any material fashion. This notion is somewhat controversial—see the objections of Silbiger and Frits Noske in, respectively, *Italian Manuscript Sources,* 191–92 (n. 1 and n. 4) and *Sweelinck* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 103—but it is still the only analytical approach able to explain "works that otherwise seem to have little sense to twentieth-century observers," as Vincent J. Panetta has put it in "Hans Leo Hassler and the Keyboard Toccata: Antecedents, Sources, Style" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1991), 32

[24] Annibaldi, "La didattica del solco tracciato," 81–82.

had already returned home. I could find no sure evidence for his stay in Rome in the *avvisi di Roma* or the surviving *stati d'anime* for the years 1645–49. However, there is a remote possibility that a "Giovanni from Germany, 40 years old" and a "Giovan Jacomo brother, 42 years old," recorded during Lent in 1647 by the parish priest of Santa Lucia della Tinta in a hotel near Piazza Navona, were Froberger and his elder brother Johann Christoph.[25] On one hand, seventeenth-century *stati d'anime* were notoriously unreliable regarding age (that here Johann Jakob Froberger, born in 1616, may have been reported ten years older would recall the miscalculations of the age of Frescobaldi in some *stati d'anime* by more than ten years);[26] on the other hand, although in 1647 Johann Christoph Froberger served the Stuttgart Hofkapelle, his name does not appear in the relevant payrolls before 31 May.[27] Because Easter was the last day the inhabitants of Rome could be recorded in the *stati d'anime,* and Easter fell on 20 April that year, he could well have stayed in Rome until 20 April 1647 and returned to Stuttgart by the end of the following month.

More reliable evidence of Froberger's presence in the papal city during those years is a letter written to Kircher by the emperor's confessor, Father Johannes Gans, on 9 February 1649 urging the delivery, "even without Mr. Froberger," of a "musical box," for which Ferdinand III was eagerly waiting.[28] Scharlau points out that the box in question was a device for automatic composition that was described in the *Musurgia universalis,*[29] and he supports this claim with the quotation of the letter that the musician wrote to Kircher September 18 of the same year, reporting on his arrival at the imperial court, his two-hour meeting with the emperor, and the emperor's immediate attempts to compose music through Kircher's machine. The relevant passage, transcribed by Scharlau, reads:

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[25] Archivio storico del Vicariato, S. Lucia della Tinta, St.d'An. (1642–48), sub anno, item no. 6.

[26] For example, in 1635 he was said to be forty years old instead of fifty-two, in 1636 forty-eight instead of fifty-three, in 1638 forty instead of fifty-five, and so on. See Archivio Storico del Vicariato, S.Lorenzo ai Monti, St.d'An. (1634–49), sub anno, nos. 71, 64, and 207, respectively.

[27] See Gustav Bossert, "Die Hofkapelle unter Eberhard III. 1528–1657. Die Zeit des Wiedergangs, der Auflösung und der ersten Versuche der Wiederherstellung," *Württembergische Vierteljahrshefte für Landesgeschichte,* new series 21 (1912): 121.

[28] Scharlau, "Neue Quellenfunde," 50, and idem, *Athanasius Kircher,* 348.

[29] For Kircher's theory of automatic composition, which was obviously based on combinatory principles, and for its aim to enable the missionaries of the Jesuit to set to music religious texts in any language, see Scharlau, *Athanasius Kircher,* 202–12, and Carlo Maria Chierotti, "La *musurgia mirifica* di Athanasius Kircher. La composizione musicale alla portata di tutti nell'età barocca," *Musica/Realtà* 13, no. 37 (1992): 107–23.

> The Father Gans brought [the machine] to His Majesty and His Majesty sent for me. I then showed His Majesty how it is to be understood. The Emperor, however, soon grasped and understood it, and also immediately composed a number of things out of it, and was greatly delighted. Finally, after the second hour, the Emperor said to me, I should now just go home; he would send for me again the next day.[30]

Scharlau concludes that Froberger was already in Rome when Gans wrote Kircher the letter of the preceding February, and speculates that he was there to study with Carissimi. To support this further claim, the scholar cites two passages from Froberger's letter to Kircher mentioned above in which Carissimi is mentioned not by name but as the "master of Sant'Apollinare," interpreting this appellation as evidence that Froberger studied with him.[31] However, this view is untenable for a number of reasons: (1) the appellation in question was merely due to Carissimi's status as the musical master of the church of Sant'Apollinare, which was attached to the Jesuitic Collegio Germanico Ungarico in Rome; (2) he is cited by Froberger in a context that suggests on the contrary (as we shall see below) that the latter was never a student of his; (3) there are two letters from Kircher's epistolary that escaped Scharlau suggesting that, during Froberger's second stay in Rome, he underwent a musical apprenticeship not with Carissimi but with Kircher himself. Let us consider first these letters thus far unknown to Froberger's biographers.

The earlier letter is from the above-mentioned Father Gans, who wrote it on 7 August 1649 from Vienna to inform Kircher of Froberger's meeting with the emperor on the preceding day:

> I gave the Emperor the musical box, and he liked it. The courier [i.e., Froberger] instructed him for two hours but told me very little. The Emperor wants your Reverence to send some written instructions. I beg you to send good ones and a similar box for me.[32]

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[30] Scharlau, "Neue Quellenfunde," 48. All my quotations from Froberger's letters to Kircher closely follow an unpublished translation of Howard Schott, to whom I am indebted for sending me a copy of the typescript.

[31] Scharlau,"Neue Quellenfunde," 50.

[32] Carteggio kircheriano 561, fol. 137. The letter goes on to hint at the serious illness of the empress, who had just given birth to a child—an event that Froberger reports to Kircher as having occurred the day after his meeting with the emperor. This letter, as well as Schega's quoted below, is transcribed in the appendix of my "La macchina dei cinque stili: nuovi documenti sul secondo soggiorno romano di Johann Jakob Froberger," in *La musica a Roma attraverso le fonti d'archivio. Atti del convegno internazionale, Rome 4–7 June 1992,* ed. Bianca Maria Antolini, Arnaldo Morelli, and Vita Vera Spagnuolo (Lucca: Libreria Musicale Italiana, 1994), 399–408.

This report anticipates the one the musician gave to Kircher in his own letter of September 1649 and adds an interesting detail: the musical box Kircher sent to the emperor through Froberger was delivered by the latter without any written instructions on its use. The other letter is from Father Johannes Schega, the confessor of the emperor's brother, archduke Leopold Wilhelm, who was Froberger's patron and would soon become the dedicatee of the *Musurgia universalis.* Schega, who wrote to Kircher from France on 6 April 1649, deals chiefly with the printing of the treatise but ends with a sentence that both reveals that Froberger actually spent his second Roman stay in some kind of musical training and begins to suggest Kircher, if not as his master, as the man responsible for his apprenticeship:

> I am delighted to know that the organist of his Serene [i.e., the archduke] is behaving so well in Rome and is making progress in the art of music. Give him my greetings.[33]

This perspective becomes more definite if we eventually turn to Froberger's letter to Kircher of the following September and consider his reference to Carissimi in the original context rather than in the fragmentary (and somewhat inaccurate) transcription by Scharlau.[34] The passage in question reads:

> Your Reverence will still be able to recall how I took leave of you. You led me into a room and showed me a secret, how to make a canon on the unison. I thought more about this secret on the journey and found it extraordinarily expedient but have to date revealed it to no one, and nobody will learn of it from me, as I promised you.

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[33] Carteggio kircheriano 561, fol. 151.

[34] For example, Scharlau mistranslates "Kestel" (box) and "regaliert" (rewarded with some gift) as "Retsel" (*Rätsel,* riddle) and "regalist" (player of the regale-type organ). As a consequence, the passage in which Froberger reports that on his way from Rome to Vienna he stopped twice to illustrate Kircher's machine to the grand duke of Tuscany and the duke of Mantua, and that he was consequently rewarded with some gift, is misconstrued, as if in Florence and Mantua Froberger performed on the organ for the above-mentioned princes and demonstrated for them an undefined device related to Kircher's theory of automatic composition. Moreover, Scharlau misidentifies an Italian nobleman met by Froberger in Florence (prince Leopoldo de' Medici, brother of the grand duke of Tuscany) as archduke Leopold Wilhelm, assuming that the latter arrived in Italy in early 1649 and that Froberger was a member of his entourage (see Scharlau, *Athanasius Kircher,* 348). The latter assumption is contradicted by epistolary evidence on the presence of the archduke in Brussels.

> Today I composed a psalm in which three sopranos can sing from one part. I diligently put the *basso continuo* under it, in order that it should not be too easy to understand. You can have it tried out at Sant'Apollinare, but do not leave a copy in anyone's hand, such that it would become common [knowledge]. I am anxious to know what the master of Sant'Apollinare will say to this. I therefore eagerly await an answer. If Your Reverence had confided such a secret to me earlier, then I could have pushed myself further, so that the box would have been much better equipped [with compositional devices]. However, nothing was lost [by this]. I have already had thoughts of a new box that will make a much better effect. In time I shall send Your Reverence one such box. But I still have one more request to make of Your Reverence: could you by mathematics invent a canon, not on the unison but rather on the fifth below and fourth above, thus in four [parts]? No composer in the world has ever enjoyed the revelation of such a thing. If Your Reverence could send it to me I would remain forever in your debt for life.[35]

The closing of the letter returns to this last request: "I ask Your Reverence once again for the other secret, but send me an example with it as well and explain it very clearly so that I could understand it." Then Froberger adds two postscripts. The first, omitted in Scharlau's transcription, shows Froberger's concern that other people not see Kircher's answer: "Your Reverence should not enclose this letter with the one to Father Gans, but rather address it to me directly." The second postscript, quoted by Scharlau without the last sentence, concerns again the score sent to Kircher: "I have intentionally not written out this psalm in my own hand, for then it would be known that I composed it. Your Reverence can say that you did it."[36]

Can we continue, then, to entertain the hypothesis that Froberger studied with Carissimi on the basis of this letter alone, as it seems Scharlau would have it? I think not. First of all, Froberger's psalm was but an application of a canonic technique Kircher had taught him during their last meeting in Rome. It is most unlikely that Carissimi would be used to test the effectiveness of a piece that one of his students composed following the teachings of another master. Second, Froberger's suggestion to Kircher that the psalm be rehearsed at Sant'Apollinare was probably motivated by a practical consideration—that the singers of the church attached

[35] Carteggio kircheriano 557b, fol. 305v.
[36] Carteggio kircheriano 557b, fol. 306.

to the Collegio Germanico Ungarico would be those most available to a German Jesuit living in Rome. Third, even if consultation with Carissimi, as master of Sant'Apollinare, would have increased the value of such an experiment, it appears that Kircher's judgment was more important to Froberger. The experiment originated from Kircher himself, and—as a subsequent passage of the letter reveals—Froberger was eager to send him other pieces, in fact any piece he might request, if the psalm was appreciated by Kircher.[37] At any rate, Froberger seemed content with knowing merely Carissimi's first impression of his piece; had he wanted the master to examine it accurately, Froberger would not have recommended that Kircher refrain from leaving the score in anyone else's hand. Fourth, Froberger's remark that an autograph score would reveal his authorship is not surprising. His style of notation, such as in the volumes he offered Ferdinand III and Leopold I between 1649 and 1658, is so distinctive that his authorship would likely be identified not only by musicians in close relationship with him but by any Roman musician who had previously seen an autograph piece of his.

Why, then, did Froberger seek to conceal the authorship of the psalm sent to Kircher? According to Scharlau, Froberger's behavior would testify to his difficulty as a professional musician in adhering openly to Kircher's compositional theories, which was generally regarded as a matter for amateur composers.[38] But the musician's eagerness for receiving further information on these theories makes such an explanation unconvincing, suggesting that he did not wish to appear as the author of the piece sent to Kircher in order not to condition the reaction of the singers who would have performed it. This view is supported by the three 1649 letters mentioned above (those of Froberger, Gans, and Schega) when their contents are analyzed in order to clear up what musical apprenticeship Froberger may have undergone with Kircher during his second visit to Rome.

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[37] Carteggio kircheriano 557b, fol. 305v. The passage, omitted in Scharlau's transcription of the letter, reads: "If this psalm pleases you, you should merely require and command me and I shall make more of the same or whatever else of mine you would like to have. I shall do such with diligence and send Your Reverence everything that you desire of me."

[38] Scharlau, *Athanasius Kircher,* 351. For Kircher's boast that his theories would enable even nonmusicians to become composers, see the passage from the *Musurgia* cited below in the main text.

* * *

To envisage the secret canonic technique Kircher revealed to Froberger on the eve of the latter's return to Vienna, we should perhaps look at the chapter of the *Musurgia* titled "De secreto canonis harmonici musarithmorum ope perficiendi" (On the Secret of the Harmonic Canon To Be Made through Musical Numbers), which describes a mathematical method to derive a canon on the unison from the simplest note-against-note counterpoint.[39] The contents of this chapter correspond extremely well to the secret communicated by Kircher to Froberger, not only because they deal with the same kind of canon at which the musician hints in his letter of September 1649 but also because Kircher presents them as if for the first time—i.e., even if he had previously disclosed the secret to Froberger, the latter, as has been suggested above, would have had to promise not to communicate it to anybody:

> And these things, which I made up my mind to reveal to musicians, are a secret which is as amazing as it is important in any compositional matter.[40]

Furthermore, the secret in question is so elementary that a glance at the examples provided by Kircher would be sufficient for any musician to grasp the essence of his method, thus conforming perfectly to the conciseness of the revelation that Kircher apparently made to Froberger in their last meeting in Rome—which, after all, was a farewell visit rather than a lesson in composition. But if Kircher's revelation did not conclude some previous discussion with Froberger on canonic techniques and merely represented a sort of precious souvenir of Rome—a token of esteem of a great theoretician toward a composer to be mentioned in his forthcoming treatise—what kind of apprenticeship would Froberger have undergone with him? To my mind, the answer is suggested in the musician's complaint that had he learned earlier Kircher's mathematical method of composing a canon on the unison, the compositional machine built for the emperor would have worked more efficiently. In fact, such a complaint could only refer to one of the two musical boxes described in the *Musurgia:* not the so-called *arca musarithmica,* which is described at length and even

[39] Kircher, *Musurgia,* II: 165–66.

[40] Kircher, *Musurgia,* II: 165–66: "Et haec sunt, quae Musicis communicanda duxi, secretum uti mirificum, ita ingentis in toto negotio harmonico momenti."

reproduced in a large engraving attached to the treatise,[41] but the so-called *arca musurgica,* which is described there very briefly, as Kircher regarded its details a secret to be communicated only to the happy few:

> The reader should know that in this book we have intentionally omitted any written example of the above-mentioned artifice, since it is reserved only to princes and some worthy friends.[42]

Overlooking the description of the *arca musurgica,* Scharlau is led to conclude that the machine Froberger regarded as capable of being improved through the secret canonic techniques of Kircher was an *arca musarithmica.*[43] This one, however, had nothing to do with canons, since it was intended to set literary texts to music in any meter and language and could produce, at best, pieces in a florid polyphonic style. On the contrary, canonic techniques fit perfectly with the *arca musurgica,* which was intended to produce pieces in five different styles:

> [We] have also built a special *arca musurgica,* very different from the one dealt with below [i.e., the *arca musarithmica*]. We dealt there with five musical styles using such devices that, whatever style in which someone wishes to compose, he may find what accomplishes his desire. The first style is the recitative style, whose combinations are arranged in the first compartment of the box and are so suitable to words that even ignorant people can easily deal with whatever text, comic or tragic, it may be; the second compartment concerns so perfect a way of treating church style that even a nonmusician could accomplish church melodies with great ability; the third includes fugal combinations arranged by degrees [. . .]; the fourth contains combinations to be used for dance style, and, if you wish to compose some sinfonias to be played by instruments only, you will find there

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[41] Kircher, *Musurgia,* II: 185–90. The engraving in question is inserted between pages 186 and 187. Its caption speaks of an *arca musurgica,* but the main text unequivocally refers to an *arca musarithmica.* Scharlau, who has apparently examined a seventeenth-century *arca musarithmica* in the Herzog August-Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel, specifies its size (23 cm in height, 17 cm in width, and 5 cm in depth) and notes: "It is an upright, narrow box on whose forefront and rear there are the combinations of clefs and the tables of keys described in the *Musurgia,* while inside there are arranged movable cards whose recto and verso contain, respectively, the tables of musical numbers and the corresponding rhythms published in the *Musurgia*" (Scharlau, *Athanasius Kircher,* 206).

[42] Kircher, *Musurgia,* II: 184. Remarks concerning the secrecy of the *arca musurgica* also occur in idem, I: XIX, II: 147 and 166.

[43] Scharlau,"Neue Quellenfunde," 50.

> that which enables you to do so [. . .]; the fifth compartment of the *arca musurgica* contains polyphonic or many-voiced combinations so that there is no difficulty in putting together compositions for 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 voices. We have also gone on with the compositions of this kind so as to reach 16 voices or more to be conveniently divided among four choirs.[44]

Perhaps the most compelling proof that the machine delivered by Froberger to Ferdinand III on 6 August 1649 was the five-style machine is Kircher's efforts to maintain its secrecy. Such efforts—which strongly recall the passages of the *Musurgia* that underline the need to communicate the use of the *arca musurgica* only to the happy few—are testified to by either Gans's letter of 7 August 1649 referring to the meeting of Froberger with the emperor and implying, as we have seen, that the former was given no written instructions on the use of the machine,[45] or Froberger's letter of 18 September 1649 reporting that he had refused to show the use of the machine also to Gans "as he had not showed it to anyone"[46] (it goes without saying that the demonstration of the *arca musurgica* Froberger offered to the grand duke of Tuscany and the duke of Mantua on his way from Rome to Vienna was an exception authorized by their princely status). Such secrecy would make sense only if the machine were an *arca musurgica*, because a few months after Froberger returned to Vienna in August 1649, details about the *arca musarithmica* would have been within the easy reach of any reader of the newly published *Musurgia*, whereas the description of the *arca musurgica* was eventually omitted from the treatise.

It is possible that Froberger not only learned how to use the five-style machine but collaborated in its actual creation as well. This is suggested both by his remarks on the possibility of improving the compositional machine built for the emperor through Kircher's mathematical method of composing a canon on the unison and by his subsequent effort to build by himself a machine that took such method into account. At any rate, the five-style machine "required an astute approach in order to work well,"[47]

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[44] Kircher, *Musurgia*, II: 177–78.

[45] For a passage of the *Musurgia* openly hinting at the possibility that the secrets of the *arca musurgica* were communicated "orally" to princes, see Kircher, *Musurgia*, II: 166.

[46] This passage, omitted in Scharlau's transcription of the letter, reads: "It is unnecessary to repeat to Your Reverence here that I have delivered the box to Father Gans. He, however, desired that I show it to him, but I did no such thing. As I had not showed it to anyone, I therefore did not wish to show it to him" (Carteggio kircheriano 557b, fol. 305).

[47] Kircher, *Musurgia*, II: 166: "Artificium . . . ingenium requirit perspicax ad bene operandum."

and Ferdinand III was an amateur composer eager to use it himself. This means that instructing him orally on the resources of the machine in question was not an easy task to carry out and that it is most likely that Froberger spent a good part of his second stay in Rome discovering the wonders of the five-style machine under the guidance of its inventor. He thus faced compositional issues totally alien to a virtuoso keyboard player—since they encompassed all styles of vocal music, ranging from polyphonic writing to monodic practice.[48]

We can now begin to understand why in April 1649, halfway through Froberger's apprenticeship with Kircher, the latter was complimented on the former's good behavior and musical progress by the confessor of archduke Leopold Wilhelm. To be sure, Schega may have been ironically referring to the fact that the musician was diligently carrying out the task committed to him by the emperor (a fact seemingly mocked by Gans when he had urged Kircher to send the five-style machine "even without Mr. Froberger"). But the use of an emphatic phrase such as "progress in the art of music" also points to something of greater importance. To Schega, music was—above all—vocal music, as was generally believed in the seventeenth century. Therefore, an organist who was gaining so thorough a knowledge of vocal music—as Froberger was doing by familiarizing himself with Kircher's five-style machine—was undoubtedly gaining the knowledge of music *tout court.*

If this is correct, we can also begin to understand what might have prejudiced the master and singers of Sant'Apollinare against the canonic psalm of Froberger, had they guessed its authorship: a widespread bias against vocal pieces composed by instrumentalists. It is well known that even Frescobaldi suffered from this prejudice.[49] Kircher himself shared it enough for Froberger to write to him: "Your Reverence will also not have imagined that I could have done a thing like this [an entire psalm as a canon on the unison]" and "In the same manner I could also make something different, more so than perhaps Your Reverence imagines."[50] This prejudice likely accounts for why Froberger preferred that Carissimi and

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[48] If so, Froberger's second visit to Rome might well have begun in the last stage of Kircher's work on the first draft of the *Musurgia,* which was accomplished in fall 1647. Indeed, Froberger is quoted there as a composer, not as an adviser, like the other musicians listed in Kircher, *Musurgia,* I:xxii. But the absence of acknowledgment for any collaboration with Froberger that may have occurred could be explained by such a fact as that the musician cooperated with Kircher on an invention whose description was eventually omitted in the final version of the treatise.

[49] For criticism of Frescobaldi's vocal pieces by the Florentine theoretician Giovan Battista Doni and the papal singer Antimo Liberati, see Hammond, *Girolamo Frescobaldi,* 85, 267.

[50] Carteggio kircheriano 557b, fol. 305v. This passage is omitted in Scharlau's transcription.

his singers regard his psalm as a piece composed by such a highly esteemed theoretician as Kircher, rather than a virtuoso keyboard player like himself.

* * *

Froberger's other surviving letter to Kircher, dated 9 February 1654 in Regensburg, was written during a period in which the musician had turned to a more sedentary life at the imperial court after some years spent traveling in a number of European countries. Different from his letter of 1649, which contains no address since it was seemingly attached to the psalm sent to Kircher, this letter is clumsily addressed (figure 3) "All Molto Reverendo Padre Athanasio Kirchero, Padre della Società Giesù, nello Collegio Romano, Roma" (To the Most Honorable Father Athanasio Kirchero, Father of the Jesuit Society, in the Roman College, Rome).

Such an address represents a specimen of Froberger's normal handwriting in Italian that, if compared with the Italian headings of his Viennese volumes, can prove decisively the autograph qualities of the whole set. The most apparent characteristic features are the capital letters of the words "Reverendo," "Romano," and "Roma" and the crosslike full stop after the last word, which correspond exactly to the capital letters and the full stops recurring in the headings of the *recercari* included in the 1658 volume.[51]

The main text of this letter does not deal with the music directly, but one passage seems to hint at the letter of September 1649. I am referring to Froberger's request for a copy of a book on music that Kircher had promised to him and that he had subsequently come across in England.[52] If the book in question was the *Musurgia universalis,* as suggested by Scharlau, it is possible that five years earlier Kircher had answered Froberger's request for further information on canonic techniques based on mathematics by promising him a copy of his forthcoming treatise, in which a chapter headed "Tabula mirifica, omnia contrapunctisticae artis arcana revelans" (Wonderful Table Revealing All the Secrets of the Con-

[51] Robert Hill's complaints of the lack of sufficient specimens of Froberger's ordinary handwriting to prove the autograph quality of his Viennese volumes (*17th-Century Keyboard Music,* 3:3) are due in part to the fact that Scharlau published the facsimiles only of the main text of Froberger's letters to Kircher—a German text written by the musician with sloping characters that are quite different from the upright ones he used when writing in Italian.

[52] Scharlau, "Neue Quellenfunde," 49. The passage reads: "While [I was] in England [they showed] me that invaluable book about music, which not only they value greatly but which is also greatly esteemed everywhere. As I recall well that Your Reverence promised it to me, I have made as bold as to ask such of Your Reverence" (Carteggio kircheriano 557b, fols. 309–309v).

Figure 3: Autograph address of a 1654 letter from Froberger to Kircher (Rome, Archive of the Pontificia Università Gregoriana, Carteggio kircheriano 557b, fol. 310v)



trapuntal Art) actually displays a mathematical method to compose canons of any kind.[53]

[53] Kircher, *Musurgia,* I: 361–65. Strangely enough, Scharlau's writings on Kircher thoroughly ignore the *tabula mirifica.* Its importance for the composition of canons of any kind

The chief biographical information of this letter, however, is not contained in the main text—which is concluded by a number of questions put forth by Froberger on behalf of a physician friend who was planning a trip to Arabia and wanted firsthand information on that country. It is contained on the page where the musician wrote the address quoted above, due to the fact that the wax seal used by Froberger to close the letter is still attached. Using a magnifying glass, one discovers that the seal shows the imprint of a coat of arms flanked by the initials "I.I.F.," surmounted by a winged helmet, and divided into two halves: the upper one with a heart pierced by two crossed arrows, the lower with three balls or rings (figures 4a and 4b).

Since such a design conforms to the heraldic patterns used at the time by German nobility,[54] we cannot help but wonder how Froberger—a professional musician like his father and his brothers—succeeded in acquiring a seal of such status. Consequently, a fascinating lead to be followed up on by his future biographers is this apparent change in his social status during his twenty years of service to the Hapsburgs. To be sure, a number of musicians serving the emperors of Germany in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are known to have been rewarded with some title of nobility: suffice it to mention Konrad Paumann and Hans Leo Hassler, each of whom was honored with the knighthood of the Golden Spur.[55] But in the case of a virtuoso instrumentalist such as Froberger, the cause of social ascent—his loyalty to his imperial patrons or the latter's appreciation of his exclusive art—would not be insignificant. In fact, if his lifelong dedication to keyboard music emerges as having been the actual cause of his ascription to German nobility, evidence also will emerge regarding the beginnings of the dignification of instrumental music in the culture of seventeenth-century Europe.

