current musicology

number 69/spring 2000

Edited by Mark Burford

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articles

Spooning Good Singing Gum: Meaning, Association, and Interpretation in Rock Music[1]

By Travis A. Jackson

Since at least the early 1950s, scholars and critics from widely varying backgrounds have attempted to come to terms with the musics collectively known as "rock," returning again and again to the issue of meaning. Predictably, their answers to the implied question are as varied as their intellectual standpoints. Some scholars, for example, have viewed rock through the lenses of mass and youth culture, drawing on the work of Theodor Adorno and a large body of sociological writing. Others, coming to rock from cultural studies and literary theory, have conceptualized it as a series of "texts" that comment on and reflect current debates on cultural identity, hegemony, resistance, gender and sexuality (Frith and Goodwin 1990; Hesmondhalgh 1996). Writers for the popular press, meanwhile, have tended to focus on issues of authenticity, originality and rebellion, particularly in canonizing iconic figures like Elvis Presley, Sid Vicious, or Kurt Cobain. In reading all this work, some fans or aficionados of rock (including scholars and critics) are likely to be dissatisfied. To them it might seem that (other) rock commentators are either focusing on too narrow a portion of the musical landscape—discussing it in ways that render it nearly unrecognizable—or missing the point of the music altogether. Whatever the point, to such fans rock is potentially about more than youth culture, the (re)production of ideology, or authenticity and rebellion.[2] The question, of course, is what "more" there might be and, relatedly, how one gains access to and talks about it.

In previous attempts to discern rock's meanings, three approaches have tended to dominate: content analysis of rock lyrics; study of rock's relation to varied social, historical, and cultural contexts; and examination of rock's formal and stylistic parameters. While each approach has the potential to illuminate different aspects of what rock might mean and how it achieves its effects, each is also manifestly incomplete. Their individual shortcomings cannot be addressed merely by producing analyses that combine them. To do so, in fact, would be to assume naively that in themselves those approaches exhaust all the questions that one might ask about rock. Getting at what rock means requires asking a different, but related, set of

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questions, ones that go to the heart of what it means to *make* and *experience* rock.[3] How do those who record rock music make recordings? What intellectual and aesthetic choices are typically part of such processes? What contextual factors influence and constrain those choices? Similarly, when individuals listen to or otherwise experience rock, how do they interpret and evaluate their experiences? On what criteria are their interpretations based? To the degree that there exists consensus on aspects of interpretation, how is such consensus built, challenged, modified, or dismantled over time? These are not, of course, new questions, but examining them in light of one another can clear useful paths for approaching musical meaning.

The argument here will proceed through three stages. The first is a selective, critical survey of previous approaches to the study of rock. It is organized loosely around the three different analytic paradigms discussed previously and highlights the strengths and deficiencies of each. The second stage theorizes the making and experiencing of rock through a discussion of recording processes and listeners' individual and collective experiences of recordings. This section takes as its departure point ethnomusicological writing about musical meaning, particularly Steven Feld's discussion of the "interpretive moves" (1994) that listeners make as they experience music. The third explores the complexity and variability of meaning in rock through the example of the Scottish trio the Cocteau Twins. The group, active from 1979 to 1998, produced a series of recordings whose qualities, while not exceptional or singular, draw attention to the inadequacy of previous analyses.

Before consideration of such issues can begin, however, a few key terms in the discussion need to be more clearly fleshed out. The first is the term "rock." Regardless of the criteria scholars and critics have employed in defining it—instruments and technologies, structural or formal parameters of music-making, the economics of the recording industry, or the self-consciously "artistic" orientation of the music's performers—nearly all attempts leave the impression that rock is a category with fixed boundaries (Lakoff 1987), a container for musics that share certain attributes.[4] Indeed, if one considers the variety of music labeled rock in critical and popular discourse, it becomes difficult to imagine a bounded grouping that could accommodate, at one and the same time, Bob Dylan's *Blonde on Blonde* (1966), Van Morrison's *Astral Weeks* (1968), Joni Mitchell's *The Hissing of Summer Lawns* (1975), Prince's *1999* (1983), and Soundgarden's *Superunknown* (1994).[5]

