current musicology

numbers 60 & 61/1996

Edited by EMILY SNYDER LAUGESEN

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A Canonical Museum of Imaginary Music

By Harold Powers

Most readers of *Current Musicology* will have recognized the main title of Lydia Goehr's *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* as the source on which my title is calqued.[1] I was deeply engrossed in this excellent philosophical study when I had to supply a title for the talk of which this present essay is now an annotated adaptation.[2] My task now is to explain why Goehr's "museum" has been renamed "canonical"; why it's now the "music" that's "imaginary"; and why there is no mention of "works."

Most postmodernist rethinking of European music history turns either on opera or on 19th-century instrumental music. European music before 1500 might already seem to require a different kind of rethinking. But many of the general issues that currently preoccupy historical musicologists take on an even stranger color if seen from the perspective of an art music belonging to a non-European civilization. I take up two of these issues: the notion of a canon, and the concept of the musical work, as seen by one who has spent his adult life intimately involved with an alien art music that has been his Significant Other.[3]

The existence of a canonical museum into which some music, perhaps called "classical music" or "art music," can be admitted, while other musics are excluded, has troubled many well-intentioned critics who reject the idea that one kind of music might have more "value" than another. I see

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[1] Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). This is the second time I have offered the readers of *Current Musicology* a piece based on a plenary address with a calqued title. The first, calqued on Pirandello's play "Six Characters in Search of an Author," was "Three Pragmatists in Search of a Theory", in *Current Musicology* 53 (1993): 5–17, the annotated but otherwise unaltered text of my plenary address to the joint meeting of the American Musicological Society, the Society for Ethnomusicology, and the Society for Music Theory, at Oakland California in November 1990.

[2] I'm most grateful to Mark Everist for having invited me to address the joint meeting of the Royal Musical Association, the Society for Musical Analysis, and Critical Musicology, at the British Musicology Conference in April 1996, thereby affording me the occasion to put these ideas of mine, old and new, together in one place.

[3] Much of what follows, when it is not quoted directly from Goehr and others, is paraphrased from efforts of mine from the '60s, '70s, '80s, and 90's, published and unpublished, as noted in their proper places.

this as a non-issue. A canonical music is best identified culturally, not musically, and in terms of status, not value. More than that, a canonical music need not be dependent on the notion of a body of determinate musical works that have been created by highly regarded specialists called composers.

The principal subject of Lydia Goehr's *Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* is something she calls the "work-concept."

> The concept of a musical work . . . attained a centrality, a certain kind of status in musical practice . . . This *institutionalized centrality* is closely related to what in more familiar terms we identify as a mainstream or a canon.[4]

Goehr's use of the past tense in the expression "attained a centrality," however, implies that the "institutionalized centrality" is historically contingent, even with respect to the European art music that is the canon with which she is concerned. As she rightly observes in one place:

> The work-concept is not a necessary category within musical production.[5]

and in another:

> Speaking about music in terms of works is neither an obvious nor a necessary mode of speech, despite the lack of ability we presently seem to have to speak about music in any other way.[6]

That the work-concept is contingent not only historically but also geographically and culturally is implicit but not fully generalized in Goehr's philosophy. Musical practices *not* linked to a work-concept are familiar to ethnomusicologists and students of popular music, and a full-scale canonical musical practice—an art music—that is not regulated by a work-concept should be a logical possibility; I shall show how such a canon has its being in Indian art music. But let me first summarize a general set of criteria for ascribing canonical status to a musical practice without linking it to a work-concept.

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[4] Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum*, 96.
[5] Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum*, 114.
[6] Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum*, 243.

In an essay published a number of years ago I suggested four empirically derived diagnostic features to look for in order to identify cultural canonization of a musical practice.[7] First, are there highly skilled specialists who undergo long training? Second, is there a learned music-theoretical tradition with which the musical practice in question is supposed to be in some sort of conformity? Third, is the musical practice in question independently grounded in the culture? that is, can music occur as cultural performance by itself, as well as together with other kinds of cultural performance which it can accompany or support?[8] And fourth, is there a patron class that professes connoisseurship? If most of these conditions are readily to be observed, it is likely that most members of the culture in question will agree that that musical practice in their culture has high status, though they may denigrate it as elitist rather than attribute value to it.[9]

If cultural anthropology or history or source criticism or all three in combination confirm two or more of these diagnostic features—specialists, theory, autonomy, connoisseurship—in a musical practice, then the workings of that particular musical practice can probably be studied meaningfully apart from the culture to which the practice belongs. Needless to say, this does not mean that such music has no appropriate social context, but many musical practices are so intimately tied to life-cycle events or social activities that they cannot meaningfully be separated from such events or activities. But if complex techniques of musical performance practice can be studied autonomously by a member of a given culture, so

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[7] Harold Powers, "Classical music, cultural roots, and colonial rule: an Indic musicologist looks at the Muslim world," in *Asian Music* 12, no. 1 (1979): 5–39.

[8] For the notion of "cultural performance," see Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 70–71.

[9] An interesting passage in which Turkish classical music—ex-Ottoman court music—is denigrated by a member of the Turkish élite is quoted by Karl Signell in "The modernization process in two Oriental music cultures: Turkish and Japanese," *Asian Music* 7, no. 2 (1976), quoting Ziya Gökalp on pp. 77–78.

> Before the introduction of European music, there were two kinds of music in Turkey: one was Eastern music, which Farabi took from the Byzantine, the other was folk music, which was a continuation of ancient Turkish music. . . . This morbid music ["Eastern music"] after being transmitted by Farabi to the Arabs, passed to the Persians and Ottomans chiefly because of the esteem in which it was held at the courts. . . . In the Ottoman lands this music was the only institution common to all Ottoman ethnic and religious communities, and for this reason we may call it the music of the Ottoman peoples. . . . Eastern music is morbid music and non-rational. Folk music represents our culture. Western music is the music of our new civilization. . . . Our national music, therefore, is to be born from a synthesis of our folk music and Western music.

also they can be learned and performed by an outsider, the theory of that music can be studied in its own language, and purely musical connoisseurship is possible.[10] In short, one can deal with that alien musical practice as with "art music" of one's own culture, as a second musical language so to speak; as Mantle Hood put it long ago, we can become "bimusical."[11] To whatever extent the fundamental musical assumptions of such a practice differ from one's own, moreover, internalized intimacy with a complex alien musical practice can help one to fresh perspectives on one's own music and one's fundamental assumptions about it, assumptions ideological as well as technical, including those so taken for granted as normally to be invisible.

Not all four of even my very general diagnostic features are necessarily going to be equally relevant for musical practices that one would intuitively think of as "art music" or that members of a given culture would regard as having canonical status. For instance, until the second half of the twentieth century, Javanese court *gamelan* music had no formalized music-theoretical tradition to speak of, though musicians and patrons obviously could and did talk with one another about what they were doing, and poets wrote elaborate descriptions of musical performances. But now there is a strong written theoretical tradition for Javanese *gamelan* music that originated in the modernization process in late colonial and early independent Indonesia. Formal musical theory in Java emerged partly in response to the realization that other high cultures, specifically Western and Indian, had "musical theory," but even more in response to a felt need for pedagogical material to use in institutions set up to teach music in the conservatory manner. With Western as well as Javanese practitioners of *gamelan* music taking active roles, Javanese musical theory has evolved explosively, especially since the 1970s, and is now a highly sophisticated

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[10] See my review of Alan P. Marriam, *The Anthropology of Music*, in *Perspectives of New Music* 4, no. 2 (1966): 161–71.

[11] Mantle Hood, "The challenge of bi-musicality," *Ethnomusicology* 4, no. 1 (1960): 55–60. One need not advert to the Takemitsus of European art music to document successful cross-cultural bi-musicality in art musics. Gendèr and rebab performers like Marc Perlman or gambang artists like Anderson Sutton in Javanese *gamelan*, and sitarists like Ken Zuckerman or vocalists like Jon Higgins, in North and South Indian classical music respectively, have won full acceptance as artists in their own right. I myself spent three years in the 1950s learning South Indian classical music in Madras before going to Varanasi to begin work with North Indian music in the mid-1960s. Though public performance was never my ambition or intention, it was my personal test of acceptability and thereby my qualification to talk about Indian classical music as though from the inside, as well as in terms of what I still prefer to think of as "comparative musicology."

explanatory and analytical tradition resting on a completely indigenous practical base, as may be seen most recently in Sumarsam's just published comprehensive book, *Gamelan*.[12]

Indigenous art music in most parts of the Muslim world, seen in terms of my diagnostic criteria, is on shakier ground these days. The first two criteria are fully met: its practitioners are certainly highly skilled, and there is certainly a traditional musical theory of great antiquity and complexity. But music is not as strongly grounded culturally as it is in Europe, Java, and India. For one thing, there is, as Kristina Nelson has ably summarized the matter,

> a strong suspicion on the part of many Muslims that the recognized power of music is somehow antithetical to the ideals of Islam. . . . Most contemporary books [in Arabic] on the history of Arabic music include such discussions as "The Position of Islam with Regard to Music," or "Music in Islam" . . . even today nothing may be taken for granted regarding the status of music, for the case continually must be made anew.[13]

There is no multi-dimensional clustering of music with other arts, moreover, that is comparable in scale to the symphonic/church-music/opera complex of Europe, or the *wayang/gamelan/macapat* complex of Java, or the *khayāl/gat/kathak* complex of North India; in these three cultures music and religion are intimately associated and the representation of living creatures, including divinities, in theatrical and figural forms is normal and unquestioned. And while there were once strong court-music cultures in the core areas of the Muslim world, patronage support from

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[12] Sumarsam, *Gamelan: Cultural Interaction and Musical Development in Central Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Sumarsam's most distinctive personal contribution to Javanese theory may be seen in his "Inner melody in Javanese gamelan," in *Karawitan: Source Readings in Javanese Gamelan and Vocal Music*, ed. Judith Becker and Alan Feinstein, vol. 1 (Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies [of] the University of Michigan, 1984), 245–304. In this same volume, pp. 1–244, is an English translation by Martin Hatch of the late Martopangrawit's monumental two-volume *Pengetahuan Karawitan*, originally published in mimeograph in Surakarta in 1972 (Part I in Indonesian) and 1975 (Part II in Javanese).

[13] Kristina Nelson, *The Art of Reciting the Qurʿan* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 32–33.

indigenous élites for traditional art music and its presentational norms largely dried up during the modernization process.[14]

In short, in the Muslim world there was nothing comparable to the transfer of indigenous art music from court culture to bourgeois and national patronage, without essential change or serious contamination from European performance practice, that took place in Indonesia and India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, during their respective Independence movements.[15] That transfer of patronage was not unlike a similar transfer that was taking place in Christian Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, alongside the full-fledged and completed emergence of Lydia Goehr's work-concept.

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[14] Some years ago Habib Touma summarized the state of affairs through the first three quarters of the 20th century sternly but not unfairly, to be sure with a strong purist orientation:

> Until the downfall of the Ottoman empire in the year 1918, the music of the Arabs essentially remained a part of the musical culture of the Near East. Not until coming into contact with European music, especially during the colonial rule of the British, Spanish, Italians, and French after World War I, did Arabian musical life change fundamentally in its content and in its formal and sociological aspects. Then a kind of cultural catastrophe took place. The responsibility for this transition lay with a group of leading Arabian intellectuals who believed (and still believe today) that European culture is superior to Arabian. As a result, they regarded their own musical culture with disdain. It is because of these intellectuals that one must search very long and hard in the Arab world today before encountering the authentic music of the Arabs.
>
> Nonetheless, despite the irresponsible behavior of many of these Arabs, the traditional music has been able to maintain its ground in certain areas. Those who have contributed to its preservation are the musicians of the *maqam-al-ʿiraqi* in Iraq, the singer Umm Kulthum in Cairo, the singers of the *muwashshahat* in Aleppo, the musicians of the *maʾluf* in North Africa, and the artists of Andalusi music. Most Arabs today, however, however, whatever their level of education might be, no longer know true Arabian music.

Habib Hassan Touma, *The Music of the Arabs,* trans. Laurie Schwartz (Portland, Oregon: Amadeus Press, 1996), 16; from the expanded second German edition of 1989, but in this passage only slightly altered from the original German edition of 1975.

For attitudes in post-Ottoman Turkey, see Signell 1976, cited in note 9 above. For an account of the Russification of the Central Asian court traditions, see Theodore M. Levin, "Music in Modern Uzbekistan: the Convergence of Marxist Aesthetics and Central Asian Tradition," in *Asian Music* 12, no. 1 (1979): 149–58. In pre-Revolutionary Iran, to the contrary, there was considerable élite support for the reconstructed "classical" *dastgāh* music based on the *radif,* alongside many other musical genres indigenous and imported, but Islamic strictures under the present regime have brought all musical practices under suspicion in varying degrees at various times.

[15] For a summary account of the developments in India and Indonesia, see my "Classical Music, Cultural Roots, and Colonial Rule" (reference in note 7), 14–32.

In all four of the broad cultures from which my diagnostic criteria derived—European, Indic, Indonesian, core-Muslim—it is reasonable to think of music in terms the anthropologist Robert Redfield introduced a half-century ago: there is a Great Tradition, which both feeds and is fed by numerous Little Traditions.[16] In India, the musical Great Tradition—cultural practices that go by the English loanwords "classical music"—is both culturally self-standing and patronized by connoisseurs, as is its counterpart in the West. What is more interesting is the way my other two diagnostic features—specialization and theory— are manifested. In India, a traditional performing art may be said to belong to the musical Great Tradition if it satisfies two conditions. First, its practitioners must make a claim, and have it accepted, that they belong to a disciplined oral performance tradition, a master-disciple chain whose members can be named, that extends over several generations.[17] Second, they must make a claim, and have it accepted, that their art conforms to canonical theoretical doctrine, to *sastra*, in this case, *saṅgīta-śāstra*, "music-theory," which has its own transmission history.[18] These two features are of course also a part of the Western Classical music tradition, but they are not what determines its status, as they do in India. Whether either of the two claims for canonical status of a musical practice in India are historically true is irrelevant, so long as they are accepted as true. A rather formal term in Sanskritized Hindi for North Indian music of the Great Tradition is *saṅgīta-śāstra*, quite literally "canonical music," music that can be associated with the canonical theoretical tradition. A more common expression in the vernacular is *rāg-dār-saṅgit*—"music based on *rāgas*"—an expression, as will be seen, that happens to be particularly relevant to my present thesis regarding imaginary music.

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[16] Robert Redfield, "The Social Organization of Tradition," in his *Peasant Society and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 67–104,

[17] Among older generations of practical musicians, who were mostly Muslim, the teacher-disciple relationship was designated by the Urdu coupling *ustād-shāgird*, which implies master and apprentice. Among most musicians in India today, Muslim and Hindu alike, the relationship is designated by the Sanskritic coupling *guru-śiṣya*, which implies teacher and disciple in the Brahminical Hindu tradition. The teacher-disciple succession is called *guru-śiṣya-paramparā*; the Sanskrit word *paramparā* literally means "passing onward," hence "succession" or "lineage."

[18] For a close comparative study of two recent centrally important figures in the ongoing theoretical tradition of North Indian classical music, see my "Reinterpretations of Tradition in Hindustani Music: Omkarnath Thakur contra Vishnu Narayan Bhatkhande," in *The Traditional Indian Theory and Practic of Music and Dance*, ed. Jonathan Katz (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J. Brill 1992), 9–51.

My four criteria for identifying high-status musical practice are as pertinent for Western "classical music" as for Indian, yet there too Goehr's "musical museum of imaginary works," the canonical music of Western civilization as we customarily imagine it, requires culture-specific refinement. She sees it

> in a peculiarly romantic conception of composition, performance, notation, and reception, a conception that was formed alongside the emergence of music as an autonomous fine art.[19]

Goehr admonishes us, however, not to confuse that composite conception in the Western musical canon, that amalgam of "composition, performance, notation, and reception" that characterize the musical work as *concept,* with the notion of *a* musical work as *an* object. She argues for the emergence of the "work-concept" as a kind of complex of cultural assumptions that she calls a "regulative concept." She tells us that

> for a concept to function regulatively, many associated concepts have to function together and stand in the appropriate relations to one another in a particular way.[20]

> A regulative concept determines the normative content of subsidiary concepts . . . The concept of a musical work, for example, emerged in line with the development of numerous other concepts, some of which are subsidiary— performance-of-a-work, score, and composer— some of which are oppositional—improvisation and transcription.[21]

I've already implied that the "work-concept" is not regulative for canonical Indian art music by omitting the word "works" from my calque on Goehr's title. I'll illustrate more specifically with respect to two of the contributing concepts Goehr describes as essential components of our evolving and evolved work-concept, concepts that also are not relevant for Indian classical music: the concept "improvisation" understood as oppositional; and the concept "composer" as it has come to be understood in today's world.

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[19] Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum,* 113.
[20] Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum,* 119.
[21] Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum,* 103.

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The historical contingency of Goehr's subsidiary concepts "improvisation" and "composer," as they began to emerge in the musical culture of European multipart music of the late 15th century, is implicit in a number of musicological writings of the past two or three decades, above all in a series of paradigmatic essays by Margaret Bent.[22] The contingent particularity of these two notions as we have come to accept them has been explicitly argued by Rob Wegman.[23] Wegman wishes to make a sharp distinction between polyphony as sung and polyphony as written, in the period just before Goehr's subsidiary concepts score, performance-of-a-work and composer began to converge towards the regulative work-concept. Citing a number of documents in support, Wegman characterizes what we call "improvised counterpoint" as the ordinary mode for ensemble vocal music, a purely performative art.

> In these cases, the art of discant was in all likelihood taught and transmitted as a living practice, possibly without the use of a single treatise. What mattered was the practical skill of singing correct successions of consonant intervals: the rules were internalized, not by learning them from Latin manuals, but by applying them in lessons as well as in communal music making.[24]

Wegman goes on to propose that putting counterpoint into notation was at first more akin to writing as a skill than to music as an experience:

> Unlike the practice of counterpoint, which could be and was widely popularized, mensural theory was essentially intellectual in its conception, involving specialized Latin terminology and modes of thought

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[22] See especially Bent's "Musica recta and musica ficta," *Musica Disciplina* 26 (1972): 73–100 (reprinted in *The Garland Library of the History of Western Music: Medieval Music II: Polyphony* [New York: Garland, 1985]); "*Res facta* and *cantare super librum*," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 36, no. 2 (1983): 371–91; and "Editing early music: the dilemma of translation," in *Early Music*, 22, no. 3 (August 1994): 373–92.

[23] Rob C. Wegman, "From Maker to Composer: Improvisation and Musical Authorship in the Low Countries, 1450–1500," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 49, no. 3 (1996): 409–79.

[24] Wegman, "From Maker to Composer," 416. This was a tradition in my own family, as no doubt in others. I remember my mother teaching me to sing "descant" and "alto" to simple melodies during long car trips when I was about eight. One of them, a Stephen Foster song, was ideal for beginners in family-style "improvised polyphony" since the "harmony" was completely in parallel thirds or sixths except for unison beginnings and endings at the tonic: faux-bourdon in 20th-century upstate New York.

whose underlying rationale could not be fully comprehended except through university training in the liberal arts. . . . To handle the elusive complexity of polyphonic sound on paper, to capture and manipulate it as an object, to reflect upon it as a finished "work," was to take it out of the sphere of actual music- making, into the world of clerics and intellectuals.[25]

Wegman quotes Tinctoris, as had Bent and others besides, on *res facta* and *cantare super librum,* and goes on:

What is remarkable here is not that Tinctoris recognizes the existence of extemporized counterpoint, for that is what counterpoint is understood to be *tout court* ("in the absolute sense"). Indeed, for him the very expression "extemporized counterpoint" could only have been a pleonasm: if counterpoint and discant are generally oral, then it is written polyphony that needs the distinguishing adjective *(cantus compositus, res facta).*[26]

A few pages later Wegman links "composition" with "writing."

That a given musical event might be based in notation was an accidental circumstance: it did not affect the aesthetic criteria by which the event itself was to be judged. Not surprisingly, then, *compositio* was a purely technical term, covering simply all counterpoint that was written out . . . The defining criterion of the term was writing: hence a counterpoint exercise was just as much a *compositio* or *res facta* as a cantus firmus or tenor motet . . . *Compositor* similarly was a technical term: unlike in the modern period, it had little or no social reality.[27]

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So much for "improvisation" and "composition" in the Low Countries before they became oppositional and subsidiary concepts, respectively, in the pan-European work-concept that was just beginning to emerge around

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[25] Wegman, "From Maker to Composer," 428–29, 429–30.

[26] Wegman, "From Maker to Composer," 431. In this connection, note the ubiquitous and unexamined synonymity of "write" and "compose" in common parlance today, as though there were no such thing as oral composition of music; I recall once hearing the blind musician Stevie Wonder refer to a song he had "written."

[27] Wegman, "From Maker to Composer," 434.

1500. That the work-concept had fully emerged as regulative and had become a globally unexamined assumption by the 20th century is illustrated in an extraordinary passage on Indian classical music written in the last years of the Raj.[28]

During the Second World War the British novelist/journalist Beverley Nichols paid a long visit to India. Among the many things upon which Nichols eventually pronounced his *Verdict on India* was Indian music.[29] He tells of having been entertained to a private concert at the court of a Maharaja and having been disturbed by his inability to appreciate what he heard. He describes his attempts to question the musicians and to transcribe what they were doing on paper. Finally he discovers what will become the minor premise of an argument that Indian classical music cannot be considered an art:

> The secret of Indian music . . . lies in the word "improvisation."[30]

Much later Nichols states and develops his major premise:

> Art is not . . . a matter of improvisation. . . . This fundamental principle applies to all art. You cannot "improvise" a statue; you cannot "improvise" a fresco; you cannot even "improvise" the lightest fragment of lyric poetry.[31]

The impeccably logical conclusion had in fact just been stated, and Nichols's whole proposition denying Indian classical music the status of an art, in the order conclusion, minor premise, major premise, is as follows:

> Indian music cannot be regarded as a serious art because:
> a) Indian music is almost entirely a matter of improvisation.
> b) Art is not, never has been, and never can be a matter of improvisation.[32]

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[28] Except for quotations from Lydia Goehr, Rob Wegman, and Bruno Nettl, much of what follows is adapted from an unpublished talk I gave in November 1971 at the joint annual meeting of the American Musicological Society and the Society for Ethnomusicology in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

[29] Beverley Nichols, "Musical Interlude," in *Verdict on India* (London: Jonathan Cape, and Bombay: Thacker, 1944), 122–36.

[30] Nichols, *Verdict on India,* 111.

[31] Nichols, *Verdict on India,* 134–35.

[32] Nichols, *Verdict on India,* 134.

However flippant its manner, Nichols's syllogism on the art of music is formally correct. Furthermore, he appears to have been a well-trained and musically sophisticated observer, and his proposition in aesthetics is an uncluttered presentation of a normally unstated assumption about the art of music and its materials and processes: the touchstone of perception and discourse in music is a "work of art" that is manifested physically, spelled out in Nichols's final verdict:

> Indian music . . . must come down to earth, out of the everywhere into the here. It must boldly proclaim itself on paper, in black and white.[33]

Nichols's general view of the art of music, to which Indian music fails to conform because it is unwritten and improvisatory, may have been expressed a bit colorfully—he was very much an apologist for the Raj and a critic both savage and frivolous of Indian ways—but it is forthright and clear, and is still an underlying and all too rarely questioned assumption in Western critical, analytical and historical writing about music, whatever its ideological stance.

Time and familiarity have long since shown the falsity of Nichols's conclusion: it is hardly possible to maintain that "Indian music cannot be regarded as a serious art." The minor premise, that Indian music is centrally to be judged as "a matter of improvisation" is accepted. Where the syllogism as a whole goes wrong is in the major premise, that serious art cannot be a matter of improvisation. And where the major premise itself goes wrong is in Nichols's notion of "improvisation," the common term in his syllogism.

As Lydia Goehr has pointed out, "improvisation" was an "oppositional" secondary concept in the regulative work-concept that came to shape Euro-American discourse about music:

> When notation was introduced to give concrete form to the idea of preserving written music, extemporization was limited to connote spontaneous composition-performance of, say, "divisions on a ground" . . . when composition was defined as involving the predetermination of as many structural elements as possible, the notion of extemporization acquired its modern understanding. For the first time it was seen to stand in strict opposition to composition "proper."[34]

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[33] Nichols, *Verdict on India,* 136.
[34] Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum,* 234.

It might be objected that once notated music had become the norm for European multipart music, then composition, in the sense of written-down instructions for performers, became indispensable at least for ensemble control. And so it did, but that too is contingent on cultural choice, the choice to have control exerted over a performing group through writing, by an individual not necessarily present. We know from other kinds of highly elaborate polyphony—Javanese *gamelan* music for instance, or Dixieland jazz—that neither notation nor composer is necessary for ensemble control. Lydia Goehr, as part of an argument that a performance is not simply a case of compliance with a score, observed that

> In most jazz, extemporization is the norm, and it is just this feature that forecloses the possibility of our speaking comfortably of one and the same work (rather than of a tune, theme, or song) simply being instantiated in different performances.[35]

So far as this goes, it could be modified without change to apply to an Indian *rāga,* which is indeed an entity that is "simply being instantiated in different performances" when it is rendered in either memorized, improvised, or mixed form.

A number of years ago, in an essay called "Thoughts on improvisation," Bruno Nettl pointed out that

> the juxtaposing of composition and improvisation as fundamentally different processes is false . . . the two are instead part of the same idea.[36] . . . The improviser . . . [is] performing a version of something, not improvising upon something . . . he is giving a rendition of something that already exists.[37]

Later in his essay Nettl writes of "models" as the entities that guide a performer in rendering his "something that already exists." Rob Wegman makes the same observation:

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[35] Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum,* 99–100.

[36] Bruno Nettl, "Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach," *Musical Quarterly* 60, no. 1 (1974): 6.

[37] Bruno Nettl, "Thoughts on Improvisation," 9.

> Improvisation in oral traditions almost always involves well defined
> models (thematic material, formulas, schemes, cantus firmi) and
> agreed rules of realizing the performance.[38]

If one must use the word "improvisation," then, it is not to be opposed to
the word "composition," as Nettl pointed out, since the processes are
essentially of the same kind; if a contrastive term is wanted, I would pro-
pose "memorization." Unlike "composition" and "improvisation," it is
"memorization" and "improvisation" that are fundamentally different men-
tal processes. The communicative materials are the same, but it is like the
difference between being able to learn by rote and expressively recite a
poem or the lines of a play, and being able to engage in spontaneous
coherent conversation or present on demand an extempore speech on an
assigned topic.

In the Hindustani classical music of North India, improvisation takes
up almost all the time in musical performance; improvisation is the su-
preme art of the classical Carnatic music of South India as well, though
there a memorized item is not infrequently presented with little adjunct
improvisatory elaboration. The most prestigious improvisatory genres, more-
over, do not depend on the kinds of improvisatory process associated with
blues and jazz, most of which are more nearly analogous to the "divisions
on a ground" referred to by Goehr. The most highly regarded genre of all
is *ālāp/ālāpana,* a word meaning "discourse." The procedures of *ālāp* are
analogous to those of rhetorical discourse, in which the words and expres-
sions of a language are correctly used in the orderly presentation of ex-
tempore discourse on a particular topic. A traditional Western improvisa-
tory genre whose procedures somewhat resemble this sort of discourse
might be an extempore concerto cadenza using motivic material from the
concerto movement into which it is inserted. Beethoven's alternative ca-
denzas to the the first movement of his Fourth Piano Concerto might be
regarded as two different exemplary discourses on the same material
(though one of them is confined to a single motive elaborated with inter-
stitial flourishes while the other interrupts similar elaborations of the mo-
tive not only with flourishes but also with appearances of two lyric melo-
dies from the movement).

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[38] Wegman, "From Maker to Composer," 443, n. 102. Several terms that Bruno Nettl
cited in his "Thoughts on improvisation" designate specific entities—"well defined models"
in Wegman's words—that get rendered in performance, among them the *rāgas* of Indian
classical music. Others, such as the *pathet* of Javanese *gamelan* music, are more like European
"modes," that is, sketchily defined categorical constraints on what may and may not be done,
rather than "well-defined models" guiding what ought to be done.

Indian improvisatory genres that do come somewhat near to "divisions on a ground" are those in which the metrical frame of a fixed item is retained while thematic material belonging to the melodic type is presented: in the South, *niraval;* in the North, vocal *bol-bāṇṭ* and instrumental *toḍā*. The material rendered belongs to the general melodic type, however, and is not tied to the melodic successions of the fixed item, only to its metric constraints.[39]

In Indian classical music the basic building blocks in the rendition of either memorized musical items or improvised musical discourse are short melodic motives and phrases; these are concrete tokens of recognizable but abstract motivic types. Individual motivic types are manifested variously in the small: distorted, varied, reduced, extended by prefix, infix, or suffix. In the large, manifestations of motivic types are ordered in tonal space according to register, direction, and orientation with respect to a universal system tonic; they are ordered in time according to various presentational norms involving register, style, genre, and sometimes restrictions as to position in the ordered flow of events. Taken together in a given memorized and/or improvised rendition, all this presents a concrete token of some abstract melodic type, namely, of a *rāga*.

Rāga is a concept for which Western art music provides no analog. A *rāga* is not a tune, where all the intervallic and durational relationships are fixed in advance, to be memorized and reproduced by a performer. A *rāga* is not a scale either, though, not simply a collection of pitches laid out in stepwise order. If one imagine a continuum of degrees of pre-arrangement, ranging between tune at one end and scale at the other, the concept *rāga* covers most of the territory between: more pre- arranged than a scale but less pre-arranged than a tune. Some *rāgas* tend towards the scale end of the continum, and might be regarded as particularized scales; others may tend more towards the tune end, and might be regarded as generalized tunes.

Entities ontologically similar to the *rāga* in Western monophonies might be the "tune types" of Anglo-American folk music, or the melodic types of the Gregorian antiphoner. These, however, are the conscious constructions of analysts; though they are probably present subliminally to the inner ear of the singer of folksong or chant—most of us can hear the

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[39] One prominent feature of certain Indian improvisational genres, however, closely resembles an important aspect of jazz practice. The alternation between extended improvisatory passages and a fixed phrase from a pre-composed item to which those passages return, rondo- like—a procedure already described by the 13th-century Sanskrit theorist Sarṅgadeva with the term *prati-grahaṇika* ("back to the beginning")—is very like the breaks and riffs, respectively, of "classical" jazz.

resemblances between "Red River valley" and "You are my sunshine"—
tune types are not themselves what are being rendered apart from their
embodiments in particular tunes. Characteristic of the notion of *rāga*, to
the contrary, is that each *rāga* is itself an entity consciously controlled and
manipulated by the performer, all the while maintaining an identity rec-
ognized and savored in its various manifestations by the connoisseur, an
entity whose unique identity is confirmed in its possession of a unique
proper name.

The *rāgas* are the most prestigious elements in the practice of Indian
art music and the "*rāga*-concept" is the central regulative concept for
Indian classical music, like the "work-concept" for European classical mu-
sic. But a *rāga* is not a work.

* * *

In an essay first published in 1967 and reprinted in 1989 Leo Treitler
wrote of

> a unique condition in historical studies of the arts. It is that the
> central object of study is an artifact born into a special, that is an
> aesthetic, relationship with the culture of which it is a part, and
> which continues through its survival to be both a historical record
> and an object of aesthetic perception.[40]

Treitler specifies no distinction between a musical artifact and a statue,
fresco, or fragment of lyric poetry, but the beginnings of such a distinction
appear in an essay written at about the same time as Treitler's, by the late
Donald Grout:

> The central events which music history aims to explain are those
> having to do with the creation of individual works of music. I use the
> more general word "creation" in order to avoid the implications of
> "composition," a concept not applicable to all musics; also as intend-
> ing to include works not notated or notated only partially or notated
> only at a time distinctly later than that of their creation . . . The
> creation of a work of art is an "event" which, like all events in history,
> has to be inferred from evidence; commonly, the principal evidence
> is the present existence of the work.[41]

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[40] Leo Treitler, "On Historical Criticism," in *Music and the Historical Imagination* (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 79.

[41] Donald J. Grout, "Current Historiography and Music History," in *Studies in Music History:
Essays for Oliver Strunk*, ed. Harold Powers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 33.

Here Grout dissolved one corollary to Beverley Nichols's mistaken major premise, in that the concept "work of music" is now allowed to include music that does not necessarily "proclaim itself boldly on paper": the notational record of a work of music and the work of music itself are kept separate, so that unwritten, oral composition is allowed into the canonical process. Still, according to Grout:

> what [a music historian] then seeks to explain is the creation of the work, in the particular form in which he has it.[42]

That is to say, a musical work may be an orally created "object of aesthetic perception," but it is still an object, an object that has to have been created. Before the music historian can deal with it, moreover, that object has to have a "particular form."

That kind of permanence is not a necessary state of affairs for the art of music in general. The premises and conclusions so pithily argued by Beverley Nichols follow naturally from any search for "works" and "creation" under the regulative force of the "work-concept." But what manner of "*object* of aesthetic perception" can we have in a music that has no permanent form even in sounding actuality? let alone in material written form. How can we speak of such music in terms of "historical *record*"? And yet we know the *rāga*s exist, that they are perceived aesthetically. There is plenty of documentary evidence in Sanskrit and vernacular theoretical works, moreover, that testifies to the existence in the past of this or that *rāga* that we know now. In some cases there is enough evidence to enable us to hypothesize the continuance or evolution of some of the features of a given *rāga* from one period to another with reasonable confidence.

We can no more investigate the music of ancient India than that of ancient Greece, but even where there is some documentary evidence that helps us to know how this or that feature of some *rāga* we know and love today may have been shaped at some point during the past few centuries, even how it may have evolved over time, we are still blocked if we have to start from Grout's premise that "the creation of a work of art is an event," since a *rāga* is not a work. The only universal musical "event," I would maintain, is what happens when music is performed and heard. Whether some prior "event" that can be called its "creation" took place is moot, depending on the musical culture—as is, therefore, the need for a "creator," a composer as we would call him or her.

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[42] Grout, "Current Historiography," 33.

