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Editor's Preface

Welcome to Current Musicology #62! Regular readers will detect a few changes in this issue, which I would like to address. First of all, we have increased our commitment to greater representation of the work of musicologists who specialize in areas outside the conventional bounds of the Western art music canon. This is reflected in our selection of submissions: In addition to publishing two articles that examine Schubert's life and work, we include an essay by Jonathan Stock, in which he compares ethnomusicology and "new musicology." Our book reviews concern subjects as diverse as bebop, music and technology, the music of the Ewe, and conventional Western music theory. Finally, our conference reports cover "the 'ethnic' in music," the shaping of Welsh musical culture, music in nineteenth-century Britain, and papers presented at the 1997 annual conference of the Musicological Society of Southern Africa.

Another area of progress is the adoption of the author-date citation system, which is generally the most economical in terms of cost, time, and space; additionally, *The Chicago Manual of Style* (1993:640–41) recommends this approach (over the old-fashioned, humanities-style citation system) for all academic disciplines. (A cursory survey of the current issues of over 30 different journals of musicology revealed that all of the ethnomusicological journals use the author-date system, as do 50 percent of the music theory journals and a minority of the historical journals. Since *Current Musicology* cannot be categorized as belonging exclusively to one or another musicological discipline or approach, our decision was primarily guided by pragmatism. The option of using both citation systems was rejected in order to maintain consistency.)

A final change of format: names of book review authors no longer appear at the end of reviews, but at the beginning. Since we are now using the author-date system, and since we encourage substantive book reviews (which may have their own lists of references at the end), this change avoids the awkwardness of placing the author's name at the end of the list of references.

I would like to thank the authors who contributed to this issue; Emily Snyder Laugesen, Dieter Christensen, and the other members of the *Current Musicology* Advisory Council for their advice on various aspects of editorial and publishing operations; and Deb Salzberg for her support in the office. Finally, I would like to thank the editors of *Current Musicology*, all of whom contributed to #62, and whose combined efforts—particularly those of Associate Editor Marilyn Nonken, Reviews Editor Suzanne M. Lodato, and Reports Editor Judith Olson—significantly enriched this issue of our publication. Cheers!

—DNT

articles

In Defense of Scholarship and Archival Research: Why Schubert's Brothers Were Allowed to Marry*

By Rita Steblin

Maynard Solomon's article "Schubert: Some Consequences of Nostalgia," published in the Summer 1993 issue of *19th Century Music* (Solomon 1993:34–46) challenges me to a response. I would like to be able to reply to the charges he levels against my article "The Peacock's Tale: Schubert's Sexuality Reconsidered" in the same issue of that journal (Steblin 1993:5–33). Solomon writes: "Taking Schubert's heterosexuality as an article of faith, Rita Steblin will allow no alternatives. Her paper is less a critique than an apologia; it does not significantly advance the discussion, but seeks to return to superseded positions" (35). I would answer that I never took Schubert's heterosexuality for granted, since I believe that it is impossible to judge conclusively the sexuality of a long-dead personality from a different historical era. Instead, I examined Solomon's arguments in favor of Schubert's imputed homosexuality and found the scholarship to be deficient. One needs very good evidence in order to overthrow long-established positions, and Solomon's evidence, of a speculative nature, is not sound.

Solomon is to be credited with identifying the two quotations in Schubert's diary entry of 8 September 1816 as coming from Plautus and Epictetus.[1] But the tone of the remark that follows, with its omniscient insight into Schubert's inner feelings and motivations, belongs in the realm of romantic fiction: "Schubert is deeply troubled: he is increasingly reluctant to continue playing an odious part that has been assigned to him. Rather, he wants to be given a role congruent with his inner self, not only in order to resolve anguishing issues of identity but because he must be true to himself" (34).

The controversial passage from Schubert's diary, where he presents his feelings on marriage, reads as follows: "Happy he who finds a true manfriend. Happier still he who finds a true friend in his wife. To a free man matrimony is a terrifying thought in these days: he exchanges it [matrimony] either for melancholy or for crude sensuality. Monarchs of today, you see this and are silent. Or do you not see it? If so, O God, shroud our senses and feelings in numbness; yet take back the veil again one day without lasting harm" (Deutsch 1946:71). I interpret this diary entry, with its railing cry against contemporary monarchs, as Schubert's reaction to

the newly-imposed marriage consent law. This "Ehe-Consens Gesetz" of 1815 made it virtually impossible for a person in Schubert's class station who had no fixed income to marry.

Solomon criticizes my "translation" of the Ehe-Consens law as "a tendentious gloss, designed to mask the likelihood that Schubert, both as a schoolteacher and as the son of a house-owning citizen, was exempt from the operation of the law" (36).[2] Solomon is wrong on several accounts here: Schubert was not a schoolteacher (*Lehrer*) but a school assistant (*Schulgehilfe*); there was nothing in the law that exempted the son of a house owner from having to meet the conditions of the "Ehe-Consens Gesetz"; Schubert's father did not become a "Bürger" ("special citizen"—see the explanation below) until 1826.

My original text, which had attempted to explain the law and its implementation more fully, was severely cut by the editor of *19th Century Music*. I had originally written (section omitted is in italics): "Franz Herzog's 1829 legal interpretation of this decree specifies in exact terms who did not qualify for this exemption: *foreign nobles, civil servants who worked for private institutions such as banks, those with higher degrees who were Jews or not native (foreign degrees were not accepted), patricians without the proper papers [Bürgerzettel], etc.*" I then continued: "Schubert, who was listed in official documents as 'school assistant' [Schulgehilfe], was obviously not exempt from this law. An alphabetical list of 98 categories of persons who were not allowed to marry without obtaining the 'Ehe-Consens' permit includes as no. 61 'Musikanten' and as no. 82 'Schulgehülfen'" (7).

In addition, the list also included as no. 3 "Akademische Architekten, Bildhauer, Graveurs, Kupferstecher, Mahler" (academic architects, sculptors, engravers, copperplate engravers, painters) and as no. 54 "Lehrer an Privat-Lehranstalten auch an den die Hauptschule vertretenden Trivialschulen" (teachers at private educational establishments, also at elementary schools which substitute for intermediate schools).[3] These categories are important because they concern Schubert's three brothers.

These brothers are important to the discussion because of Solomon's serious charge: "Steblin's hypothesis utterly collapses when one simply recalls that all of Schubert's brothers married despite the law—Ferdinand in 1816 when he was still a school assistant at an orphanage in the Alsergrund suburb; Karl in 1823, although he was then a free-lance landscape painter who had never made an adequate living; and, two years later, Schubert's oldest brother, Ignaz, when he too was a school assistant" (36). Because Solomon also writes "we need to know much more about the actual implementation of the marriage law," and because there is so much more basic research that needs to be done in Vienna, the following documents concerning the Schubert family are published here for the first time.

The marriage registry (Trauungs-Protokoll) of Schubert's family church in Lichtental contains the following entry for 7 January 1816: "Bridegroom. Name and station. Schubert, Ferdinand. Teacher in the Imperial and Royal Orphanage. Born here, the legitimate son of Mr. Franz Schubert, a house-owning school teacher, still living, and his wife Elisabetha, née Fitz, deceased."[4]

Ferdinand Schubert (1794–1859) was listed in this document as a "Lehrer" (teacher, not a school assistant) at the "k. k. Waisenhaus" (I. & R. Orphanage, not a private school [Privat-Lehranstalt], see above) and thus was exempt from the marriage-consent law. Because of this exemption, no further marriage documents for Ferdinand are found in the Lichtental church archives.

The situation for Karl Schubert (1795–1855) was quite different. His marriage entry, dated 19 November 1823 in the Lichtental church "Trauungs-Protokoll," reads as follows: "Schubert, Karl, academic landscape painter, born here, son of Mr. Franz Schubert, school teacher, and his wife Elisabeth, née Fitzin."[5] (One of the two witnesses was: "Ignaz Schubert. Schulgehülfe Rossau.")

Karl, as an academic landscape painter, was not exempt from the marriage-consent law (see no. 3, "academische Mahler," of the list of 98 categories of non-exempt persons) and thus was required to meet its conditions. Accordingly, the Lichtental church archive (housed in the attic) contains the following documents, which Karl had been required to present to the church authorities as proof of his having obtained permission to marry. (I have assigned numbers following the chronological order of these documents.)

[1] "Honorable Government Authority / The undersigned academic landscape painter, born in Himmelpfortgrund, 28 years old, proposes to marry Theresia Schwemminger, single milliner; [he] requests that the marriage consent be granted favorably. / Vienna, 6 October 1823. / Karl Schubert."[6]

[2] "D / Honorable Government Authority / No. 10274. 1 florin 30 kreuzer / Karl Schubert, academic landscape painter, living in Altlerchenfeld, in the school house no. 234 / Requests #27656 / for the marriage consent to be granted favorably, so that he may marry Theresia Schwemminger [spelling standardized]. / Presented 7 October 1823 Gr."

[2 verso] "To be returned [to the requester] and, as a result of the earning capacity testified by both sides, no objection will be made on the part of the political authorities against the proposed marriage of the petitioner with Theresia Schwemminger. The petitioner has [now] to appeal, with

the required marriage-consent documents from his birth authorities, to the parish where the wedding is to take place. From the Municipal Council of the I. & R. capital city of Vienna, 14 October 1823. / Czapka, Secretary."[7]

[3] "Honorable Real Estate and Government Authorities of Himmelpfortgrund: A: The undersigned, according to document A, a landscape painter, according to the certificate of baptism B: [document] B, born in Himmelpfortgrund, 28 years old, proposes to marry the single, according to [document] C: certificate of baptism C, Theresia Schwemminger, milliner; [and] requests that the birth authorities grant their consent. D: He has the permission of the Hon. city authorities, according to [document] D. Vienna, 22 October 1823 / Karl Schubert."[8]

[4] "Honorable Government Authorities of Himmelpfortgrund / Karl Schubert, landscape painter, resident at Altlerchenfeld No. 234 / requests / consent from the birth authorities in order to be permitted to marry Theresia Schwemminger / presented: 23 October 1823."

[4 verso] "The petitioner, who has already obtained governmental permission from the local city authorities, is herewith granted birth-authority consent for his proposed marriage with Theresia Schwemminger. He has [now] to appeal to the parish where the wedding will take place. Vienna, 23 October 1823. / I. & R. Real Estate Land Registry Office."[9]

[5] "Certificate of Announcement. / I, the undersigned, testify herewith: that the banns for the bridal pair Mr. Carl Schubert, academic landscape painter, single state, Catholic religion (in which he has been found to be fully instructed), 28 years old, born in Lichtental, resident in my parish, house no. 234; and Theresia Schwemminger, single state, Catholic religion, 24 years old, born in Lichtental, and resident there in house no. 163, have been duly read three times in the local parish church, namely on the 1st, 2nd, and 9th of November this year and that no lawful hindrance to their marriage has been found. / Vienna, parish of Altlerchenfeld, 13 November 1823. / Franz Blasius Kuderna m.p.[manu propria] / Priest for the reigning Sovereign."[10]

These documents show that it was necessary for Karl to procure the following papers in order to obtain permission to marry: A. proof of his profession, B. his birth certificate, C. his bride's birth certificate, and D. grant of the marriage-consent permit from the Viennese government authorities. Of these papers, only document D is preserved in the Lichtental

church archives. Karl was required to go to two civil governing authorities: the "Magistrat" of the city of Vienna, where he had to prove that his income or "Erwerbsfähigkeit" was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Ehe-Consens Gesetz (as well as proving that he had a clean political record), and the local land registry for the district of Himmelpfortgrund (k. k. Staats-Realitäten Grundbuchamt) for what appears to have been a second check. As a final step, before the marriage could be carried out (on 19 November 1823) by the priest of the Lichtental church, proof was needed that the marriage banns had been duly read (by the priest of the Altlerchenfeld church). The whole process of gaining permission took more than five weeks (6 October until 13 November).

It is not evident from the documents preserved for Karl Schubert in the Lichtental church archive what testimonials he had presented to the city authorities to prove that his income was sufficient to support a family. Such evidence is preserved in the papers at Lichtental for a certain Joseph Schwägler, a twenty-three-year-old "Maurergesell" [journeyman bricklayer], who had petitioned to marry the "Wäscherin" [washerwoman] Katharina Lebenbeck. In a document dated 8 October 1823, Schwägler uses the following wording: " . . since he has already amassed some wealth, and continues to earn good wages, in order to support a family."[11] His request to the Viennese government authorities that he be granted the marriage consent reads as follows:

> "Honorable Government Authority! / According to document A, I have indeed received permission to marry Katharina Lebenbeck from my Hon. canons of the Scottish Order, [and] nevertheless can also show the permission from the Hon. Government Authority in its function as guild council with regard to my earnings. Subsequently, and according to document B whereby I earn 2 florins 10 kreuzer daily, I dutifully request that the Hon. Government Authority may be pleased to grant me the required marriage consent with Katharina Lebenbeck. / Joseph Schwägler"[12]

Schwägler's request was granted by the City of Vienna on 20 November 1823. His income of 2 florins 10 kreuzer daily is to be compared with Franz Schubert's annual 1816 income, as assistant in his father's school, of 80 florins, A.C. (Deutsch 1946:933)[13]

Schubert's oldest brother Ignaz (1785–1844) did not marry two years after Karl, as stated by Solomon, but thirteen years later (on 14 September 1836, in Pötzleinsdorf). By this time he had inherited his father's position as director of the school in Rossau and as a "Lehrer" at a "k. k." school was exempt from the Ehe-Consens law. (The official name of this school, as

entered in Viennese land registry books, was "löbliche k. k. deutsche Schulanstalt" [honorable I. & R. German educational establishment]; at Franz Theodor's death in 1830 Ignaz's official title was "Schullehrer.")[14] The marriage entry for the fifty-one-year-old Ignaz reads: "Mr. Ignaz Schubert, public schoolteacher in Vienna, born in Vienna, a legitimate son of Mr. Franz Schubert, former public [school] teacher, and Elisabeth, née Fitz, both Catholic and deceased."[15]

Solomon writes that I have "altered the sense of [Schubert's] diary entry to conform to an undocumented scenario" (36). The above documents confirm my initial interpretation of the 8 September 1816 diary entry as expressing Schubert's despair at his inability to marry because of the harsh conditions set by the new Ehe-Consens law. It is Solomon's scenario—that Schubert was terrified of marriage because of homosexual leanings—that is undocumented.

Schubert, who had been courting Therese Grob from at least 1814, told Anselm Hüttenbrenner: "for three years [Therese] hoped I would marry her; but I could not find a position which would have provided for us both. She then bowed to her parents' wishes and married someone else, which hurt me very much" (Deutsch 1958:182).

The archive in the Lichtental church attic holds another document, an impressive certificate with an attached seal, which "Bergmann, bürgl. Bäckermeister"—the man who married Therese Grob—was able to produce to claim his bride. As a "Bürger," Johann Baptist Bergmann was exempt from the Ehe-Consens regulations. Being from another parish, he presented this document as proof that the marriage banns had been duly read (see plate 1):

> "Johann Georg Uhl, honorary canon and rector at the local cathedral and main parish church of St. Stephen, supreme princely archiepiscopal consistorial adviser, Electoral and prebendary master, as also steward, and vice-director in the archiepiscopal seminary there, and chaplain of the complete "Bürger"-militia etc. etc. testifies herewith: that Mr. Johann Baptist Bergmann, "bürgerlicher" master baker, of single state, catholic religion (instructed in the same), resident at St. Stephen's parish Nr. 831 and the respectable and chaste maiden Theresia Grob, daughter of a "bürgerl." silk factory owner, Catholic religion, resident in the parish of Lichtental Nr. 163, have proclaimed the banns properly three times, namely on the lst, 5th, and 12th of this month in the parish church of the undersigned, and no illegal hindrance to the marriage has been discovered. / In witness whereof I have signed this bill of proclamation with my own hand, and attached to it the parish seal. / Vienna, the 12th day of the month of November in the year 1820. / Johann Georg Uhl / as above."[16]


Johann Georg Uhl, Ehrendomherr und Rector an der hiesigen Metropolitan- und Haupt-
Pfarrkirche zum heiligen Stephan, hochfürstlich erzbischöflicher Konsistorial-Rath, Cur- und Chormeister, wie auch
Oekonom, und Vice-Director in dem erzbischöflichen Alumnate daselbst, und der sämmtlichen Bürger-Militz Kaplan ꝛc. ꝛc. bezeuge hiemit: daß
Scheine eigenhändig unterschrieben, und das Pfarrsiegel beygedruckt.
Zur Urkund dessen habe ich diesen
Wien den 12 Tag des im Jahre 1820.

Plate 1: Schubert Church, Lichtental Parish, Marriage Documents from January to July 1820: Johann Baptist Bergmann—Therese Grob.

This was the document that Schubert could not produce. Times were very different then, and it is wrong to interpret the events of Schubert's life without understanding the real conditions under which he lived.

Solomon's misinterpretation of the historical state of Schubert's era is apparent from his criticism of my translation of the word "Bürger." He writes "where a simple translation of 'Bürger' as 'citizens' or 'burghers' would imply Schubert's exemption, [Steblin] renders the word as 'patricians'" (36), and again elsewhere "she mistranslates 'Bürger' as 'patricians' to bolster her reading of the marriage-consent law" (44). While I admit that the use of "patrician" was not necessarily the best choice of term, to translate "Bürger" as "citizen" would have been most wrong, since this word does not reveal that the "Bürgers" in Vienna were a separate class with special privileges, set apart from the normal citizen. In Vienna the right to be a "Bürger" was not inherited, as in other cities, but was generally limited, in the Biedermeier era, to "Gewerbetreibenden"—tradesmen or manufacturers—and to house-owners. That Schubert's father was able to become a Bürger, unusual for a school teacher, was probably helped by his status as a house-owner.[17] As mentioned above, "Bürger" status was only granted to Schubert's father in 1826 (the title being accompanied by special papers, the Bürgerzettel," and requiring the payment of a special tax),[18] and Schubert himself never achieved this high rank.

Solomon implies that I have pursued the issue of Schubert's sexuality with a "crusading spirit" (42). But since he also accuses me of wanting to maintain the status quo, I have to ask: Who is the crusader here? If Solomon feels that he is "qualified to make judgements about Schubert's sexuality" (42) then let him produce documentary evidence about homosexuality in the Schubert circle. Machiavellian or late twentieth-century American interpretations of "young peacocks" are not sufficient in explaining Eduard von Bauernfeld's use of the term. The archives in Vienna are teeming with material that would provide answers to the political, social, and sexual matters Solomon speculates about. Schober's correspondence, the excised excerpts from Bauernfeld's diary, etc., all remain unpublished. It is easy to speculate. Archival research, on the other hand, is difficult and requires the methodological and philological skills of traditional scholarship.

Notes

* I wish to thank Dr. Erich Benedikt for helping me in 1994 to locate and interpret these new Schubert documents from the archives of the Lichtental Church in Vienna, and Konsistorialrat Dr. Paul Varga, Pfarrer of the Lichtental Church, for permitting me to publish them.

1. Schubert had written: "Man resembles a ball, to be played with by chance and passion. This sentence seems extraordinarily true to me. I have often read authors to the effect that the world is like a stage on which each human being plays a part" (Deutsch 1946:70).

2. Solomon consistently misspells "Consens" as "Consenz."

3. The law and its lengthy interpretation for Vienna, including the 98 categories, are given in full in my article "Franz Schubert und das Ehe-Consens Gesetz von 1815" (Steblin 1992:32–42).

4. "Bräutigam. Namen und Stand. Schubert Ferdinand Lehrer in k. k. Waisenhaus von hier gebürtig des Hr. Franz Schubert eines behausten Schullehrers noch am Leben und dessen Gattin Elisabetha gebohr. Fitz sel. ehel. Sohn." Pfarre Lichtental, Trauungs-Protokoll IX, 1 April 1810 to 30 June 1819, Fol. 238.

5. "Schubert Karl akademischer Landschaftsmahler von hier gebürtig, des Hr. Franz Schubert Schullehrers und dessen Gattin Elisabetha gebohr. Fitzin, Sohn." Pfarre Lichtental, Trauungs-Protokoll X, 11 July 1819 to 1 March 1829, Fol. 159.

6. The following documents (notes 5–9) are located in the Pfarre Lichtental, "Trauungs Acten vom August bis December 1823."

[1] "Schubert 11/823 [November 1823] / Löblicher Magistrat / Unterzeichneter akadem. Landschaftsmahler von Himmelpfortgrund gebürtig, 28 Jahr alt, gedenket sich mit der ledigen Theresia Schwemminger Putzmacherinn zu verehelichen; bittet den Ehekonsens gnädigst zu ertheilen. / Wien den 6ten 8bris 823. / Karl Schubert."

7. [2] "D / Löblicher Magistrat / No. 10274. 1f 30x / Karl Schubert akademisch. Landschaftsmahler wohnhaft in Altlerchenfeld im Schulhaus No. 234 / Bittet 27656 / um den Ehekonsens sich mit der Theresia Schwemingerin verehelichen zu dürfen gnädigst zu ertheilen. / ps 7t Oktober 823 Gr."

[2 verso] "Zurückzustellen und wird bey der beiderseits ausgewiesenen Erwerbsfähigkeit gegen die vorhabende Verehelichung des Bittstellers Karl Schubert mit der Theresia Schwemminger von Magistrate politischer Seits kein Anstand genommen, und hat sich der Bittsteller mit dem Ausweise des erforderlichen Ehekonse[n]s seiner Geburtsobrigkeit der Trauung wegen an die betreffende Pfarre zu wenden. Vom Magistrate der k. k. Haupt u. Residenzstadt Wien am 14. 8ber 823. / Czapka Sekr."

8. [3] "Löbliche k. k. Staats-Realitäten und Herrschaft Himmelpfortgrund! A Unterzeichneter, Laut Zeugniß A Landschafts-Mahler, laut Taufschein B [Zeugnis] B von Himmelpfortgrund gebürtig, 28 Jahr alt, gedenket sich mit der ledigen laut C Taufschein C Theresia Schweminger Putzmacherinn zu verehelichen; bittet den Geburtsobrigkeitlichen Konsens zu ertheilen. D. Er hat die Bewilligung von dem löbl. Stadtmagistrat laut D. Wien den 22ten 8bris 823 / Karl Schubert."

9. [4] "Löbliche Herrschaft Himmelpfortgrund / Karl Schubert Landschafts-Mahler wohnhaft im Altlerchenfeld No. 234 / Bittet / um den Geburtsobrigkeitlichen Konsens sich mit der Theresia Schweminger verehelichen zu dürfen / praes: 23t. Oktober 823."

[4 verso] "Dem Bittsteller wird hiemit der geburtsherrschaftliche Consens zu seiner vorhabenden Verehelichung mit der Theresia Schwemminger über die bereits von dem hiesigen Stadtmagistrat erwirkte ortsobrigkeitl. Bewilligung, ertheilt, und hat sich derselbe der Trauung wegen an die betreffende Pfarre zu wenden. Wien den 23ten 8ber 823. / Dem kk. Staats-Realitäten Grundbuchsamte / [illegible signature]."

10. [5] "Verkündigungsschein. / Ich Endesgefertigter bezeuge hiemit; daß Herr Schubert Carl, akademischer Landschaftsmahler, led: Standes, katholischer Reli-

gion /:in welcher er vollständig unterrichtet befinden wurde:/ 28 Jahre alt, gebürtig von Lichtenthal, wohnhaft in meinem Pfarrbezirke Hs Nro: 234; und die Schwemminger Theresia led: Stand: kathol: Relig: 24 Jahre alt, gebürtig von Lichtenthal, und wohnhaft alldort Hs Nro: 163, als Brautpersohnen in der hiesigen Pfarrkirche ordentlich dreymal, und zwar am 1ten 2ten und 9ten November l: J: verkündiget; und gegen ihre Ehe kein gesetzliches Hinderniß entdeckt worden sey. / Wien Pfarre Altlerchenfeld, am 13ten Novemb: 823. / Franz Blasius Kuderna mpia / Landesfürstlicher Pfarrer."