When, however, we understand genre designations like "rock" as relying not on immutable sets of characteristics but on their material, social and cultural relationships to other designations, we might regard them as resizable umbrellas or genealogical and shifting markers of inclusion and

exclusion. With that understanding in mind, rather than posit a unifying rock "essence," I follow Theodore Gracyk in in aiming "to identify and theorize about . . . paradigm cases of rock music" (1996:xi) that a significant number of fans and critics have come—through whatever means—to include in their individual and collective canons. A paradigmatic definition has the virtue of not circumscribing too narrowly the universe of rock, allowing for variation in musical style and approach as well as historical change. Paradigmatic definitions are closely tied to "open concepts" capable of undergoing "alteration in their definition without losing their identity as new examples come to appear as standard" (Goehr 1992:93).[6] What is crucial is recognizing that genre designations are emergent, both shaping and being shaped by what they include as well as being informed by what they accommodate less easily (Briggs and Bauman 1992). It is for that reason that concepts like rock—or jazz, for that matter—can over time seem to cover a widely varying range of musical practices without disappearing as useful signifiers. The Morrison and Mitchell recordings mentioned previously—because they relied on jazz-derived instrumentation and harmonies, respectively—might have been difficult to square with paradigmatic notions of rock when they were released. They are now both considered landmark rock recordings at least partially because they have influenced musicians more easily labeled as rockers. Indeed, the genealogical maps that musicians and fans draw linking performers and recordings over time show the genre's possible definitions to be as mutable as the ways in which connoisseurs and fans construct the past (Straw 1997; Weinstein 1997).

If anything unites the forms of music rock designates, it is that they, like the five examples above, exist and have their most enduring impact as recordings. In fact, discussions of rock, even when they use words like "song" or "performance," are almost always about specific *recordings* which may or may not be the result of separate acts of songwriting and performing (Gracyk 1996:viii–xi).[7] Moreover, some researchers have convincingly shown that even the most dedicated singer-songwriters or live performers (like Bob Dylan and Bruce Springsteen) are so intensely self-conscious about the recording process that rather than write songs before recording, they record and assemble sometimes unrelated fragments which only later become "songs" that even they, like musicians in cover bands, must learn from recordings in order to perform live (Gracyk 1996:1–17, 47–50; Zak 2001).

For its part, "meaning" is a term that is perhaps even more resistant to definition or clear explication. Most simply, meaning is something that humans individually and collectively create as they navigate the shifting terrain in which sounds, symbols and concepts are embedded. In other

words, meanings emerge from processes of interpretation, from the often unconscious ways in which we relate individual terms or elements to larger patterns and structures (Kessels 1986–87:201). Rather than being inherent *in* particular genres, objects or activities, meanings are actively constructed from the ways in which we relate those genres, objects or activities to others. As such, particular items do not so much determine the kinds of meanings that can be attached to them as their qualities constrain the kinds of meanings we might construct. Consequently, while one is to some degree free to attach whatever meanings he or she wishes to particular items, those meanings seem appropriate only to the degree that they are shared or thought to be compelling by others. I might argue stridently that the lyrics of the Beatles' "Taxman" (1966) depict a failed romantic relationship, but few other people who know the recording would find that interpretation tenable.

Analyzing Rock

In this sense, knowing about singer/songwriter/guitarist Chrissie Hynde's life and political leanings as well as early 1980s American social and economic conditions affects the number of compelling interpretations one might make of a lyrical excerpt from the recording "My City Was Gone" (The Pretenders 1983):

> I went back to Ohio
> And my pretty countryside
> Had been paved down the middle
> By a government that had no pride
>
> The farms of Ohio
> Had been replaced by shopping malls
> And Muzak filled the air
> From Seneca to Cuyahoga Falls.

Through content analysis, one might interpret the lyrics as relating a narrative of loss and destruction brought on by deindustrialization and suburbanization in the Reagan era.[8] In this account, the meaning of this lyrical excerpt proceeds from interpreting language and relating the connotative and denotative meanings of words to a larger social and historical context. Following that line of reasoning, one might say that the meaning of the recording lies in the way its words "reflect" or are closely connected to its contexts.[9]

For textually-minded analysts, such an interpretation of "My City Was Gone" might be the first-resort strategy for making sense of the recording. What justifies that strategy is perhaps the greater relative accessibility of

words for individuals who are neither musicians nor scholars of music. Useful, if provisional, analyses might result from employing that strategy. One can "read" the fourth and fifth verses of Bob Dylan's recording "With God on Our Side" (1964), for example, as his questioning of the relations between God and country during the Cold War and link them—perhaps too facilely—to the emergence of a pervasive anti-war mood among youth and some folk and rock musicians in the early 1960s:

> The Second World War
> Came to an end
> We forgave the Germans
> And then we were friends
> Though they murdered six million
> In the ovens they fried
> The Germans now too have
> God on their side
>
> I've learned to hate the Russians
> All through my whole life
> If another war comes
> It's them we must fight
> To hate and to fear them
> To run and to hide
> And accept it all bravely
> With God on my side . . .