A Sanskrit word that has been translated "composer" by Indians writing in English is *vāg-geya-kāra,* which means "words-(and)-tune-maker." It is primarily used in South India, where rendering memorized items attributed to "composers," usually with improvised adjuncts, is an important part of the practice. But the operative term for present purposes is *vāk,* "word(s)." Someone who makes a tune for someone else's words is only a "tune-maker" and has the status that an arranger has in the modern West. For example, the South Indian Swati Tirunal, a 19th-century Maharaja of Travancore, created verbal texts (assuming they were not made by a court poet under his name) and he specified the *rāga* and the *tāla* (the metric type) with which they were to be sung. He is regarded as a "composer"—*vāg-geya-kāra*—though the melodies that we know and sing were supplied by well-known Travancore court musicians, by "tune-makers." In South India, to have the sociomusical status equivalent to that ascribed to composers in the West as a constituent of Goehr's emergent regulative work-concept, it is obligatory to have composed the words, but the only features of the musical garb that need be indicated are a melodic type (its *rāga*) and a metric frame (its *tāla*). In the familiar European sense of the word, on the contrary, to have the status of "composer" a musician need only have borrowed the words, but he must have prescribed their musical garb in detail. By the South Indian criterion, strictly applied, Machaut, Wagner, and Cole Porter would have the status "composer," but Dufay, Schubert, and George Gershwin would not; they would only be "tune-makers."

This is not to say that an Indian musician cannot take a well-loved poetic text, work it out in ordered musical phrases appertaining to a classical *rāga,* in one or another musical meter—*tāla*—and get it memorized in that fixed form. This is one of the ways the late Vishnu Digambar Paluskar helped bring classical Hindustani music from court patronage to the newly emerging Indian bourgeoisie. But that does not give him composer status. The South Indian musician and holy man Tyagaraja, on the other hand, who died in 1847, taught hundreds of devotional *kīrtaṇam*s to his disciples. Since he made the words and music both, he was a *vāg-geya-kāra,* and in their search for an English word with equivalent musical status, South Indians call him a "composer." Even so, the melodic shapes of Tyagaraja's *kīrtaṇam*s that we sing today were refashioned by professional performers in the later 19th and early 20th centuries, and it is in those forms that they became the nucleus of the concert practice of Carnatic music today. But to whatever extent the particular melodic forms with which we now sing his words may or may not have originated with Tyagaraja, the words are his, and in almost all cases the designation of *rāga* and *tāla* seem authentically his as well, and therefore, he has "composer" status.

Today, if a musician assembles phrases from various *rāga*s, or modifies

motivic types from one or more traditional *rāga*s, or concocts a novel scale-type and sings with it, he may like to regard himself as the "composer" of a new *rāga*. And he may well be so regarded in sophisticated urban circles, for the belief that "composer" is the highest professional status a musician can have has certainly become familiar in India through the Western contact. But it is only if such a *rāga* comes into general practice, is handled by many musicians, and is no longer, so to speak, the intellectual property of its originator, that it enters the canon of Indian classical music. Some *rāga*s, to be sure, have varieties whose names include the sobriquets or names of great musicians of the past, such as Miyān-kī Todī and Vilāskhānī Todī but these names are now there as identifiers of particular varieties of Todī just like the name Bhūpāli Todī which designates a Todī variety with the pentatonicism of *rāga* Bhūpāli, pitch-classes from the Todī group of *rāga*s, and contours and emphases common to both Bhūpāli and the Todī *rāga*s.[43]

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As already noted, the *rāga*-concept plays the regulative role for Indian classical music that the work-concept plays for European classical music. The canon of Indian classical music is the total assemblage of traditional *rāga*s, each multifariously presentable in varying mixes of extempore musical discourse and memorized pre-composed items. A *rāga* is the nearest thing to that musical artifact that, in Treitler's words, "continues through its survival to be both a historical record and an object of aesthetic perception." But a *rāga* is not an artifact or an object, it is a melodic type, and

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[43] The 16th-century chief musician of Akbar's court, Miyan Tan Sen, is regarded as the progenitor of modern North Indian music; his name is attached to what is now the standard variety of North Indian Todī, sometimes also called "Dārbārī Todī" (Court Todī), or simply "Todī." It uses a scale type with flat second third and sixth degrees (as do all Todī varieties)—the "system tonic" first degree and the fifth (when present) are always natural—but its fourth and seventh degrees are sharp. The name of his disciple Vilas Khan identifies the next most important *rāga* of the Todī group in North India, whose fourth and seventh scale degrees are flat (giving the so-called "Phrygian" scale type), and it has a few limiting turns of phrase peculiar to itself. Treatises from the 17th century, however, give the scale type with all lowered degrees—the scale type of modern Vilāskhānī Todī—for the generic Todī of that time, and this is also the scale-type of the modern South Indian Todī *rāga*. For an account with full bibliographic and illustrative detail of how the 17th-century generic North Indian Todī with its "Phrygian" scale type probably evolved into the modern standard Todī—Miyān-kī or Dārbārī Todī—with its sharp fourth and seventh scale degrees, see pp. 17–27 of my "Historical and Comparative Approach to the Classification of Ragas," in *Selected Reports of the Institute of Ethnomusicology (UCLA)*, 1, no. 3 (1970): 1–78.

none of the habits of thought that the European founding fathers of musicology fell into through familiarity with classical philology and art history, through analogies with the historiography of lyric poetry and of statues and frescoes, are of much use in dealing with *rāgas*. Entities that are not even as fixed as "works not notated or notated only at a time distinctly later than their creation," to use Grout's words, do not lend themselves to most of the familiar musicological modes of thought, New and Old alike. *Rāgas* are not "works" nor do they have any particular time of creation. The *rāgas* widely current at any one time are ideal and anonymous.. Both a present *rāga,* or a past *rāga* at a given moment, are or were the stuff of process, dynamic not static. There cannot be critical editions of *rāgas*. Only particular manifestations of *rāgas* exist in real time; any lump of manifestation that may be set down, in Beverley Nichols's words, "on paper, in black and white," as an example in an old treatise or modern textbook, or for that matter by transcription from a recording, may be evidence or teaching material, but it is not music.

The rendition of a particular *rāga,* in whatever performative guise, is the experiential equivalent for the Indian musician and music-lover of our "artifact born into . . . an aesthetic relationship with the culture." But the entity "which continues through its survival to be both a historical record and an object of aesthetic perception" is the *rāga* itself, which is neither artifact nor object, nothing like a statue or fresco or fragment of lyric poetry, or a composed and memorized piece of music. Yet a *rāga* often has a documentable past in the theoretical tradition, as well as an existential present in its infinite variety of renditions. Its ideal features can be analyzed too, in terms of their own properties, and above all, in contrast to features of other *rāgas*.[44] It is a human creation, but collective and timeless, a Gestalt that is virtual, in any actual instance necessarily incomplete. It is one constellation in a galaxy of such Gestalten, a Platonic Form in a "canonical museum of imaginary music."

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Rejecting the premise that "serious art . . . never can be a matter of improvisation," and divesting ourselves of the work-concept as governing paradigm, encourages us to examine our assumptions about what it is that historical musicology, close analysis, and hermeneutic criticism may need

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[44] See my essay, "The Structure of Musical Meaning: A View from Banaras," *Perspectives of New Music* 14, no. 2/15, no. 1 (1976): 308–34.

to explain. Musical practice regulated by the *rāga*-concept has its own kind
of historiography, its own modes of study, and its own critical canons.
Scholars disputing the proper matter or the proper manner for musical
research and interpretation, as well as philosophers speculating on the
essential nature of musical art, might like to consider contemplating mu-
sic that exists in a rich world of canonized practice, music without works
and without composers, music that is really imaginary.

ABSTRACT

This essay focuses on two interlocking philosophical issues among those
that currently preoccupy postmodern musicological theorists, as seen from
the perspective of a non-Western art music: the notion of a canon; the
concept of the musical-work. After an empirically derived tentative list of
common features characterizing art-music canons comes a summary dis-
cussion, based on work by Margaret Bent and Rob Wegman, of "improvisa-
tion" and "composition" in the Low Countries before they became a pair
of oppositional subsidiary concepts in the pan-European but historically
contingent regulative "work-concept" that was beginning to emerge after
1500, to become stabilized ca. 1800, as elaborated in Lydia Goehr's thought-
provoking book, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*. The present essay
deals with these concepts—work, improvisation, composition (and com-
poser)—as understood and misunderstood with respect to Indian classical
music, where the thesis that not only popular and folk traditions but also
high-status canonical art music can perfectly well exist without "works" or
a "work-concept" is amply demonstrable.

Hearing, Remembering, Cold Storage, Purism, Evidence, and Attitude Adjustment

By Joseph Dubiel

It seems reasonable to expect music theory to talk about what we hear. Things that we don't hear have to be talked about, too, of course, if theory is to establish relations between what we hear and the structures, dispositions, and contexts that affect what we hear; but a focus on hearing must be what organizes the discipline (if anything does).[1] And if relations between what we hear and what we don't hear are to be investigated, then it is probably advantageous to be able to tell the difference.

This is not to suggest that the difference is always going to be fixed. Dominants may be among the things that you hear, while for a beginning student they may only be factors that account for a perception of closure; and for some other listener even this closure may be not quite a percept, but only a factor contributing to a general feeling of comfort with tonal music. This kind of uncertainty about what is audible is not an impediment to theoretical study—it is a subject of study.[2] Flexibility of the boundary between what is heard and what is not is something that music theorists properly cultivate, for ourselves and for the people we try to help.

Sometimes, though, a phenomenon that seems clearly to lie within the scope of music theory does not lend itself to description as an auditory experience: we find ourselves not knowing how to characterize it as something heard, while feeling that we ought to be able to. This state of affairs is disconcerting (or at least I find it so). An instance of it is the topic of this paper. Part of what is disconcerting about this instance is that it is so thoroughly unexotic: it occurs smack in the middle of the standard reper-

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[1] Even a highly critical characterization of the discipline like that offered by Fred Everett Maus in "Masculine Discourse in Music Theory" has theory defined by its *purporting* to be concerned with hearing: "the discourse of mainstream theory, when it is unevocative [of musical experience], . . . seems . . . like a *substitute* for sensitive, evocative description, an *Ersatz* even; something that responds, publicly but speciously, to the desire for a shared articulation of musical experience" (*Perspectives of New Music* 31, no. 2 [Summer 1993]: 276).

[2] Mark DeBellis has written usefully about this question in *Music as Conceptualization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

toire and is elicited by an analytical strategy that is familiar to the point of tedium. These very characteristics make it provocative. Not much of what theorists do escapes disruption if this situation cannot be dealt with.

If we are lucky, some disruption will occur even if it can. My ideas about how to deal with this problem have less to do with making it go away than with finding ways to live with it, letting the category of the audible stay ill-defined and seeing how music theory might adapt. I am going to consider a situation in which it seems that we must be hearing something but it is particularly hard to say what, and I will suggest that it is sometimes significantly easier and more relevant in such a situation to speak of hearing in a certain *way* than of hearing a certain *thing*. While this possibility first occurred to me as a tactic for keeping certain musical experiences within the realm of hearing, as opposed to that of a different kind of mental activity, I am not sure that my original convictions about the definition of this realm have survived the experience of working out the idea. Perhaps there is no need to be anything but agnostic about the distinction between hearing and not hearing after all.

A little way into the first movement of the Beethoven Violin Concerto, the peculiar pitch D♯ intrudes into a placid context. (Example 1 shows the first theme.) The peculiarity of the pitch plays out in the manner of its departure: a point is made of its not resolving, and in fact of its not returning, or being referred to, for a remarkably long time. It is tempting to say that the piece is trying to see how long it can get away with doing nothing about D♯ after its first curious occurrence.[3]

Of course this notion of "getting away with" has never been adequately explained. No one knows exactly—or even approximately—what conditions a piece has to satisfy in order to behave like this, or what failure would mean. All that this phrase really expresses is the feeling that *something* has to be done, that it ought not to be possible simply to drop a weird note into a piece, do nothing about it, and then carry on as though everything were just fine. Fortunately we can proceed without knowing whether any such stricture actually holds, because it must be the case that responding to this piece involves imagining that one holds, in order to experience the frisson of hearing the necessity flouted.

In any case, my concern is with our experience of the music between D♯'s departure at the end of m. 10 and its reappearance in m. 65. To the extent that D♯'s first occurrence is problematic—is *experienced* by us *as being*

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[3] The analysis that follows intersects extensively with that presented in Joseph Dubiel, "Composer, Theorist, Composer/Theorist," in *Rethinking Music,* ed. Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

Example 1. Beethoven Violin Concerto, mm. 1–18

problematic—we presumably cannot be simply unconcerned with D♯ during the music that follows. Rather there must be some state of mind that we're in, because we've heard D♯ come and go in a way that is not completely satisfactory, from which state we are eventually released when we hear something more satisfactory happen to D♯. It would not seem sufficient to say that we puzzle over D♯ for a moment, move on to other things, and recall D♯ when the piece brings it back. If D♯ really strikes us as disturbing, it would not seem sufficient, either, simply to say that we remember it. It ought to weigh on us continually in some way until it is dealt with.

Is there any way to describe this state of mind as a state of *hearing*? A state of hearing *something*? Or is it a state of another kind—a state of conscious verbal reflection, for example? And if this is so, then are we satisfied for our analytical account of the piece to commit us to a state of mind that is not a state of hearing? Do we have to give such states a regular place in our accounts of listening to music? Does this have any consequences for our conception of our project as theorists?

I take the basic analytical scenario to be a very familiar one. Tovey— whom I think of as representing the conventional wisdom in an intelligent, if undisciplined, form—narrates it with a particular dramatic interpreta- tion. He reads "mystery" into the "astounding" D♯, noting that "Beethoven leaves it unharmonized and carefully avoids moving it in the direction which would explain it away," until a later phrase "in which the mysterious D♯ . . . is now explained away."[4] (Example 2 shows the later passage.) The condition D♯ is left in from m. 10 to m. 65 is one that it wouldn't be good to leave it in for the entire piece, and even leaving D♯ in that condition for a long time is remarkable. What is problematic is the unexplained state of the D♯; later, D♯ is not just explained, but explained *away*.[5]

Tovey thus seems to be describing a state of rational reflection on a problem (mystery), in search of a solution (explanation)—as though there's something we need to *know* about D♯ that we can't know when it happens (like what chord it belongs to that can progress to the dominant) and that we later find out (D♯ diminished-seventh). There is a suggestion, more- over, that until we gain this knowledge we experience D♯'s occurrence as *unjustified*. Once Beethoven gives us D♯ as part of a chord, apparently, we find comfort in imagining that it could have belonged to that chord on its first occurrence. Exactly when this imagining takes place is a puzzle in itself (and this is a large part of what suggests a substantial admixture of *thinking about* the music in Tovey's account of hearing it); but in any case it seems that the "explanatory" passage brings with it some feeling of relief.

The details of Tovey's text aside, this approach to the piece must seem fairly familiar—a version of a story that we tell about pieces all the time. In

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[4] Donald Francis Tovey, "Beethoven: Violin Concerto," in *Essays in Musical Analysis: Concertos and Choral Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 72–3.

[5] Admittedly the expression "explain away" is a mannerism of Tovey's, and perhaps should not be overinterpreted; but when he makes the point without this expression, there is still plenty to suggest desired relief from an uncomfortable state: "The mysterious unaccom- panied D sharp near the beginning of the Violin Concerto is unharmonized, and flagrantly avoids explanation until a later harmonized passage explains it as an example of sweet reasonableness" (Donald Francis Tovey, "Normality and Freedom in Music," in *The Main Stream of Music and Other Essays* [New York: Meridian Books, 1959], 197).

Example 2. Beethoven Violin Concerto, mm. 65–73

its bluntest form the story goes like this: D♯ sounds like a wrong note at first, this bothers you, and it stays on your mind until some later event allows you to realize that it wasn't a wrong note after all. But the story doesn't have to make such a point of *wrongness:* if you're a more urbane sort of analyst, you can say that D♯ has implications far beyond what happens to it at its first appearance, and you experience what happens to it later as the spelling out of these implications. If you're truly urbane, you might not trouble yourself to regard this elaboration as rectifying any problem: much nicer to regard it as just the gradual exploration of a signal characteristic. But even at this level of refinement, you might feel that *something* would be wrong with the piece if this exploration didn't occur—or at least that this exploration counts as praiseworthy finesse, as

the difference between a deep stroke and a cheap shot (an effect "for its own sake," as people say). What these different stories share is the sense that a peculiar event early in a piece places some kind of constraint on what happens later. Between the peculiar early event and the later one that responds to its peculiarity, we experience some kind of *Spannung*, induced by the peculiarity of the earlier event and relaxed by the smoother fitting of a similar event into a later context.

This *Spannung* is my main concern. Are stories like this *true*? How can you tell? What experience do you have that corresponds to this *Spannung*? What is the experience of protracted problematicity? Is this experience well represented as a need to know something? As a wish to have the music come back into line with some norm of good behavior that it has violated? In some other way? Is there a way to represent this experience that makes clearer how it is part of *hearing*? Or is the element of extra-auditory reflection in these descriptions somehow an essential feature of the experience?

Really I could be repeating the second of my questions—How can you tell?—as a refrain after every one of the others. The hardest thing in this business, I often think, is knowing what to introspect for in order to tell whether you're having the experience that is supposed to go with some analytical description of a passage. If one theorist said that the D♯ of m. 10 is not resolved in m. 11, because there is no E in the right register; and another one said that it is resolved, either by octave transfer or by implication in the harmony, how would you go about deciding which one you agreed with? Not by looking for something in the score—both these analyses deal with all the available information, although they give two different descriptions of it. You'd have to form some idea of what experience was supposed to go with each of these analyses, and then see which was more like your experience—or, more open-mindedly, try having both experiences to see which one you enjoyed more. If you're like me, you might not know exactly how to match these descriptions with different experiences, and you'd have to ask some more questions, particularly about each theorist's idea of what the experiences of resolution and non-resolution are like.

As far as I can see, unless you can tell what experience is supposed to go with a particular structural description, you don't *understand* the structural description. This doesn't absolutely mean that the music has to present itself to you in the terms of the description; but you do have to know what experience is supposed to correlate with the description. I'm often amazed by what analysts get away with on this score: in the name of objectivity, I suppose, they in fact insulate their analyses from empirical evaluation, by suppressing mention of the experiences that are the analyses' only con-

ceivable explananda.[6] Anyway, this concern applies to every one of my questions, including the main one, which I might now reformulate as: what auditory experience can I recognize as corresponding to a theoretical ascription of *Spannung* (or problematic mystery, or unresolvedness in some form) between the D♯s in mm. 10 and 12 and those in mm. 65 ff.?

One of the kinds of experiences we rely on all the time, for better or for worse, is the experience of something's sounding *right* (or not). I think this is a treacherous idea in a lot of respects (the way it sacrifices specific character for vague acceptability, the way it entails a venerative attitude toward the music we analyze), but we do rely on it. Very possibly, the main thing you asked yourself in order to decide whether you heard D♯ resolved or not in m. 11 was some form of the question "Does it sound right?"— perhaps "Is it OK to go on from here, or do we still have to do something about this?" This is just the kind of question that makes me think that I don't know whether D♯ is resolved or not. D♯ sounds odd, or something—I don't know how to say it sounds, but I can't say that it sounds *wrong*. It sounds peculiar, and I can believe that its peculiarity has something to do with the absence of the E that would resolve D♯; but on the other hand, D♯ never is resolved in this sense, and life somehow goes on. It's hard to believe that D♯ persists, demanding resolution (like a suspension) for fifty-odd measures; and yet it's hard to believe that all it takes to make D♯ go away for fifty-odd measures is to ignore it.

You can feel the incongruity particularly strongly, I think, if you try to look for the compositional maxim in this passage. Can a composer *really* get away with what we say Beethoven is doing here—dropping in a foreign note, leaving it unresolved, and doing nothing about it for fifty-odd measures? So what if it does pay off later—how would that be enough to make it OK on the spot? Mustn't there be some constraint on how it happens on the spot that we're overlooking—in particular, some constraint on how the odd note gets left behind? Or can we really just take in the odd event and keep it in cold storage until later, no matter what happens in between?

You can see that my funny feeling about the lack of compositional constraint is of a piece with my funny feeling about the idea of listening that it implies. My problem with the idea that Beethoven does nothing

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[6] A crisp, provocative statement about "musical feelings" as theory's explananda can be found in Diana Raffman's "Proposal for a Musical Semantics," in Mari Reiss Jones and Susan Holleran, eds., *Cognitive Bases of Musical Communication* (Washington: American Psychological Association, 1992), 23–31. See also her "The Meaning of Music," in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., *Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume XVI: Philosophy and the Arts* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 360–77.

about D♯ for fifty-odd measures is essentially a problem with the idea that *I* do nothing with D♯ for fifty-odd measures except remember it as a problem (or as having once been a problem). As I keep saying, I'm not sure how remembering D♯ as a problem is part of my *hearing* of these fifty-odd measures.

This means that what I'm looking for is not necessarily some features of mm. 13–64 that I can recognize as sustaining D♯; rather it's a way of hearing mm. 13–64 that is in some way recognizably conditioned by D♯'s having occurred. I might expect to find *some* features of these measures that reinforce my hearing them in this way, of course; I find it hard to believe that the effect of the passage depends entirely on my propensity to carry a torch. But I want to be very careful of this expectation. In some obvious way the point of the passage *is* precisely to leave it up to me, by avoiding anything that I can recognize as a reference to my concern. I don't want my analysis to undermine this by uncovering hidden references to D♯ (at least, I don't want to set out with the *assumption* that this is its task); nothing would be more disappointing than to analyze the fascinating absence of D♯ as an *illusion*.

To put this another way, if a compositional constraint does follow from Beethoven's D♯ gambit, it isn't necessarily a constraint to *do* something, something that he would only do because of D♯. It might be only a constraint to do something that lends itself well to being listened to under a preoccupation with D♯. It's the principle of deadpan humor: if you say something funny and maintain a dead pan, you *are* following up your funny remark, just as surely as you are if your style is different and you say "Nudge, nudge" or give yourself a rim shot. It just happens that your follow-up is to do exactly what you would do if you hadn't said anything funny. (If you're really good, we might not know whether you think you have.) What makes your not following up your remark a follow-up is the way we perceive it—what we read into it because we've heard your funny remark (or heard your remark as funny).

Now I can update my main question. When I ask about those D♯s waiting for whatever it is they're waiting for while they're waiting for it, I'm really asking what *we're* doing to keep them in mind—and then what, if anything, the music is doing to encourage us.

Before I go to work on this, I want to say two things about why I think it's an important problem. The first is that it represents a very general problem (as I suggested before). There's an awful lot of musical analysis out there that deals with passages essentially like this one: passages in which a brief but striking event (very often the prominent appearance of a chromatic pitch) provokes some kind of special attention, concern, anxi-

ety, or expectation, that is said to persist through a span of time during which the event is not referred to, until eventually the event is re-evoked and treated more satisfactorily or normatively—or in any case more elaborately—than it was at first, often with the character of an improvement on the earlier treatment.

I'm tempted to say that this is one of the most important paradigms of musical analysis in our professional culture. In tonal analysis, it's probably next on the list after chord labeling, form labeling, and Schenker analysis (in some order). This struck me a few years ago, when my colleagues and I were writing an analysis exam at Columbia on the first movement of the second Razumovsky quartet, the E minor, and almost every question that survived a screening for excessive "subjectivity" turned out to be about some ramification of the F♮s near the beginning. It struck me especially strongly, because I'd got us to use the quartet by arguing that it didn't channel discussion this way as strongly as the first piece proposed—the first movement of the Appassionata. Of course the students up for this exam consulted Patricia Carpenter's paper on the Appassionata, which works mostly by reference to the purported consequences of a chromatic move at the beginning. Rightly or wrongly, something like this has come to represent the most common interpretation of Schoenberg's dictum that "the real idea of a composition" is "the means by which balance is restored" after "a state of unrest, of imbalance" is produced by tones that make "the meaning" of the beginning tone "doubtful."[7]

A particularly clear and well-known example of reliance on this model is Edward T. Cone's "Schubert's Promissory Note": not only does this kind of reasoning ground the interpretation of the note in question as *promising* something; Cone also considers this analytical interpretation to be so uncontroversial that it can serve as the vehicle for a further hermeneutic interpretation that is highly controversial (and meant to be). Cone's later article "Schubert's Unfinished Business" generalizes the same analytical approach. (I could also mention his Stravinsky paper, outside the tonal repertory, as depending absolutely on the idea of events left as problem-

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[7] Patricia Carpenter, "*Grundgestalt* as Tonal Function," *Music Theory Spectrum* 5 (1983): 15–38. Arnold Schoenberg, "New Music, Outmoded Music, Style, and Idea," in *Style and Idea: Selected Writings of Arnold Schoenberg*, ed. Leonard Stein, trans., Leo Black (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 123.

atic over considerable spans of time until later events alleviate what was problematic about them.)[8]

In any case, I think some form of this analytical plot—waiting for a problematic event to be attended to—is in use all the time (in tonal music; elsewhere it may be harder to come up with a reading of some early event as problematic). And yet I can't tell exactly what anyone thinks listeners do during the waiting period.

My other reason for thinking that this is an important question is more ideological. I feel a strong inclination to try and make the answer come out a certain way, and I don't fully understand why this would be justified. As I think you can tell, I very much want to represent my disturbed recollection of D♯ as part of my *hearing* of the music from which D♯ is absent. I feel the urge to try and make my model of listening entirely *about* listening, a model in which my consciousness is entirely taken up with sonic images. This would entail getting anything that I want to have in mind into the sonic images I entertain.

This is why I'm working so hard to make my concern about D♯ manifest itself in some way I *hear* the vast span after D♯. If I can't find such a hearing, then I'm afraid I leave myself relying on a side track of essentially non-musical recall: "Hmm, that's odd; I'd better keep it in mind," followed by what I've called a period of cold storage, until I can say "Oh, there it is again." This doesn't mean that I doubt the possibility of recalling D♯ without having held it in consciousness all the way along. Of course that can happen. But that's a model better suited to a detail that's adequately handled by its immediate context, that later turns out to have more of a story; it doesn't do justice to the feeling that D♯ needs attention. As I've been saying, I want to take the unresolvedness of D♯ seriously; and I take this to mean making it part of the *sound* I'm hearing, not just something I think by the way while listening to something else.

Let me borrow some strong words of Benjamin Boretz's to indicate the direction of my concern (if perhaps also to overshoot slightly: I don't know if I can defend a position quite as strong as the one he articulates). Referring to literary experience, in a paper called "Experiences with No

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8 Edward T. Cone, "Schubert's Promissory Note: An Exercise in Musical Hermeneutics," *19th-Century Music* 5, no. 2 (1982): 233–41; revised version in *Schubert: Critical and Analytical Studies*, ed. Walter Frisch (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 13–30. "Schubert's Unfinished Business," *19th-Century Music* 7, no. 3 (1984): 222–32; reprinted in *Music: A View from Delft: Selected Essays*, ed. Robert P. Morgan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 201–216. "Stravinsky: The Progress of A Method," *Perspectives of New Music* 1, no. 1 (Fall 1962): 18–26; reprinted in *Perspectives on Schoenberg and Stravinsky*, ed. Benjamin Boretz and Edward T. Cone (New York: Norton, 1972), 155–64.

Names," he speaks of "the possibility of immediate and total interpenetration of text and consciousness." He elaborates the two adjectives: "immediate: that is, unmediated by any supervenient content of consciousness; and total: that is, leaving no part of the consciousness of the experiencing being sentient of its own self as other than the content of *having* the experiential output of the interpenetration of the text and consciousness."[9] Let me paraphrase this into musical terms and condense it a little: "interpenetration of *piece* and consciousness," in which you're unaware of yourself except "as *having*" this experience of the piece. To put it bluntly, you don't keep a bit of your consciousness aside in order to talk to yourself about what you're experiencing; you just try to *be* the experience.

I find this an attractive ideal. I think of myself as standing up for it in wanting to describe the Beethoven Violin Concerto the way I do. But I have to admit that I have a reservation about the ideal—about it's *being* so ideal. I can wonder whether maintaining it doesn't have an element of pointless purism; or if not pointless, at least strained. As I've worked on the Concerto under the guidance of this ideal, I've sometimes found myself feeling that I was *insisting* that the hearing I was modeling *had* to be ideal in the respect I'm talking about, that I just couldn't let it not be. I could not altogether shake the fear that I might be shouting to drown out uncertainty.

What I haven't always felt is that I've been recording my experience, as best I could observe it. Not that I've felt I'm falsifying it, either: it's more that I'm not really sure what my experience is. Either I'm not examining it before I make up my mind about some of the characteristics that my representation of it will have to have, or—and this is more to the point—I don't quite know where to look (or listen) to *determine* whether my experience matches my description. I mean, how do I *know* whether I'm remembering D♯ in the way I incline to prefer, or in some other way? (This is a very general version of the question I was asking before, about how you know whether D♯ is resolved or not.) Until I know how to look for an experience to go with whatever I say about D♯, I'm stuck feeling that my position on it may be mostly ideological. (Of all the questions I raise in this paper, this is the one I'd most like to have responses to.)

This question leads me back to the business of modeling a sustained concern with D♯. Think ideological; think strained; think doggedly hanging on to a perspective, come what may—what are you thinking? You're thinking Schenker! Our best elaborated model for holding on to a musi-

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    [9] Benjamin Boretz, "Experiences with No Names," *Perspectives of New Music* 30, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 273.

cal percept through time—be the percept problematic or not—is a Schenkerian one. In fact, we could say that Schenker's theory is *about* making musical percepts last through time: one of its basic ideas is that when two temporally separated events enter into direct relationship, there is some sense in which the earlier of them *persists* through the intervening time. More precisely, Schenker maintains this of the relationships that he models through *Stimmführungsverwandlungen;* relationships without this property are motivic. In English we commemorate this sense of temporal extension by talking about "prolongation" (although this pretty clearly isn't what Schenker means by the German word *Prolongation*).[10] Sometimes we think of a harmonic problem, like a dissonant or chromatic tone's being unresolved, as subject to prolongation in this sense; we describe this as a prolongation of the dissonant tone, and we understand it on the model of an ornamented suspension-resolution in fourth-species counterpoint.

For a series of examples that gradually stretch the suspension model from undeniable plausibility to something more debatable (plausible deniability?), let me turn to the beginning of the slow movement of Mozart's A-major Piano Concerto K488 (shown in example 3). The melody in mm. 1–2 is compounded of two voices moving in parallel sixths, A–G♯–F♯ over C♯–B–A, staggered to form a series of 7–6 suspensions. In no case, of course, does any of these intervals, seventh or sixth, sound simultaneously; all of these intervals are successions in the melody, and we hear the 7–6 pattern by hearing notes across breaks in the two registral lines. We have no trouble retaining each note of the upper line as a new note of the lower line makes it dissonant, and hearing the next note of the upper line as resolving this dissonance.

When the circumstances are more challenging, this kind of perception shades off. What should we say about the D in m. 3? Does it hang through the half cadence of m. 4, to be picked up and resolved in the second phrase (mm. 5–6)? It's an attractive idea, since the first chord of the second phrase sounds like the initial F♯-minor triad with a sixth displacing its fifth, and since the phrase makes such a lovely fuss over resolving D to C♯. But would we want to go so far out on a limb as to deny that D is displaced at the half cadence? I like leaving this indeterminate, so that whether a pitch is hanging is not a strictly yes-or-no matter. (I like it for

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[10] This is the main point of my paper "What Did Schenker Mean By Prolongation?," read at the conference *Critical Perspectives on Schenker: Toward A New Research Paradigm,* University of Notre Dame, 20 March 1994; it is also noted in "'When You Are A Beethoven': Kinds of Rules in Schenker's *Counterpoint," Journal of Music Theory* 34, no. 2 (1990): 291–340.

Example 3. Mozart Piano Concerto, K. 488, mm. 1–12

this spot especially, because I hear the upper one of the two parallel voices, A–C♯–F♯, faltering as the lower one, C♯–B–A continues G♯–F♯–E♯ to the end of the phrase: the upper voice misses the step between F♯ and D, and doesn't make it to C♯—so that I can't tell whether it still means D or simply has fallen silent.)

I presume that we can't hang on to notes like this forever, though. For instance, I don't hear the low E♯ of m. 2 hanging until the entry of the orchestra in m. 12, which is when we first get F♯ in its register (from the second bassoon and contrabasses—not even from the piano). This would be too much of a good thing. I don't know what it would be like to hear this low E♯ as persisting through all the complexities that follow it, which have nothing much to do with E♯.

If I don't hear this low E♯ as suspended, though, I'm also not satisfied to say simply that it's transferred up an octave and resolved there in the next measure. Yes, this happens, and it must have something to do with how the passage doesn't sound wrong; but leaving it at this doesn't take low E♯ fully seriously as what it is—an isolated low note, with strong voice-leading implications that are not realized. To take E♯ seriously, I have to find a way of listening to the piano solo that makes room for E♯ to *be* isolated and

unfulfilled. Here's a brief sketch: the character of the solo is that it moves tentatively, one little step at a time, with all its patterns greatly attenuated, and with a lot of one-of-a-kind details sticking out of it, low E♯ being only one of them—high D in m. 10 being another; this is in contrast to the next few sections, which become progressively more patterned, each devoting more of its time to more exact repetition than the last, until an impasse is reached that is broken by modulation to the relative major.[11]

You can probably see easily enough how this reasoning transfers to D♯ in the Beethoven Violin Concerto. I can't get very far through the fifty-odd measures hearing D♯ as an implied suspension! But as long as I also can't accept that what happens to D♯ in mm. 10–13 really takes care of it—and I don't want to accept this, for reasons I've expatiated on—I need another model for how D♯ "stays in my ear."

Back when I was talking about deadpan humor, I emphasized that the model I'm looking for is more a model of what I'm doing than of what Beethoven is doing. The implied-suspension model is at least partly a model of what I'm doing, of course—who else is keeping those notes in mind?—but it's a model under which what I do is fairly directly motivated and narrowly constrained by what's in the score.

From one point of view, this is a strength of the implied-suspension model: the relative ease with which we can say what configurations of notes might elicit the perception of a suspension. Fourth-species counterpoint specifies the paradigmatic configurations that elicit this perception; and some rules of transformation give us other configurations that also elicit it, even though they are literally not suspensions by the paradigmatic definition. (Such extension of an attribution to configurations other than the paradigmatic ones is what *Prolongation* is, by the way.) Once the configurations get too far away from the paradigmatic ones, we don't know how to go about perceiving a suspension in them. Either we can't understand the claim that a configuration is a suspension, or we understand it as a metaphor, which means that we have to make up our way of understanding it on the spot. (That's presumably what you'd have to do if I said that D♯ is suspended for fifty-odd measures and you wanted to give the idea a respectful hearing.)