11. " . . als er sich schon etwas Vermögen gesammelt, und noch immer einen guten Verdienst hat, eine Familie erhalten zu können." Pfarre Lichtental, "Trauungs Acten vom August bis December 1823."

12. "[Schwägler 11/823] Löbl. Magistrat! / Laut Anlage A habe ich die Bewilligung von meiner löbl. Stiftsherrenschaft Schotten zu meiner Verehelichung mit der Katharina Lebenbeck zwar erhalten, jedoch habe ich auch die Bewilligung von den löbl. Magistrat als Innungsbehörde in Betreff meines Erwerbes auszuweisen. Diesem zu folge bitte ich, nachdem ich mir laut Zeugniß B täglich 2f 10kr verdiene: Ein löbl. Magistrat geruhe mir den erfoderlichen Ehelichungs Consens mit der Katharina Lebenbeck gehorsamst zu ertheilen. / Joseph Schwägler."

13. Had Schubert been successful in his bid in 1816 for the musicmaster position in Laibach, he would have received a yearly salary of 500 florins, A.C.

14. Wiener Stadt- und Landesbibliothek: Oberwörtisches Gewähr- und Satzbuch 17, Fol. 2; H. A.-Akten, Persönlichkeiten S 17 (Schubert: No. 4, Vater, Verlassenschaftsabhandlung, 9 July 1830).

15. "Herr Ignaz Schubert, öffentlicher Schullehrer in Wien, gebürtig von Wien, ein ehlicher Sohn des H. Franz Schubert, gewes. öffentlichen Lehrers, und der Elisabeth, gebornen Fitz, beider katholisch und selig." Pfarre Pötzleinsdorf, Trauungs-Protokoll for 1836. I wish to thank Martha Böhm-Schubert, a descendant of Ferdinand Schubert, for securing this document for me.

16. "Johann Georg Uhl, Ehrendomherr und Rector an der hiesigen Metropolitan- und Haupt-Pfarrkirche zum heiligen Stephan, hochfürstlich erzbischöflicher Konsistorial-Rath, Cur- und Chormeister, wie auch Oekonom, und Vice-Director in dem erzbischöflichen Alumnate daselbst, und der sämmtlichen Bürger-Militz Kaplan etc. etc. bezeuge hiemit: daß Herr Johann Baptist Bergmann, bürg. Bäckermeister, ledigen Standes, katholischer Religion /:in selber unterrichtet:/ wohnhaft in der St. Stephans-Pfarr Nro. 831 - mit der ehr- und tugendsamen Jungfrau Theresia Grob, bürg. Seidenzeug-Fabrikantens Tochter, katholischer Religion, wohnhaft in der Pfarr im Lichtenthale Nro. 163 ordentlich dreymal und zwar: am 1ten; 5ten und 12ten d. M. in der Pfarrkirche des Unterzeichneten verkündet und kein gesetzwidriges Ehehinderniß entdeckt worden sey. Zur Urkund dessen habe ich diesen Verkünd Schein eigenhändig unterschrieben, und das Pfarrsiegel beygedruckt. / Wien den 12ten Tag des Monaths Nov. im Jahre 1820. / Johann Georg Uhl mpia / wie Oben." Pfarre Lichtental, "Trauungs Acten vom Jänner bis July 1820."

17. See Jäger-Sunstenau (1967:132–45) and Buchinger (1988: 5, 25ff).

18. See Deutsch (1946:510–11).

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A Palimpsest of Mozart in Schubert's Symphony No. 5

By George Edwards

That Schubert based many of his works on previous models has been widely acknowledged. According to Tovey, Schubert's earliest known song ("Hagar's Klage," D. 5) is "accurately modelled, modulations and all, on a setting of the same poem by Zumsteeg" (1949:108). Even at the age of 13, Schubert improves on his model, and ends by achieving "a sense of climax and a rounding-off which Zumsteeg hardly seems to have imagined possible" (1949:108). At the other end of Schubert's brief career, Charles Rosen has noted the striking dependence of the last movement of the Piano Sonata in A Major, D. 959, on that of Beethoven's Sonata op. 31, no. 1. Schubert's rondo, which Rosen regards as greater than its model, often reproduces Beethoven's phrase structure and succession of textures "almost without reference to the material that was to be poured into them" (1971:456).[1] But Schubert is not content to borrow only the husk: the opening theme of the D. 959 rondo also practically quotes the first sixteen measures of the second movement of Schubert's own Sonata D. 537! In several well-known cases, Schubert takes the main theme from a previous work (often from a song). But the D. 959 rondo is especially suggestive for my purposes, since Schubert takes his theme from one source, his composition plan from another.

The minuet of Schubert's Symphony No. 5, D. 485, has reminded many listeners of the minuet of Mozart's Symphony No. 40, K. 550, a work Schubert is known to have admired. Yet this is another composite borrowing, one "so candid" in its thematic relations to the third and fourth movements of the Mozart that "one feels as if a deliberate allusion were intended" (Rosen 1971:455). This suspicion can only be increased by the fact that Schubert's orchestral forces (apart from slight differences in the dispositions of the two horns) are identical to those of Mozart's original version (before he revised it to include clarinets). The young Schubert is likely to have led his amateur orchestra in an informal performance of Mozart's symphony around the time he composed his Symphony No. 5, and may have deliberately modelled parts of his new symphony on Mozart's.

In the light of well-known similarities between Schubert's Symphony No. 5 and Mozart's Symphony No. 40, it is curious that the many striking resemblances between their first movements seem to have gone unremarked. As I will show, the exposition of Schubert's first movement follows Mozart's format quite closely and often uses its (almost identical) orchestral forces similarly at analogous points. Yet even more striking is Schubert's clever appropriation of Mozart's melodic and harmonic mate-

rials. If these "thefts" have gone undetected, this is only partly because we prefer to focus on cases where we think Schubert has improved on his models. Partly because Schubert's movement is in neither the same key nor in the same mode as Mozart's, Schubert's strongest references to his model rarely ocur where we would think to look for them. We will often find that Schubert uses or adapts Mozart's composition plan at a comparable point in his exposition and that he simultaneously lifts Mozart's material from elsewhere. Thus Schubert's opening (from m. 5) clearly follows Mozart's in its phrasing, orchestration, and overall direction; but it takes its thematic and harmonic details from later in Mozart's exposition. Schubert's disassociation of format and material may be an attempt to cover his tracks. But we can also compare him to a thief whose guilt causes him inadvertently to give himself away, for Schubert practically quotes, in his home key of B♭, material that occurs in B♭ (III) in Mozart's exposition!

Schubert's appropriations from Mozart's first movement are multi-layered. Our investigation of the resulting palimpsest is complicated by our suspicion that Schubert sometimes attempts to improve on (or merely misconstrues) Mozart's presumptive composition plan. This suspicion forces us to address the relationship between the Classical style and Schubert's classicizing proto-romanticism, and to consider even more loaded questions of value. On the basis of my findings, can we defend the young Schubert from Rosen's charge that his "imitations are too often more timid, less disturbing than the originals?" (1971:456) Do we value this movement less for knowing how much of it is lifted from Mozart? Or can the vague discomfort of hearing "a blurred echo of the past" (1971:455) be dispelled by openly acknowledging deliberate and pointed quotation and paraphrase? Finally, could Schubert have intended us to recognise his indebtedness to Mozart?

* * *

The initial thematic statements of the Mozart (mm. 2–16) and the Schubert (mm. 5–19) both approximate the structure of a sentence: two short (four-measure) units (A) of parallel structure, followed by a longer unit (B) whose internal structure (short, short, long; a,a,b) mimics that of the whole. Because of a grouping overlap, each sentence is one measure shorter than the 16 measures (4+4+8) we expect. Each reaches the dominant in its 15th measure, and each is scored entirely for strings until shortly before the arrival on V (see examples 1a and 1b).

Measures 9–12 of each sentence consist of two measures and their repetition (varied in the Mozart), with each bass line moving twice from scale-degree 4 to 3. Scale-degree 6 appears in the bass in the thirteenth

Example 1a: Similarities of phrasing and design between the first-movement main themes of Mozart's Symphony No. 40 and Schubert's Symphony No. 5.



measure of each sentence, where the winds enter. In each sentence, the harmonic rhythm is slow at first, and accelerates to four times its original rate as the half-cadential dominant approaches. These similarities of structure are reinforced by similarities of dynamics (***p*** in Mozart, ***pp*** in Schubert), tempo (*Allegro molto, Allegro*), meter (cut time), and texture (repeated-note patterns in the inner voices and a bass line that becomes sustained only from the ninth measure of each sentence).

Example 1a (cont.)



Example 1b: Mozart's and Schubert's phrase-structure in relation to a typical sentence.

1. The typical sentence:



2. Mozart (2–16):



3. Schubert (5–19):



The arrival of the tonicized dominant (Mozart: m. 16; Schubert: m. 19) is coordinated in each case with several other important changes: the full orchestra is introduced; the music is louder (*f* in Mozart, *p* with accents in

Schubert); and a pedal on V is implied (Mozart) or introduced (Schubert); see example 2. Each prolonged dominant lasts six measures, and subdivides into 4+2 mm. Each four-measure unit features the tonicization of V by the diminished seventh built on its leading-tone, and involves an element of dialogue (winds against strings in Mozart, flute against violin I in Schubert).[2] Each two-measure unit thins the texture (dropping the pedal in 'cello and bass) and leads back to the tonic and to the resumption of the theme.[3] Each two-measure lead-in features parallel thirds descending by step in the bassoon's middle or upper-middle register (although these are somewhat overshadowed by Schubert's continuation of the oboes in mm. 23–25).

The resumption of each main theme involves the addition of sustained oboes and bassoons to the original string material (Schubert also adds a countermelody in the flute). But here Schubert decisively breaks from his model: while Mozart departs from his tonic and theme within four measures, beginning the move towards the relative major, Schubert luxuriates in an enriched reprise of his theme for a full sixteen measures. Only at m. 41 does he elide his cadence in the tonic with the new material that will eventually establish the key of the dominant.

Since Schubert seems unsure whether Mozart's transition begins at mm. 21–22 or at m. 28, some of the relationships between the two transitions are complex and ambiguous, and will be dealt with later; however, as soon as Schubert's transition begins to move away from simple alternation of tonic and dominant, his bass line (mm. 47–64) begins to resemble Mozart's (mm. 28–37); see example 3.

Mozart's bass descends by step from B♭ to a C, elaborated by its upper-neighbor, D♭, while Schubert's arpeggiates from B♭ to G via D before descending (mostly chromatically) from G to a C elaborated by D♭. Needless to say, since Schubert is headed toward his dominant (F) as the secondary key, his transition can end on C (m. 64). For Mozart, however, the corresponding C (m. 37) is V/V of the secondary key (B♭). His transition therefore spends six measures elaborating the dominant of B♭—measures which have no analogue in Schubert's transition, but which I will soon show to have been closely paraphrased in Schubert's mm. 19–24.

While the first part of Schubert's exposition is about 50% longer than Mozart's, the two second theme-groups are almost identical in length, and divide into two halves of almost equal length (Mozart: 28+29 measures; Schubert: 27+26 measures). There are still many correspondences of format, and some of these are supported by similarities of other kinds. That these similarities are mostly less striking than those we found (or will find) in the first-groups and transitions could suggest to some readers that they are caused by shared congruence with our most stereotyped expectations

Example 2: Similar elaborations of the dominant and returns to the theme, Mozart, mm. 16–22 and Schubert, mm. 19–25.



Example 3: Bass-lines of Mozart, mm. 28–37 and Schubert, mm. 47–64.



of second groups, not by any specific influence of Mozart's movement on Schubert's. Yet our ideas of what is 'normal' are mostly based on nineteenth-century formulations of sonata form that *ex post facto* turned the first movement of the Mozart (but not, say, of Haydn's Symphony No. 80) into an ideal example of the form. So I prefer to see Schubert's imitation of Mozart's movement as part of the process by which it became a 'model' sonata-form movement (see example 4 for an overview of the two second theme-groups).

Like Mozart's, Schubert's second theme-group begins with a phrase-pair that fails to end as expected. Each eight-measure first phrase is homophonic in texture, ***p***, and dominated by strings (Schubert avoids any equivalent of Mozart's *Klangfarbenmelodie* in mm. 44–6 and 52–4); each ends on the tonic, and is connected to the answering phrase by an ascending scalar upbeat in the winds. Each answering phrase combines and contrasts winds and strings, and each features an interpolation of harmonically remote material beginning at its seventh (Mozart) or eighth (Schubert) measure. Schubert's deceptive cadence becomes the beginning of a new pair of balanced phrases, each beginning on the flat submediant, while the rest of Mozart's first part of the second group is much more unstable or irregular.

The second halves of the second theme-groups (Mozart: mm. 72–100; Schubert: mm. 92–117) both begin by recalling material from their respective first themes, and by repeating eight-measure groups that internally contrast ***f*** and ***p***. Each ends (apart from Mozart's m. 100) by becoming increasingly conventional and cadential. Yet it is here (Schubert's mm. 110–113) that Schubert dares to refer to material (not merely to borrow a composition plan) from the comparable spot in Mozart's exposition (from mm. 95–99; see example 5, which quotes the equivalent measures of Schubert's recapitulation so that both cadential passages can appear in B♭).

Having found that Schubert has often followed a composition plan similar to Mozart's, and having found one near-correspondance of material and formal function, we turn our attention to paraphrases and near-

Example 4: Overview of grouping, Mozart and Schubert second theme-groups.

Mozart: 2nd Theme-group



Schubert: 2nd Theme-group



Example 5: Cadential material from Mozart (end of exposition) and Schubert (end of recapitulation). Only string parts are shown.



quotations. These, too, are most densely clustered early in Schubert's exposition, but they tend to occur in a different order than in the Mozart, and with a different structural function. What is really odd about them is that, like so many well-known intertextual relationships, they appear at the same transposition level. I will present these relationships in the order they appear in Schubert's exposition, even though that forces me to put off mentioning the strongest such relationship (the 'smoking gun') in order to account for Schubert's mm. 1–4, which we have so far ignored.

The first four measures of the Schubert are closer to a same-tempo introduction than to a beginning of an exposition. They are, accordingly, absent from the recapitulation. Yet they are the basis for the first sixteen measures of the development—a development that is notable for its avoidance of the most characteristic features of the main theme. Measures 1–4 can replace the main theme in the development, not because of any direct and obvious relationship between them, but because Mozart's main theme has provided them with a common ancestor.

Example 6 transforms Mozart's brief return to his opening material (mm. 22–28) into the beginning of Schubert's movement. The harmony and voice-leading of Mozart's first move toward B♭ bear a striking resemblance to those of Schubert's first composing-out of his tonic. Even the one anomalous element in Schubert's opening—the descent in eighth-notes in the violin I—is a near-quotation from Mozart's preparation for the second half of the second theme-group (mm. 70–71; see example 7).

Example 6: The derivation of Schubert's mm. 1–5 from Mozart's mm. 22–8.



Example 7: Mozart's lead-in to the second half of the secondary theme-group and Schubert's lead-in to his main theme.



Example 8: Schubert's main theme as close paraphrase of two different passages in Mozart's Symphony No. 40.



Schubert's very first move is to superimpose aspects of two different passages from the Mozart, one of them transitional, the other introductory!

Schubert's next gambit makes perfect sense under either of two contradictory assumptions: 1) he feels certain that the listener has recognized the allusions to Mozart in mm. 1–4, and is prepared for a movement that will pay continued homage to Mozart; or 2) he is convinced that his opening's sleight of hand, combining two passages of his model, has passed by unnoticed, and that, as long as he avoids paraphrasing any of Mozart's most striking material in G minor, he is home free. (I am inclined to exclude a third possibility: Schubert was largely unaware of the extent of his dependence on Mozart's movement.) For Schubert has the temerity to

Example 8 (cont.)



follow his reference to Mozart's mm. 22–27 with a main theme that paraphrases the very next passage (Mozart's mm. 28–33; see example 8). Who, Schubert seems to be saying, would expect Mozart's transition to be transformed into a main theme? But if you do notice the relationship (despite the utterly different character and dynamics of the two passages) this reordering and reinterpretation of Mozart's transition is the "smoking gun." Even more delicious is our sense that Schubert has taken from Mozart even the idea of turning a transition into a theme. For Mozart uses the transitional idea of his first movement as the basis of the 'second theme' of his fourth movement.

In examples 8a and 8b, the violins make an initial ascent from the first

to the fifth scale degree, followed by an elaborated descent back to the first scale degree. This scalar descent is coordinated with a similar descent in the bass from scale degree one to three; even the (mostly 6–3) chords that result from this prolongation of I mostly correspond. Example 8c eliminates the melody's initial first scale degree, and shifts the bass (violas) down to F in the seventh measure to produce a cadential 6–4 instead of the tonic 6–3 of 8a and 8b. Schubert even summarizes the progression of his mm. 9–13 in mm. 17–18, thus referring again to the way example 8c approaches the dominant (see example 9).

Even Schubert's mm. 19–23, which we have considered as similar in format to Mozart's elaboration of the dominant in mm. 16–21, can also be seen as a close paraphrase of Mozart's mm. 38–42. These were the only measures of Mozart's opening (mm. 1–ca. 58) which had so far not been shown to bear any close relationship of format or material to Schubert's exposition (see example 10).

We are now ready to summarize the most important of Schubert's doubly distilled borrowings from Mozart. Schubert's mm. 1–4 superimpose different aspects of Mozart's mm. 22–27 and 70–71. His mm. 5–19 follow the basic format of Mozart's mm. 2–16 and paraphrase the material of Mozart's mm. 28–33. Schubert's mm. 19–24 are derived from both Mozart's mm. 16–21 and 38–44. Only at the very end of Schubert's exposition does he simultaneously refer to both Mozart's material and its format, and only there does borrowed material serve the same function in Schubert's movement that it did in Mozart's .

* * *

While I am convinced that Schubert deliberately modelled his exposition on Mozart's, we can also judge the evidence I have presented by what insights it can provide into either movement. Quite apart from Schubert's relation to his putative source, what can we gain from hearing Schubert's movement in relation to Mozart's? If Schubert's opening 'doubly distills' so much of Mozart's, how do we account for its relatively relaxed, almost Biedermeier character, in contrast to Mozart's uncanny blend of fleetness and grace with urgency and menace? The difference in mode is an obvious, but obviously insufficient, answer. Paradoxically, I hope ultimately to defend Schubert against the charge that he domesticated his model, a charge for which I will first present a strong case.

Schubert's added preparatory phrase (mm. 1–4) seems to begin in *medias res* (which it obviously does in terms of its borrowings from Mozart), as if to lay to rest Mozart's ghost. It lands us gently at the beginning of the theme at m. 5; more importantly, it orients us metrically, and confirms the

Example 9: Schubert's mm. 17–8 as derived from mm. 9–13 and from the secondary theme-group of Mozart's fourth movement.

a) Schubert, mm. 9–13:



b) Schubert, mm. 17–8:



c) Mozart (IV), mm. 73–5:



Example 10: Mozart's mm. 38–42 and Schubert's paraphrase in mm. 19–23.

a) Mozart, mm. 38–42:



b) Schubert, mm. 19–23:



basic correspondence of phrase and hypermeasure. For quite a while we will be able to assume that each phrase will begin on a downbeat, that the first downbeat of each phrase will occur in a strong measure, at least at the two-measure level, and that large-scale groups will begin in strong measures on larger metrical levels.

By contast, we begin Mozart's symphony completely in the dark. We have, at first, no way of knowing whether the first measure is strong or weak; only at m. 5 can we retrospectively interpret m. 1 as strong (until then it could have been part of a two-measure upbeat). Each two-measure subphrase of the beginning of Mozart's opening theme goes from weak to strong; we yearn to move forward, in contrast to Schubert's self-satisfied strong-to-weak phraselets.

Moreover, Mozart will quickly force us to change gears: there is an extra weak measure either at m. 9 (destroying its parallel with m. 5) or at m. 13 (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983:22–24). Under one interpretation, the next regular four-measure hypermeasure after mm. 1–4 does not occur before mm. 34–37; for the return to the tonic at m. 22 is understood as the strongest downbeat so far, despite its correspondence to m. 3, which was strong only at the two-measure level (see examples 11a and 11b).[4]

In terms of meter and phrasing, then, Schubert's opening is entirely regular, Mozart's unstable and highly ambiguous: Schubert ambles comfortably along, Mozart darts and thrusts restlessly. Schubert has eliminated or softened every disturbing feature of the Mozart: his divisi violas; the suspension in the bass at m. 5; the melodic sevenths outlined by the theme (mm. 3–5 and 7–9); the conflicting slurs of mm. 10–13; the chromaticism and cross-relation of mm. 14–15. Schubert dampens Mozart's fiery outburst at m. 16. Even Schubert's chromatic convergence on the dominant (mm. 18–19) softens the impact of the diminished sevenths at mm. 20 and 22. Unlike Schubert, Mozart shocks us again by returning to E♮ (bassoon, m. 16) after having cancelled it by E♭ just before the arrival on V.

However, the most obvious indication that Schubert is reluctant to leave the womb is his expansion and reinterpretation of Mozart's return to the opening theme. Schubert is determined to create a closed, rounded form at the beginning of his movement.[5] His return to A (at m. 25) turns mm. 19–24 into a miniature B section, and gives him an excuse to cadence securely on the tonic (with an elision—otherwise the movement would die on its feet) at m. 41. But Mozart's idea is completely different. He avoids any full cadence in the tonic that could be interpreted as more than an entirely local ending, and avoids any suggestion of a rounding-off of the beginning. For his resumption of the main theme at m. 21 is not a reprise, but the beginning of the transition, and his prolonged dominant (mm.

Example 11: Conflicting metrical interpretations of Mozart, mm. 1–22; comparative metrical regularity and coincidence of metrical strong points and grouping boundaries in Schubert, mm. 5–25.

a) Mozart, mm. 1–22:



b) Schubert, mm. 5–25:



16–21) is not a middle section, but the punctuation of a half cadence and a lead-in to a new beginning.

On the other hand, if we look ahead to Schubert's transition, we may decide he was trying to have it both ways: to model his first group on Mozart's mm. 1–27, but his transition on Mozart's mm. 22–43. This is hard to confirm, for there is no way to get correspondences of phrase-structure and correspondences of material to support each other. But let's imagine that, on second thought, Schubert takes Mozart's transition to begin with the resumption of the main theme. Schubert will then ignore Mozart's m. 21, since it corresponds to Schubert's m. 24, but to nothing in Schubert's theme. Instead of regarding Mozart's mm. 21–28 as an eight-measure phrase whose last measure has been elided, he will treat it as a six-measure phrase (mm. 22–27). He will then take Mozart's points of arrival (mm. 22, 28, 34, 38, and 44) and use them as the model for his phrasing, insisting on six-measure units (beginnings in mm. 41, 47, 53, and 59) even where Mozart varies the pattern (see example 12).[6]

Example 12: Schubert's hypothetical interpretation of Mozart's mm. 22–44 and his version of them in mm. 41–55.



We have now arrived (again) at Schubert's second theme-group, with its many (but sometimes unremarkable) resemblances to Mozart's. Here Schubert's deployment of the orchestra is much more conventional than Mozart's. Unlike Mozart's, his second theme-group does not begin with an unstable summary of the end of the previous transition (see Mozart's mm. 44–45). Nor do Schubert's deceptive resolutions at phrase endings (mm. 80 and 86) approach the subversive power of Mozart's m. 58, which re-

places the seventh measure of the answering phrase with a seven-measure interpolation. The chord Mozart extends for the first five interpolated measures is far more remote than Schubert's flat-submediants at mm. 80 and 86; if it were treated as a German sixth (as Schubert's is in mm. 83–84 and 89–90), it would lead Mozart back to G minor (cf. Mozart, mm. 15–16). There is no real equivalent in the Schubert to Mozart's mysterious dialogues of suspensions and of fragments of the main theme in mm. 72–76 and 80–84.