A slightly expanded view might move away from reflection theories to allow that lyrics' narratives show how their protagonists have navigated or might navigate their lives or that such narratives create empathy and identification (or resist them) through confessional, personally expressive writing. Thus, the opening verse of Joni Mitchell's "Help Me" (1974) might offer the listener a glimpse into the exhilaration that can be part of falling in love as well as the uncertainty that might accompany it:

> Help me, I think I'm falling
> In love again
> When I get that crazy feeling,
> I know I'm in trouble again
> I'm in trouble
> 'Cause you're a rambler and a gambler
> And a sweet talkin' ladies' man
> And you love your lovin'
> But not like you love your freedom.

Such readings, however, potentially do rock a disservice. If an analyst reduces rock to its lyrical capacity to reflect social ideals or engender empathetic identification, s/he can do so only on the assumption that rock can effectively be read as a verbal text. To read it thus ignores the way listeners generally experience these excerpts: as *sounds* emanating from recordings rather than as printed poetry.[10] Indeed, those analyses that settle for the "easy terms of lyrical analysis" (Frith 1981:14), prominent in popular press rock discourse as well as in 1980s and 1990s scholarly articles concerned with the negative effects of heavy metal and gangsta rap, give us only part of the picture.

Moreover, an analyst focusing exclusively on lyrics ignores evidence that has been mounting since the 1960s that rock fans rarely comprehend or devote concentrated attention to the lyrics of the tunes that they like most.[11] Using words as the primary frame of reference can also produce a distorted vision when we confront the numerous recordings whose linguistic/poetic meaning is obscure enough to render them "meaningless." The narrative qualities and/or coherence of the opening verse of Crowded House's "Don't Dream It's Over" (1986) are at best episodic:

> There is freedom within; there is freedom without
> Try to catch the deluge in a paper cup
> There's a battle ahead; many battles are lost
> But you'll never see the end of the road while you're traveling with me

More dramatically, David Bowie's use of William Burroughs's "cut-up" technique is a deliberate attempt to make songs like "Heroes" (1977) defy conventional readings. Rather than strive for narrative coherence, Bowie aims instead to "purposely fracture everything. . . . [On *Heroes*], I wanted a phrase to give a particular feeling. But never a song as a whole—I never had an overall idea of the feeling. Each individual line I wanted to have a different atmosphere, so I would construct it in a Burroughs fashion" (quoted in Thomson and Gutman 1993:xviii).[12]

Such examples might convince some to seek more refined ways of analyzing lyrics, methods that have convincingly confronted the obscurity of some twentieth-century literature. But such a search may be an obstinate attempt to avoid a by now foregone conclusion: that the meaning of the song does not lie exclusively or entirely in its lyrics.[13]

One possible way out of this impasse is to present an analysis that considers not just words, but how they are sung. Since it seems self-evident that rock listeners identify with the *voices* of singers and can identify with them even when they don't know lyrics being sung (Frith 1987:144), we might be on firmer ground here. When Michael Jackson almost cryingly

sings "Damned indecision and cursed pride/ I kept my love for her locked deep inside" in "She's Out of My Life" (1979), English-speaking listeners might feel that they know what he is "feeling," even though his enunciation (particularly dropping the sounds of ending syllables) makes it difficult at points to know exactly what he is singing. Moreover, to the degree that musical instruments can imitate or produce voice-like sounds, this notion that we might label "communication by inflection" is extensible to them. Sometimes, perhaps, understanding *how* something means—in terms of pitch contour, timing, and timbre as they relate to regular speech—is enough. Those listeners embedded in the appropriate cultural matrices (or those who believe they are) might feel that they can understand *emotion(s)* behind particular sounds even when those sounds aren't recognizable as words.

Philip Tagg (1982) has tried to understand such processes for instrumental music through adapting semiotic methods. He suggests the possibility of focusing attention on "musemes": minimal units of musical meaning, the smallest musical elements or gestures necessary to communicate a certain notion or create a certain impression. Tagg explores, for example, how certain uses of the voice conventionally connote specifiable stances toward lyrics and larger meaning. He suggests as well that certain transformations of a piece of music—such as changing it from major to minor mode—have the potential to change our relationship to it, while others—like changing key—might go unnoticed. Thus, singing softly or whispering into a microphone—as Marvin Gaye does at the beginning of "Sexual Healing" (1982)—*can* communicate a certain level of intimacy. Likewise, singing a particular phrase in a portion of one's vocal range where the voice wavers and cracks can be equated with emotional vulnerability—e.g., Robert Johnson's falsetto singing of "My life don't feel the same" in "Kindhearted Woman Blues" (1990, recorded 1936).