The limitation of the implied-suspension model is that it addresses itself so directly to the *content* of my perception, and then gives me so few choices: D♯ is consonant; D♯ persists as a dissonance (in fact or in imagina-

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[11] See the analysis by Marion A. Guck in "Music Loving, Or the Relationship with the Piece," *Music Theory Online* 2.2 (March 1996), especially paragraphs 24, 28, and 30. A print version of this paper is forthcoming in the *Journal of Musicology* 15, no. 3 (Summer 1997).

tion); D♯ is resolved. If what I hear doesn't fit into those categories, then I can't describe it. And I know that I'm going to be facing a lot of situations in fifty-odd measures when it will seem forced to say that D♯ persists but deflating to say that it's resolved. What I need is a model that allows me to classify a wide, incompletely predictable, range of perceptions as perceptible symptoms of my concern with D♯—potentially anything at all, provided that I hear it with reference to D♯.

So here's my radical suggestion: I'll just go ahead and talk about being concerned with D♯—that is, characterize my hearing by this concern, rather than by any particular percept that this concern engenders. I'll just say that for a while after I hear D♯ and find it problematic, I scan whatever comes along for any characteristics it might have that I can imagine as pertinent to the issue of D♯. I set no prior stipulations on what I might find pertinent; in fact my intention is to be as opportunistic as possible in this respect. If I do this, you might say that I'm focusing my modeling efforts on specifying an *attitude* that I take toward whatever comes along, rather than on specifying what particular entities and relationships I will find in what comes along.

The attitude I'm describing is something very much like *preoccupation*. When you're preoccupied, you scan whatever you encounter for its relevance to what preoccupies you. Chances are, you notice something that you might not have noticed otherwise; you notice whatever you notice in a particular way, as it relates to what preoccupies you. What seems salient to you is determined in significant part by your preoccupation.

What might this mean in m. 11 of the Violin Concerto? After the D♯s of m. 10, and in response to them, I hear E missing from the register of D♯. This means that I hear the interval from D♯ to C♯ as peculiar. It's neither the voice-leading interval that would explain D♯ nor a harmonic interval—so that in some important sense it's not a real succession, even though it has all the "physical" attributes of a descending major second. (It might be a diminished third, of course, descending from E♭ rather than D♯; but since this hearing would take such a beating in the next two measures anyway I'm going to give it short shrift.) Hearing E missing also means that I hear the whole chord as lying "too low," which is something I might not bother to notice about it otherwise. The chord's low registral position is there to notice, certainly, as is its contrast with the range of the woodwinds, as, for that matter, is the roughness and laboriousness of the low strings' strokes, as contrasted with those of the violins or the timpani. Even the chord's loudness may be part of it. All these characteristics are there to notice—but perhaps I put them together in this way and invest in the combination because I've got so much reason to notice the top note of

the chord as lower than some other note that it might have been (not to say should have been).

It's obvious what this attitude leads to in the next two measures. My preoccupation with D♯ is reinforced by its repetition; and this time when I scan the following chord for E, I hear its upper voices as lying "too high." Perhaps I hear the top voice specifically as much too high—that is, high by more than the upper voice of m. 11 was too low by: by more than one position in the chord. Certainly I hear this chord as escaping from D♯ as the previous chord did not—by absolute range, and more particularly by position in the space defined by the D-major triad. What I mean by this is that the opening wind tune is about descending from A, and particularly from A neighbored by B, and about not getting down through E to close on D. In this context, a note down in the area of D, even a D♯, sounds low in the space; and so, certainly, does a C♯—and especially a C♯ that I hear as too low to be an E. This being the case, I hear the B in m. 13 as escaping the "gravity" of the three measures before.

I am borne out in this perception in mm. 14–15, as the violins, descending from B, begin to show a melodic affinity with the woodwinds of the opening that, up to this moment, I have never considered them to have (they're even in parallel thirds). And the sonority from which they descend is a lot like the winds' sonority in m. 7, with B and G over A. In retrospect, I can hear the upper voices in m. 13 as "accented" by their larger-than-precedented leap out of the range of D♯ and C♯, and I can hear this impulse as playing itself out through the descent of mm. 14–15.

The rhythm that the strings have taken from the drums is playing itself out, too, during these measures, in the low strings' afterbeats. By the time the first violins reach E in m. 16, a lot of the divisions between the music before m. 10 and the music since then have closed. On the largest scale, the voice-leading and registral, and even motivic, synthesis accomplished between m. 13 and m. 16 allows me to hear all the music from the beginning of the movement to the cadence I expect soon as a *Satz*—rather than as a closed period in the winds followed by who knows what in the strings, which is what it was sounding like for a few measures.

On a smaller scale, of course, measure 16 finally gives me the E that would resolve D♯. This E even belongs to the triad that, on first blush, I might have thought D♯ most strongly suggested that it would belong to, namely II. Actually I don't find the II triad in itself quite so moving as I find the *succession* of II and V in mm. 16 and 17, because this succession spells out what I can imagine to have been implicit in the use of D♯ to approach a note of V. If you look at the eventual resolution of D♯ in mm. 65 ff., you'll realize that this succession is unpacked there: first the D♯ diminished-seventh chord goes to the dominant a couple of times, but the

dominant with G in the bass; then, in mm. 69–70, it's reoriented toward the II chord of m. 71, and this finally leads into a strong cadential progression that in effect closes the ritornello. The arpeggiation up from D♯ through F♯, A, and C♮ in mm. 69–70 also connects the range of D♯ to the range of B. Returning to m. 16, now: it's a nice touch that, during the II–V succession, the first violins' descent to A establishes the whole phrase's melodic space as explicitly plagal, thus resolving the contrast that struck us in m. 10.

In light of all this, should I perhaps say that D♯ *is* resolved by the E of mm. 16–17? It depends. Under an implied-suspension model, no, I shouldn't—not unless I'm ready to commit myself to the view that D♯ is left hanging, is thus in some sense *prolonged,* all the way from m. 10. Since it is apparently the *dominant* against which D♯ would be suspended, I'd have to be ready to accept the predominant of m. 16 as embellishing a dominant that lasts from m. 10 through m. 17; and to take the tonic in the latter half of m. 15 as connecting the dominant to this predominant, rather than as resolving the dominant (a resolution that would pretty much do D♯ in). I won't say that this is impossible, but it's a hard trick.

If my model is oriented toward preoccupation rather than "prolongation," I have more freedom. I can comfortably say that my preoccupation with D♯ is considerably alleviated in mm. 16–17, and I can mean something by this more specific than just that the passage of time has persuaded me to give up on D♯. I've been able to give some idea of what it means, in auditory terms, to remember D♯ as a problem through these few measures, by showing where besides in harmony and voice leading a concern with D♯ might affect my perception. I have found this easier to do by concentrating on my attitude—by representing my concern with D♯ as a preoccupation that I retain, for reasons of choice or temperament, rather than because it is forced on me by some structural property of "unresolvedness" that I can demonstrate in the notes. Ultimately I will want to have more to say about how the notes *sustain* such a preoccupation, but meanwhile it is a considerable relief not to have to say how they *force* it.

I don't want to make too much of a slogan of saying that I'm describing an attitude, but I do want to say again that it's a great help to think this way because, by doing so, I take upon myself more of the responsibility for what I hear, reducing my responsibility to show how the score causes what I hear. Even if my attitude is formed in response to the music, still the tendentiousness of listening that this attitude engenders is mine, and the sense of the music that results is the product of an interaction between the score and this attitude, not simply a projection of the score. I can believe of the score that it is designed to withstand and reward a particular kind

of listening without having to believe that it consists of patterns that automatically induce it.

What I'm calling an attitude or a disposition, I might consider calling an affect, a mood. Why not? I don't see why, in our attempts to model listening, we need to restrict ourselves to those mental activities that most resemble conscious (and even professional) intellectual activity, like "expecting" or "believing to be implied by." It's not more fanciful to speak of ourselves as unconsciously having desires than as unconsciously making inferences—it's probably less fanciful, in fact. The arguments on this subject usually invoke the presumable information-processing function of unconscious processes, but a concern with information in itself doesn't necessarily confine us to talking about beliefs and inferences.[12] Many affective states have quite specific cognitive components.[13] Preoccupation, considered as an affect, might even be said to be defined largely *by* a cognitive component—by the phenomenon with which one is preoccupied (whether or not by any particular proposition about it).

Nonetheless, one advantage I see in allowing affects, dispositions, attitudes, or moods into our repertoire of theoretical models is the freedom that we would sometimes gain from always having to lead with a specification of *what* is heard. We may sometimes do better to speak of hearing in a particular *way* than of hearing particular *things*. Another advantage may be the freedom we could gain in talking about the onset, maintenance, and relinquishment of ways of listening by modeling them as attitudes rather than necessarily as beliefs. Intuitively, there may be more plausibility, and thus more explanatory value, in the idea of giving up a preoccupation simply by getting over it with the passage of time than with the idea of giving up a belief in this way.

Of course, I intend to do nothing like get over D♯ in the remainder of this paper. I'm going to work as hard as I can to draw out some account of *what* I'm hearing from what I've said is the *way* I'm hearing. Because my old question still stands: how do I know I am preoccupied with D♯? Or, what am I hearing that corresponds to the theoretical ascription of a preoccupation with D♯? The move from a percept (like "suspension") to an attitude (like "preoccupation") as my primary characterization of my

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[12] Conversations with Naomi Cumming helped me to think of this; you can find the point adumbrated in her "Eugene Narmour's Theory of Melody" (review of *The Analysis and Cognition of Basic Melodic Structures*) in *Music Perception* 11, nos. 2–3 (July–October 1992): 354–74, especially 359.

[13] Ronald deSousa's "The Rationality of Emotion" (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987) elaborates this point; Claire Armon-Jones's *Varieties of Affect* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) is also suggestive.

hearing doesn't eliminate the requirement eventually to articulate the *content* of the hearing. It only enforces the possibility that the formation of that content may be ad hoc rather than principled in any obvious way. Hearing a suspension is a very predictable kind of auditory experience, as well as a predictable response to a certain kind of sonic configuration (in the right context and frame of mind). Taking on a preoccupation may likewise be a predictable response to a certain musical situation, but its consequences in auditory experience are significantly less predictable. These auditory consequences are what I have to work out.

What I like about the analysis that I've got already is how it disengages from any direct connection to the pitch (or pitch class) D♯, while remaining plausibly an account of listening under D♯'s influence. I take particular pride in the bonehead simplicity of hearing one chord as "too low" and the answering chord as "too high"—bonehead simplicity as a starting point for some pretty fancy lines of perception, admittedly, but also bonehead simplicity as a confrontation of very fundamental qualities of the sound, to which I'm delighted to have gained such pointed access through such esoteric methodological concerns.

Let me expand on some non-pitch features of the D♯ figure that I've already referred to. The figure occurs as an intrusion on the music of a small band—music of a certain understated squareness, imparted largely by the tonic-and-dominant drumbeats that frame the winds' phrases. This intrusion has the specific form of a deadpan imitation of the drumbeats, on a very unsquare pitch, by the most unlikely instruments (unlikely to imitate a drum, especially to do so by way of entrance). The pitch is hard to interpret: it's easy to suppose that it must be an alteration of the drum's tonic that it imitates—that it is some kind of D, that is, and not some kind of E—but the implications of this alteration are not played out in the sequel. Meanwhile, the string basses mediate between the upper strings and the timpani, timbrally and registrally—and they get their pitches exactly right, almost as though the strings' D♯–A pair were just passing for a version of the drums' D–A pair. The low strings' comparatively successful impersonation of the timpani is crucial to the eventual synthesis of the phrase in mm. 14–17, when they "liquidate" the drums' rhythmic motive as the upper strings make their peace with the woodwinds.

In the long run, though, the violins retain their curious wish to be part of the band's drum section. The band comes back in m. 43, with a major thematic articulation, and this time the violins do belong to the battery. In fact they lead it, introducing the rhythm "one, two, three, four," in m. 42. They do a better job with the figure than before, too: they introduce it on the dominant note (the one that the strings always *could* get right). They

remain responsible for it after the drums and horns join them. (The low strings are still mediating; the violins' vast improvement moves the mediating position closer to the timpani, which the low strings double, pizzicato.) In m. 50, the drums reclaim the figure, with horns *and* with trumpets; but even these instruments follow the violins' lead in confining themselves to the dominant note (and the normalcy of their playing this role is slightly undermined by the minor mode).

If I extend these observations about the unusual behavior of the strings just a little further, I get a way to hear the D♯ figure resonating in the use of the orchestra through the entire ritornello. The two instances of the rhythmic figure, in mm. 10 and 42, are the only things initiated by the strings—until m. 65, when D♯ is harmonized and resolved. Only after this do the strings lead the *tutti*, in what might be considered the normal manner, into the cadence of m. 77 and the closing theme that ensues.

To make this claim about the strings' restricted role, I have to finesse two passages. One is the minor-mode version of the second theme (mm. 51 ff.), which I can of course say is not an initiation, relative to the winds' introduction of this theme in m. 43. The other is the earlier plunge into ♭VI (mm. 28 ff.); this I have to say is an undifferentiated *tutti*, rather than one led by the strings. I might also say that this passage stands outside the main line of D-major themes: never again in the movement does it occur at this point in what is otherwise an invariable sequence.

To some degree the influence of D♯ persists in the development of its rhythmic motive, no matter where in the orchestra the motive goes. In some sense, it's with me whenever I find myself bothering to think of the rhythm "one, two, three, four" as a motive. I very well might not bother to think this about the opening drum figure, whose point seems to be precisely its foursquare commonplaceness.[14] But the strings gradually defamiliarize this figure for me, give it a more specific identity. The process begins with the low strings' dissolution of the motive into weak-beat attacks (especially second-beat) in mm. 14–17; these weak beats represent the motive, while the upper strings' half notes stand for the woodwind tune. When the violins bring this motive back in m. 42, they regenerate it from a weak-beat figure (the one that they have been repeating since the half cadence of m. 35), thereby adding an upbeat inflection to the weak-beat inflection: a strong overlay of "—, two, three, four, one" upon the original "one, two, three, four," which the drums and brass of m. 50 then

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[14] To be more precise, I learn to hear "one, two, three, four" as the motive from the strings, and then read this motive back into the opening, in which the drums actually never play exactly this. I owe this improvement to Anton J. Vishio.

ratify decisively. They also make the figure as a whole more definitely an upbeat, after its initial ambiguity.[15]

The return of D♯ in m. 65 is a crux for both the rhythmic line of development and the orchestral one. The figure is put back onto its original footing, "one, two, three, four"; and from then, everything is hearty strong-beat romping until it is time for the soloist to enter. Needless to say, the soloist enters "—, two, three, four, one"; and thus do the rhythmic and orchestral issues begin to come together with the fact, of which I haven't yet made much, of the piece being a concerto. All this fuss, remember, comes from an initial funny use of the violins to play drums, while much of the serious work is done by the woodwinds. This restraining of the orchestral violins allows the solo violin to be the first (sometimes the only) string instrument to play most of the major themes: the opening theme (mm. 102 ff.), the second theme (mm. 148 ff.)—but not the minor-mode version of the second theme, which the orchestral violins do play in the ritornello, and to which the solo violin contributes a counterpoint (mm. 152 ff.). The one theme that *is* introduced by the orchestral violins, the closing theme (mm. 77 ff.), is never played by the soloist.

The soloist's role in the assimilation of D♯ depends on its being, as it were, even more conspicuously a string instrument than the orchestral strings. In the approach to the second theme (mm. 143–4), the modulation to A major is accomplished with the aid of D♯, though without any particular allusion to the drumbeat rhythm; and when the violin settles onto E, in the measure preliminary to the theme (m. 143), it *doesn't* reintroduce the rhythm. Instead it replaces the rhythm with a trill, which it sustains through the entire major-mode statement. I hear this as an unexpected new degree of "violinization" of the figure, far beyond anything the orchestral violins could achieve by imitating the drums. (The solo violin's next long trill, in mm. 205 ff., will be the occasion for reintroducing the figure, and for drastically altering its dynamic, by making the repeated note normal and the following sustained note strange.)

Thus is D♯'s charge transferred to aspects of the sound other than pitch, through the orchestral and rhythmic consequences of the violins' playing at drums; and these, I would suggest, are the compositional facts that sustain Beethoven's *audacitá* of leaving D♯ alone for so long after such

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[15] A detailed reading of the opening would have to consider the initial measure as sounding hypermetrically "strong" when it happens, but perhaps "weak" relative to the woodwinds' subsequent entrance—unless, indeed, the strong accent is understood as diffused between the measures. This issue is intricately reopened by the drums between the woodwinds' first and second phrases.

rough treatment. I'm not displeased to have found my preoccupation leading me into such a peculiar pattern of connections among such a peculiar assortment of entities—that's exactly what I'd hoped it would do. But I feel that I still haven't passed the acid test, because I haven't been talking much about the music right after the first theme (mm. 18 ff.). I haven't been because none of the lines of connection I've been exploring yields very much in this music. This is to say that *this* music is *really* the music in which D♯ is left alone; what I've been talking about is the easy part. And I can still remember my own advice about not wanting to handle D♯'s absence by finding D♯ everywhere secretly present.

So: *how* is D♯ absent from mm. 18 ff.? What experience of the passage corresponds to the claim of some persistent concern with D♯? What in the passage becomes salient by virtue of D♯'s absence?

I'm going to try bonehead simplicity again: what's salient is the absence of D♯. You wouldn't bother to notice this if you were starting at m. 18, but in context it's pretty striking to run into nothing untoward between D in m. 18 and E in m. 20. The theme's one-step-at-a-time phrasing, its slow unfolding of ostentatiously slight content with an extraordinarily exact and easy-to-follow parallelism between the elaboration of D and the elaboration of E (and then that of F♯), gives an especially strong sense that we've got D♯ out of our system—that D♯ isn't remotely in consideration.

This is a case in which identifying what I hear is especially hard. *Saying* to myself "Gosh, no D♯" would feel like a kind of failure, for reasons I elaborated earlier. This passage might be the one for which the image of deadpan humor is specifically revealing. In the wake of D♯, perhaps the way to hear the passage is as exaggeratedly innocent in character.

I can point out details that clean the slate in specific respects: that these are woodwinds getting down to the lower part of the triad with no trouble, and that they eventually get back up to A, in thirds (in m. 25), and resynthesize the triad space before the cadence, in a kind of cleaned-up version of the first section's synthesis. But the way to experience all this is less to *remark* it than to hear the passage as curiously *unengaged* with the signal peculiarities of what precedes it.

One of the subtler characteristics of the passage is the relative erasure of weak beats, particularly second beats, as distinctly articulated points. This provides for continuity with the music of mm. 28 ff., and for contrast with the violins' eventual regeneration of the four-beat rhythm from the weak-beat figure of m. 35 ff. This is another kind of disengagement—from the rhythm one-two-three-four, as it's begun to be parsed—but we may not be specifically aware of it until it's reversed.

Measures 28 ff., I wouldn't call innocent, even if they are disengaged from the opening rhythmically (and orchestrally). At the least, they are

guilty of *every* pitch class outside the D-major scale, in some spelling: F♮ and B♭ in m. 28, E♭ and C♮ in m. 30, and eventually G♯ in m. 34. This means, among other things, that these measures take off from a problematic pitch where there wasn't ever one in the D–E–F♯ space, between E and F♯. (There was no reason at all to remark the absence of F♮, or for that matter of B♭.) In general, this section so violently separates itself from the issues raised by what precedes that, I must admit, I hardly hear the E♭ of m. 30 as resembling D♯, however preoccupied I may be. I'll just say that inasmuch as I do hear this resemblance, I hear these measures as a realm in which out-of-register resolution of sensitive notes seems to be less of a problem than it is in the opening, both for E♭ resolving to D in m. 31 and for B♭ resolving to A in mm. 32–33. (I suppose this sense of resolution is facilitated by a general indeterminacy of register, created by the tune's wide range and by the heavy doublings of the orchestration.)

Through this passage, D minor eventually emerges as an alternative sphere not particularly troubled by D♯. This is what D minor is later, too, in the second theme: the return of D♯ at m. 65 is, on the spot, significantly a return from D minor to D major. I must admit that, in the minor-mode statement, I don't know what to do with the change from a Neapolitan, in m. 59, to an ordinary II chord in the parallel place in the repetition of the phrase, in m. 63: I have to imagine that this change is to avoid sounding E♭ close to D♯, but I don't know what to hear. I do know that that the definition of D minor as a realm without D♯ (but perhaps with E♭) adds force to the wonderful crux of the development section, in mm. 343–6, in which D is regained as the tonic—D *minor*—by a move from E♭ major, recently tonicized (as VI of G minor), reinterpreted as the Neapolitan, to the dominant of D. The dominant arrives in $^6_3$ position, so the bass succession is E♭–C♯. This, as I say, is a way of reestablishing the tonic; and it in some sense belatedly vindicates the "Neapolitan" hearing of our D♯ as E♭ (but only in D minor).

The development of two distinct lines along which D major might be disrupted—the line of D minor and the line of D♯—has its reflection in the specific losses of innocence that the theme introduced in m. 18 eventually undergoes. In the exposition, this music turns to D minor—starting over, in that mode, at just the moment when its slow climb D–E *would* have reached F♯. From this point the soloist carries a second wave of ascent, D–E–F♮, through which much of the work of modulating to A is accomplished (the job is completed by combining F♮ with D♯).

In the recapitulation, this theme finally meets D♯—in a repetition apparently just for the purpose, mm. 400–405. The harmonic progression in these measures is what we've thought all along would make the most sense of D♯, namely V/II, II, V. But notice how D♯ is treated. The bassoon

reaches D♯, in its characteristic register, at the top of the scale in m. 401. This D♯ is resolved to E, but not in the bassoon part—in the clarinet part, while in the bassoon it drops a major seventh, as it perhaps did on its very first occurrence. The cellos and basses respond in mm. 404–405, in octaves like the clarinet and bassoon, but with their *top* octave matching that of the bassoon—and the cellos' high note is the very C♯ to which D♯ originally moved. So right here D♯ does everything it ever has done or might do, all at once: moves to E without resolving, resolves to E, *and* falls to C♯. And even the step D♯–C♯ is now embedded in a context in which it's less than no problem harmonically.[16]

What I have found most instructive about working out this analysis is the far-flung, heterogeneous, and (as I suggested earlier) ad hoc and unpredictable character of the comparisons, connections, and contrasts that I am led to draw by the open-ended notion of preoccupation. Perhaps my initial apprehension that preoccupation was not a state of hearing is better understood as recognition of this ad hoc character than as recognition of a categorical failure of audibility. That is, the feeling that I didn't know exactly what it would mean, as an auditory experience, to have D♯ lingering in my ear over a long period of time may have been a response to the difficulty of imagining what it could mean *in general:* a slowness to see how a sufficient account could be worked out for this particular case. A moral that I might draw is that (contrary to my expectations) there can be excellent reason to acknowledge, as states of hearing that properly concern music theory, many mental states that are not well-defined in any principled way as combinations of those percepts that we know best how to tie to sonic configurations. As long as there is an answer to the question "What is it to hear that?" in each *instance* that we care about, there may be no need to be able to give an answer for all instances.

This view is most congenial to an essentially pragmatic conception of music theory as seeking above all to enhance auditory experience (less so to one of theory seeking to translate musical experience reliably into some regimented symbols more trustworthy than music). Under this conception, a theoretical posit may serve its purpose by provoking perception—especially perception along lines that you might not have considered before an encounter with the posit: simply put, by getting you to notice

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[16] There is a remarkable subsidiary plot line involving the bassoons, including at least their prominence in the development section, their joining the strings on the repeated D♯s in the recapitulation, the first bassoon's role in the passage I've just described, and the first bassoon's star turn in the movement's coda.

things that you'd otherwise never have thought to listen for. In this enterprise, I have found the image of an open-ended preoccupation—open-ended as to objects and extent—a useful device.

In my exploitation of this device, I am relieved to have found a way to sublimate the purist ambition about which I expressed reservations earlier. Nothing in what I have just said is a reason to back off from the question "What does it mean to hear that?"; there is only an implicit warning against too specific an expectation of how the answer to this question will go. I'd better make sure I'm comfortable with the idea of music theory as ineluctably involving complex, specially made-up stories about how its concepts relate to experience, as opposed to regular reliable translations of these concepts into experiential terms. Moreover, I'd better get comfortable with the idea that *figuring out* such stories (essentially an *interpretive* activity) and swapping them have to be central practices, and central occasions for learning, in music theory—and therefore that a bit of theory might be esteemed for the sharpness with which it provokes such invention, just as appropriately as another bit might for the smoothness with which it appears to render such invention unnecessary. And I'd better recommend these views to all my colleagues; which I hereby do.

ABSTRACT

What does it mean for the celebrated D♯s in the first movement of Beethoven's Violin Concerto to "stay in one's ear" during the time between their initial unresolved occurrence and their eventual resolution? What is it to hear such a thing? Or is the relevant experience not to be described as an auditory one?

Supposing that an account of an auditory experience can be given (one is offered), what if it is of such a nature as to seem unsuited to generalization? Then, presumably, occasion will have been found to countenance a music-theoretical posit without consistent auditory significance. Is this acceptable? To what conception of music theory might it be most congenial?

Plot and Tonal Design as Compositional Constraints in *Il trovatore*

By Scott L. Balthazar

Although almost two decades have passed, Joseph Kerman's response to Sigmund Levarie's essay in *19th-Century Music* on tonal relations in *Un ballo in maschera* remains a landmark in the analysis of Verdi's operas.[1] Arguing that "Verdi was less interested in tonal absolutes . . . than in what could impress *his* naive listener," Kerman questioned the relevance of analyses that seek long-range relationships between non-adjacent keys—relationships which depend on the perception of absolute pitch—particularly when such relationships ignore the immediate tonal contexts and temporal sequences of those keys.[2] Kerman stopped short of condemning such studies entirely and even acknowledged that they can produce exciting results. Nonetheless, his polemic is troubling if we accept it, for it suggests that many of our most prominent analytical edifices—for example, studies which explain tonal designs as long-range cadential progressions, as systems of keys centered on single tonics, or as networks of associations between specific keys and protagonists or dramatic concepts—and their implications regarding tonal structure tremble on shoddy foundations.

By directing our attention away from background relationships to those in the foreground and middleground, Kerman has lent his support to a productive line of investigation that has illuminated Verdi's efforts to reach his audience and to stage successful operas. And Kerman's assumption that Verdi was too savvy to expect his listeners to appreciate long-range tonal connections seems reasonable enough. However, we can hardly conclude that Verdi's attention to the expressive surface of his music led him to ignore completely such deeper levels of its design. Like other compos-

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[1] Joseph Kerman, "Viewpoint," *19th Century Music* 2, no. 2 (1978): 186–91; Siegmund Levarie, "Key Relations in Verdi's *Un Ballo in Maschera*," *19th Century Music* 2, no. 2 (1978): 143–47. See also the responses to Kerman by Guy A. Marco and Levarie in *19th Century Music* 3, no. 1 (1979): 83–89. I am grateful to Professors Leonard B. Meyer, Roger Parker, and Gary Tomlinson for reading an early draft of this essay and making many helpful suggestions. Another version was read at the conference "*Il trovatore* and *Le trouvère*" held at the American Institute for Verdi Studies, New York University, 25 May, 1991.

[2] Kerman, "Viewpoint," 187–89. The issue of audibility has come up most recently in Roger Parker's assessment of Allan W. Atlas's analysis of keys and meanings in Puccini. See Parker, "Counterpoint: A Key for *Chi?* Tonal Areas in Puccini," *19th-Century Music* 15, no. 3 (1992): 231, and Allan W. Atlas, "Crossed Stars and Crossed Tonal Areas in Puccini's *Madama Butterfly*," *19th-Century Music* 14, no. 2 (1990): 186–96.

ers, he faced compositional problems and made decisions that would not have directly affected the aesthetic experiences of his listeners.

Verdi's choices of keys involved just these sorts of decisions. Most likely they were guided by a complicated network of influences and constraints which varied in importance from one instance to the next. This network probably included such factors as the keys of other music recently heard, personal or idiomatic tonal preferences or aversions, conventional or idiosyncratic associations between affect or topos and key or mode, and the vocal ranges of his singers.[3] And tonal schemata—even the abstract designs rejected by Kerman—could certainly have functioned as conscious or subconscious compositional constraints, facilitating Verdi's selection of keys by limiting options. Several studies have indicated, in fact, that Verdi experimented with long-range tonal schemata as early as the 1850s. David Lawton has shown that *Rigoletto* incorporates long-range bass-line arpeggiations of D♭ major and D major triads and "double cycles" of parallel tonal progressions which correspond to various aspects of the libretto. Martin Chusid's argument that *Rigoletto* is governed by a network of relationships centered on D♭—whether or not we agree that D♭ functions as a tonic for the entire opera—tends to corroborate Lawton's findings. Similarly, Edward Cone has suggested that the deep structure of *Simon Boccanegra* depends partly on a long-range arpeggiation (a broadly deployed augmented triad E/C/A♭)which Verdi clarified in revising the work and which contributes to dramatic cogency through its relationship to the plot.[4] Since the existence of such schemata in his scores would suggest that tonal planning played a role in his conception of operatic structure at some level—especially since Verdi offered no conflicting testimony—we should hardly ignore them. Instead, we should treat them as integral elements of

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[3] The last consideration could at best have provided a partial constraint. That is, the vocal range of a specific singer, coupled with the range of a given melody would have confined Verdi's choices to a single key only if 1) that melody reached both the lower and upper limits of the singer's range (otherwise the melody could have been moved down or up); 2) he had conceived the entire melody before determining the key in which it would ultimately be set (otherwise he could have avoided the problematic contours); and 3) he was unwilling to adjust the extremes of his melody to fit the singer's range or to situate its principal ideas—its thematic block—effectively in the singer's tessitura. It is unlikely that this combination of criteria pertained to many of Verdi's melodies. Consequently, in most cases, vocal range would at most have restricted the number of possible keys without determining the particular key chosen.

[4] David Lawton, "Tonality and Drama in Verdi's Early Operas," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1973), 175–211; Edward T. Cone, "On the Road to 'Otello': Tonality and Structure in 'Simon Boccanegra'," *Studi verdiani* 1 (1982): 72–98; Martin Chusid, "The Tonality of *Rigoletto*," in *Analyzing Opera, Verdi and Wagner*, eds. Carolyn Abbate and Roger Parker (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 241–61.

his style, of his development as a composer and, more broadly, of the intellectual history of Italian opera in the nineteenth century.

Although these analyses raise the possibility that Verdi's other middle-period operas might follow similar designs, to date those works have resisted attempts to find patterned progressions or single tonics. *Il trovatore* seems particularly troublesome in this respect, since Verdi juxtaposed distantly related keys in successive scenes without adhering to any obviously conventional arrangement. Perhaps the analytical intractability of *Il trovatore* explains the vigor with which scholars have instead pursued apparent associations between keys or pairs of keys and the *personae* of individual characters.[5] For example, connections have been drawn between E minor and Azucena's love for her mother (her filial love) and consequent vindictiveness, between G major and Azucena's love for Manrico (her maternal love), between Ab and Leonora's heroism, between F minor and her despair, and so on. Despite the initial appeal of this method, however, the evidence for presumed associations between key and aspects of persona in *Il trovatore* seems equivocal at best.

The relationship proposed by Pierluigi Petrobelli between E minor and Azucena's filial love and vindictiveness, a relationship for which perhaps the strongest evidence can be cited, will serve as an example. Table 1 lists and gives the lengths of all passages in which E minor is tonicized and summarizes concurrent events in the plot.[6] It shows that seven of nine passages involve Azucena (as either the singer or subject) or her mother, while five of them (marked with asterisks in column 2) present some aspect of their relationship. At least a general connection with E minor seems evident—and I will later suggest that E minor is one component of a network of keys associated with Azucena. However, in several of these instances Verdi's choice of key may have been influenced by other factors. "La fattucchiera perseguitata," the second verse of Ferrando's *racconto*, conventionally stays in the same key as the first. And since the E minor passages in Azucena's act 2 *racconto* and the act 4 finale are linked to quotations of "Stride la vampa," they may have resulted secondarily from

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[5] See Julian Budden, *The Operas of Verdi*, vol. 2, *From* Il Trovatore *to* La Forza del destino (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 70; Pierluigi Petrobelli, "Towards an Explanation of the Dramatic Structure of *Il trovatore*," trans. William Drabkin, *Music Analysis* 1, no. 2 (1982): 129–141, see pp. 131–37; William Drabkin, "Characters, Key Relations, and Tonal Structure in *Il trovatore*," *Music Analysis* 1, no. 2 (1982): 143–53. See also Marcello Conati's presentation of a complex network of associational and schematic relationships in *Rigoletto: Rigoletto di Giuseppe Verdi: Guida all'Opera* (Milan: Mondadori, 1983), 124–37.

[6] I have noted in column 2 that Ferrando's melody fluctuates between E minor and G major.

thematic recapitulation. So only two independent cases exist of an association between E minor and Azucena's relationship with her mother ("Sarebbe tempo presso la madre" and "Stride la vampa"). Even more importantly the specific associations proposed by Petrobelli appear infrequently. None of the passages cited in table 1 explicitly discusses either Azucena's love for her mother or her present quest for revenge, and only two allude to her attempted murder of the Di Luna baby ("La fattucchiera perseguitata" and "Quand'ecco agl'egri spirti"). In addition, several of them broach absurdly unrelated issues: in the act 1 trio, Leonora affirms her love for Manrico in E minor; the E minor passage in the act 2 chorus attests that liquor bolsters gypsy courage; and E minor is associated with Azucena's maternal love (for Manrico), not her filial love (for her mother) in the slow movement of the act 3 trio. While these last three examples are not the longest in E minor, they cannot be deemed inconsequential, since they are comparable in length to other passages cited in table 1 (see column 5).

Table 2 approaches the evidence from the opposite direction, examining all references to Azucena's filial love and vindictiveness in conjunction with the accompanying keys.[7] Here the case for associations between key and persona seems even cloudier. Again, while the general connection between E minor and Azucena is apparent, the more specific one between that key and her filial love and vindictiveness is not. In five of thirteen passages, texts involving Azucena and her mother's death are associated with E minor. However, the aforementioned second verse of Ferrando's *racconto* and two recapitulations of "Stride la vampa" (II, 5, Allegretto, and IV, 14), in which Verdi's choice of E minor may have occurred coincidentally, comprise three of those five examples. More significantly, only one of Azucena's four cries of "Mi vendica"—the phrase that Pierluigi Petrobelli has asserted was "meant to identify what Verdi calls Azucena's '*amor filiale*'"—is unambiguously oriented toward E minor (the one in her act 2 *racconto*).[8] And in this instance, although the diminished seventh chord that accompanies her outburst is preceded by a dominant pedal in E minor, it resolves not in that key but in F♯ minor. Both of Azucena's own accounts of her efforts to avenge her mother ("La mano convulsa stendo," II, 5, Allegro, and "Oh se ancor ti spinge il fato," II, 6, *Tempo d'attacco*) occur in keys other than E minor. Strikingly, "Condotta ell'era in ceppi"

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[7] In table 2, secondary keys within passages dominated by primary ones are given in parentheses; straight horizontal lines indicate a progression (the following key supersedes the preceding one); horizontal arrows indicate tonal instability.