* * *

Schubert posed himself some difficult problems by so extensively modelling his exposition on Mozart's. Having adapted his main theme from Mozart's transition, for example, and having returned to it at length in mm. 25–40, Schubert could not model the beginning of his transition on the material of Mozart's. Despite the fact that Schubert's development is not modelled on Mozart's, and despite the indirect nature of any relationship between Schubert's recapitulation and Mozart's, we will find that Schubert's appropriations continue to have consequences throughout his movement, and help us to understand some of his decisions. Why does Schubert never develop his main theme? Why does his recapitulation begin in the subdominant? And why does it seem to avoid any equivalent to Mozart's developmental outburst in mm. 191–210? We might be tempted to answer such questions by pointing out that Schubert often does not develop his themes, that he often begins his recapitulation in IV (an idea perhaps borrowed from Mozart's Sonata K. 545), and that doing so sometimes enables him to avoid recomposing his exposition, and especially its transition, in the recapitulation. But such answers, which refer every individual case to a generalization, fail to consider why Schubert does these things in some movements, but not in others.

While Schubert's exposition superimposes different aspects of its model, taking its material from one passage in Mozart's exposition and its format from another, the beginning of its recapitulation (mm. 171–230) deals consecutively with different aspects of one passage in the Mozart; that is, we can understand Schubert's recapitulation of his main theme and his transition as two consecutive glosses on Mozart's developmental expansion in his mm. 191–210. Schubert's recapitulation of his main theme, like Mozart's secondary development, draws its material from Mozart's transition: both passages begin in E♭ major. That Schubert's decision to begin his recapitulation in the subdominant was not motivated by any desire to write a literal recapitulation is confirmed both by his elimination of any equivalent of the exposition's mm. 19–22 and by the extensive reworking

of his transition, whose second phrase is expanded from six to eight measures, and leads to a developmental expansion broadly similar to Mozart's (see example 13).

Example 13: Comparison of Mozart's developmental expansion in the recapitulation wtih Schubert's.

a) Mozart, mm. 191–211:



b) Schubert, mm. 217–25:



Mozart's expansion moves from a tonicization of E♭ major, to a tonicization of F minor and (after an inserted progression descending by fifths) a cadence in G minor. Schubert's transition begins in A♭, and features an ascending circle of fifths which reaches B♭ minor in its fifth measure and C minor in its ninth measure. Both passages are *f* and *tutti* throughout. Each involves a dialogue between soprano and bass—through voice exchange in the Mozart and imitation in the Schubert—and each leads to an elaborated dominant and a clear break before the second group begins.

Schubert's recapitulation begins with a veiled reference to the material of Mozart's developmental expansion, just as Schubert's main theme in the exposition referred to the material of Mozart's transition. But Schubert cannot afford to develop his main theme, let alone to feature it *f* and *tutti* because that would give the whole game away. For if Schubert's theme were subjected to such treatment, even a casual listener with a nodding acquaintance with Mozart's movement might notice its derivation from Mozart's transition. Here we find Schubert concealing his 'theft' and calling attention to it both positively (recapitulation in the key of the beginning of Mozart's secondary development) and, like the dog that failed to bark in the night, negatively (omission of any development of his theme).

* * *

Schubert's adaptation and reinterpretation of many aspects of Mozart's design, his borrowing of some of Mozart's material, and his convoluted redistribution of that material to enable it to serve new formal functions—all these raise questions about the connection between historical interpre-

tation and aesthetic evaluation. From ca. 1760 into the early nineteenth century, there is a fairly consistent tendency for forms to become more fixed and stereotyped, and for grouping and metrical structures to become more regular and more congruent with one another. At some point in this process, we either change our standards of evaluation or apply one of many possible yardsticks to incompatible musics.

Thus Rosen, for example, finds Haydn's music of the 1760s and 70s, despite its many strengths, deficient by the standards imposed by his later works (1971:146–51). He might find a work such as Schubert's first movement deficient by the standards imposed by Mozart, and find Schubert's forms "mechanical in a way that is absolutely foreign to his model[s]" (1971:456). Yet, as James Webster emphasizes, Rosen's views derive from a narrative based on organicist analogies, one that places Haydn (from about 1780), Mozart, and Beethoven at the evolutionary peak, and that judges early Haydn as groping toward, and early Schubert as failing to reach, that height.[7] But this is only one of many such stories we could tell ourselves. If we value Haydn's op. 20 quartets, and judge those of op. 33 by their standards, we may miss the earlier intensity, extravagance, and emotional force, and may disparage the lightness and comparatively easily-won order of, for example, the minuet of op. 33, no. 4. Similarly, we could see Mozart's relative regularity of form—it is no coincidence that I use terms such as 'first theme-group' or 'transition' without embarrassment in connection with the Symphony No. 40—as a decisive step in constructing "the idea of a 'sonata' as a fixed form like a sonnet" (Rosen 1971:456). In that case, Schubert's radical reorientation of the relation between form and material (a dichotomy that already suggests a rigid idea of form) might seem revolutionary rather than academic.

It would no more occur to me than to Rosen to value Schubert's movement as highly as Mozart's. But that does not mean that when Schubert imitates Mozart, I have to judge Schubert's result by the standards I apply to Mozart. Least of all does my conviction that Schubert's movement is heavily dependent on Mozart's force me to value it less on that account. Instead, I find myself fascinated by Schubert's conscious manipulation of the relationship between an idea and its formal function, a relationship which seems so natural in Mozart's movement that one would expect no one to dare to tamper with it. Thanks to Schubert's appropriations, his otherwise rather two-dimensional movement gains in depth and resonance: I now view it through multifaceted glasses which reveal amazing overlays of different aspects of Schubert's model. Thus, while each particular borrowing from Mozart is (as Rosen says in another context) "more timid, less disturbing than the original[s]" (1971:456), this criticism begins to seem beside the point.

We can only understand this movement as a remarkably intricate palimpsest if we recognize Schubert's appropriations; only then can we begin to listen to it in a way that justifies them. Like Stravinsky, and unlike a merely weak and classicizing imitator, Schubert manages to create a coherent piece that simultaneously tears its model to shreds and tatters.

If I am right, however, in thinking that Schubert's borrowings from the first movement of Mozart's Symphony No. 40 have gone undetected until now, I can hardly claim that Schubert intended them to be heard as deliberate allusions, either by his contemporaries (who could rarely have known either work as well as we do), or by posterity. Yet similarly implausible claims are frequently made in defense of individual examples of literary plagiarism (a term I have avoided until now, since I am ethically neutral with regard to Schubert's borrowings). Defenders of Tristram Shandy, for example, are quick to claim that when Sterne plagiarizes an attack on plagiarism (!) from Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy, he intends "a whimsical literary in-joke, something that invites detection and laughter by its sheer blatancy" (Mallon 1989:17).[8] But, as Thomas Mallon goes on to say, "[r]eaders aren't going to think that Sterne has done something clever with Burton; they're going to think he said something clever himself" (1989:18). We can still enjoy Schubert's "thefts," and use them to enrich our experience of his movement; but we should do so on our own account, without any sanction from the composer. Probably the last thing Schubert wanted us to think was that he had "done something clever" with Mozart.[9]

Notes

1. A more detailed account of D. 959's reliance on the Beethoven appears in Cone (1970:782–86).

2. Such dialogues are prominent in Schubert's theme (between soprano and bass), but not in Mozart's.

3. Since Mozart's theme begins with a one-measure upbeat, he overlaps the last of the six measures on V with the first measure of the return of the theme.

4. This second interpretation is that of Kramer (1988:113–16).

5. Schubert's Sonata D. 959 begins with a miniature closed form that mimics the structure of a sonata form (with coda); see mm. 1–26.

6. Schubert's mm. 53–64 could plausibly be regarded as three four-measure groups instead of the two six-measure groups outlined here. My reading prefers to continue the six-measure groups established by the first 12 measures of Schubert's transition, and to hear m. 59 (not m. 61) as the real arrival on the dominant of the dominant. Under either interpretation, groups and hyper-measures would correspond.

7. For a critique of this narrative, see Webster (1991:335–56).

8. Here Mallon describes a position that he contests.

9. For more on plagiarism in music, see Rosen (1980:87–100). I have not followed Rosen's advice that "in discussing influence in music, it would be wise to refuse in advance to consider the work of adolescent composers...[since their] models have largely a biographical, but not much critical significance" (88).

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viewpoint

New Musicologies, Old Musicologies: Ethnomusicology and the Study of Western Music*

By Jonathan P. J. Stock

Introduction

Ethnomusicology currently engages with the study of Western music in two principal ways. On the one hand, there are specific ethnomusicological studies that focus on aspects of Western musical traditions. Examples include Paul Berliner's analysis of improvisation in jazz (1994), Philip Bohlman's study of chamber music as ethnic music in contemporary Israel (1991), and the examinations of music schools and conservatories by Bruno Nettl (1995) and Henry Kingsbury (1988). These works, in and of themselves, offer explicit and direct indication of what an ethnomusicological approach to Western music involves and what manner of insights can be produced thereby. Second, and more diffusely, ethnomusicological research plays into the study of Western music through musicologists' adoption, adaptation, and application of ethnomusicological techniques and concepts: some musicologists have drawn from specific ethnographies of non-Western musical traditions, and others have made recourse to the standard texts of ethnomusicological theory and practice (such as Merriam 1964 and Nettl 1983). Conference presentations, seminars, conversations, and, especially in the case of younger scholars, courses taken as part of their academic training also provide channels of contact between the repertory of scholarly ideas and procedures developed primarily for the explanation of non-Western musics and the field of Western musical studies. The titles of such publications as Nicholas Cook's *Music, Imagination, and Culture* (1990) and Peter Jeffery's *Re-Envisioning Past Musical Cultures: Ethnomusicology in the Study of Gregorian Chant* (1992) are clear in their referencing to this particular field of academic endeavor.

Nonetheless, despite musicology's recent expansion into cultural models of musical interpretation, it remains rare for musicologists to draw on existing ethnomusicological approaches or theories. It is almost as if the new musicologists and critical musicologists would prefer to invent their own theories of social and cultural contextualization than consider those already developed in ethnomusicological research.[1] Kay Kaufman Shelemay writes:

> While I applaud its efforts, the "new musicology" . . . seems not so startlingly new, at least not to someone familiar with the last half

> century of ethnomusicological research, not to mention considerable earlier work in historical musicology itself that engaged fully with issues relating to culture, society, and politics. I am delighted that "new musicology" has moved full force to considerations of music and culture, but I marvel at the oversight of decades of ethnomusicological scholarship long concerned with these same themes (1996a:21; see also Shelemay 1996b, Qureshi 1995).

The aim of the first section of this paper is to look in more detail at this apparent musicological avoidance of ethnomusicological materials, methods, and theories. Mainly through the assessment of specific examples, seven differences in the perspectives and scope of traditional musicology and ethnomusicology are exposed: the initial scope of each discipline; their respective scholarly and cultural perspectives; their distinct target readerships; their divergent historical practices; the disparate units of study deemed typical in each approach; the possession in each field of a contrasting set of central concepts; and the employment by musicologists and ethnomusicologists of dissimilar forms of authority (see figure 1). In fact, the assemblage of ideas underpinning each discipline might perhaps be more happily illustrated with a diagram in the form of a web, network, or cluster. Nonetheless, it is here set out as a list so that each aspect can be discussed in turn. By traditional musicology (hereafter "musicology") in fig. 1 and the accompanying discussion, I refer mostly to what we might today more formally identify as historical musicology. Much of the following discussion, however, applies in part to the field of music theory ("music analysis" in Britain) as well. By traditional ethnomusicology (below "ethnomusicology"), I refer in the main to research of living musical traditions; again, however, part of this portrait may apply to the more text-based strains of "historical ethnomusicology."

In the second part of this article I examine certain recent trends in musicology. Here the objective is to assess how far these new trends relate to ethnomusicological and older musicological work. I will argue that there is much further to go in creating a genuinely "new" musicology. Finally, and in light of the previous two sections, I suggest three key aspects of current ethnomusicological approaches which, in my view, might prove useful to those interested in developing new means of approaching Western musical culture. These are only briefly discussed, since the musicologist who wishes to benefit directly from existing work on non-Western musics may have to adjust quite considerably his or her habitual imaginings of "music" and its study; while such a process (which, incidentally, has significant logistical implications) can certainly be encouraged, it cannot be forced or unduly hurried.

Figure 1: Historical areas of distinction between traditional musicology and ethnomusicology.

	MUSICOLOGY	ETHNOMUSICOLOGY
1. initial scope	the West, art music	whole world except West, folk music
2. perspectives	"music" used as shorthand for "musical sound" or "music itself," culturally bounded, specific instructions referring to particular pieces and repertories	"music" seen as a complex of conceptualization-behavior-sound, cross-cultural, generalizations about music and musicality
3. target readership	scholars, performers, and others within Western musical tradition	international scholars of music, anthropology, etc.
4. historical practices	reconstruction and interpretation of lost repertory	documentation and preservation of disappearing repertory
5. typical units of study	the individual composer, the score, idealized performances	"performers," the music event, actual performances
6. central concepts	the individual, the idiosyncratic, history, influence, development (once seen as good), musical autonomy (declining), formal unity (declining)	the culture, the typical, tradition, transmission, change (once seen as bad), social function, cultural uniqueness (declining)
7. distinct forms of authority	scholar's authority as cultural expert	informants, folk evaluation

Differences

In the first half of this century, geographical and social demarcation was perhaps the most immediate way in which musicological scholarship was distinguished from that in ethnomusicology.[2] This, the first area of distinction on fig. 1, needs little amplification: musicologists studied Western art music, ethnomusicologists (or, more properly at that time, comparative musicologists) examined folk music. In fact, the early ethnomusicologists were in some cases unsure as to whether or not European folk music fell within their frame of reference, or how exactly they

should refer to research on Oriental art music traditions. Despite these concerns, however, the fundamental divisions in the organization of our present disciplines of musical scholarship have reflected this initial divide, with Western music scholarship on the one side and other kinds of music scholarship in a rather heterogeneous assemblage on the other.

The separation of those studying music into two more-or-less distinct scholarly traditions has had a number of results, of which perhaps the most apparent today is that given as the second point on fig. 1, the rise of distinct scholarly perspectives. When musicologists and ethnomusicologists talk about "music," the resonances they find in this short word can be strikingly disparate. I will dwell on this point at some length, since it is fundamental to the remainder of the essay.

Joseph Kerman almost got it right in that now infamous passage of *Contemplating Music* where he announced that "Western music is just too different" to be compared with non-Western musics and hence to yield up much to ethnomusicological modes of investigation (1985:174). I say "almost" because the problem is not that Western music is too different—or even different, as we shall see below; the issue is rather that musicology is just too different. Or, to put this more neutrally, ethnomusicology and musicology are just too different. Kerman, to give him his due, has heard of ethnomusicology, even if he seems (unnecessarily) concerned that it challenges his authority to interpret the music of past cultures. (I will return to this point below.) In Britain, on the other hand, it remains commonplace for musicologists to leave the conference chamber when an ethnomusicology session begins and to write as if other musical traditions do not exist.[3]

John Rink, for instance, opens a review of Jonathan Dunsby's book *Performing Music: Shared Concerns* with the sentence, "Only in the last ten years or so has musical performance started to attract the range and level of scholarly attention it has always merited but inconsistently received" (1996:253). Actually, much ethnomusicology is intimately concerned with issues of musical performance; some of it even refers quite explicitly to the Western art music tradition. But neither Rink nor Dunsby makes any mention of this large body of published research. Ethnomusicology is effectively "written out" of the history of music research.

Barry Cooper, to give a second example, asks in a recent article in *The Musical Times* why there have been no studies of children's music, other than those designed to tell children how to compose, and then proceeds to list five features he believes children's music might have (1996:6). Once again, those familiar with the ethnomusicological literature (not to mention work in music education—see, for instance, Davies 1992) will know that there has been a substantial amount of publication on this very topic,

and, incidentally, that the first of Cooper's five features (that we might expect children's music to be simpler than that created by adults) was already challenged in John Blacking's *Venda Children's Songs* (1967).[4]

It probably appears unkind to point at particular examples. However, in this paper I argue that musicology and ethnomusicology are actually much more different than their five shared syllables might lead us to think. There exist significant voids in perspective and practice between the two disciplines. To fully expose these areas of disjunction, I refer to specific examples and concentrate on the areas of each discipline where these differences are most clearly expressed.

These two examples, then, illustrate a general characteristic of musicology—that it is quite acceptable for a scholar of Western classical music to write about "music" as if other musical traditions, even those of the West, do not exist. These writers see no need, either in their titles or their remarks on the respective states of the field, to mention the restricted focus of their views. Technically, Dunsby's book might be more appropriately renamed something like *Performing Western Classical Music,* while Rink's review could more accurately begin, "Only in the last ten years or so has musical performance in the Western art music tradition started to attract the range and level of scholarly attention it has always merited but inconsistently received." Omission of qualifying statements like these presumably indicates that for these writers (and their intended readers) "music" essentially means "Western art music." (Incidentally, one of the effects of such rhetorical structures is to sideline other forms of music—as well as the scholarship that describes them—whether or not the authors in question specifically intend it.)

In contrast, the whole discipline of ethnomusicology rests on the assumption that "music," or human musical practice, is shared by different cultures (see, for example, Kaemmer 1993:1–27). According to ethnomusicological theory, this practice is articulated differently from one social group to another in ways that speak of, and to, the distinct characteristics of social organization in these societies. Not only do all societies make music, but the results of the study of one group may be relevant in reaching an understanding of another; in the words of John Blacking, it is all "humanly organized sound" (1973:3–31). By way of analogy, to the ethnomusicologist looking over at the field of musicology, it is as if those who study gorillas do so marvellously but without reference to the work of those who study chimpanzees, orangutans, and the other apes.

The musicologist would perhaps see this as an unfair analogy. Apes are actual living creatures; music is more properly a concept. As a concept, music belongs not so much to the natural world as to the cultural domain—in this case, that of the West. If other cultures, this argument

continues, have some form of activity which the Western or Westernized observer considers "music," then this is coincidence and self-deception; the foreign activity is not "music," but just looks or sounds somewhat like it. The assumed relationship between the foreign activity and the Western concept is not some deeper human commonality, but a fiction in the mind of that particular observer. To adapt Kerman's earlier dictum, Western "music" is different.

This argument seems attractive at first, and some ethnomusicologists have been tempted to go along with it (see, for instance, Gourlay 1984:36).[5] It is certainly true that concepts of music are not uniform across the globe and that ethnomusicologists have studied forms of activity that those who practice it would not admit to their own nearest-equivalent category to "music," if they have one at all. Studies of Quran cantillation offer a classic instance of a form the practitioners insist is not "music." In this respect, Bruno Nettl has referred to ethnomusicologists as "gluttons," consuming anything and everything that fits into both local and external notions of music (1983:24–25).

Despite their acknowledgment of—and interest in—variety in local conceptualizations of "music," ethnomusicologists still insist on the validity of a general, global concept of music. In doing so, they typically take the word "music" to refer to a broad network of musical thinking, musical behavior, and musical sound (Merriam 1964:32–33). In delineating a particular "music," the ethnomusicologist seeks to introduce the characteristics of observed musical activity and to show how these fall, if at all, into native categories. There is a broader sense of the scope of musical study than that habitually (and tacitly) employed in much of the musicology of the past and the present. For the musicologist, "music" is typically an unproblematic word, although it is still flexible enough to be applied in a number of different contexts (see also Kingsbury 1988). As we have already seen, "music" may stand in as an abbreviation for Western art music. In other cases, "the music" means exactly what ethnomusicologists might label "the musical sound," and in yet further situations, "the music" means simply "the score" or "the notes." Anthony Seeger offers a sample list of the readings an ethnomusicologist might bring to this same term:

> Music is much more than just the sounds captured on a tape recorder. Music is an intention to make something called music (or structured similarly to what we call music) as opposed to other kinds of sounds. It is an ability to formulate strings of sounds accepted by members of a given society as music (or whatever they call it). Music is the construction and use of sound-producing instruments. It is the use of the body to produce and accompany the sounds. Music is an

> emotion that accompanies the production of, the appreciation of, and the participation in a performance. Music is also, of course, the sounds themselves after they are produced. Yet it is intention as well as realization; it is emotion and value as well as structure and form (1987:xiv).

Many present-day musicologists would happily accept the above list, no doubt, but it seems unlikely that they would expect to write about all of these aspects in a single publication, whereas the ethnomusicologist might well aspire to. In normal usage, then, the notion of "music" means something rather different in each discipline. I emphasize this not to criticize musicology's focus, but to note the distinct traditional modes of operation and perspective of each discipline. These habitual practices and perspectives need to be uncovered because they shape the kinds of work music scholars produce and the ways in which we view our own field and perceive each other's.

One implication of the above is that when we apply this ethnomusicological view of "music" to Western musical culture, we are compelled to abandon the idea that Western music is somehow different in kind from all other types of music.[6] There are so many commonalities of musical thought, practice, and sound (see also Harwood 1976) that we can be as confident in employing the global generalizations "music" or "musics" as we are "language" and "religion." If this is so, the claim "Western music is different" is uncomfortably akin to that of the zealot who insists on viewing the holders of other faiths as an undifferentiated mass of infidels. Or, to put it another way, every kind of music is different, but Western music is no more different from African music, say, than Chinese or Indonesian music is from North American Indian. Four-day long operas and lute manuscripts are found in Beijing and Nara as well as in Bayreuth and Venice. The logical conclusion of this whole train of thought is that musicology's areas of difference from ethnomusicology are not simply a function of the music itself: if ethnomusicological methods are applicable to the musics of Vietnam and Venezuela, then there is no reason why they could not be applied to that of Vienna.

Kerman's claim that Western music resists ethnomusicological investigation has collapsed. Nonetheless, there are other reasons why the musicologist might elect to set aside musical evidence from other cultures. After all, a willingness to acknowledge that ethnomusicology might conceivably be able to shed light on Western art music is not the same as taking an active interest in the music of other traditions or believing its study can make any contribution to the better understanding of Western music itself. Perhaps one of the most important of these reasons is given

as the third area of distinction shown in fig. 1. This is the question of target readership, those to whom music scholars address their writings. Both musicologists and ethnomusicologists write primarily for an international academic audience, but a crucial difference is that musicologists write for others who themselves already know the music in question, or could reasonably be expected to do so. Musicologists write for other cultural insiders. Ethnomusicologists, on the other hand, are much more likely to address those whose contact with the particular music culture is limited, possibly consisting only of material channelled through the ethnomusicologist himself. The musicologist, then, can assume—and leave implicit—a great deal of shared musical context with his or her audience. The ethnomusicologist, conversely, cannot, unless writing in a highly specialized journal. Indeed, an ethnomusicological author may consider it necessary to devote considerable effort to the establishment and demonstration of a shared musical context in which to present the specific findings of a paper. Such papers might be likened to sandwiches: on each side are slices of theory, while the filling is a specific case study demonstrating that theory in action. In principle, another case study might have done just as well.

As an example, I would cite Philip Schuyler's important paper on Yemeni views on music (1990). Given that this article is published in *Ethnomusicology,* the leading journal in the discipline of the same name, the author can assume a certain familiarity with the aims and techniques of the discipline on the part of his readership. Nonetheless, as Schuyler knows, ethnomusicologists work on many different musical cultures and are accustomed to receiving a theoretical justification for the paper along with its content. Thus, Schuyler begins by contextualizing his study with reference to Baron Rodolphe d'Erlanger's earlier work on Arabic music. He then briefly contrasts Yemeni and Western views on the question of whether there could exist a theory for Yemeni song, which links into an account of the history of the science of music in Arab scholarship. It is only on the third page of his article that Schuyler first fully reveals the aim of his paper (setting aside, of course, the title): "In this article I would like to look at theory from the perspective of three groups of Yemeni musicians," and, even then, he takes another two-and-a-half pages to clarify the identity of each group. To point this out is not to accuse Schuyler of procrastination; on the contrary, his paper is concisely written and his contextual explanations very elegantly handled indeed. This illustrates, rather, the amount of theoretical positioning typically found in ethnomusicological papers.