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has been recently discussed in Giancarlo Bizzi, *Specchi invisibili dei suoni. La costruzione dei canoni: risposta a un enigma* (Rome: Edizioni Kappa, 1982), 59–133.

[54] A similar coat of arms is illustrated in Gottfried S. Fraenkel, *Pictorial and Decorative Title Pages from Music Sources* (New York: Dover, 1968), table 77. Its owner was a musician whom Froberger most likely met during his Roman stays—Johann Hieronymus Kapsberger, a German nobleman and celebrated theorbo player who was Kircher's consultant for instrumental music (Kircher, *Musurgia,* I:xxii).

[55] According to Elizabeth Luin, "Mozart—Ritter vom Goldenen Sporn," *Studien zur Musikwissenschaft* 22 (1955): 68, n.67, and Hans Joachim Moser, *Paul Hofhaimer. Ein Lied- und Orgelmeister des Deutsches Humanismus* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1966), 28, Froberger was also given a similar honor. Unfortunately, neither scholar supports the view with archival references. According to Robert Lindell, whom I cordially thank for his assistance, the sources available in the Vienna archives contain no mention of Froberger's knighthood.

Figure 4a: The seal used by Froberger in his 1654 letter to Kircher (Carteggio kircheriano 557b, detail of fol. 310v)



ABSTRACT

The prevailing views on Froberger's two stays in Rome between 1637 and 1649 are revised in light of the author's findings in a number of Roman archives. Such findings include the first archival source testifying to Froberger's presence in the papal city during Frescobaldi's life. It is a parish register of 1640 enabling us to identify one of Froberger's dwellings in Rome, to reconstruct some musical events in which he may have assisted, and to discuss his relationships with Frescobaldi and the master's entourage both as a music student and as a composer in his own right. Two previously unknown letters written in 1649 to Athanasius Kircher by the confessors of, respectively, emperor Ferdinand III and archduke Leopold Wilhelm, Froberger's patron, enable us to consider Froberger's

Figure 4b: Drawn copy of the seal of 1654 (by the author)



well-known letter to Kircher of September 1649 as proof of the musician's apprenticeship not with Carissimi, as is currently held, but with Kircher himself as the inventor of a compositional machine to be delivered to the emperor. Finally, the author examines the other extant letter of Froberger to Kircher, dated February 1654, arguing that, as suggested by the coat of arms shown on its wax seal, one aspect of the musician's lifelong service to the Hapsburgs was a change in social status—the ramifications of which should be measured against the current notions of the inferiority of instrumental music in seventeenth-century culture.

Lieder, Listeners, and Ideology: Schubert's "Alinde" and Opus 81*

By David Gramit

> The lied's space is affective, scarcely socialized: sometimes, perhaps, a few friends—those of the Schubertiades; but its true listening space is, so to speak, the interior of the head, of *my head:* listening to it, I sing the lied with myself, for myself. . . . The lied supposes a rigorous interlocution, but one that is imaginary, imprisoned in my deepest intimacy.
>
> —Roland Barthes, 1976[1]

> [The lied is] a form of lyric poetry whose character rests on the depiction of a single feeling, which gently moves the soul. The subjectively perceived feeling is objectified in aesthetic form and then works directly on the feelings and only indirectly (through those feelings) on the powers of imagination and desire.
>
> —Georg Christoph Grosheim and Gustav Nauenberg, 1837[2]

One of the constants in the history of the reception of the nineteenth-century lied has been a belief in the intimate and direct expressive power of the genre. Different though the vocabulary and concerns of Barthes and the nineteenth-century encyclopedists cited above are, their common

* I would like to thank Henry Klumpenhouwer, whose comments on earlier versions of this essay have contributed substantially to the present one. Karen Painter and Emily Snyder Laugesen both provided valuable suggestions, as have several anonymous readers. I am also indebted to the work of Susan McClary; she has provided a succinct statement of the premise this essay explores: "music is able to contribute heavily (if surreptitiously) to the shaping of individual identities. . . . For better or for worse, it socializes us." ("Sexual Politics in Classical Music," in *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality* [Minnesota and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991], 53.)

[1] Roland Barthes, "The Romantic Song," in *The Responsibility of Forms: Critical Essays in Music, Art, and Representation,* trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill & Wang, 1985), 290.

[2] ". . . ist das Lied eine lyrische Dichtungsart, deren Charakter auf der Darstellung nur *eines* Gefühls beruht, welches die Seele sanft bewegt. Das subjectiv wahrgenommene Gefühl wird in der ästhetischen Form objectivirt und wirkt daher unmittelbar wieder auf das Gefühl und nur mittelbar (durch dieses) auf das Vorstellungs- und Begehrungsvermögen." Grosheim and Nauenberg, "Lied," in *Encyclopedie der gesammten musikalischen Wissenschaften, oder Universal-Lexicon der Tonkunst,* ed. Gustav Schilling, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Franz Heinrich Köhler, 1837), 383–84. The quoted excerpt focuses on the literary lied, which the rest of the lengthy article goes on to extend to relate to the musical genre as well.

starting point is a genre they perceive to have uniquely immediate access to the most interior regions of the listener. Joseph Kerman's widely used music-appreciation text introduces listeners to that genre in strikingly similar terms when he characterizes the lied's "intimacy of expression. . . . The singer and the pianist seem to be sharing an emotional insight with you, rather than with an entire audience."[3]

Although not often so explicitly stated, this understanding of the nature of the lied conditions much of the traditional music-historical discourse about the genre, including the most familiar commonplace of all: Franz Schubert's "establishment of the lied as an autonomous musical form."[4] Such assertions as "the Schubert song was practically without ancestry," despite the activity of numerous earlier songwriters, rest largely on the conviction that Schubert's songs achieve an immediacy of emotional expression that has no precedent.[5] That immediacy removes the lied from any particular historical or social context and places it in unmediated contact with the individual listener, who can then be moved by, analyze, converse with, or simply luxuriate in the song as an autonomous work of art.

Appropriate and rewarding though all these activities may be, the understanding of the lied that makes them possible is not "natural" or automatic, but rather culturally determined; it is influenced by and participates in the social formation of the listener who learns so to hear lieder. In short, it is an ideology, if, with James H. Kavanagh, we understand ideology as "a rich 'system of representations,' worked up in specific material practices, which help form individuals into social subjects who 'freely' internalize an appropriate 'picture' of their social world and their place in it."[6]

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[3] Joseph Kerman, *Listen,* 2d brief edition (New York: Worth, 1992), 253.

[4] John Reed, *Schubert* (London: Dent, 1987), 31. To link Barthes to "traditional" approaches to listening may seem perplexing, but as Pierre Bourdieu has noted, Barthes's emphasis on modes of perception acquired through lifelong acquaintance with a tradition rather than those that can be learned through formal education also aligns his musical writings with socially established concepts of bourgeois high culture (*Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste,* trans. Richard Nice [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984], 75–76).

[5] The quotation is from Maurice J. E. Brown, *The New Grove Schubert* (New York and London: Norton, 1982), 86. The discussion that follows makes clear that Brown was quite aware of earlier composers' work but that the emotional depth of Schubert's songs sets them completely apart. Even a study as sensitive to the social context of early lieder as Margaret Mahony Stoljar, *Poetry and Song in Late Eighteenth Century Germany: A Study in the Musical* Sturm und Drang (London, Sydney, and Dover, New Hampshire: Croom Helm, 1985), sets the "art song" of Schubert and his successors apart from the eighteenth-century lied and its context (pp. 16–17).

[6] James H. Kavanagh, "Ideology," in *Critical Terms for Literary Study,* eds. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 310.

Like all ideologies, the ideology of the lied's unmediated communicative power directs our attention to certain aspects of the objects it presents, but it equally effectively obscures others. In the discussion that follows, I seek to explore both how that ideology functions and what it serves to obscure through an examination of one song as well as the publication of which it formed a part—Franz Schubert's "Alinde" (D. 904), written in January 1827 and published in that year as opus 81, no. 1—from a perspective informed by these opening reflections and by an interpretive focus on the primary nineteenth-century audience for such music: the Austro-German educated classes. How might such a song both help reinforce and be interpreted through the terms established by the ideology of the lied's immediacy? Such an undertaking requires a simultaneous insistence on two distinct perspectives: first, that of the experience of music as a formally structured, apparently autonomous object—a perspective that, as I have argued elsewhere, is intimately related to the culture in which the lied flourished.[7] The second is that of the role of music as a marker of collective identity and self-definition.[8] In brief, I seek to interpret both a musical work and the ideological filters that helped define it.

Since, as Jeffrey Kallberg has argued, the social construct of genre can offer a more direct link to the social role of music than can analysis of individual works,[9] I begin not with "Alinde" itself but with the lied, a genre whose function and mode of circulation both underwent drastic changes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Earlier lieder had at best a modest place in the output of professional musicians/composers. The relative expense and restricted availability of printed music and the still significant role of manuscript circulation limited their potential as a commercial commodity, while any claims to status as prestigious art were undercut by the lied's association with domestic recreation or education and its lack of overt ties to aristocratic musical practice.[10] With the development of an international, professional, and profitable publishing industry around the turn of the century, however, the lied's domestic associa-

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[7] See David Gramit, "Schubert's Wanderers and the Autonomous Lied," *Journal of Musicological Research* 14 (1995): 147–68.

[8] For an extensive consideration of the role of cultural artifacts, including music, from this perspective, see Bourdieu, *Distinction.*

[9] See Jeffrey Kallberg, "The Harmony of the Tea-Table: Gender and Ideology in the Piano Nocturne," *Representations* 39 (summer 1992): 102–33.

[10] For a detailed study of the place of the lied before Schubert, see Heinrich W. Schwab, *Sangbarkeit, Popularität und Kunstlied: Studien zu Lied und Liedästhetik der mittleren Goethezeit, 1770–1814,* Studien zur Musikgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts 3 (Regensburg: Gustav Bosse, 1965). On the genre's lack of status, see esp. pp. 137–51.

tions made it (along with music for the keyboard) one of the most readily salable of musical commodities.[11] Its literary texts appealed to those who might have less interest in purely instrumental music, its modest performing forces made it suitable for domestic use, and its generally small scale and lack of virtuoso pretensions meant it could attract amateurs as well as accomplished performers. So, for instance, when on 9 February 1828, the publisher B. Schotts Söhne made its first overtures to Schubert, although they pointed with pride to publications that would suggest prestige to a musician—the late works of Beethoven—they asked for "pianoforte works or vocal pieces for one or several voices, with or without pianoforte accompaniment." Similarly (and, coincidentally, on the same day), the publisher H. A. Probst also wrote Schubert, requesting "songs, vocal pieces, or romances which, without sacrificing any of your individuality, are yet not too difficult to grasp."[12]

Beyond these relatively modest requirements for technical facility and material possessions, though, a developed taste for lieder required substantial cultural capital: familiarity with both a complex musical idiom and an equally highly developed tradition of German lyric poetry, and a cultivated sensitivity to the interaction of the two arts. Furthermore, since public lieder recitals did not yet exist and public concerts included lieder only irregularly, extensive access to lieder was distinctly limited: listeners could hear lieder frequently only if they themselves had the requisite possessions (resources sufficient to own a piano and purchase music) and training (knowledge of music and at least minimal proficiency at the keyboard) or if they had among their acquaintances such individuals. Without such access, connoisseurship could scarcely exist. Thus, familiarity with the genre and its conventions implied membership in a limited group for whom such songs had meaning and value: to recognize conventions is to confirm one's sense of belonging—in this case, of belonging to the German-speaking, educated classes that provided the lied's principal audience, just as they provided the audience for the poems those lieder set.[13]

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[11] On the development of music publishing and its implications, see William Weber, "Mass Culture and the Reshaping of European Musical Taste, 1770–1870," *International Review of the Aesthetics and the Sociology of Music* 8 (1977): 7–12.

[12] Cited in Otto Erich Deutsch, ed., *Schubert: A Documentary Biography,* trans. Eric Blom (London: Dent, 1946), 737, 735. Probst had already requested lieder and simple piano pieces on 26 August 1826 (Deutsch, *Schubert: A Documentary Biography,* 550).

[13] On the link between the elite portion of the German middle class and German literature, see Martha Woodmansee, "The Interest in Disinterestedness: Karl Philipp Moritz and the Emergence of the Theory of Aesthetic Autonomy in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *Modern Language Quarterly* 45 (1984): 22–47, esp. pp. 36–43. On the continuing link between this segment of society and the lied, see Gramit, "Schubert's Wanderers and the Autonomous Lied."

In a society in which the middle class owed its station largely to the services it provided to states ruled by traditional monarchs and aristocrats, such literary and artistic cultivation assumed particular symbolic importance: middle-class standing did not bring political and economic power, which at least before 1848 remained firmly in the hands of the hereditary nobility and monarchies, but rather prestige, and knowledgeable participation in the forms of "high" culture was a highly visible sign of that status.[14] Under such circumstances, the lied—with modest performing forces that made relatively small domestic spaces equipped with only a piano musically viable, but which placed both literary and musical demands on its performers and listeners—was well suited to the cultural needs of the *Bürger* of moderate financial means but well-developed cultural awareness.

Although the lied was thus both a commodity and a marker of status, both these roles were masked by the ideology of the lied's immediacy, which stresses instead the impact of an autonomous aesthetic object on a listener's individual experience. And insistence on the primacy of individual experience was a central element of bourgeois self-identity, an element that received unusually straightforward expression in a letter written by Schubert's friend Eduard von Bauernfeld in October 1826:

> I don't demand that all people be cut to the same pattern. On the contrary, this variation of individuals carried out to the smallest detail is what makes me constantly seek out and observe new acquaintances. . . . I know a hundred people, and each knows me differently. Whether or not this is to my credit, I don't know. It's simply a necessity always to be what the relationship demands. At bottom, though, my unique nature gleams through to those who know how to grasp it.[15]

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[14] On the limited political and economic standing and the cultural significance of the German middle class, see David Blackbourn, "The German Bourgeoisie: An Introduction," in *The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. Blackbourn and Richard J. Evans (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 1–45, esp. pp. 4–6; and Eda Sagarra, *A Social History of Germany, 1648–1914* (London: Methuen, 1977), 253–54. On the dependence of the middle class on the traditionally structured state, see Anthony J. La Vopa, "Conceiving a Public: Ideas and Society in Eighteenth-Century Europe," *Journal of Modern History* 64 (1992): 89–90, and the literature cited there. My emphasis on the middle class is not intended to suggest that members of the nobility had no interest in the lied, nor that those members of the nobility who participated in the activities I here describe were fundamentally distinct from their untitled contemporaries. However, as many scholars have noted, the individualist model that allowed such free interaction was fundamentally bourgeois.

[15] Edward von Bauernfeld to Franz von Schober (October 1826). Cited in Walburga Litschauer, ed., *Neue Dokumente zum Schubert-Kreis: Aus Briefen und Tagebüchern seiner Freunde* (Vienna: Musikwissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1986), 53–54: "ich fordere nicht, d[ie] Menschen

Recent studies of German social history provide a broader (and, ironically, generalizing) context for Bauernfeld's emphasis on the irreducibly individual: although diverse and regionally varied, German bourgeois culture, like many national counterparts, upheld values that placed a premium on the individual and his own attainments, albeit always within the bounds of the socially acceptable; among them are such familiar values as competition, hard work, achievement and its rewards, and independence both financial and intellectual (the latter achieved through self-cultivation).[16] The peculiarities of the German administrative classes alter the expression rather than the broad outlines of these values, for to define one's status by educational attainments or cultivation is in many respects analogous to doing so by individual entrepreneurial or political achievement: whatever the role that one's background may actually have played in positioning oneself to achieve status in a particular field, that status is viewed as the achievement of a free individual, not the result of one's hereditary place in a natural order.[17] To cite Bauernfeld once again: "Until I have done something worthwhile I am no human being."[18] A genre that was believed to communicate directly to such unique, self-defining individuals—just as it was purchased on a market that catered to the needs of those individuals—could provide an ideal "material practice" for the internalization of those values.

The situation, however, is less tidy than the above review might at first suggest. To append "socially acceptable" to a list of individualistic values is more than a perfunctory hedge against overgeneralization. It raises a problem given succinct expression in Franco Moretti's study of the

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nach Einem Leisten zu modeln. Im Gegentheil: diese bis ins kleinste ausgearbeitete Verschiedenheit der Individuen ist es, die mich immer mit Lust neue Menschen suchen u. beobachten läßt. . . . [I]ch kenne 100 Menschen, u Jeder kennt mich anders. Ob dieß ein Lob ist, weiß ich nicht. Nur ist es Bedürfniß, immer so zu seyn wie es gerade das Verhältniß mit sich bringt—im Grunde schimmert doch für den, der sie aufzugreifen versteht, die eigenthümliche Natur durch."

[16] See Blackbourn, "The German Bourgeoisie," 9, for a discussion of these values and their role. This is not to minimize the substantial differences between the institutional and musical life of, for example, Berlin and Vienna, but to acknowledge a degree of unity that local studies can obscure. On the ideals of "bürgerliche Kultur" as unifying factors, see Wolfgang Kaschuba, "Deutsche Bürgerlichkeit nach 1800: Kultur als symbolische Praxis," in *Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert: Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich,* ed. Jürgen Kocka, vol. 3 (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), 9–44; on the similarities and differences between Austria and Germany, see Ernst Bruckmüller and Hannes Stekl, "Zur Geschichte des Bürgertums in Österreich," in *Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert,* 1, 160–92.

[17] For an overview of this transformation in perception, see Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat* (Munich: Beck, 1983), 264–71.

[18] From Bauernfeld's diary entry of 8 March 1826. Cited in Deutsch, *Schubert: A Documentary Biography,* 516.

Bildungsroman: "how can the tendency towards *individuality,* which is the necessary fruit of a culture of self-determination, be made to co-exist with the opposing tendency to *normality,* the offspring, equally inevitable, of the mechanism of socialization?" As Moretti goes on to note, the problem is still more acute because bourgeois society "cannot concede that socialization is based on a mere compliance with authority. It is not enough that the social order is 'legal'; it must also appear *symbolically legitimate.*"[19] Overt coercion would undermine the appearance of individuality and freedom; social values are more effectively inculcated through symbolic practices, including art. As long as the ideology of immediacy appears natural—"the way to appreciate lieder"—it serves to legitimize the social practices and beliefs that enable it. Its almost exclusive stress on individual experience masks the tensions inherent in those practices.

These considerations establish the conditions for my hearing of "Alinde." Its focus, like that of the nineteenth-century lied in general, is unquestionably on the individual subject. At the same time, unlike many of Schubert's earlier songs, it reflects his increasing activity as a composer writing not exclusively for a circle of personal acquaintances but for a larger public: both the short interval between its composition and publication and the relative prominence—at least in musical circles—of its poet, *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung* founder and editor Friedrich Rochlitz (whose poems also provide the texts for the other two songs in opus 81), suggest that it was conceived expressly for the purpose of immediate publication,[20] and its relative technical simplicity marks it as a song Probst might have considered "not too difficult to grasp."

* * *

Die Sonne sinkt ins tiefe Meer,
Da wollte sie kommen.
Geruhig trabt der Schnitter einher,
Mir ist's beklommen.
Hast, Schnitter, mein Liebchen nicht gesehn?
Alinde! Alinde!—

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[19] Franco Moretti, *The Way of the World: the 'Bildungsroman' in European Culture* (London: Verso, 1987), 16.

[20] Although Rochlitz is now remembered almost exclusively in his role as founding editor of the Leipzig *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung,* at the time he was also known as a poet and literary figure. John Reed, *Schubert* (London: Dent, 1987), 170, suggests that Tobias Haslinger, Schubert's publisher, encouraged such settings of prominent contemporary poets to increase sales.

"Zu Weib und Kindern muß ich gehn,
Kann nicht nach andern Dirnen sehn;
Sie warten mein unter der Linde."—

Der Mond betritt die Himmelsbahn,
Noch will sie nicht kommen.
Dort legt der Fischer das Fahrzeug an,
Mir ist's beklommen.
Hast, Fischer, mein Liebchen nicht gesehn?
Alinde! Alinde!—
"Muß suchen wie mir die Reusen stehn,
Hab nimmer Zeit, nach Jungfern zu gehn.
Schau, welch einen Fang ich finde!"—

Die lichten Sterne ziehn herauf,
Noch will sie nicht kommen.
Dort eilt der Jäger in rüstigem Lauf,
Mir ist's beklommen.
Hast, Jäger, mein Liebchen nicht gesehn?
Alinde! Alinde!—
"Muß nach den bräunlichen Rehbock gehn,
Hab nimmer Lust nach Mädeln zu sehn,
Dort schleicht er im Abendwinde."—

In schwarzer Nacht steht hier der Hain;
Noch will sie nicht kommen.
Von allen Lebendgen irr' ich allein
Bang' und beklommen.
Dir, Echo, darf ich mein Leid gestehn:
Alinde—"Alinde,"
Ließ Echo leise herüberwehn;
Da sah' ich sie mir zur Seite stehn:
"Du suchtest so treu: nun finde!"—

The sun sinks into the deep sea—she was going to come then. The reaper trots calmly along, I am uneasy. Reaper, haven't you seen my beloved? Alinde! Alinde!—"I have to meet my wife and children, I can't go looking for other girls; they're waiting for me under the linden."

The moon enters its heavenly course—still she doesn't come. There the fisherman puts his boat ashore, I am uneasy. Fisherman, haven't you seen my beloved? Alinde! Alinde!—"I have to look over my nets, I never have time to chase after girls. Look what a catch I have!"

> The bright stars rise—still she doesn't come. There the hunter hurries in a vigorous run, I am uneasy. Hunter, haven't you seen my beloved? Alinde! Alinde!—"I have to go after the brown roebuck, I never feel like looking for girls—there he creeps in the evening wind."
>
> The grove stands here in black night—still she doesn't come. Of all living things, I stray alone, worried and uneasy. Echo, to you I can confess my sorrow: Alinde—"Alinde," Echo wafted gently towards me; then I saw her standing at my side: "You sought so loyally, now find!"

Despite its author's status at the time, Rochlitz's poem has not fared well with more recent critics. According to Alfred Einstein, Rochlitz was a publisher "who also fancied himself a poet": "it was due solely to Schubert that a few of his poems acquired some degree of immortality."[21] The text has received the patronizingly faint praise of Richard Capell's "slight but charming" as well as the brusque dismissal of Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau: "a not very good idea of a not very convincing poet."[22] In short, "Alinde" has been consigned to that large category of Schubert's songs in which a mediocre poem is tolerated only because a composer of genius provided a superior setting. But the context of listening is crucial: what audiences in the 1820s heard—the work of a respected literary figure set by an interesting young composer, is quite distinct from what present audiences hear—the work of a forgotten poet of interest solely because of a setting by a Great Master. And the interpretative climate of the 1820s also supplies a widely available context—that of Romantic criticism—in which the text's incessant, almost ritualistic repetitiveness could be read as an asset rather than a flaw.

One need not draw on such leading Romantics as the Schlegel brothers or E. T. A. Hoffmann to encounter discussions of the implications of romanticism. By the second decade of the nineteenth century, one could even find such observations in the pages of the *Wiener Moden-Zeitung:* "Romanticism is different; it destroys all space and all time, as well as every limiting relation of perception; it presses into the furthest distance—its life is longing, intimation of the absolute (love)."[23] Read from this per-

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[21] Alfred Einstein, *Schubert,* trans. David Ascoli (London: Cassell, 1951), 48, 269.

[22] Richard Capell, *Schubert's Songs,* 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan / London: Duckworth, 1957), 15–16; and Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau, *Schubert: A Biographical Study of His Songs,* trans. Kenneth S. Whitton (London: Cassell, 1976), 247.

[23] "Anders ist es mit der Romantik; sie vernichtet allen Raum und alle Zeit, so wie jedes andere beschränkende Verhältniß der Anschauung; sie dringt in die fernste Ferne, ihr Leben ist Sehnsucht, Ahndung des Absoluten (Liebe)." Aloys Jeitteles, "Gegen die romantische Schicksalstragödie," *Wiener Moden-Zeitung und Zeitschrift für Kunst, schöne Literatur und Theater* 2, no. 24 (22 March 1817): 190.

spective, the poem's focus becomes less a trivial love story than a challenge to the conventional order of time and activity. The reaper, the fisherman, and the hunter engage in successively more agitated activity, but the poem places them from the outset in opposition to the speaker; their activity is described, and without transition, the speaker reveals his apparently unrelated emotional state. In each of the first three stanzas, the speaker's vain attempt to find information about Alinde demonstrates his inability to overcome this formal and affective distance. The fourth stanza alters these constants. Each previous stanza had begun by describing the passage of time; now the grove simply stands. The third lines of previous stanzas had all described purposeful activities; now the speaker strays, aimless and isolated. Instead of speaking to an active member of society, he addresses a magical entity, a force of nature. Echo simply repeats the speaker's cry, yet this passive reliance on a magical world finally produces the results that the bustling society of workers had denied the speaker. Alinde appears—again without any activity. She is simply present.