[8] Petrobelli, "Explanation of the Dramatic Structure of *Il trovatore*," 130–31.

Table 1

E minor in *Il trovatore*

(1) Scene	(2) Movement	(3) First Line of Text	(4) Action or Topic	(5) No. of Meas.
I, 1	Introduzione Ferrando's *racconto*, verse 1 (e / G)	"Abbietta zingara, fosca vegliarda"	The gypsy was expelled from the Count's nursery	48
	Ferrando's *racconto*, verse 2 (e / G)*	"La fattucchiera perseguitata"	The gypsy was burned, the Di Luna baby assumed killed by her daughter	52
	Tempo di mezzo*	"Sarebbe tempo presso la madre"	Di Luna's men want to kill Azucena, just as they had killed her mother	8
I, 3	Scena Romanza e Terzetto *Tempo d'attacco*	"Qual voce"	Leonora has mistaken Di Luna for Manrico; she loves Manrico	17
II, 4	Coro e Canzone Gypsy chorus	"Versami un tratto: Lena e coraggio"	Drinking gives gypsy men courage	12
II, 4	Coro e Canzone Azucena's *canzone* (e / C)*	"Stride la vampa"	Azucena recalls her mother's execution: the crowd's reaction, her mother's appearance, and her "shout of death"	118
II, 5	Racconto d'Azucena Allegretto*	"Quand'ecco agl'egri spirti" (musical reprise of "Stride la vampa")	As Azucena wavered about killing the baby, she had a vision of her mother's torture	32
III, 10	Trio Slow movement (e / G)	"Giorni poveri vivea"	Azucena was poor yet happy until Manrico deserted her	34
IV, 14	Finale *Scena**	"Un giorno turba feroce" (musical reprise of "Stride la vampa")	Azucena tells Manrico that his grandmother had been executed	14

Table 2
Filial love and key in *Il trovatore*

(1) Scene	(2) Movement	(3) First Line of Text	(4) Action or Topic	(5) Key	(6) No. of Meas.
I, 1	Introduzione Ferrando's *racconto*, verse 2	"Ma rimaneva la maledetta"	The daughter became her mother's avenger	G	8
	*	"Compì quest'empia nefando eccesso"	The daughter killed the Di Luna baby	e (f♯)	28
II, 4	Coro e Canzone	*Canzone**	"Stride la vampa"	Azucena recalls her mother's execution: the crowd's reaction, her mother's appearance, and her "shout of death"	e(C)	118
	Recitative	"Mi vendica"	———————	Dim. 7/D⁷	4
II, 5	Racconto d'Azucena	Andante	"Condotta ell'era in ceppi"	Azucena recalls her attempted interaction with her mother before the execution	a	34
	"'Mi vendica!' sclamò!"	———————	a/dim.7/d	2
	"La vendicasti?"	Azucena stole Di Luna's son, but wavered	a——>G	11
	Allegretto*	"Quand'ecco agl'egri spirti" (musical reprise of "Stride la vampa")	Azucena had a vision of her mother's torture	e——>	32

Table 2 (cont.)

Filial love and key in *Il trovatore*

(1) Scene	(2) Movement	(3) First Line of Text	(4) Action or Topic	(5) Key	(6) No. of Meas.
	Allegro*	"Mi vendica"	———	dim. 7 [V/e]	4
		"La mano convulsa stendo"	Azucena tried to kill the Di Luna baby, but instead killed her own	a——>	61
II, 6 Duetto	*Tempo d'attacco*	"Oh se ancor ti spinge il fato"	Azucena wants Manrico to kill Di Luna	C (a)	29
	Tempo di mezzo	"Mi vendica"	———	c	2
IV, 14 Finale	*Scena**	"Un giorno turba feroce" (musical reprise of "Stride la vampa")	Azucena tells Manrico that his grandmother had been executed	e	14
	Conclusion	"Sei vendicata, o madre"	Azucena declares her mother avenged	e♭	5

(II, 5, Andante), her most personal account of the execution and most moving expression of filial affection—certainly one piece that Verdi should have set in E minor according to the hypothesis under consideration—appears instead in A minor.[9] And she attains her revenge in yet another key, E♭ minor. One additional related passage not cited in table 2 occurs in the *tempo di mezzo* of Manrico's aria in act 3. It sets Ruiz's reference to Azucena's impending execution by fire ("Accessa è già la pira")—recalling her mother's death—in E major, although that key is weakly tonicized, its mode is wrong, and the text focuses on Manrico's relationship to Azucena instead of her relationship to her mother. Moreover, when the image of fire returns moments later in Manrico's *cabaletta* ("Di quella pira") he sings in C.

It would be unreasonable to expect Verdi to have maintained associations between key and persona with complete consistency. However, lacking Verdi's testimony and faced with strange incongruities at crucial mo-

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[9] As William Drabkin has argued, dramatic similarities between Azucena's two solos in act 2 and the opening scene of the opera (both provide descriptions of the gypsy's death) explain to some degree the tonal parallel between those scenes (both move from E minor to A minor) and might partly account for Verdi's choice of A minor for "Condotta ell'era" (Drabkin, "Characters, Key Relations, and Tonal Structure," 145). However, if the link between E minor and filial love had been dear to Verdi he would certainly have set "Condotta ell'era" in E minor, preserving the correspondence between filial love and that key at its most salient point. If the parallel motion across both the act 1 *introduzione* and Azucena's two arias were also deemed necessary, he could have maintained it by reversing the progression in both scenes, setting Ferrando's *racconto* and "Stride la vampa" in A minor, the chorus of Di Luna's men and "Condotta ell'era" in E minor. (Naturally, adjustments of the present melodies—or even different melodies—would have been necessary.)

Martin Chusid's recent attempt to relate E♭ as the dominant of A♭ to "Manrico's cruel or evil destiny, or to the idea of death, sometimes to both" and A♭ to "Leonora's love and sacrifice" suffers from similar problems ("Death and Destiny: The Sonority of E♭ in *Trovatore*, read at the conference 'Verdi's *Trovatore* and *Trouvère*,'" American Institute for Verdi Studies, New York, 1991; Professor Chusid has urged me to take his arguments into consideration and has graciously provided me with a typescript of his essay). Although Chusid cites numerous incidents where these concepts and keys coincide, the evidence again suggests that such specific relationships may have resulted indirectly from more general affinities between characters and keys. For example, because Leonora sings frequently in A♭ and is preoccupied virtually to the exclusion of other sentiments with the issues noted by Chusid, the proposed associations occur frequently. However, Leonora's fixations also carry over into substantial passages in other keys. The *cabaletta* "Tu vedrai che amore in terra" of her act 4 aria—in F major—includes all four concepts (love, fate/destiny, death, and sacrifice): "You will see that no love stronger than mine ever existed on earth; fate won in a fierce battle, it will conquer even death. Either with the price of my life I shall save your life, or united with you forever I shall descend to the tomb!" Similarly, her *risposta* "Un istante almen dia loco" from the D♭ *stretta* of the act 1 finale mentions death, love, and sacrifice.

ments (which could only have compounded his audience's task of tracing connections) we have to wonder whether he gave them much consideration and whether the correspondences that do occur might have resulted accidentally from other relationships between key and text. These conclusions regarding *Il trovatore* are seconded by Kerman's evaluation of similar associations in *Un ballo in maschera.* As he so aptly observed, "on the face of it, it does not look as though the composer who dealt this mess expects to win many contracts in the great game of key relations."[10]

While analyses of this sort present substantial problems, they bring us closer to understanding the structure of *Il trovatore* by suggesting that we view the libretto as a primary rationale for tonal design. That is, in contrast to analyses that seek tonal coherence in such purely musical sources as bass-line arpeggiations, parallel progressions, and close circle-of-fifths relationships, associational analyses can treat aspects of the libretto as the principal framework for the distribution of keys.[11] In particular this approach can lead to a more convincing interpretation if we shift our focus from relationships between key and *persona* to relationships between key and *plot.* Close study of *Il trovatore* indicates that its tonal design may reflect Verdi's interpretation of the plot structure of the libretto. His distribution of primary keys and the nature of relationships among them seem to correspond to 1) connections between related scenes, sections of scenes, or events, and 2) distinctions among and convergences of separate subplots or arenas of action.

Within this design, primary keys are those given preponderant emphasis and stability within individual scenes. Usually they are presented in such lyrical pieces as one-movement arias or choruses and the *tempi d'attacco* (opening movements), slow movements, and cabalettas or strettas (concluding movements) of multi-movement lyric numbers, the landmarks of operatic design that would have commanded Verdi's attention. These correspondences between key and libretto involve the arrangement of plot elements, which is independent of affect, rather than the elements them-

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[10] Kerman, "Viewpoint," 190.

[11] Previous writers who have traced such associations have not recognized this potential and have instead attributed structural coherence to purely musical factors. For example, Petrobelli has argued that "the plot of *Il trovatore* is static, since none of the characters 'grows' in any way during its four acts. . . . The cohesion and the enhancing powers of the opera must therefore be found exclusively in the music, or to be more precise, in the constructive principles and relationships which the composer establishes in the score" ("An Explanation of the Dramatic Structure of *Il trovatore,*" 130). Drabkin has argued that the principal keys of *Il trovatore* are united through common-tone relationships. See "Characters, Key Relations, and Tonal Structure," 149.

selves, that is, the personalities, situations, or ideas that evoke particular moods and thereby suggest either major or minor mode. Consequently, Verdi's long-range design might well have dictated tonics only, and not modes, the latter instead reflecting surface events. Thus, in contrast to analyses which view key as an aspect of *persona*, and which consequently must regard mode as an essential element of that expressive relationship, an analysis of key and plot structure can dissociate tonics from their modes and treat parallel major and minor keys as interchangeable. By attending to parallels between key and plot, this approach traces the roots of tonal ordering to the text's principal source of dynamic cohesion. In doing so, it gives priority—as Verdi might have—to progressive features of the mid-nineteenth century libretto, that is, to a new emphasis of linear aspects of drama and the infusion of action into lyric numbers.[12] And by regarding the arrangement of keys primarily as a compositional constraint, and sec-ondarily—if at all—as an aspect of the aesthetic experience that could be appreciated only by precocious listeners, it avoids unreasonable assump-tions regarding Verdi's assessment of his listeners' capabilities.

Il trovatore has been judged remarkable for the symmetry of its libretto. Gabriele Baldini, for example, noted formal parallels between acts 1 and 2 and acts 3 and 4, involving the durations of acts, the relative complexity and "organicity" of their construction, the distribution of their numbers, and the disposition of their emotional climaxes.[13] While these symmetries are real enough, I believe that the tonal design of this work has at least as much to do with asymmetries of plot that we have as yet taken for granted. That is, many of Verdi's choices of key seem to reflect differences between the plot structures of the first and second halves of the opera caused by the progress of the action across those two sections.

As John Black has remarked in his study of the genesis of Cammarano's libretto, although Verdi initially viewed Azucena as the principal female role, his conception changed as work on *Il trovatore* progressed, and he

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[12] I have discussed these issues in "Analytic Contexts and Mediated Influences: The Rossinian *convenienze* and Verdi's Middle and Late Duets," *Journal of Musicological Research* 10, no. 1 (1990): 19–45, and in "Aspects of form in the *Ottocento* libretto," *Cambridge Opera Journal* 7, no. 1 (1995): 23–35.

[13] Gabriele Baldini, *The Story of Giuseppe Verdi: Oberto to* Un ballo in maschera, ed. Fedele d'Amico, trans. and re-ed. Roger Parker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 213–15. Other scholars have seconded aspects of Baldini's analysis and have taken it as a point of departure for their own observations. See Petrobelli, "Explanation of the Dramatic Structure of *Il trovatore*," 131–32; Drabkin, "Characters, Key Relations, and Tonal Structure," 145; and Roger Parker, "The Dramatic Structure of *Il trovatore*," *Music Analysis* 1, no. 2 (1982): 157–59.

gradually enlarged Leonora's role until it almost equaled Azucena's.[14] This shift in the balance between female leads is paralleled by the bifurcated dramatic structure of the first half of the opera, in which two essentially disconnected subplots develop concurrently, their scenes presented in alternation. During acts 1 and 2, Azucena and Leonora inhabit separate and dissimilar dramatic worlds, which comprise both the scenes in which they appear and the scenes in which they serve as the focus of discussion or action (see tables 3 and 4). Azucena's world includes the *introduzione* of act 1, which contains Ferrando's account of her mother's death, and her two solo numbers and duet with Manrico in act 2. Leonora's scenes include her *cavatina* and trio with Manrico and Di Luna in act 1, Di Luna's love aria in act 2, and the act 2 finale. During this first half of the opera the two women neither meet nor refer to one another (although Manrico of course mentions Leonora when he ends his reunion with Azucena by rushing off to save her in act 2, scene 6).

In their libretto, Verdi and Cammarano underscored this isolation of the female leads with noteworthy contrasts of dramatic style. In Leonora's scenes, characters mark time in a traditional Bellinian operatic world of static conflicts. As in an opera of the 1820s or 30s, those scenes tend to focus on a conventional, inert love triangle and tend to underscore the ineffectuality of attempted actions. Manrico and Di Luna squander at least two opportunities to kill one another: the duel following the act 1 trio, in which Manrico spares Di Luna, and the battle occurring between acts 1 and 2, in which Di Luna leaves Manrico for dead without finishing him off. Their renewed confrontation in the act 2 finale only prolongs the standoff. Di Luna fails to kidnap Leonora as promised in his act 2 aria. And Leonora even misses the chance to end her suffering by taking holy vows.

Azucena's scenes, in contrast, emphasize actions taken, their motivations, and their results. Thus they depict a more up-to-date operatic world of effectual antagonists typical of Verdi's librettos of the 1850s. Azucena exacerbates a chain of events begun prior to the start of the opera—her mother's execution, her botched attempt to kill the Di Luna baby, the unintended death of her own son, and her abduction of the surviving infant—by rescuing Manrico from the battlefield and making him her avenger. Similarly, her duet with him stresses consequential aspects of his fight with Di Luna: Manrico spared his enemy deliberately and not through poor swordplay; Di Luna succeeded in taking Manrico to the point of

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[14] John N. Black, "Salvadore Cammarano's *programma* for 'Il trovatore' and the Problems of the *finale*," *Studi verdiani* 2 (1983): 78–107, see p. 80.

Table 3
Azucena's keys in acts 1 and 2 of *Il trovatore*

(1) Act, Scene	(2) Movement	(3) First Line of Text	(4) Key
I, 1 Introduzione	*Racconto* Ferrando	"Abbietta zingara, fosca vegliarda"	e
	Chorus	"Sull'orlo dei tetti"	a
II, 4 Coro . . . e Canzone	*Canzone*	"Stride la vampa"	e
II, 5 Racconto d'Azucena	*Racconto*	"Condotta ell'era in ceppi"	a
II, 6 Scena e Duetto	*Tempo d'attacco*	"Mal reggendo all'aspro assalto"	C
	Cabaletta	"Perigliarti ancor languente"	g/G

Table 4
Leonora's keys in acts 1 and 2 of *Il trovatore*

(1) Act, Scene	(2) Movement	(3) First Line of Text	(4) Keys
I, 2 Cavatina Leonora	Slow Movement	"Tacea la notte placida"	A♭
	Cabaletta	"Di tale amor, che dirsi"	A♭
I, 3 Scena Romanza e Terzetto	*Romanza*	"Deserto sulla terra"	e♭/E♭
	Stretta	"Di geloso amor sprezzato"	d♭/D♭
II, 7 Aria Conte	Slow Movement	"Il balen del suo sorriso"	B♭
	Cabaletta	"Per me ora fatale"	D♭
II, 8 Finale	Chorus	"Ah! se l'error t'ingombra"	E♭
	Concertato	"E deggio e posso crederlo"	A♭

death (Azucena almost buried him); and Azucena's skill as a nurse—
rather than Di Luna's incompetence—saved Manrico. In this dynamic
context, Di Luna and his henchmen seem formidable, their threats to find
Azucena and kill her seem credible.

Unlike acts 1 and 2, acts 3 and 4 avoid this bifurcated structure. There
the fates of Azucena and Leonora are interlocked through Di Luna's
intrigues, although the two women still fail to realize it. His plottings have
their most visible roots in act 2, where he declares his love and first at-

tempts to kidnap Leonora; and they proceed in acts 3 and 4 through his preparations for a second abduction, his capture of Azucena and discovery that she is Manrico's mother, Manrico's unsuccessful attempt to rescue her and his subsequent imprisonment, Di Luna's insincere negotiations with Leonora, and the deaths of the hero and heroine.

We can find parallels for various aspects of this dramatic design in the tonal structure of *Il trovatore*. Verdi's choice of keys for the three scenes in which Azucena and Leonora are introduced (two scenes for Azucena, one for Leonora) reflect both the functional similarity of those scenes and the separation of their characters (again see tables 3 and 4). Those scenes are the act 1 *introduzione*, in which Ferrando paints Azucena as a crone, Azucena's *canzone* and *racconto* in act 2 (in effect an idiosyncratic double aria) which present her as a loyal daughter, and Leonora's *cavatina* in act 1, which depicts the heroine as a devoted lover. Here the correspondence between scenes elicited the same tonal cliché. That is, all three fall by fifths from beginning to end: the *introduzione* from E in its *scena* and Ferrando's *racconto* to A in its concluding chorus, Azucena's solo scene from E in its opening chorus and her first aria movement to A in her second, and Leonora's from E♭ at the start of her *scena* to A♭ in the two movements of her aria. Yet despite the parallel modulations, the keys of the two women (E and A versus E♭ and A♭) are as distantly related as possible—that is, they share the minimum number of pitches—emphasizing the separation of the two women.

Corresponding to the divisions of plot and style in acts 1 and 2, two distinct arrays of keys develop concurrently for the worlds of Leonora and Azucena. As others have noted, Leonora's primary keys are drawn from the flat side: E♭, A♭, D♭, and B♭. Azucena's are drawn from the sharp side: E, A, C, and G.[15] Moreover, different types of tonal motion within these arrays correspond to the contrasting styles of action through which the two women are presented. Leonora's keys form a symmetrical progression (the second half mirrors the first) which diverges from A♭ alternately in both directions around the circle of fifths and returns to that key by retracing its steps (see table 3 and figure 1). After bringing Leonora onstage in E♭ in her *scena*, Verdi established A♭ as a stable point of departure by devoting both movements of her *cavatina* to that key. Subsequently, her

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[15] Budden has also discussed this polarization of the female leads through musical means (see *From* Il Trovatore *to* La forza del destino, 70). Parker has noticed this dichotomy between flat and sharp keys, but has emphasized their sequential relationships rather than their role in articulating alternating planes of action: in each of the first two acts, sharp keys give way to flat keys, and flat keys dominate acts 3 and 4, ("Dramatic Structure," 159).

progression moves up a fifth to E♭ in Manrico's *romanza*, down a fifth
below A♭ to D♭ in the *stretta* of the act 1 trio, and up a fifth above E♭ to B♭ in
the slow movement of Di Luna's aria in act 2. At that point the progres-
sion reverses, returning to D♭ in the *stretta* of Di Luna's aria, to E♭ in the
nuns' chorus of the act 2 finale, and to A♭ in the slow movement of that
finale.

Figure 1. Leonora's keys

I, 2	I, 3	II, 7	II, 8
		B♭	
	e♭/E♭		E♭
A♭			A♭
	d♭/D♭	D♭	

In its cyclical, formulaic nature, Leonora's tonal progression mirrors
both the stasis of her love triangle and the conservative, Bellinian dra-
matic style of her scenes in acts 1 and 2. More specifically, the points of
greatest tonal discontinuity between adjacent keys, the two juxtapositions
of E♭ and D♭, coincide with the two most obvious dramatic disjunctions.
One of these points of discontinuity separates Manrico's *romanza* in E♭
minor/major, which he sings unaware of Di Luna's presence, from the
crystallization of their confrontation in the trio's *stretta* in D♭. The other
marks the change of scene and mood between Di Luna's cabaletta in D♭
and the nun's chorus in E♭ which opens the act 2 finale. These relation-
ships seem to explain in part the deflection of Leonora's direct cycle of
fifths—A♭ to E♭ to B♭—by incorporating D♭. It also seems significant that
both movements in D♭ develop Di Luna's animosity, first toward Manrico,
then toward a "rival God." He is out of place with respect to both society
and key.

One element in Leonora's schema—Manrico's E♭ minor *romanza*, heard
during the *scena* of the act 1 trio—deserves special attention, since analy-
ses of this scene by Roger Parker and James Hepokoski make its inclusion
as a primary tonal center seem questionable. Briefly, Parker has proposed
that across the entire *scena* "there is an underlying arpeggiation of C
minor."[16] C major is established first by an instrumental introduction and
several opening lines of recitative, Manrico's *romanza* ("Deserto sulla terra")

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[16] Parker, "Dramatic Structure," 160–61.

introduces E♭ minor and also provides striking references back to C major at "è sola speme un cor" and "è d'ogni re maggior," G appears briefly in the ensuing recitative at "Ella scende," and finally a decisive cadence in C major ends the *scena* prior to the *tempo d'attacco* ("Infida! Qual voce! Ah dalle tenebre"). Hepokoski has taken this interpretation farther, arguing that "tonal motion . . . , at least through the opening of the *tempo d'attacco* . . . is governed by the initial C tonic."[17] According to this formulation, which treats the *scena* as a middleground prolongation of C major/minor, the scene as a whole would move to D♭ in the *stretta* not from E♭, as I have suggested, but from C, disrupting the symmetrical progression that I have proposed. This long-range association of C and D♭ is foreshadowed in microcosm by a prominent inflection to D♭ in the eighth measure of the instrumental introduction.

In my view this interpretation is questionable, particularly if we examine harmonic motion in this scene as we hear it in prospect. I prefer to regard the E♭ of Manrico's *romanza* as the stable harmonic goal of the preceding recitative. This scena moves directly toward E♭ down the circle of fifths from its initial C to F at "Ah! . . . l'amorosa fiamma," and then to B♭, which functions initially as a tonic when Manrico's harp is first heard, then as a dominant shortly before he sings ("Il trovator, io fremo"). Verdi's transposition of the instrumental introduction from its original F major to C, a revision discovered by Hepokoski, reinforces the sense of linear motion in this passage by lengthening the cycle of fifths and by avoiding extended emphasis of F as a conflicting tonic, which might have made ambiguous the role of E♭ as a structural downbeat.[18] Once E♭ has been established as a primary tonic, it serves as the most audible context for subsequent tonal motion. Consequently, the brief inflection to C following Manrico's *romanza* (before "Infida! Qual voce!") functions more as an unstable digression than as a stable point of return.

Read in this manner, tonal resolution and deflection in this passage present a plausible interpretation of the concurrent action. The abortive return to C parallels Di Luna's attempt at ignoring Manrico's presence and believing again, as he had at the start of the scene, that Leonora loves him. Although she mistakenly confirms his tonal gambit with a full cadence, her acquiescence is short-lived. Manrico's entrance exposes their errors, both emotional and tonal, as he seizes Leonora and the key, usurp-

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[17] James A. Hepokoski, "Compositional Emendations in Verdi's Autograph Scores: 'Il trovatore,' 'Un ballo in maschera,' and 'Aida,' " *Studi verdiani* 4 (1986–87): 87–109, see p. 95.

[18] Hepokoski, "Compositional Emendations," 96.

ing the pitch E from C major as a common-tone pivot to E minor for the start of the lyric trio. Moreover, the inflection in the *scena*'s instrumental prelude not only to D♭ but also to A♭—the key in which Leonora's *cavatina* has just ended—casts Di Luna's entrance into her tonal world as an unwanted intrusion and foreshadows conflicts that will come to a head in the D♭ *stretta*.

Azucena's progression E/A/C/G resembles Leonora's in its reliance on motion by fifths, E/A and C/G (table 4). And like Leonora's, it has a cyclical element. As noted earlier, the keys of Azucena's two aria movements (E minor and A minor) restate the principal tonics of the *introduzione* (also E major/minor and A minor), reflecting a similarity of dramatic function. In contrast to the long-range symmetry and tonal return of Leonora's progression, however, Azucena's provides an open-ended tonal design which corresponds to her more active ethos. The background tonal stasis created by the *introduzione* and her own first scene ends in her duet with Manrico, which replaces E/A with C/G. This shift to forward tonal motion occurs when the action begins to move, that is, when the characters turn their attention from the remote past to more recent events and future plans: Manrico describes his fight with Di Luna, promises to act ruthlessly next time, learns that Leonora intends to become a nun, and resolves to stop her.

Leonora's and Azucena's progressions lead from opposite directions toward F major/minor, a tonal center which will dominate acts 3 and 4, connecting events stemming from Di Luna's intrigues. One key from each of their progressions provides a link to F: Leonora's B♭ as its subdominant; Azucena's C as its dominant. Verdi introduced these pivot keys precisely when connections between events in acts 1 and 2 and Di Luna's stratagems first become apparent. And he introduced them explicitly in the context of F, making plain the harmonic relationships. B♭ is the key of Di Luna's only love song, his act 2 *romanza*, which crystallizes his motivation for subsequent intrigues. Di Luna had prefaced this movement by staking his claim to Leonora in a passage that cadences squarely on F (at "Leonora è mia"), and he hears the bells summoning her to the convent in F minor shortly afterward. C is established in the *tempo d'attacco* of Azucena's duet with Manrico, where he explains that he spared Di Luna's life because he felt a presentiment of their brotherhood, revealing a crucial miscalculation that will open the way to catastrophe and alluding to a central element of Azucena's revenge, Di Luna's eventual murder of his own brother. Eleven measures prior to this movement, Azucena had reminded her son of Di Luna's treachery in F minor (at "Ecco mercede ai giorni").

Unlike Leonora's progression, for which the pivot key, B♭, represents the point of maximum divergence from the starting and concluding key

of A♭, Azucena's tonal motion proceeds beyond her pivot, C, to G in the cabaletta of her duet with Manrico. Although this arrangement reduces the prominence of the pivot by embedding it within an ongoing progression rather than making it an endpoint, it has an arguable relationship to the plot. As indicated above, the *tempo d'attacco* of the Azucena-Manrico duet provided an obvious moment to present C as a primary key because of the dramatic ties between that movement and Di Luna's intrigues in acts 3 and 4. Verdi could not have exchanged Cammarano's text for the *tempo d'attacco* with that of the cabaletta to put C at the end of the progression, since the present cabaletta's text ends with Manrico's departure. Returning to A or E for the cabaletta, or even repeating C, might have seemed unacceptable, since these alternatives would have produced a cyclical arrangement or middleground tonal stasis and a resulting similarity to Leonora's progression that Verdi probably wanted to avoid. Thus it was advantageous to introduce a new key in the cabaletta, and G maintained the characteristic motion by fifth seen in previous stages of the tonal design. Moreover, by overreaching the pivot, Verdi added a separate tonal analog for a new subplot—Manrico's conflict with Azucena over his divided loyalties—that begins with his decision to abandon his mother and save Leonora. The key of G returns when Azucena discloses her search for Manrico in the slow movement of the act 3 trio (at "Io, deserta, vado errando"); it is the key in which mother and son are reunited in the act 4 finale (at "Sì; la stanchezza m'opprime, o figlio"); and it is the key in which Manrico questions Leonora's loyalty in that finale (at "Parlar non vuoi?"), before the lovers are reconciled.

During acts 3 and 4 the two arrays of keys devoted originally to Leonora and Azucena are still associated with those characters, serving as sources of primary keys juxtaposed against the F axis (see table 5). As in acts 1 and 2, Azucena's tonal plan is more event-oriented than Leonora's: tonics chosen for actions in the second half of the opera are the same as those chosen for similar actions in the first. The C major soldier's chorus that begins act 3 resembles in its combative mood the C major *tempo d'attacco* of the Azucena-Manrico duet in act 2, in which Manrico had described his fight with Di Luna. Azucena's E minor-major slow movement in the act 3 trio, in which she laments her poverty and loneliness and discloses her maternal ties to Manrico, parallels the gypsy chorus and her *canzone* in act 2, also in E: both scenes describe aspects of gypsy life, characterize her situation, and convey her emotional attachments to her kin. Manrico's cabaletta in C major, after which he abandons Leonora at the altar to save Azucena, relates to his moment of bonding with his mother during their C major *tempo d'attacco* in act 2. Finally, as explained above, G major links the events through which Manrico's conflict of loyalty is developed and resolved.

Table 5
Primary keys other than F in acts 3 and 4 of *Il trovatore*

	(1) Act, Scene	(2) Movement	(3) First Line of Text	(4) Azucena's Keys	(5) Leonora's Keys
III, 9	Coro	Movement 1	"Or co'dadi, ma fra poco"	C	
III, 10	Terzetto	Slow Movement	"Giorni poveri vivea"	e–E	
III, 11	Aria Manrico	Slow Movement (f—D♭)	"Ah sì, ben mio, coll'essere"		D♭
		Cabaletta	"Di quella pira l'orrendo foco"	C	
IV, 12	Aria Leonora	Slow Movement (f–A♭)	"D'amor sull'ali rosee"		A♭
IV, 13	Duetto	Slow Movement	"Mira, d'acerbe lagrime"		A♭
IV, 14	Finale ultimo	Slow Movement 1	"Sì; la stanchezza m'opprime, o figlio"	g–G	
		Slow Movement 2	"Parlar non vuoi?"	G	
		Slow Movement 3	"Prima che d'altri vivere"		E♭/e♭

In contrast, Leonora's keys follow a conventional, purely musical schema—as in the first half of the opera—and do not connect parallel situations. Her keys again move upward by fifths, in a progression that extends through single movements in four numbers: 1) the slow movement of Manrico's act 3 aria, predominantly in D♭ (though it begins in F minor), in which he anticipates a spiritual reunion with Leonora; 2) the slow movement of Leonora's act 4 aria, primarily in A♭ (though it too begins in F minor), in which she affirms her love for Manrico; 3) the slow movement of her duet with Di Luna in act 4, also in A♭, in which she pleads for Manrico's life; and 4) the last slow movement of the act 4 finale, in E♭ major-minor, in which Leonora and Manrico are reconciled. Yet Leonora's open-ended progression contrasts with her closed, cyclical one in acts 1 and 2, reflecting her new involvement in Azucena's world of action. Moreover, its eventual arrival on E♭ causes the opera to end in one of the keys most distant from that in which it began (E major/minor), reflecting the substantial progress of the plot. At the same time, arrival on the key in which both she and Manrico had originally made their entrances corresponds to her physical and anticipated spiritual reunion with her lover.

During the second half of the opera F major/minor, the intersection between Leonora's and Azucena's tonal worlds established in act 2, mediates among keys associated with Leonora and Azucena (see table 6). Three of the five scenes in acts 3 and 4 begin in F, and four of them end there. In addition, each scene includes one or two lyrical movements (a slow movement and/or cabaletta/stretta) that begins in F major or minor. This axis serves as a tonal parallel for the chain of events set in motion by Di Luna's intrigues. That is, virtually all of the events leading to the final disaster are set to music centered on F. Di Luna discovers Azucena's relationship to Manrico over a dominant pedal in F during the *tempo di mezzo* of the act 3 trio (beginning "E tu non vieni, o Manrico") and realizes in the ensuing F major *stretta* ("Deh, rallentate, o barbari") that he can punish Manrico by killing her. During the *tempo di mezzo* of Manrico's aria in that act, he and Leonora pledge their devotion in F ("L'onda de'suoni mistici"), and in a modulatory passage that begins in F Ruiz reveals that Azucena has been captured, his music eventually moving to E major (recalling the tonic of "Stride la vampa") when he mentions that she will be burned (beginning "Manrico?/Che?/La zingara...vieni..."). Leonora first discloses that she will rescue Manrico in F minor during the *scena* of her act 4 aria ("Salvarlo io potrò, forse"), then affirms her intentions in her F major *cabaletta* ("Tu vedrai che amore in terra"); and finally, Di Luna vows to kill both Azucena and Manrico in F major during the *scena* of his duet with Leonora ("Come albeggi, la scure al figlio"). Di Luna and Leonora

Table 6
F major and f minor in acts 3 and 4 of *Il trovatore*

	(1) Act, Scene	(2) Scene Begins in F/f	(3) Scene Ends in F/f	(4) Movement(s) wholly in F/f or Beginning in F/f	(5) First Line of Text
III, 9	Coro	——	X	*Stretta*	"Squilli, echeggi la tromba guerriera"
III, 10	Scena e Terzetto	X	X	*Stretta*	"Deh, rallentate, o barbari"
III, 11	Aria Manrico	——	——	Slow movement (f–D♭)	"Ah sì, ben mio, coll'essere"
IV, 12	Scena ed Aria Leonora	X	X	Slow movement (f–A♭)	"D'amor sull'ali rosee"
				Cabaletta	"Tu vedrai che amore in terra"
IV, 13	Scena e Duetto	X	X	*Cabaletta*	"Vivrà! Contende il giubilo"

make plans to betray one another over a dominant pedal in F during their *tempo di mezzo* ("Olà/M'avrai . . . ma fredda"), and she again promises to save Manrico in their F major cabaletta ("Vivrà! Contende il giubilo"). Thus, having established the F major/minor axis just as the fates of the two women are drawn together by Di Luna's plottings, Verdi kept it in effect until the climactic moment in act 4 when Di Luna and Leonora set courses of action that ensure the final disaster.

I turn now to the manifold relationships among secondary tonics, those established for relatively brief periods of time with less emphasis and stability than the primary ones that have occupied us so far. Explaining tonal relationships at this local structural level presents a thorny problem, since the aesthetic impact of audible harmonic progressions can hardly be regarded as insignificant. Verdi's decisions must have depended upon many different considerations, among them his intuitive judgments regarding the character and importance of particular dramatic moments and the intensity of their accompanying harmonic progressions. Nonetheless, I believe that we can take a tentative step toward understanding this level of design by examining two ways in which Verdi's long-range network of primary keys may have limited his choices of secondary keys in acts 1 and 2.