By way of contrast, we might look at a pair of musicological accounts, beginning with a study by David Greer of manuscript additions in Ameri-

can-domiciled early English printed music (1996). The author immediately begins with his survey of printed scores: "One of the musical treasures in the Huntingdon Library is the sole surviving copy of the first edition of Parthenia, published ca. 1612–13 and containing keyboard music by Bull, Byrd, and Gibbons." There is almost no contextualization at all. Greer does not tell us what printed music sources are or remind us of previous studies of these; he does not try to persuade us that these specific scores are interesting or worthy of study, either in themselves or as exemplars of some broader issue. He assumes we know all this already and so immediately begins with what we do not already know. Few explicit theoretical ideas are offered up for potential use by, say, someone studying early Chinese printed scores or nineteenth-century piano editions. Instead, the whole frame of reference of the article is carefully indicated by its title.

The same sense of focus may also be found in my second example, Tim Carter's study of laments prepared by Claudio Monteverdi and Sigismondo d'India for the wedding festivities in December 1628 of Duke Odoardo Farnese and Margherita de'Medici (Carter 1996). Carter's paper is rich in historical (and musical) detail, describing such aspects as the intrigues surrounding the commissioning of music for the wedding. But, like Greer, Carter makes no effort to provide a theoretical justification for his work. Also, neither musicologist engages in any cultural cross-referencing (which could mean between the distinct musical cultures of different periods in the history of Western music just as much as those separated by geographical location). These may or may not be representative examples of musicological writing, but what is self-evident is that these two papers can be published without overt theoretical contextualization on the part of either author. Of course, this is not to say that these articles do not rest on particular ideological positions or that they have been written without recourse to certain theories. (Again, I stress once more that to document this tendency is not to criticize it, but to point out that these authors are able to assume their target audience is already conversant with the intellectual context in question.)

Writing for different kinds of audiences points to a fourth difference between the two disciplines: their distinct historical practices. According to Eugene Helm (1994:17–19) and Don Randel (1992:14), musicologists most usually concentrated until a generation ago on the practical issues of the reconstruction and interpretation of lost repertories. Many ethnomusicologists, at a similar level of generalization, formerly worked to document and preserve disappearing cultures. Given such distinct areas of focus, we can readily understand why ethnomusicological writings were not much referred to by musicologists or vice versa. This distinct historical heritage remains an issue because the values of an academic discipline

quickly become enshrined in its literature and its standard methods. Even though many members of these disciplines now express common musical interests, they are still expected to accumulate mastery of their discipline's canonic literature and associated scholarly technique. Historical practice plays a central role in the training of new (ethno)musicologists, both in terms of providing specific texts with which the new scholar can interact and in offering a generalized sense of where the boundaries of the discipline normally lie. Here I refer to boundaries in ideas and methodology just as much as in repertory. The development of a body of canonic literature and thought is clearly essential to the establishment of disciplinary focus, and music scholars have continually subjected their own canons to critique and renewal, so the process of canonization need not be regarded as wholly, or even largely, negative. Even so, one of the canon's effects is to guide and inform our reading and thinking, which must necessarily be selective, since there is such a mass of music-related information available. From this point of view one might propose that Rink, Dunsby, and Cooper fail to refer to ethnomusicological texts not through disdain, willful disregard, or a jealous desire to suppress this body of academic thought, but because of their deep internalization of a habitual musicological perspective that renders this literature, or its pertinence, invisible to them.[7]

A fifth difference also arises from the distinct intellectual heritages and foci of these two disciplines. This point of difference might be referred to as the "typical unit of study." While musicologists have usually focused on individual composers and written scores (or their idealized performance), ethnomusicologists have emphasized "performers" (interpreted in both the musical sense and anthropologically to mean all those taking a role in a particular musical tradition) and the music event (the occasion at which some form of musical interaction takes place—see Stone 1982), as well as the actual sound structures produced during these periods of musical activity. By way of partial illustration, figure 2 compares the tables of contents of two recent monographs, each one a significant example from its field (Zaslaw 1989; Turino 1993).

As can be seen, each book assesses a major genre of instrumental ensemble music created by a migrant musician or musicians. A comparative reading of these books would suggest certain other points of contact. Nonetheless, in the case of Zaslaw's book on Mozart's symphonies the focus is placed on the written works of an individual composer, while Turino's study of Peruvian music looks primarily at the particular social contexts surrounding the performances of two contrasting panpipe ensembles.

A sixth difference is that of central concepts. This category of differ-

Figure 2: Tables of contents from sample monographs in musicology and ethnomusicology (chapter numbers and appendices omitted).

ZASLAW, *MOZART'S SYMPHONIES*	TURINO, *MOVING AWAY FROM SILENCE*
Salzburg (I): Origins (1756–1764)	Introduction: From Conima to Lima
The Grand Tour (I): London (1764–1765)	Part One: *Music in Conima*
The Grand Tour (II): Holland...Bavaria (1765–1766)	Instruments, Aesthetics, and Performance Practice
The *Sinfonia da Chiesa,* and Salzburg (1766–1767)	The Collective and Comparative Nature of Musical Performance
Vienna (I): Orchestra Land (1767–1768)	Making the Music: Rehearsals, Composition, and Musical Style
Lambach and Salzburg (1769)	Three Fiestas
Italy: Fons et Origo (1769–1773)	Part Two: *The Local, the National, and the Youth of Conima*
Salzburg (II): Limbo (1770–1777)	Qhantati Ururi of Conima
Mannheim and Paris: Frustration (1777–1778)	The Urban Panpipe Movement and the Youth of Conima
Salzburg (III): Serfdom (1779–1780)	Part Three: *The Music of Conimeño Residents in Lima*
Vienna (II): Independence (1780–1791)	Conimeños in Lima and Regional Associations
Performance Practice	Centro Social Conima: Music and the Importance of Community
Meanings for Mozart's Symphonies	The Framing of Experience: Festivals and Performance Occasions in Lima
	From Lima to Conima: The Residents Return Home

ence, like its predecessor, could also be explained as a subset of the question of historical practices. Central concepts in traditional musicological writings might perhaps be listed as "the individual" and (often) "the idiosyncratic" (referring both to works and "genius" composers); notions of historical progress, influence, and musical development; and the autonomy

and formal unity of great music. (Several of these concepts are now discredited or declining.) An equivalent listing for traditional ethnomusicology would place the culture in the space occupied by the individual composer in musicology's list. It follows that the ideal in a study of a music culture was once to describe typical, average, shared, or transmitted musical practice, and not the works or lives of the unusually innovative minority.[8] Change was viewed by many as a problem. In an echo of the musicological emphasis on the autonomy and abstractness of great music, each non-Western music culture was seen as being special and unique: just as early musicologists disdained programmatic pieces, so early ethnomusicologists stepped carefully around syncretic genres. Furthermore, music was investigated (and praised) for its social role, and explanations of music concentrated on how musical performance enacted or created social structure. In some ways, when early folk music scholars—the predecessors of today's ethnomusicologists—developed a list of interests they appear to have created the alter ego of those aspects valued by contemporaneous musicologists. While classical music was individually created by a known culture-hero, folk music was communal and anonymous; where classical music showed a distinct sense of historical development, folk music was essentially unchanging, although distinct versions of tunes proliferated from performer to performer and event to event; if classical music was written down, true folk music was transmitted orally; where one was composed, the other must ideally be either memorized or improvised; and where music analysis in the former sought to demonstrate structural unity quite independent of any particular social setting, that in the latter set out to expose social function (see also Bohlman 1988:69–72). In their construction of this reactive conceptual cluster, the folk music scholars revealed just how partial their escape was from Western conceptualizations of music.

Since the widespread rise in the 1960s of anthropological-style fieldwork investigation, and with the benefit of reminders that other traditions are not simply the "non-West" or the "non-classical," many of these views have been challenged, rejected, or redefined. Ethnomusicology, like musicology, has changed. Unfortunately, these changes appear not to have been noticed by all music scholars; see, for example, the wholly outdated characterization of ethnomusicology in Shepherd (1993:63–64), or Richard Middleton's critique of ethnomusicological perspectives (1990:146–54), which rests on just two pieces of folk music research from the 1960s (one of them highly controversial even then within ethnomusicology). The danger of misleading accounts like those of Shepherd and Middleton is that they are read and accepted as representations of present-day practice by trainee musicologists. This problem aside, it remains true today (and is readily experienced among the shelves of a well-stocked academic music

library) that each discipline revolves around a distinct set of central values and interests. The impact of these theoretical concepts and themes on the form and characteristics of musical writing in each discipline cannot be underestimated.

I wish to consider a seventh and final area of disciplinary non-congruence. Like the preceding two, this one rests on and refers back to those already discussed. The final generalized difference is the question of authority and representation: Who is speaking in a scholarly musical account, on whose behalf are their voices raised, and whose interests are served by the insights they are offering? (Just as the previous pair of differences is bound up with the historical practices of each discipline, so does this one interconnect with issues such as perspective and target readership.)

Of course, both musicology and ethnomusicology have much in common with respect to their attitude toward questions of authority, but there are also elements specific to each discipline, and I will concentrate on these singular elements. Thus, while acknowledging that both musicologist and ethnomusicologist rely on a common body of scholarly conventions, I will examine the role of folk evaluation in ethnomusicology and that of the expert view in musicology.

At its best, folk evaluation is not just the assemblage of colorful anecdotes in order to add local flavor to ethnomusicological analyses of music-making; rather, the opinions of different cultural insiders themselves is the primary means through which the ethnomusicologist sets out to relate one of these aspects—sound, for instance—to another. Since the ethnomusicologist approaches the culture or group in question as a learner, he or she typically seeks to reach an understanding of other individuals' views and values. Ethnomusicologists may explain why a particular informant considers a musical performance "bad," but—in distinction to the musicologist—rarely offer these opinions themselves.

Anthony Seeger's investigation of the characteristic pitch-rise in Suyá Amazonian Indian song offers a nice example of the employment of folk evaluation to link musical sound to the society's musical concepts. Encountering a recording made by a researcher who had visited the Suyá some years earlier, Seeger noticed that the song was both lower in pitch than any he had heard before and also sounded a bit slow. Suspecting a dubbing error, Seeger made a copy which he took back to the Amazon on his next field trip. Playing it one evening, the village men listened attentively, telling him it was beautiful. "That is the way the Suyá really sang in the old days," they said. Later, through various tests, Seeger became certain that the recording was indeed faulty; by inference, the Suyá may not have sung that way in the old days. In this case, their interpretation was based on false premises, but their error was in no sense a dead end,

because the Suyá men's enthusiastic reactions to the recording revealed their belief in the "deep throats" of their ancestors, a central ingredient in their aesthetic of song. This insight was doubly valuable, in that the Suyá were not normally minded to theorize about their music-making (Seeger 1987:97–100).

The musicologist, on the other hand, speaks from a position of personal authority. As a musical expert within the culture in question, the musicologist (and particularly the theorist) typically sees little need to consult with, say, members of the nearest symphony orchestra, their managers, or their audiences before composing a paper on Beethoven's symphonies. Until recently, it was generally the musicologist's own representation of Beethoven's symphony that mattered, and not that of performing musicians or their followers (see also Cook 1995–96).[9] To point this out is not to accuse the musicologist of elitism; on the contrary, when he or she provides specialist insights into aspects of Western musical heritage the musicologist acts as a responsible member of society, sharing his or her expert learning with the musical community as a whole. The musicologist thus assumes a role as educator, a shaper of ideas about certain kinds of music, which no other musician can so effectively fulfill.

The ethnomusicologist has this responsibility too, but, as the discussion of folk evaluation will have shown, is typically involved in a more visible dynamic of representation, speaking not only for him- or herself but also on behalf of those whose music they study. This is sometimes misunderstood. For instance, in an article considering canons, Kerman cites Blacking's statement that "an anthropological approach to the study of all musical systems makes more sense than analyses of the patterns of sound as things in themselves" (Blacking 1973:vii) and then responds:

> Again there is something quixotic about this attack. It may be that Gregorian chant as we now know is best studied in terms of Frankish culture and politics and that country music yields most as an expression of everything that Robert Altman put into *Nashville.* But if nineteenth-century music is to be approached on the same basis, that is, in terms of its own culture and ideology, the force exerted by the canon must be recognized. . . . We shall certainly not feel bound to study and appreciate this music exclusively in the terms it evolved for itself (Kerman 1994:42).

Blacking makes no claim for exclusivity, nor does he propose that living musical traditions are to be explained solely in terms of the cultural context of their period of origin. These are Kerman's fantasies, summoned up to frighten impressionable musicologists. To be honest, an "anthropologi-

cal approach" to music cannot—by definition—mean an analysis "exclusively in the terms [the music culture has] evolved for itself"; it has to mean an approach that is more-or-less informed by anthropological theory and method. Just a few pages later in the source cited by Kerman, Blacking gives an example of what he means:

> If, for example, all members of an African society are able to perform and listen intelligently to their own indigenous music, and if this unwritten music, when analyzed in its social and cultural context, can be shown to have a similar range of effects on people and to be based on intellectual and musical processes that are found in the so-called "art" music of Europe, we must ask why apparently general musical abilities should be restricted to a chosen few in societies supposed to be culturally more advanced (1973:4).

In other words, Blacking does not suggest that analysis can only go as far as social and cultural boundaries, but that careful, contextually-grounded analyses can throw up more general human questions about the making of music. Kerman, a tireless advocate of "music criticism," misunderstands this, fearing perhaps that ethnomusicology challenges his own authority to critique a wide historical range of Western art music. If this is so, Kerman is wrong. What Blacking is arguing against (apart from elitist views of musical talent in Western society) is an earlier ethnomusicological approach where the musical sounds of one cultural group were measured against those of another.[10] The ethnomusicologist might argue that just as the Suyá reactions to Seeger's faulty recording revealed much about their own conceptualizations of music, so Kerman's Lied criticism says something about him as a musicologist socially and culturally situated in the late twentieth century, as well as about nineteenth-century German song. This is not to rob him of his authority, only to locate it as distinct from a nineteenth-century voice. Kerman doesn't claim to be the voice of the nineteenth-century, so he need not feel threatened. It is true that some ethnomusicologists, as some historians, are less interested in what the present-day critic has to say than in the views of the cultural insiders themselves, but despite their championing of insider knowledge, ethnomusicologists still expect the expert to provide the argument.

In all, seven interlinked areas of distinction between musicology and ethnomusicology have been discussed. As has been seen, there are areas in which the two disciplines are not simply dissimilar but diametrically opposed. If the above is an accurate summary, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that ethnomusicologists on the one hand, and musicologists on the other, are regularly asking such different questions that there

is little they can do to offer each other specific help. With the rise of new trends within musicology, however, this situation has begun to change.

Ethnomusicology and the New Musicologies

Over the past ten or more years, increasing numbers of scholars from musicological backgrounds have begun to take a greater interest in the broader questions of how music actually works in (Western) society. In doing so, they have questioned the received notions of the masterpiece and "master-repertory," some of them moving away from the heartland of traditional musicology to consider other musical genres and styles. The ideology underlying the musicological canon has also been subjected to considerable scrutiny and review. Names like "new musicology" in the United States and "critical musicology" in Britain have appeared, though these terms suggest a uniformity of perspective among the scholars concerned that has yet to cohere, and indeed for which they themselves may not entirely wish.[11]

These new musicological trends might be summarized as falling into two main categories. On the one hand, much work has been devoted to the reinterpretation of music and musical styles with which musicological readers were already familiar (or thought they were). Lawrence Kramer's book on nineteenth-century music, for instance, examines the standard figures of Beethoven, Chopin, Liszt, Wagner, and Wolf (Kramer 1990), while composers whose music is particularly studied among the essays collected in the influential volume *Music and Society* (Leppert and McClary 1987) are Bach and Chopin. On the other hand, and as the latter volume also illustrates, there has been a simultaneous move to expand the repertory of music studied by the academy. Here, the most striking aspects have been the rehabilitation of the music and lives of numerous women composers and the application of new musicological tools to many aspects of popular music, once primarily the reserve of sociologists. A particularly impressive instance of the latter trend is Robert Walser's study of heavy metal music and culture (1993).

At the same time, and as mentioned at the beginning of this article, a number of ethnomusicologists have devoted concentrated attention to Western musical traditions. What makes their work different from earlier ethnomusicological commentary on Western music is that this earlier work had mainly consisted of the suggestion of parallels (and divergences) between studies of non-Western musics and Western art music, which was generally carried out to illustrate a theoretical or methodological question (e.g., Blacking 1973, 1987; Nettl 1983). Now, however, there has begun to arise a new trend of writings that specifically focus on individual Western musical traditions. Henry Kingsbury's study of the music conservatory is

perhaps one of the most stimulating publications within this field to date (Kingsbury 1988). It is probably fair to say that these new ethnomusicological studies have generally concentrated more on aspects of musical conceptualization and behavior than on the explanation of the actual sound structures of individual Western pieces or performances.

We might wish to interpret the move by the new musicology into sociocultural domains and the simultaneous appearance of ethnomusicologies of the West as the drawing together of these two modes of musical scholarship. It is just as probable, however, that what we are seeing is each discipline in more-or-less uncoordinated expansion. If this is so, overlap is coincidental, as new intellectual territories are staked out in the fields of academe, and dialogue is likely to be fraught with misperceptions.

Certainly it is true that despite the ongoing process of disciplinary self-reflection in every form of music scholarship, some of the deep-seated ideologies in each discipline remain influential. For instance, commenting on the state of Korean traditional culture, ethnomusicologist Keith Howard, himself no enemy of musical change, slips into a traditional ethnomusicological lament of this very process: "Unfortunately, traditions until recently considered old fashioned, boring, and heathen, tend to have undergone restructuring to package them more appropriately for the new world" (1989:vi). If we pause to consider what is happening here in Howard's description, we see only Koreans adapting their musical practices to better suit their contemporary lives, an equation that supports the standard ethnomusicological contention that musical structures are intimately tied to patterns of social life. Nonetheless, Howard's "unfortunately" articulates an older view, in which "authentic" traditions were valued above those sullied by contact with the modern, urban world.

Turning to musicology for a second example, we might consider Nadine Hubbs's article "Music of the 'Fourth Gender': Morrissey and the Sexual Politics of Melodic Contour." The very title of this paper signifies its allegiance to new musicology, both by asserting a link between gender constructions and musical structure and by placing this examination in the arena of popular music. But Hubbs soon reveals the grip of an older musicological belief: "It is ironic that the music receives less attention than any other aspect of Morrissey's work," she writes, "for it is indeed the music that fosters audiences' most powerful connections. But such silence remains the norm for popular music criticism in general" (Hubbs 1996:271). I refer here to Hubbs's utilization of the term "music" when what I think she properly means is "music sound."

To make this observation is not mere pedantry, because the irony to which Hubbs refers might just as well result not from an unwillingness of popular music criticism to engage with "music" but from Hubbs's own

inherited employment of a traditional musicological reading of this term. This is not to say that there should be no scholarly attempt to come to terms with technical aspects of musical sound in popular music, or to deny the importance of musical sound in shaping audience response—here Hubbs echoes the call of other musicologists who have turned to examine popular music. It is to say that if we want to investigate "music" as social process (the encoding of sexual politics in melodic contour, for example) we cannot assume that a traditional musicological reading of "music" is necessarily pertinent to an analysis of the social group in question. Instead, we have to learn—perhaps through participation, observation, and dialogue—how the individuals and groups involved make sense in and of these songs.[12]

Once we can establish what "music" is, we can then determine whether melodic contour is a viable analytical unit and whether or not it is deemed capable of bearing notions of sexual politics. If it is so deemed, we need to identify those for whom this notion is meaningful. If, on the other hand, melodic contour is not separated from other musical features by the community of musicians and audiences, this tells us that its analysis—while still valid for specialist musicological or compositional purposes—is unlikely to tell us anything about the musical negotiation of sexual politics in the given social context. Tim Rice's model of ethnomusicological enquiry would likely serve just as well as a checklist for the socially oriented musicologist, in that it identifies key areas that need to be discussed and interrelated in a study of this kind. Rice asks, "How do people historically construct, socially maintain, and individually create and experience music?" (1987:483).

Some musicologists are clearly already asking questions like this. In 1984, for example, Gary Tomlinson wrote an important article outlining the potential of anthropological modes of enquiry for musicology. One of Tomlinson's key points was to call on music scholars to make the "effort to converse with other cultures and times" (1984:362). New musicology, however, often appears resistant to such calls, remaining close to the models of older musicological discourse. A case in point is provided by the feminist music criticism proposed by Susan McClary in her book *Feminine Endings* (1991). This seems to me particularly ironic, since McClary claims that she is herself "involved with examining the premises of inherited conventions, with calling them into question, with attempting to reassemble them in ways that make a difference within the discourse itself" (1991:19). To complete this section of the essay, I will look in a little more detail at McClary's discourse, showing how it confirms and sustains existing conventions rather than developing anything new.

McClary opens her book by drawing parallels between the Bluebeard

myth and her own search for musical meaning. She then begins to link her quest to her status as a woman. This is a useful point at which to begin a consideration of the reliance of her work on conventional musicological approaches:

> As a woman in musicology . . . I have been granted access by my mentors to an astonishing cultural legacy: musical repertories from all of history and the entire globe, repertories of extraordinary beauty, power, and formal sophistication. It might be argued that I ought to be grateful, since there has only been one stipulation in the bargain—namely that I never ask what any of it means, that I content myself with structural analysis and empirical research (1991:4).

While it is true that academic mentors can, sometimes unreasonably, prevent a graduate student from selecting a particular dissertation topic or approach and recommend against publication of a book or paper, the argument that female musicologists are obliged to avoid the research of musical meaning is problematic. Furthermore, the notion of such a stipulation rests uneasily with the claim that these same musicological gatekeepers granted the author access to non-Western musics. Given that much research on these musics was (and is) concerned with the investigation of what music meant in particular societies, it seems curious that McClary was introduced to these musics at all. Scholars who desire to suppress the study of musical meaning would surely protect their students from the potentially corrupting influence of studies of non-Western music. Presumably, then, McClary means some particular kind of "meaning" distinct from those already established in the musicological and ethnomusicological agendas. Fortunately, she carries on to give a clearer indication of the object of her quest:

> Yet what I desired to know about music has always been quite different from what I have been able to find out in the authorized accounts transmitted in classrooms, textbooks, or musicological research. I was drawn to music because it is the most compelling cultural form I know. I wanted evidence that the overwhelming responses I experience with music are not just in my own head, but rather are shared.
>
> . . . I soon discovered, however, that musicology fastidiously declares issues of musical signification to be off-limits to those engaged in legitimate scholarship. It has seized disciplinary control over the study of music and has prohibited the asking of even the most fundamental questions concerning meaning. Something terribly important is

> being hidden away by the profession, and I have always wanted to know why (1991:4).

Here McClary—like Rink and Cooper—effects a kind of disciplinary cleansing, disposing silently offstage of the ethnomusicologists, music sociologists, music psychologists, and other inconvenient "others." This is unfortunate, since these music scholars have ideas to offer in the investigation of musical meaning. More to the point for present purposes, we note that the author "wanted evidence that the overwhelming responses I experience with music are not just in my own head, but rather are shared." In other words, McClary's quest is not to discover how music comes to be meaningful for certain socially and historically situated individuals and groups, but rather for corroboration of the "meaning" she already feels.

As such, and in common with a long line of musicological progenitors, McClary posits personal experience of music as the source of her authority to speak. In constructing an art-reflects-life reading of the first movement of Tchaikovsky's Fourth Symphony, for instance, the author notes that her account of one section does not "jibe with Tchaikovsky's. He ascribes nothing negative to this part of the piece" (1991:72). Musicology for McClary, like Kerman's criticism, retains the Old Testament model of insights handed down from the expert specialist. (As I intimated before, this is not in itself a flaw: musicology has a vital and continuing role within its present cultural bounds as a mode of specialist instruction and encouragement for the musically interested members of Western society.)