The poem's lack of transitions, repetition of words and rhymes, and insistent use of the present tense all undercut its sense of forward motion, despite the temporal progression of the first three stanzas, establishing throughout a stasis that the final stanza makes explicit. The bustle of the workers is thus isolated from the reader's experience of the text, strengthening that reader's identification with the speaker.

To raise these familiar categories of romanticism—transcendence of the everyday world, the magical forces of nature, and the like—is only to begin to contextualize "Alinde": its implications are social as well as aesthetic, if we read it to show that the values of the busily virtuous workers of the first three stanzas are illusory and that the truly worthwhile is attainable only outside such fixed roles and obligations. Each character begs off with a different invocation of social responsibility: the reaper, with his duties as head of a household; the fisherman, with the necessity of retrieving the fruits of his labor; and the hunter, with an even more pressing desire for mastery over what he has not yet attained. Their increasing levels of activity correspond to the decreasing security of their positions (the first returning to an established household, the second retrieving an anticipated catch, and the last seeking a still-elusive quarry), but despite this differentiation, none doubts that his position entails specific obligations. Only the speaker himself—the "I" through whom the reader experiences the poem—remains uninvolved; we know nothing about him save his desire. And that desire is to know another subject, an individual with a unique name, not the various objectifications—*Dirnen, Jungfern, Mädeln*—offered by his interlocutors. Finally, it is not action but desire itself, spoken only to himself through the medium of Echo, that brings fulfilment.

Fixed roles, relationships, and actions are contrasted with the undefined, free subject, to the decided advantage of the latter.

The poem's literary context strengthens these social implications. Contemporary readers would have recognized the workers with whom the poem's narrator speaks as stock characters from a type of poetry quite different from, and older than, "Alinde." As representatives of preindustrial, rural livelihoods, sure of their proper place in the social order, they enact roles and uphold values that link them to a large body of late-eighteenth-century German poetry. These earlier poems formed a part of the pedagogical tradition that has become known as the *Volksaufklärung,* the goals of which were to educate the common people, inculcating not only Enlightenment rationality but also diligence, loyalty to authority, and contentment with one's station.[24] The poets of these works—many of them widely printed and long lived—included a variety of prominent figures, among them Gottfried August Bürger, Matthias Claudius, Johann Wilhelm Gleim, and Johann Heinrich Voß. A sampling of Schubert's settings of such texts (most set between 1815 and 1819) suggests the dominant tone: Ludwig Hölty's "Erntelied" (D. 434) celebrates the rewards of a successful harvest; Johann Gaudenz von Salis-Seewis's "Fischerlied" (D. 351, D. 364 [TTBB], and D. 562) places the work of its fishermen in the context of a world order in which each person fulfils a divinely ordained task; the anonymous "Tischlerlied" (D. 274) expresses pride in useful craftsmanship; and several texts by Matthias Claudius not only celebrate rural life but also explicitly advocate satisfaction with one's station.[25]

As if to strengthen the reference "Alinde" makes to this tradition, the poem's first three stanzas refer successively to three of its staple topics: social roles, the rewards of work, and diligence in that work itself. But the stable world of these topics is not the focus of "Alinde," any more than

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[24] On such poetry and its background, see Georg Weissert, *Das mildheimische Liederbuch: Studien zur volkspädagogischen Literatur der Aufklärung,* Volksleben 15 (Tübingen: Tübinger Vereinigung für Volkskunde, 1966). The conservative aims of such poetry are discussed in Lessing's 1772 letter to J. W. Gleim praising Gleim's *Volkslieder,* cited in Gleim, *Sämmtliche Werke,* ed. Wilhelm Körte, vol. 1 (Halberstadt, 1811; rpt Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms, 1971), 337–40. See also La Vopa, "Conceiving a Public," 95; and Gerhard Sauder, "'Verhältnismässige Aufklärung': Zur bürgerlichen Ideologie am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts," *Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-Gesellschaft* 9 (1974): 102–26. The extent and surprising longevity of the *Volksaufklärung* is revealed in Holger Böning and Reinhart Siegert, *Volksaufklärung: Bibliographisches Handbuch zur Popularisierung aufklärerischer Denkens im deutschen Sprachraum von den Anfängen bis 1850,* 4 vols. (Stuttgart: Holzboog, 1990ff.).

[25] See especially Claudius's "Zufriedenheit" (D. 362 and D. 501); others by Claudius include "Lied im Reifen" (D. 532) and "Täglich zu singen" (D. 533). Among the other texts of this type set by Schubert are Salis-Seewis's "Pflügerlied" (D. 392) and "Herbstlied" (D. 502); and the "Morgenlied" (D. 266) of Friedrich Leopold, Graf Stolberg.

members of the literate urban society to which not only Schubert and his friends but also most of those who purchased printed poetry and songs belonged, would identify unproblematically with happy farmers, fishermen, and hunters. Read by such an audience, "Alinde" could draw on the appeal of idealized rural life while at the same time confirming its readers' sense of removal from that society: such stock figures invoke a culture to which neither the poem's protagonist nor its readers belonged. There is no question, however, of nostalgic yearning for a return: in the end, the freedom of the bourgeois subject triumphs over the sense of loss via the utopian deus ex machina of the final stanza.

* * *

I have so far been discussing "Alinde" as a printed text, but those who bought Schubert's Opus 81 would have experienced it quite differently: not as four typographically distinct stanzas, but as an isolated line of text broken at points determined by the necessities of musical notation and printing. As anyone who has tried to read a poem for the first time from a musical score can attest, this altered layout can render comprehension difficult, at best. Furthermore, musically literate readers would likely follow at least the rhythmic and melodic outlines of the piece even on first perusal; there would be no purely literary experience of the poem. And when the song was sung, the text would not even have begun before the listener had oriented himself to the music, making the immediate interpretive moves that determine the categories the listener will use to make sense of the piece.[26]

What, then, might such a listener conclude from the six-measure introduction to "Alinde" (example 1)? Beyond the obvious—i.e., tempo, meter, and key (A major)—it introduces first an unchanging rhythmic pulse and then (in mm. 3–6) a pattern of phrasing in paired two-measure units, while a tonic pedal continues underneath. Harmonic motion is so conventional that the reiterated rhythm and simple, stepwise right-hand figuration dominate the attention. The opening is thus calm, almost static: the music pulses and moves but does not develop or progress.

A listener familiar with contemporary generic conventions of song would likely have provisionally summed up these observations more succinctly with the observation (also made by John Reed[27]) that "Alinde" is a barca-

[26] This conceptualization of the listening process draws on Steven Feld, "Communication, Music, and Speech about Music," *Yearbook for Traditional Music* 16 (1984): 1–18.

[27] John Reed, *The Schubert Song Companion* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 13.

Example 1: Franz Schubert, "Alinde," introduction (mm. 1–6)



rolle. Its "gentle motion, moderate tempo" and "marked lilting rhythm" in 6/8 meter (to draw on two standard twentieth-century definitions of the genre) are conventions widely recognized from the eighteenth century onward.[28] As the examples discussed below demonstrate, the tonic pedal too is a common trait. That these features had by the nineteenth century acquired associations beyond the strictly musical is suggested by an 1835 definition:

> Barcarolle . . . is the name the sailors and gondoliers of the ocean cities of Italy give to their national- or folksong, which they sing in the streets at work, or in their boats themselves as they move about on the water; thereby they express their happy, cheerful temperament, or else they lighten and make themselves forget the often great hardships of their life. . . . Its unique qualities are its rare but pleasant simplicity of harmony, interrupted only once, or at most twice at some suitable place by an unusual, passionate chord. The melody works in the same way, moving almost exclusively in the diatonic mode and passing through a few chromatic intervals only in accord with the harmony. As a purely natural song [*reiner Naturgesang*] its key and rhythm are also the most natural: 2/4 or 3/8, more rarely

[28] The first quotation is from M. J. E. Brown, "Barcarolle," *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians,* ed. Stanley Sadie (London: Macmillan, 1980); the second is from Willi Kahl, "Barkarole," *Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Allgemeine Enzykopadie der Musik,* ed. Friedrich Blume (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1949–51): "sanfte Bewegung, mäßiges Tempo." Both articles trace reports of the genre to the eighteenth century. For more extensive discussion of the genre and further musical examples, see Walter Salmen, "Venedig und die Barkarole in Oper und Operette," in *Die "Couleur locale" in der Oper des 19. Jahrhunderts,* ed. Heinz Becker, Studien zur Musikgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts 42 (Regensburg: Bosse, 1976), 257–68.

> 3/4 and 6/8, but with passionate accents, just as feeling itself stirs more powerfully in the breast of the typical natural human [*Naturmenschen*]; hence its ravishing effect. . . . It is a more difficult task for the composer than it appears at first glance: he must have studied precisely the character of that class of people if he would like to be successful in his creation; the musically uneducated boatman will most often surpass him.[29]

As the song proceeds, however, its relationship to the genre proves problematic. The music remains appropriate to the barcarolle, but the text and its implications stand in tension with the expectations that genre generates. There are no gondoliers here, the fisherman is only one of several rustic characters, and even the opening mention of the sea has no function beyond providing a veneer of plausibility for that fisherman's later appearance. That leaves only the "natural" art and emotional spontaneity of the workers to link musical genre and text. But as we have seen, rustic though they may be, the workers of "Alinde" are anything but free and spontaneous; on the contrary, spontaneity and freedom are the domain of the subject, the poem's speaker, and through him, the reader/listener. This suggests that the barcarolle may here function less straightforwardly than the above definition implies. Although we have no direct evidence that listeners to "Alinde" interpreted the barcarolle in this way, several near-contemporary operatic barcarolles establish the plausibility of such a claim: each is heard by the opera's characters to evoke a simplicity and stability far removed from the dramatic situation at hand.

Example 2 shows the beginning of the barcarolle found in the third act

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[29] "Barcarole," *Encyclopädie der gesammten musikalischen Wissenschaften,* ed. Gustav Schilling (Stuttgart: n.p., 1835–8); unsigned entry: "Barcarole . . . nennen die Schiffer und Gondelfahrer in den Seestädten Italiens ihr National- oder Volkslied, welches sie auf den Straßen bei ihrer Arbeit, oder auch im Fahrzeuge selbst beim Herumschiffen auf dem Wasser singen, um dadurch ihr frohes, heiteres Temperament auszudrücken, oder auch die oft großen Mühseligkeiten ihres Lebens zu erleichtern und vergessen zu machen. . . . Das Eigenthümliche derselben besteht in einer seltenen, aber wohlthuenden Einfachheit der Harmonie, die nur ein-, höchstens zweimal an irgend einer passenden Stelle durch einen fremdartigen leidenschaftlichen Accord unterbrochen wird. Eben so verhält es sich mit der Melodie, die sich fast ausschließlich nur in dem diatonischen Klanggeschlechte fortbewegt, und nur nach Maaßgabe der Harmonie wenige chromatische Intervalle durchgeht. Als reiner Naturgesang ist auch ihre Tonart und ihr Rhythmus der allernatürlichste: 2/4 oder auch 3/8, seltener 3/4 und 6/8 Takt, aber mit leidenschaftlichen Accenten, wie die Empfindung selbst mächtiger sich regt in der Brust des gewöhnlichen Naturmenschen, und daher hinreißend. . . . Für den Componisten ist sie eine schwierigere Aufgabe, als es auf den ersten Blick scheint: er muß den Charakter jener Volksclasse genau studirt haben, wenn er glücklich bei seiner Dichtung seyn will; der musikalisch ungebildete Bootsmann übertrifft ihn meistens darin."

of Rossini's *Otello* (1816). A gondolier's song interrupts Desdemona's impassioned expressions of despair with a cruelly appropriate passage from the fifth canto of Dante's *Inferno* (rustic simplicity notwithstanding). The contrast becomes still stronger by the major-mode end of the inserted song, after which Desdemona resumes with increased agitation. The speeches that precede and follow this interlude confirm that the barcarolle is a foil, a vision of lost wholeness amid the broken relationships of the tragedy:

Desdemona: Che dici? che mai pensi? In odio al Cielo,
al mio padre, a me stessa . . . in duro esilio
condannato per sempre il caro sposo . . .
Come trovar poss'io tregua, o riposo?
Gondoliere: "Nessun maggior dolore
Che ricordarsi del tempo felice
Nella miseria."
Desdemona: Oh come infino al core
giungon quei dolci accenti!
Chi sei che così canti? . . . Ah tu rammenti
lo stato mio crudele.
Emilia: E'il Gondoliere, che cantando inganna
il cammin sulla placida laguna
pensando ai figli, mentre il ciel s'imbruna.
Desdemona: Oh lui felice! almen ritorna al seno,
dopo i travagli, di colei ch'egli ama.
Io più tornarvi, no, non potrò.

Desdemona: What are you saying? Whatever are you thinking of? Hated by heaven, my father, and myself . . . my dear husband condemned to cruel perpetual exile . . . how can I find respite or repose?
Gondolier: "There is no greater woe than to recall past bliss while in distress."
Desdemona: Oh, how these sweet sounds penetrate to my heart! Who are you that sings? . . . Ah, you remind me of my cruel lot.
Emilia: It is the gondolier, who singing beguiles his way along the placid lake, thinking of his children, while the sky is overcast.
Desdemona: Oh happy man! at least, after his labour, he returns to the bosom of the one who loves him. No, I cannot return there any more.[30]

[30] Translation from program notes in Gioachino Rossini, *Otello*. Philharmonia Orchestra (Philips 6769 023).

Example 2: Gioachino Rossini, *Otello,* Act 3, mm. 54–63



The familiar complex of simplicity, traditional work, and happy family offer an imaginary life that Desdemona can only look on as an unreachable ideal. The shift from recitative "realism" to the barcarolle with its otherworldly special effect of *ponticello* tremolo expresses through rhythmic gesture and sonority the split suggested in the text.

Another barcarolle—rhythmically and gesturally more similar to "Alinde"—dominates the second act and returns in the finale of Auber's *La muette de Portici* (1828). In Act 2, just before the outbreak of an ill-fated revolt by Neapolitan fishermen, Masaniello, their leader, sings a barcarolle describing a clandestine hunt for "the king of the seas"—a thinly veiled allusion to what is to come. By the end of the act, the rebellion is under way, and Masaniello urges that the barcarolle be sung by all, "pour mieux

cacher nos projets" (the better to hide our plans). In this case, even those who themselves sing the barcarolle know that it marks them as innocents and diligent subjects, but the idyllic has become a conscious pose to veil subversive activity.[31]

Another opera of rebellion, Rossini's *Guillaume Tell,* premiered the year after *La muette de Portici,* and the barcarolle again highlights a tension between idyll and oppressive reality. In the introduction to Rossini's final opera, Tell overhears a fisherman serenading a "timide jovencelle" with a barcarolle and is moved to reflect not on the song's charms but on its incongruity with his own and his country's situation: "he is not tormented by the weariness of spirit that afflicts me. . . . We no longer have a fatherland! He sings, and Helvetia mourns her lost freedom."[32] As in the other operas, by presenting an image of a lost, happy past, the barcarolle serves to emphasize the broken relationships of the present.

To consider these operas in the context of interpreting "Alinde" is not to suggest models for that song, still less to prove that Schubert was aware of how other composers used the barcarolle.[33] What these scenes do represent is a response to *hearing* a barcarolle. And for each hearer, the barcarolle evokes a harmonious world but, in so doing, reveals the extent of the action's distance from that world. The use of the barcarolle to set a text that explores the situation of an alienated individual among traditional roles places Schubert's "Alinde" within this interpretive context—except that real, socially situated listeners replace the staged audiences of the operatic barcarolles.

* * *

A return to the listeners' perspective can further clarify the relationship of the barcarolle to the poem's protagonist/voice: the listener first hears a barcarolle and only later encounters the subject who is declaiming the poem—*in* the barcarolle. The opening suggests what might seem an idyllic escape—temporary immersion in the simple world of the gondolier—

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[31] The reappearance of the barcarolle in the fifth act, as the rebellion fails, strengthens the disjuncture between the ideal world of the folksong and the treacherous one in which it is sung.

[32] "Il n'est pas tourmenté. . . . / Pour nous plus de patrie! / Il chante, et l'Helvétie / Pleure, pleure sa liberté." Translation by Joseph Allen from Gioachino Rossini, *William Tell* (Angel SEL-3793). On this scene's political context, see Philip Gossett, "Becoming a Citizen: The Chorus in *Risorgimento* Opera," *Cambridge Opera Journal* 2 (1990): 50–52.

[33] Of these operas, Schubert knew only *Otello.* See his letter to Anselm Hüttenbrenner of 19 May 1819, cited in Deutsch, *Schubert: A Documentary Biography,* 149.

but as the song continues, the barcarolle and the society it evokes become increasingly inappropriate and uncomfortable.

To follow this process, consider the opening vocal line of the first strophe (example 3). Its first two phrases (mm. 7–10 and 11–14) continue the pattern of two-measure units but also introduce the song's first strong contrasts. The opening (mm. 7–8), with its descending tonic triad ornamented only by upper and lower neighbors, is in keeping with the simple musical character of the introduction. Its text, announcing an ocean sunset, also leaves the prevailing tone undisturbed. The next two measures, however, offer a sharp contrast: as the text enters the subject's realm by introducing a character—"sie"—who is defined only by her absence, the melody begins not with an anacrusis to a downbeat, as had the opening phrase, but in mid-measure, a shift that remains associated with the subject's concerns until the final strophe. Melodic shape too is altered, replacing triadic melody with a flat, declamatory line that closes with an ascending fourth (E to A). The beginning of the next phrase, reiterating the opening triadic melody, introduces the reaper (mm. 11–12).[34] With the fourth line's indirect announcement of the subject's presence, the melody returns to its more declamatory form and introduces the song's first nondiatonic pitch, F♮, an upper neighbor to E (mm. 13–14). The question that follows (mm. 15–16) retains the subject's declamatory style, reduced pitch material, and focus on the interval of a fourth, albeit in transposition (A to D) and without the chromatic neighbor; however, both F♮ and the semitone neighbor figure remain in the accelerated motion of the bass, implying the relatively distant key of D minor.

When, following this question, the speaker reveals Alinde's name (mm. 18–19), the perfect fourth, again transposed (C to F), receives its most elaborate treatment yet: the upper neighbor, D, is supplemented by a lower, B, and the figure is expanded to twice its original length. The reaper's reply, however, eliminates the prospect of further expansion of the subject's melody by returning to the opening melodic shape, now given increased forward momentum by its outlining of the dominant seventh prior to resolution. Thus the melody establishes a context in which the lines most closely identified with the speaker, those through which the listener first learns of his existence and his plight, are melodically set apart from the character of the rest of the song.

[34] On the association of such triadic melodies with songs of wandering workers, see Louise E. Peake, "Kreutzer's *Wanderlieder*: The Other *Winterreise*," *Musical Quarterly* 65 (1979): 83–102. Many of Schubert's earlier settings of songs of simple workers also employ such melodies.

Example 3: Schubert, "Alinde," strophe 1 (mm. 7–29)



Example 3 (cont.)



Harmony as well as melody contributes to this setting apart, for "Mir ist beklommen" is indeed a "suitable place" for what our definition termed an "unusual, passionate chord." The expression of uneasiness through which the listener first encounters the subject is also the first departure of any kind from the pitches of the tonic key, albeit a mild, passing one: F♮, the lowered sixth, simply intensifies a diminished seventh. However mild, though, that departure prepares the strophe's only extended nondiatonic harmony and identifies it with the subject rather than his surroundings. (The successive strophes of the setting follow the same pattern.) The F♮ returns in the accompaniment of the following phrase, until F♯ is reasserted in a brief but abrupt turn toward B minor and its dominant, F♯ major.

If the F♮ becomes associated with the speaker's discomfort with the present, the new sharp-key areas that so suddenly "correct" it—not only here but also in the following two strophes—become associated with his hope of reestablishing contact with another. Whether expressing uneasiness or utopian hopes, the speaker seems unable to accommodate himself to the prevailing tonality. These sudden juxtapositions undermine the sense of untroubled inevitability that the simple diatonic harmony of the opening had established. In effect, there is a sudden lurch, a tear in the fabric of conventional harmony in the midst of each strophe. That tear was enough to disturb one contemporary reviewer, who criticized "a few harmonic turns . . . which seem to us, for this particular piece, to sound a little too abrupt and therefore too hard."[35]

Precisely those abrupt turns, though, are crucial in each strophe: they appear each time the speaker utters Alinde's name, in association with expanded versions of the rising fourth already associated with the subject's affective realm (see example 4). In the first strophe, the result is that the semitone upper neighbor (C♯–D, analogous to the original, disruptive E–F♮) becomes diatonic, in that it does not disturb the suddenly prevailing F♯-major/B-minor harmony (nor, indeed, the song's tonic) as the original had disturbed A major. But this "normalization" of the semitone, reestablishing the link between the neighbor figure and the immediate harmonic context, is achieved not by returning to A major but rather by removing the entire passage disconcertingly far from that key—a move that the dominant seventh of the reaper's response immediately negates.

Just as the speaker's next two discussions follow the pattern of the first, seeking Alinde by trying to maintain a link with the surrounding society,

[35] From the Leipzig *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung*, 23 January 1828, cited in Deutsch, *Schubert: A Documentary Biography*, 721.

Example 4: Schubert, "Alinde"
a. Strophe 1, mm. 17–20



b. Strophe 2, mm. 44–7



c. Strophe 3, mm. 71–4



so the pattern of transposition and reharmonization remains in the next two strophes. The second attempts a less elaborate treatment of the neighboring figure but substitutes a whole for a half step. The result is an even more firmly established distance from the tonic, since no suggestion remains of B minor, a chord at least present in the tonic key.[36] The third

[36] The harmony instead strongly implies F♯ major.

Example 4 (cont.)
d. Strophe 4, mm. 99–104



strophe returns to the melodic form of the first but presents an alternative harmonization, in which D-major and B-minor triads initially promise closer relation to A major; the A♯ that follows immediately, however, sounds still more conspicuously out of place as a result. Still, as in each preceding strophe, the subject's efforts to shake convention are ineffectual: not only does the end of each strophe reassert the tonic, but after each ending the last four measures of the introduction also return, reminding the listener that the situation—both tonal and relational—remains unchanged. An alternative has been imagined but not realized.

Rhythmically, too, the central section of each strophe upsets the barcarolle's prevailing character. Most obviously, each time the speaker asks his question, rhythmic activity in the bass increases suddenly (mm. 14ff.), and the following measure introduces a new bass figure to compete with the regular quarter-eighth pulse for the first time in the song. This seems in keeping with the "passionate accents" characteristic of the barcarolle, but together with the harmonic lurch at the same moment, it contributes to the sense of dislocation in m. 17. Here, changes in harmony suggest a pattern of accents ♪ ♩ ♪ ♩ that stretches the limits not only of the barcarolle but also of the conventions of 6/8 meter. Only the act of questioning brings about this disruption, though; when Alinde herself is recalled, meter and pulse are immediately secured. The resolution the speaker imagines seems to be made in the image of the order that cannot give it to him.

The measure that breaks the prevailing pulse brings about more than momentary metrical insecurity; it also breaks the pattern of two-measure phrases that had previously been completely regular. Measure 17 begins like a continuation of the previous two measures but quickly departs from that pattern; the chord change, dynamic climax, and entry of the voice in the following measure make it equally difficult to hear as the beginning of a phrase. Its status, like that of the subject whose question precedes it, is indeterminate. The following phrase (mm. 18–20) regularizes the disruption by following a two-measure phrase with a one-measure extension in the form of an echo that anticipates the solution of the final strophe (m. 20). In the first three strophes, however, the only impact of this alteration is on the workers' reply; each dismissal of Alinde's individuality in favor of an objectifying category occurs in a phrase structured with an echo parallel to the first (mm. 23–25, 50–52, and 77–79).

The final strophe (example 5) changes this situation as well as several other previous constants. Within the first four phrases, only the introduction of F♮ two measures before its usual appearance (m. 92) departs from the expected pattern. The fifth phrase, however—the usual question now replaced by an appeal to Echo—enters one beat later than expected (compare m. 96 to mm. 15, 42, and 69); this delay and the extension of the phrase by one measure begin a subtle transformation of the remainder of the strophe. Harmonically, the final "Alinde" (mm. 100–101) offers yet another alternative. The rising fourth remains, but the neighbor figure now combines the D♯ of the second strophe with the elaboration of the first and third. The result is the song's first B-major triad, a sonority that, although functioning locally as a dominant to the tonicized F♯, provides a previously absent harmonic link between the recurrent F♯ harmony and the E^7 of the reply.[37]

The echo, previously confined to the piano, is more obviously transformed. It now appears in the voice to announce Alinde's presence with the rising fourth that had first revealed her existence. The newly explicit echo also gradually establishes a shift from the previously normative two-measure phrasing to a pattern of three-measure units. Measures 96–98, which had begun the transformation, are followed by a six-measure unit (mm. 99–104) that could be heard as subdividing into 4 + 2 or 3 + 3, but

[37] The connection remains indirect, since F♯ harmony (mm. 101–104) intervenes between B (m. 100) and E^7 (m. 105). The significance of this chord, though, can be seen by comparing this version with that of the second strophe: both the B-major of the fourth strophe and the C♯ dominant seventh of the second function as dominants to local tonics, but only the B-major triad retrospectively provides a link between the "Alinde" passage and the following phrase.

Example 5: Schubert, "Alinde," strophe 4 (mm. 88–120)



Example 5 (cont.)