Tables 7 and 8 show ways in which secondary keys serve a process of modulating the tonal palette by phasing keys in and out of focus. Keys that eventually reach the status of primary tonics frequently appear initially as prominent secondary tonics within scenes dominated by other keys. Less often, primary tonics reappear in later scenes as prominent secondary keys.[19] This device is most apparent in Azucena's scenes in acts 1 and 2 (see table 7). The shift to C and G in act 2, scene 6, is prepared by the prior introduction of those tonics as secondary keys against A and E in act 1, scene 1, and act 2, scenes 4 and 5, and by the pronounced increase in emphasis of C and G across those earlier scenes. Conversely, when C and G become primary keys, A major/minor still serves as a secondary tonal center.

Although the same approach is also evident in Leonora's scenes in acts 1 and 2 (table 8), her secondary tonal references are shorter than Azucena's, perhaps because her primary keys fall into a more conventional pattern. Nonetheless, Db and Eb do appear in act 1, scene 2, before they become primary keys in the next scene (act 1, scene 3). And Bb is touched in act 1, scene 3, before reaching the foreground in act 2, scene 7. Moreover, conjunctions between each of the earlier occurrences of those three keys and

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[19] This characteristic may relate to Verdi's gradual introduction of keys distant to the initially primary ones of Ab and Db in *Rigoletto*. See Chusid, "Tonality of *Rigoletto*," 247.

Table 7

Primary keys used as secondary keys inAzucena's scenes,
acts 1 and 2 of *Il trovatore*

(1) Act, Scene		(2) Number of Measures / Percentage of Scene			
		E or e	A or a	C or c	G or g
I, 1	Introduzione	155/47%	88/26%	5/2%	9/3%
II, 4 and 5	Coro e Canzone and Racconto d'Azucena	124/40%	88/24%	36/10%	58/16%
II, 6	Duetto	————	15/5%	66/25%	148/47%

Table 8

Primary keys used as secondary keys in Leonora's scenes,
Acts 1 and 2 of *Il trovatore*

(1) Act, Scene		(2) Number of Measures / Percentage of Scene			
		A♭	E♭ or e♭	D♭	B♭
I, 2	Cavatina Leonora	147/72%	10/5%	7/3%	————
I, 3	Romanza e Terzetto	17/5%	45/14%	157/49%	3/1%
II, 7	Aria Conte	16/8%	————	103 / 52%	31/16%
II, 8	Finale	66/41%	45 / 28%	————	————

aspects of plot that adumbrate their later occurrences affirm the significance of those connections. E♭ major as a secondary key accompanies Leonora's complaints about her loneliness in act 1, scene 2 ("Un'altra notte ancora"); E♭ minor functions later as a primary key in Manrico's troubadour song, in which he expresses a similar sentiment. D♭ follows E major with startling effect when she explains that civil war separated her from Manrico ("Civil guerra intante arse—nol vidi più!); as noted previously, the next instance of that key in the *stretta* of their trio with Di Luna polarizes the antagonists. B♭ appears briefly in act 1, scene 3, when Di Luna's drive to see Leonora ("Ch'io ti vegga e d'uopo") foreshadows his avowal of love in act 2, scene 7 ("Il balen del suo sorriso"), set in the same key.

Verdi's separation of primary tonics into separate arrays for Azucena and Leonora may have also contributed to his choices among secondary keys. That is, aside from the examples discussed above, in which primary keys from within the dominant array serve temporarily as secondary keys, *all* of the prominent secondary keys in acts 1 and 2 are drawn *only* from the opposite tonal array (and *never* from the four keys that belong to neither array). Thus, Azucena's tonal array provides all the remaining secondary keys in Leonora's scenes and vice versa, linking the two tonal systems through a system of cross-references (see table 9).[20] Moreover, these divergences from the prevailing tonal system virtually always coincide with and heighten unexpected, often shocking moments in the plot: painful memories, dangerous plans, ominous foreshadowings, and unwelcome realizations and revelations. Most notably, they occur when Ferrando recalls the Di Luna baby's sudden illness and Di Luna's vow to hunt down Azucena (both in I, 1), when Ines predicts disaster for the lovers (I, 2), when Leonora realizes that she has mistaken Di Luna for Manrico (I, 3), and when Manrico learns that Leonora will become a nun (II, 6). These inflections seem not to serve specific semantic functions, since they seldom accompany references to the opposite character (that is, references in Azucena's scenes to Leonora and vice versa). Instead, Verdi's choices of keys represent efforts to match the abruptness of harmonic progressions to the emotional intensity of particular dramatic moments.

The *stretta* of the soldiers' chorus which begins act 3 ("Squilli, echeggi la tromba guerriera") was the only section of *Il trovatore* transposed by Verdi—from F to E—for the Parisian *Le trouvère* in 1857. Lawton has sug-

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[20] Table 9 lists all of these distantly related secondary keys in acts 1 and 2 (under the brackets in column 5), shows their harmonic contexts (column 5), and gives the number of measures for which they are relatively stable (column 6). Vertical double lines denote a sudden shift toward or away from the new key; horizontal arrows represent gradual modulations.

Table 9
Secondary keys in acts 1 and 2 of *Il trovatore* drawn from the opposite tonal array

(1) Act, Scene	(2) Movement	(3) First Line of Text	(4) Action or Topic	(5) Keys	(6) No. of Meas.
I, 1 Introduzione	Transition between stanzas of *racconto*	"Lenta febbre del meschino"	The gypsy had lied, the child fell ill	B——>c♯ (d♭)	9
	Tempo di mezzo	"Bramò che il signor nostro"	Di Luna swore to find Azucena	C——>d♭/c♯	10
I, 2 Cavatina Leonora	*Scena*	"Al vincitor sul crine"	War divided Leonora and Manrico	E ‖ D♭	5
	Tempo di mezzo	"Quanto narrasti di turbamento"	Ines fears Manrico will bring trouble to Leonora	A♭ ‖ E—>C—>A	21
I, 3 Scena Romanza e Terzetto	First *scena*	"Tace la notte!"	Di Luna realizes Leonora is awake	C—>F—>B♭—>e♭	26
	Second *scena* and *tempo d'attacco*	"Anima mia!"	Leonora realizes she has mistaken Di Luna for Manrico	E c–C ‖ e	27
II, 4 Coro e Canzone	————	————	————	None	—
II, 5 Racconto Azucena	*Scena*	"La incolpò superbo conte"	Azucena's mother was accused of witchcraft	f ‖ D♭ A	2

Table 9 (cont.)

Secondary keys in acts 1 and 2 of *Il trovatore* drawn from the opposite tonal array

(1) Act, Scene	(2) Movement	(3) First Line of Text	(4) Action or Topic	(5) Keys	(6) No. of Meas
II, 6 Scena e Duetto	*Scena*	"Che portai nel dì fatale"	Only Manrico resisted Di Luna in battle; Di Luna wounded him	V/G ‖ E♭ V/A♭ ‖ f	12
	Tempo di mezzo	"In nostra possa è Castellor"	Castellor has been captured; Leonora will enter convent	C ‖ D♭ b♭	3
II, 7 Aria Conte	————	————	————	None	—
II, 8 Finale	*Scena*	"O dolce amiche"	Leonora has no future, is eager to take her vows; Di Luna enters	E♭ V/c c–C ‖	15

gested that Verdi might have made the change to prepare more smoothly the new ballet that follows this chorus in the Parisian version, which begins in A minor/major.[21] While this relationship could certainly have played a role in Verdi's decision, motion from F major to its mediant A minor would scarcely have posed a problem in his harmonic idiom, and by retaining the original key he could have avoided rewriting the recitative that connects the *stretta* with the preceding chorus in C major ("Or co'dadi, ma fra poco"). Likewise, tessitura seems an unlikely reason for the transposition down a half step. The prevalent ranges of the vocal parts are comparable to those of the other choruses in the opera, and the contours of the tenor part could easily have been adjusted to eliminate the few high As that occur toward the end of the piece, if they had really presented a problem. (High As for the tenors also occur in the act 1 *introduzione* and the act 3 trio.)

Consequently, I suspect that other factors may have contributed to Verdi's revision. By setting the *stretta* in F originally, he had tied this chorus, in which Di Luna's men anticipate attacking Manrico's castle, to the F axis associated with Di Luna's intrigues. Because the attack never takes place—Azucena falls into Di Luna's hands unexpectedly and his plans change—this chorus ultimately plays no consequential role in later developments. Verdi's transposition acknowledges this functional distinction between a number that sets the stage and others that advance the plot by eliminating the tonal connection. In addition, the return to E affirms the role of this scene in the second half of the opera as a dramatic counterpart to the act 1 *introduzione*, a relationship noted by Baldini.[22] Finally, by returning to the opera's initial key Verdi brought the endpoints of tonal motion across the entire opera (E and E♭) into closer proximity, framing the section of the opera (Acts 3 and 4) in which the action proceeds to its climax and resolution.

While relationships between tonality and plot structure in *Il trovatore* can be supported by evidence from the score, Verdi's reasons for choosing specific keys must remain subject to reasoned conjecture. However, it seems plausible that he took as a point of departure a particular key or sonority—perhaps one in which an especially important number had already been visualized for a given singer—from which other keys could be derived through the system of relationships outlined above. One such key might have been E minor. It is the key in which Azucena sings her first

[21] David Lawton, "'Le trouvère'. Verdi's Revision of 'Il trovatore' for Paris," *Studi verdiani* 3 (1985): 79–119, see pp. 92–94 and 98–99.

[22] Baldini, *Story of Verdi*, 213.

important solo "Stride la vampa," an aria which Verdi had apparently conceived relatively early in the compositional process.[23] And it is the key which defines, according to Petrobelli, the association of the sonority of B with the image of fire and the immolation of her mother.[24] Having established one or more such starting points and developed (consciously or unconsciously) principles governing tonal and textual correspondences, in conjunction with such other constraints as the vocal ranges of his singers, Verdi would have substantially limited his own choices of keys and arrived at either the existing arrangement or one similar to it.

This analysis suggests that Verdi's apparently irregular sequence of keys in *Il trovatore* likely resulted from an unexpectedly sophisticated tonal design. Tied closely to the libretto, it incorporates systems of static associations between keys, characters, and subplots as well as dynamic progressions in which the nature of those progressions and disjunctions within them parallel the arrangement of onstage events. All primary occurrences of keys fit into this inclusive, consistent arrangement. And secondary occurrences of those same keys also seem to function in relation to this long-range structure. That is, increasing and decreasing emphasis of keys within the prevailing array (either Leonora's or Azucena's) brings primary keys gradually into and out of focus; and abrupt intrusions of keys from the opposite tonal array serve at the background level to unify the two arrays and at the foreground level to reinforce dramatic shocks. Evidence also suggests that once *Il trovatore* was completed its tonal schema had a meaning for Verdi that surpassed its role purely as a compositional constraint. As early as his Parisian revision, long range tonal planning seems to have represented more than a practical exercise for Verdi, more than an expeditious step in the compositional process. Once in place, the tonal design became part of his conception of the opera. By articulating and clarifying relationships in the action and by providing an elegant rationale for his distribution of keys, it may well have been viewed by Verdi as a cornerstone of the dramatic architecture of *Il trovatore*.

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[23] Budden, *From* Il trovatore *to* La forza del destino, 66.

[24] Petrobelli has argued that the sonority of B, which in his view serves as a fulcrum for E minor and its relative major, is central to the tonal structure of this opera. See "Explanation of the Dramatic Structure of *Il trovatore*," 134–35.

ABSTRACT

For more than a decade, *Il trovatore* has served as a focus of scholarly investigations into Verdi's treatment of tonal structure. To date, its tonal plan has been viewed primarily from three directions: 1) as a long-range prolongation of a cadential harmonic progression (Levarie); 2) as a system of tonal double cycles and short-range symmetries (Parker); or 3) as a network of associations between keys and characters (Baldini, Petrobelli, Drabkin).

I wish to suggest an alternative way in which Verdi used long-range key relationships in *Il trovatore* to interpret and reinforce its plot structure By establishing separate constellations of keys for Azucena and Leonora and by moving within and between these constellations in specific ways, his music distinguishes independent plot lines, underscores their convergences, articulates shifts from one event to the next, and connects related events This analytic approach explains tonal relationships in *Il trovatore* consistently and comprehensively, accounting for all primary keys. Moreover, by attending to parallels between key and plot, it connects tonal ordering to the text's principal source of dynamic cohesion, giving emphasis—as Verdi might have—to linear aspects of drama and the infusion of action into lyric numbers.

reviews

Ruth Smith, *Handel's Oratorios and Eighteenth-Century Thought.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 484 pp.

The study of context has achieved significance in quite different fashions and rates of speed in various fields of music history. For Mozart, contextualism has become quite central, thanks in particular to the work of Neal Zaslaw, though we still know precious little about other composers of the time. For Beethoven, we still lack a true social biography, but can turn to general works on concert life in his time and to aspects of reception of his works. For composers of the Italian Renaissance we have perhaps the most highly developed study of context, at least in terms of patronage. For Handel, rich sources have been elucidated on the development of the King's Theatre and aspects of his role as entrepreneur. But a huge gap has existed for Handel's oratorios and their religious and political dimensions: as Nicholas Temperley warned thirty years ago, we cannot understand works such as these without talking about religion. What Smith has come up with is a model study in contextualism to which historians like myself feel quite akin.

It is not surprising that Smith came to study Handel in such a fashion from the field of English literature, rather than from either musicology or history. For a long time, scholarly study of the oratorios was deeply affected—one might say in some ways inhibited—by performance practice. The use of large forces in grandiose, ceremonial fashion diminished their dramatic nature and made scholars averse to thinking about them in religious terms. Handelians such as Winton Dean and Paul Henry Lang came out of quite secular musical backgrounds, and tended to play down, or in some cases outright deny, any religious meaning in these works; they saw the oratorios in terms of pagan humanism.[1] In this respect they were quite similar to historians such as J. H. Plumb or Roy Porter who have not tended to see eighteenth-century Anglicanism, or even Dissent, as major social or cultural forces.[2] The return to religion in the eighteenth century

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[1] Winton Dean, *Handel's Dramatic Oratorios and Masques* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); Paul Henry Lang, *George Frideric Handel* (New York: Norton, 1967).

[2] J. H. Plumb, *Sir Robert Walpole* (Boston: Houghton, 1960); Roy Porter, *English Society in the Eighteenth Century* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1982). Note, however, Plumb's highly influential Ford Lectures, *The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675–1725* (London: Macmillan, 1967).

has been associated most directly with the controversial scholar J. C. D. Clark, who argued that England remained in an aristocratic mold best termed an *ancien régime*, and that Jacobites constituted a major political force right up to the defeat of the Scots in the Great '45.[3] Linda Colley established a convincing middleground between different views in her book *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837*, arguing that we must see English national character as founded upon both land and capital and as linked intimately with Protestantism.[4] Ruth Smith has a moderate point of view similar to that of Colley and indeed demonstrates a remarkable command of the literature of eighteenth-century England.

Smith views the oratorios from three different perspectives: Handel and his librettists; the reading and listening public; and the political and religious community. Her perspective on Handel is essentially deconstructive; she argues against the idea that he conceived of the works as complete works of art from start to finish. She concludes that "He did not have a Romantic concern for his works' 'integrity'" (p. 38). Instead she stresses the discontinuities between librettist and composer, the necessity that they obey public taste, and the many practical contingencies that dictated their techniques. Her main object of attack is the notion (so prominent in Dean's work) that Handel aimed at dramatic shape in terms of plot, character and *dénouement*; she takes every opportunity to show that the sources do not prove such a conception on his part. Kenneth Nott has recently made a similar argument for *Jephtha*, but from a musicologist's point of view.[5]

Lydia Goehr would probably find sympathy with the argument here, since she has written a path-breaking book on the rise of the idea of the work of art in music during the nineteenth century.[6] I would nonetheless urge caution in this regard. While performers changed arias within the oratorios, they did not see these works as *pasticcio* nearly to the extent that they did operas, and the repeated republication and performance of the oratorios gave them a permanence that we must take seriously. The canonic

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[3] J. C. D. Clark, *English Society, 1688–1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice in the Ancien Régime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Eveline Cruickshanks, *Political Untouchables: The Tories and the '45* (London: Duckworth, 1979).

[4] *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (London: Yale University Press, 1992). See also her *In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714–60* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[5] Kenneth Nott, "'Heroick Vertue': Handel and Morell's 'Jephtha' in the Light of Eighteenth-Century Biblical Commentary and other Sources," *Music and Letters* 77 (1996): 194–208.

[6] Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

status of these works, which I have argued arrived by the 1780s, gave them the status of art works on a certain plane, and by that time commentators had begun to attack what they regarded as untoward ornamentation of Handel's melodies.[7]

Smith attempts to clear away a whole array of assumptions about librettists; she asks us to take them seriously in their own right. She also shows how literary people had their own cultural agendas, did not take opera very seriously, and were slow to accept the oratorio as a worthy genre. Her perspectives are similar to those of the literary scholar James Anderson Winn, whose intriguing book on the relations between music and poetry through the ages makes us realize that the two arts were more rivals than colleagues in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[8]

Smith makes an interesting analysis of how the librettists transformed the Biblical texts. In one chapter she shows how they excerpted sentences or phrases from Biblical passages for anthems, leading readers rapidly through texts they knew well by giving them particularly vivid selections. In another chapter she makes the case that the librettists not only simplified the Biblical stories but also purged them of all details that might seem morally reprehensible. In so doing they were accommodating the criticism mounted by Deists against the Bible both as failing to serve as an historical authority and as a moral model. "Even the least sophisticated librettos are remote from the Old Testament world of a partisan, intolerant, vengeful deity promoting a disobedient, complaining rabble of in-fighting tribal colonists entirely in His own interests and often apparently at their expense" (p. 234).

When we turn to the musical public's understanding of the oratorios, we see how Smith has contributed greatly to expanding the bibliographical range of Handel studies. She has made the first extensive use of works that either served as precedents for the oratorios' librettos or shaped how people understood them. During the eighteenth century people read a great deal of religious literature, not only the Bible but also paraphrases of its texts and disputations over theological problems; one has to see each libretto linked to a wide variety of related writings and discourses. The style of Biblical texts—at least the fashion by which they were translated— was a source of admiration and imitation, a concern that must have been as important to many listeners as the music itself. The secular and the

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[7] William Weber, *The Rise of Musical Classics in Eighteenth-Century England: A Study in Canon, Ritual and Ideology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

[8] James Anderson Winn, *Unsuspected Eloquence: A History of the Relations between Poetry and Music* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 163–93.

sacred flowed together in Biblical commentaries, since the idea of the sublime served as a key means by which to interpret Biblical writings.

In viewing the librettos as part of theological controversy, Smith situates herself among scholars who have concluded that England, not France, was the first site of the Enlightenment. A critique of church dogma that permeated both politics and culture with debate of major issues and ecclesiastical practice became widespread from the 1670s onwards. Smith argues that, as a general rule, the librettos were designed to circumvent the Deist movement in its attempts to question miracles and spiritual mysteries. This does not mean that the librettists were reactionaries; far from it, they established a centrist—one might say Newtonian—position in accepting reasoned explication for divine phenomena while still speaking of their existence.

One might also argue that the texts of the oratorios interacted with religious and political issues not as a matter of propaganda, but rather as a vehicle of topical entertainment. Political meaning did not necessarily arise from the espousal of a partisan viewpoint in a libretto. Men of letters tended to be identified with a particular faction, as a musician normally would not be, but what they did with librettos politically had more to do with the audience's expectation that they would hear lots of references to recent events and disputes. The author of any play in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries thus felt obliged to allude to things around him as a way to entertain his public. In opera this discourse usually did not involve taking a position; as Curtis Price has shown, opera librettos often contained ambiguous political implications that must have generated much discussion.[9]

Smith shows in specific terms how centrally the oratorios functioned in public life. In the chapter "Towards Oratorio" she explores passages in *The Spectator* that call for sober entertainment through the evocation of sacred texts, and remarkable contemporary concerts that mingled sacred and secular music put on by Cavendish Weedon for members of Parliament. Although music historians have known of these tendencies, Smith is the first to put them in broad context, showing that the oratorios did not come out of nowhere, but were rather the culmination of several decades of fertile innovations in musical life. The Finnish historian Henrik Knif has added to this discussion recently in his impressive study of commen-

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[9]   Curtis Price, "Political Allegory in Late Seventeenth-Century Opera," in Nigel Fortune, ed., *Music and Theatre: Essays in Honour of Winton Dean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

tary on opera in *The Spectator*, he argues that Richard Steele had a much more positive view of music than is often assumed.[10]

Smith portrays the oratorios as part of a movement for the moral rebuilding of English life. "In putting onto the theatrical stage works that endorsed Christian teaching and advocated public and private virtue, Handel and his librettists were fulfilling many elements of the programme being pursued by a variety of groups to produce a reformed, public art that would revitalise the nation's morals, religious belief, spirituality and patriotism" (pp. 52–54). A historian would look at this movement in broader but also more specific terms. During the 1690s there appeared a variety of organizations outside of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, most prominently the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, that challenged people directly to improve morals, especially by reporting evil deeds (from swearing to whoring) to their councils. The movement grew out of the political instability that came after the Glorious Revolution and the deep-seated social changes brought by capitalistic development and urbanization. The Manners Campaign, as it has been called, had a devastating impact upon the London theater, for the publication of a work by Jeremy Collier critical of its scripts in 1698 called the whole post-Restoration theatrical world seriously into question.[11] One can argue that the establishment of the King's Theatre in 1705 came as a solution to the breakdown of the theater undertaken by Van Brugh and his colleagues; they decided to start an institution that would be impervious to such criticism by virtue of its Italian texts and would stand above the chaos of the time by close links with the Peerage. The oratorios served as a second such solution to this ongoing attempt to reform society; it is no accident that they began to purge both immoral words and political slogans from the scripts in the same decade in which the Licensing Act of 1737 brought censorship to the theaters.

Biblical stories about the Israelite people, Smith shows, served as a means by which the English portrayed themselves in their political travails. Her literary perspective is crucial here, since she defines the librettos as part of the genre of the epic: "the nation is taken to be the central concern, the individual hero existing principally as the barometer of national strength" (p. 132). But she sees the librettos presenting not confidence but uncertainty, providing a vehicle by which people could work through their anxieties about the instability of political life.

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[10] Henrik Knif, *Gentlemen and Spectators: Studies in Journals, Opera and the Social Scene in Late Stuart London* (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1995).

[11] Jeremy Collier, *A Short View of the Immoralilty and Profaneness of the English Stage* (London: S. Keble, 1698).

It should be obvious that one cannot distinguish politics from culture in a context such as this. As Smith puts it, "During the first half of the eighteenth century music was a major metaphor for politics" (p. 72). By "politics" here she does not mean party divisions or parliamentary actions, but rather politics "out of doors," as it was put, the public controversies far more pronounced in England than elsewhere in Europe until French politics opened up in the 1750s. One should note, however, that she erroneously identifies the Rev. Arthur Bedford as a Non-Juror. Bedford wrote in the manner of a Tory and established a charity school in Bristol with that party's support, but he voted Whig in the city. In later years he was pilloried in the press for associating himself with the Non-Juror Jeremy Collier in the moral campaign against the theaters.[12]

In examining the nature of political rhetoric, Smith follows the important recent work of Christine Gerrard on the "Patriot" Opposition, the faction of dissident Whigs that opposed Robert Walpole and helped oust him in 1742.[13] Gerrard's book, like Smith's, demonstrates how much it is literary scholars who are gaining a precise understanding of the rhetoric that surrounded these political events—terms such as Liberty, Constitution, Luxury and Standing Army. Gerrard has demonstrated that slogans of a patriotic nature took highly diverse forms in the hands of different parties, and she has pulled us back from interpreting these tendencies on the model of mass-based nineteenth- or twentieth-century nationalism. By the same token, Smith argues that the nationalistic rhetoric surrounding the oratorios should be seen to have been worried and defensive rather than aggressive, indeed militaristic. The new perspectives on this history make clearer how and why Handel became identified with Walpole, after having entered the court essentially under Tory auspices. In this area Smith follows the work of Donald Burrows and Graydon Beeks in making more precise the diverse, changing links Handel set up with factions in the political community.[14]

We need to take a wide perspective on the oratorios—seeing them as part of the on-going political and social consolidation that occurred in

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[12] See *The Rise of Musical Classics,* 47–51.

[13] Christine Gerrard, *The Patriot Opposition to Walpole: Politics, Poetry, and National Myth, 1725–1742* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994).

[14] Donald Burrows, "Handel and Hanover," in *Bach, Handel, Scarlatti: Tercentenary Essays,* ed. Peter Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 35–59; and Graydon Beeks, " A Club of Composers: Handel, Pepusch, and Arbuthnot at Cannons," in *Handel Tercentenary Collection,* eds. Stanley Sadie and Anthony Hicks (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987), 209–21. See also Kenneth Nott, "Sacred and Profane: The Ambitious Minister and the Unsearchable Ways of God's Wisdom," *Musical Times* 136 (1995): 87–91.

Britain during the hundred years following the Civil War. Between about 1640 and 1750 Britain was essentially in a state of protracted post-revolutionary instability, the kind of political experience France underwent after 1789 and both Russia and China underwent after the turn of our century. During this time a cycle of change in regime took a century to work itself out. Musical life was affected profoundly by this process, often in positive ways, for it opened up many new opportunities for musicians to do business, even if conditions often proved chaotic. Handel took advantage of the last stages of this process, not only in shaping the King's Theatre to his liking, but also in developing a new concert genre in the oratorio. Smith shows us how shrewdly Handel and his librettists tailored their works for a specific intellectual and political situation, and in so doing came up with an extraordinary new musical experience.

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Robert Samuels. *Mahler's Sixth Symphony: A Study in Musical Semiotics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 175pp.

Semiotics and Mahler's Sixth Symphony: The Suicide of Music Analysis?

Robert Samuels's new study of Mahler's Sixth Symphony is a welcome addition to the analytical literature on the composer's music. Combining insights from semiotics, deconstruction, genre theory and narratology with such traditional methods as Schenkerian and formal analysis, Samuels seeks "to explain the tremendously powerful effect that this symphony has always exerted on listeners, and to explain this effect in terms that could address both the sequence of notes on the page and the accumulation of programmatic anecdote and interpretation that has surrounded it" (p. 2). Early in the book, he attacks the narrowness of current analytical practices, contending that only by moving beyond purely musical considerations can the actual significance of the purely musical be properly understood. Traditional analysis, he suggests, produces only "partial representations of the [musical] text, whose selectivity indicates ideological choice" (p. 13) and compounds the problem of this partiality by taking its "representation" as constitutive of musical significance. Yet there is no escaping such partiality, since the totality that would be the musical work is nowhere wholly present. "Writing always engenders more writing; the refusal to accept this fact of human communication is called 'ideology'" (p. 4). This leads Samuels to semiotics, to the thesis that music is a system of signs (p. 1). If semiotics does not escape ideology because its representations too are only partial, it at least foregrounds the ideological choices that must always be made.

Samuels's semiotics is primarily "esthesic" according to Nattiez's typology; that is, Samuels places theoretical emphasis on the question of "how the listener 'makes sense' of the musical work" (p. 12) rather than on compositional process or "poietics."[1] A listener, he suggests, "engages in a sign-producing activity which consists of delimiting semiotic codes according to different ranges of reference amongst potential signifying units" (p. 15). By this, Samuels means that musical signs are the result of the particular code that a listener invokes. Listening for the motivic code, for instance, produces "a certain sort of signifying unit within the musical text,

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[1] Jean-Jacques Nattiez, *Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music,* trans. Carolyn Abbate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

and hence a certain sort of structure," namely a structure of motivic rela-
tions (p. 15). Likewise, listening in terms of other codes creates other
kinds of musical signs, so that a wide range of analytical techniques would
be needed to give a sense of the extent of possible musical signification. In
Samuels's view, such a concern for musical signification has an added
advantage in counteracting a pernicious tendency in Anglo-American mu-
sic analysis toward producing a single "'correct' reading of structure,"
replacing it with "a more open-ended inquiry into the possible multiple
meanings which the musical text can carry" (p. 5).

   Samuels's basic semiotic tool is the s-code based on the work of Umberto
Eco.[2] Samuels defines an s-code as "any collection of objects, ideas, musi-
cal stimuli or whatever that can be grouped together and described as
structured in some way. Thus a harmonic structure, a pattern of motivic
repetition, a given musical form, and an explanatory narrative can all be
described as arising from s-codes of different sorts" (p. 6). Semiotics, how-
ever, does not provide an analytical method itself but only "an orientation
for analysis, a kind of 'meta-analytical' discourse" (p. 14). For Samuels,
semiotics is, among other things, a means for probing the limits of an
analytical method and of the musical codes and signs that that method
can reproduce. As he notes, codes are partial, never identical with the
totality of music; they will therefore always reveal "moments of excess or
absence in the musical text" where the text is no longer "readable" in
terms of the code invoked. Strictly musical codes such as motive and form
"[threaten] to become elusive and speculative as soon as any more than
the simplest analytical observations are made" (p. 65). This gives rise to
what Samuels calls "semiotic exegesis": "where one code fails, another, of
wider referential scope, is invoked" (p. 94). The fact that codes are always
partial drives semiotic analysis forward through a process of supplementa-
tion. "A semiotic analysis," he writes, "constantly finds points at which one
code needs to invoke another to explain the distribution of the units it
identifies" (p. 24). The extent to which signification extends beyond the
immediate context of the particular code defines its "signifying scope" (p.
14). Samuels continually expands the signifying scope in the book, which
self-consciously traces a progression "from 'introversive semiosis,' finding
relations within the work in hand, to 'extroversive semiosis,' which relates
the work to an intertextual space" (p. 14). In this "deconstructive" move-
ment of analysis, the invocation of a particular s-code always requires a
code of wider signifying scope to resolve enigmas and ambiguities pro-
duced by that s-code (p. 55). By drawing out those musical moments when

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[2]   Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).

the code and the work do not coincide, semiotics highlights the operation of the codes, the manner in which "the code dictates the segmentation of musical signs" (p. 14). Since codes are always partial, moreover, "it follows that different analytical techniques will become appropriate in the context of different codes. . . . The results of existing analytical techniques can be made to serve new ends" (p. 14).

Samuels's book follows this deconstructive path from introversive to extroversive semiosis, which is at the same time a path from musical to extramusical considerations. The "genuine autonomy" (p. 62) of the Andante of Mahler's Sixth serves to justify his most ascetic introversive analytical procedures. In this movement, he examines only those purely musical signs "whose referential scope is entirely 'intramusical,' and initially even 'intratextual,' requiring no interpretant (to use Peirce's term) drawn from outside the work in hand" (p. 18). Samuels first performs a paradigmatic analysis of the surface motivic content, looking especially at the opening motive of the main melody and the characteristic motives of descent in the movement (ex. 1). He finds that whereas the interval content of the opening motive "is varied . . . each time it appears," the interval content of the descent motive is held relatively constant (p. 61). Samuels suggests that this is what makes the variants of this theme comprehensible to the listener: "the re-working and melodic recombination fall into a coherent structure" because the invariant features of the descent motive allow the transformations of the main motive to unfold by what seems a "linear logic" (p. 61). Still, Samuels recognizes the limits of this kind of analysis, the way it must continually overreach itself: "any discussion of apparently 'purely musical,' abstract motivic shapes is likely to throw up multiple connections in which significance is both undoubted, and yet only describable by resort to metaphor or narrative" (p. 26). Motivic analysis, for instance, cannot even explore its own significance without stepping outside itself, without drawing on informal, metaphorical modes of exposition and analysis that are, strictly speaking, outside the bounds of motivic analysis.

Samuels next turns to form, a code whose referential scope is wider than the motivic code. The formal code, though still largely introversive, is intertextual rather than intratextual because it presupposes the concept of a formal mode. Any movement "gains significance from its relationship to other movements with similar form or function" (p. 35). Indeed, it would have no "form" at all outside this intertextual matrix. Hence, the formal code remains an "analytical fiction" for Samuels, since it "does not really exist in music" (p. 56) but is created by bringing a particular s-code, that of form, to bear on music.[3] Samuels uses this s-code to investigate the

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[3]   Cf. Marion Guck, "Analytical Fictions," *Music Theory Spectrum* 16, no. 2 (1994): 217–30.

Example 1. Mahler, Symphony no. 6, III, mm. 1–10. x = opening motive; y = motive of descent.

formal problems of the finale, a movement that has always posed severe interpretive difficulties to analysts and critics. He runs through various attempts to parse the movement into something resembling sonata form, including those by Adorno, Bekker, Floros, and Sponheuer. Samuels notes that many of the sectional divisions within the finale prove surprisingly resistant to any coherent sonata-form interpretation, despite the fact that the movement as a whole seems unmistakably sonata-like in tone as well as overall shape. The various appearances of the opening measures of the movement are especially noteworthy in this respect because each recurrence renders the actual formal function of the section it introduces "undecidable." "The chord is 'unreadable' [in formal terms] except as a formal marker, an indicator of a major sectional division" (p. 86). A sectional division may be clear, in other words, even when the formal function of that section remains ambiguous. In fact, any reading of a section in

terms of a particular formal function "must willfully and arbitrarily privilege one sort of sign over others identifiable at [that] point. . . . It is a state of aporia, a situation in which the structuring of experience, upon which any construction of meaning relies, exposes itself as arbitrary" (p. 86). The very formal complexity of the finale also underscores the operation of the formal code, the way in which that s-code is invoked and deployed by listeners to make sense of musical experience. At the same time, the failure of the formal code to produce a convincing sonata-form interpretation pushes analysis beyond that code. "Faced with the limit points of the application of existing formal categories to the musical text, the analyst is faced with a choice: either to invoke new categories, or to turn to alternative codes to justify a preferred hearing" (p. 89). Either alternative, Samuels notes, leads to new s-codes, in particular away from introversive, "purely musical" codes and toward extroversive codes such as genre and narrative.