Other aspects of traditional musicology appear alongside conventional patterns of expert representation in this body of feminist music criticism. McClary's championing of her own interpretation of the Tchaikovsky symphony, for instance, can also be explained as part of her attempt to demonstrate the encoding of gender narratives within musical structure. Explication of these narratives then forms a kind of reconstruction and interpretation of lost, or in this case misunderstood, repertory, a further characteristic of conventional musicological enquiry. Further, McClary, in conjunction with the usual practice of her musicological elders, restricts herself to commentary on Western music alone (albeit to a fairly wide range of styles).

McClary is also at pains to concentrate on exceptional musical individuals. As in standard musicology, McClary's culture heroes are largely those whom she can establish as composers. In the course of an essay on Madonna, for example, McClary tells us, "I will be writing of Madonna in a way that assigns considerable credit and responsibility to her as a creator of texts" (1991:149). My point is not necessarily to dispute Madonna's personal agency in the creation of her own aural and visual imagery, but simply to note that it is only in standard musicological writing that Ma-

donna would need justification as an original composer at all. A conventional ethnomusicological approach to Madonna, by way of contrast, would tend to read her first and foremost as a "performer." Such a reading is not necessarily preferable to that offered by McClary, but the fact that it is possible underscores McClary's internalization of the standard rhetorical conventions of traditional musicology. A genuinely new musicology would not simply extend the habitual means of evaluation to a few new subjects.

Typically, the music created by these individuals is, whenever the medium allows (and as traditional musicology prefers), discussed in terms of idealized performances. McClary tells us, for example, that Donizetti's already-mad Lucia di Lammermoor can "even take time out to tease out her lines sensually, willfully" (1991:96). Comments on specific performance interpretations—do singers actually take time out?—are given only rarely, and generally in the endnotes rather than in the main text. Again, this is a conventional mode of musicological address, one that reinforces the "instructional" character of the author's expert readings.

We find also a focus in McClary's writing on particular musical works, the standard musicological unit of study. We might observe that if Western musical tradition "works" in terms of works, the analyst can hardly be expected to set these aside. Nonetheless, a glance at the traditional ethnomusicological equivalent is suggestive. The Western music tradition unfolds not only as a series of works but also as a series of music events: performances, rehearsals, auditions, lessons, discussions, readings, etc. An author who claims an interest in "examining the premises of inherited conventions, with calling them into question, with attempting to reassemble them in ways that make a difference within the discourse itself" seems to have missed yet another opportunity to do just that.

In short, all the features of standard musicological discourse also characterize McClary's writing. This is not to say that her writing is bad, but only to identify her innovations as shifts of emphasis within an established tradition rather than the start of something new. My critique of McClary's book has so far concentrated on how she couches her message, but to close this review of a work that some consider one of the key new musicological texts, I will briefly discuss an aspect of the message itself.

During her analysis of Madonna's "Live to Tell," McClary reads the fade-out ending of this song (leaving D [minor]–F major oscillations unresolved) as a strategic resistance to misogynist narrative closure, one of Madonna's armory of "brave new musical procedures" (1991:160–61). Fade-outs over an oscillating bass are a standard feature in music of this kind; the Beach Boys, whom I had not previously envisaged as masters of feminist narrative discourse, do this in "California Girls," which perhaps brings a new irony to this particular song. If such fade-outs are standard devices,

then it follows that the potential of that in "Live to Tell" to signify in the terms McClary suggests is seriously diminished. We might do well to raise questions about the status of the work here: where exactly does a pop song end, for instance (particularly given many radio disc jockeys' practice of fading songs out to introduce the next track)? To argue by analogy, in an individual lied, there is little dispute over where the song ends. In a song cycle like *Dichterliebe,* on the other hand, keyboard postludes sometimes also function to prepare the way for the start of the next song. A good analysis of a song from a cycle thus takes into account its position in the set, the preparation that precedes it, and its role in setting up the next song. In certain cases, a cycle is through-composed, such that the piano postlude to one song becomes also the prelude to the next. "Live to Tell" is not part of a nineteenth-century song cycle, whether through-composed or otherwise; on the other hand, neither is it a nineteenth-century solo song, and its fade-out may not be best analyzed as the finite codetta of such a piece.

More generally, although I hear the chords McClary identifies, I find it hard to hear this song as tonal in the sense of her analysis: if the initial D is a submediant (relative minor) preparation for an overall tonic of F major, McClary's whole analysis folds in on itself. On the other hand, before proposing either tonal reading, I would first want to be convinced that the harmonic language of popular music works in the same way as the progressive tonality found in common-practice art works. If not, the idea of D–F oscillation needs to be entirely rethought. McClary is attached to this notion because her book sets out to illustrate, among other themes, the encoding of gender and sexuality within (Western) musical language. In doing so, she draws on the narratological schema of Teresa de Lauretis and others (McClary 1991:12–17). When McClary applies this theory (i.e., all stories boil down to a male hero's conquest of a feminine other) to music, she makes several assumptions: that it is correct; that Western culture has only one essential idea; that music bears meaning of the same order as that contained in words; that tonality is the primary musical feature in which this meaning inheres; and that music ranging from Monteverdi to Madonna is subject to the same tonal procedure. While some of these assumptions might be challenged, it occurs to me that this whole set of suppositions might be strengthened through some form of cross-cultural amplification. Oppression of women is not a uniquely Western phenomenon, and neither is the encoding of cultural values in musical structure. If we could show how this process of encipherment occurred elsewhere, we would be better placed to understand what is special and different about its operation in Western musical traditions. Unless, that is, Western music is different, which is where we came in.

McClary's musicology, then, remains entirely concerned with Western music, ignoring research on other musical traditions, even where this may be pertinent to her own examinations of musical meaning. If McClary's work is representative of certain trends in new musicology, then its newness lies only in the expansion of the disciplinary frame of reference to include music by women and popular music. In other senses, much remains in common with older strains of musicology. Those who dislike the term "new musicology" are indeed right to do so.

Coda

If some genuinely new form of musicology is required, there are three primary areas where it might productively draw on ethnomusicology. The first of these is in arming musicologists with an expanded view of music as an interrelated cluster of concepts, behaviors, and sounds activated in (and activating) specific individual, social, and historical contexts. It will be self-evident that the scholar able to discover what "music" is among a particular social group is well placed to assess questions of value and change within that music or society. Equally, the musicologist who analyzes what musicians and others actually do in particular musical instances, and how these individuals explain what they do, is likely to gain enlightening perspectives on the sounds that emerge on these occasions. Ethnomusicologists have been addressing questions like these for quite some time already, and their existing literature contains a considerable amount of material of potential utility to the musicologist interested in formulating questions that say something about (rather than to) fellow members of Western society.

There is also reassurance in this literature for those who fear, perhaps like Kerman, that allowing other voices into our accounts must necessarily erode the musicologist's traditional mode of address as cultural authority. It is true that, impelled by the exigencies of investigating unfamiliar traditions, ethnomusicologists have discovered the voices of "the people themselves" to bear information that is different in kind, rather than simply deficient in quality, from the voice of the specialist scholar, and that customary modes of research in ethnomusicology raise questions of authority and representation that are directly relevant to many in the field of musicology. Nonetheless, the value of the informed expert's view has not been rejected; what has resulted is a clearer demarcation, where necessary, of the scholar's voice from those of the musicians and others involved in the music-making itself, and a greater sense of the context within which their dialogue arose. Ethnomusicological approaches to Western music, then, will not replace musicological ones, but supplement them, allowing the music scholar access to a broader selection of perspectives from which to write.

Secondly, if it is accepted that folk evaluation provides a kind of information not otherwise available to music scholars and that this information can be of value to the musicologist in certain cases, then it follows that scholars will also have to learn how to elicit and process this information, and how to come to terms with their own involvement in its production. Ethnomusicology offers the socially oriented musicologist access to a rich bank of experience in the methodologies and theories of research through personal participation. Such an approach could certainly be more widely exploited in the study of Western musical forms as created, performed, and received in contemporary society. Indeed, there are many forms of music in Western society that have yet to be written about from a historical perspective and for which printed scores and written documentation are rare. Church bell ringing, musicals, and amateur popular music offer but three diverse examples, but it would also be possible to gain new perspectives on what it actually means to perform or listen to the standard concert repertory in today's society. In these cases, personal participation (performing as part of the musical ensemble) may be not only the best way but the sole way for the musicologist to gather material. Again, we can note that there is little threat to the conventional methods of traditional music history and analysis here. As before, ethnomusicology promises a supplementation of approaches, and access to rich, new, firsthand material; it does not close off existing options.

Thirdly, it is clear from remarks earlier in this essay that music can be studied as a general part of human life. Lévi-Strauss has referred to music as "the supreme mystery of the science of man" (1970:18). At times, musicologists may wish to employ their in-depth knowledge of aspects of Western music in order to generate more general notions about how music works as a part of human life. Or, conversely, they may wish to use such general notions as already exist in order to assess what is special and different about the culture-specific example they have in mind. Since we have a much richer knowledge of Western art music than of any of humanity's many other musical styles, musicologists are, in fact, well positioned to lead investigation into the pan-human aspects of music making. At such moments, however, they will need to draw on evidence of musical traditions from across the rest of the world. To do this, they will require access to a spectrum of writings and recordings of world music, and enough grasp of ethnomusicological theory to be able to confidently apply this material to their own ends.

Once again, there is here no particular threat to the traditional musicologist who wishes to remain in the culturally bounded role of an educator who reflects (more-or-less philosophically) on aspects of the Western art music tradition. There is, however, perhaps an indirect threat. The

provision of sufficient training for musicologists in ethnomusicological theory and practice requires a certain level of institutional support, and often expansion in one area threatens to prohibit expansion in another. Institutions without existing expertise in ethnomusicology will have to consider whether that discipline's contribution is worth its price. Often, however, this is difficult to do. In Britain, for instance, the majority of universities and conservatories have yet to appoint (and show little sign of appointing) an ethnomusicologist to their staffs; library holdings are extremely limited outside a few enclaves.[13] The music student who independently decides to seek an exposure to other musical traditions and pertinent scholarly perspectives has a hard time locating materials and informed guidance within this extensive field. Those who are never told by their teachers that such a thing as ethnomusicology actually exists and might be helpful to them can be hardly be blamed if they graduate and start work in musicology believing ethnomusicology to be peripheral, yet these are the people who will have to decide whether or not to establish new posts in this field.

By several accounts, it appears that American music students are generally advantaged in this respect. As such, they are well placed to develop truly new forms of musicology. The recent diversification of traditional musicology has laid the groundwork for the serious consideration by musicologists of ethnomusicological theory and practice.[14] As we have seen, ethnomusicology is unlikely to contribute to the solution of every musicological problem; the two approaches remain too different. Only in certain domains, such as the three outlined above, does it offer assistance to the scholar of Western music. Nonetheless—and in distinction to certain of the trends that have so far appeared, in which perspectives are borrowed from literary theory and other non-musical disciplines—a musicology empowered by ethnomusicology has the advantage that it draws from another approach centered on key issues of music itself. We are, in fact, at a moment of some opportunity.

Notes

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1. Some object to the term "new musicology," but for the sake of convenience I will employ it nonetheless, without inverted commas.

2. An accessible historical overview of the rise of ethnomusicology is provided by Myers (1992).

3. I refer mainly to the British musicological situation in certain sections of this article not because I necessarily wish to single out British(-based) musicology for criticism, but simply because this is the musicological community with which I am most familiar. Similarities and disparities elsewhere are best judged by the informed reader; certainly, Bernard Harrison has suggested to me that the issues outlined here are very closely tied to trends in Anglo-American scholarship that are not replicated in Continental Europe.

4. See also Blacking (1992:302), Merriam (1964:147–50), and Nettl (1983:342–44). Music psychologists have also put considerable effort into studying the musical activities of children. That this research is invisible to Cooper may follow from the indication in his article that his primary interest is in uncovering "masterworks."

5. Gourlay argues not so much for the abandonment of cross-cultural studies of music as for the establishment of an even broader concept, embracing other performance media such as dance and ritual.

6. Kofi Agawu has recently pointed to the Western reification of a notion of "African rhythm" (1995). The construction of such mental frameworks surely also arises from the belief that music from other parts of the world must inherently be different from that of the West: Africans do not have rhythm; they have "African rhythm."

7. Incidentally, ethnomusicologists are likely to be at an advantage here, since musicology is much bigger, and harder to disregard. In Britain it is also difficult to take an undergraduate degree in music—one of the primary routes into specialist studies in ethnomusicology—without encountering many of the standard musicological sources. (As far as I am aware, there is only one U.K. undergraduate program purely in ethnomusicology, itself only a year old.)

8. For further discussion of the study of the individual in ethnomusicology see, for instance, Rice (1994:8–9) and Stock (1996:1–3).

9. One reader has kindly reminded me of work in reception history, which forms an exception here, one that lies closer in some respects to ethnomusicological patterns of authority and representation. If we used this mode of writing to discuss contemporary concerts, lessons, record store purchases, etc., we would entirely match the ethnomusicological model. Notwithstanding this exception, I would generally characterize musicological insights as those offered to other cultural insiders as expert interpretations "from above" (although it is possible that this terminology is overly redolent of royalist Britain; it certainly seems to have dismayed at least one egalitarian U.S. reader).

10. Merriam, although hardly the chief representative of this trend, provides an accessible example, offering a statistical analysis of (Western) intervals as found in the musics of various American cultures (1964:300–02). In Blacking's case, it was his experience of Venda music, where improvised melodic transpositions were not only common but stylistically essential, that inspired his calls against the acontextual comparison of interval counts from around the world.

11. In Britain the critical musicology grouping presently provides a forum for a diverse range of individuals. Scholars of popular music are there in force, as are music theorists, feminists, and sociologists. There are also composers, music edu-

cationists, psychologists, performance specialists, and the occasional ethnomusicologist. This informal portrait arises from my own attendance at critical musicology meetings since 1993.

12. During the last two years undergraduate students of mine have interviewed approximately 400 "non-musicians" for their views on what "music" is. While opinions differ from one subject to another, it is clear that many of those questioned have a far broader sense of this term than do formally trained music students. If the same is true for Morrissey and his audiences, "the music" may not mean only the sound structures of Morrissey's performances, but a field of action and interaction between performer and audience, a system of behaviors including on- and offstage "performing" (again, in the anthropological sense of the term even more than in the musicological), sets of lyrics and the manner in which they are delivered, selection of instruments and effects, particular sites where the songs are heard, and the way the critic comes to feel while experiencing these songs, as well as much else.

13. Of the 58 U.K. music departments assessed in a 1996 national research exercise, less than one quarter have an ethnomusicologist on their staff. Only two or three of these 58 departments employ more than one full-time ethnomusicologist. (Very few ethnomusicologists are found in U.K. departments of anthropology, folklore, or area studies.)

14. The opposite is also true, of course, but many ethnomusicologists are already drawing on musicological work; theoretical and methodological perspectives are already flowing smoothly in this direction. Additionally, both ethnomusicologists and musicologists will likely wish to know more about recent discoveries in the field of music psychology, which seems to offer much that could be fruitfully employed in the development of new forms of musical enquiry.

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reviews

Kofi Agawu. *African Rhythm: A Northern Ewe Perspective.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. xx, 217 pp., 19 plates; compact disc.

Reviewed by David Temperley

Among the three branches of musicology—historical musicology, theory, and ethnomusicology—it is the relationship between the last two that is most distant and tenuous. It is not difficult to see why. In terms of their subject matter, the theorist's domain (mainly Classical, Romantic, and twentieth-century art music) is essentially a subdomain of the historical musicologist's (Western art music as a whole); and this, in turn, is non-overlapping with the ethnomusicologist's (everything else).[1] The more serious divide between ethnomusicology and theory, however, is in their philosophy and approach. The theorist's main activity is intensive study of the score of a piece, more or less in isolation from its historical context: the circumstances of its creation, the life and personality of its composer, and its historical milieu. (This is an oversimplification, but it fairly characterizes the way most music theory and analysis—Schenkerian analysis and pitch-class set theory, for example—is done.) If this approach is troubling to many musicologists, who see the score as but one source of evidence toward the understanding of a work,[2] to ethnomusicologists it is positively anathema. Indeed, to some ethnomusicologists, even the relatively broad perspective of the historical musicologist has seemed too narrow—excessively concerned with limited documentary evidence and factual questions of chronology and authorship, and not enough with larger issues of social context, function, and meaning.[3] From the ethnomusicologist's perspective, confining one's attention to the score alone is simply the extreme of this unhealthy tendency. It represents the ultimate embrace of a dangerous fiction: the autonomy of the musical work.

This portrayal of the situation implies that theorists and ethnomusicologists have nothing to talk about (and there are some on both sides, I believe, who feel this way). But in truth, there is no insurmountable conflict between the two approaches, and indeed, much room for interaction and cooperation. All that is required from ethnomusicologists is the concession that intensive and "autonomous" study of musical objects, represented by scores or in some other way, can be a valuable route to the understanding of music of any kind; and the conces-

sion by theorists that this is not the only route to such understanding, and hardly ever a sufficient one. (I will explain further what I mean by "autonomous" study of musical works.) If this much can be agreed, the way would seem clear for a fruitful reconciliation between theory and ethnomusicology, both in philosophy and in subject matter. Plenty of people on both sides, I expect, would make the necessary concessions; now all that is needed is for someone to actually do the work.

Under such circumstances, Kofi Agawu's *African Rhythm: A Northern Ewe Perspective* is particularly welcome. The author is an accomplished theorist, who has written extensively about Classical and Romantic music; most notably, his book *Playing With Signs* (Agawu 1991) is a semiotic study of the "topics" operating in Classical chamber music. However, Agawu has also been working for some years in the field of African music, as his numerous articles attest (see 1986:64–83; 1987:400–18; 1988a:127–46; 1988b:75–105; 1990:221–43). In *African Rhythm,* Agawu crowns this body of work with an extended ethnomusicological study of the music of the Northern Ewe. One point is worth stressing here: *African Rhythm* is, among other things, most certainly an ethnomusicological book. (On page 3 Agawu claims that his book is "a contribution to African music study rather than to ethnomusicology," but I find this questionable; in any case, it seems odd to think that this single sentence should affect the way the book is construed.) It involves close ethnographic observation of the musical life of the Ewe people: their music, the manner and contexts in which it is performed, and its functions and meanings in the larger context of Ewe life. I can see no reason why *African Rhythm* is any less ethnomusicological than, for example, Blacking's *Venda Children's Songs* (1967), Nketia's *Drumming in Akan Communities of Ghana* (1963), or Keil's *Tiv Song* (1979). Alongside its ethnographic aspect, however, the analyses in *African Rhythm* very much reflect Agawu's background as a theorist. And this brings us to an important point, one that qualifies the theory/ethnomusicology divide discussed earlier. In the broadest sense, analysis—the study of patterns of pitch, rhythm, timbre, form, and other aspects of musical structure—is a central part of ethnomusicology; it features heavily, for example, in the studies by Blacking and others just mentioned. But analysis as practiced by theorists is of a rather different character. In the first place, it entails intensive study of individual pieces, in all (or many) of their structural aspects, with an interest in what is individual or unique about them. Secondly, it entails an interest in musical structures and relationships whose extramusical function or cultural meaning may be unknown or unclear, simply because they seem musically important. This kind of analysis assumes that music is, to some extent at least, "autonomous," in that it cannot be fully explained in terms of its cultural context (at least, not by

any means known to us at the moment). That music is (to some extent) autonomous in this way is, I think, profoundly true. It is this perspective that Agawu brings to bear, and that makes *African Rhythm* a work of music theory as well as ethnomusicology.

* * *

As the title suggests, Agawu's study is concerned with the music of one African ethnic group, the Northern Ewe of Ghana, although he often extends his conclusions to African music as a whole. To describe the book as a study of Northern Ewe music, however, is not quite accurate: Agawu addresses himself not only to music, but to all the "rhythms" involved in Ewe life. Agawu begins the book with a description of the "rhythms of society" encountered in the course of a hypothetical day. These include rhythms of work (the pounding of cassava by girls and the pounding of nails by carpenters), rhythms of children's games, the rhythmic calls of market vendors, and, especially in the evening, the rhythms of drumming, singing, and dancing. At the end of the first chapter, Agawu presents a model of what he considers the primary "modes of rhythmic signification" in Ewe society, showing how each mode is generated by another (28):

> Gesture → spoken word → vocal music → instrumental music → dance → Gesture

Gesture is "the primordial rhythmic event" (27). Gestures generate words, in that any linguistic understanding between two people assumes a shared gestural language. Word generates song; this is amply shown by Agawu's analyses of the role of speech tones in melody. Song generates instrumental music, instrumental music generates dance—these connections seem apparent enough—and dance generates gesture, to complete the circle. As Agawu emphasizes, there are other links and dependencies here as well. Speech, for example, can generate instrumental music directly, as in the well-known "talking drum" music of the Ewe and other groups. Moreover, each kind of rhythm has its own internal generative power (e.g., while vocal music is clearly influenced by language, it is also guided by purely musical factors). Instrumental music, too, despite its connections to melody and speech, is also motivated partly by considerations internal to music—for example, "a fascination with a particular rhythm" (29).

This model is too idealized to be taken very far, as Agawu readily admits. But it provides a useful preview of the topics Agawu intends to discuss, and the order in which he will discuss them. Following the first chapter, Agawu devotes chapters to the rhythms of language (chapter 2),

song (chapter 3), and drumming and dancing (chapter 4). Following this are two extended analyses of Ewe performances: a drumming-dancing performance (chapter 5) and a folktale (chapter 6). A short concluding chapter offers some general points about African rhythm.

Agawu's discussion of language begins with an overview of Ewe prosody. Syllables in Ewe have three properties: length, tone (low, medium, or high), and stress. While length and tone pattern can impose an accent on a syllable (with longer and high-tone syllables being accented), these accents are distinct from, and independent of, actual "stress." In the word *adevu,* for example, the tone pattern is low-low-high, creating a tone accent on the last syllable, but it is the middle syllable that is stressed (37).[4] Agawu goes on to consider some uses of language that he finds particularly musical: greetings, a town crier's announcement, children's riddles, and the prayers that accompany the pouring of libations. As Agawu notes, an essential aspect of this musicality is periodicity and repetition. This may take the form of exact repetition; for example, in a prayer to gods and ancestors, each of the narrator's lines is followed by a co-narrator's affirmation ("Yoho"). It may involve near repetition, as in the many similar phrases in an extended greeting exchange ("Did you sleep?" "Did yours sleep?" "Did you sleep peacefully?"). More subtly, it may consist simply of a sequence of phrases of roughly comparable length, establishing a latent metricality. In the second prayer Agawu considers, this metricality is prominent enough to place it "on the threshold of musical rhythm" (60).

The book is accompanied by a CD, containing over 30 examples of speech, song, and instrumental music, including both of the extended performances analyzed in chapters 5 and 6. In some respects, Agawu's analyses and discussions apply only to specific performances, since many aspects of Ewe pieces—songs and dances—are improvised and will vary from one performance to another. Agawu handles this matter well, making it clear which aspects of a performance are improvised and which ones are fixed.

Agawu begins chapter 3 with a discussion of children's songs. One of his main points here is that children's song is no less complex, nor indeed different in any fundamental way, from adult music. Frequently children's songs are accompanied by physical movements such as clapping, pointing to objects (as in counting songs), or moving stones. In some cases, a single melody may be aligned with physical movements in different ways, creating challenges of coordination for the participants. Adult songs are divided into two categories, those in "free rhythm" and those in "strict rhythm." (Agawu suggests that free rhythm might just as well be called "speech rhythm.") A number of songs are analyzed here. Two improvised songs in free rhythm by a singer-composer reflect complex patterns of line

repetition, which Agawu represents in a "paradigmatic arrangement" reminiscent of semiotic analyses. Several of the songs analyzed here and in chapter 5 reflect large-scale structural pitch patterns, which Agawu represents using quasi-Schenkerian graphs. Among the complexities of these pieces are the shifts between improvised and "set" portions and the shifts between strict and free rhythm (which are not always clear-cut). The chapter ends with an extended analysis of an Ewe lament.