Example 5 (cont.)



the following two phrases unambiguously follow a 2 + 1 pattern. Even the previously problematic inserted measure (m. 99) is altered: F♯ is introduced one eighth-note earlier, regularizing the measure's implied accentuation, weakening its link to the previous measure, and grouping it less ambiguously with those that follow. Only the last line of text reverts initially to a two-measure phrase, recalling the earlier norm as its words recall the questions of earlier strophes. Finally, this too is transformed into a three-measure phrase in repetition (mm. 113–15), and the introduction/interlude, now a coda, closes the piece with a final progression from a unit of two measures (mm. 116–17) to one of three (mm. 118–20), the latter culminating in the motionless final measure.

Describing the final strophe in this way stresses its differences from the preceding three, but in other respects it is far from a radical departure from the rest of the song. Echo makes use of the same melodic material as her predecessors, the barcarolle reasserts itself just as implacably as it had earlier, and utterly basic, functional diatonic harmony closes off this strophe as it had the rest.[38] Indeed, in one respect, the final strophe is still

[38] Lawrence Kramer writes that Schubert's unconventional harmonic practices "expose the rationality of Classical syntax as historically contingent rather than natural." Kramer, "The Schubert Lied: Romantic Form and Romantic Consciousness," in *Schubert: Critical and Analytical Studies,* ed. Walter Frisch (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 234. Here, the rejection of unconventional alternatives suggests that Classical syntax, while not natural, is imposed as authoritative.

more conventional than the others: each phrase now begins with an anacrusis to a downbeat. Thus, on a variety of levels—the piece's own melodic material, the genre, the meter, and the harmony—"Alinde" presents a subject who, in achieving unique, individual fulfillment, nevertheless accommodates himself to conventions that had seemed oppressive and foreign when presented in the first three strophes.

Does "Alinde," then, suggest through its persistent retention of the conventional that the freedom of the free bourgeois subject is, finally, illusory, as imaginary as the magical resolution of the text? Or does its creative reworking of conventions offer a hope for that subject's survival as an autonomous individual even amid the conventional society in which it must exist? For those imbued with the ideology I have outlined, the first alternative seems improbable: such an interpretation would question the legitimacy of society as the guarantor of individualistic values. By contrast, the second offers precisely the comforting harmonization of free individual and surrounding society that could reinforce those values. Both the ideological practice of the lied and the song itself, heard through that practice, instantiate and reinforce socially "appropriate" images of the self in relation to society—that is, images that do not disturb the prevailing order. This is not to suggest that one alternative is more correct or authentic than the other, but rather to insist that both—and indeed all—interpretations are contingent on values and practices that rarely receive explicit statement. In this case, the result was that the optimistic hearing of the lied has been essentially the only viable one; contemporary reviewers heard nothing more troubling in "Alinde" than slight harmonic indiscretion.

* * *

Those contemporary reviews also serve as a reminder that "Alinde" reached its public as the first of three songs in Schubert's opus 81. Like many of Schubert's published sets of songs, the three treat related ideas, and the similarity of the opening gesture of the second, "An die Laute" (D. 905), to that of "Alinde" establishes an unusually clear musical link as well, as example 6 shows.[39] A brief consideration of the remaining songs can provide a final perspective on the interaction of "Alinde" and its audience.

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[39] On relations between songs in Schubert's publications, see Walther Dürr, "Franz Schubert in seiner Zeit: Ergebnisse musikalischer Quellenforschung," in *Quellenforschung in der Musikwissenschaft*, ed. Georg Feder, Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 15 (Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August Bibliothek, 1982), 115–17.

Example 6

a. Schubert, "An die Laute," mm. 1–4



b. Schubert, "Alinde," mm. 3–6



The speaker of "An die Laute" is another lover separated from his beloved, but this character is both more cautious and more conventional than his counterpart in "Alinde":

Leiser, leiser, kleine Laute,
Flüstre, was ich dir vertraute,
Dort zu jenem Fenster hin!
Wie die Wellen sanfter Lüfte,
Mondenglanz und Blumendüfte,
Send' es der Gebieterin!

Neidisch sind des Nachbars Söhne,
Und im Fenster jener Schöne
Flimmert noch ein einsam Licht.
Drum noch leiser, kleine Laute:
Dich vernehme die Vertraute,
Nachbarn aber—Nachbarn nicht!

Whisper more softly, little lute, whisper my secret to that window there. Send your message to my mistress like a ripple of soft airs, like moonlight and the scent of flowers.

The neighbor's sons are envious, and a solitary light still gleams in my beauty's window. So play yet more softly, little lute, so that my love may hear you but not—ah, not—the neighbors![40]

[40] Translation from Reed, *The Schubert Song Companion*, 35.

Although the situation is that of a serenade, the speaker addresses not the beloved but his lute. The neighbors occupy a position analogous to that of the workers in "Alinde"—only here the subject's exaggerated fear of their disapproval renders the situation openly comic; not only will he not address them directly, but he so fears their envy that he undermines his chances of being heard at all. The result is a parody of the lied's immediacy, but one that mocks the imagined singer rather than the genre; he apes the traditional situation and describes his song in shopworn images. The setting is equally stereotyped: strictly strophic, with harmony moving only to closely related keys, by straightforward, unexceptional means.

Contemporary reviewers uniformly found the final song, "Zur guten Nacht" (D. 903, for soloist, men's chorus, and piano) to be the least original in opus 81.[41] If the opus is considered as a whole, however, the near-complete reversion to convention in a song that evokes the context of the convivial *Liedertafel* in both text and musical form becomes another comment on the individual subject—or in this case, on its absence:[42]

Der Vorsitzende: Horch auf! es schlägt die Stunde,
Die unsrer Tafelrunde
Verkündigt: Geh' ein jeder heim,
Hat er sein Glas geleeret,
Den Wirth mit Dank geehret,
Und ausgesungen diesen Reim!

Alle: Erst sei dies Glas geleeret,
Der Wirth mit Dank geehret,
Und ausgesungen dieser Reim!

Der Vorsitzende: Wir dürfen fröhlich gehen;
Was wir gehört, gesehen,
Gethan das darf kein Mann bereun;
Und das, was wir empfunden,
Was enger uns gebunden
An Freund und Kunst, darf ihn erfreun.

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[41] The review already cited finds it "sociable" but criticizes its "commonplace close." The Munich *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung* (6 October 1827) called it the "least original" (cited in Deutsch, *Schubert: A Documentary Biography*, 677). The Vienna *Allgemeiner musikalischer Anzeiger* (16 May 1829) criticized it as "zu ernst, zu steif, und wegen des gleichen Baues der musikalischen Perioden zu einförmig." Cited in *Schubert in Wiener Vormärz: Dokumente 1829–1848*, ed. Otto Brusatti (Graz: Akademische Druck- & Verlagsanstalt, 1978), 34.

[42] On the nature and function of the *Liedertafel*, an institution in which Rochlitz was active, see Peter Nitsche, "Die Liedertafel im System der Zelterschen Gründungen," in *Studien zur Musikgeschichte Berlins im frühen 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Carl Dahlhaus (Regensburg: Bosse, 1980), 11–26.

Alle: Ja, ja, was wir empfunden (etc.) . . .

Der Vorsitzende: Schlaft wohl; und träumt, wie Bräute!
Kommt nächstens gern, wie heute!
Seyd auf manch neues Lied bedacht!
Und geht einst Einer abe
Zu seiner Ruh im Grabe,
Singt ihm mit Liebe: gute Nacht!

Alle: Ja, geht einst Einer abe (etc.) . . .

Leader: Listen! The hour is striking to tell our party: let everyone go home, when he has emptied his glass, honored our host with his thanks, and sung through this rhyme!

All: First let this glass be emptied, our host honored with thanks, and this rhyme be sung through!

Leader: We may leave happily; no man may regret what we have heard, seen, and done; and that which we have felt, what has bound us more closely to friends and art, may delight him.

All: Yes, yes! What we have felt, etc. . .

Leader: Sleep well, and dream, like brides! Come again next time, like today! May many new songs be thought of! And if anyone should go off to his rest in the grave, sing to him with love: good night!

All: Yes, and if anyone should go off, etc. . . .

If "Alinde" opens opus 81 with an exploration of the place of individuality in a traditional society hostile to it, "Zur guten Nacht" closes the set with an ambivalent image of a characteristic middle-class response to the alienation that an individualistic society could engender: participation in a wide variety of associations (*Vereine*) in which free individuals could come together, on the basis not of inherited roles or status but of mutual special interests.[43] As David Blackbourn has written, such associations can be seen

[43] On the crucial role of *Vereine* in German bourgeois society, see Thomas Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur in Deutschland im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert," in *Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie,* Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft 15 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), 174–205; and Blackbourn, "The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie: Reappraising German History in the Nineteenth Century," in Blackbourn and

as "the social counterpart to the market economy: one was based on the mutual exchange of goods between formally equal participants in the marketplace, the other on the mutual exchange of opinions between formally equal citizens."[44]

In place of the individual protagonists of the first two songs, "Zur guten Nacht" offers such a group of freely associating participants; however, here freedom brings not individuality but faceless uniformity. Instead of the uncomfortable individual "ich" of "Alinde," we encounter a series of impersonal or collective forms that include, but do not allow differentiation: "ein jeder," "wir," "Mann," "einer." Even the *Vorsitzende* has no distinguishing characteristics. The death of any one of the group will bring about at most a slight pause in the proceedings of the next meeting. The thoroughly conventional gestures that contemporary critics noted in Schubert's setting can be heard as entirely appropriate to a text in which individuality has no place.

This hearing of "Zur guten Nacht" suggests that "mutual exchange . . . between . . . formally equal citizens," whether of goods, opinions, or even songs, could result in behavior that minimized the very individuality from which it ostensibly arose. The result is comfortable if superficial fellow-feeling and conformity. In this case, the critics themselves provided an ideologically acceptable, less negative interpretation: the conventionality of the song was evidence of musical weakness. That is, because of its overuse of musical conventions, the lied failed to speak, as lieder ought, directly to the individual hearer. The ideology of immediacy, then, again worked to protect individualistic self-identity in bourgeois society by transforming what might have been heard as social critique into simple musical failure.

In the case of "Alinde" itself, the situation is oddly complementary. Still under the influence of an ideology that stresses the lied's unmediated impact on the listener, and less aware than contemporaries of textual and musical clues to social meaning, twentieth-century critics have seen "Alinde" as at best a divertingly pleasant song of no great significance; indeed, if the act of hearing lieder is to function ideologically as I have suggested, "Alinde" must be so heard. The alternative I have proposed attempts to balance the limitations of contemporary listeners against our own. To imagine a contemporary hearing while at the same time remaining aware of the concerns we bring to that act does not eliminate the persistent ideology of the

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Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 195–99.

[44] Blackbourn, "The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie," 197.

lied, nor does it allow us to duplicate, *wie es eigentlich gewesen,* the experience of hearers in Schubert's lifetime. It does, however, illuminate the critical role of the listener—and of the listener's socially constituted (and constituting) ideology—in constructing musical meaning.

ABSTRACT

The essay examines the frequently expressed claim that the lied has unmediated access to the most interior regions of individual listeners; that claim functions ideologically to reinforce a belief in the viability of the free individual in bourgeois society. This ideology is explored through an examination of Schubert's "Alinde" (D. 904) and a brief consideration of the two songs published with it, "An die Laute" (D. 905) and "Zur guten Nacht" (D. 903), in the context of the values of the German-speaking educated classes that formed the lied's principal audience in the nineteenth century. By considering music both as an autonomous aesthetic object (as the ideology proposes) and as a marker of collective identity and self-definition, this approach reveals social implications of features of "Alinde" that have previously been considered only in a stylistic context. Among these are the barcarolle as a reference to idyllic peasant society (illustrated by reference to Rossini's *Otello* and *Guillaume Tell* and Auber's *La muette de Portici*) and the disruptive effect of what an early reviewer considered overly abrupt harmonic shifts. The result is a case study in both how music can reinforce social values and how the values of socially situated listeners shape their interpretation of music.

The Evolution of the Thirteenth-Century Byzantine Hypakoae (Responds) of the Church Year

By Simon Harris

It is commonly assumed by liturgists that music in the liturgy is no more than the servant of the words, an assumption that is often of little help in deciding the musical nature and history of a chant.[1] This is especially so with the two parallel series of hypakoae in the medieval Orthodox Rite, each of which may only be distinguished by its music from another chant with an identical text and in the same mode. In dealing with such chants, the twentieth-century music historian often has to make the opposite assumption that the words serve the music, at least to the extent that they may help to reveal the origin of the music.[2]

Many texts of hypakoae in the thirteenth-century cycles of the Psaltikon and Asmatikon are identical: notably, the eight texts of the two Octoechi, and eight of the two yearly cycles (see table 1). Some hypakoae, like that for the Dormition of the BVM (15 August), were transferred to other equivalent feasts; but when all such adjustments have been made, it becomes apparent that the Asmatikon cycle, while containing equivalent chants for the entire Psaltikon cycle, has hypakoae for a number of occasions for which the Psaltikon cycle does not. In a recent article on the hypakoae for the two Sundays before Christmas, I observed that it is with the Psaltikon cycle rather than the Asmatikon cycle that the cycle in modern service books most closely agrees. Thus it is perhaps a little surprising that the same is true of the typika (books with orders of service) written in the two or three centuries before the musical sources.[3] What is the explanation?

Taking the yearly cycles of the two books in order, five of the seven sources for the Asmatikon in southern Italy begin the hypakoae of the church year with chants for the Entry of the BVM in the temple (Presentation, 21 November) and for the Feast of St. Nicholas (6 December), be-

[1] See, for example, Pierre Battifol's comments on Gregorian chants in the preface to his *History of the Roman Breviary*, translated by A. M. Y. Baylay (London: Longmans Green, 1912), xi.

[2] For further details, see Christian Thodberg, *Der Byzantinische Alleluiarionzyklus*, Monumenta Musicae Byzantinae, Subsidia 8 (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1966), 12–14, 20–27.

[3] Simon Harris, "The Byzantine Responds for the Two Sundays before Christmas," *Music and Letters* 74, no. 1 (1993): 1–15.

Table 1

Comparative Table of Hypakoae as They Appear in the Thirteenth-century Cycles of the Asmatikon and Psaltikon for the Church Year

Asmatikon Cycle	*Psaltikon Cycle*	
21 November, Entry of the BVM Σήμερον ἡ θεοχώρητος σκηνή		
6 December, Feast of St. Nicholas Πατέρων κλέος		
Sunday of the Forefathers Ἄγγελος παίδων	Εἰς δρόσον τοῖς παισί verse: ὁ Θεος ἐν τοῖς ὡσὶν ἡμῶν	
Sunday of the Fathers Εἰς δρόσον τοῖς παισί	Ἄγγελος παίδων verse: ἀλαλάξατε τῷ κυρίῳ πᾶσα ἡ γῆ	
Christmas Eve Αὐλῶν ποιμενικῶν		
Christmas Day Τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν	Τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν	} Complete in only one MS
Epiphany Ὅτε τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ σου also: Ἐν Ἰορδάνῃ βαπτιζομένου	Ὅτε τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ σου	
2 February, Hypapante (Purification of the BVM) Ὡς ἀνήχθης βρέφος		
Orthodoxy Sunday (first Sunday in Lent) Ὁ ἀπερίγραπτος λόγος also: Τὴν τῶν ἀληθινῶν δογμάτων φαιδρότητα		
Lazarus Saturday Σαρκικῶς τὴν στοργὴν ἐνδεικνύμενος		
Palm Sunday Μετὰ κλάδων ὑμνήσαντες	Μετὰ κλάδων ὑμνήσαντες	
Easter Προλαβοῦσαι τὸν ὄρθρον	Προλαβοῦσαι τὸν ὄρθρον	
29 June, The Feast of SS Peter and Paul Ποία φυλακή	Ποία φυλακή	
6 August, Transfiguration Τοὺς ἐν νυκτὶ ῥαθυμίας καθεύδοντας		
15 August, The Dormition of the BVM Μακαρίζομέν σε πᾶσαι αἱ γενεαί	Μακαρίζομέν σε πᾶσαι αἱ γενεαί	

fore giving the hypakoae for the two Sundays before Christmas.[4] Of the two sources for the Asmatikon that do not have these chants, one has a lacuna at this point. The two Asmatikon manuscripts from Greece itself—Kastoria 8 and Athos, Laura Γ.3—do not have the first two hypakoae, but only those for the two Sundays before Christmas, which are in the reverse order (that of the Psaltikon cycle). Published typika of an earlier date do not have these two chants either; moreover, the information in these typika about the hypakoae for the two Sundays before Christmas suggests that their ordering was not of overriding importance. It seems that at San Salvatore di Messina in the twelfth century the order of the Asmatikon was used.[5] At the Euergetis monastery in Constantinople at much the same time, and for both Sundays, the ordering of the two hypakoe was decided by the mode. The Euergetis typikon explains: "If Mode II, II Plagal, IV or III Plagal occurs, Εἰς δρόσον is sung first, but if Mode III, I Plagal, I or IV Plagal occurs, Ἄγγελος παίδων is sung."[6]

To make sense of these instructions, it is necessary to remember that these hypakoae were Sunday chants, and that for each successive Sunday of the year a mode of the Octoechus determined which set of ἀναβαθμοί, which stichera for the αἶνοι, and which ἐωθινόν were to be sung at the main morning service, the Octoechus providing cycles of chants in the eight modes primarily destined for use on Sundays. Since the two Sundays concerned are consecutive, in order to ensure a strict alternation of the primacy of each hypakoe, it would have been necessary for each group of chants to fall into one of two series of alternate modes, Modes I, III, I Plagal, and III Plagal (i.e., nos. 1, 3, 5, and 7), and Modes II, IV, II Plagal, and IV Plagal (i.e., nos. 2, 4, 6, and 8). But reference to the later music manuscripts shows that if this had been done, the modes of both hypakoae would have fallen into the second series, and one hypakoe would thus

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[4] The seven southern Italian sources for the Asmatikon are: four Asmatika (Grottaferrata Γ.γ.I, Γ.γ.VI, Γ.γ.VII, and E.α.XIII), and three composite manuscripts with Asmatic hypakoae of the yearly cycle (Grottaferrata Γ.γ.V, Messina gr. 129, and Vatican gr.1606). The lacuna is in Γ.γ.VI, and the two initial chants are also absent from Γ.γ.VII. See also Kastoria 8 ff. 44v and 47r, Athos, Laura Γ.3 ff. 25r and 26v, and table 1.

[5] Miguel Arranz, ed., *Le typicon du monastère du Saint-Sauveur à Messine*, Orientalia Christiana Analecta 185 (Rome: Pontificio Istituto per gli Studi Orientali, 1969), 73. The volume is a publication of the foundation typikon of the monastery of San Salvatore di Messina (1131), preserved in the MS Messina gr.115.

[6] Aleksei Dmitrievskii, ed., *Opisanie Liturgicheskikh Rukopisei* 1 (Kiev: G. T. Korchak-Novitski, 1895), 339: καὶ εὐθὺς ἡ ὑπακοή, ἡ τό· Ἄγγελος παίδων ἢ τό· Εἰς δρόσον. Ἐὰν γὰρ λάχῃ ὁ β΄. ἦχος ἢ ὁ πλβ΄. ἢ ὁ δ΄. ἢ ὁ βαρύς, ψάλλεται πρῶτον τό· Εἰς δρόσον. εἰ δὲ λάχῃ ὁ γ΄. ἢ ὁ πλα΄. ἢ ὁ α΄. ἢ ὁ πλδ΄ ψάλλεται τό. Ἄγγελος παίδων. See also p. 344. Preserved in the MS Athens National Library 788, the Euergetis typikon is published here in pp. 256–655.

have become linked to chants that were always of a different mode from its own. And so the scheme outlined above (involving an exchange of the last mode between the two groups) may well have been settled on as a compromise.

The Euergetis typikon goes on to provide performing instructions for these two hypakoae. It seems that a soloist (ψάλτης) sang the main hypakoe, which was then repeated by the congregation (λαός) "with cheironomy"; the soloist then sang the "verse" (the beginning of the psalm), and the performance concluded with a reprise of the end of the main hypakoe sung by the congregation. Since there were verses for both Εἰς δρόσον τοῖς παισί and Ἄγγελος παίδων the texts were, therefore, those of the later Psaltikon (which alone of the two has the verses) and thus differed structurally from all other known hypakoae. But the music must have consisted either of earlier versions of chants in both the Psaltikon and Asmatikon cycles, or of neither.[7]

The hypakoae for Christmas and Epiphany form a group of four texts in the Asmatikon cycle—Αὐλῶν ποιμενικῶν, Τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν, Ὅτε τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ σου, and Ἐν Ἰορδάνῃ βαπτιζομένου—to which a fifth, Ἄρατε πύλας, perhaps should be added. All five texts are in the Greek Asmatika, but only the first three are in the southern Italian manuscripts, the first two separated by the Asmatic troparia (antiphons associated with psalms) for the Christmas Vigil, Λαθὼν ἐτέχθης and Ἀνέτειλας Χριστέ, and the second and third separated by those for the Epiphany vigil, Ἐπεφάνης ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ and Ἁμαρτωλοῖς καὶ τελώναις. For the Psaltikon cycle, the second and third texts appear in only one manuscript (see table 1). Because the first of these hypakoae seems to have been destined for the morning of Christmas Eve, the second for the morning of Christmas Day, and the third for the morning of the Epiphany, it appears as though the southern Italian Asmatika have all their chants in the correct liturgical order. It is puzzling, therefore, to find in the two Asmatika from Greece that the order of the first two chants is reversed, so that Τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν stands in front of everything, and that the Asmatic troparia for Epiphany are placed between or after the two Epiphany hypakoae. The Uspenskii Kondakar, a Russian music manuscript in paleoslavonic notation dating from 1207, also reverses the order of the Christmas hypakoae but puts the

[7] Dmitrievskii, ed., *Opisanie Liturgicheskikh Rukopisei* 1, p. 339. The continuation of this passage gives these performing instructions, which are also referred to by Juan Mateos, "La psalmodie dans le rite byzantin," in *Proche-Orient Chrétien* 15 (1965): 107–26.

Christmas troparia before both, while preserving the southern Italian arrangement for Epiphany (and so excluding Ἐν Ἰορδάνῃ βαπτιζομένου).[8]

If the arrangement of hypakoae in southern Italian Asmatika can be explained in terms of a liturgical order, it is tempting to look for a similar explanation for the order of the same chants in the thirteenth-century music manuscripts of Greece and Russia. Such an explanation for the order of the Christmas chants can be found in the manuscript no. 40 of the Holy Cross Library at Jerusalem, which was published thirty years ago as a tenth-century typikon for the Cathedral of St. Sophia at Constantinople. Here Τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν appears as a troparion to be sung to Psalm 50 at the main morning service of Orthros on 22 December, and Αὐλῶν ποιμενικῶν appears as a similar troparion for 24 December. According to the same typikon, Ἄρατε πύλας was sung in the same position on 23 December, in commemoration of the Dedication of St. Sophia itself.[9] It thus seems that originally, and certainly in the tenth-century rite of St. Sophia, none of these texts was sung on Christmas Day.

A similar arrangement appears in the Euergetis typikon. Presumably, the Dedication of St. Sophia was not commemorated at the Euergetis monastery, since Τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν appears in Orthros for the morning of 23 December and then again on Christmas Day, on both occasions as an hypakoe; Αὐλῶν ποιμενικῶν appears as an hypakoe on Christmas Eve and then again for the Pannychis on Christmas Day as a kathisma, on both occasions after the third Ode of the Kanon; and Ἄρατε πύλας disappears completely, not even reappearing for the commemoration of the Dedication of the monastery on 29 December. It seems, therefore, that a liturgical rearrangement may have taken place between the tenth and the thirteenth centuries: the original position of Τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν as a pre-Christmas troparion to Psalm 50 before it became the Christmas Day hypakoe is reflected in its position in the Greek Asmatika Kastoria 8 and Athos, Laura Γ.3. But the position of Αὐλῶν ποιμενικῶν seems to have been much more uncertain: it is described in a rubric in Athos, Laura Γ.3 as a Christmas Day hypakoe, but only in the Uspenskii Kondakar does it seem to be preceded by the two troparia for the Christmas Vigil, Λαθὼν

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[8] Kastoria 8 ff. 49r58v; Athos, Laura Γ.3. ff. 28r–35v. Arne Bugge, ed., *Contacarium Paleoslavicum Mosquense,* Monumenta Musicae Byzantinae, Principal Series 6 (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1960), 7 and ff. 153r–162r. This is a facsimile edition of the manuscript known as the Uspenskii Kondakar, Moscow Historical Museum 9.1099. The word *troparion* is usually translated "hymn" but may also be used, as here, for a hymnodic refrain to a psalm (i.e., an antiphon).

[9] This chant also can be found among chants for the Dedication of a Church in both Kastoria 8 and Athos, Laura Γ.3.