Genre theory is potentially the most interesting s-code because, "situated midway between those codes which refer entirely 'intramusically,' such as motivic working or harmonic process, and those—such as musical narrative or programme—which refer entirely 'extramusically,' requiring interpretants that are wholly cultural" (p. 93), it mixes introversive and extroversive interpretants. Though more extroversive than either form or motive, the generic code differs from those more introversive ones in that it considers music a "social practice as well as an artistic convention" (p. 94). This opposition between social practice and artistic convention, while initially plausible, is really untenable to the extent that it must efface the institutional production of the musical. "A form such as a ländler, march, minuet, or waltz," Samuels writes, "carries some inheritance from its origin as a social activity, no matter how much it may also have a history within the practice of 'high art' composition" (p. 94). Samuels here forgets that artistic convention is itself always also a social practice, that motivic and formal attributes, not to mention sonata form itself, always owe their origin to social activity—that of music. The symphony and other genres of absolute music are no doubt especially interesting because they actively participate in and so also reflect to an acute degree the social activity—music—on which they are predicated. A sonata or symphony is self-consciously composed as music in a way that is perhaps not true of the waltz, which necessarily takes the dance it motivates into consideration. This, however, defines the *social* difference between the symphony and the waltz; it does not show not that the waltz has a connection to the social world where the symphony has none.

Better is Samuels's idea that simply identifying a genre of a work does not necessarily say anything about the relation of genre to signification. "Generic fingerprints" such as distinctive rhythmic and melodic shapes do

not simply "signify" a particular genre; rather they make reference to the genre "in order to signify something else" (p. 110). Genres, moreover, "invoke expectations relating not only to melodic and rhythmic shapes, but also to typical middleground shapes and formal outlines" (p. 108). These middleground shapes, which open "a dialectic of generic and symphonic-formal codes" (p. 115), help support the coherence of large-scale symphonic form (p. 112). In the Scherzo of the Sixth, for instance, Samuels demonstrates a "tendency towards collapse and dissolution at sectional cadences" (p. 117). This effect, he contends, is "a direct outcome of the supervenience of the symphonic formal scheme over the generic" (p. 117). Such cadences thus act "as an immanent critique of [their] own formal function" (p. 118), where the cadential dissolutions "denude the units of their generic reference. In other words, the process of closing the section gradually obliterates the generic code, as this code serves the needs of formal function. The process itself becomes characteristic: the play of genres leads inevitably to 'negative fulfillment,' a signifier of destruction, at its end" (p. 118).

For Samuels, the generic character of the Mahlerian scherzo itself signifies the dance of death. Samuels makes a convincing case for the relevance of this topos with respect to the scherzo of the Fifth Symphony, where an explicit invocation of the waltz supplies a solid musical connection. For the Sixth Symphony, however, the case is less certain. Here, Samuels must argue in a rather roundabout way that a general generic connection among all Mahler's scherzos is sufficient to make the dance of death a plausible referent for the Sixth Symphony as well. Samuels, to his credit, recognizes a problem here, though he never really succeeds in overcoming it. The evidence he musters is meager at best: a close historical connection between the ländler and the waltz on the one hand and the association of the xylophone with the *danse macabre* on the other (pp. 129–31). Samuels must therefore invoke an abstract "fencing with kitsch" (p. 119), rather than any convincing concrete generic fingerprint to motivate the interpretive leap to the dance of death. If this leap fails it is not because his methodology is "speculative in the extreme" as he fears (p. 131); but rather his leap fails because the dance of death remains such an abstract referent for the Sixth that we are not certain that it really is a referent of this music at all.

After genre, Samuels turns to narrative, the "most abstract, or extroversive, mode of reference" (p. 133). Where his interpretation of the scherzo is unconvincing, his reading of the symphony as representing "the suicide of the Romantic symphony" (p. 157) is much more satisfying. Like much of the book, this provocative thesis is culled from Adorno's wonderful writings on Mahler, an influence that Samuels readily admits (p. 16). For

Adorno, the Sixth's "grandiose immanence of form" gives the work a tragic character in which the work follows this immanence to its own demise.[4] The immanent coherence of the work, Adorno writes, "allows for no escape, so that the life that pulsates in the great finale of the Sixth is not destined for destruction by the hammerblows of fate, but to an internal collapse: the *élan vital* stands revealed as sickness unto death."[5] Following Adorno's hint, Samuels develops an analogy to the Sixth not with the familiar spiral quest of the *Bildungsroman,* but with a closely related reverse image of it—one ending in catastrophic closure of suicide and a self-wish for the end. As Samuels notes, this latter archetype—"the story of the protagonist struggling with forces that crush his or her individuality, promising and then denying freedom" (p. 150)—is not uncommon in the nineteenth century, occurring in such notable novels as Goethe's *Werther,* Flaubert's *Madame Bovary,* and Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina.*

Samuels argues that Mahler's Sixth, like these novels, reveals the institutional oppositions and social contradictions of nineteenth-century bourgeois society.

> It is precisely the desire for individuality within formal convention that causes the semiotic conflict between function and content. . . . Just as the musical outworking of this tension drives first to a positive conclusion (in the end of the first movement) created out of reified musical objects, and then to a negative conclusion (in the Finale) created out of the patient working through of each developmental possibility of the material, so, in the novel, suicide is both willed and forced upon the heroines (pp. 156–57).

Samuels points out that the suicide archetype tends to involve a female protagonist, which helps him account for the prominence of the second theme—coded feminine in general and even more so in this symphony since Mahler explicitly identified this theme with Alma (p. 157). While Samuels is no doubt correct in noting that female protagonists are usual in novels that invoke the suicide archetype, he probably goes too far when he suggests that this archetype "is one that virtually necessitates a female protagonist" (p. 155), if only for the important exception of Werther. Certainly, some tensions of novelistic form are better exposed with a female protagonist as a result of the place women hold in bourgeois society,

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[4]   Theodor W. Adorno, *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy,* trans. Edmund Jephcott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 100.

[5]   Adorno, *Quasi una Fantasia,* trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1992), 91.

which is the setting of the novels and provides their tacit morality; but likewise the archetypal plot will unfold somewhat differently with a male protagonist simply because he, too, occupies a different cultural position. All the feminine features in the world do not make Werther female, for instance, and so the pressures that lead to his suicide will be somewhat different than those that affect the heroines of Tolstoy's and Flaubert's novels. Given the cultural associations of the symphony as a masculine musical discourse[6] and Mahler's well-known love for Goethe, it is arguable that *Werther* would have served as a better model for a symphonic suicide plot than would *Madame Bovary* or *Anna Karenina.* If Samuels's choice nevertheless seems the correct one, this is probably because of the cata-strophic sense of closure with which this symphony ends.

"The bodily violence of narrative closure in *Madame Bovary* and *Anna Karenina,*" Samuels writes, "[arises] from a lost struggle with system and authority" (p. 158). Likewise, the ending of the Symphony is violent, even terrifying, and arguably it too is the result of such a lost struggle. The final chord records the sacrifice of the individual and the particular to the system, even though a conventional cadential progression is avoided. The so-called "fate" motive, which always seems to remain stubbornly outside the musical flow, here yields to the demands of the tonal system only to bring the musical flow to an end as well. To see why this is a plausible interpretation of the end of the work, we need to consider the role of the fate motive in the work. Example 2 represents its first appearance. After a dissolution of the motivic material of the first theme, the snare drum and timpani break in with a rhythm characteristic of the funeral march; this is followed by a sudden, radiant A-major chord. The prominent trumpet sonority hints at a vision of something transcendent, something beyond the world, compressing all the potential of a utopian breakthrough into a single chord.[7] But the world weighs heavily on this chord as it is drawn inexorably back to A-minor. The visceral, deflating effect of this moment thoroughly belies the seeming banality of its conception with a bare alter-nation of major and minor chords. This kind of alternation has a symbolic character that is almost linguistic in force, even if it is difficult to put into words the exact "meaning" of shifting from major to minor. Set off from the first theme group by both the thematic dissolution with which the section concludes and the stark timbre of the drums, the fate motive is musically isolated and so semiotically marked. The fate motive intervenes

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[6] See Susan McClary, *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality* (Minneapolis: Univer-sity of Minnesota Press, 1991), 68–90.

[7] "Breakthrough" is one of the analytical categories Adorno develops in his discussion of Mahler's music. See Adorno, *Mahler,* 4–14.

Example 2. Mahler, Symphony no. 6, 1, mm. 57–60.

in the musical course like a leitmotiv (p. 161), arresting the musical flow as though it were a linguistic sign. It is, as it were, a semantic irruption into the purely musical flow, which is defined by the smooth operation of functional, syntactic relationships.

The alternation of major and minor is a musical relation not easily handled on a purely musical level. Rhythmically indistinct as it is, Mahler's motive resists coherent introversive analysis because harmonic theory does not functionally distinguish between major and minor tonics. Moreover, unlike the similar major-minor figure in the famous opening fanfare of Strauss's *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, where a distinct rhythmic profile encourages us to hear the first note of the pair as an appoggiatura, it is difficult to imagine Mahler's motive this way. Mahler's major-minor shift also lacks what is usually taken as fundamental to an explanation in terms of functional harmony: root progression.[8] The very ease of labelling the function of these chords masks a deeper theoretical problem concerning musical grammar. The succession of I to i is *syntactically* nonsensical; it is less a "progression" than simply a substitution of one musical sign for another, an ornamental coloration. As Samuels notes, "slipping from major to minor is normally a subtle process involving retrospective recasting of experience and ambiguity of chord progression. . . . The stark presentation of a major triad in close spacing and its minor version banishes the possibility of such effects" (p. 161). I and i are musical signifiers whose signified, "tonicity," exists only discursively, that is, outside music. As such, the movement from I to i (or vice versa) is symbolic rather than syntactic; it operates under the auspices of semiosis, which is characterized by displacement, substitution, and deferral. Taking either the major or minor as fundamental and originary—that is, as the ultimate musical signified of the motive—misses what is so crucial about it: namely, the alternation

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[8] Carl Dahlhaus "Harmony," in *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians,* ed. Stanley Sadie 8 (London: Macmillan, 1980), 177.

between the signifiers of the same (unsounding) signified.[9] If the motive "sounds incapable of development" as Samuels suggests (p. 161), it is perhaps because this alternation is rather too obvious and too potent to sit easily in an economy of music that constantly sets syntax and function above semantics and semiosis. In this sense, although the fate motive is a purely musical sign, it is also, to the extent that it operates on a symbolic level as a "sign" protruding from and impeding the syntactically governed musical flow, profoundly unmusical.

A quirky chorale (ex. 3) responds to the disruption and perturbations that the semantically-charged fate motive introduces into the work. These bars seem to fulfill the formal function of a transition between the first and second theme group except that the chorale really goes nowhere, remaining, as Constantin Floros among others points out, wholly within the sphere of A minor.[10] The introduction of B♭ toward the end of the first-theme group and the abatement in the dissolution field with which the section concludes arguably make a transition between first- and second-theme groups tonally and syntactically unnecessary and even superfluous. Samuels, for instance, admits that F has already "been prepared . . . by the occurrence of B♭s in the melodic line earlier on" and notes that the augmented triad on which the chorale ends really leads no further toward F than did the close of the first-theme group (p. 145). The chorale is therefore a section with the formal function of a transition, but one whose actual syntactic transitional character seems intentionally minimized. In any case, the entrance of the second theme would hardly have been more abrupt there than after the chorale, where, as Adorno points out, the entrance of the theme seems calculated to appear as an unmediated interruption.[11] Moreover, chorales do not usually serve as transitions in symphonies.[12] Thus, its use here "foregrounds the artificiality of the choice. . . . The myth of formal succession is rewritten as fiction, narrated by the

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[9] The relation between the first and second statements of Strauss's motive—the first minor, the second major—is closer to the effect of Mahler's motive, though it is arguable that the relation between the statements in *Zarathustra* involves a "retrospective recasting of experience" and so it would not place syntax under pressure as Mahler's motive does. However, the *Zarathustra* fanfare resembles Mahler's motive in that it also lacks an underlying root progression, entailing nothing but an alternation between minor and major.

[10] Floros, *Gustav Mahler: The Symphonies*, trans. Vernon and Jutta Wicker (Portland, Oregon: Amadeus, 1993), 167.

[11] Adorno, *Quasi una Fantasia*, 108–109.

[12] Samuels is simply mistaken when he intimates that the genre of the chorale lies outside symphonic technique (p. 145). Indeed the chorale is the very embodiment of symphonic transcendence, the musical symbol, as it were, of symphonic self-overcoming. But Samuels is correct to note that the deployment of the chorale here as a transition is anomalous.

Example 3. Mahler, Symphony no. 6, I, mm. 61–76.

music" (p. 145). At the same time, the chorale retains its generic associa-
tion with symphonic transcendence within the symphony, confirming the
possibility of breakthrough represented by the A-major chord. As the work
progresses, the chorale material becomes associated with the utopian Oth-
erness of what Floros calls "distant" music.[13] But this chorale is wholly
unlike the glowing, *ad astra* chorales associated with the breakthroughs of
the earlier symphonies, especially those of the First and Fifth Symphonies.
Here, the chorale maps breakthrough onto the trajectory of the fate mo-
tive. Stripped of its sacred quality, its aura of transcendence, breakthrough
has in the Sixth Symphony become worldly and mundane, no longer
striving toward a Heaven beyond the world but seeking it instead within.[14]

What then is the function of this "transition" if not to bridge the first
and second theme? This question returns us to the fate motive. The cho-
rale fulfills its transition function by making a first attempt to integrate the

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[13] Floros, *Gustav Mahler*, pp. 169, 181.

[14] Cf. John Williamson, "Liszt, Mahler, and the Chorale," *Proceedings of the Royal Musical Association* 108 (1981–82): 115–25.

fate motive into the tonal flow of the Symphony by presenting a context in which the major-minor shift makes sense. As Example 3 shows, the many descending chromatic lines in the chorale often give rise to major-minor shifts that, unlike the fate motive, operate on a syntactic level (for example, m. 63). If the passage into the second theme nevertheless remains abrupt, so that the fate motive and chorale seem an intrusion that draws attention to the disjunction between first and second theme, the chorale makes a first attempt to come to terms with the semantic irruption, to create a proper musical syntax for the major-minor shift. The chorale, in other words, tries to mitigate the effects of this irruption by channelling the impulses of this tonally recalcitrant material back into the musical flow. That the motive nevertheless remains a sign impervious to proper musical syntax and so continues to resist the musical flow—this signifies a musical failure that encodes the tragedy of the work on a purely musical level.

Samuels spends the last full chapter of his book tracing the fate motive through the Symphony, where he discovers "an alternation between the model and increasingly distant forms of it" (p. 162). The motive, he says, reinforces "the contours of symphonic form. It is less an interruption than it seems: rather, its distribution shadows the progress of the form of the entire work" (p. 162). Samuels charts the various appearances of the motive throughout the work, dividing the motive into two fundamental components—the funeral rhythm in the drums and the major-minor tonal shift (p. 161). He finds clear instances of the motive in all the movements except the Andante, in which the motive appears, he claims, only "vestigially" (p. 161). While the motive admittedly never appears in definitive form there, Samuels's decision to allow only the horn melody of m. 127 into the motivic paradigm is surprising and somewhat arbitrary, especially given that earlier he had noted how the "modal equivocation" of the E♭ major theme, which he explicitly associated with the major-minor shift, was the result of a persistent chromatic alteration of scale degrees (p. 25). The chromatic fluctuations of this melody, he wrote in his chapter on the Andante, "can be linked with both the specific motivic features of the major/minor triad which appears in all the other movements . . . and with the more general voice-leading mixture of major and minor tonality which is prevalent in the work as a whole" (p. 25). Nowhere in the Andante, it is true, does the fate motive itself appear, but the movement contains many moments that allude to the basic paradigm every bit as much as the horn melody does.

Samuels is surely correct in identifying a bodily violence, a "brutally physical impact" (p. 162), with the fate motive, though—perhaps reflecting a general musicological bias—he reverses the terms, associating the

semantic properties of the motive with society and the musical system with the individual. The fate motive, he suggests, is an image of "mob violence" linked to an oppressive system external to music. This is an arguable position, though not quite a persuasive one. Certainly, there is a sense in which the various appearances of the fate motive, the cowbells, and especially the hammer strokes, seem outside, even foreign impediments to, the musical flow. They are touches of tone painting that inspire, indeed, almost seem to demand programmatic interpretation, Mahler's attempt to delegitimize such interpretation notwithstanding.[15] As such, these elements function as traces of the external narrator who made this music, who dictated the direction and form of the sonic world without regard for the consequences on the individual musical processes. In this sense, the semantic, semiotic properties of the fate motive—for instance, its resemblance to a leitmotiv—might be viewed as sonic remnants of an external linguistic force, which the tonal flow must absorb, erode, or eliminate in order to set its own course and secure its autonomy. However, this argument ignores the fact that the closure at the end of the work is a musical closure rather than a linguistic one. The fate motive, Samuels suggests, follows a musical imperative for closure after all developmental options have been exhausted (p. 163). The finale, however, does not actually come to a close because the material has been fully developed—further developmental episodes could always be devised—but rather because the material no longer has space to develop. In the course of the finale, the flow of the development is ruthlessly channelled toward a single catastrophic moment, in which the material, in particular the fate motive, is revealed as caught in an unbearable contradiction between the particular and the totality. Adorno outlines the "desperate choice" that this contradiction inflicts on subjective consciousness: "Either [a subjective consciousness] must harmonistically stylize the contrary course of the world and heteronomously obey it, against his own better insight—or, doggedly loyal to his own definition, he must act as if the world's course did not exist and must perish by it."[16] Mahler's symphony, like the protagonist of the suicide

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[15] In a footnote to m. 198 of the first movement, Mahler writes: "The cowbells should be played with discretion—so as to produce a realistic impression of a grazing herd of cattle, coming from a distance, alternately singly or in groups, in sounds of high and low pitch. Special emphasis is laid on the fact that this technical remark admits of no programmatic interpretation" (cited and translated in Hans Redlich's "Critical Commentary" for the Eulenburg study score of the symphony [Mainz, 1968], p. xxix). Mahler no doubt feared an overly literal programmatic interpretation that would, cinema-like, suddenly cut to a herd of cows coming down off the mountain whenever the bells sounded.

[16] Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 152.

archetype, chooses to preserve subjectivity, the motivic definition of the major-minor shift, and so perishes by this choice.

The final chord (m. 820) lands like the ax of an executioner, representing a bodily assault on the fate motive in which the motivically incomplete but musically proper minor chord substitutes for and displaces the motivically complete but musically improper major-minor shift. The motive here acquiesces to the tonal demand for proper syntax, its decapitation the route to the properly musical. The final chord is therefore not a simple instance of musical overcoding in which functionally "the concluding part of the motive is used to conclude" (p. 163); rather, this overcoding points to the site of decapitation, to the sacrifice of semiosis and intelligibility that accompanies the closure necessary to constitute the authentically musical time so crucial to musical autonomy.[17] The closure at the end of the symphony is terrible for the way it emphasizes this sacrifice without glorifying it, or even making it comprehensible. With it, not just the piece, but both the musical flow and the whole process of internal semiosis necessary to sustain the music itself, collapse as well: the irreducible, motivic core of the major-minor alternation, which had supplied the work its identity, is at this moment obliterated, as the motive—now reduced to a minor chord—is purified of semantic content, absorbed into a tonal flow that now has nowhere to go. Semiosis finds stability, its point of anchorage, in death, and the tonal flow that had seemed opposed to and impeded by the semantic content of the fate motive dissipates into silence as semiosis ceases. Semiosis turns out to be not just an impediment to the tonal flow but its enabling condition as well. The conclusion of Mahler's Sixth thus raises the existential horror that nothing musical exists—neither the extramusical nor indeed the purely musical—without the presence of the sign as a sign. Beyond the sign lies only the death of music, music as an empty, syntactic core.

If Samuels associates the protagonist with the musical flow and the oppressive system with a semiotic entity such as the fate motive or the hammer stroke due to a musicological bias that posits a link between music and individuality, he runs into similar difficulties with his theoretical aims. For this remains an exceedingly cautious book, more beholden to the interpretive security offered by standard music-analytical practices than his invocation of structuralist and post-structuralist methodologies would seem, at first glance, to suggest. Samuels proves curiously reluctant to follow his deconstructive trajectory to, as it were, its logical conclusion. This becomes clear when he confronts Nattiez's objections to narratological

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[17] James Buhler, "Breakthrough as Critique of Form: The Finale of Mahler's First Symphony," *19th Century Music* 20, no. 2 (1996): 143–61.

analysis. Nattiez believes that if music were narrative like language, "it would speak directly to us" (cited on p. 135). Samuels, on the contrary, recognizes that language does not speak directly to us either. "The gap which is so obvious in the case of musical interpretation is nevertheless still there in the case of written narrative. . . . A 'narrative frame of mind' is necessary in literature too; the question is rather whether any other sort of 'frame of mind' is equally viable in approaching music" (p. 135). The listener and reader occupy structurally similar positions in that they both "construct" a narrative from a material trace, in one case musical, in the other literary (p. 135). Even so, Samuels is more in agreement with Nattiez than not when he insists that the arbitrariness of a musical narrative "is of a different order from that involved in reading a book" (p. 136). No doubt, literary and musical narratives are not identical, but it is questionable whether this difference lies principally in the arbitrariness of interpretants. Narrative applied to music is certainly "a hermeneutical metaphor"; but then so too is all analysis, including semiotic analysis, to the extent that it feigns—as all analysis must—to represent the work adequately within itself.

Samuels, like Nattiez, worries about the promiscuity of more extroversive modes of analysis. He views extroversive semiosis in general with suspicion, necessary to his analytical project to be sure, but always threatening "to take leave altogether of the musical trace" (p. 90). For Samuels extroversive semiosis is an "arbitrary," subjective force that, if not properly circumscribed, imperils the concrete particularity of the purely musical procedures identified with introversive semiosis. He valorizes, for instance, the "advantage" of signifiers that "are constituted solely by musical material" (p. 64) and believes that his approach avoids "the tendency toward unsubstantiated metaphorical interpretation founded on anecdote or solipsistic hearing" (p. 115). He is careful to remind his readers, for instance, that his own attempts at genre and narratological analysis derive from the thing itself, arising "directly from the consideration of motive, form and tonal process" (p. 90). Yet this is a claim that one could make for most modern hermeneutic analyses as well, even when, like Samuels's discussion of the scherzo in relation to the dance of death, the results are less than convincing. No musicologist nowadays sets out to interpret music verbally without directly considering the music. For one thing, the profession simply does not allow it. That an interpretive performance is sometimes unconvincing is undeniable, but then so too are the results of more traditional modes of analyses: if formalized music analysis (Schenker, motivic analysis, etc.) were adequately satisfying for the musicological community as a whole, hermeneutic modes of interpretation would hardly be seductive.

Samuels blames the extroversive interpretants for their tendency toward promiscuity, contending that "any attempt to link non-musical, or extroversive, interpretants to symphonic composition is more likely guilty of partiality or arbitrariness than analyses based on the introversive investigation of motivic working or formal construction" (p. 115). This point, too, is debatable. In "introversive" analyses, partiality and arbitrariness have simply been concealed in an underlying methodology, whose institutionalization has obscured an original partiality and arbitrariness. At times, especially early in the book, Samuels is willing to concede the point (p. 13), but he continually returns to the apparent interpretive security of formalized introversive analysis when attacking extroversive modes on account of the supposed slipperiness of their interpretants. For along with the insights that extroversive interpretants allow, each expansion of signifying scope also introduces unwanted subjectivity into the analysis. In the later part of the book, Samuels is preoccupied more with combatting the encroachment of subjectivity on analysis than with using the overt subjectivity of extroversive analysis as an opportunity to explore the inherent subjectivity of introversive analyses.

Nowhere does Samuels's acceptance of the basic structure of traditional musicology become clearer than in his refusal to challenge or even question the basic premise of that practice: the division between the musical and the extramusical. The musically "pure," introversive semiosis is associated with the individual and the particular; the extramusical, extroversive semiosis with the system and the general. As with his analysis of the fate motive, where he associates the musical with the individual and the extramusical with the system, it is arguable that the terms should be reversed here as well. In analysis introversive methods are systematic and general, seeking to eliminate from its view what is merely subjective. Thus the individual and particular—the concrete specificity of the music—accrue almost by default to the extroversive rather than the introversive interpretants. Caught between the institutional pressure to produce introversive analysis and the individual desire to embrace the extroversive other, Samuels leads analysis along the same suicide plot trajectory his analysis identifies in the symphony. The promiscuity of extroversive interpretants mirrors the promiscuity of the female heroines in the suicide archetype, and both transgress the strictures of an implicit institutional morality. Just as female infidelity offends bourgeois propriety, so too the perceived promiscuity of extroversive interpretants offends the standards of proper analysis. These moral strictures impose the same grim alternatives on both the protagonist and the extroversive interpretant as well: death or conformity. Samuels's semiotics leads us to the edge of an interpretive abyss, the same one marked out by Mahler's Symphony; but unlike the Symphony,

Samuels's analysis refuses to take the leap, to negate itself in order to preserve itself. Humanistically, Samuels preserves the extroversive other only to deliver it broken to the system, as nothing but an empty shell. He ultimately sides with the system rather than the subject, with properly formalized interpretants rather than improperly informal ones. Mahler's Symphony, on the contrary, is bolder, resisting the system till the end. It prefers death, even the end of music, to the fate that awaits a subject cut to fit within the system.

> The possibility of "producing the text" narrated by music is located in the desires of the interpreter; the code of narration is the trace of desire within the musical text. And the path from the detection of isolated "moments of narration" within the movement, through the more holistic treatment of literary archetypes, to a final, thoroughly deconstructed, ironically self-aware state of aporia, is itself a suspiciously Romantic narrative of increasing mastery of the musical substance, or at least of the substance's signifying potential; and as such it too should perhaps be resisted. (p. 165)

What needs to be resisted, however, are not just the "ironically self-aware state of aporia" (if such a state is even attainable) and the interpretive excesses of extroversive analysis, but the systematic element within analysis itself, including, of course, the systematic element that would transform musical narratology or semiotics into yet another highly formalized mode of music analysis. Herein lies the desire for narrative, for a mode of analysis that is informal, extroversive, and hermeneutic, while still figuring the work as something beyond the interpretation, as an object resisting interpretation. Deconstructive analysis, assuming that such a thing exists or is indeed even possible, should be a necessity rather than a choice: it would follow the logic of the work to its point of incoherence and disintegration in the analytical discourse, where the analytical discourse and so also ourselves become complicit in the incoherence.[18] This does not mean that analysis can do without a system, without theory, any more than than thought can do without concepts. Thought that seeks to see further, to expand horizons must use its concepts against itself so as to see what escapes the conceptual net. Likewise analysis that seeks a wider signifying scope must deploy its systematic element against itself so that the system

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[18] See, for instance, Brian Hyer, "'Sighing Branches': Prosopopoeia in Rameau's *Pigmalion*," *Music Analysis* 13, no. 1 (1994): 7–50.

not only opens itself to the supplementary path of "semiotic exegesis" but also reveals the informal, nonsystematic element at its very core.

At his best, Samuels approaches this kind of understanding. He recognizes, for instance, that formalized, introversive analysis has its limits, indeed that an "aporetic state of affairs is both the limit of interpretation—an inherent shortcoming of language as a hermeneutic medium—and a definition of the essentially fluid significatory capabilities of music itself" (p. 165). However, he misconstrues the significance of this thought. Rather than eliminating informality from our musical observations as Samuels continually urges, we need instead to preserve that informality within the most rigorously introversive procedures themselves; to recognize that the purely musical exists not outside the extramusical as a thing apart, but within it as its moment of most emphatic intensification. Pure formality is the trace of a dead analytical practice; informality, a sign of analysis yet to be done.

—*James Buhler*

Allen Forte. *The American Popular Ballad of the Golden Era, 1924–1950.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 366pp.

"If the tool at hand is a hammer," a colleague of mine is wont to say of analytical systems, "then everything begins to look like a nail." We could apply this old saw to many critical methods, music-theoretical, psychoanalytical, or sociological. But it becomes particularly apparent in Allen Forte's recent study of American popular song during the "golden age of Tin Pan Alley." Forte adopts a Schenkerian approach, and this is not the place to rehearse the various ontological and epistemological questions surrounding it.[1] Schenkerian analysis is a given here, and Forte ranks as one of the most adept and sensitive masters of its procedures and goals. He provides a lucid primer spread over the first seven chapters of his book, and while it provides little comfort to the intended audience of layman or amateur, it makes the approach more accessible to anybody with a college background in part writing and basic harmony.

The problem of hammer and nail does not result from Forte's decision to treat popular music seriously, for which he provides an *apologia* in his introduction (p. 4). The rich harmonic and elaborate motivic vocabulary of Tin Pan Alley repertory, based heavily in the practice of European classical music, would seem to make it particularly susceptible to the close scrutiny and elaborate explication associated with formal analysis. Apologies for or defenses of the academic study of popular music are, at any rate, growing a bit tiresome—people from Richard Crawford to Charles Hamm have been engaged in scholarship on popular music for almost two decades. Even the bandwagon for Schenkerian analysis of Tin Pan Alley song is rolling at some speed.[2]

The difficulties Forte encounters stem instead from a mismatch between the assumptions inherent in the Schenkerian method and the nature of American popular song during the period in question. At the heart lies a notion that these songs constitute "works" in the aesthetic sense of that word: coherent objects of art in which analysis will reveal every part connected inseparably to the whole, because the work has been fashioned that way, usually by a single creative intelligence.[3] In Forte's

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[1] See Eugene Narmour, *Beyond Schenkerism: Toward an Alternative in Music Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

[2] Schenkerian analysis of show tunes has a surprisingly lengthy history; see Steven E. Gilbert, "Gershwin's Art of Counterpoint," *The Musical Quarterly* 70, no. 4 (1984): 423–56.

[3] The literature on the "musical work" is long and perhaps best summarized by Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992).

own words, "an effective analysis will always be able to incorporate *every musical component and relate it to the 'large scale view.'* Indeed, without the large scale view *it is not possible to discover meaningful interpretations of detail; nor is it possible to reveal the large scale structure without careful analysis of detail. . . .*" (p. 42; the emphasis is mine). At the end of this same chapter on Schenkerian fundamentals, the author states the principle more clearly in the context of a reduction for Kern's "Lovely to Look At": "it is the underlying structure that provides the long-range continuity and coherence of the whole" (p. 51). I take these to be intelligent and accurate statements about Forte's (and Schenker's) principles, and in the phrase "continuity and coherence of the whole" lies the rock upon which the hopes of this book are built. Or perhaps more correctly, upon which they founder, because Forte assumes that Tin Pan Alley songs are "works."

We encounter the problem of the "coherent whole" in the introductory chapters, and a salient example taken from the chapter on lyrics dramatizes it. Forte gives a lengthy account of the lyrics and melody in Rodgers and Hart's "Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered." But the text Forte quotes for the chorus (verse omitted, p. 33) deviates significantly from the lyrics sung on Broadway in *Pal Joey*:

Forte (sheet music?)	*Broadway cast album*[4]
I'm wild again, beguiled again,	
A simpering, whimpering child again	
Bewitched, bothered and bewildered am I.	
Couldn't sleep, and wouldn't sleep,	
When love came and told me	Until I could sleep
I shouldn't sleep,	where I shouldn't sleep,
Bewitched, [etc.]	
Lost my heart, but what of it?	
He is cold, I agree,	My mistake, I agree,
He can laugh, but I love it,	He's a laugh, but I love it,
Although the laugh's on me.	Because the laugh's on me.
I'll sing to him, each spring to him,	A pill he is, and still he is
And long for the day when I'll cling	All mine, and I'll
to him,[5]	keep him until he is
Bewitched [etc.]	

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[4] I cite the text as Vivienne Segal recorded it for Columbia, OL-4364, matrix XLP-3711 on 20 September 1950.

[5] This line does appear in the Broadway version, second stanza of the chorus, second period, changed significantly to read, "I'll sing to him, each spring to him, and *worship the trousers that cling to him.*"

I would guess that Forte has taken his version from sheet music based on the copyright permission he reproduces at the back of the book (p. 351; Forte's version also seems more generally applicable out of the Broadway context). But which of these lyrics belongs to the "work" as conceived by Rodgers and Hart? If both versions are equally valid, how can we speak of a coherent whole (or are we merely talking about variations with no theme, to borrow a phrase from Carl Dahlhaus)? This is no minor question, because Forte subjects the text to close analysis, using sentences like, "Hart must have had difficulty finding the right word [for the second line of the bridge]. Although 'cold' does not fit the sonic patterns very well, its meaning is straightforward: the desired individual lacks the ardor." (p. 34) The Broadway version changes the sonic structure and meaning of the lyrics substantially.

The difference between the two versions of "Bewitched" is all the more ironic for a generalization Forte offers about the content of Tin Pan Alley lyrics: "Love was a potent and pervasive subject, but it was romantic and old-fashioned love, not the carnal love between the sexes that was occasionally showing up on the silver screen" (p. 29). Reconcile this generalization with:

> When he talks, he is seeking
> Words to get off his chest;
> Horizontally speaking,
> He's at his very best.
> Vexed again, perplexed again,
> Thank God I can be oversexed again,
> Bewitched, [etc.]

Sexuality lay very close to the surface of many Tin Pan Alley songs, and it could be explicit.

Forte might wave my concerns about lyrics aside, arguing quite correctly that words were often added to pre-composed music, not the other way around. He might also claim with some justice that his book primarily concerns music. If we take this point of view, we run into the problem of the "work" here as well. Does sheet music (assuming that Forte relied on sheet music) really present us with a "coherent whole" from the pen of a Rodgers or a Gershwin or a Kern? We know (and Forte takes specific and repeated cognizance of the fact) that Irving Berlin did not inscribe his own songs, but relied on an arranger or "secretary" to do so. We also know that Tin Pan Alley songs were often released in simplified versions for the less adept performer, and we must suspect that a number of songwriters did not write these accompaniments. How can we tell which version of the

sheet music contains the "work"? Should it disturb us that a song was not
the exercise of a single creative intellect? I add the latter simply because
Forte often writes as if the composer, and the composer alone (with the
notable exception of Berlin), authored the sheet music. For instance, in
his discussion of Gershwin's "Embraceable You," mm. 5–8 ("Embrace me,
you irreplaceable you") we read, "Thus the vertical conflation here is a
linear, not a harmonic, phenomenon, and the 'F^7' is relieved forthwith
from any responsibility to behave as a decent dominant seventh chord
should. This is made even more apparent in *Gershwin's notation* (example
170)" (p. 164; emphasis mine). Is this Gershwin's notation? That remains
to be seen. Where claims about a "work" appear, philology is not dispens-
able.