Agawu's discussion of drumming (chapter 4) is framed in terms of a model proposed by Nketia. Nketia posits three main modes of drumming in African music: speech mode (actual "talking drums," which imitate the rhythms and tones of speech), signal mode (in which drums convey information through arbitrary signals), and dance mode (in which they accompany dance) (Nketia 1963:17–31). The third is by far the most prevalent in Ewe culture and the main object of Agawu's attention. Agawu divides dances into two types, serious and recreational, and discusses several examples of each, culminating in a fairly detailed account of the *Gbolo* recreational dance. Agawu says relatively little about the musical details of Ewe drum ensemble pieces, which, as he notes, have been widely analyzed elsewhere; rather, he focuses here on the social context of dances, their narrative content, and their broad outlines in terms of both music and dance. Among the most fascinating is *Adabatram,* a dance done to mark the funeral of an important chief, in which a large drum is carried around by a specially chosen (and in this case very reluctant) carrier. The drum is said to dictate where the carrier will walk, and inspires great fear in anyone who encounters it.

Chapter 5 offers an analysis of a performance by the *Ziavi Zigi* group. The entire sung text of the 35-minute performance, and the notated first line of each musical section, is included in the book. Here Agawu has the opportunity to describe aspects of the performance that are inevitably neglected elsewhere: the physical setting, the costumes, the performers, the dynamics of performance space, and the interaction between audience and performers. On this last matter, Agawu makes an important point. It is sometimes claimed that in African performance everyone participates and there is no performer-audience distinction. Awagu argues that this is mistaken: the boundary between performers is usually quite clear, and participation by the audience (clapping, etc.) is usually fairly limited.

The Ziavi Zigi performance involves an introduction followed by a series of four dances, each one comprising several short songs. Each of the dances has an underlying theme, or at least a traditional context associated with it (i.e., the first two dances center around young couples, the third is a hunting dance, and the fourth concerns death and ancestors),

but these themes are only very loosely reflected in the texts of the songs, which touch on a wide variety of subjects. (The inclusion and ordering of songs varies from one performance to another.) However, Agawu notes many musical connections between the songs: rhythmic motives, archetypal pitch patterns, and long-range peaks and valleys of energy that give the performance an overall shape. Another recurring theme in Agawu's discussion here is the clash between tradition and modernity—elements of the latter including an incongruous spoken introduction halfway through the first dance (132), and a song dedicated to the governing party of Ghana (133–34).

In chapter 6, the telling of a folktale is analyzed. The folktale describes a childless couple and their discovery of a child whom they adopt; the child is kidnapped by animals and eventually escapes. In the course of this, it is explained how various animals—the rat, the dove, and the butterfly—came to have their characteristic sounds and movements. The musical aspects of the narration are discussed: the strategic use of repetition; the modulation of speed, pitch and intensity to depict what is being described (e.g., the motions of the different animals); and the use of nonsense syllables as sound effects. An intriguing aspect of this performance is the "interludes": brief songs (more or less relevant to the story) interpolated by members of the audience, unscripted and spontaneous, but welcomed and incorporated by the narrator.

The book concludes with a brief chapter of general discussion. First Agawu reconsiders his model of rhythmic modes in Ewe society. He then offers a critique of A. M. Jones's transcriptions of Ewe songs; in so doing, he presents some general conclusions about African rhythm, to which I will now turn.

* * *

Since this is both an ethnomusicological and a music-theoretical book, it requires evaluation from both of these perspectives. I am not an ethnomusicologist, and will leave it to others more qualified to assess that aspect of *African Rhythm* in depth. From some acquaintance with the field, however, I can say that Agawu's observations and discussions of Ewe culture seem exemplary. They are sensitive, careful, and admirably free of preconceptions and facile generalizations, making *African Rhythm* a worthy successor to pioneering studies of African music by Jones, Blacking, Nketia, Keil, and others. My focus here will be on the analytical aspects of the book, which I am more qualified to address.

The first thing to note is that Agawu devotes considerable space to analysis of the music-theoretical kind discussed earlier—analysis that con-

siders a piece in many aspects at once (pitch, rhythm, motive, form, music-text relations, etc.), trying to make sense of them however possible, without any fear of making observations whose significance appears to be purely musical. The analyses in chapter 3 are perhaps the best examples of this. On several occasions Agawu feels compelled to defend this analytical approach. Before embarking on the analysis of the lament in chapter 3, for example, he notes that some readers might find such detailed analyses to be "ill-founded, premature, or at best of doubtful relevance" (83). Similarly, on page 4, he argues energetically against the view that one cannot simply "listen" to African music (i.e., that it can only be understood in conjunction with its extramusical—particularly visual—elements and other aspects of context). These remarks seem to suggest that Agawu, too, senses the tension between music theory and ethnomusicology to which I earlier referred, although he does not describe it in these terms. (His repeated insistence that vocal music and drumming are not determined only by language, but also by musical considerations, is significant here as well, drawing attention in another way to the importance of musical factors.) By giving this kind of analysis a major role in his book, Agawu brings a new approach to the study of African music, one which should be given serious consideration.

In general, the analyses in *African Rhythm* are of a very high order. Agawu's Schenkerian analyses are musical and plausible; indeed, the underlying melodic archetypes he finds, such as those in the Ziavi Zigi performance (129–30), are more compelling than many in similar analyses of Western music. As in much analysis, Agawu searches for the unifying features of each piece, but without imposing unity to a degree that is musically unjustified. Particularly impressive in this regard is the analysis of the lament at the end of chapter 3. Agawu shows that the singer, using what seem to be very simple resources of pitch and rhythm, constructs a work of great complexity, through shifts of register, intricate motivic connections, and subtle tonal focus. Another factor here, less accessible to the non-Ewe-speaker, is the tension between the inherent "tone" of the words spoken and the contour of the melody.

On several occasions, Agawu cites as a main characteristic of Ewe music the frequent conflicts between accent and meter. By "meter" he means—I assume—a framework of levels of beats, not necessarily always expressed in sound, but present in the mind of the experienced performer and listener. Some time-points are high-level (or "strong") beats, while others are not, so that different time-points have differing degrees of "metrical accent." Frequently the "phenomenal accents" of Ewe music—events marked by loudness, linguistic stress, high pitch, length, or other means—do not coincide with metrical accents, and therefore "conflict" with the

metrical structure (64, 68, 110, 189, 192, 193). As Agawu notes, this conception of African rhythm is at odds with that of some earlier writers, notably A.M. Jones, who posited constantly shifting metrical structures, so that every accented event was metrically strong (Jones 1959). Agawu argues convincingly that African rhythm, like Western rhythm, is based on a regular metrical framework; thus the differences between Western and African rhythm are not as fundamental as Jones and others have maintained (193). "If there is a Northern Ewe difference," Agawu suggests, "it resides in their ability to test the limits of a stable background without relinquishing dependence on that background" (190). While this is no doubt true, it is important to note that this is a matter of degree rather than a fundamental qualitative difference. Certainly Western classical music contains many examples of conflicts between metrical structure and phenomenal accent. Agawu's discussions of metrical conflicts in Ewe music would have benefited from some acknowledgment of this, especially given his general point that the differences between African and Western music have often been exaggerated.

A related issue concerns the connection between meter and phrasing. Several times Agawu notes that meter and phrasing are frequently out of synchrony in Ewe music, so that phrases begin on weak beats (64, 66, 110). Again, this is undoubtedly true; what is odd here is the implication that it is not also true of Western music. Agawu comments that "[s]ome listeners to African music are often thrown by the consistency with which, and extent to which, phrases suppress a normative strong beat pattern, originating and terminating elsewhere in the bar. Their instinct is to regard the first sound as the origin of whatever cycle of beats is operative in the music" (64). But in Western music, too, it is common for meter and phrasing to be somewhat out of phase, so that the phrase starts slightly before the strong beat; any melody that starts on an upbeat is an example of this. (Consider—out of innumerable examples—songs such as "The Star-Spangled Banner," "Dixie," and "Happy Birthday.") There may be a difference in degree between Western and African music with regard to the asynchrony between grouping and meter that is tolerated. But Agawu has not shown any fundamental difference here between African and Western rhythmic perception. Indeed, Agawu's example 3.1 (which is the context in which the above comment is made) contains a two-note anacrusis that seems no different from many anacruses in Western music.

These issues—the distinction between metrical and phenomenal accent, and between grouping and meter—are complex and subtle. Although strong beats and phenomenal accents may not always coincide, it is from the phenomenal accents that we infer the metrical structure (in Western music and presumably in Ewe music as well); therefore, there cannot be

too much syncopation without the metrical structure being undercut. Similarly, the relationship between grouping and meter is complex; although they are in principle independent, there is a tendency (other things being equal) to hear them as roughly aligned. Understanding of these issues has come relatively recently in music theory. The main achievement of Lerdahl and Jackendoff's *Generative Theory of Tonal Music* (1983) was to present a satisfactory (and relatively formal) model of these structures and the way they are inferred.[5] Agawu's comments suggest that something similar to the *GTTM* model might be applicable to Ewe music (and other African music as well) although this would require much further study.[6] It is unfortunate that Agawu did not give greater emphasis to these commonalities. Again, this is particularly ironic in view of the fact that one of Agawu's stated goals is to debunk the myth of irreconcileable "difference" between African and Western music (4–5, 188, 193). It seems, actually, that the affinities between African and Western rhythm are even deeper than he suggests.[7]

One further point Agawu makes about rhythmic structure is truly puzzling. He comments several times that the time signatures in his examples should be taken primarily as an indication of grouping. Meter in Ewe music, he suggests, is mainly a "grouping mechanism" that does not imply any "accentual hierarchy" (70–71, 110, 188, 200). This would seem to directly contradict Agawu's other point: grouping—or in Agawu's terms "phrasing"—is frequently not in synchrony with meter. And in any case, if meter implies only grouping, without having accentual implications, then where is the conflict between meter and phenomenal accent that Agawu repeatedly mentions? Perhaps Agawu takes this step to avoid what he sees as the contradiction of having a metrical structure in which not all the strong beats are explicitly accented; however, as I have noted—and as Agawu seems to acknowledge elsewhere—this is not a contradiction but is rather the normal state of affairs.

Let us pursue this line of thought one step further. Agawu's musical examples are notated in Western music notation, with traditional time signatures. I take this to mean that Agawu understands Ewe melodies (at least the ones in strict rhythm) as having metrical structures similar to Western music (notwithstanding the confusing remarks just mentioned about meter and grouping). Consider example 3.5 from Agawu's book, shown here as example 1: a melody with a clapping accompaniment. In *GTTM*'s terms, the metrical structure indicated in Agawu's transcription would be represented by structure A in example 2: three levels of beats, corresponding to eighths, quarters, and half-notes. In this case, Agawu notes that the even-numbered measures are heard as strong. We can represent this by adding a fourth row of beats at the two-measure level, as

Example 1: From Agawu, *African Rhythm,* page 64.



Example 2: Possible metrical structures for example 1.



shown in structure A. I have full confidence in Agawu's intuitions about how Ewe music should be heard, and in most cases, the metrical structures he suggests are exactly the ones I would infer. A question arises here, however: why do Ewe listeners infer this particular metrical structure for this melody? Why do they not hear the melody as being in 6/8 (structure B), as they do in many other cases, or in 2/4 with the strong beats one quarter-note later (structure C), or with odd-numbered measures strong (structure D)? *GTTM* offers a general solution to this question, which seems to work well here. The *GTTM* model is stated in the form of a series of "Metrical Preference Rules" (i.e., we choose the structure that best satisfies the preference rules). For example, we prefer a structure in which long notes coincide with strong beats (1983:84); in this case, structures A and D seem to align strong beats with long notes (both in the melody and the clapping) better than structures B and C. We also prefer a structure in which parallelisms (i.e., motivic patterns) are aligned with the meter, so that strong beats occur in the same place at each repetition of the motive (1983:75); this favors structures A, C, and D over structure B, since in the former cases the metrical structure is aligned with the clapping pattern. We also slightly prefer to locate strong beats at or near the beginning of "groups" (i.e., groups of notes that are close together in time—separated by rests—and similar in register) (1983:76); this tends to favor structure D over the other three (since the entire four-measure phrase clearly constitutes a group). But structure A is preferred to structure D in another way, since it gives greater metric strength to the long notes at the end of the clapping pattern, as well as the final long note of the melodic phrase. (Personally, I think I hear structure D here—contrary to the Ewe hearing reported by Agawu—but structure A is certainly not out of the question.) Suppose, however, that the clap pattern shifted (relative to the melody), as in example 3 (which, Agawu notes on page 67, sometimes occurs in performances of the song). Now the long notes in the clapping pattern are aligned with odd-numbered measures of the melody rather than even-numbered ones. According to *GTTM,* this would make hearing D stronger (with odd-numbered measures of the melody metrically strong). If we assume that, in example 2, structure A is the preferred hearing, example 3 might be ambiguous between structure A and structure D. (According to *GTTM,* an ambiguous passage is one in which the metrical preference rules favor two interpretations roughly equally.) And this is exactly what Agawu suggests; in his words, there is now a conflict between "clap accent" and "melodic accent" (68). In short, this example suggests that the *GTTM* model could do a good job of predicting the metrical structures inferred by Ewe listeners. It may well turn out that Ewe listeners had somewhat different "weightings" of the rules, causing slightly different interpreta-

Example 3: Example 1, with the clapping pattern shifted.



tions to be formed by Western and Ewe listeners in some cases (and, as I noted, this example is perhaps such a case); perhaps even somewhat different rules would be involved. One possibility relates to the alignment of linguistic stress with metrical accent; Agawu suggests that this principle operates rather weakly in Ewe music (192), whereas it is of great importance in Western music. In this sense the *GTTM* model could perhaps provide a way of representing the differences in rhythmic perception between Ewe and Western listeners, as well as the similarities. The same point might be made regarding the conflicts between meter and grouping that Agawu discusses. All this requires much further study, but it seems to me that *GTTM* offers some promising possibilities here.

With his many careful transcriptions of Ewe performances, and his thoughtful comments and analyses, Agawu provides us with a valuable body of information about Ewe music. It is a pity that he did not take the final step of integrating his observations about Ewe rhythm with recent theoretical work on the subject; still, this book makes an important contribution to such a comparative project by giving us a much clearer picture of how rhythm works in Northern Ewe music.

Since I have undertaken to evaluate the analytical portions of *African Rhythm,* it seems appropriate to point out errors of detail, but I find very few. Line 5 of page 66 should read, "So, although phrase boundaries occur after the second crotchet of bar 2 . . . and after the downbeat of bar 5. . . ." Page 81, line 9, should read ". . . of the downbeat of m. 9." On page 190, Agawu retranscribes three of Jones's transcriptions of children's songs. While Agawu's discussion here relates mainly to the barring, there are also differences in actual rhythmic values (especially in example 7.4). Some comments about these differences would have been appreciated. Was Jones's transcription simply inaccurate, or is there some reason that Agawu's makes better "sense" in Ewe terms? On page 192 Agawu says that Jones's insistence on the alignment of stress and meter led him to set the word *abaye* with the second syllable metrically strong, but Agawu's retranscription does exactly the same thing.

A few other thoughts I have about the book are more in the nature of questions than criticisms. Agawu's discussion of children's songs includes

a section on what he calls "rhymes." These do not appear to be rhymes in the Western sense; perhaps Agawu has a reason for calling them rhymes, but it would be interesting to know what it is. Secondly, Agawu comments at one point that Ewe children's music involves many of the same rhythmic devices as adult music, including syncopations and "displacements" (62); however, Agawu says virtually nothing about displacements anywhere else in the book. I have argued elsewhere that many syncopations in rock can be understood as displacements—as deviations from an implied "deep structure"—rather than merely as metrical conflicts (Temperley, in press). It would be interesting to know if syncopations in African music also involved displacements, but to my knowledge this question has hardly been addressed. A final question concerns Agawu's discussion of the "rhythms of [Ewe] society": rhythms of everyday work, speech, and play. I wonder if similar scrutiny would show that Western society, too, was every bit as "rhythmic" as Ewe society. If this were true, it would not in any way diminish the value of Agawu's insightful observations about the Ewe; however, in stressing the "rhythmicity" of Ewe society, Agawu is setting up, or really reinforcing, a kind of "difference" between Africa and the West. As Agawu rightly reminds us, this is something to be cautious about.

I have tended to emphasize here how Agawu's theoretical perspective enriches the study of African music, and how bringing to bear other theoretical ideas could enrich it further. In short, I have emphasized what music theory can do for ethnomusicology. But the other lesson of this book, of course, is what ethnomusicology can do for music theory. For there is no doubt that our appreciation of Ewe music—and Agawu's analyses of it—are greatly enhanced by the ethnographic context he provides. Agawu is right that just listening to, say, the performance of the Ziavi Zigi group is a deeply satisfying way to approach it. And yet knowing something about the physical situation, the elaborate rituals of introduction and of asking permission that must be followed, the words being sung and their complex and sometimes hidden meanings for Ewe listeners, the uneasy mixture of tradition and modernity—all these things add an invaluable dimension to the experience. How much less satisfying Agawu's analyses would be if they were presented in the usual "music-theoretical" manner, with no context at all. For anyone interested in bridging the gap between theory and ethnomusicology, *African Rhythm* offers an inspiring example of how to proceed.

Notes

1. These are rough generalizations, as are several statements that follow. Ethnomusicologists have recently begun to seriously address the issue of applying their methods to Western art music, and historical musicologists have broadened their horizons as well; generally, however, these divisions still hold.

2. For a lively debate over this issue, see Taruskin (1986:313–20) and Forte (1986:321–37).

3. See, for example, Nettl (1964:11–12) and Hood (1965:261–62). Perhaps few ethnomusicologists would make these criticisms today; certainly they would be less justified now than they were when they were made. More recently, however, similar contrasts between historical musicology and ethnomusicology have been drawn by historical musicologists themselves. In their critique of "formalist" musicology, Richard Leppert and Susan McClary point to ethnomusicology as a model to be emulated (1987:xviii). Joseph Kerman, too, while finding ethnomusicologists' criticisms overstated, agrees that "many musicologists pay too little attention to anything outside the strictly musical context they are studying" (1985:170).

4. This distinction seems a little confusing. In linguistics, stress is usually taken to mean the marking of some syllables as more prominent than others. This can involve various phonological factors, including length, pitch, and volume (see Spencer 1996:240–41). It seems wrong, therefore, to speak of stress as a characteristic of syllables alongside length and tone; rather, stress is a more abstract property of syllables, which can be influenced by length and tone.

5. Lerdahl and Jackendoff build on the work of others, notably Carl Schachter (1976:281–334).

6. In many cases, Agawu generalizes his observations about Ewe rhythm to African music in general; to what extent this is justified I am not qualified to say.

7. Agawu in fact cites Lerdahl and Jackendoff's concept of "phenomenal accent" (201). However, he could have acknowledged more clearly that the conflicts between phenomenal and metrical accents he finds in Northern Ewe music are common in Western music as well.

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James M. Baker, David W. Beach, and Jonathan Bernard, eds. *Music Theory in Concept and Practice.* University of Rochester Press, 1997. 529 pp.

Reviewed by Marilyn Nonken

Music Theory In Concept and Practice is a seventieth-birthday tribute to Allen Forte, a theorist of unprecedented influence. Its editors claim that "in the modern rise of music theory . . . no single individual has been more central" (6). If this is an exaggeration, it is only a slight one. In addition to authoring landmark works (including *Tonal Theory in Concept and Practice* and *The Structure of Atonal Music*), Forte has also been an active and motivating presence in the field: as the editor who ushered the *Journal of Music Theory* through its transition from a fledgling publication to one of prominence; as a catalyst behind the foundation of the Society for Music Theory; and as a guiding force whose efforts resulted in the establishment of the doctoral program in music theory at Yale, the first of its kind at a major American institution. As depicted by Jonathan Bernard in the first of nineteen essays in this collection, Forte stands as heir to a tradition of musical inquiry that extends to the earliest decades of the century. With contributions by scholars on a wide variety of topics, this volume cannily evidences the transforming effect of one scholar's work on the discipline.

Music Theory in Concept and Practice is divided into two broad categories ("Historical and Theoretical Essays" and "Analytical Studies"), then further divided into four subsections. The essays are categorized according to their musicological orientation ("Historical Perspectives" and "Theoretical Perspectives"), and the analyses to the repertoire they treat ("The Tonal Repertoire" and "Twentieth-Century Music"). The reader is warned that these divisions are by no means airtight. Works treating twentieth-century music, for example, are commonly found in other sections. Robert Morris's analysis of Varèse's *Octandre* is located in "Theoretical Perspectives," while Arnold Whittall's study on Carter and Birtwistle is found in "Historical Perspectives." The analyses are rarely lacking historical and theoretical comment, nor are the predominantly historical essays lacking analytical components. To their advantage, many essays in this collection ignore these distinctions. The best of them attain the fusion of historical, theoretical, and analytical thought, providing the reader a richer understanding of history, a firmer grasp of some of the issues surrounding music composition and scholarship, and an enlightened conception of the notes on the page. Because several studies will thus be of interest to historical

musicologists as well as theorists, contributions will be summarized and critiqued individually.

One article that straddles theory and history with unique aplomb is William Rothstein's "The Form of Chopin's *Polonaise-Fantasy*." Rothstein focuses on the curious construction of Chopin's op. 61, a work that has recently seen an "explosion" of interest (337). Retracing the steps of previous analysts, Rothstein considers conflicting interpretations, which range from ternary and strophic readings to elaborations of sonata-allegro form. Gradually, he presents a detailed original analysis that, through the identification of grouping structures, harmonic motions, and motivic connections, suggests "the expansion of simple song forms . . . into a relatively vast and certainly imposing structure" (359). The analysis is convincing, and the study is distinguished by Rothstein's dynamic view of form. Never depicted as a preconceived construct into which the composer simply funnels his materials, form is portrayed as emerging gradually from the interaction between the musical materials (as assembled by the composer) and their relationships (as heard). Through perceptive analysis of the *Fantasy,* op. 49, and *Polonaise,* op. 53, Rothstein reveals how Chopin reworked ideas from earlier pieces in op. 61. "The Form of Chopin's *Polonaise-Fantasy*" provides a multidimensional view of the latter's form not simply as recreated through contemporary analytical techniques, but as having evolved in the course of Chopin's compositional development.

The success of "The Form of Chopin's *Polonaise-Fantasy*" stems not only from the strength of Rothstein's ideas but his gift for explanation. His style is typified by ready references and apt examples. Contemporary theories of semiotics and narrativity are invoked with the same ease that Schenker and Schachter are cited, and musical examples from Beethoven to the Beatles, summoned with an uncanny knack and utter lack of self-consciousness, always refine, rather than obscure, the larger points. Further, his illustrations offer a wealth of information in an accessible, readable manner. His durational reduction, for instance, delineates the quatrain form, identifies smaller phrase constructs, provides a harmonic and hypermetric analysis, and supports numerous points regarding enharmonic spellings, bass motion, and modal mixture. His Schenkerian-style reductions not only chart the progression of specific scale degrees but also incorporate roman numeral analysis and descriptions of phrase structure. Elsewhere in this collection, David Neumeyer reminds the reader that "it is usually easier to locate patterns of tonal relations than it is to prove that they are significant" (216). Through concise prose and elegantly constructed examples, Rothstein makes the significance of his findings remarkably clear.