ἐτέχθης and Ἀνέτειλας Χριστέ.[10] It does not appear at all in the twelfth-century typikon from Messina, although it appears as an Asmatic hypakoe for Christmas Eve in southern Italian music manuscripts of the Messina tradition, and a text almost identical with it appears in the modern Menaeon as the second kathisma for Orthros on the morning of Christmas Eve.[11]

Surviving sources also indicate a change in liturgical practice for Epiphany, though one that is even less clear. The tenth-century typikon of St. Sophia (Holy Cross 40) makes no mention of the text that later southern Italian music manuscripts, the Uspenskii Kondakar, both the Euergetis and the Messina typika, and modern service books all recognize as the only hypakoe-text for Epiphany: Ὅτε τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ σου.[12] Holy Cross 40 mentions the text Ἐν Ἰορδάνῃ βαπτιζομένου as a second troparion to Psalm 50 on 6 January and as the only such troparion for 5 January. Essentially the same text can also be found as the apolytikion for the Vespers preceding Epiphany in the modern Menaeon, as the troparion to the Θεὸς Κύριος and as the apolytikion for Epiphany Orthros in both the Euergetis typikon and in a tenth- or eleventh-century Kanonarion from Sinai, for the Entry and Respond to the Third Antiphon (Psalm 117) in the Epiphany Mass in the same two sources, and as a second hypakoe for Epiphany in both thirteenth-century Greek Asmatika.[13]

That Ἐν Ἰορδάνῃ βαπτιζομένου was ever an hypakoe is shown only by these two Asmatika. Once again, it may be that they reflect an earlier practice, for there seems little doubt from the evidence of other sources that Ἐν Ἰορδάνῃ βαπτιζομένου was replaced by Ὅτε τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ σου at

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[10] Juan Mateos, *Le typicon de la Grande Église,* Orientalia Christiana Analecta 165 (Rome: Pontificio Istituto per gli Studi Orientali, 1962), 144, 146, 148. Volumes 165 and 166 consist of a publication of the typikon, Holy Cross 40. See also Dmitrievskii, ed., *Opisanie Liturgicheskikh Rukopisei* 1, pp. 349, 350, 356, 365; Kastoria 8 ff. 49r–58v, 66r; Athos, Laura Γ.3 ff. 28r–35v, 41r. The term *kathisma* indicates a hymnodic attachment to a psalm or canticle that was probably sung once at the end. *Pannychis* literally means an all-night vigil, but it seems to have been a relatively short service sung before Orthros and, presumably, in place of the midnight service.

[11] *Menaeon* December (Athens: Phos, 1970), 344.

[12] Grottaferrata E.α.XIII f. 99r; E.β.V f. 67r; Γ.γ.I. f. 21v; Γ.γ.V f. 47v; Γ.γ.VI f. 10r; Γ.γ.VII f. 31v; Messina gr. 129 f. 56v; Vat. gr. 1606 ff. 51v–52r. Bugge, *CPM* 7 and f. 161r. Dmitrievskii, *OLR* 1, 382. Arranz, *OCA* 185, 101. *Menaeon* January (Athens: Phos, 1970), 142.

[13] Mateos, *OCA* 165, 174, 184. Dmitrievskii, *OLR* 1, 209–10, 382. *Menaeon* January, 139. Kastoria 8, f. 57r. Athos, Laura Γ.3., f. 33v. An apolytikion is a final chant before the dismissal (apolysis) at Vespers. The Θεὸς Κύριος follows the Hexapsalmos in Orthros and is followed immediately by the troparion of the day—a chant that, like the Vespers apolytikion, varies throughout the year and is often identical with it. See the *Horologion,* 2d ed. (Rome: Vatican, 1937), 77–78, 230–34, and Diane Touliatos-Banker, "The Byzantine Orthros" *Byzantina* 9 (1977), 330–31.

least from the eleventh century on. The slight difference in order between Kastoria 8 (in which the two hypakoae are separated) and Athos, Laura Γ.3 (in which they are followed by the troparia for the Vigil), may reflect successive stages in this replacement. For both hypakoae may have been sung on Epiphany Eve before Ὅτε τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ σου became the hypakoe for Epiphany itself.[14]

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The remaining hypakoae may be divided conveniently into two groups: those confined to the Asmatikon cycle, for 2 February, Orthodoxy Sunday, Lazarus Saturday and 6 August; and those in both cycles for Palm Sunday, Easter Day, 29 June and 15 August. The hypakoe for 2 February (in the West, the Purification of the BVM; in the East, the Hypapante or Meeting, Ὡς ἀνήχθης βρέφος, is found in the Asmatika of southern Italy but not in the two from Greece. Since it is also found in the Uspenskii Kondakar and its text is noted in the Messina typikon, it probably occurred universally and was at least one or two hundred years old by the time of its southern Italian sources.[15]

There are two hypakoae for Orthodoxy Sunday (the First Sunday in Lent) in thirteenth-century music manuscripts. One of them is given in most Asmatika, both are given in Grottaferrata Γ.γ.I, and neither appears in Grottaferrata Γ.γ.V. Almost certainly, the older of the two chants is Ὁ ἀπερίγραπτος λόγος, which is textually identical with the first verse of the kontakion for the same occasion but which, as Kenneth Levy has suggested, may correspond musically to an Asmatic form of the kontakion preserved only in paleoslavonic notation.[16] As an hypakoe, it is found in the two Asmatika from Greece and in four from southern Italy, Grottaferrata Γ.γ.I, Γ.γ.VI, Γ.γ.VII, and E.α.XIII.[17] The other hypakoe, Τὴν τῶν ἀληθινῶν δογμάτων φαιδρότητα, is found only in manuscripts from southern Italy, Grottaferrata Γ.γ.I, Messina gr. 129 and Vatican gr. 1606. Neither chant is found among the hypakoae of the Uspenskii Kondakar; and for the typika, the Messina typikon records an unnamed hypakoe, and the Euergetis typikon records Τὴν τῶν ἀληθινῶν δογμάτων φαιδρότητα as a kathisma.[18]

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[14] Kastoria 8, ff. 54v–58v. Athos, Laura Γ.3., ff. 32v–35v.

[15] Bugge, *CPM* 6, 7, f. 162r. Arranz, *OCA* 185, 118.

[16] Kenneth Levy, "The Byzantine Communion-Cycle and its Slavic Counterpart," *Actes du XIIe congrès international des études byzantines. Ochride 1961* 2 (Belgrade: n.p., 1964), 571–74.

[17] Kastoria 8. f. 58v. Athos, Laura Γ.3., f. 35v. Grottaferrata E.α.XIII f. 109v, Γ.γ.I f. 23v., Γ.γ.VI f. 12v., Γ.γ.VII f. 34v.

[18] Grottaferrata Γ.γ.I f. 23r. Messina gr. 129 f. 80r. Vat. gr. 1606 f. 76v.

The final two hypakoae confined to the Asmatikon cycle are those for Lazarus Saturday (the day before Palm Sunday) and the Transfiguration (6 August). Both are found only in two or three southern Italian sources, and for both occasions the Euergetis and Messina typika record kathismata with different or unidentified texts.[19]

Most music manuscripts conclude whichever series of hypakoae they give for the church year with four chants, for which there are both Psaltikon and Asmatikon versions, some composite manuscripts giving both chants. These hypakoae are for Palm Sunday (Μετὰ κλάδων ὑμνήσαντες), Easter Sunday (Προλαβοῦσαι τὸν ὄρθρον), the Feast of Saints Peter and Paul on 29 June (Ποία φυλακή) and the Dormition of the BVM on 15 August (Μακαρίζομέν σε πᾶσαι αἱ γενεαί). The fact that these hypakoae in both cycles were not very much better established than those confined to the Asmatikon cycle is shown rather dramatically by the Uspenskii Kondakar, which gives no hypakoae for Palm Sunday. This absence might be explained by the Euergetis typikon, which has the beginning of the Palm Sunday text as a kathisma in a mode different from that of the later hypakoe. Moreover, the tenth-century typikon of St. Sophia (Holy Cross 40) only uses the texts of the two final hypakoae: that for 29 June, appearing as a second troparion for a procession between Orthros and the Mass, and that for 15 August, appearing as a second troparion for Psalm 50 at Orthros. In some places, the hypakoe for 15 August was transferred to other feasts of the BVM as well as retained for the Dormition. For example, southern Italian music manuscripts tend to indicate it for the Birth (8 September), and, to judge from the Messina typikon, San Salvatore di Messina may also have used it for the Annunciation (25 March) and the Entry (21 November). The Euergetis typikon, however, expressly excludes this transference, and in the modern Menaeon there is another hypakoe text for 8 September (Πύλην ἀδιόδευτον), of which there is no trace in any medieval source.[20]

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A comparison of the cycles of hypakoae in the Asmatikon and Psaltikon with indications in medieval service books clears up certain details but leaves unanswered the main question of why two such parallel cycles existed. One thing seems to be clear: medieval typika contain no evidence of

[19] Arranz, *OCA* 185, 176, 226. Dmitrievskii *OLR* 1, 48081, 540. Grottaferrata Γ.γ.I ff. 24r, 27v. Messina gr. 129 ff. 92r–v. Vatican gr. 1606 ff 87v–88r, 142v–143v.

[20] Mateos, *OCA* 165, 324, 370. Dmitrievskii, *OLR* 1, 265, 542. *Menaeon* for September, 108.

two parallel cycles of hypakoae, which suggests that perhaps these cycles of hypakoae never existed. It is tempting, however, to dismiss the evidence of the typika discussed for one of two possible reasons.

The first possible explanation is that the two cycles of hypakoae may have evolved rapidly during the twelfth century, after the Messina typikon had been written in 1131 and before the earliest dated Greek musical source was written in 1225. But this allows a period of less than a century for the evolution and dissemination of chants that are found throughout the Byzantine world, which hardly seems likely. Moreover, the Uspenskii Kondakar, dated 1207, seems to contain some hypakoae in the Asmatikon cycle. And although the Uspenskii Kondakar is the only dated paleoslavonic manuscript containing hypakoae, it is probably not the earliest. In addition, the two typika of the eleventh and twelfth centuries that have so far provided information—those of the Euergetis monastery in Constantinople, which dates from about 1050 at the earliest, and of the San Salvatore monastery at Messina, dating from 1131—were influential documents. For example, according to its foundation typikon the monastery in Constantinople of the Kosmosoteira, founded by Isaac Comnenus in 1152, was to follow the rites as laid down for the Euergetis. And the Messina typikon is for all intents and purposes the same as a later typikon written for the monastery of Santa Maria at Gala in 1211 and referred to by Arranz in his notes.[21] And so, given the relatively slow rate of change in the medieval world and its respect for tradition, especially tradition buttressed by the written word, a period between the creation of the earliest transcribable music manuscripts and that of the liturgical documents here consulted (during which the hypakoae might have evolved) probably did not exist.

The second reason for dismissing the evidence of the typika is that the hypakoae, as musical rather than liturgical phenomena, might not necessarily show up in the typika that have survived, but could have led a sort of secret existence in musical establishments, being independently passed on orally from one singer to another. But the typika that have survived, published during the last hundred years and consulted here, have done so because they originally belonged to important liturgical centers that were also the most important musical establishments. In them, one reads of trained singers, who presumably were capable of reading musical notation and so did not, perhaps, rely exclusively on oral transmission. And since

[21] Louis Petit, ed., "Le typicon du monastère de la Kosmosotira," *Bulletin de l'institut archéologique russe à Constantinople* 13 (Sofia: Odessa, 1908), 23. Arranz, *OCA* 185, introduction.

our knowledge of the hypakoae comes entirely from musical notation of a rather later date, there is no reason to suppose that typika and music manuscripts did not belong to the same tradition.

The most important musical establishment of all was probably the Great Church itself, the cathedral of St. Sophia at Constantinople. The evidence of Symeon, the late-fourteenth-century archbishop of Thessalonika, shows just how different the rite at St. Sophia was by comparison with other centers; how important a role music had in it, how influential it was, and how severely it was damaged by the Crusade of 1204 and its consequences (though Symeon may exaggerate this damage).[22] The typikon of another important musical center besides the Great Church, that of San Salvatore at Messina, reflects the liturgical practice of a monastery where later music manuscripts are known to have been written. And the Euergetis typikon, which is perhaps the most informative typikon of all, shows that the Euergetis monastery must also have been an important musical center. Indeed, dismissing the typika because they may not embody musical developments looks rather like making an essentially modern distinction between musical and liturgical phenomena that probably did not apply to medieval religious establishments.

So disregarding the typika is not really possible, and in any case they contain important information for the music historian. It is true that Byzantine music manuscripts in general may well have omitted much that was sung, but this does not necessarily mean that the reverse was also the case—that typika omitted things contained in music manuscripts. The evidence is that generally they did not, and the brevity of remarks about musical performance contained in typika does not indicate that the writer is not interested in music but simply reflects the function of the typikon. One of the most graphic of these remarks, though perhaps not the most helpful, occurs in the Messina typikon for the hypakoe for Epiphany (Ὅτε τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ σου): "The precentor and choir. It is sung with cheironomy, a branched candlestick being put in front of them with lighted candles."[23] We are not necessarily wrong here to imagine a precentor with a copy of the Psaltikon or Asmatikon with paleobyzantine musical notation in front of him, surrounded by a group of singers.

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[22] The writings of Symeon of Thessalonika were published by J. P. Migne in *Patrologia Graeca* 155 (Paris: Petit-Montrouge, 1857–66). For the music of the rite of St. Sophia, see also Oliver Strunk, "The Byzantine Office at Hagia Sophia," in *Essays on Music in the Byzantine World* (New York: Norton, 1977), 112–50.

[23] Arranz, *OCA* 185, 101: ὁ πρωτοψάλτης καὶ οἱ ψάλται. Ψάλλεται δὲ μετὰ χειρονομίας προτιθέντος [?προτεθέντος] μανουαλίου μετὰ λαμπάδων.

Disregarding the typika also means disregarding paleoslavonic music manuscripts. It is true that most of those containing hypakoae probably date from the early thirteenth century and are written in an untranscribable musical notation that had long ceased to exist in the Greek world, if indeed it had ever existed there. But this fact alone shows that their evidence is a lot older than their actual date, that almost certainly this evidence should be equated with that of earlier typika, and that, for example, the presence in the Uspenskii Kondakar of the hypakoe for 2 February, Ὡς ἀνήχθης βρέφος, and the absence from it of the second hypakoe for Epiphany, Ἐν Ἰορδάνῃ βαπτιζομένου, shows that the contents of southern Italian manuscripts are not recent local aberrations but may reflect widespread practices of two or three hundred years earlier.

There is therefore no reason to think that the hypakoae referred to in all three groups of manuscripts (typika, paleoslavonic manuscripts, and Greek music manuscripts) are different chants. But this does not mean that textual correspondences between these manuscripts automatically entail precise musical ones. The same chant often can be found in different forms in different manuscripts; and this seems to be particularly true of the Psaltikon and Asmatikon. Indeed, the fact that both these musical collections come from all parts of the Greek-speaking world yet vary from place to place suggests that they did not evolve quickly. And the Asmatikon alone contains chants that are in various stages of evolution, as is shown by the complex and simple forms of the same melody. Perhaps the most remarkable of these chants are the Fourth Plagal Mode melodies of the Lenten Communion, Γεύσασθε καὶ ἴδετε, which can be found in Asmatika generally for Lent, and specifically for the Thursday of the fifth week in Lent, for Holy Tuesday and for Good Friday.[24] In such cases, the text is identical, but there are different melodic forms between which a music historian must distinguish. And since for many chants of the Asmatikon and Psaltikon there is no single thirteenth-century form of melody, one cannot assume that tenth-century forms, though probably simpler, were any less various than thirteenth-century ones.

The problem, therefore, is to differentiate among degrees of difference: 1) what musically is completely distinct, 2) what originally may have been the same but has become perhaps unrecognizably different, and 3) what is still recognizably similar. Mode indications, where they are different, may help to distinguish melodic differences of the first kind, and typika usually abound in them. But when texts are identical, modes are

[24] No. 40a–d of my transcriptions of the Communions of the Asmatikon, to be published by Harvard Academic Publishers.

usually the same too, and, in distinguishing between substantial and insubstantial differences where there is no resort to a transcribable musical notation, inferences have to be made from what little else a typikon or liturgical book may indicate.

Perhaps the most important of these inferences concerns what may be inferred from the use of the term ὑπακοή. This word, which I have transliterated *hypakoe,* means "respond," and although Greek uses several words in different contexts to indicate a respond, *hypakoe* has this meaning above all others.[25] And so it is odd that hypakoae, apart from the two for the two Sundays before Christmas (both of which have "verses" formed from the opening words of psalms), are not, and do not seem to have evolved from, responds.

The same word, ὑπακοή, can be found untranslated in the medieval Georgian lectionary, which is generally assumed to reflect the rite of Jerusalem of about A.D. 600. Here it seems to be a chant usually associated with a complete psalm but was probably not the usual respond to the psalm and may not have been a respond at all (the usual respond was perhaps what is usually called "stichus" or "verse," which often precedes the psalm itself).[26] Indeed, the fact that the word was left untranslated probably indicates that it was something special; and although both the Georgian and the later Greek hypakoae may have started life as responsorially performed psalms, they seem to be remote from each other, and there is no way of knowing what may have happened to either of them over the centuries.

Apparently much less remote is the connection between chants in the two thirteenth-century Asmatika from Greece, Kastoria 8 and Athos, Laura Γ.3, and chants indicated in the typikon Holy Cross 40. Not only are there features already discussed among the hypakoae for Christmas and Epiphany, where these two manuscripts seem to follow Holy Cross 40, but there are several other parallels, such as the text that appears as the first troparion to Psalm 50 for 15 August in Holy Cross 40, Ἐν τῇ γεννήσει τὴν παρθενίαν ἐφύλαξας, which reappears with musical notation toward the end of Kastoria 8.[27] For the Exaltation of the Cross on 14 September, Holy Cross 40 has no fewer than six troparia in the same position (four more than any other feast), presumably accompanying a ceremony that other typika give at the very end of the service of Orthros. One of these troparia appears with different music in two southern Italian Asmatika, and three of them can

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[25] P. N. Trempelas uses the term Ἡ καθ' ὑπακοὴν ψαλμῳδία to mean Responsorial Psalmody in his essay "Αἱ εὐχαὶ τοῦ Ὄρθρου καὶ τοῦ Ἑσπερινοῦ" Μικρὸν Εὐχολόγιον 2 (1955): 150.

[26] Michel Tarchnishvili, "Le Grand Lectionnaire de l'église de Jérusalem," in *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium,* vols. 188, 189, 204, 205 (Louvain: Chabot, 1959, 1960).

[27] Mateos, *OCA* 165, 370. Kastoria 8, f. 79v.

be found in the Uspenskii Kondakar; but four of the texts appear with musical notation in both Kastoria 8 and Athos, Laura Γ.3.[28] Moreover, it should not be forgotten that these two Asmatika from Greece alone contain chants commemorating the Dedication of a Church, whose texts are also found in Holy Cross 40 and which according to Symeon of Thessalonika formed a particular feature of the rite of St. Sophia on 23 December.[29]

There is one snag in all this: most of these chants in Holy Cross 40 are troparia to Psalm 50, whereas the later Asmatika from Greece (if they call them anything at all) use the word *hypakoe,* a word that appears very rarely in Holy Cross 40. So could chants sung at St. Sophia in the tenth century as troparia to Psalm 50 turn up in later manuscripts as hypakoae? The answer must be that they could. The word *troparion* is ambiguous, but there seems little doubt that the troparia to Psalm 50 mentioned in Holy Cross 40 were, like the troparia for the Christmas and Epiphany Vigils and the later hypakoae, elaborate chants. Moreover, typika not written for St. Sophia do not mention troparia to Psalm 50, and many things besides hypakoae did not appear in the rite of St. Sophia.[30]

Two other words in Greek may mean what is understood by the word *hypakoe* in music manuscripts. The most straightforward of these is probably the word καταβασία, which occurs in one or two thirteenth-century Psaltika from southern Italy—for example, Grottaferrata E.β.V. and Γ.γ.III.—as well as the Uspenskii Kondakar. Καταβασία probably refers to the members of a divided choir descending from their seats and reuniting. The music seems to be no different from what is usually called "hypakoe," of which the word must therefore by a synonym. The term serves as a reminder that many Greek words for chants refer less to the function of a chant than to the liturgical action associated with it.[31]

The other word is *kathisma.* There are one or two cases where kathismata, like hypakoae, may have been elaborate chants: the Euergetis typikon mentions one for 8 November, which might have been the same chant as the hypakoe for St. Michael to which Arne Bugge refers in his introduction to the Uspenskii Kondakar; and in the Messina typikon the kathisma

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[28] Bugge, *CPM* 6, 8 and ff. 168v–171r. Kastoria 8, ff. 75v–79v. Athos, Laura Γ.3, ff. 55v–58r. See also Simon Harris, "Mittelatterliche byzantinische Erhöhangshymnen" in *Labrorare fratres in unum: Festschrift László Dobszay zum 60. Geburtstag.* Berliner Beiträge zur Mediävistik 7 (Berlin: Wiedmann, Hildeskeim, 1995), 87–104.

[29] Oliver Strunk, "The Byzantine Office at Hagia Sophia," 113. Migne, *PG* 155, c. 325. Kastoria 8, ff. 66r68v. Athos, Laura Γ.3, ff. 41r–44r.

[30] See for example, Strunk, "The Byzantine Office at Hagia Sophia," 131–34.

[31] Egon J. Wellesz, *Byzantine Music and Hymnography,* 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), 240.

for 6 August, Τὴν τῶν βροτῶν, may also have been an elaborate chant.[32] But references in typika to kathismata are numerous, and there are generally no performance instructions; they tend, moreover, to occur in the same positions as the far less numerous hypakoae and so may have been replaced on some occasions by hypakoae.

The name *kathisma* may once again be a reference, as Egon J. Wellesz has suggested, to the way the chant was sung, but it may also be a reference to what seems to have been the primary use of these chants in association with cyclic recitations of the Psalter in the early part of Orthros.[33] For the purpose of these cyclic recitations which ensure that, quite apart from the fixed psalms the entire Psalter is recited usually once a week, the Greek psalter is divided into twenty sections called "kathismata," two of which are sung in Orthros. On many occasions these two kathismata are followed by one or two further recitations, generally from the Polyeleos (Psalms 134–135) or the Amomos (Psalm 118), one or both of which may have been sung, depending on the importance of the feast and the length of the night.[34]

Each of these recitations was concluded with a chant called a "kathisma," the last of which might be replaced by an hypakoe on, for instance, Christmas Day or Epiphany. If such a feast fell on a Sunday, two kathismata might have been replaced by hypakoae, one from the Octoechus and one from the Yearly Cycle. Moreover, for most occasions during the Church Year, both the Euergetis and the Messina typika prescribe a kathisma to be sung in Orthros after the third Ode of the Kanon. It is only on a few occasions—Easter Day in the Messina typikon, and Easter Day, 23 December, and 24 December in the Euergetis typikon—that medieval typika prescribe an hypakoe at this point, although it seems to be the usual place for them in modern Greek service books.[35]

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the hypakoe was usually sung in place of one or more of the later kathismata associated with Psalter recitations before Psalm 50 on important feasts, which still seems to be the usual position for the hypakoae in the Russian Church.[36] But on certain

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[32] Dmitrievskii, *OLR* 1, 308. Arranz, *OCA* 185, 176.

[33] Wellesz, *Byzantine Music,* 240.

[34] Anton Baumstark, *Nocturna Laus* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1956), 156–66, discusses this division of the Greek Psalter into kathismata and gives a comparative table on pp. 160–61. This division has continued in the Orthodox Church. See, for example, the *Greek Psalter* (Rome: Vatican, 1873). Psalm numbers are those of the Septuagint (which are also those of the Vulgate).

[35] Dmitrievskii, *OLR* 1, 349, 350, 558. Arranz, *OCA* 185, 248.

[36] See, for example, Johann von Gardner, *Russian Church Singing* 1 (New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1980), 81.

days it seems to have been transferred to replace a kathisma sung after Psalm 50 and after the third Ode of the Kanon, a transference that may well have been prompted by the structure of the Easter Day Orthros, which did not have the Psalter-recitations of the earlier part of the service, and one which seems to have become the general rule in the Greek church.[37]

So, quite apart from the fact that it could have acquired its name of "respond" from its association with psalmody—whether as a troparion to Psalm 50 or as a conclusion to Psalter recitation without necessarily tracing its ancestry back to a responsorially performed psalm, the hypakoe may have been introduced into later monastic rites from the rite of St. Sophia by acquiring a liturgical position from a kathisma.[38] If this was so, hypakoae must have been musically distinct from kathismata, even if some of them had the same text. For the hypakoe seems always to have been an elaborate chant, while the kathisma, by virtue of its commonness, may well have been quite simple.

There are two words in medieval typika, commonly used in references to hypakoae, that suggest an elaborate musical style: ψάλτης and χειρονομία. The former, "psaltes," meant a trained singer; so it should perhaps be asked, "Trained in what? In musical notation, improvisation, or in memorizing elaborate melodies?" And when the plural, *psaltae,* is used together with the word *protopsaltes,* should we not think in terms of a precentor and schola cantorum and all that these imply? Cheironomia was a means of conveying a melody visually by hand signs that was probably vague and must have looked a bit like conducting. Cheironomic signs found their way into musical notation, thus creating a two-tiered system in which larger signs were spelled out, as it were, by smaller and more exact signs from which a transcribable notation eventually developed. Early cheironomic signs are found in the notation of the five paleoslavonic manuscripts that seem to contain Asmatikon chants (among which is the Uspenskii Kondakar), probably dating from before the mid-thirteenth century. Cheironomic signs can also be found in later Greek manuscripts, dating from the fourteenth century and later, where they are often written in red.