   If we overlook even this philological dilemma and regard the sheet
music (whether authored singly, or jointly, or compositely) as the "work,"
Forte's analyses still do not "incorporate every musical component and
relate it to the 'large scale view'" (p. 42). His accounts rarely treat both
verse and chorus (what he calls the "refrain") together; for the most part
he confines his comments to the chorus of selected songs. To be sure,
choruses were often detached, played alone by dance bands, and sung
alone. But that practice was a tacit admission that Tin-Pan-Alley songs
were not the "works" that Forte's analytical system was designed to treat.
Not surprisingly this problem surfaces in his overall conclusion:

   From the standpoint of this book, the most significant of what I
   have dubbed "the deeper aspects of style" are those melodic struc-
   tures [represented by Schenkerian graphs] of larger scale that orga-
   nize smaller components (phrases and motives) and harmonies (in-
   dividual sonorities and harmonic progressions) to create formal blocks
   that we know as verse and refrain (comprising chorus and bridge.)
   . . . Whatever may be their external form, they contribute in the
   most elemental fashion to the shaping of the ballad and to its de-
   tailed affects, often down to the level of the setting of individual
   components of the lyrics. (p. 333)

Forte tries to sidestep the question of verse and "refrain" by calling them
separate formal blocks. But anybody familiar with these songs knows that
the verse often sets up what follows, and this must surely be the concern of
the analysts who would find "the coherence of the whole" in "large scale
melodic structures" at work in these pieces. Moreover, this conclusion
mimics the initial statement of method so closely, it leaves the uneasy
feeling that in some sense the music has been used to display the system.
   The various descrepancies between method and material may reveal

why Forte's language lies so ponderously upon his discussion of individual songs. To give just a sample from the exposition on the last poignant melodic fillip in "Embraceable You" by the Gershwin brothers:

> The climactic $e\flat^2$ at bar 30 invites additional attention. A composer less sensitive to detail would have made this apex pitch e^2, the octave image of the very first note of the melody and following the pattern of diatonic tetrachords characteristic of the opening music of the song. Here, however, the lowered sixth scale degree $e\flat^2$ not only represents a brief excursion into the domain of the parallel minor key but also connects firmly to the primary tone d^2, so that the closing gesture $f\sharp^2$–g^1 does not sound like the completion of an ascending scale segment, d–e–f$\sharp$–g, in which the last two notes are transposed down an octave; rather, $e\flat^2$ is the absolute upper limit of the melody, adjacent to d^2, and not merely a passing tone in the closing formula. In this situation the note pair d^2–$e\flat^2$ provides the inevitable and compelling setting of "embrace," bringing this gemlike song almost to its delicate conclusion. (p. 166)

This is actually one of the more scintillating passages in the discussion of one of the raciest songs in the Gershwins' output. Forte has a very good point to make here, but he makes it with a jargon so relentless that the moment dies under its weight.

An analysis of the descending melodic sequence and harmony that shapes the first phrase of the chorus from Arlen and Harburg's "Over the Rainbow" runs:

> Example 250 permits closer consideration of the octave line and, in particular, the role of motive *a* [the two-note ascent first heard on the word "rainbow"], a topic broached earlier. Two factors weaken the case for resolution of d^2 to $e\flat^2$ in bar 2 of the melody. First, a secondary dominant seventh, not a tonic harmony, supports $e\flat^2$, which affords only shaky support for a strong upward resolution. Second, the replicas of motive *a* at the end of the period, in bars 6 and 7 ("heard of" and "lullaby"), are unequivocally of upper adjacency persuasion.
>
> Large-scale harmonic progression over the first six bars of chorus 1 consists of a projection of the tonic triad in the bass, indicated by hanging beams in example 250 that connect E$\flat$ (bar 1)–G (bar 2), and B$\flat$ (bar 6). In this projection A$\flat$ occupies a central role as the passing tone that connects G to B$\flat$ and, as discussed previously, A$\flat$ itself is embellished by its lower adjacency G in bar 4. (p. 233)

Thus are little Dorothy's dreams, with their repeated melodic leaps of imagination settling slowly back to earth, limned in all their Schenkerian majesty.

Granted that scholarly examination of music should not read like journalism, the language of serious books on popular music need not anesthetize, as Richard Crawford's chapter on "I Got Rhythm" or Philip Furia's careful analysis of Ira Gershwin's lyrics demonstrate so well.[6] And the dint of Forte's implacable jargon also betrays a deeper failing in this book, which by imposition of its system loses sight of an essential feature in these songs: the unobtrusive quality of their expressiveness. Forte cannot explain why these songs, for all their rich harmonic vocabulary, prodigious melodic technique, and magnificent structure, leave an impression of effortlessness peculiar to American art. American film shares this ability to employ extremely sophisticated techniques in the service of being unobtrusive, thus lending the impression that the viewer is actually beholding an action or object rather than a work of art. For music we might ask how, using complex chords and melodic sequences borrowed from classical music, American songwriters rendered their compositions seemingly artless, their message so unobtrusive? The language and graphs of Forte's analyses do not divulge this secret and perhaps they cannot. The all-encompassing method does not permit Forte to reveal what is truly unique about these songs.

Forte does reveal, to give him his due, things of interest and value. He is thoroughly familiar with this repertory, and his book bears the marks of personal commitment to it. He establishes carefully the context in which each song first appeared, its place in what I would call "the core repertory," and its standing in the secondary literature. All this serves as background to analyses laid out very clearly and connected well to the illustrative graphs. These are designed primarily to show the relationships of pitches to one another with only occasional points about rhythm, which the graphs depict less clearly.

The primary virtue of the book lies in the harmonic analysis of individual choruses. Forte's account of harmony and voice leading is impeccable, his discussion of melody intelligent. And if I were to suggest a use for this volume, I would commend individual analyses of individual pieces to students of popular song. Forte makes little attempt to relate the analysis of one song to another, and he sustains few overarching thoughts

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[6] See respectively Richard Crawford, *The American Musical Landscape* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 213–36, and Philip Furia, *Ira Gershwin: The Art of the Lyricist* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

about the genre in general or specific composers' style in particular. Good technical analysis of the harmony in Tin Pan Alley song is rare and not to be despised. But a series of individual, and almost unrelated discussions hardly make for a compelling narrative in the long run, and I would not suggest a reading from cover to cover.

In his short section of "Concluding Reflections," Forte poses the following question for our consideration: "does the corpus of music studied in this volume constitute a basic segment of what might be termed American Lieder, analogous to, say, the nineteenth-century German Lieder of classical music?" (p. 334) It is a revealing question, for Forte's frame of reference remains the aesthetic and procedures of German classical music. If we seek the American art written in this conceptual framework, we will find it among the songs of MacDowell and Beach, Copland and Thompson, Rorem and the many other composers of American classical music. Tin Pan Alley offers us something different, something unique, something that requires analysis and description sensitive to the premises under which it was created. Any analysis that fails to realize this unique quality, no matter how intelligent the investigator, will miss the artistic point.

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William Kinderman. *Beethoven.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, 374 pp.

The "central task" for William Kinderman in *Beethoven* "is to trace the formation and evolution" of the "process" of 'artistic unification' (*Kunstvereinigung*: Beethoven's term) "through analysis of works from all periods of Beethoven's life" (pp. 1–2). Formal analysis is not an end unto itself, but rather serves the higher goal of aesthetic criticism, "while maintaining the necessary balance between subjectivity and objectivity." The writings of philosphers contemporary with Beethoven, principally Friedrich Schiller, provide the conceptual basis for the emphasis on aesthetics. Kinderman sees a close link between Beethoven's aesthetics and Schiller's interest in the "synthesis of the sensuous and rational" (p. 5) in art, as well as the latter's "claims of 'freedom and progress', innovation and fantasy, [which] were ingrained so deeply into Beethoven's creative method." Unity is "a primary condition for the appearance of a true work," but unity is "understood not as an abstract, tautological concept, or even an organic whole, but rather that totality of concrete elements and relationships that demand realization in sound" (p. 12). Unity is "synthetic in nature, and entirely compatible with tension, contrast, diversity, and the individuality of a work" (p. 12). The evolution of Beethoven's art cuts a "path towards progressive integration, narrative design, and a deepened symbolic expression (p. 13)," and these structural and expressive elements are the primary constitutents of "artistic unification."

These ideas are set forth in Kinderman's introductory "Overture." (Curiously, in view of their significance, he suggests that the non-philosophically inclined reader may skip this first chapter.) Yet the book has broader aims. It is perhaps better to regard Kinderman's "central task" as one of several threads (and not always the central one), which are skillfully interwoven around the discussion of the repertory. In the course of chronologically arranged chapters Kinderman provides a broadly conceived sketch of Beethoven's life and career (the latter including remarks on his attitudes towards art and an account of the context—for example, contract or concert—in which Beethoven decided to write a new piece or pieces), brief commentary on the compositional process for selected works on the basis of sketch and autograph evidence, and occasional discussion of the contemporary reception and scholarly literature.

This omnibus approach is a great virtue of Kinderman's book, for it is the first comprehensive study of Beethoven to appear since Maynard

Solomon's *Beethoven* in 1977, and, in addition to incorporating much of the Beethoven scholarship of the past two decades, Kinderman devotes considerably more space to analysis and criticism than Solomon had done. It shares these analytical and critical concerns with Carl Dahlhaus's *Ludwig van Beethoven: Approaches to his Music*, but Dahlhaus essentially excludes biography.[1] By its very nature it is a significant book and a very useful one—it can be read with pleasure and profit by the scholar and the music student, but also by the non-specialist who has some knowledge of music theory and history. Many of the lengthier discussions of works are distillations of previously published articles and books, in which Kinderman has made notable contributions to our understanding of works such as the Diabelli Variations, the *Missa Solemnis,* and the late quartets. Although they have been simplified—no doubt with the general reader in mind— they preserve the standard of excellence he has established, and this standard is maintained throughout the entire book.

Kinderman has complete control of his material. He persuasively generalizes about works, and often makes discerning comparisons between works within or across genres and style periods. As suggested in the formulation "path towards" (see above), Kinderman has a teleological view of Beethoven´s artistic development and subscribes, with certain reservations, to the "convenient simplification" of the style periods. But he adds a "fragmentary" fourth one (1824–27) to the usual three, in which the late quartets, or at least opp. 132, 130 with the Grosse Fuge finale, and 131, "open up new artistic territory in ways comparable with the *Eroica* or the *Hammerklavier*" (p. 199).

The remarks about compositional process, which, no doubt for the sake of user-friendliness, include no reproductions of sketches and very little detail about them, are nonetheless skillfully presented within his analyses in order to illuminate aspects of Beethoven´s "creative method" at the service of his aesthetic goals. For example, in his discussion of the Fifth Symphony, Kinderman explains that Beethoven "originally intended to repeat the entire scherzo and trio, but the published version, without the repetition, is most effective in the overall narrative design. The scherzo thereby yields up some of its formal autonomy in the interest of the unfolding progression between movements" (p. 126). Consistent with his view that criticism must depend on analysis, he usually reserves his consideration of aesthetic content for the conclusion of his discussion of a work. His remarks about the Fifth Symphony provide a good example of his

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[1]   Carl Dahlhaus, *Ludwig van Beethoven: Approaches to His Music,* trans. Mary Whittal (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991).

critical approach and also demonstrate (in light of his remarks about the scherzo) how analysis supports criticism:

> The Fifth Symphony . . . embodies a process of symbolic transforma-
> tion, which is projected with remarkable coherence over the work as
> a whole. Unifying motifs are almost inevitable in any such
> intermovement narrative design, but no less essential is the direc-
> tional tension culminating in the finale—a feature that resurfaces in
> later masterpieces such as the Ninth Symphony and the C♯ minor
> Quartet. A shifting of weight to the finale occurs in certain eigh-
> teenth-century pieces—notably in Mozart's 'Jupiter' Symphony—but
> in Beethoven this tendency assumes such prominence as to realign
> the aesthetic foundations of music. In the Fifth Symphony Beethoven
> departs from the more static, successive classical formal models by
> explicitly connecting the movements, undermining their individual
> autonomy. A mythical pattern seems to be imposed on the overall
> artistic sequence, guiding the processive chain of interconnected
> musical forms. In its embrace of the dichotomous and its evocation
> of the ineffable or even the demonic, the Fifth Symphony opens the
> door to Romanticism, yet the profound lucidity of its musical shape
> defies unequivocal programmatic interpretation. In this respect, as
> in many others, Beethoven's importance lies in his synthesis of the
> old and new, of the universality of the classical harmonic framework
> with the quest for particularity of expression characteristic of the
> nineteenth century. (p. 130)

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Unfortunately, the goal of comprehensiveness, along with the chrono-
logical rather than topical chapter organization, has prevented Kinderman
from fulfilling his central (and secondary) tasks with complete success.
This book has 336 pages of text and notes, yet it is too short. Only a
handful of Beethoven's published works go unmentioned—surely a "pre-
compositional" decision by Kinderman—and one senses the author's
struggle to say something meaningful about many pieces in very few words.
Moreover, one wonders sometimes about the criteria by which certain
works were selected for longer discussion than others. The cello sonata in
A Major, op. 69, for example, receives one short paragraph, which reads
like a program note:

> In the op. 69 Sonata the cello begins unaccompanied *dolce*, and
> legato, with motifs that permeate the entire first movement. After

the main theme has been heard in both instruments it is suddenly dramatically altered, and cast into A minor. The contrast between the quiet atmosphere of the lyrical opening, and a turbulent, rhythmically charged continuation is characteristic of the *Allegro, ma non tanto*. The second movement is a scherzo, whose main theme takes on a strong rhythmic tension through syncopation. Like the cello sonatas of op. 5, this work has no independent slow movment, but the finale is introduced by an expressive *Adagio cantabile* in E major, whose thematic material bears a subtle relationship to the finale. (p. 133)

Let us note the absence of true analysis as well as critical commentary for one of Beethoven's unquestioned masterpieces of chamber music, and a major work in the transition from the heroic style of the years surrounding the Third and Fifth Symphonies to the more lyrical and subtle character of compositions for piano (op. 78) and for chamber ensembles (String Quartet op. 74, Sonata for piano and violin op. 96, Piano Trio op. 97) surfacing around 1809.

On the other hand, the first movement of the first piano sonata, op. 2 no. 1 in F minor, receives detailed discussion. The reason is clear: it is a celebrated movement in a piece that despite its opus number has assumed the status of a portentous opus 1, and the author wanted to contribute to the substantial literature on it. But he neither critiques that literature nor attempts to move beyond the technical analysis into stylistic or aesthetic criticism. (I would welcome a quarter-century critical moratorium on this sonata!)

I am also surprised that *Fidelio* receives only five and one half pages, one of which is devoted to the overtures. In light of its significance both as a work and as an expression of Beethoven's political and moral perspectives, the reader could have expected a more substantial discussion. Kinderman offers thirteen pages on *Wellington's Victory* and *Der glorreiche Augenblick*, principally in order to offer an extended discourse on kitsch, and the "spectacle of a great composer lowering his art to gain economic reward and court political favour" (p. 169). This is fine and the Adornoesque conclusion rings true: "But intentionally or not, Beethoven held up a very unflattering mirror to this grand party of the restoration. In giving his audience what they wanted, his Congress of Vienna pieces exposed the superficial veneer that concealed the far less glorious realities of post-Napleonic politics" (p. 180). Yet I still sense an imbalance.

Even in the longer commentaries, the author often limits his analysis to one aspect of the work, and his choices sometimes appear arbitrary. In the discussion of the "Hammerklavier" Sonata op. 106 (pp. 201–10), for ex-

ample, he traces the working out of relationships of the third (he acknowledges Rosen's discussion in *The Classical Style*) and the half-step over the course of the sonata, and makes Toveyesque descriptive generalizations about the movements—"The . . . scherzo is a humorous yet dark parody of the opening *Allegro* . . . [with] a sardonic dimension . . . "—which have little to do with his discussion of pitch relationships.[2] The closing fugue is described in more detail, but even here the weightiness of the critical remarks (they are similar in spirit to the conclusion of the section on the Fifth Symphony) and their degree of generalization here and elsewhere are not supported sufficiently by the analysis.

The problem of analysis and criticism is an old one, and it is unfair to expect the author to solve it—particularly in a book of this kind. Yet Kinderman should (and doubtlessly could) have found a way to explore it in more systematic detail and to achieve fuller syntheses more often. Apart from his critique of formal analysis and definition of his own critical goals in the introduction, he devotes little attention to methodological concerns, pausing only, in the space of one and one half pages, to defend his interests in narrative process and unity against attacks by Carolyn Abbate and Jean-Jacques Nattiez. As can be expected in such a short commentary, his discussion is superficial. The great methodological "other" for Kinderman is Carl Dahlhaus, whose work on Beethoven consistently succeeds in grounding criticism in analysis. (Dahlhaus's book has the advantage of being organized topically, as a series of chronologically arranged essays on aesthetic-structural problems.) Dahlhaus looms large through his virtual absence in this book, but surely Kinderman has read and thought about his work. Because their analytical-critical goals are so similar, and because Dahlhaus has had such a decisive influence, Kinderman's failure to "take him on" is disappointing.

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Aside from the musicality of his thinking and the clearness of his writing, perhaps the most significant contribution of a more general nature is Kinderman's emphasis on Beethoven's humor and his critique of overly solemn interpretations of his music.[3] This aspect of his music and per-

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[2] Tovey, although infrequently cited, and Joseph Kerman, who is often mentioned, are major influences on Kinderman's approach to the technical and descriptive discussion of the music; on the other hand, Kinderman's philosophical perspective owes little to either.

[3] He also emphasizes qualities such as paradox, ambiguity, openness, and doubt, all of which, like humor contrast with the notion of heroic authority that has been the predominant view of Beethoven and his music.

sonal outlook was not unknown (see p. 349 of the useful selected bibliog-
raphy), but Kinderman skillfully reinforces it by devoting careful attention
to the links between them on the basis of farcical canons and musical
epigrams, and verbal puns. The most famous of these, of course, concerns
the relationship between the "muß es sein" joke and the beginning of the
last movement of the string quartet op. 135 in F. Here Kinderman is
perhaps misled, in his zeal to assert the significance of humor in
Beethoven´s music, to find it where it is not. The finale is undeniably
humorous; Kinderman is quite right to quote Joseph Kerman on its musi-
cal embodiment of the "essence of gaiety." The question is, where does
the fun begin? I do not agree with Kinderman's critique of Paul Bekker,
who "takes the mock pathos of the *Grave* sections too seriously, missing
the parodistic dimension that surfaces at once in the opening *Grave* and
even more clearly when Beethoven brings back the *Grave* at the end of the
development" (p. 333). I, like Bekker, hear in the *Grave* true and deep
pathos, which is overcome in the main body of the movement, to achieve
a "humour won through reflection."[4] Where does this reflection take place?
The opening retains the expressive character of the preceding slow varia-
tion movement, whose own pathos apparently did not make an impression
on Kinderman; he limits his discussion of it to an explanation of its struc-
ture, noting nothing about its character. But even as the introduction to
the finale retains the character of the variations, it transforms it: the
recitative-like motto implies the appearance of a human consciousness
that reflects on the events of the variations, asks itself the famous question,
answers it with a joke and leaves the pathos behind. The return later in
the movement can be interpreted as a further reflective act (Kinderman
sees it as confirmation of the parody), but one that recalls a process
already completed.

Kinderman's reading introduces into our understanding of the piece
the elements of narrative process and cross-movement unity, two of
Kinderman's primary concerns, particularly in the late music. Hearing the
entire last movement as parody deprives it of dynamic elements and em-
phasizes stasis. Moreover, this interpretation seems very suggestive of
Beethoven's attitude towards his own life and his sublimation of his expe-
rience in his art. Despite his punning about his illness in 1825 and his
deathbed citation "applaud, friends, the comedy is over" (see p. 336),
there is ample evidence that Beethoven throughout his life took his adver-
sity and suffering seriously and, instead of resorting principally to parody,
adopted in the finales of numerous works various strategies to overcome

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[4] Paul Bekker, *Beethoven* (Berlin: n.p., 1912), 555.

hardships represented in earlier movements: heroic triumph (Symphony no. 5), serene contemplation (Piano Sonata no. 32 in C minor), and humor. In each of these cases the process of overcoming is a primary motivation to the formal design and expressive character of the finale. Without pathos in op. 135 there can be no such process. Humor seems to be a strategy of particular importance in the string quartets in F major and F minor. (Kinderman is as interested in continuities as in progress over the course of Beethoven's career.) In op. 59, no. 1, the element of process is very strong, but it begins within the third movement, when the first violin's soloistic flight escapes the prevailing melancholy and introduces the rough dance-like humor of the finale. In op. 95, the unexpected turn of events in the coda might be a thumbing of the nose at the entire previous quartet, but Beethoven is having serious fun that does not compromise the gravity of the first three movements.

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The book is well produced. I find only one major fault in the technical aspect of the publication: although measure numbers are given above musical examples, the scores themselves are not numbered, which unnecessarily complicates the reader's task.

Although I cannot conclude that Kinderman always accomplishes his ambitious objectives, the effort alone has produced a book of unusual worth. I have enjoyed reading his insightful discussions of Beethoven's music and, thanks to the portrait of Beethoven as artist that emerges over the course of the book, I am more conscious than ever of the creative intelligence that the composer possessed. These are reasons enough to heartily endorse this study, which is further enriched by its biographical and cultural-historical material. Kinderman's *Beethoven* will set the standard for many years to come.

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Tia DeNora, Beethoven and the Construction of Genius: Musical Politics in Vienna, 1792–1803. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

Tia DeNora has undertaken an important study of Beethoven's early years in Vienna. She examines three issues as they pertain to Beethoven: the nature of Viennese society; the concept of the artist, in particular the notion of genius in late eighteenth-century Europe; and the conflict of musical styles that emerged near the end of the century. Most of the issues themselves are not new. We know, for instance, that Beethoven succeeded in large measure when he first came to Vienna because he had strong backing from important aristocrats. We know that the concept of genius, particularly as applied to music, had gained currency by at least the 1780s. We also know that Vienna was a stratified and hierarchical city, and that the nature of the hierarchy affected artistic activities in a major way. In this regard Vienna may be contrasted with London, a comparison facilitated by Haydn's experiences in each city. And we know that Haydn's and Mozart's style changed later in their lives, as they wrote for a broader public, not to mention the French Revolutionary influences that had begun to affect many composers' work by the end of the century.

DeNora's book is of interest because she focuses on the intersection of these elements. She examines more closely than anyone else just which aristocrats supported Beethoven, where they were in the complex Austrian hierarchy, why they backed him, and how this affected aesthetic perceptions. Her study provides substantial insight into the interworking between musical creation and production and the social forces that shape them, although, as I will discuss, some of her conclusions about Beethoven and about the aristocracy's motivations possibly go too far.

In the first half of the book DeNora examines the aristocratic structure in Vienna in relation to musical patronage. She discusses how the concert world of Vienna changed in the 1790s as the aristocracy withdrew its support from public concerts. She also provides the clearest picture yet of the complex hierarchical world of aristocratic position and prestige that existed in Vienna. The strongest part of the book is the description and analysis of the changes in patronage that occurred in Vienna at the end of the eighteenth century. DeNora discusses the decline of the *Hauskapelle* and attributes it not to the declining fortunes of the aristocracy in the wake of the European upheavals, but rather to the loss of interest in such activity at the Imperial Court and the attendant increase of the same by the lower aristocracy and the upper middle class. A *Hauskapelle* no longer identified the aristocrat with the court nor separated him from the lower orders.

But the aristocracy did not abandon music. They shifted their support elsewhere, and where and why form the heart of De Nora's argument. Aristocrats supported public concerts, with institutions such as the Gesellschaft der Associierten Cavaliere founded by Baron von Swieten, considered the "Patriarch of Music" in Vienna (p. 20). In its simplest form, to associate the rise of the public concert with an ascending middle class misrepresents what happened. According to DeNora there were three groups of musical patrons—the old aristocracy, the new aristocracy, and the middle class (p. 47)—and in contrast to received opinion, each formed a relatively isolated circle, with little overlap between them. By distinguishing different types of concert venues according to their sponsorship, DeNora affirms the important role that the aristocracy continued to play in Viennese musical life well into the nineteenth century, but especially in the 1790s, when Beethoven's reputation was established.

This leads to her principal argument, that music remained a vehicle for prestige, but that as musical sponsorship broadened, upper aristocrats sought a way to separate their activities from those of the lower aristocracy and the middle class, and that they did this by supporting music that was more learned, grandiose, and serious. The concepts of musical taste and musical genius became pillars in the new aesthetic forming around this effort, and Beethoven became their champion not only because he evinced all the qualities of genius, but because his style was decidedly in opposition to the style favored by the bourgeoisie. Her claims are explicit and broad:

> It seems fair, then, to suggest that serious music ideology, which took as its exemplars Beethoven and reconstituted more explicitly 'learned' and grandiose versions of Mozart and Haydn, emerged during the 1790s in Vienna, and that this ideology was primarily subscribed to by old aristocrats, not the middle class (p. 35).

> [I]t was in Vienna that the new model of musical seriousness based around Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven was initially formulated (p. 36).

This is an important and exciting thesis, and DeNora makes a strong case for much of it. Just how far it can be carried, however, is open to question. At one level DeNora suggests almost a grand conspiracy: the aristocracy, with Beethoven's approval and Haydn's willing help, decided to engage in cultural wars on behalf of high musical culture; Beethoven became their lucky recipient, and the idea that he was a genius was a product, a "construction" that suited the aristocracy's own purposes. DeNora

suggests that our modern standards of musical evaluation derive from this construction, and implies that had the aristocracy decided to back another musician, we might use an entirely different framework to measure the canon:

> It is interesting to consider what our modern musical evaluative standards would look like if a different composer had been inserted into the supportive frame that surrounded Beethoven: consider the Irish-born composer John Field (1782–1837), whose prophetically Chopinesque nocturnes provided a contemporary alternative to Beethoven's forceful approach (p. 142).

DeNora readily concedes that Beethoven was not a passive beneficiary of this aristocratic agenda. He did much to further the myth himself, ranging from positioning himself as both Mozart's and Haydn's heir, to carrying on an aesthetic campaign for stronger and heavier pianos more suited to his, and conversely less suited to his competitors', style.

There are two aspects of the book's argument that I would like to address; both have to do with the extent of inference and evidence. First, while DeNora, in establishing the relationship between social hierarchy and musical activity in Vienna, has contributed significantly to Beethoven scholarship, she extends her argument in a questionable fashion when she affirms that the activities of the Viennese aristocracy were the turning point for a new aesthetic in Vienna, and that Beethoven's success may be attributed to his being more or less a useful pawn in a grand scheme created by an aristocracy using music as a means to make a social statement. Second, there is an empirical problem with her evidence: in some cases evidence is either misread or whole lines of it are simply ignored.

A fundamental question that permeates much of DeNora's argument is Beethoven's position relative to the social structure of Vienna. According to DeNora Beethoven arrived at Vienna with particularly strong backing from his contacts in Bonn. This opened doors for him not available to most musicians. Beethoven knew how to capitalize on his advantage, and from there entered into certain musical and social alliances that solidified his position. He also willingly and knowingly let himself be used by those same aristocrats who supported him to further their own cultural/political agendas.

There are few Beethoven scholars who would disagree with the above remarks in broad outline. But what is the significance of specific pieces of evidence? DeNora, who considers in detail several incidents of Beethoven's early years in Vienna to demonstrate how musical and social issues interwove, places particular importance on what she refers to as the "Haydn's

hands" story. In many ways it forms the centerpiece of her argument. When Beethoven was preparing to leave Bonn to study in Vienna in 1792, Count Waldstein, along with several other Bonn patrons and friends, inscribed statements of congratulations and support in an autograph album. Count Waldstein's inscription contained the prophetic line, "With the help of assiduous labor you shall receive Mozart's spirit from Haydn's hands" (p. 84). Both the story itself and its significance are well known in Beethoven scholarship. Thayer included it, and Joseph Kerman chose to begin his book on Beethoven's string quartets with it. But according to DeNora it became the rallying cry for elevating Beethoven to a position of genius. It established Beethoven as the heir to both Haydn and Mozart, even though, as DeNora observes, in some respects Beethoven's aesthetic was diametrically opposed to Mozart's.

The real question is how important is the story, or rather how important was it, in establishing Beethoven's position in Vienna? DeNora marshals considerable evidence to suggest that the story was repeated and became a sort of mantra for the aristocracy, allowing them to focus on Beethoven. She quotes several other accounts of the Mozart-to-Haydn-to-Beethoven connection. With one exception, however, none of the other stories about Haydn and Beethoven that she quotes even refer to Mozart. On 23 January 1793, B. L. Fischenich, a professor at the University of Bonn, wrote to Charlotte Schiller, referring to a musical setting by "a young man from here, whose musical talents are praised everwhere and whom the Elector has sent to Haydn in Vienna" (p. 85). Schönfeld's 1796 *Jahrbuch* refers to Beethoven as a "musical genius," who "has put himself in the hands of our immortal Haydn in order to be initiated into the holy secrets of the art of music" (p. 87). And Haydn's own account, written to the Elector of Bonn on behalf of Beethoven, predicted that "Beethoven will in time fill the position of one of Europe's greatest composers, and I shall be proud to be able to speak of myself as his teacher" (p. 86).

The only account that does compare Beethoven directly with Mozart was written by Beethoven's teacher Neefe in 1783, and the reference is more to Beethoven's keyboard ability rather than his compositional skills. Neefe suggests that were Beethoven able to travel as Mozart did he would have been recognized as a prodigy similar to Mozart. But this story, suggesting that Beethoven may be a child prodigy in the same league as Mozart, is about a very different issue than the Mozart-through-Haydn-to-Beethoven legacy.

The other comments quoted by DeNora state what had become obvious by the 1790s: that Beethoven had extraordinary talents, which were recognized by many, and that Beethoven came to Vienna to study with Haydn. Thus the Viennese classical legacy was being passed on. There is

nothing new nor surprising in these accounts, and there is nothing un-
usual about the two facets—Beethoven's talent and his choosing to study
with Haydn—being recognized by contemporary observers.

But DeNora also argues that Beethoven and Haydn are not just passive
beneficiaries in this grand scheme: "Beethoven and Haydn were willing to
collaborate to produce a fiction that became a resource for the construc-
tion of Beethoven's greatness" (p. 10). For Haydn it was "a way of consti-
tuting Haydn as great within the Viennese musical world" (p. 84). It is true
that Haydn only later received the recognition he deserved. But in the
1790s Haydn did not need Mozart to establish his reputation. Haydn's first
trip to London and the honorary doctorate he received at Oxford oc-
curred before Beethoven arrived in Vienna. The relationship between
Haydn and Beethoven was a complex one, and even though Haydn may
have been troubled by Beethoven's more daring experiments, a musical
bond between them at least begrudgingly existed. I believe the explana-
tion is relatively simple: Haydn respected Beethoven because he recog-
nized Beethoven's talent, even though he was not comfortable with some
of Beethoven's compositions. The leap from this respectful yet strained
pupil-teacher relationship to one of collaboration to promote a fiction is
greater than I am willing to make.

But the real issue of this study is Beethoven's genius. What did the label
of genius mean in the late eighteenth century, and how did it come to be
applied to Beethoven? It seems that at the heart of this issue is the ques-
tion of the relativistic nature of Beethoven's genius (p. 89). The older
explanation is appealing: early on Beethoven displays the same outstand-
ing talent that we hear retrospectively in his music, and this was recog-
nized by those closest to him. If, however, we are not willing to accept that
point, and DeNora suggests we suspend the "commonsense view" that
Beethoven received special treatment because he had special talent, then
we are compelled to say on what basis the concept of genius rests.

The issue of genius then becomes the question of how it is constructed.
There is no doubt that the notion of genius underwent a change in the
late eighteenth century, and that it was used for specific purposes, I be-
lieve to explain that which seemed musically inexplicable. And there is no
doubt that social factors play a part in the idea of genius. Yes, genius is
what we make it to be. But can we jump from there to the notion that the
aristocracy, possibly in active collaboration with both Beethoven and Haydn,
set out to create a myth, the myth of Beethoven's genius?

The concept of musical genius, as applied by the Viennese aristocracy,
existed long before the 1790s. One explanation of Beethoven's genius lies
in eighteenth-century terminology. According to eighteenth-century writ-
ers, such as Schubart and Koch, a musical genius was distinguished not by

a good ear, technical capacity, or facility, but rather by a feeling for music.[1] Beethoven apparently possessed all of the other elements, but it was his depth of feeling, the emotive power of his playing, especially his improvising, that set him apart and was immediately apparent to all. The evidence on this point is overwhelming, and the many accounts that discuss this aspect of his talent demonstrate at the very least that Beethoven's reception in Vienna was closely tied to it. The label *genius* flows naturally, the application of a concept previously defined to one whose particular musical abilities fit it precisely. One does not have to look for hidden agendas to understand why and how the label *genius* would be applied to Beethoven.

Much of the above argument involves nuance of intent and meaning. Granted, the evidence could be read in several ways. What concerns me more is the offhand way in which an entire galaxy of evidence is dismissed. DeNora argues that Beethoven aligned himself with the aristocracy to create a more serious and grandiose style in opposition to the lighter styles of Hummel and Spohr that later appealed to the Viennese public. It is worth noting that Spohr maintained as strongly as Beethoven that he was an artist.[2] Posterity has not reciprocated in that judgment, but the reason seems less that Spohr lacked aristocratic support than that he lacked compositional talent. This difference turns the argument back to the musical issues. Spohr did not lack exposure throughout Europe. A good public-relations representative or a well-placed Count might do much to further a composer's career and image, but ultimately there is a musical judgment at work. And upon that musical judgment Beethoven's as well as Spohr's position rests.

To return to the question of evidence, DeNora outlines three phases of Beethoven's career: 1) his first fifteen years in Vienna, when his musical public was essentially the aristocracy; 2) in 1814, around the time of the Congress of Vienna, a brief phase as a popular composer; 3) from 1819 a retreat from the public and an increasing alienation from the lighter styles that had become popular (pp. 9–10).

DeNora is on target in her analysis of the extent to which Beethoven associated with the aristocracy. Given the position in which he found himself from the start, a position that, as DeNora observes, many musi-

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[1] Christoph Friedrich Daniel Schubart, *Ideen zu einer Asthetic der Tonkunst* (Vienna: n.p., 1806), 368–70, written in the 1780s; Heinrich Christoph Koch, *Versuch einer Anleitung zur Composition*, 2 (Leipzig: n.p., 1782–93), 9.

[2] *Die Selbstbiographie von Louis Spohr* (Kassel and Göttingen: n.p., 1860). Republished in part as *The Musical Journeys of Louis Spohr*, trans. and ed. Henry Pleasants (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1961), 66–67.

cians envied, there is no reason he would not cultivate those contacts to the fullest. What modern artist, launching a concert career today, would turn away sponsorship by the most powerful management agencies in the business?