Similarly providing a potent mix of historical and analytical insight is

James Baker's "Scriabin's Music: Structure as Prism for Mystical Philosophy." Baker takes as his point of departure the crisis of identity suffered by artists in fin-de-siècle Russia, and a large part of the article is devoted to the evolution of Scriabin's legendary, poetic persona. While he never entirely dispels the image of Scriabin as a delusional megalomaniac, Baker makes a solid case for him as a child of his time, vividly documenting the composer's interests in Schopenhauer, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche; the influences of the Russian Symbolist and Theosophical movements on the development of his personal philosophy; and the interaction of artists and intellectuals in the Silver Age. Musical analysis then demonstrates how Scriabin's mystical and philosophical convictions may have manifested themselves in the structural design of his works. For example, the tonal and whole-tone components of the *Poème fantasque,* op. 45, no. 2, are shown to correspond to the interpenetrating planes of existence discussed in Theosophy. Commenting on the *Prelude,* op. 59, no. 2, Baker notes that its structure has the geometric proportions of a crystal, which may have possessed special ramifications for Scriabin in its perfect reflection of Theosophical cosmic principles. Several works are described as moving through states of languor, longing, impetuous striving, dance, ecstasy, and transfiguration, states that mirror the spiritual progress of the soul "towards ecstatic union with the Divine Principal" (80). Taken out of context, this may sound sensational. Even in context, the reader may suffer the occasional cracked smile, unaccustomed to the impassioned exhortations of a bygone era. ("I am God!" announces Scriabin in his diary. "I am fire enveloping the universe/Reducing it to chaos") (61). What makes this essay unusually effective, however, is the author's intimate knowledge of his subject, which is conveyed with unswerving seriousness and lucidity.

In Robert Wason's "Signposts on Webern's Path to Atonality: The *Dehmel Lieder* (1906–08)," analysis is again offered in a compelling historical context. Posthumously published, these five songs date from a little-documented period of Webern's creative evolution, the transition to atonality, which directly preceded his landmark *Fünf Stücke,* op. 5. Emphasizing the volatility of the composer's compositional development, Wason seeks to show that the songs "move gradually along a continuum between 'tonality' and 'atonality'—not necessarily linearly nor without regression" (311). To this end, different analytical approaches are summoned to capture the wavering tonal and atonal dimensions of the *Lieder,* which are stylistically diverse, and vary in their dependence on tonal convention. In songs in which the tonal residue is thick, Wason suggests how referential sonorities function as tonic and dominant, evoking "keys" in otherwise atonal environments. In the analysis of songs in which the tonal pull is weaker, the consideration of pitch-class sets, motive, contour, and text-setting takes

precedence. "Signposts on Webern's Path to Atonality" enables us to see how Webern's increasing reliance on referential sonorities and motivic shapes led him to abandon traditional harmonic formulae. Wason also includes thoughtful speculation regarding the ordering of the songs and the reasons they were withheld from publication.

Like the *Dehmel Lieder,* Liszt's *Blume und Duft* also breaks with convention. In "Chasing the Scent: The Tonality of Liszt's *Blume und Duft,*" Robert Morgan outlines the contradictions presented by this song, which is locally triadic but resists standard tonal interpretation on a global level. Morgan takes issue with Forte's 1987 exploration of *Blume und Duft,* which focused on its octatonic elements and suggested that its pervasive dominant-seventh sonorities had "no functional role within a tonality, explicit or implied." In an attempt to provide an alternative to Forte's interpretation, Morgan offers tonal hearings that alternately identify a centricity around A♭, F, and D♭ major. It is fascinating to follow him through these various interpretations; however, Morgan is unable to present a tonal reading that shows how any tonality, explicit or implied, provides harmonic function within the work. In reference to his interpretations, he admits that "neither reading does justice to—nor is indeed fully consistent with—critical features of the composition," deeming them "valid, if only to a degree" (371). Is the assertion that *Blume und Duft* is "still (somehow) tonal" (376) really more compelling than Forte's depiction of the song as (somehow) octatonic? Morgan concludes by celebrating the song's tonal uncertainty, claiming that the harmonically ambiguous setting is a perfect reflection of the text. Few will argue with this unobjectionable point, although other authors in this collection treat the conflict inherent in many post-tonal works with greater sensitivity.

One of *Music Theory in Concept and Practice*'s strengths is its wealth of articles exploring the twentieth-century repertoire. Notable (and engagingly written) is Daniel Harrison's "Bitonality, Pentatonicism, and Diatonicism in a Work by Milhaud." Harrison's gamble—to use a piece "neither intended nor received as an important intellectual achievement in the twentieth century" (393) to exemplify sophisticated compositional procedures—succeeds. His analysis of Milhaud's *Second Chamber Symphony* and astute commentary illuminate how its bitonal environment is established and maintained, even when Milhaud encounters certain "problems" in composition. Ann McNamee's "Elision and Structural Levels in Peter Maxwell Davies's *Dark Angels*" is a more workman-like exploration of text-setting, motivic recurrence, and hierarchical structure, but a welcome study of a work this author was pleased to discover. Also gratifying is David Lewin's "Some Notes on *Pierrot Lunaire,*" which takes as its point of departure Forte's analysis of the same material. Lewin's elegant analysis details

intricacies of pitch, rhythm, instrumentation, and text, and posits the interrelationships between them. While Lewin's analysis considers only the work's first eleven measures, it does so with rewarding thoroughness.

Robert Morris's "K, Kh, and Beyond" presents an alternative to Lewin's transformational approach. Morris seeks to reassert the usefulness of the relatively obscure K/Kh methodology introduced by Forte in the mid-1960s. In the present climate, K and Kh relations (relations between the set-class complexes, characteristic of a work's harmonic environment and its partitions) are generally viewed as dated analytical tools. "No doubt they are associated with the music theory of the 1960's and 1970's," writes Morris, "which tended toward more global, totalizing accounts of music" (275). However, as Morris presents theoretic extensions of the K and Kh relations and suggests their analytic applications, a strong case is made for the relevance of these tools to the contemporary analysis of the post-tonal repertoire. Compilation and comparison of the set-class lists (SC-lists) for Varèse's *Octandre,* Bartok's "From the Island of Bali" (from *Mikrokosmos*), and Webern's Five Movements for String Quartet, op. 5, demonstrate how this methodology provides a way to analyze and generalize about the harmonic environments of different structures, pieces, and musical contexts. Admittedly, this article may be the least accessible in *Music Theory in Concept and Practice,* due to its use of symbolic language and specialized terminology. Before reading "K, Kh, and Beyond," the reader unfamiliar with theories regarding KI, K, and Kh relations may find it helpful to review writings on the subject, such as Forte's *The Structure of Atonal Music* (1973) or Morris's *Composition with Pitch-Classes* (1987).

In addition, two essays on Schoenberg are offered by Patricia Carpenter and Christopher Hasty. Hasty's "Form and Idea in Schoenberg's *Fantasy*" is the more provocative. In response to Schoenberg's aesthetic writings, with which he largely concurs, Hasty argues that form is "nothing apart from the emerging particularity of events and their particular emotive characters". (479). His analytical approach is offered to counter those that treat content, expression, and form independently, and his motivic analysis illustrates a hearing in which formal function is directly tied to expressive character. Perhaps the problems of description that often plague these kinds of investigations, which are fraught with terminological, methodological, and conceptual difficulties, cannot be avoided. Yet if Hasty fails to persuade, his essay is refreshing for its risky attempt to reveal something that seems intuitively correct: that perceptions of changing musical character contribute to our perception of form—that "character, however we might wish to describe it, is not separate from, not other than, its 'formal' . . . function" (477). Judgments of novelty, expressivity, and beauty will remain controversial, as will any author who evokes them in support of a

structural analysis. Readers are encouraged to follow Hasty into this challenging territory, if only to visit a realm we are often discouraged from entering.

In contrast, Carpenter's "Tonality: A Conflict of Forces" is an unusually uncritical presentation of Schoenberg's thought. At the outset, the author announces, "I shall not assume some 'real' tonality, but rather suspending the question of whether his concept of tonality is 'correct,' adequate to what tonality 'really' is, I shall emphasize its character as an individual thought" (98). While Schoenberg's ideas are of interest in the context of his work and its significance, one must admit that "tonality is conflict" is not a particularly novel thought, nor one that has been neglected in the theoretical literature of the twentieth century. Most of the ideas detailed in this essay—the concept of pitch space, for example, and issues of unity, balance, and coherence—have been and continue to be pursued by other musical thinkers. Schoenberg's influence is nowhere in dispute, nor are his ideas languishing. Consequently, the need for such an exposé is unclear. Carpenter struggles to convey how the composer agonized to formalize his ideas, as if it were possible, through extensive citation, to let the reader vicariously experience his search for inward harmony. Her efforts might seem more valiant were the materials she draws upon, such as *Style and Idea, Structural Functions of Harmony,* and *Harmonielehre,* not widely available.

Arnold Whittall's "Modernist Aesthetics, Modernist Music: Some Analytical Perspectives" offers more hearty fare. Whittall aggressively targets David Schiff, the biographer of Elliott Carter, among those who have suggested that an inherent unity or synthesis underlies the fragmentation characteristic of many twentieth-century aesthetics. Countering this stance, Whittall instead suggests that "modernist art at its most interesting and successful is . . . an expression of the special and unprecedented tension between the attempt to embody fragmentation and the impulse to transcend it" (158). To underscore this point, he offers analyses that examine the role and possible meaning of diverging elements in works of Carter and Birtwistle. Exploring Carter's *Enchanted Preludes,* for example, Whittall adeptly shows how the work may be seen as embodying not a progression from separation to synthesis but rather "a sequence . . . which presents the similarity/difference dialog from ever-changing angles, and with different emphases" (168). Focus on Birtwistle's work leads him to assert that this is not "the kind of linear music that requires globally functioning goal-directedness . . . in which 'contradictions and ambiguities' are subsumed into a higher unity" (170). What is genuinely refreshing about his argument is that it does more than simply identify conflict as characteristic of contemporary composition. He does not simply raise differences as irrec-

oncilable but convincingly shows how fragmentation functions as a vital part of the aesthetic. Considering this attractive alternative to synthesis-based approaches, the reader may similarly conclude that unity is more a matter of balance than synthesis in these modern works.

Pieter van den Toorn also explores the presence of conflict in "Neo-Classicism and Its Definitions," an analytical and philosophical essay that revolves around Stravinsky's *Symphony in Three Movements.* Neo-classical works such as the *Symphony,* stylistic hybrids exhibiting elements of tonal and atonal import, offer a unique challenge to theorists. With an eye toward the analysis of this repertoire, van den Toorn poses sharply drawn questions regarding extant analytical approaches and their limitations. How accurate or satisfying are tonal readings of the *Symphony,* such as Salzer's, and are the tonal elements they privilege structurally "legitimate"? Conversely, what are the merits of a set-theoretical analysis, which may not acknowledge the tonal implications of certain features? How successfully can motivic analysis reveal what is unique to one composer's style—can it distinguish Stravinsky's, for example, from Schoenberg's? Finally, what is the value of an analytical approach specific enough to embrace the substantial conflicts posed by the *Symphony*? These questions pertain to all analytical inquiries, not only those involving the neo-classical repertoire. When van den Toorn's analysis brings him to describe Stravinsky's symphony as one in which "a high degree of conflict coexists with one of transcendence" (153), he echoes Whittall in both wording and sentiment; indeed, these two essays are elegant complements. While Whittall offers a vision of how fragmentation may function within an aesthetic, van den Toorn suggests its important role in analysis.

An article uneasily paired with van den Toorn's is Joseph Straus's "Voice Leading in Atonal Music." Featuring analyses drawn from Stravinsky's *The Rake's Progress* and *Concerto for Piano and Wind Instruments,* this essay supplements the author's already significant contribution to the discourse on atonal prolongation. Musical excerpts from Schoenberg, Webern, Scriabin, Roslavetz, and Crawford are also summoned to elaborate on his previously introduced voice-leading model. Straus posits linear connections between musical objects, then suggests how they may be interpreted as transpositionally and inversionally related. He acknowledges his debt to Forte and Lewin, and his model is aptly described as "set theory with a transformational attitude" (244). Schenker is the third primary influence behind his voice-leading model, which leads to multi-level representations of structure.

In many ways, Straus's analyses seem incomplete. He rarely indicates, for example, why one voice-leading interpretation might be preferable to another, in terms of its relation to perceived structure or compositional

design. He describes his analyses as hierarchical in only a "casual" sense, yet this deserves more comment than it receives. Furthermore, his analyses routinely ignore notes that do not coincide with the transformational networks being traced; while Straus admits this, he maintains that those notes belong to other transformational networks, all of which collectively contribute to the fabric of the composition as a whole. "We must content ourselves with describing the multiple voice leadings (plural)," he asserts, "knowing that for each transformational path we traverse, there will be others that run alongside or intersect it, each with its own points of interest" (259). Despite his grand rhetoric ("the time has come to embrace the multiplicity and diversity of atonal music, to accept the tensions and discontinuities . . .") (273), the reader is being asked to accept an essentially undesirable partiality as a unique strength of transformational analysis. Ultimately, Straus cannot explain away the sense of arbitrariness, one that is nowhere in evidence in Lewin's transformational analysis of *Pierrot.* This reader recalls van den Toorn's warning to those who "adopt relations of an increasingly abstract nature precisely to override conflict," noting that "given a sufficient degree of abstraction, all parts can be made to relate" (133).

Straus's article is only one of many contemporary extensions of Schenkerian theory offered by *Music Theory in Concept and Practice.* Another is David Neumeyer's provocative "Synthesis and Association, Structure and Design in Multi-Movement Compositions," which examines voice-leading and harmonic associations between movements and debates their relevance to structural analysis. Building on Schenker's work and responding to contributions by Schachter, McCreless, Lewis, and Kaminsky, Neumeyer delves into the issues surrounding the nature of musical autonomy. As he considers the conditions under which parallels between movements may be interpreted as bearers of form, it becomes clear that these knotty issues are not exclusively relevant to Schenkerian studies. How should analysis reflect the differences among a Baroque dance suite, the "Waldstein" sonata, *Dichterliebe,* and *Rosenkavalier?* In answer to this question, Neumeyer establishes a continuum recognizing differing degrees of structural autonomy and presents a model that offers a plausible framework for the analysis of song cycles, symphonies, film music, and opera. His model does not address stylistic and aesthetic concerns other than those he mysteriously refers to as "the obvious ones of sensitivity to historical context and of adherence to what may be called musical common sense" (207). However, his essay skillfully outlines some of the important issues at play.

David Beach and John Rothgeb present more straightforward Schenkerian studies. Beach's "The Submediant as Third Divider: Its Representation

at Different Structural Levels" provides an in-depth look at the common progression, I–vi–IV–V–I, offering several examples in which the role of the submediant may be interpreted as potentially ambiguous. This essay stands as a striking antithesis to Harrison's "Bitonality, Pentatonicism, and Diatonicism in a Work by Milhaud." While Harrison exploits an arguably second-rate symphony to illustrate surprisingly sophisticated compositional practices, Beach uses renowned works of Haydn, Schubert, Beethoven, and Bach to illustrate a progression that generally "is perfectly straightforward and thus requires no special comment" (309). Whether one is convinced by Beach's argument will depend largely on one's fascination with the submediant. For entirely different reasons, this reader grew impatient with Rothgeb's "Salient Features," which examines the relation between obviousness and import in tonal contexts. Conflicts between motivic, harmonic, and rhythmic/metric materials are of uncontested interest, but Rothgeb's larger argument suffers from poor articulation. Most problematically, "salience" is never satisfactorily defined, although it is asserted that the criteria for musical salience "are far from obvious and are scarcely susceptible to generalization . . . [and] have far less to do with immediate noticeability than is commonly supposed" (181). In the analysis of a Bach prelude, for example, the association between two figures is "more than merely salient: it literally cannot be missed" (184). Later, in the context of Schubert, Rothgeb proposes that "a feature salient by conventional standards is . . . actually subordinate to a more subtle association . . . that should be heard in spite of its apparently inferior degree of salience" (186). He concludes that "'salient' features recede in significance by comparison to tonal shapes that are less obvious but, once perceived, more powerful. These less obvious shapes, indeed, are the salient features of high musical art" (196). The overreliance on a weakly defined concept regrettably clouds the fine points at stake in these examples.

Moving from "so-called art music" (385) to the popular domain is Stephen Gilbert's "Reflections on a Few Good Tunes: Linear Progression and Intervallic Patterns in Popular Song and Jazz." Gilbert offers an approach to the analysis of popular song informed by Schenkerian theory. His thesis, that a tune's melodic and intervallic structure contributes to its suitability for jazz improvisation, is tenable and makes good sense, and there is little reason to doubt that the author is well-versed in jazz lore and adept at "cross-over" analysis. Yet he seems uneasy writing for an audience he assumes to be musically sophisticated but jazz-illiterate. Readers may feel patronized by a discussion of how jazz players "learn" music (without a score!) and what improvisation entails; we are cautioned to "keep in mind . . . that performance practice plays a much larger role in popular song . . . even a straightforward interpretation of a standard takes liberties

unheard of in the world of classical music" (385). In an attempt to instantly familiarize the reader with the subject matter, Gilbert offers excessive historical details. Unfortunately, many of these details pertain only tangentially to the analysis. More helpful to the strong analyses of the songs would have been notated versions of the tunes, which include "Stardust," "How High the Moon," and "Stella by Starlight."

Also from a notably different perspective is Elizabeth West Marvin's "Cognitive Strategies for Recognizing Transposed Melodies," the sole entry in the collection that addresses the important research being done in cognitive music psychology. Marvin focuses on empirical studies that examine how listeners remember melodies, many of which were done in the 1970s by Diana Deutsch and W. Jay Dowling. Appearing more often in psychological publications than music theory journals, the studies suggest how pitch-class, intervallic content, and harmonic context influence the mental representations developed by listeners in response to musical stimuli. Providing a reworking and re-evaluation of Dowling's experiments from the 1970s, Marvin's own experimental work is carefully described in terms of its design, results, and implications. Her findings indicate that listeners tend to be more accurate in recognizing tonal melodies in various transformations than their atonal counterparts; that they use different cognitive strategies depending on the nature of the musical stimulus and according to their prior musical experience; and that they are capable of sensitively discriminating between similar melodies in tonal and atonal contexts. As Marvin contends, these findings have interesting implications for music pedagogy. To a reader versed in the contemporary music psychological literature, however, these findings are not controversial, but have already been strongly supported by the thinkers mentioned above and by Carol Krumhansl (whose substantial contributions are acknowledged in a single footnote). It is unfortunate that the author's pragmatic but narrow focus leads her to omit significant work done on the cognition of contemporary music by Krumhansl, Irène Deliège, Fred Lerdahl, and Stephen McAdams, since knowledge of this colorful discourse would only enhance the reader's appreciation of Marvin's own contribution.

Music Theory in Concept and Practice's stated intention is to reflect the preoccupations of the field today. In this task, it succeeds only in part. The editors have chosen not to focus on the following influences, acknowledged in the introduction: computer science, linguistics, mathematics, literary theory, gender studies, philosophy, aesthetics, and psychology. As a result, set-theoretical and Schenkerian studies dominate the bulk of the text. In explaining their decision, the editors assert that such interdisciplinary work is "not at the heart of the enterprise." They identify three general areas of study as central to music theory, to which their authors

are largely confined: historical research, the theory and analysis of common practice music, and the theory and analysis of the post-tonal repertoire. Many would argue that the areas of interdisciplinary exchange are not as peripheral as the editors maintain. Perhaps it is in the spirit of a fitting tribute that Baker, Beach, and Bernard have chosen not to venture far beyond Forte's shadow. Yet the resultant volume is not one that "well represents the considerable diversity of philosophies and methodologies within the three areas of inquiry," as claimed on page 2. Instead, it is one imbued with an oddly retrospective feel.

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Reviewed by Kai Fikentscher

In 1904 Erich M. von Hornbostel and Otto Abraham published an article entitled "On the Significance of the Phonograph for Comparative Musicology" in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie,* thereby formally establishing the connection between technologies of sound recording and reproduction, and their field of academic inquiry, then known as comparative musicology. Since then, both domains have developed significantly. In the United States comparative musicology became ethnomusicology in the 1950s, while in the realm of musical technologies, the primary function of the phonograph shifted from recording to playback and, more recently, to performance. A second important technological shift for musicians and musicologists alike was the spread of audiomagnetic tape recorders in the 1950s and 1960s, a development that has more recently led to the mass marketing of technologies such as digital audio tape (DAT) and recordable compact disc (CD-R).

In many corners of the world at the end of the twentieth century, digital audio technologies have become the media of choice for purposes of composing, recording, archiving, analyzing, and teaching music. Histories of audio technologies and studies of the relationships between musical practice and technologies (especially those associated with post-World War II developments in popular music) are, however, small in number, and most of them have not kept up with the impact and significance of this technological evolution. In sum, at a time when digital audio technology has extensively altered the ways in which both the musical layman and specialist interact with music on a daily basis, systematic and comprehensive research into audio technologies has at best been marginal to both musicological and ethnomusicological studies.[1] This lamentable situation is not, however, the only reason why the publication of Paul Théberge's *Any Sound You Can Imagine* is a welcome and timely affair: combining diachronic and synchronic approaches, this book offers more than just a comprehensive look at the history of musical technologies, beginning with the first inventions about a century ago; more importantly, the book traces a parallel history of shifting meanings attached to musical technologies and their uses.

The author describes the book, a reworking of his Ph.D. dissertation, as "[a study of] the role of recent digital technologies in the production of

popular music" (5). As such, he frames the discussion in the context of cultural studies theory, taking as a point of departure the concepts and terminology of sociologist Raymond Williams (1982). As a formal device, Théberge adopts a tripartite scheme of presentation from an essay by Dick Hebdige (1981), in which the topic under scrutiny, the motor scooter, is treated in the context of a "cultural biography" that traces its constantly shifting significance along a series of three distinct historical "moments" (labeled "design/production," "mediation," and "consumption"). Correspondingly, *Any Sound You Can Imagine* comprises three separate sections which are entitled "Design/Production: The Musical Instrument Industry" (part 1); "Mediation: Musicians' Magazines, Networks, and User Groups" (part 2); and "Consumption/Use: Technology and Musical Practice" (part 3). "Each section," Théberge explains, "begins with a chapter that is primarily historical or theoretical in nature and sets up some of the important background issues to be addressed in subsequent material" (11). As a result, each of these sections can be treated as an autonomous, self-contained unit. There is no need to read this book cover-to-cover or to follow the numerical order of its subdivisions. By combining Hebdige's analytical framework with a historically informed theory, Théberge achieves a reasonable and readable balance between the synchronic and diachronic modes of presentation.

Part 1 of *Any Sound You Can Imagine* analyzes the emergence of the synthesizer industry in the larger context of the history and organization of the musical instrument industry in North America since the nineteenth century. Above all, Théberge focuses on keyboard instruments, thereby offering an insightful chronology that ranges from the early days of piano and player piano manufacturing to the later production of the Hammond organ, and from the first generation of performance-oriented analog synthesizers to the contemporary scenario. This prepares the reader for the subsequent in-depth look at digital synthesis, the sound- and "songware"-selling cottage industry (which serves a small and volatile market), and the impact of an industry-wide communications protocol named MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface).

Working historically allows Théberge first to introduce the reader to the market-specific forces that have driven and continue to drive this industry, then to critically revisit and question a number of concepts that often remain unchallenged in the general discourse of musical industries and of music as practice. For example, chapter 3 deals with the complex process of the invention and innovation of electronic musical instruments, and pairs it with an account of the economically driven strategies for survival of certain technology companies (primarily computer and consumer audio industries), which led to "transectorial" innovation (e.g., the

incorporation of microprocessors into early polyphonic keyboards and sequencers), migration (e.g., the story of the Ensoniq Corporation, whose founders were ex-Commodore International employees), and marketing (e.g., the product strategy Ensoniq used to successfully market its Mirage sampler). In this fascinating and instructive discussion the author repeatedly underscores the relevance of the points of intersection, feedback, and exchange between producers and consumers of musical technologies.