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[37] Gardner, *Russian Church Singing* 1, 89. For the history of the Easter Sunday Orthros, see Gabriel Bertonière, *The Historical Development of the Easter Vigil and Related Services in the Greek Church,* OCA 193 (Rome: Pontificio Istituto per gli Studi Orientali, 1972).

[38] What may be an early representative of monastic practice, the tenth- or eleventh-century Sinai Kanonarion (Sinai, St. Katherine's monastery library 150, published in Dmitrievskii *OLR* 1, 172–222) contains kathismata but apparently not hypakoae. According to Mateos, the kathisma is Palestinian or monastic in origin; see "La psalmodie dans le rite byzantin," p. 121.

But cheironomic signs do not seem to occur systematically in most earlier Greek manuscripts, and for many years it was thought that the only link between early Slavonic examples and later Greek ones was the survival of a few cheironomic signs in paleobyzantine and mediobyzantine notation, until the discovery in 1967 of Kastoria 8, an Asmatikon containing a fully-developed cheironomic notation for much of its length.

When the text itself corresponds, it seems that these two words, *psaltes* and *cheironomia,* may have referred to music that was later written in thirteenth-century Psaltika and Asmatika. The Psaltikon was apparently the book for the psaltes, the solo singer, while the Asmatikon, written perhaps for a choir of psaltae, seems to have been associated with the use of cheironomic signs.[39]

The Euergetis and the Messina typika, therefore, in using these two words together, suggest that hypakoae involved fairly elaborate singing both by a soloist and by a choir. The Euergetis typikon was quite specific in requiring an alternation between soloist and congregation in the performance of the hypakoae for the two Sundays before Christmas.[40] The singing of hypakoae may not have been very different from the singing of the troparia in the Christmas and Epiphany vigils, about which typika are more specific and which involved both a solo and a choral performance of the complete text. This, incidentally, would provide yet another explanation for the name "hypakoe," an alternation between soloist and choir, or "respond," being built into such a chant. But kathismata may not have

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[39] On paleoslavonic notation, see: R. Palikarova-Verdeil, *La musique byzantine chez les Bulgares et les Russes,* MMB Subsidia 3 (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1953); Levy, "The Byzantine Communion-Cycle and its Slavonic Counterpart."; Levy, "Die slavische Kontakarien-Notation," in *Anfänge der slavischen Musik* (Bratislava: Slowakische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1966), 77–92, trans. as "The Earliest Slavic Melismatic Chants," in Christian Hannick, ed., *Fundamental Problems of Early Slavic Music and Poetry,* MMB Subsidia 6 (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1978), 197–210; Constantin Floros, "Die Entzifferung der Kondakarien-Notation (I)," *Musik des Ostens* 3 (1965): 7–71; Floros, "Die Entzifferung der Kondakarien-Notation (II)," *Musik des Ostens* 4 (1967), 12–44; Miloš Velimirović, "The Present Status of Research in Slavic Chant," *Acta Musicologica* 44 (1972): 23565. For a description of the manuscript Kastoria 8, see Linos Polites, "Δύο χειρόγραφα ἀπὸ τὴν Καστοριά," Ἑλληνικά 20 (1967): 29–41.

[40] There is a difference in terminology between the Euergetis and Messina typika, yet it is probably insignificant. While both mention cheironomy, the Messina typikon refers to the protopsaltes and psaltae, meaning presumably a precentor and choir. In the Euergetis typikon, the corresponding terms seem to be psaltes and laos (literally "singer" and "people"). The latter was, of course, a community of monks, evidently trained in cheironomy, that could at times function as a choir, a point made by the typikon itself in connection with the Blessing of the Waters at Epiphany (Dmitrievskii, *OLR* 1, 381): "εἰσερχόμεθα ἐν τῷ ναῷ καὶ συστήσαντες χορόν, ψάλλομεν μετὰ ἤχου τροπάριον . . ." ("[W]e come into the church, and, forming a choir, we sing a hymn . . .").

been performed purely chorally, and since they seem to be distinct from hypakoae even in cases where they share a text, this distinction may lie in the difference between a simple and an elaborate chant.[41]

If the complete text of an hypakoe was sung both by a soloist and a choir, this would provide not only a reason why two apparently complete cycles of hypakoae are found in thirteenth-century manuscripts for which there is no evidence in typika but also go some way toward explaining the larger relationship between the Psaltikon and the Asmatikon. This explanation might run somewhat as follows: The hypakoe, like the kontakion, koinonikon (communion), and Psalms 66, 86, and 92, as they were sung at the Christmas and Epiphany Vigils, was an elaborate chant already in the tenth century and may have derived from the rite of St. Sophia, where it took the form of a troparion attached to Psalm 50 in Orthros. But unlike the kontakion, which later seems to have become a chant for a soloist, or the koinonikon, which seems always to have been a choral chant, the hypakoe was then and continued to be a chant sung by both a soloist and choir.

For this kind of performance originally, and perhaps until about A.D. 1000, only one book was needed—a book for the protopsaltes, or precentor, who sang the solos himself and then communicated the music by means of cheironomy to his choir. No doubt as a soloist he sang with improvised embellishments that at times turned into pure improvisations, and the inadequacies of the earliest forms of paleobyzantine notation must have thus promoted a considerable and growing divergence between what he sang and what his choir sang. This early form of the Asmatikon, in which there is no distinction between solo and choral performance, may well be represented by the Slavonic Kondakars of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. These, for example, still have the soloist's psalmody with the choral troparia for the Christmas and Epiphany vigils. Similarly, the composite manuscripts of the Messina tradition, containing parts of both the Psaltikon and the Asmatikon, can be explained as manuscripts for a protopsaltes, though here the Psaltikon repertoire is fully developed, and Asmatikon chants appear somewhat misleadingly as adjuncts to it.

By about A.D. 1100 this early book must have split in two—the Psaltikon for the soloist and the Asmatikon for the choir—perhaps in response to a feeling that music for the Divine Service should not be allowed the license of unfettered improvisation and that chants for a soloist should be fixed in musical notation. But there must also have been a practical necessity for another book in establishments where the protopsaltes was not the only

[41] See Juan Mateos, "La psalmodie dans le rite byzantin," pp. 120–22.

soloist, for a monastery with a choir trained to sing from cheironomy could have had more than one potential soloist. This might explain why there are about three times as many surviving Psaltika as Asmatika.

For the hypakoae, the later Asmatikon must have taken over the complete written repertoire while the Psaltikon cycle evolved bit by bit: because although the hypakoae of the Octoechus are complete in it, the yearly cycle has no more than half as many chants as that of the Asmatikon, and two of them are only found complete in one manuscript. Some hypakoae were probably still confined to the Asmatikon cycle in the thirteenth century, as survivors of a procedure that did not in the end become established. This is confirmed by modern service books where all but one hypakoe have counterparts in both cycles, the exception having a counterpart in neither. The implication of all this is that the later Asmatikon did not become a purely choral book, but for as long as it was compiled it remained a book for the protopsaltes.

ABSTRACT

The Byzantine hypakoae in medieval manuscripts present an unusual exercise for the music historian. Generally translated "responds," nearly all hypakoae are single-verse hymns that were not apparently responsorially performed, and yet survive in two series contained in two books, the Psaltikon and Asmatikon, the first usually thought to contain music for a soloist, the second music for a choir. In one set of chants for ordinary Sundays, the hypakoae of the Octoechus, the two parallel series are textually identical, but in the other—those for the Church Year—they are not; and this fact offers an opportunity to discover why the two series existed. The article leads ultimately to a possible explanation of how these two books may have functioned that is more precise than the usual description of the first as a soloist's book and the second as a choirbook.

viewpoint

The Turn from the Aesthetic

By Joel Galand

Not long ago this journal published a now famous debate between Lawrence Kramer and Gary Tomlinson over what a postmodern musicology might look like.[1] Though their visions clash, both turn for inspiration to the "New Historicism," a critical school rooted in Continental philosophy—particularly Michel Foucault's version of Gallic poststructuralism—that has emerged in comparative literature. The literary critic Peter Brooks has recently expressed reservations about this trend in words that could easily apply to the musicological situation as well.[2] Brooks understands "aesthetics" both in the narrow sense as "discriminations of the beautiful and the significant" and in the fuller sense of "poetics," which includes as well considerations of form, structure, and genre. He argues for the right of aesthetics, broadly construed, to exist as a separate endeavor, over and against ideological critique, insisting that poetics (like systems of music analysis, one might add) are the grounds on which one begins to make sense of texts. We too eagerly "go right for the interpretive jugular" (*AI,* 517). We need the structural frameworks of poetics if we are to produce work that is sharable, teachable, capable of being "subsumed in a continuing enterprise . . . and made the subject of an intelligible dialogue" (*AI,* 510). Brooks worries that today,

> for the first time since the 1930s and in a vastly different form, we have an ideologization of the aesthetic; the claim that the critic can, and must, position him or herself as analyst and actor in an ideological drama, that not to do so is simply to be a bad faith participant in hegemonic cultural practices. (*AI,* 513)

Brooks's description of an ideologized aesthetic recalls those passages in the Kramer-Tomlinson colloquy that warn us of the "narrow set of

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[1] The debate was occasioned by an earlier article of Kramer's, "The Musicology of the Future," *Repercussions* 1 (1992): 5–18, hereafter cited in the text as *MoF.* The remaining texts were published in *Current Musicology* 53 (1993): 18–40. These include Tomlinson's response, "Musical Pasts and Postmodern Musicologies" (pp. 18–24); Kramer's counterresponse, "Music Criticism and the Postmodernist Turn: In Contrary Motion with Gary Tomlinson" (pp. 25–35); and a final volley from Tomlinson (pp. 36–40). They will be cited in the text as *CM.*

[2] "Aesthetics and Ideology: What Happened to Poetics?" in *Critical Inquiry* 20 (1994): 509–23. Hereafter cited in the text as *AI.*

social interests" lurking behind notions of "autonomous greatness" (*MoF,* 6), without clarifying whether these notions actively *perpetuate* those interests or merely *emerge* from them. The question of autonomy bears careful scrutiny, since the terms in which Kramer and Tomlinson discuss it may be taken prematurely for granted. I argue in part 1 of this essay that the postmodernist distrust of the aesthetic needs to be tempered by a recovery of what was originally at stake in the positing of such an autonomous sphere. Enlightenment aesthetic thought may prove to be more of a piece with at least some poststructuralist critical theory than Kramer and Tomlinson seem to recognize.

A second, related issue, to be explored in part 2, concerns Tomlinson's description of how we encounter others. I question his account of incommensurability between the conceptual schemes that interlocutors bring into such encounters. Our suspicion of the Enlightenment's transcendental subject has led us to a concept of radical alterity that is now lingua franca in much humanities discourse. I want to suggest how some aspects of alterity so conceived might be incoherent, and how others lead us after all right back to the Enlightenment project. By way of conclusion, I indicate how these discussions of the aesthetic and the ethical bear on one another.

I. Aesthetics and Truth

Much "New Musicology" shares with its New Historicist correlate the tenet that the private sphere of aesthetic pleasure is inherently politicized; to think otherwise amounts to false consciousness. One might respond pragmatically, with Richard Rorty, that a goal of liberal democracy has been precisely to protect such private spheres while seeking to enlarge the ranks of those who are able to enjoy the pleasures, aesthetic ones included, that up to now have been available only for the relatively fortunate.[3]

On a more theoretical level, rather than talking about the politicization of the aesthetic, we might just as well describe the aestheticization of the political, for Enlightenment thought suggests clear structural similarities between aesthetic, ethical, and even cognitive judgments.[4] When Nietzsche claims that "existence and the world are justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon" (*The Birth of Tragedy,* sec. 24), he is pushing to its ultimate

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[3] Richard Rorty, "Towards a Liberal Utopia," *Times Literary Supplement,* 24 June 1994, p. 14.

[4] The aestheticization of Truth as a salutary corrective to an apodicticity that can all too readily descend into Terror is a theme common to contemporary writers as diverse as the French political philosopher Luc Ferry (*Homo aestheticus: l'invention du goût à l'âge démocratique* [Paris: Grasset, 1990]) and the British literary theorist Christopher Norris (*What's Wrong with Postmodernism: Critical Theory and the Ends of Philosophy* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990]).

conclusion the autonomization of the sensible with respect to the intelligible—the subjectivization of the world—to which eighteenth-century aesthetics gave impetus. The moral lesson of aesthetic autonomy, as Nietzsche presents it, is this: the aesthetic form of judgment is the most authentic insofar as it *proposes* an evaluation without dogmatically *asserting* its adequacy to its object.[5]

As an *entrée* to the issue of aesthetic autonomy, consider a paradigmatic description of it by the young Heinrich Schenker:

> Music needs and demands *active engagement*, enjoyment which is also mental activity when it appears to be mere enjoyment, and at the same time is genuine enjoyment which leads to mental activity. And this need on the part of music is all the more intense and justified because music is denied forever the kind of logic that is peculiar to the world of ideas, a world which in turn emanates from the world of phenomena.[6]

Schenker divorces music from conceptual truth; its laws derive from an artistic "caprice" that lends a work the *illusion* of causality. The work behaves *like* the phenomenal world—for example, it appears as if we might subject the work to lawlike categories—but this world is a fiction devised for pleasure. This pleasure may be of the highest sort, promoting intense mental activity, but the activity is bounded: it does not point beyond itself, much less to anything that could be termed "the Absolute."

For Kramer and Tomlinson, such relatively modest claims on behalf of the music-aesthetical imagination bring with them a problematic intellectual heritage, for "modernist internalism and aestheticism [still carry] the potent charge of nineteenth-century transcendentalism" (*CM,* 20). The problem with aesthetic autonomy is its failure to "jibe with the worldliness and contextual contingency that postmodern scholars find in all utterance, musical and otherwise" (*CM,* 19). Tomlinson deplores our inability to free ourselves from "a particular kind of aesthetic engagement defined and created in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe" (*CM,* 37). Kramer similarly describes the "invest[ment of] the objects of musicological investigation with the glamour or charisma of both truth and beauty" (*MoF,* 9).

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[5] Kramer says something like this in *CM,* p. 29, as part of an argument that Tomlinson later rejects (p. 38).

[6] "Die Musik von Heute," *Neue Revue* 5, no. 3 (3 January 1894): 87–88; translated by Jonathan Dunsby in *Music Analysis* 7 (1988): 33–34. Later, of course, Schenker changed his views in a reversal that might be compared to the reactionary turn taken by the Romantics (see below).

Such critiques suggest that the aesthetic ties art to a version of "Truth" that is purely conceptual; after all, sensibility could hardly fail to "jibe with worldliness." Yet in the history of epistemology, aesthetic autonomy refers in the first place to the autonomy of the *sensible.* It also bears reminding that the "aesthetic engagement defined and created in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe" was often explicitly "worldly." The Jena Romantics, for example, to whom "the potent charge of nineteenth-century transcendentalism" would seem especially apt, conceived of *Kunstreligion* as an emancipatory, civic movement. The distinction between "aesthetic autonomy" on the one hand, and "worldliness and contextual contingency" on the other, is forced because notions of aesthetic autonomy were from the very first interwoven with problems both ethical (the mediation of individual and society) and epistemological (the mediation of percept and concept).

"Language," writes Kramer, "cannot capture musical experience because it cannot capture any experience whatever, including the experience of language itself" (*MoF,* 10). Observations on the limits of language have led some poststructuralist thinkers to rehearse the Kantian argument that aesthetics properly belongs within the project of critical philosophy. Language, they argue, constitutes us as thinking subjects but is cut off from "truth" as it would appear to an ideal observer. In order to conceive change, whether through scientific inquiry or ethico-political action, our minds have to be receptive to ideas that have only a speculative, hypothetical status (e.g., "the coherent," "the good," "the progressive," and even "the world"), ideas whose objective validity can never be determined by empirical knowledge. Such are Kant's ideas of reason—linguistic signs devoid of representational content that nonetheless open up to us the very possibility of ethics and of science. What awakens these ideas is an *aesthetic* sense of the rightness of a principle or the coherence of a theory. If a de Man or a Lyotard turns back to eighteenth-century aesthetics, it is precisely because a category like the sublime, in the words of Christopher Norris,

> marks a crucial point of intersection between language, politics, and the discourse of representation . . . [it] figures as a strictly unthinkable category, one that can never be present to thought in some form of existing reality or phenomenal cognition, but which none the less exists (like Kant's "ideas of pure reason") in a realm of as-yet unrealized future potential.[7]

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[7] Christopher Norris, *What's Wrong with Postmodernism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 215. Hereafter cited in the text as *Postmodernism.*

It is because the aesthetic opens up to us a *purely speculative potentiality* that I consider Kramer and Tomlinson to have overly stressed its internalism and mystification, and to have one-sidedly emphasized the historical links between aesthetics and truth (in the sense of the "Absolute" or "transcendental signified"). The claim I wish to defend here is that ever since the advent of aesthetics, art has been largely divorced from truth so conceived. The link between Art and Absolute—the identification of work with the unconditioned—is less characteristic of aesthetic thought than its demystifiers claim. (*Schön ist Schein,* as Schiller put it.) Dahlhaus has written much the same thing in connection with music aesthetics:

> [I]t is only Schlegel, Hoffmann, and later Nietzsche [in an early, and not particularly representative fragment] who expound a theory of "absolute music" that ventures without qualification on the metaphysical, or (to invert the formulation) a metaphysics of which "absolute music" is an organon. . . .
> [Even Schopenhauer] melded the metaphysics of music with the emotional theory of aesthetics (though in an abstract form).[8]

We might flesh out Dahlhaus's point by noting that in the eighteenth century the necessary philosophical groundwork for the "emancipation" of music from word was laid without any appeal to "transcendent expressive modes" (*CM,* 18). Consider Baumgarten, who coined the term *aesthetic.*[9] The very word suggests that what matters in the experience of art is the mental state of the αίσθητής—that which perceives. A work of art occasions mental states, and the discrimination between them forms the basis of aesthetic judgments. Baumgarten's aesthetics marked a decisive turning point in the rationalist tradition, according to which the measure of the human mind had been the standpoint of the ideal observer for whom spatial-temporal relations (the very conditions for human sensibility) appear as strictly logical relations. One consequence of rationalism was that art—the paradigmatic product of sensibility—could be considered at best a pale copy of the intelligible. If the first stage of knowledge

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[8] Carl Dahlhaus, *Between Romanticism and Modernism: Four Studies in the Music of the Later Nineteenth Century,* trans. Mary Whittall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 38. Elsewhere Dahlhaus deems Wackenroder a transitional figure, whose musical thought constitutes an "aus der Ausdrucksprinzip herauswachsende Metaphysik" ("Romantische Musikästhetik und Wiener Klassik," *Arkiv für Musikwissenschaft* 29 (1972): 177.

[9] Earlier than commonly supposed, in his doctoral dissertation *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus* (Halle, 1735), trans. Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther as *Reflections on Poetry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954).

involves, as Descartes put it, "leading the mind away from the senses" toward a "clear and distinct" vision, it follows that knowledge carries a price: we give up the vividness of sensuous apprehension. Baumgarten's radical step was to divorce art from truth by insisting on aesthetic perception, a confused (i.e., not distinct) cognition, as the paradigmatic stance toward the work.[10] If Baumgarten does after all compare the work of art to the world, it is not because of its referentiality but because, like the world, it appears to hang together. No longer is the order of an artwork the *reflection* of an order exterior to a finite mind; at best it *suggests* such an order by analogy. Although Baumgarten says little about music, it logically follows from his discussion that there are no longer any grounds on which to devalue music in relation to the other arts.

Far from "not jibing with worldliness and contingency," aesthetic autonomy signals the emancipation of sensuous perception, of precisely that which is contingent as opposed to what is contemplated *sub specie aeternitatis.* From there, it is but a step to Kant's demonstration that the world is radically mind-dependent. That Kant used "aesthetic" to designate both the spatial-temporal conditions of sensibility (in *The Critique of Pure Reason*) and the judgment of taste (in *The Critique of Judgment*) indicates the extent to which aesthetic autonomy figures in the critique of metaphysics. Turn now from the rationalist to the empiricist tradition. When Burke divorces poetry from imitation, discarding the slogan *Ut pictura poesis,* he implicitly replaces painting with music. He denies that the effect of poetry is to "raise ideas of things" (*Philosophical Enquiry* V.2), claiming instead that its power resides in tonal effects, in sonority. The poet is "affected with this strong enthusiasm by things of which he neither has, nor can possibly have any idea further than that of a bare sound. . . . [D]escriptive poetry operates chiefly by substitution, by the means of sounds, which by custom have the effect of reality" (V.5). Burke's analysis of reading within a psychological account of the beautiful and the sublime casts poetry in the image not of image itself but of organized sound. Wordless music becomes an aesthetic paradigm not because it is closer to truth but because it suggests a critique of the view that language represents truth conceived as *adaequatio intellectus et rei.* Poetic language has no particular advantage over music in representing nature.

Much has been written about the role played by theories of the metaphysical Absolute in the "emancipation of music." The point to be stressed here is that the philosophical arguments by which such an emancipation

[10] Karsten Harries develops this point in *The Meaning of Modern Art: A Philosophical Interpretation* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 18–21.

might be justified were already in place three-quarters of a century earlier, and in a context that has nothing to do with "venue[s] of transcendence" (*MoF,* 8). Rather, the heightened aesthetic status of music is first articulated in contexts where rationalist theories of language are questioned. Norris argues that the increased privilege accorded to music during the course of the eighteenth century marks a "crucial instance of the passage from a doctrine of language founded on ideas of mimesis, self-presence, and adequate representation to one that acknowledges the 'empty' or non-self-identical nature of the sign" (*Postmodernism,* 213).[11] If this is so, then the autonomization of music—and, more globally, of the aesthetic—is not something we need to distrust automatically as a source of mystification. We can read it instead as a lucid prefiguration of themes with which poststructuralist thought at its most rigorous is deeply concerned.

It is Kant who shows us most clearly why the aesthetic paradigm comes to matter so much as the eighteenth century unfolds: the autonomy of the aesthetic brings with it a subjectivization of taste, of ethics, even of the very idea of a cosmological order. In the wake of this *retrait du monde* (Luc Ferry), the reflective aesthetic judgment assumes a paradigmatic status as that mental activity that opens up in a nondogmatic fashion the realm of ethics and science. Something like an aesthetic capacity enables concept formation. Thus, Kant posits the beautiful as an experience that invites thoughts of an order in which our efforts to realize the (mere) ideas of reason *might* not be in vain. The sublime, on the other hand, by flooding our cognitive capacities, recalls us to our higher faculties even as we recognize their limits. The cognitive dissonance of sublime experience evokes the Kantian antinomies by inviting an analogy to the clash between our facticity and our aspirations. An appreciation of the sublime, and hence an acceptance of radical finitude, marks reason's coming of age, a coming of age Kant described in his essay "What is Enlightenment?" Our ideas can never be guaranteed by knowledge, but the gap between reason and understanding—between the intelligible and the sensible—need not be cause for despair. We must dare to act in the subjunctive; we ourselves have, in a sense, to become sublime. Art invites us to draw analogies by suggesting that the organicism we ascribe to a work might be adopted as a regulative (not a constitutive) principle with which to deal generally with experi-

[11] Norris makes this point in the context of reviewing Kevin Barry's *Language, Music, and the Sign: A Study of Aesthetics, Poetics and Poetic Practice from Collins to Coleridge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

ence.[12] The political implications of the aesthetic emerge when we are moved freely, *without empirical justification,* to approach others with respect and to make humanity itself our purpose.[13]

For Kant, as for his popularizer Schiller, art remains appearance. Indeed, it is important for them that art not be a matter of truth, for the ideas of reason evoked in the Analytic of the Sublime are strictly unknowable. If these ideas merely traced an exterior truth, human freedom would be impossible. Kant does not subscribe to a *constitutive* "symbolist-organicist creed."[14] Such a creed, which Kramer and Tomlinson seem to find at the root of aesthetic autonomy, is a Romantic—essentially counterrevolutionary—accretion to a paradigm that was developed without it. And even among the Romantics, the emphatic claim that art is a transcendent medium through which truth actually manifests itself was put forth without irony by relatively few.[15]

Why even this limited turn toward a metaphysical conception of art after 1800? For the later Romantics, the impossibility of attaining absolute knowledge, of reconciling our finite sensibility with the infinite, seems to have become a source of despair, to which the degeneration of revolutionary ideas in the Terror and the Thermidorian reaction surely contributed. The Romantic solution was to bypass Kant's strictures on knowledge. By becoming an actual medium for the organic attunement of mind and world, art could regain an ontological status denied it in the eighteenth-century aesthetic paradigm. The metaphysics of instrumental music could be read as a defensive reaction to critical philosophy, a move that posits a constitutive *totality* to which music would somehow give access. Norris

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[12] Against the New Historicism, Peter Brooks invokes Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* as "one of the most powerful, and, for all its datedness, most persuasive arguments for the centrality of the aesthetic in culture and the need to make it a core concept in education." The reason he cites is precisely that which Kant develops: "the aesthetic is what permits human beings to emerge from the purely physical while retaining the concrete and sensuous in their composition." Brooks argues that "constantly trumping the aesthetic by the ideological and political—making the aesthetic simply a mask for the ideological—risks losing a sense of the functional role played by the aesthetic within human existence" ("Aesthetics and Ideology," 516–17).

[13] The connections between the Kantian sublime and politics are drawn especially clearly by Luc Ferry in *Homo aestheticus,* especially in chapter 3.