But while Beethoven was performing in the salons and palaces and writing his big, major compositions, he was also publishing a lot of other music: many sets of variations on popular opera tunes and other sources, songs and vocal ensemble pieces, and sets of German dances, minuets, and ländler. DeNora dismisses them out of hand: "His lighter and more popular compositions aside, Beethoven was not, during these years, particularly concerned with appealing to middle-class audiences" (p. 8). But by 1801 his publications had become a significant part of his income. In a letter to Franz Wegeler, dated June 29, 1801, Beethoven commented: "My compositions bring me in a fair sum; and I may say that I have more commissions than it is possible for me to fill. Besides, I have 6 or 7 publishers after each piece and might have more if I chose; people no longer bargain with me, I ask and they pay."[3] There are too many lighter compositions among his publications, and Beethoven's income from publishers was too important, to say that Beethoven ignored the middle-class dilettante world in the 1790s. He may have been quite commercial and calculating, and clearly the lighter pieces have little bearing on his historical position. But they cannot be dismissed in a study of the publics Beethoven cultivated. Worse, to dismiss them because they are trivial (DeNora, herself, gives no reason for doing so), would be to fall prey to the very trap of viewing Beethoven through the filter of his current canonical position, a trap from which DeNora's study itself goes far to free us. I believe that Beethoven, in his first fifteen years in Vienna, pursued his career in every way possible, and that he did what worked. Beethoven threw his lot in with the aristocracy, and, like Spohr, saw himself as an artist who aspired to write serious music. That, however, is not the same as saying that he wrote serious as opposed to frivolous music.

Finally DeNora analyzes in depth the Beethoven/Wölfl piano competition of 1799. It did pit two aesthetics against each other: Wölfl, trained in the school of Mozart, played with brilliance, clarity, and precision; Beethoven's playing was heavier, more powerful, and fantastical. DeNora considers it a duel between "popular and serious music," between "*Kenner* and *Liebhaber*" (p. 155). Wölfl and Beethoven did represent two aesthetic poles, and in one sense Wölfl represents the Mozartean as opposed to the

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3   *Thayer's Life of Beethoven*, rev. and ed. Eliott Forbes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 283.

Beethovenian pole. Such a distinction undercuts the "Haydn's hands" story, in which Beethoven is perceived as the heir-apparent of Mozart, as transmitted through the vessel of Haydn. That issue aside, however, I believe that there is a another way of viewing the exchange: Wölfl and Beethoven represent late classicism and a burgeoning Romanticism respectively. The issue then becomes as much temporal as social.

I have raised several issues based on the direction or the extent DeNora has taken some of her arguments. This is in no way meant to diminish the importance or the originality of DeNora's thesis. She has looked intensely and in a new way at an issue usually glanced at cursorily. Inevitably such a new approach will raise many questions, and I have addressed some of my own. More than anything I hope to have demonstrated that her study is provocative, and as such is worthy of careful consideration by the world of Beethoven scholarship.

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Robert S. Hatten. Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, Correlation, and Interpretation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. 349pp.

Robert Hatten's *Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, Correlation, and Interpretation* is the result of over a decade of research into aspects of musical semiotics. In addition to participating in conferences, symposia and workshops, Hatten has contributed articles to scholarly journals in a variety of subjects: music theory, musicology, semiotics and interdisciplinary studies. Topics range from cognition and perception to the nature of musical drama, from the intertextual possibilities of music to matters of musical style and aesthetics, and from the nature of the interaction between music history and music theory to core issues in Peircean semiotics and their possible relevance to musical understanding.[1] At first sight, these concerns seem scattered and eclectic, the product of a restless and inquiring musical mind; but a closer look reveals a thread of continuity, namely, a fascination with the nature of musical meaning. Although *Musical Meaning in Beethoven* is necessarily selective in what it brings together of the author's earlier studies, it may nevertheless be taken as representative of the range of issues that define his ongoing project.

The first thing to ask is what, exactly, the book is about. The title suggests a focus on Beethoven's music while the subtitle points to the origins of some of Hatten's conceptual props in linguistic theory. Furthermore, the book appears in the series, Advances in Semiotics, published by Indiana University Press under the general editorship of the distinguished semiotician, Thomas A. Sebeok. Although it deals with Beethoven's music, in particular with the late works, the book manages in the end to leave Beethoven behind. In other words, the author seems divided in his allegiances to Beethoven, on the one hand, and to semiotic theory, on the other. My impression is that Beethoven's music serves as a rich and convenient site for the practice of analysis. Beethoven's music is a foil, a source

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[1] See, among numerous publications, Hatten's "The Splintered Paradigm: A Semiotic Critique of Recent Approaches to Music Cognition," *Semiotica* 81, nos. 1–2 (1990): 145–178; "Aspects of Dramatic Closure in Beethoven: A Semiotic Perspective on Music Analysis via Strategies of Dramatic Conflict," *Semiotica* 66, no. 2 (1987): 197–210; "The Place of Intertextuality in Music Studies," *American Journal of Semiotics* 3, no. 1 (1985): 69–82; "Toward a Semiotic Model of Style in Music: Epistemological and Methodological Bases," (Ph.D. Diss, Indiana University, 1982); "Response to Peter Burkholder," *Journal of Musicology* 11, no. 1 (1993): 24–31; and "A Peircean Perspective on the Growth of Markedness and Musical Meaning," in *Peirce and Value Theory: On Peircean Ethics and Aesthetics*, ed. Herman Parret (Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1994).

of illustrations, for Hatten's main concern, namely, to explore the nature of 'structural' and 'expressive' musical meanings. Of course, Beethoven's work has been paradigmatic for tonal theory and analysis for some time now, so it makes perfect sense to use it as a touchstone for a new theory of meaning. But the paradigmatic Beethoven is not late- but middle-period Beethoven. Hatten does not explain or explore this apparent anomaly. Perhaps the composer disappears because the theoretical issues, complex and challenging, take on a life of their own. In this way, the possibility that the theory has a wider explanatory potential is reinforced.

Hatten is an instinctive theorist. Chapters devoted to analysis (or inter-pretation) alternate with others devoted to theory. In the analytical chap-ters, Hatten gives due attention not only to the meanings he reads but to *how* he constructs them; little is taken for granted. This is not to say that we agree with every meaning he attributes to Beethoven's works; it is rather to draw attention to his success in avoiding unsupported assertions. There will be readers who will simply wish to know whether Hatten has any fresh insights into Beethoven's late works. For such readers, and de-spite the affirmative response that one might give to that question, the deliberate pace at which the book's arguments unfold may be a source of frustration. There will be others, however, for whom analysis and meta-analysis (roughly, doing and talking about that doing) can no longer be construed legitimately as separate or separable activities. Such readers will welcome the generous explanations offered in the theoretical chapters, explanations that make it easier to evaluate the author's claims.

Finally, the problem of terminology. Hatten's book is burdened with terms and concepts drawn primarily from linguistic and semiotic theory. Terms like opposition, markedness, correlation, abnegation, motivation, trope, and token are frequently used. For this reason the author has pro-vided a glossary on pp. 287–95 of seventy-eight terms and concepts rel-evant, and in some cases central, to the book's argument. Although the glossary is an implicit acknowledgment of the origins of Hatten's theoreti-cal concepts, it does not always clarify his meaning. For example, under the entry for *topic,* I read the following definition: "a complex musical correlation originating in a kind of music . . . used as part of a larger work." Curious about the term *correlation,* I turn to that entry and encoun-ter the following: "Stylistic association between sound and meaning in music; structured (kept coherent) by oppositions, and mediated by markedness." The plot now thickens, since I have to seek clarification of the terms *opposition* and *markedness.* Of course, all lexicons are self-referen-tial. In other words, definitions are possible only in terms of other defini-tions. Were I to persist in looking up Hatten's terms, I would sooner or later return to my point of departure. Nevertheless, given the high popu-

lation of unfamiliar terms and concepts in the book (at least to music theorists and musicologists), Hatten might have ensured that his glossary was *less* like a glossary by providing not only a list but a set of more expansive definitions. In general, the explanations of terms offered at their initial occurrence in the text and in subsequent usage provide a better guide to their meaning than what is offered in the glossary.

* * *

Looking back over his achievement in the book, Hatten writes in the closing chapter as follows:

> We must not neglect the explanation of marked and unmarked op-
> positions that have lost their "stylistic salience" or that are part of the
> background in a work—and not solely because they provide for un-
> derlying coherence. Coherence must itself be understood
> integratively—neither as "structure" nor as "expression" alone, but as
> a product of the marked and correlational organization of musical
> meaning. Thus, I offer a theory that claims to be both structuralist
> and hermeneutic, but that expands the range of these complemen-
> tary approaches. The theory is structuralist in its further pursuit of
> the structure of expression, and hermeneutic in its further pursuit of
> the expressiveness of formal structures. (p. 279)

Style and history, necessary elements in the construction of a work's "back-ground," play a part in Hatten's theory, but the core of the theory is the interplay between structure and expression. I use the neutral term *inter-play* to characterize this relationship because its exact nature and limits are not made absolutely clear. It is a dichotomy, however, whose roots reach back at least to the nineteenth century, and one that has become a point of conversation among today's musicologists and theorists. Although it is a convenient dichotomy, it may also be a false one ultimately.[2]

What, then, is the domain of "structure," and how does it differ from the domain of "expression"? To begin to answer this question, we are obliged to recreate some of the contexts in which the dichotomy is in-voked in *Musical Meaning in Beethoven*. Setting out his plan for the book, Hatten declares allegiance to a semiotic approach:

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[2] For nineteenth-century precedents, see *Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Ian Bent, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). A recent discussion is Anthony Newcomb, "Sound and Feeling," *Critical Inquiry* 10, no. 4 (1984): 614–43.

> I am committed to a semiotic approach, which I construe as involving both structuralist and hermeneutic approaches to the relationship between sound and meaning. (p. 2)

Even before he has had time to map the respective domains of "structure" and "expression," Hatten has already found a home for them in semiotic theory. It is not clear from this early statement whether his theory is semiotic *because* it includes "both structuralist and hermeneutic approaches," or whether semiotics, vast and tolerant as it is of a bewildering array of methodological approaches, merely provides a home for this type of investigation, functioning ultimately as a kind of universal solvent.[3] Notice here that the opposition is between "structuralist" and "hermeneutic" whereas in the quotation from the last pages of the book, it is between "structure" and "expression." It would seem that the two dichotomies are equivalent. Later when Hatten introduces the key concept of markedness, defined concisely as "the valuation given to difference," (p. 34) he simply incorporates markedness into a prior field of discourse:

> What is proposed by a semiotic theory of markedness is the grounding of musical relationships in the cultural universes of their conception, in order to address the expressive significance of formal structures in a richer way. (p. 66)

If markedness is really as crucial to musical understanding as Hatten claims— if, in other words, there is more to markedness than the asymmetrical framing of (binary) oppositions—then the role assigned to it in the above statement is of a decidedly auxiliary nature. For the crucial claim here concerns those "cultural universes," complete with what are elsewhere called "cultural units," that will enable the interpreter to construct meanings that would be consonant with contemporaneous constructions. Although markedness serves as a valuable tool for such historical reconstructions, the more pertinent competence is apparently the stylistic one.

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[3] For contrasting mappings of the field of musical semiotics, see Jean-Jacques Nattiez, "Reflections on the Development of Semiology in Music," trans. Katharine Ellis, *Music Analysis* 8, no. 1 (1989): 21–75; David Lidov, "Music," in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics,* ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1986), 577–87; Robert Hatten and Gayle Henrotte, "Recent Perspectives on Music Semiotics," in *The Semiotic Web 1987,* ed. Jean Umiker-Sebeok and Thomas A. Sebeok (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1988), 408–29; and Raymond Monelle, *Linguistics and Semiotics in Music* (Chur, Switzerland and Philadelphia: Harwood, 1992). Those still in doubt about the diversity of the field may wish to consult *Musical Signification: Essays in the Semiotic Theory and Analysis of Music,* ed. Eero Tarasti (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995).

The structure-expression or the structuralist-hermeneutic dichotomy is thus underargued in the book. It is however not clear that further, abstract pursuit of it would have advanced the book's aims. Hatten's sympathies, it quickly becomes clear, are more with the expressive or the hermeneutic than with the structural. This may be justified on the grounds that, as he puts it towards the end of the book, "music scholarship is just beginning to recover from the repression of expressive discourse fostered by a formalist aesthetics" (p. 228). And this claim will be readily resonant with recent calls for a return to a human-centered discourse about music.[4] This is not the place to make the counter argument that "formalist aesthetics"—as enshrined, for example, in the writings of Schenker and his followers, and in contrast to prevailing views about analysis—has been vitally concerned with hermeneutic meaning, sometimes explicitly, other times (and more typically) implicitly.[5] After all, the under-complicating of what formalist analysts do may be no more than a rhetorical strategy on the part of their opponents. But Hatten's concerns are never merely polemical. By declaring an interest in musical meaning, he is forced to tilt the balance of his analyses towards the hermeneutic end of the spectrum, away from the structural. Whether an ideal balance can ever be achieved, or whether it is desirable to strive for such balance—these are questions admitting of no straightforward answers.

The domain of expression is potentially boundless. A theory that claims to deal with expressive meanings is faced with the challenge of dividing expressive from non-expressive meanings. All meanings are potentially or actually expressive. Cadential action, linear spans, modulations, the filling in of symmetrical pitch spaces: these "structural" procedures, these conceits of theory-based analysis, frequently elicit affective responses from listeners. In fact, I can think of nothing in a work of music that could be said to lack expression. Hatten's response to this boundlessness is to latch

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[4] See, among other calls, that of Lawrence Kramer in *Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

[5] On aspects of Schenker's "hermeneutics," see the description of his metaphorical language in Robert Snarrenberg, "Competing Myths: The American Abandonment of Schenker's Organicism," in *Theory, Analysis, and Meaning*, ed. Anthony Pople (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 29–56. Evidence of hermeneutic awareness in the work of Schenkerians may be found in Oswald Jonas, *Introduction to the Theory of Heinrich Schenker (Einführung in die Lehre Heinrich Schenkers): The Nature of the Musical Work of Art*, trans. and ed. John Rothgeb (New York: Longman, 1982); Ernst Oster, "The Fantasie-Impromptu: A Tribute to Beethoven" and "The Dramatic Character of the Egmont Overture" in *Aspects of Schenkerian Theory*, ed. David Beach (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 189–208 and 209–222; and Carl Schachter, "The Triad as Place and Action," *Music Theory Spectrum* 17, no. 2 (1995): 149–69.

on to historically-supported or "contemporaneous" meanings. For Beethoven, one source of expressive content is the body of *topoi* or 'topics' that were current in the eighteenth century and that constituted a sonic background to the formation of his musical style. Following Leonard Ratner, Hatten elevates the following into a provisional universe of topics: musical styles based on stylized constructions of degree of dignity in the eighteenth century (such as the high or low styles), types of pieces (like minuets and contredanses), and certain kinds of figures (like the learned or strict style, the military or hunt style, or the fantasia style).[6] These subjects of musical discourse are referential; they embody certain conventional affects. And although Hatten declines to provide an explicit and comprehensive taxonomy of expressive connotations for each topic, his invocation of them is never complete without some allusion to the feelings they kindle in the prepared or receptive listener.

A series of "expressive genres" developed from the conjoining of topics constitutes the other source of formal expressive content. Since topics normally function at a local level of structure, a global supplement that subsumes the individual moments is required. "Expressive genres" are designed to provide over arching characterizations of whole movements or even whole works. For example, the expressive genre of the slow movement of the *Hammerklavier* Sonata, the subject of Hatten's opening chapter, is "tragic-to-transcendent," while that of the Fifth Symphony is "tragic-to-triumphant." That of the A major Piano Sonata, op. 101, is simply (and inconsistently) "pastoral." The aim here is to capture something of the broad affective flow of the music by isolating a dominant expression at the beginning and ending. The severely limited number of expressive genres— two, to be precise—and the special pleading on behalf of one (the pastoral) that does not embody a readily identifiable "change of state" are some of the limitations of the notion of an expressive genre. Yet, the move "from topic to expressive genre" (the title of Hatten's third chapter) is theoreti-

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6 The foundational works are Leonard G. Ratner, *Classic Music: Expression, Form and Style* (New York: Schirmer, 1980), 1–30 and Wye Jamison Allanbrook, *Rhythmic Gesture in Mozart: Le Nozze di Figaro and Don Giovanni* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 1–70. See also V. Kofi Agawu, *Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Allanbrook, "Two Threads Through the Labyrinth: Topic and Process in the First Movements of K. 332 and K. 333," in *Convention in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Music: Essays in Honor of Leonard G. Ratner,* ed. W. J. Allanbrook, J. M. Levy and W. P. Mahrt (Stuyvesant, NY: Pendragon, 1992), 125–71; Birgitte Moyer, "*Ombra* and Fantasia in Late Eighteenth-Century Theory and Practice," in *Convention in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Music,* 283–306; Harold Powers, "Reading Mozart's Music: Text and Topic, Syntax and Sense," *Current Musicology* 57 (1995): 5–44; and Robert L. Martin, "Musical Topics and Expression in Music," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 53 (1995): 417–24.

cally necessary unless one regards topics as dependent signs anchored to a more continuous harmonic, contrapuntal, or rhythmic structure.[7] Perhaps the limited results of Hatten's postulation of expressive genres will influence future explorations of larger levels of affective movement.

Hatten's contribution to topical theory is to urge closer attention to the oppositions that define the constituents of a topical universe. Drawing on Ratner's work, Hatten first teases out and displays what he calls a "rough hierarchy" implied in Ratner's presentation of topics. The four parts of this hierarchy deal respectively with codes of feelings and passions, styles, topics, and pictorialism. Because the categories used by those contemporaneous theorists upon whom Ratner relies are, according to Hatten, "inevitably messy," it becomes necessary to clean them up, to order them in such a way that they can be more systematic.[8] Hatten's strategy is to reach for his tool of oppositions, and to begin to suggest how certain differences among topics and affective fields can be stated in terms of oppositions. One opposition is between sacred and secular, another is between historical and current styles, with the possibility that the sacred, for example, given its inherent conservatism, could be easily turned into a historical style. The demarcation of styles based on degrees of dignity (high, middle, and low styles) is also interpreted as an opposition between high (marked) and low (unmarked), with the middle or galant style serving as another unmarked region. Although this particular tripartite scheme does not respond well to Hatten's oppositional scheme, the most fundamental genres for Classical music apparently do. For example, major and minor, which correlate conventionally with comic and tragic respectively, are unmarked and (sometimes highly) marked respectively.

How useful is an oppositional scheme for characterizing the topical universe domesticized in Beethoven's music? One main difficulty with thinking of the world of expression in terms of 'X and not-X' or 'Y and not-Y' is that such oppositions do not necessarily constitute points of departure for listeners. Knowing that the affective home of a small portion of the Classical repertory is not-Comic may not feature in my hearing of the next Comic work. Furthermore, given the range of affects that characterizes the Comic world, I could conceivably take my affective bearings from a more broadly intertextual scheme rather than from an opposition between not-Comic and Comic. Could it be that we have oversimplified Saussure's insight that meaning is difference by focusing on binary oppo-

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7   I have argued this in Chapter 3 of *Playing with Signs*.

8   For another attempt to improve the categories into which topics may be distributed, see Harold Powers, "Reading Mozart's Music," 28–29.

sites when the reality may involve tripartite or 'many-partite' schemes formed into a kind of network? In explicating a universe of topics, individual elements may respond well to definition in terms of oppositions of certain musical features, but it is not clear that the universe as a whole can be fruitfully categorized on the basis of the same oppositions.

<div align="center">* * *</div>

I mentioned earlier that although Hatten declares a comparable interest in structural and expressive (or hermeneutic) meaning, the latter occupies the lion's share of his attention. I went further in casting doubt on the viability of the opposition. Let us now find out what exactly the hermeneutic signifies in Hatten's semiotics.

"Often," writes Hatten, "it is the idiosyncratic that sparks hermeneutic insight into the expressive significance of a musical event" (p. 133). Note that an event appears "idiosyncratic" to me because it relates at a tangent to the normal routines that I have internalized from listening to this same repertory. Elsewhere, Hatten says that "a hermeneutic approach is geared toward the unusual detail, the striking feature, of a work as a clue to its expressive or thematic significance" (p. 11). Again, knowledge of norms, and the ability to spot departures from them, is crucial. Hatten's parting remark that his theory is in part "hermeneutic in its further pursuit of the expressiveness of formal structures," however, embraces a procedural aspect of the hermeneutic method that involves teasing out expressive meaning from purely structural procedure. On this score, hermeneutic meaning may be extracted from a voice-leading graph, a metric reduction, or a thematic analysis. When finally Hatten puts it all together in a formal and comprehensive statement, he cannot help but expose the inner contradictions of a hermeneutic approach. Spotting idiosyncracy, salience, and the unusual detail all presuppose a sophisticated knowledge not only of the style in which a piece is written but the specific strategies that are at work within it. As musicians, however, we are always already trapped in musical space; a sediment of musical salience is already implanted in our memories. Since our pre-theoretical state is thus already contaminated with intuitive and hence 'theoretical' notions of norm and deviation, the hermeneutic effort becomes unavoidably circular. Here is how Hatten summarizes his analysis of the slow movement of Beethoven's Sonata in E♭ major, op. 7:

> It is this kind of method that I have called hermeneutic: working back and forth between stylistic knowledge and interpretive speculations, grounding those speculations in hypothetical stylistic opposi-

> tions; and then moving beyond established correlations of the style
> to a contextual and thematically strategic accounting of the unique
> significance of musical events. (p. 61)

Hermeneutics, then, is interpretation. For some theorists, it is also analysis, since analysis has always involved interpretation. It may be that in Hatten's practice the hermeneuticist is more self-conscious in milking structural features for expressive connotation. But this marks a difference only in the degree to which structural elements are represented verbally (and hence 'expressively'); it does not mark a fundamentally new point of departure.

In order to replicate one aspect of Hatten's hermeneutic method, then, one attaches explicit expressive labels to motivic or voice-leading patterns observed in the piece. For example, struck by the behavior of chromatic pitches in the first movement of op. 101, Hatten describes the D♯–D progression in the left hand of bar 1 in terms of "yielding," the "poignant reversal" involving A–A♯ in bar 17 as "resignation," the A♯–A progression in bars 48–49 as "frustrated reversal," and the progression in 50–51 as "outrage." The eventual arrival on a cadential six-four in bar 90 suggests "saving grace," a "positive spiritual insight." And so on. Hatten's is by no means the most comprehensive study of chromaticism in this movement. But where the structuralist is apparently content to explain the structure of the movement with due attention to chromaticism at different levels of structure, perhaps allowing him or herself the indulgence of an occasional adjective, Hatten opens the flood gates and reads op. 101 in terms of social and spiritual meanings that are said to be consonant not only with other Beethovenian late works but with what we can reconstruct of contemporaneous responses to the work.

There are at least two kinds of responses to the kind of hermeneutic reading offered here. First, those who desire greater detail concerning structural matters, who wish to place chromatic elements in a broader context of voice leading patterns, may well turn to other analyses (such as Schenker's) for the fuller picture. Second, and related, those who find descriptions of expressive content either too precise and therefore limiting, or too vague and thus unhelpful, and who prefer to think of a flexible range of meanings associated with particular structural processes—meanings that, while retaining a palpable core, are modified with each new hearing of the work—will wish to leave room for such active speculation by withholding metaphors rather than deploying them as if they were stable and concrete. Hatten is not unaware of these difficulties. His solution is to retain fluid boundaries between some expressive states. For example, topics and expressive genres are said to encompass conventional

topics like pastoral and march and the more elusive, though no less important, affective and uniquely Beethovenian states such as "positive spiritual insight."

Occasionally, Hatten's eagerness to specify certain expressive meanings leads him to moments of excess. Consider, for example, his contention that the first two bars of op. 101 (shown in example 1) "present a complete expressive package of typically pastoral features" (p. 97). These he identifies as six-eight meter, pedal on 5, harmonic stasis, relatively simple melodic contour, contrary motion creating a "wedge" shape, rocking accompaniment, parallel thirds, consonant appoggiatura on the downbeat of bar 2, elaborated resolution of 4–3 suspension between the alto and bass in bar 2, and major mode with quiet dynamics. That these are features of the music quoted in example 1 there is little question, but they surely are not all paradigmatic features of the pastoral expressive genre. Furthermore, a "relatively simple melodic contour" is too vague to serve as a guide to the discovery of pastoral passages, just as "major mode" and "quiet dynamics," as Hatten himself recognizes, cannot establish the particular oppositions that would define pastoral. Of course these features operate in tandem with others, but Hatten never takes the crucial step of specifying, first, how we might infer a given topic or expressive genre from a musical context, and second, what dimensional behaviors interact (and in what way) to create a minimally coherent syntax of topic. We discover topics because we know them already.

Further into the analysis of op. 101, Hatten mentions two additional Beethovenian techniques, "undercutting" and "yearning." Both are deployed in the movement, but since neither of them is an authentic pastoral technique, Hatten is forced to argue that they are "expressively appropriate to the pastoral genre." The question immediately arises: What would it take for something to be expressively *in*appropriate? Obviously there can be no such thing in practice, for one of the features of topical discourses in the Classical style is the mixture of apparently incompatible topics for purely artistic purposes. Hatten notices such "mixing of topics" in the second movement of op. 101, for example, where he finds a "pastoral march" and a "learned yet rustic trio" (p. 105). It would seem, then, that the pastoral serves as a kind of umbrella topical or expressive field, attaining greater or lesser degrees of prominence on the musical surface. Indeed, in discussing the finale of op. 101, Hatten identifies a number of topics (heroic/learned style, musette-like figuration, imitation, folk element) and then concludes that the pastoral "inflects what might otherwise have been interpreted as a straightforwardly heroic/triumphant finale" (p. 107). In its appropriate vagueness, the word 'inflect' invites individual listeners to construct their own topical hierarchies for this finale.

Example 1. Beethoven, Piano Sonata in A major, op. 101, first movement, mm. 1–2.

Etwas lebhaft, und mit der innigsten Empfindung.
Allegretto, ma non troppo.

* * *

The structural side of Hatten's structural-expressive divide consists of observations about aspects of form, harmony, voice-leading, phrase structure, and instrumentation. Hatten does not spend a great deal of time explaining how he arrives at certain structural meanings; it is simply assumed that readers will understand them. Indeed, his observations about harmony, for example, are refreshingly free of prescription, reminiscent of writers like Tovey and Charles Rosen, whose critical stances managed to bypass the demands for immediate justification of method made by theory-based analysis.[9] Now and again, Hatten turns up the notch on the structural side; his analysis of the Cavatina from op. 130 is a case-in-point. Conceived as a kind of summary analysis for the book, this detailed analysis takes up some of the concerns of a theory-based analysis. A few comments on the analysis will serve to conclude our discussion of Hatten's analyses. (See example 2 for the analysis of the first ten bars of the *Cavatina.*)

Hatten's intuition that this is "a remarkably integrated movement" (p. 204) leads him to invest, first, in demonstrating thematic resemblances among the instrumental parts on the smallest or most local levels of structure, and second, in arguing for a coherent ten-bar phrase that, however, includes an "expressive interpolation" between the last beats of bars 4 and 6. Example 2 is described as a "phrase-structural analysis and quasi-Schenkerian outer-voice reduction," and is said to begin with a one-bar anacrusis followed by what promises to be a four-bar phrase (bars 2ff.). Three bars into this four-bar phrase, however, an "expressive interpola-

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[9] By this, I do not mean that Tovey and Rosen's analyses are in any way free of theory; I only mean that they take for granted the theory that supports their insights.

Example 2. Hatten's analysis of Beethoven, String Quartet in B♭, op. 130, fifth movement "Cavatina", mm. 1–10 (after Hatten example 8.3, p. 213).

tion" is introduced for a full seven quarter-note beats. Then the progression is restored at bar 7 and brought to completion, with a one-bar echo in bar 10. Hatten's numbering of the bars as 1, 2a, and 3a reflects this larger process of going over the same ground, first incompletely, then completely.

The remarkable continuity of this ten-bar passage may lead some readers to doubt the clarity of Hatten's phrase divisions. Bar 1, for example, is interpreted as an anacrusis to bar 2 mainly on the strength of the first violin leap of a sixth to initiate the melodic process. But bar 1 is more integral to the phrase than the upbeat status conferred upon it would suggest. Reference to the full score shows that bar 1 includes in miniature the harmonic progression I–ii–V–(I), thus adumbrating the harmonic progression of Hatten's four-bar phrase. And as Hatten points out, there are close thematic resemblances between the second violin phrase in bar 1 and that of the first and second violins in bars 2 and 3 respectively. Furthermore, the first violin's G–F sigh figure on the downbeat of bar 3 is echoed in the viola's second and third eighth notes in the same bar, and the rising third E♭–F–G in bar 2, adumbrated in bar 1 and heard again in bar 4, leads to a reversal in bar 5. The fact that each string part has "melodic" material, the sharing of the upper voice between the two violins, the little echoes between voices—the effect of these internal thematic connections is to make the passage seem as seamless and continuous as possible. This suggests that Hatten's phrase divisions operate on a subsurface level.

The most provocative aspect of Hatten's analysis is his claim that there

is an "expressive interpolation" in the middle of this ten-bar phrase. Presumably the interpolation is "expressive" rather than "structural"? He is led to this interpretation because the first violin ascends to the apex of the phrase in bars 5–6 and then drops suddenly to a lower register to complete the phrase. But why is this an interpolation rather than, say, a phrase expansion? The melodic and harmonic processes of bars 5–6 seem to be so intimately connected with what came before and what comes after that the sense of an interpolation, of the introduction of extraneous matter, is undermined. Moreover, the fact that the emotional temperature is heightened in this phrase does not deprive it of a structural function. It is true that Beethoven sometimes marks departures from a putative four-bar norm for consciousness by introducing an "expressive" feature such as a chromatic element, but such a feature serves only to highlight the underlying structural process. The structural and the expressive are interdependent, if not ultimately identical. And while one can advance pragmatic reasons for keeping them separate in theory, it is clear that their difference is erased in practice.

One feature of Hatten's analysis of the "Cavatina" which is consistent with other analyses in the book is his use of expressive terms to characterize structural features. He locates the movement as a whole in "the nontragic realm of the transcendentally serene." The two quarter-note rests in the first violin part of bar 3 have a "gasping effect." Speaking of the aftermath to the apex of the melody, he says that "the immediate effect of the sudden collapse in m. 6 is unmistakably a (tragic) reversal, even in this serene environment." The approach to the climax itself is characterized in terms of a "'willed' (basically stepwise) ascent." A V–V$^{4/2}$–I^6 progression is described as a "familiar yielding progression."[10] And so on. This is Hatten in typical hermeneutic mode. He invites us to complete the expressive impact of the relationships among the tones by peppering his description with evocative metaphors and colorful adjectives.

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Looking beyond the minutiae with which this review has been concerned, we may evaluate Hatten's book as a contribution to two research areas: Beethoven study and the semiotic analysis of music. Near the beginning of this review I remarked upon the disappearance of the composer. My point was that, while reading Hatten's book, I was less aware of an explicit engagement with the Beethoven style than I was of issues in music

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[10] These characterizations in Hatten, *Musical Meaning in Beethoven*, 211–13.

analysis. This is not my impression from reading earlier commentators like Riezler or Bekker, both of whom were concerned as much with the composer as with his music.[11] Hatten takes for granted the critical tradition that has sustained the Beethovenian myth, and forgoes an opportunity to forge a genuine comparative approach by allowing the late works to stand as normative sites of meaning, instead of exploring, for example, their intensely metamusical aspects, or their ever-present concern with the basics of musical articulation, of form, and of reference.[12] It may well be that such a historical-stylistic study lies beyond the purview of semiotics, whose framework tends to be synchronic and systematic rather than diachronic and historical.

As a contribution to the field of musical semiotics, Hatten's book inhabits at first glance the corner of the field that Raymond Monelle has recently characterized as "soft semiotics," distinguishing it from the hard semiotics of distributionalists like Nattiez, Ruwet, Chenoweth and others.[13] The explicit concern with affect, meaning and expression, the avoidance of "purely musical" taxonomies, and the recognition that the verbal component of a semiotic analysis has the potential to reach places that other symbolic metalanguages do not: these set Hatten's soft semiotics apart from that of his hard predecessors. It is important, however, to note that all of the ingredients of hard semiotics are present here. Hatten relies upon taxonomies, upon elements of variation among musical units, and upon overall syntagmatic progressions. The difference lies in his choice of frame.

An element of "hardness" in Hatten's theory stems from the notion of markedness, introduced as a tool for discriminating between musical events. Markedness provides an effective explanatory mechanism at the most basic levels of musical articulation, at the pre-stylistic level, so to speak, so that it requires a special effort on the part of the analyst to adapt it to the analysis of a specific musical style. By failing to make an explicit application not just to Beethoven but to the Beethoven of the late quartets and

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[11] Walter Riezler, *Beethoven*, trans. G.D.H. Pidcock (London: Forrester, 1938); Paul Bekker, *Beethoven* (Munich: Schuster & Loeffler, 1911).

[12] As explored in Theodor Adorno, "Spätstil Beethovens," in *Moments Musicaux* (Frankfurt am Main: n.p., 1964); Edward T. Cone, "Beethoven's Experiments in Composition: The Late Bagatelles," in *Beethoven Studies* 2, ed. Alan Tyson (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), 84–105; and Ratner, *The Beethoven String Quartets: Compositional Strategies and Rhetoric* (Stanford: Stanford Bookstore, 1995).

[13] Raymond Monelle, *Linguistics and Semiotics in Music* (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood, 1992). Monelle discusses the work of Nattiez, Ruwet and Chenoweth.

piano sonatas, Hatten succeeds in drawing attention to markedness theory as such, and thereby points to analytical issues that lie beyond Beethoven.

Musical Meaning in Beethoven makes explicit some of the meanings that we assign (sometimes intuitively) to Beethoven's music; Hatten explains how we know what we know. He has drawn upon terms and concepts from linguistics and semiotics and has sought to align them with some of the explanatory concerns of music theory. And although his structural approach leaves room for further elaboration (the kinds of insights inspired by Schenker's theory, for example, could have been featured more prominently), he manages to suggest ways in which hermeneutics could be brought into a productive dialogue with theory-based analysis. Books like this are much needed, for by exemplifying in a self-conscious way a critical approach that claims to invest as much in the structural as well as in the expressive aspects of a work, they lead us to a better understanding of basic aspects of the musical experience.

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