Théberge elaborates the latter point in chapter 4, in a discussion of the so-called "democratizing" effect of musical technology in the 1980s, when sound synthesis went wholly digital after several Japanese and U.S. manufacturers agreed to develop a shared communications protocol for their product lines: MIDI. He defines the democratization of synthesizer technology as "a phenomenon based on at least three separate, though interrelated, trends in the electronic musical instrument industry" (89). First of all, microprocessor technology became faster and cheaper, which had a trickle-down effect on synthesizer manufacturers. Secondly (and as a result of this trend), the synthesizer became not only a sound-producing, but also a sound-reproducing instrument that provided the basis for the emergence of a new "subindustry." As the instruments became more and more complex to program, ready-made sounds or patches became increasingly available through what Théberge calls "the entrepreneurial spirit of third-party [sound] developers," who developed a small cottage industry to meet the needs of a new market that viewed musicians as consumers (89). Finally, the establishment of MIDI as an industry standard helped to stabilize the market overall, and strengthened consumer confidence to the extent that any attempt to replace MIDI with more recent and more efficient interfacing systems has met with strong industry resistance. Here, Théberge offers a provocative analysis of the political, economic, and ideological links between music and "democratic" values, a theme he returns to in chapter 6.

In part 2 the ideas of exchange mechanisms between agents of musical production and consumption are elaborated in the context of technologies of communication-about-music. Théberge devotes one chapter each to the discussion of music periodicals and on-line communication networks/user groups.

> The increasing emphasis on technology in music production has spawned new forms of association and communication that bear as much resemblance to groups such as the early ham operators and computer 'hackers' as to any form of affiliation previously connected with music-making. What is particularly striking in all these examples is the predominantly male, hobbyist orientation of these activities;

> the fascination with technology itself; and, perhaps most important, the idealistic, democratic, and utopian rhetorics that are often mobilized in support of such activities (152).

While Théberge is somewhat speculative about the future effects of rapid technological development in the current marketplace, he is not remiss to point out the tensions among "technical excellence," marketability, innovation, consumption, and capital flow.

The final four chapters—contained in part 3 (the strongest portion of the book)—address the implications of the performance and use of the technologies discussed earlier. This section in particular makes for stimulating reading by itself; in fact, it might be a good idea for readers with a stronger musical than socioeconomic orientation to begin the book here.

In chapter 7 ("Musical Knowledge in Action") three modes of interacting with music—practice/performance, notation, and theory—are discussed as conceptually distinct. Théberge reiterates a point he has made earlier: musical instruments are not forever conceptually defined after the stages of design, manufacture, and marketing are completed. "[R]ather, they are 'made-over' by musicians in the process of making music" (160). In a sufficiently thorough examination of musical practice and of the role of technology in it, Théberge draws primarily on ethnomusicological theory, especially the work of John Blacking (1977) and Alan Merriam (1964).[2]

In chapter 8, after an assessment of the role of notation in Western musical practice, the author returns to the concept of musical sound. In doing so, he not only refers to Merriam's tripartite analytical model of concept-behavior-sound (Merriam 1964) but also to his own groundbreaking essay on the topic (Théberge 1989). Nine years after the latter's publication its conclusion is even more noteworthy than it was, since Théberge's voice is still one of only a few that have proclaimed sound/timbre as one of the most central, yet underexamined aspects in twentieth-century music and musicological inquiry. Théberge reiterates the special relevance of the concept of sound in the age of digital technology, and defines an aesthetics of sound as one that no longer distinguishes between musical production and consumption, but instead "demands that all sounds . . . be made available for musical purposes" (213). At this point, Théberge eloquently and persuasively articulates the quite radical notion contained in the book's title: every imaginable sound is available (and to a larger number of people than ever before) for the purposes of musical production and consumption.

Chapter 9, entitled "'Live' and Recorded: MIDI Sequencing, the Home Studio, and Copyright," examines recent modes of rationalization in contemporary music-making, particularly with regard to the spread of MIDI

and the growth of the home recording industry, and discusses the implications for copyright. The expansion of multitrack recording technology from an exclusively professional arena into a vast amateur/semi-professional playground after the advent of inexpensive 4-track cassette recorders and MIDI-compatible computer software is discussed in the context of the "democratization" process, as presented earlier. Théberge reveals how current musical discourses have at times been rendered glaringly inadequate by technology-induced changes in music-making, singling out copyright laws and the "live" concept (which has been expanded so as to be applicable to the world of MIDI sequencing in addition to that of stage performance) as examples. He concludes that a century of continuous change in technologies of sound production and their use by consumers and musicians call for an overdue re-evaluation of music as concept, form, and performance practice. In the final chapter, he begins to outline a model for that purpose, again drawing on ethnomusicological literature (e.g., Keil 1984) and on comments and works by musicians and performers (e.g., David Bowie, Brian Eno, Peter Gabriel, Glenn Gould, and Todd Rundgren) whose careers exemplify these processes.

To add Théberge's book to the already impressive catalogue of its *Music/Culture* publication series was a deft decision by Wesleyan University Press, since the musical academy now has the outline of a platform on which to engage in a constructive debate on the roles of musical technologies: as *objects of* and, to a somewhat lesser degree, as *tools for* musicological research (as well as for everyday musical pedagogy involving teachers and students, most of whom are either making music and/or consuming one sort of musical technology or another on a regular basis). The stimulating insights provided by *Any Sound You Can Imagine* more than make up for the regrettably small number of illustrations (eleven in all). Notwithstanding this minor quibble, *Any Sound You Can Imagine* should be part of the library of anyone who is concerned with the state of music and music-making at the end of this century.

Notes

1. One slightly earlier work is Chanan (1995).

2. Although not without reservations, Théberge believes that "Merriam's formulation of music-making as an integrated process has distinct advantages over the way in which music is dealt with in traditional music theory and in musicology" (163). From Blacking he borrows the distinction between "technology as a 'means' of production versus technology as 'mode' of production" (158).

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Reviewed by Robert Rawlins

The past 50 years have witnessed the publication of a large and growing body of jazz literature. Numerous books and articles have appeared in the areas of jazz biography, discography, history, and sociology. Generations of famous jazz writers have come and gone, some having achieved greater recognition than many jazz musicians themselves. Certainly, anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of jazz is familiar with names such as Leonard Feather, Ira Gitler, Gunther Schuller, and Nat Shapiro. Yet, in this vast collection of literature, the realm of jazz theory and analysis has, until recent years, been under-represented. Comparatively little had been written that directly addressed the concrete musical elements and theoretical underpinnings of the music. It was as if the mysteries of improvisation were deemed impenetrable, or perhaps too sacred to be reduced to formulae and convention. In recent years this situation has changed, as an increasing number of scholars have begun to examine the improvisations of jazz masters at close range in order to discern their methods and define in concrete terms the parameters that differentiate the various jazz styles.

Thomas Owens's *Bebop: The Music and the Players* attempts to explicate the improvisatory style that many feel lies at the very core of the jazz tradition. Observing that bebop is alive and well in the 1990s, having flourished in each of the past five decades, he deems it "the *lingua franca* of jazz, serving as the principal musical language of thousands of jazz musicians" (4). As Owens observes, the bebop style, far from a mannered expression of a particular period, is an ongoing force in the jazz world, influencing the continuing evolution of the music, as well as the way many present-day musicians reinterpret pre-bebop idioms. In short, it is the parent language of jazz, a mother tongue whose grammar is familiar to jazz musicians around the world, even when their chosen modes of expression outwardly suggest other jazz styles.

Historically, the term "bebop" generally refers to the jazz style that thrived in New York City during the late 1940s and early 1950s. The style grew out of the experiments of a small group of musicians led by Charlie Parker and Dizzy Gillespie and provided the springboard for several other styles that quickly evolved from it, such as cool jazz, Afro-Cuban jazz, and hard bop. Understood in this light, the style was short-lived, holding preeminence in the jazz world for less than a decade. But Owens's concept of bebop, which is in accord with how present-day musicians generally use

the term, implies something more than a historical style period, for bebop also refers to a general approach to the basic materials of jazz that has not been substantially altered since Charlie Parker. The word "bebop" has become synonymous with the jazz musician's concept of playing "straight-ahead."

For example, Owens has no qualms about including a substantial discussion of Stan Getz in a book that purportedly concerns bebop. Yet at the time of Getz's emergence as a young jazz star, he was considered a prominent figure in the cool jazz movement, which was seen as a reaction to bebop. From the vantage point of the 1990s, it is now clear that the harmonic language of classic recordings such as Getz's Storyville sessions of 1951 differs little from the work of Parker and Gillespie, no matter how much superficial characteristics may suggest otherwise. When a jazz musician of today improvises in a similar fashion, the result is called bebop, regardless of the prevailing stylistic setting.

Two elements that have characterized bebop since its inception are the direct quotation of recognizable material and strict dependence of the improvised line on the underlying harmony.[1] The inclusion of highly recognizable excerpts from various sources was very much a part of Charlie Parker's improvisational style. Once his classic recordings became well known among jazz fans, his own tunes and solos in turn became prime material for quotation by himself and others. Likewise, linear constructions that strongly imply specific harmonies characterized much of Charlie Parker's work. His technique of specifying substitute harmonies and "turnarounds" via the improvised line was revolutionary indeed. Documented accounts reveal that piano and bass players were accustomed to listening intently to Parker's improvisations in order to discern the harmonies suggested by his lines. Surprisingly, however, Parker and other bebop improvisers seldom stated chords in a direct fashion. "Running the changes," does not imply direct arpeggiation of the chords. The essence of what Parker had discovered was a means of conveying clear harmonic implications via a rapidly moving, well-contoured melodic line. It was inevitable that others who adopted this approach would create improvisations that bore a superficial resemblance to Parker's. Yet those who mastered and applied this method after Parker should be viewed as adhering to the tenets of a valid style system, not merely imitating Parker.

In the first three chapters of the book, Owens attempts to explicate the "rhythmic, melodic, harmonic, textural, and timbral elements" (viii) that make up the bebop vocabulary. Beginning with the historical foundations of the style in chapter 1, he moves on to the early classics in chapter 2, and devotes the entirety of chapter 3 to "The Parker Style," emphasizing the alto saxophonist's position as the central role model of bebop. Chapters 3

through 9 discuss performers—grouped according to instruments—while chapter 10 discusses the great ensembles of bebop history. Finally, chapter 11 discusses young musicians of promise who are likely to become bebop's leading figures in the next century.

Perhaps there is good reason why many jazz commentators have scrupulously avoided concrete descriptions of jazz styles. While there is general agreement on the chronological arrangement of the various style periods, and even on which performers belong to which period, there is no similar consensus concerning the musical parameters that define and characterize the various styles. Thus Owens makes several statements in the early chapters of his book that are bound to raise eyebrows and pose more questions than are answered. He begins with a description of the swing style of the 1930s and 1940s as a take-off point for bebop. This seems a logical approach, but Owens goes on to contrast the swing style of the big bands with the combo style of early bebop. Owens says of swing: "often the arrangements left only short and discontinuous passages for solo improvisations" (though he does cite the Basie band as an exception), while bebop emphasized improvisation at the expense of the arrangements, which were "simpler than the often intricate arrangements of swing bands" (4). One might ask why bebop should not be seen as derivative of the small-band swing style of the 1930s instead of the big-band style. It should be noted that many of the Charlie Parker/Dizzy Gillespie quintet's early bebop arrangements, which are represented by some of the first recordings of the bebop style, were ingeniously conceived and executed, extending well beyond the basic tune-solos-tune scheme that prevailed in so many earlier (and later) small-band recordings. Owens himself comments on the complexity of various early bebop classics, such as *Koko* and *Salt Peanuts.* One might mention that the post-swing (and bebop-influenced) big bands, such as the Woody Herman and Stan Kenton organizations, also emphasized arrangements over solo work, leading to the conclusion that highly-structured arrangements are a characteristic of large-ensemble jazz of any type, not only of swing. In sum, it would be erroneous to assert that bebop musicians employed simpler arrangements than their swing predecessors for aesthetic reasons. Rather, early bebop arrangements displayed a level of structure and intricacy that met or exceeded expectations for a small-group format.

Owens considers Charlie Parker's musical vocabulary the "central point of reference" for his study of bebop. Few would take exception to this approach. Parker's method of phrasing, his conception of harmony, and his repertory of melodic devices and conventions are more closely associated with the bebop style than those of any other musician. In an effort to better understand Parker's improvisational procedures, Owens identifies

and categorizes several of Parker's "favorite figures," which formulate part of his "personal repertory of melodic formulas" (30). These figures contain as few as three to as many as a dozen or more notes and are meticulously grouped into categories based on similarities. The families of patterns do indeed appear to capture the smallest building blocks of Parker's linear constructions, but beyond this, it is not clear what conclusions are to be drawn. While Owens admits that pointing out certain of these figures is "rather like pointing out the frequent use of some common prepositions in literary works," he nevertheless believes they are "important components of the language" (32). Owens is able to trace the origins of some of the figures back to the swing era or to specific jazz or popular compositions. Addressing the issue of why a jazz musician should rely on prepared material, Owens explains that "no one can create fluent, coherent melodies in real time without having a well-rehearsed bag of melodic tricks ready" (30). This may be true, but it does not get at the real reason for the apparent repetitions in Parker's music. The melodic shapes preferred by Parker were largely driven by harmonic requirements, which severely limited his choice of materials. An essential characteristic of the bebop style is that the linear component—the improvisation—drives the harmonic element.

For example, in discussing one of Parker's simpler formulas, three notes descending chromatically, Owens mentions that the figure is part of the "bebop dominant scale" as well as the "bebop major scale" (32), but fails to suggest any reason why Parker gravitated toward this device, other than to imply that he liked its characteristic sound. The bebop dominant scale is a descending Mixolydian mode with a half-step inserted between the root and the seventh. The bebop major scale is a descending major scale with a half step inserted between the sixth and fifth.[2] In each instance the inserted chromatic tone serves a specific purpose. When constructing a descending linear passage on a dominant seventh chord it is necessary that the improviser insert the extra note in order to throw the metrical stress on the seventh, fifth, and third of the chord. To simply play a descending Mixolydian mode on a dominant chord stresses all the wrong notes ($\hat{6}$, $\hat{4}$, and $\hat{2}$). Likewise, inserting a $\flat\hat{6}$ into a descending major scale stresses the sixth, fifth, and third. If the line is to imply the harmony (not just conform to it) these changes are necessary. Certainly there are other ways to imply the same chords with descending lines, but these straightforward approaches were discovered by Parker early on, and he continued to use them because they implied the harmony in a simple and direct way.

A statistical compilation of musical figures with comments on frequency of occurrence, origins, and placement offers a tantalizing presentation of the building blocks of Parker's music but does not go far enough in

explaining Parker's improvisational choices. A discussion of bebop harmony, the constraints it placed on Parker's choices, and the harmonic implications suggested by Parker's typical phrases would have been helpful. Perhaps a smaller number of figures presented in actual context would have facilitated such a discussion.

A nagging issue throughout the book is Owens's frequent reference to players who "copied Parker's style." Owens is not just talking about second-rate artists who failed to fully master the bebop idiom. A statement such as "the recorded evidence suggests that [Sonny] Stitt copied Parker" (46) is bound to invite controversy. Disregarding the issue, for the moment, of which performer captured the style first, there is no justification for viewing stylistic conformity as "copying." It is true that Stitt's 1946 recordings "contained very little that Parker had not already played" (46), but a myopic view of musical fragments is bound to lead to such a conclusion. In 1946, the nascent bebop style was still in its earliest stage of development, with a mere handful of participants. The repertory of bebop conventions and norms was extremely small at this time. Parker and Stitt were two of the first saxophone players to master a style system that was still confined to a limited supply of gestures. It was inevitable that they should sound alike.

At times Owens seems to share the view that the act of creative improvisation resides in assembling musical figures, not inventing them. At other times he suggests that the repetition of common devices is "copying" and therefore contrary to the intentions of improvisation:

> In his earliest recordings Stitt did not copy any of Parker's solos, or even any complete phrases from Parker's solos. Instead, he internalized the components of Parker's vocabulary and used them spontaneously to meet the improvising challenges of each piece. But in his 1949 recording of *Hot House,* Stitt quotes verbatim from Parker's famous recording of 1945. And his 1964 recording of *Koko* on the album *Stitt Plays Bird* shows clearly that he had studied his role model's work—a fact that is hardly surprising, in view of the album's premise (47).

That Stitt studied Parker's work diligently is a certainty. Although it happens, it is highly unusual for musicians to ignore the work of predecessors and contemporaries working within the same style system. Furthermore, it is not surprising that Stitt should quote verbatim from Parker's work. He (and every bebop musician) quoted verbatim from many sources. Bebop thrives on a common language of shared conventions and common devices. A good deal of the material of bebop is referential in nature,

alluding to past recordings, popular songs, classical compositions, and other sources. As specific devices and phrases were repeated through the years, their tendency to be recognized—and therefore their expressive potential—increased. Phrases such as the opening line of Parker's *Cool Blues,* the beginning of Grainger's *Country Gardens,* and "Evening Star" from *Tannhäuser* became, apparently for arbitrary reasons, staples of the bebop vocabulary. Improvisers resorted to them on countless occasions, not out of desperation or lack of fresh ideas, but for their referential value. Of course Stitt's solos are interlarded with direct quotations from Charlie Parker's solos, for Parker's solos established the core of the common language. Much of the richness of bebop lies in the quotation of recognizable material. If Stitt had chosen to omit the Parker quotations from his solos, an important element of the expressive content would have been removed.

It is disconcerting that in a book that champions bebop as the *lingua franca* of the jazz world, the author should invite rather than ward off the tiresome charge that the style is laden with cliché and hackneyed formulae. The bebop musician relies heavily on the listener's expectation system. He knows through experience what the listener has heard, what the listener will expect, and what the listener will recognize. This knowledge on the part of the improviser is made more acute through the environment in which most jazz is performed. Jazz often takes place in small clubs where the audience is physically close to the performer and not at all reticent in its reactions to the music. A performer who quotes a conspicuous passage from a recorded jazz classic expects it to be identified. If Stitt quotes a complete phrase from a Parker solo in one of his own improvisations, it must be viewed as a deliberate and overt reference to a well-known work, not a furtive attempt to borrow without attribution.

The large central portion of Owens's book consists of discussions of bebop musicians grouped by instrument, and throughout these discussions it is apparent that he is highly suspicious of "recycled material" in jazz. Nowhere is this more obvious than in his discussion of John Coltrane. Borrowing a phrase from Barry Kernfeld, Owens believes that Coltrane's late 1950s work, which some musicians believe to be the height of his achievement, followed a "mechanical formulaic" approach to improvisation (95). He refers to, among other things, Coltrane's incessant use of the $\hat{1}$–$\hat{2}$–$\hat{3}$–$\hat{5}$ scale pattern in his improvisations. Unfortunately, Owens does not attempt to explain why this figure (which is surely too brief to be called a cliché) was so integral to Coltrane's work. The figure is nothing more than the beginning of a major scale with the fourth omitted. Coltrane was capitalizing on the fact that this figure, when begun on the root of a major chord, places the first and third of the chord on the downbeat,

while omitting the active fourth degree from the line. From a harmonic point of view, a four-note pattern that proceeds $\hat{1}$–$\hat{2}$–$\hat{3}$–$\hat{4}$ has its forward momentum checked by the tendency for the fourth to reverse direction and return to the third. The $\hat{1}$–$\hat{2}$–$\hat{3}$–$\hat{5}$ pattern avoids this tendency, leaving open more possibilities for continuation. In 1959, Coltrane recorded *Giant Steps* and *Countdown,* two numbers that exploited this figure extensively, demonstrating new possibilities in spelling rapidly moving harmonies via the improvised line. (Owens refers to these solos as "masterfully-presented, well-planned etudes" [98], an appellation taken from Ekkehard Jost's *Free Jazz.*) Since that time, this pattern has become one of the central approaches to ascending bebop linear constructions, as well as a corollary to the descending bebop scale.

Owens's discussion of early Coltrane seems to proceed from the assumption that the latter's early style was merely a precursor to more fully-developed processes that would not blossom until the early 1960s. This may be true. But Coltrane's later style could hardly be called bebop. So why does Owens hail Coltrane's abandonment of bebop as a breakthrough in a book that claims bebop as its theme?

> The breakthrough piece of this type [i.e., pieces that do not use constantly changing chords] for Coltrane was the famous So What from the monumentally important Miles Davis Sextet album, *Kind of Blue.* . . . Here for the first time formulaic improvisation takes a back seat, replaced almost entirely by discrete motives spun out over segments of this piece's structure (D Dorian for 16 measures, E♭ Dorian for 8, D Dorian for 8) (96).

Unquestionably, *Kind of Blue* stands as a hallmark in the history of jazz. The importance of this album cannot be overstated, since it opened the way for an entirely new approach to jazz improvisation, *and one that clearly departed from the bebop style.* It would be futile to argue that a tune that employs modal harmonies for eight to sixteen measures at a stretch is somehow an extension of bebop, no matter how steeped in the bebop tradition the performers were. This recording clearly looks toward the future. A few years later, Coltrane "became a post-bebop player, as he grew increasingly interested and involved in the harmonic freedom, flexible rhythms, and intense collective improvisation used by Cecil Taylor, Ornette Coleman, Archie Shepp, Eric Dolphy, Pharoah Sanders, and others" (99). Yet Coltrane's bebop period, which by Owens's own admission "added significantly to the possibilities open to bebop soloists" (88), contains a monumental contribution to the recorded jazz literature. From this vantage point, it is puzzling that Owens denigrates Coltrane's early approach

to improvisation as "mechanical formulaic" and applauds his ultimate rejection of bebop.

Owens, at times, seems reluctant to accept bebop on its own terms. His discussion of Stitt, one of the most fluent of saxophone players after Parker who remained rooted in the bebop tradition, clearly implies that his work is derivative of, and therefore inferior to, Parker's. Bud Powell, colleague of Parker and father of bebop piano, is quixotically called "one of Bird's children" with the accusation that he copied Parker and "borrowed heavily" from Art Tatum (146). Clifford Brown discovered ingenious ways to reduce bebop lines to tight, compact figures suitable to the trumpet and executed them with amazing speed and agility. However, Owens seems embarrassed that "Brown based his melodic ideas on the common stock of bebop figures," and insists that "his genius lay more in how he played, than in what he played" (131). Tenor saxophonist Dexter Gordon, with his uncanny knack for playing just what the listener wants to hear when it is least expected, is criticized for imbuing some of his solos with "too many tune quotations and predictable phrases" (77).

In spite of Owens's readiness to depreciate recordings or approaches that do not conform to his conception of jazz improvisation, his discussion of the dozens of musicians who have contributed to the bebop style is thorough and well-documented. Individual chapters give historical overviews grouped by instrument, typically beginning with a contemporary of Parker's and ending with a performer who remains active today. For example, the chapter on trumpet players begins with Gillespie and ends with Freddie Hubbard and discusses a dozen or so trumpet players, with particular attention given to Miles Davis and Clifford Brown. The book is well-stocked with musical examples, generally one- or two-measure figures that are meant to reveal some of the musicians' favorite devices or patterns. Unfortunately, many of these are presented without harmony or surrounding context, offering little insight into the improviser's linear/harmonic intentions.

That Owens has provided a well-researched and informative survey of the bebop style is beyond question. My reservations stem from the author's patent misgivings regarding the conventional formulae and utilitarian devices that constitute in part the very fabric of the style. One cannot expect from bebop that which it cannot offer, and as much as the word "improvisation" may suggest otherwise, *this* style of jazz thrives on the recycling, repetition, and reorganization of a wealth of devices. In the last analysis, bebop must be accepted on its own terms, but perhaps Owens's study should also be accepted on its own terms. His idealistic view of jazz improvisation merely reflects a common opinion that has held sway among jazz audiences and performers alike, despite the recorded evidence. In the

end, he has succeeded in compiling a wealth of material on bebop and its major performers, and in so doing he has made a significant contribution to the jazz literature.

Notes

1. For a systematic study of the basic materials of the bebop language, see Baker, who observes that jazz styles predating bebop can be distinguished by a "lack of unanimity with regard to the use of melodic chromaticism" (1985:1). A thorough discussion of the use of prepared material in jazz can be found in Berliner (1994:227–30).

2. My use of these terms is in accord with the descriptions given in Baker (1985: 1–2, 12–14).

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