[14] The phrase is Christopher Norris's (220).

[15] Of course, one finds passages even in eighteenth-century aesthetics (e.g., by the philosopher of the *Sturm und Drang* Johann Georg Hamaan, or by various Pietists) that describe art as religious revelation. For present purposes, however, it is enough to show that the principal developments in aesthetic theory may be plausibly read in a rather different manner from the one I detect in certain New Musicological writings.

describes the reactionary political implications of a such a move in Romantic poetics:

> One could . . . see the architects of later romantic tradition . . . as offering a kind of rearguard defence, a mystified doctrine of aesthetic value that precisely negates or collapses those hopes once vested in French political events. (*Postmodernism,* 216)

Here is where Kramer and Tomlinson have cause for unease: the shift from a regulative to a constitutive organicism in Romantic philosophies of art is indeed "darkly tinted" (*CM,* 23). For once the ideas evoked by art are said to constitute a truth deemed "Absolute," it is easy to envision how the aesthetic might become ideologized. In the writings of A. B. Marx, for instance, the musical *Idee* is invested at once with a quasi-religious significance as a bearer of ethical values, and with the historically concrete aspirations of a *Vormärz* German with a sense of national mission and cultural superiority.[16] Such a merging of art, truth, and ideological constraint could only arise by ignoring Kantian distinctions such as operate between empirical reality (objects of understanding) and speculative thought (objects of reason). The effects of such a confusion, Norris cautions,

> are by no means confined to philosophy, aesthetics or literary theory. Their repercussions may be felt in the political sphere, and never more so than at moments—like the period of German High Romanticism and its nationalist aftermath—when critique gives way to the notion of truth as residing in some single, uniquely privileged language or culture (*Postmodernism,* 216).

By recovering the original context of aesthetic autonomy—the positing of a cognitive domain apart from knowledge and instrumental reason—we discover how the aesthetic can check precisely those ideological, metanarrative impulses of which Kramer and Tomlinson are justifiably suspicious. Kramer insists that "musical autonomy, even Carl Dahlhaus's

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[16] The political goals of Marx's criticism emerge with particular lucidity in Sanna Pederson, "A. B. Marx, Berlin Concert Life, and German National Identity," *Nineteenth-Century Music* 18 (1994): 87–107. See also Scott Burnham, "Criticism, Faith, and the *Idee*," *Nineteenth-Century Music* 13 (1990): 183–92. My one reservation about Pederson's study is that she never quite distinguishes between the critical, Kantian phase of aesthetic autonomy and a later tendency, to which Marx falls prey, toward conflating empirical reality and the ideas of reason into a unitary metanarrative.

'relative autonomy,' is a chimera" (*MoF,* 9). But as far as chimeras go, this may not be a bad one to hold on to. "Relative autonomy" is simply the name we give to our intuition that though art arises within a culture, it might also in an important sense stand apart and perform a critical function.[17]

The Romantic paradigm was, strictly speaking, short-lived. Granted by Enlightenment aesthetics, contested by the Romantics, the divorce of Art and Truth was finally upheld by Hegel. We moderns, Hegel tells us, no longer take art "as the supreme mode of our knowledge of the Absolute. The peculiar nature of artistic production of works of art no longer fulfills our highest need. . . . [A]rt, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past."[18] If Hegel is correct—and the very existence of the aesthetic approach seems to bear him out—then Kramer and Tomlinson exaggerate the historical force of a metaphysics that linked art to truth. Nor should nineteenth-century aestheticist slogans of *l'art pour l'art* lead us to reject Hegel's verdict. In aestheticism—basically a version of pessimism—art becomes not a venue of "Truth" but rather a healing fiction we substitute for a world in which we are no longer at home. The aesthete seeks refuge in art (or in a life lived aesthetically) knowing full well that his refuge is a *paradis artificiel,* though one in which he hopes for a while to escape a boredom that threatens to arouse reflection. Depictions of such a life, from Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* to Huysmans's *A Rebours,* suggest a perfect lucidity regarding the mystifying powers of aestheticism. There is no need for postmodernism to show us that a self-forgetting in aesthetic contemplation is a chimera, when Mallarmé already likens even music to a feint "*pour bannir le regret.*"[19] The self-containment of *aisthesis,* the paradox of a bounded boundlessness, may well give us the illusion that we have escaped the temporality of the human condition. If, however, aesthetic contemplation affords us a surcease from Schopenhauer's "wheel of Ixion," then it follows that we must have an *interest* in achieving that disinterested satisfaction of which aesthetics speaks. We have to agree with Kramer here that the "epistemologically self-contained" aesthetic experience is impossible (*MoF,* 9). Aestheticism teaches us not that art is a "venue of transcendence" (*MoF,* 8) but rather that the

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[17] Lydia Goehr argues this point in her essay "Music has no Meaning to Speak of: On the Limits of Musical Interpretation," in *The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays,* ed. Michael Krausz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 177–90. See especially pp. 188–90.

[18] G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art,* trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 10–11. This theme is developed in Karsten Harries, "Hegel on the Future of Art," *Review of Metaphysics* 27 (1974): 683.

[19] *L'après-midi d'un faune,* 57–58. Already by midcentury it was becoming a *topos* that, though art is only appearance, its lie is one we welcome so as to make "*l'univers moins hideux et les instants moins lourds*" (Baudelaire, *L'amour du mensonge*).

search for ever more interesting experiences is enervating and destined to reach a dead end.[20]

II. Knowledge, Power, Dialogue, and the Other

The postmodern distrust of the aesthetic stems from a particular reading of the Cartesian tradition. Descartes's entire epistemological project is suffused with the optimism that "clear and distinct" sight will make us "masters and possessors of nature" (*Discours sur la méthode,* VI.2). His chain of metaphors—knowledge as a penetrating gaze that unveils, masters, and possesses the object—suggests that to know is to violate. What lies behind the accusations of mastery that run through the Kramer-Tomlinson exchange is a Nietzschean critique of this modern conception of knowledge as will-to-power. That will, Tomlinson mentions in passing, is "rancorous" (*CM,* 38). Why rancorous, and what does this have to do with aesthetics?

Nietzsche might answer that the will is rancorous because it is powerless against "time's covetousness." He names this rancor "the spirit of revenge" (*Zarathustra* II: "On Redemption"). Aesthetic experience is the other side of the same coin. Here we seem to escape temporality; the will avenges itself on time, celebrating "the sabbath of the penal servitude of volition."[21] Nietzsche shows us that the aesthetic taken in this sense supports a conception of knowledge as power. For him the idea of a disinterested satisfaction is risible, a myth of "immaculate perception." Aesthetic contemplation is a false antidote to desire, no balm for the rancor of the will. In fact, truly to lose oneself in aesthetic contemplation as Schopenhauer envisions it amounts to self-destruction; asceticism is his next step beyond aesthetics, a part of the same process. Nietzsche rejects such a life-denying aesthetic, celebrating instead an affirmative, procreative, erotic conception of art; Pygmalion, not Narcissus, is his hero.[22]

There are many responses to Nietzsche's critique of modernity: joyous dancing (Derrida, sometimes), sober epistemology (de Man), and dour moralism (Foucault). It sometimes appears as if the third has taken hold of the New Musicology. Symptomatic is a certain tone, a "rhetoric of virtue"[23] of which this passage is characteristic:

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[20] See Harries on "the search for the interesting" in *The Meaning of Modern Art,* 49–60.

[21] Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* I.38. Schopenhauer probably has in mind Schiller, who describes aesthetic contemplation as "annulling time within time" (*On the Aesthetic Education of Man,* trans. and ed. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and I. A. Willoughby [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967], 97).

[22] See Harries, "Narcissus and Pygmalion: Lessons of Two Tales," in *Philosophy and Art,* ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 53–77.

[23] The phrase is Brooks's ("Aesthetics and Ideology," 514).

> I think the subject-positions we find as scholars *do* automatically "reproduce the mastery scenario," and I do not find Kramer's "speech genres" responsible answers to the ethical problems entailed in these masterful claims. (*CM,* 38)[24]

Given their critique of the modern conception of knowledge, Kramer and Tomlinson understandably want to mitigate their "masterful claims." They find in the hermeneutic trope of interpretation-as-dialogue an attractive strategy since it builds difference and otherness into its method from the start. Their mutual appeal to hermeneutics nonetheless belies a fundamental disagreement. Kramer holds that contextual meaning is a rhetorical effect inscribed within the text. He urges us to read "within the immediacy-effects of music itself the kind of mediating structures usually positioned outside music under the rubric of context" (*MoF,* 10). During the "dialogue of listening," the interpreter asks questions that the composer has raised "by making his music behave as it does" (*MoF,* 17). Because Kramer's approach calls for the close reading of texts, he wants to salvage aspects of the aesthetic approach, defined as "the valorization of perceptual pleasure as knowledge" (*CM,* 32).

Kramer's vision seems to me an appealing mediation of aesthetics and the sociology of knowledge. For Tomlinson, though, Kramer "betrays . . . modernism already when he dubs 'criticism' the 'rhetorical' and 'subjective' language by which we might contextualize music" (*CM,* 19). Kramer's hermeneutics "comes closer to modernist solipsism than to true conversation" (*CM,* 21). He "evades the immense complexity of the historian's dialogue with past subjectivities," offering "a too-familiar modernist mastery" (*CM,* 20–21); "the art of close reading itself . . . carries with it the ideological charge of modernism" (*CM,* 22). Tomlinson does not clarify here just how we might have conversational access to past subjectivities, indeed any access at all, if not through close reading of texts. Context,

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[24] Reading New Musicological texts such as these, it is often hard to avoid the impression that humans are being essentialized as *homo politicus.* One detects a tendency to commit the fallacy of the one-dimensional man, described by one prominent historian as follows:

> In one of its forms, this fallacy mistakes people for political animals who are moved mainly by a desire for power. It reduces the complex psychic condition of man merely to their political roles and shrinks all the components of the social calculus to a simple equation of power, ambition, and interest.

(David Hackett Fischer, *Historian's Fallacies: Towards a Logic of Historical Thought* [New York: Harper & Row, 1970], 200.)

after all, just gives us more texts. We need to turn to his book, *Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others,* for a fuller exposition of his epistemology of interpretation.[25]

As a means of retaining some sense of objectivity while attacking objectivism, Tomlinson draws in part on Gadamer's notion of meaning as unfolding historically in a tradition of reception. Historical understanding is not a self-forgetting—as if we could reconstruct what actually was—nor an arrogant insistence on interrogating the past solely by our own lights. Tradition and reception, according to this model, mutually condition one another. Tradition is neither something to be passively transmitted nor something of which we need be altogether suspicious.

Tomlinson struggles with the opposing claims that the search for knowledge and the acknowledgment of difference make on us. We can never fully interpret the historical other because there always remains a barrier of an indecipherable subjectivity, yet the task of interpretation must go on, for to treat others as mute objects of scientific knowledge would be epistemologically impossible and morally flawed. Historians, Tomlinson cautions, should treat past subjectivities as ends in themselves, not as means to be mastered in the quest for knowledge. This is why I don't see his postmodernism as something opposed to the Enlightenment, but rather as the projection of Enlightenment values onto historiography. The moral sensibility guiding Tomlinson's efforts to assure historical agents their voices surely stems from his view of both himself and others according to some regulative idea of the universal worth of persons, a "party of humankind," as Hume put it. Tomlinson insists on the sense of the alien with which we encounter others. Indeed, it takes a supreme act of *imagination* to *think* the other, whom we can never know, in such a way as to command respect. History is a meeting place of aesthetics and morality.

Having said that much, I still think that Tomlinson lays too much stress on difference, and not only because there is nothing in difference itself to be valued for its own sake, as Terry Eagleton has recently reminded us.[26] Tomlinson claims that investigating occult thought can challenge the universality of the Western European view of the world. Since it is empirically demonstrable that our views have not in fact been held universally, what Tomlinson attacks is the notion that our views should be *universalizable.* His position raises some fundamental questions. What does it mean to hold a cognitive belief while not at the same time asserting its

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[25] Gary Tomlinson, *Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). Hereafter cited in the text as *MRM.*

[26] "Discourse and Discos," *Times Literary Supplement,* 15 July 1994, p. 4.

universalizability? How does this square with the logic of assertion ("belief that *p* is true" reduces to "*p* is true" reduces to *p*)? Why can't we respect others while still not believing them (Tomlinson's final chapter is called "Believing Others")? Can't others simply get things wrong?

Tomlinson's statements on behalf of Renaissance magic verge on cognitive relativism, though he denies this because he claims that relativism only makes sense against a static conception of absolute, eternal, unperspectivist truth:

> Relativism can thrive as an idea only where there remains a belief in knowing as a process that, seen through to its end point, renders others' concepts completely transparent to the knower. . . . In this epistemology, comparison and relativistic judgment are simply alternative routes chosen by the same possessive and dominating knower. But where knowledge is conceived instead to be the product of dialogical immersions in local situations, a process that leads in part to alienation and cedes at some point to belief—here there is no ground for relativism. More or less invidious comparativism gives way to more or less generous belief in others' abilities to construct for themselves a meaningful and satisfying reality (*MRM,* 249).

This passage reveals a dominant theme of Tomlinson's: others construct their own reality, and we cannot always translate their concepts into our own. For instance, between our world and Ficino's—"constructed differently than ours"—there are limits to dialogue and communication. To ask how Renaissance magic worked technically "is an unwarranted act of translation, a forced reshaping of Ficino's world . . . a coercive question." "In order not to violate his world construction, we must accept [Ficino's magic] as operating technically as well as socially" (*MRM,* 248-51). "Occult thought in the sixteenth century was precisely one way of seeing the world 'clearly'" (*MRM,* 11), another valid way of organizing the world. Its validity is a matter of "faith . . . in people's abilities to *construct through language and deed their own worlds*" (*MRM,* 247, emphasis mine). The shift to the plural here would indicate that different beliefs about the world amount to different worlds. It appears that Tomlinson is a kind of relativist after all—the sort who asserts that truth or knowledge is relative to a conceptual scheme.

One may counter that not only is there just one world, but that disagreements about it can bring about something like scientific progress without entailing a shift of paradigms so radical that translatability across them becomes impossible. It is enough for Tomlinson to dismiss an argument by exclaiming: "An eyebrow-raising portrait of science, this, for any-

one to offer twenty-five years after the publication of Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*!" (*MRM,* 12). Important objections, however, have been raised over the years to the reading of Kuhn implicitly endorsed here.[27]

Tomlinson wants us to take it "on faith" that different people construct different worlds and that differences can constitute a hermeneutic frontier beyond which we cannot or must not travel. The reference to "worlds" in the plural is, of course, metaphorical. Elsewhere Tomlinson writes of "the possibility of multiple orderings of reality that cover, so to speak, the same territory in different and perhaps incommensurable ways"; these orderings are "in some respects untranslatable" (*MRM,* 250). What he asserts, then, is not really that there are several possible worlds, but rather that there is one world (or reality or territory) observed by different people with incommensurable, only partially translatable conceptual schemes. Different schemes yield different ways of ordering reality. But, then, one may wonder, in cases where intertranslatability fails, how we are to know that it is "the same territory" that is being organized? How do we know that the same things are being individuated, only according to different concepts?

Since Tomlinson talks about the construction of worlds through language and takes untranslatability as one indication that reality has been differently organized, we might evaluate his position by adopting Donald Davidson's strategy of letting a conceptual scheme equal a set of intertranslatable languages. Davidson argues that the dualism of a conceptual scheme and an uninterpreted content (whether we call it "reality," "world," "experience," or "territory") is in itself a third dogma of empiricism, replacing the dogmas of the analytic-synthetic distinction and of a reductionism that would "uniquely allocate empirical content sentence by sentence."[28] These two dogmas, rejected by Quine, had been the mainstays of positivism.[29] The third dogma, on the other hand, buttresses the

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[27] Israel Scheffler, *Science and Subjectivity,* 2 ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982); Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association* 47 (1973–74): 5–20; rpt. in *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral,* ed. Michael Krausz and Jack W. Meiland (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 66–80. More recently, Paul Feyerabend has attacked on ethical grounds readings of Kuhn that are guided by the "philosophical principles of incommensurability and indeterminacy of translation"; see "Intellectuals and the Facts of Life," *Common Knowledge* 5, no. 2 (1993): 6–9.

[28] Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral,* 72. Further citations from Davidson will be abbreviated as *Conceptual Scheme.* For a fuller but still concise account of Davidson's approach to knowledge, language, and relativism, see Simon Ervine, *Donald Davidson* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 72–154, but especially pp. 134–54.

[29] In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," rpt. in *From a Logical Point of View,* 2 ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 42.

type of conceptual relativism that Tomlinson proposes—a type that founders on paradox. On the one hand, we need failure of translatability if we are going to talk about incommensurable schemes; on the other hand, we need something neutral and common between schemes if we are even to recognize that it is language, individuation, and conceptualization that are going on. This common thing is Tomlinson's "territory" to be ordered.

Now it makes no sense to order a single object (e.g., the world): there must be objects comprised within that which is to be ordered. Davidson argues that what enables us to recognize differences "in particular cases is an ontology common to the two languages, with concepts that individuate the same objects. We can be clear about breakdowns in translation when they are local enough, for a background of generally successful translation provides what is needed to make the failures intelligible" (*Conceptual Scheme,* 74). It comes down to two possibilities: either Ficino and Tomlinson have concepts that individuate *different* things, in which case there is no reason to talk about incommensurability; or else, their concepts are individuating *the same* things, in which case we can talk about incommensurability if we really want to, but we could be talking just as well about differences of opinion, explicable error, or malapropisms. Tomlinson's untranslatable differences no longer seem so momentous. Davidson quips, "The trouble is, as so often in philosophy, it is hard to improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement" (*Conceptual Scheme,* 66).

Of course, the radical incommensurability between our "ordering of reality" and Ficino's doesn't prevent Tomlinson from describing Ficino's world in our own language, and he can locate just where our conceptual schemes differ to the point where they seem to become untranslatable. If Tomlinson gets as far as he does, if these differences can be at all noticed in the first place, it must be because they stand out against a background of banal agreement. We cannot even begin the task of interpreting speech—of correlating sentences held true by others with sentences we hold true—without attributing beliefs to others. That this is so follows from the claim that theory and language, and meaning and belief, are interdependent, a claim that Tomlinson would presumably accept. Since we cannot know what others' beliefs might be without already interpreting their words—without knowing what attitudes they hold toward particular sentences—we have to assume at the outset that our beliefs generally agree with theirs.

What I have summarized in the preceding paragraph is Davidson's "Principle of Charity," according to which interpretation only gets off the ground if we attribute to others beliefs much the same as our own:

> The guiding policy is to do this as far as possible, subject to considerations of simplicity, hunches about the effects of social condition-

> ing, and of course our common sense, or scientific, knowledge of explicable error.
>
> This method is not designed to eliminate disagreement, nor can it: its purpose is to make meaningful disagreement possible (*Conceptual Scheme,* 78–79).

Davidson concludes that there is no way of distinguishing between differences in beliefs and differences in concepts. There is no way of judging, where translation has failed, whether others' concepts and beliefs do in fact differ radically from our own. Tomlinson writes of a "space of the other that is inaccessible to our understanding . . . an area of difference beyond the reach of dialogue or meaningful enunciation" (*MRM,* 247). From what vantage point could we identify which parts of Ficino's world correspond to our own, which parts differ because of explicable differences of opinion, and which parts differ because reality has been ordered according to a different conceptual scheme? How do we know in a given case whether a failure of translatability is evidence of a different scheme, or simply a false belief or different opinion concerning the same scheme? The claim that Ficino possessed a different conceptual scheme is something about which we have to be agnostic. Tomlinson writes out of genuine ethical concern for the integrity of the other. I share this concern without believing that it is necessarily coercive or hegemonic of me to suggest politely to my interlocutor that some of his concepts are obsolete or confused. We can identify common desires, and I can try to convince him that these are better met by adopting my cognitive apparatus. If I believe that p is true and a good thing to know, then is there not a point at which my refusal to cross hermeneutic frontiers might blend into indifference about my fellow's lot?

III. Conclusion: Aesthetics, Formalism, and Ethics

Kramer and Tomlinson agree that in the wake of nineteenth-century thought "those who sought to put the study of music on a scholarly footing were left with two options: positivistic description of historical data around the music and analytic description of the workings of the notes themselves" (*CM,* 18–19). This reductionism might be qualified by pointing out that formalism encompasses a whole range of positions, some of which lead out of the text in highly revealing ways, and not just as a "quasi-religious transcendence." Russian Formalism, for instance, verges on phenomenology in its insistence on the alienating effect of poetic language. We find similar ideas in early-twentieth-century French poetics as well, for instance, in the aesthetics of Paul Valéry, for whom a primary function of art is to open up a cognitive gap: the live metaphors of poetry remind us

of the rift between language and what is external to it. That which we use every day suddenly becomes something like a physical impediment.[30] As in Burke, as in the Kantian sublime, we find here a critique of language as a vehicle for the transcendent union of mind and nature. We think through language, yet poetry reminds us that language is something over which we stumble.

Music analysis too has often proceeded along phenomenological lines: for instance, one can look to music as a way to explore time consciousness or to reveal the way time might have been experienced in other ages. Such inquiries characterize the work of Hans Mersmann, Kurt Westpahl, Thrasybulous Georgiades, Jonathan Kramer, and David Lewin, to name just a few twentieth-century scholars. Heinrich Besseler tried to give an account of the history of listening inspired by Heidegger's historical approach to Being. None of these examples of musical research fits comfortably within the formalist/positivist binarism.

Moreover, among undergraduates and members of *le grand public cultivé,* formalist analysis, whatever its roots in Romantic ideology may be, can perform in itself a demystifying function. Demonstrating the extent to which compositions are *constructed,* dependent on transsubjective relational systems, is one way of resisting their immediacy effects. It is in such terms that Peter Brooks defends formalist aesthetics:

> The realm of the aesthetic needs to be respected by an imperative that is nearly ethical. It's not that the aesthetic is the realm of a secular scripture, that poetry has taken the place of a failed theodicy, or that critics are celebrants at the high altar of a cult of beauty isolated from history and politics. It is rather that personality must be tempered by the discipline of the impersonal that comes in the creation of form. Form in this sense is really an extension of language, which is itself impersonal in the same way (*AI,* 522).

The aesthetic can lead to revelations concerning that about which we care deeply. Revelation arises in rifts, such as that faced when we encounter others. If Kant and Schiller cling to the subjectivity of aesthetic experience, it is because one cannot give an objective account of the other that will command respect and elicit our care and commitment. Something like an *aesthetic* idea is summoned when we are confronted with another human being. In David Bromwich's words, the aim of art is

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[30] Paul Valéry, "Poésie et pensée abstraite," *Oeuvres* 1, ed. Jean Hytier (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), 1317–18.

> to create a mood of attention. The mood impresses us with a sensation that has the force of an imperative—the command to *Stop; Stand back; Respect,* which Kant associated with moral freedom and with aesthetic judgment. Moral and aesthetic thought thus share the task of inculcating a duty to treat persons as ends. Persons, and one category of objects which, it follows, must have a peculiar power to represent the dignity of persons. We honor in works of art as we do in persons *the mere fact of their autonomy.*[31]

It is tempting to dismiss Enlightenment aesthetics on the grounds that it entails a false universalization of subjective experience that verges on an ethics of mastery and possession.[32] But such mastery would involve treating the other as a thing, a tool, a means rather than an end. On the contrary, the aesthetic intuition that our rational and moral agency might be projected on to others gives us a communicative ground, a free intersubjective space for encounters, for persuasion, criticism, and influence—in short, for a discussion that, like Kant's reflective judgment, does not depend on a rule. Without saving some space for the relative autonomy of aesthetic experience, not only might we lose the critical function of art, but Tomlinson's sublime vision of a commitment to "a thousand different musics"—and to their makers—will have given up its role as a regulative demand and become an empty utopia.

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[31] David Bromwich, *Politics by Other Means: Higher Education and Group Thinking* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 227. Emphasis mine.

[32] In this connection, we might bear in mind Brooks's ascription to Schiller of a "quasi-anthropological understanding of the *Spieltrieb* as a vital component of the human. Like the creation of sign-systems, the play of the aesthetic . . . is one of humanity's basic accommodations in the world" ("Aesthetics and Ideology," 516).

James Pritchett. *The Music of John Cage.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 223pp.

James Pritchett makes evident his devotion to the music and thought of John Cage in this important contribution not only to Cage scholarship but also to the history of mid- and late- twentieth century music. Pritchett focuses on Cage's compositional activities rather than on the biographical details of his life or on analytical explanations of representative compositions. This focus appears to be motivated by two factors. One is Pritchett's fascination with Cage and his music. The second is his wish to overcome negative attitudes toward Cage as a composer—attitudes that result in descriptions of him as a philosopher or philosopher-composer at best.

The strategy Pritchett employs to overcome negative attitudes is to provide information about technical aspects that underlay the production of Cage's music. And indeed, the book's strength lies in Pritchett's accounts of the various techniques Cage used over the years and of the various concerns that led to specific technical innovations. The strategy appears to be based on the following kind of logic: since activities that lead to the production of something that can be called a "piece" are necessarily compositional, then Cage is a composer because he paid meticulous attention to the technical details of producing "pieces." This logic is adequate for Cage's devotees, but given the nature of certain techniques, I can not imagine that it addresses the concerns of those who would regard him as more philosopher than composer.

Let me be clear here that I *do* consider Cage a composer. In the case of the chance and indeterminate pieces, however, the idea of "composition" needs definition and qualification with respect to more traditional understandings of the term. For the chance and indeterminate pieces, the issue of compositional choice needs careful explanation both in general and in particular instances. Pritchett does provide such explanation of a particular piece in the book's introduction. In comments directed precisely at those who would maintain that Cage is more philosopher than composer, Pritchett shows how Cage's compositional voice is present in *Apartment House 1776,* a piece in which Cage subtracted notes using chance procedures from some "four-part choral music by William Billings and other early American composers" (p. 4). Pritchett tells us that Cage rejected a first version of the piece on aesthetic grounds, and that, after reformulating specific features of the chance procedures, he generated another acceptable version. Since Cage made an aesthetic judgment about musical

value, Pritchett considers this an instance of "a composer at work" and of Cage's "taste and style" (p. 4). Pritchett's example does in fact speak to Cage's aesthetic choice for this piece, but as the book so clearly documents, Cage employed a great variety of different chance-derived techniques. For some of these techniques, it is not readily apparent how compositional choice may be exercised. For others, it is not clear that such individual "taste" should be present since Cage disavows it. In fact, the argument that individual choice is apparent in some of Cage's music could be construed as a negative commentary on those indeterminate works in which Cage's stated intention was to relinquish a compositional voice.[1]

In providing detailed information on the technical aspects of Cage's music, Pritchett has made a substantial scholarly contribution. His book will do little, however, to depolarize attitudes toward Cage because Pritchett does not directly address the source of negative attitudes toward the music. Arguments against those who would understand Cage as more philosopher than composer must base an understanding of Cage's compositional activities and the music that is their result on a critique of "composition" itself and its relation to notation. For instance, one could argue for the idea of Cage as composer by showing that what we take to be "compositional choice" is always qualified by the formal and expressive conventions of a listening community and that compositional choice is not always a defining feature of composers.

Readers willing to engage Pritchett's strategy will find a wealth of information regarding Cage's compositional output. Laying out his topic in a mostly chronologic sequence, Pritchett documents Cage's successive stylistic periods. Pritchett identifies the major changes as occurring in 1946, 1951, 1957, 1962, and 1969 but does not consider them "hard divisions" (p. 4–5). Pritchett's topography of Cage's compositional career is convincing except in one instance. His fourth chapter, "Indeterminacy (1957–61)," documents those pieces whose scores do not direct performers to create particular sounds. As Pritchett indicates, *Variations II* (1961), most extremely of the indeterminate works, removes compositional "shaping influences" and "reduce[s] Cage's compositional voice to a near silence"

[1] I have argued in "Performance Practice in the Indeterminate Works of John Cage," *Performance Practice Review* 7, no. 2 (1994): 233–241 that aesthetic criteria may be detected in the indeterminate works through the mechanism of a "listening community." So, while Cage wishes to "relinquish" control, such abdication is theoretically impossible. I do not, however, understand the mismatch between Cage's intention and the sounding result as a compositional failing.

(p. 137).[2] In the following fifth chapter, Pritchett argues that the 1962 piece *0′00″ (4′33″ No. 2)* "stands apart from all that Cage composed before it" since "it does not appear to be 'music' in any sense that we might use the term" (p. 139). The score of the piece consists of prose directions to perform a "disciplined action" with "maximum amplification" and includes four other qualifications. Pritchett differentiates *0′00″* from Cage's previous work because of its implicit theatrical component, linking it with performance art, and because of the nature of its score. He writes:

> There is no score to speak of here at all, and there is no sense of an objective sound world to be apprehended. Instead, there exists a totally subjective situation, in which the performer acts in a deliberate and personal fashion (p. 140).

I agree that the piece does have a strong theatrical component, but it only accentuates this inherent feature of any musical performance. I disagree that its score stands in a different relation to the composer and sound. Traditional notation directs performers to do something the result of which is sound. The score of *0′00″* works similarly: execute a disciplined action and amplify its sound. In his account of the piece, Pritchett falls into the objective/subjective dualism that Cage himself sought to dismantle in his music and writings. As a result of such dualistic thinking, Pritchett observes a "piece difficult to understand" (p. 139). While it is reasonable to locate some sort of stylistic change occurring with *0′00″*, the change is incremental and certainly not the profound break Pritchett identifies. In my view, the more significant and differentiating change is Cage's use of amplification. Pritchett does discuss this aspect of the piece later in the chapter, understanding it in terms of how it makes the unintentional actions of a performer the sounding focus. A more thorough consideration of Cage's use of amplification in *0′00″*, especially in light of Cage's interest in the ideas of McLuhan, would have been welcome.

One further aspect of Pritchett's periodization requires comment. The last chapter of the book covers the years 1969–92, the last 23 years of Cage's life, while other chapters cover 15, 5, 5, 4 and 7 years. This concluding chapter reads much differently than earlier chapters, and includes such diverse subheadings as: "Work in other media," "Writing," "Visual art," "Program music," "Political themes," "Nature imagery," "Music using

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[2] Pritchett's statements here seem to contradict his position in the Introductory chapter about the presence of Cage's "taste and style" in the chance works: compositional voice is synonymous with "taste and style."

other music," "Etudes," and "The 'number' pieces." The last years were very rich for Cage, in music as well as other artistic activities. And it is this great variety of enterprises that challenges Pritchett's descriptive approach to Cage's composition. Coming at the end of a book packed full of information on numerous pieces, the last chapter, with its even greater density of details, makes for hard reading. The chapter does not paint a coherent picture of Cage as musician and composer during these years, even if that picture is of a complex, perhaps eclectic artist working in varied media. Pritchett's discussion of this period in Cage's life would have benefited from a clearer focus on Cage's musical and non-musical motivations and how these relate to earlier motivations.

The conclusion of this review considers the book's values and shortcomings. The disproportionate discussion of the latter does not mean that shortcomings outweigh values. It is simply a sign of my own wish to present clearly the issues that are the source of my criticism.

Pritchett's book will serve as a reference tool for students and scholars wanting to know the details of most of Cage's music. Its periodization of Cage's life provides intellectual shape to a very complex, almost unwieldy collection of events and music. And the book, as far as is realistically possible given its focus, presents the philosophical ideas that provided the conceptual backdrop for Cage's musical output.

The book's shortcomings demonstrate that by focussing on compositional techniques, Pritchett excludes other topics crucial to a comprehensive understanding of Cage and his music. I center my commentary on two topics: critical assessment, and consideration of the sound of Cage's music.

First, while critical understanding of composers's musical outputs necessarily builds on a knowledge of the technical details of their pieces, such understanding also goes beyond those details. Pritchett should be applauded for providing "facts" about Cage's career, but there is little in his book that counts as critique. He comments occasionally on the effects of pieces or about the problems with certain techniques, but such commentary is minimal. A critical assessment of Cage could include the following issues: a thoroughgoing assessment of the relation between Cage's technical aims and the sounding effect of the music; consideration of the role of the listener in the musical conception and its realization in sound; Cage's relation to his immediate compositional circle and to other contemporary composers, and a reception history. Pritchett should not have and could not have addressed all these issues, but perhaps in future writings he will contribute to a comprehensive critique of Cage as composer and musician.

Second, Pritchett's focus on technique results in description of what the composer did rather than what the music sounds like. For many of Cage's pieces, however, writing about musical sound is no simple task. To

consider, for instance, what *0'00"* sounds like, critics must devise a methodology for "capturing" the sound of such indeterminate pieces. A more simply achieved task would be a consideration of timbre in the works for prepared piano. While Pritchett does mention timbre as an important aspect of these pieces, he does not write about its musical role or give any sense of how the "prepared" timbres sound.

Two final comments: First, the very feature that makes Pritchett's book valuable also makes it difficult to read. Someone not well-versed in Cage's musical output may find it difficult to absorb all the information. Pritchett could have helped readers by providing more clues along the way as to which ideas and pieces are most important to his discussion. Second, given today's musical climate, I find it unconscionable for both author and publisher to allow the sexist use of the pronoun "he." Even if authors or publishers dislike such solutions as "s/he" or "she or he," sexist usages can be avoided easily. For instance, in the sentence ". . . Cage points out that the performer may not necessarily make *his* decisions randomly or even arbitrarily" (p. 108, emphasis mine) one can easily use the plural "performers" and its matching pronoun "their" with no awkwardness and no loss of meaning. Cage certainly challenged his listeners to be more inclusive in what they consider music. One would hope that those who write and publish books about him would adopt similarly inclusive attitudes.

—Judy Lochhead

Stephen Walsh. ***Stravinsky: Oedipus Rex.*** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 118pp.

Anyone wishing to track down the biography of Stravinsky's opera-oratorio, *Oedipus Rex,* can do so fairly easily. The period of its composition, January 1926 to May 1927, is well documented. Stravinsky was traveling constantly at the time, mostly between Paris, Nice, and London, and so corresponding not only with his librettist Jean Cocteau but with others as well on matters relating to translation, performance, and finances. We know, for example, that *Oedipus* was composed in sequence, that its costs were borne by Gabrielle ("Coco") Chanel and Mme. de Polignac (following prolonged negotiations), and that the finished product was presented to Diaghilev as a gift to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Ballets Russes ("un cadeau très macabre," was Diaghilev's response). All this is treated in vivid detail in Stephen Walsh's *Stravinsky: Oedipus Rex.*

Wonderfully perceptive, too, are Walsh's comments on the staging of *Oedipus,* the austere, "still life" conception envisioned initially by the composer and then also by Cocteau. Stravinsky's idea of a translation "backwards" from secular French to sacred, "monumental" Latin is discussed at length, as is the neoclassicism of the music. Indeed, the first two chapters are devoted entirely to general matters of this kind, supplemented by three appendices on the libretto, Latin translation, and orchestration. Chapter 3 turns to the music more specifically while chapter 4 addresses the reception of *Oedipus* both as a concert piece and as an opera. (The premiere featured its concert version, while the opera was first performed in Vienna, 23 February 1928.) Walsh's format is tight and amazingly insightful and informative at the same time.

Surprisingly, many specific features planned for the decor and stage action are traceable to Cocteau's two earlier adaptations, *Antigone* (1922) and *Orpheus* (1925). Cocteau is known to have been the source of the speaker device, the idea of a narrator narrating in French (as opposed to Latin) and appearing in evening dress. As Walsh notes, however, a similar device was employed at the premiere of *Histoire du Soldat* (1918), where the narrator also appeared in a dinner jacket. (Stravinsky would later regret the role of the Speaker, eliminating it from several performances of *Oedipus* during the 1950s.) Meyerhold's ideas are also discussed, although only as they pertain in general to Stravinsky's earlier stage works. Central to this entire history are the composer's initiating ideas about a "waxworks opera,"[1] ideas dealing with the characters of the drama in particular,

[1] Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, *Dialogues and a Diary* (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 6.

characters who were to relate to each other by words rather than movement or gesture, addressing the audience directly; masked so as to preclude facial expression, they were to remain rigid, moving "only their heads and arms . . . like living statues."[2] Indeed, Stravinsky would later recall that his interest lay not in Oedipus the man or in the other characters as individuals, but, rather, in the "fatal development" of the play, and in the "geometrical" rather than "personal" lines of that "development." The "geometry of tragedy" is what interested him, "the inevitable intersection of lines," and he felt that "the portrait of the individual as a victim of circumstances could be made far more starkly effective by a static presentation."[3]

And all this fits the neoclassical mold, of course, musical as well as aesthetic. Views expressed in the rather extensive Preface to the published score of *Oedipus* are entirely consistent with those contained in an earlier publication on the instrumental *Octet* (1923), the latter a kind of manifesto of neoclassicism.[4] Stravinsky sought cold and mechanical approaches to music and music making, approaches without interpretative nuance, and for reasons that were practical as well as aesthetic: for its point to be made, its displacements of accent to be heard and understood, the rhythmic-metric play of his music had to be exact, metronomic, and even percussive in articulation. (See, for example, the accentual shifts of examples 1 and 2, which would become blurred if subjected to any fluctuation of the beat.)

But it is nonetheless with the larger aesthetic issues that Walsh is primarily concerned—above all, with Stravinsky's vehement anti-individualistic stance at the time. Uncomfortable with propositions of self-expression and expressivity, the composer sought to restore distance, order, and a sense of objectivity, envisioning these as part of a removed and idealized Classical past; his stance was anti-progressive, anti-Schoenberg, anti-modernist, anti-Wagner, and so forth.

No less complex than these issues is the libretto and its musical treatment. According to Walsh, the translation of Cocteau's French into "Ciceronian Latin" by Jean Danielou was no routine Latinization but, on the contrary, a skillful Classical conceit complete with the sorts of repeti-

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[2] Preface to the score.

[3] Stravinsky and Craft, *Dialogues*, 6–7.

[4] "Some Ideas about My Octuor," *The Arts* (January 1924); reprinted in Eric Walter White, *Stravinsky* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 528–30. See also "Quelques Confidences sur la Musique" (1935), reprinted in White, *Stravinsky*, 535–39; and "Interview" (1938), also reprinted in White, *Stravinsky*, 539–41.

tions and reorderings of word, phrase, and line that Stravinsky would have required of any libretto, Russian, French, Greek, or Latin in origin. (Walsh suspects that the final draft was the result of a close collaboration between Stravinsky and Danielou. The matter is difficult to discern since Cocteau's original French drafts, sent to Danielou for translation, have been lost.)

As is well known, word and phrase repetitions permitted a changing of accent, the juxtaposition of different accentuations, and different metrical placements of a given word, techniques analogous to the accentual displacement that marks the repetition of motives and fragments in Stravinsky's music.[5] The verbal accent works against the musical, or, more commonly, the accents of a given word or phrase are changed as a result of a changed metrical placement. Either way, attention can shift away from the meaning of a word or phrase and on to its sound. More particularly in *Oedipus,* the identity of various characters can seem affected. As names, places, and events are constantly reordered and reaccented, the characters themselves can seem to lose a degree of self-determination, to become increasingly ambiguous. In turn, the sense of their helplessness is reinforced; at the mercy of forces outside themselves, they are no less at the mercy, in the articulation of their lines, of schemes of rhythm and displaced accents, a form of manipulation over which, likewise, they have no control. The following is the text of the Messenger at Rehearsal nos. 139–141 with English translation; observe, in particular, the repetition not only of words but of phrases and lines as well.

NUNTIO	MESSENGER
Repperam in monte	I found on the mountain
puerum Œdipoda,	the child Oedipus,
derelictum in monte	abandoned on the mountain,
parvulum Œdipoda,	the infant Oedipus,
foratum pedes	his feet pierced,

[5] For a revealing discussion of the role of flexible stress in Stravinsky's text-setting, especially as it concerns the origin of this technique in Stravinsky's early Russian-period works, see Richard Taruskin, "Stravinsky's 'Rejoicing Discovery' and what it meant: in Defense of his Notorious Text Setting," in Ethan Haimo and Paul Johnson, eds., *Stravinsky Retrospectives* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 162–99. The musical equivalent of this accentual displacement is discussed at length in my own studies of Stravinsky's music, *The Music of Igor Stravinsky* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 214–51, and *Stravinsky and the Rite of Spring* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 97–114. More recently I have compared displacement in Stravinsky's music with its occurence in the music of Berlioz and Debussy; see Pieter C. van den Toorn, *Music, Politics and the Academy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 220–36.

vulneratum pedes	his feet wounded,
parvulum Œdipoda,	the infant Oedipus,
Reppereram in monte,	I found on the mountain
attuleram pastori	and took to the shepherd
puerum Œdipoda	the child Oedipus

Scenes featuring the Messenger and/or the Shepherd precede the celebrated coda in act II, the accompaniment to Oedipus's threefold confession ("I was born against divine law; I married against divine law; I killed against divine law") and final resignation (*Lux facta est*). Walsh remarks quite rightly that, in contrast to the square phrasing and metric regularity of much of *Oedipus,* the Messenger and the Shepherd mark a return to the chopped-up meters and incantatory style of earlier Russian works; their music is modal, in fact, and often Dorian. At the same time, however, Walsh might have supplied an illustration not only of this return but also of the various ways and means of displacement.

Example 1 shows Stravinsky's adaptation of the first five lines of the above text of the Messenger. The passage itself consists of an initial five measures which are repeated verbatim at no. 140; the first phrase at no. 139 covers the first two lines, the second at no. 140 covers the remaining three. Yet the repeat at no. 140 conceals a displacement hinging on a background steady meter and featuring the quarter note as pulse; see the $\frac{3}{4}$ brackets in example 1 according to which, in example 2, the passage is rebarred. (The passage directly preceding no. 139 is in $\frac{2}{4}$ and features the quarter note as a distinct, unmistakable pulse.) In effect, the G–F–G neighbor-note figure, initially off the beat at no. 139, is subsequently contradicted by an on-the-beat placement at no. 140. Hence, too, even when the notated meter indicates an exact repetition, an underlying periodicity can prompt a sense of displacement. (Stravinsky would later confess that he often barred according to phrasing with material of this kind. A more detailed analysis would have addressed the rationale of the notated irregularity.) In the present case, the concealed $\frac{3}{4}$ meter at nos. 139 and 140 is brought to the surface as the notated meter at no. 144. In example 1, a dotted line connects this later $\frac{3}{4}$ meter with the earlier divisions and brackets at nos. 139 and 140.

If I have a specific reservation about Walsh's approach, it is that its impressionistic accounts of the music do not translate often enough into detailed analysis, and that the general description is not pursued in greater detail, more closely and hence in ways more readily to the point. Close analysis has been harshly dealt with in the past decade, of course, often dismissed as "formalist," "elitist," "insular," "specialist," "Westernist," "masculinist," and so forth. But Walsh does not dismiss analysis along

Example 1.



Example 2.



these lines, and his comments on the music would have been more effective had he been willing to take an occasional plunge. I would insist, in any case, that the advantage of close analysis lies in its ability to reach into the detail of music, saying something about how we process and organize detail, segment and group it. Methods of theory and analysis are distinguished not by their "technical" means, but by their study at close range, their determination to come to grips with the details of musical structures; the "technical" angle, which necessarily is descriptive and metaphorical, the label notwithstanding, is also symptomatic of intimacy and of an overriding focus on detail. And rather than being dry or mechanical, then, unresponsive to larger aesthetic ends, close work with the materials of music can be a way of sustaining a musical presence, intensifying a sense of immediacy.

Thus, for example, on the matter of tonality in *Oedipus,* Walsh can claim with some justification that Stravinsky was "less interested in tonal functions than in tonal imagery" (p. 56). Apropos of the celebrated Coda alluded to above (see example 3), he can claim that the reiteration of (D F A) at no. 167 + 3 represents "D minor," that that of (D F♯) in the flutes at no. 167 + 4 represents "D major," and that the triadic outline of (B D F♯) at no. 168 (Oedipus) is "in B minor." He can suggest that these separately juxtaposed triads, complete and incomplete, reflect a "D minor/D major-B minor" ambiguity, indeed, a neoclassical "fondness" for ambiguities involving "keys a third apart" and often "created by the omission of chord tones," a "fondness" as well for ambiguities between "major and minor modes on the same tonic" (p. 61). But at some point he is obliged to pursue these ambiguities a bit more rigorously and question the assumptions that underlie his use of an established terminology.

Example 3.



Is the music at nos. 167–170 truly ambiguous? Or is the ambiguity conceptual? Does it spring from the application of tonal terms and concepts which are no longer sufficiently relevant? More to the point, what does "key" mean here? And how is it that in Walsh's account, as indeed in so many accounts prior to his, mere triads are dubbed "keys" or "tonic" triads? With little or no definition of "keys" or "tonics," and little or no dominant preparation, how is it that Walsh and others can think in these terms? (Strictly speaking, a regular sense of harmonic progression is missing at nos. 159–170, replaced by the static reiteration of (D F A), (D F♯),

(D F), and (B D F♯). (D F A) stems from a preceding diatonic context which, featuring the Messenger and the Shepherd at no. 139 and again at nos. 159 and 163, is modal and Dorian rather than minor and, as such, tonal.) Were we to pursue such a familiar path vis-a-vis tonality and its neoclassical manifestation, how could its qualification be judged?

One option would be to retreat to a more neutral and hence less determinate level of analysis than that defined by tonality and its functions. Indeed, retreating to an abstract (unordered) pitch-class set, we could total the content at nos. 167–170, a content which, excluding C♯ as a passing tone between B and D at no. 168, is octatonic in terms of B, D, F, F♯, and A, and accountable to the second of the three content-distinguishable octatonic collections or transpositions, Collection II in terms of B, C, D, E♭, F, F♯, G♯, and A.[6] This is not, however, the collection that ultimately announces this particular stretch of interplay between the octatonic and diatonic sets. Rather, the announcement comes earlier with Collection I, and in the form of a descending scale passage at no. 158, at the end of Oedipus's aria, "Nonne monstrum." As shown in example 4, this octatonic descent imitates a still earlier diatonic flourish within the aria itself and its quasi-F-major tonality. Still more significantly, the diminished-seventh chord (D F A♭ B) that closes the aria serves to connect Collection I not only to Collection II but also to the "D minor/major–B minor" complex referred to by Walsh. The specifics are outlined in figure 1:

Figure 1

Collection I	D	E	F	G	A♭	B♭	B	C♯	(D)
3-cycle	D		F		A♭		B		(D)
Collection II	D	E♭	F	F♯	G♯	A	B	C	(D)
pc content, nos. 167–170	D		F	F♯		A	B		

As has frequently been observed, a retreat into greater abstraction entails risks. Here, however, as indeed with sets in general that are highly symmetrical and hence redundant in character (easily recognizable and manageable as such), the retreat can effectively qualify the meaning of a

[6] See van den Toorn, *The Music of Igor Stravinsky*, 31–98. The octatonic set is limited to three transpositions: ascending at C♯ with the semitone-tone interval ordering of the scale; I have labelled these Collection I (at C♯), Collection II (at D), and Collection III (at E♭). The passage at nos. 167–170 in *Oedipus* has been discussed elsewhere, indeed, in the above-noted Stravinsky volume, 298–305, 318. See also the discussion in Joseph N. Straus, *Remaking the Past: Musical Modernism and the Influence of the Tonal Tradition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 90–93.

Example 4.



residual tonality in *Oedipus*. It can explain the absence of a sense of harmonic progression at nos. 159–170, for example, and the lack of "dominant" triads in support of "tonics." ("Dominant" triads with leading tones are not available to the four (0, 3, 6, 9) symmetrically defined major and minor triads of the octatonic set.) And were we to include the (F A C) "tonic" triad of Oedipus's aria in our calculations, the entire triadic complex, consisting of the pairs (F A C) (D F A) and (D F♯ (A)) (B D F♯), would be stretched to include B, C, D, F, F♯, and A, implying, however, as shown in figure 2, the same referential alignments apropos of the octatonic Collection II:

Figure 2

triads		C							
		A	A		(A)				
		F	F		F♯	F♯			
			D		D	D			
						B			
3-cycle	B		D		F				
pc content	B	C	D		F	F♯		A	(B)
Collection II	B	C	D	E♭	F	F♯	G♯	A	(B)

The diatonic sets implied by the same complex could also be considered, as shown in figure 3. Significant, too, as part of this final consideration, would be the functional residue, specifically, the intersection of the complex with the convention of "relative keys" and that of the *tierce de Picardie,* the relation of (D F♯) to (D F A), both of which are highly qualified (each side of the referential interaction being qualified by the other). Both conventions would represent the Classical and tonal side of the bargain, a more specific and hence more determinate, inherited diatonic use, Walsh's "keys a third apart" and his "major and minor modes on

the same tonic." The advantage of the present analysis, however, is that the qualifications are given a more specific definition.

Figure 3

diatonic					F	G	A	B♭	C	D	E	(F)
scales			D	E	F	G	A	B	C	(D)		
			D		F♯							
	B	C♯	D		F♯							

Pointing to the later octatonic scale passages at no. 186 of the score, Walsh remarks that the role of the octatonic set in *Oedipus* is a limited one (p. 65). So it is, although, judging from the passages surveyed in examples 3 and 4, it is a good deal more suggestive than Walsh implies. The point here, however, is that a more extensive analysis of such relations can illuminate the detail not only of *Oedipus* but of its relations with other works, including Stravinsky's neoclassical works. To take but one example: the triadic complex shown in example 2, if transposed down a semitone, is no different from that complex which, twenty years later, governs large portions of *Orpheus* (1947). The transposition aligns itself to Collection I rather than Collection II, however.

Figure 4 (Orpheus)

triads		B							
		G♯	G♯		A♭				
		E	E		F	F			
			C♯		D♭	D♭			
						B♭			
3-cycle	B♭		C♯		E				
Collection I	B♭	B	C♯	D	E	F	G	A♭	(B♭)

Indeed, the (B D F F♯ A) content in *Oedipus* at nos. 167–170 is no different from that which opens the string Concerto in D (1946) at nos. 0–5, a fact I mention not because of the equivalence in itself but because of the greater distinctions such an equivalence can afford: in the Concerto, the B functions as a neighbor-note to the A rather than as the root of (B D F♯).

All of which is not to suggest that Walsh's book is less than useful because of omissions in detailed analysis and theory. On the contrary, and as indicated already, anyone seeking information about *Oedipus* and the neoclassical era in general will find *Stravinsky: Oedipus Rex* immensely insightful. My advice, however, is that a more detailed analysis be pursued alongside Walsh's comments. The latter will prove all the more rewarding as a result.

—*Pieter C. van den Toorn*