Where Tagg falters is in his attempt to pin down correspondences between certain performative conventions and meanings that might be inferred from them. In other words, his approach, as well as that presented with much greater nuance by David Brackett (1995), rests on application of Roman Jakobson's communication model: put simply, recordings have *messages* to communicate, and the task of the analyst is to find the *codes* that allows *receivers* of messages to interpret them. While we might accept that whispers and falsettos have the conventional meanings discussed previously, we must also remember that they might be equated with less "positive" sentiments: whispers can connote fear or secretiveness, for example, while falsettos can equally correspond to fear or anger. It is impossible, therefore, to say what certain uses of the voice signify without, at the same time, specifying the wide range of variables that give them their signifying capacity.

Those scholars who possess facility with score-based musical analysis might believe that their greater ability to talk about "the music itself" enables them to produce analyses that do not suffer from the shortcomings of lyric-based research. Unfortunately, historical musicologists and music theorists tend to sabotage their arguments on rock with questionable assumptions about music-making. Middleton (1990:104–7) identifies three major problems in such work: (1) it relies on a terminology that valorizes concert-music-derived analytic approaches and concepts—e.g., counterpoint, harmonic complexity, unity, long-range development, etc.—while neglecting others; (2) it suffers from a "notational centricity" that, like terminology, privileges certain aspects of music (pitch, simple rhythms, hierarchical organization) while excluding others (timbre and instrumentation, for example); and (3) it encourages an overriding "score consciousness" that sees notation *as* music and analysis as a detached, seemingly "objective" act of reading. Using those methods, musicologists and music theorists have produced elaborate—and sometimes willfully obscure—analyses of notatable rhythmic, melodic, and harmonic devices used in popular music (see, for example, Hawkins 1992; Middleton 1990; Moore 1995). To a degree, such analyses can be illuminating. The changing time signatures in a Beatles recording like "She Said She Said" (1966), the microrhythmic variations in the harmonically static vamps of James Brown's "The Payback" (1973), or the switches from A minor verses to C major interludes to A minor choruses in Van Morrison's "The Way Young Lovers Do" (1968) are all elements that traditional methods might describe well. Those elements surely contribute to the impact that those recordings have on listeners.

Like their lyrically centered counterparts, though, formalist musical analysts who see the text as all that matters run the risk of overemphasizing issues—like the deep structures discovered via Schenkerian analysis—at the expense of other, equally important ones. Indeed, much analytical work implicitly posits the existence of what George Lipsitz terms the "maximally competent listener," an individual capable of transforming "musical creations into mathematical schema and evaluating them on the basis of their complexity and originality." The resulting relationship between the maker of music and the listener, he argues, is "abstract, detached, and technical" and rests on the assumption that explication of harmony, rhythm, and form is sufficient to describe that relationship (Lipsitz 1990:101). But when assessing such work, the analyst's positionality becomes central: why are some issues singled out as important? Why are others excluded? How does s/he determine that, say, complexity or originality are highly valued attributes of the system under discussion? Might there be other values or attributes in music-making that are more highly prized—even to the exclusion of complexity and originality?

Much of what is meaningful about rock—and perhaps all other musics—lies outside what rhythmic, harmonic and melodic analysis alone can tell us.[14] In fact, even when we acknowledge the degree to which rock musicians are concerned with what traditional music analysis can reveal, we still have to resist the temptation to see their statements as validating those analytical paradigms. When Lou Reed, for example, announces proudly at the beginning of "Femme Fatale" on *Live at Max's Kansas City* (Velvet Underground 1973) that it's his first composition utilizing an augmented chord, we cannot make too much of the statement. Only after eliminating more logical possibilities—that he's engaging in nervous between-song chatter or stalling while instruments are retuned—can we say that he related that information to an audience *because* he thought his "harmonic sophistication" was notable. In any event, I suggest that Reed might bristle at an analysis of that recording or any other by the Velvet Underground that charted his development based solely on his use of harmony and melody.[15] Such analysis might leave the impression that meaning is accessible via notated "musical substance." Gary Tomlinson, in a discussion of formalist musical analyses, laments that

> Behind [such analyses lurks] the absurd but hard-to-eradicate proposition that music alone, independent of the cultural matrices that individuals build around it, can *mean*—that a recording or transcription of a Charlie Parker solo, for example, or the score or performance of a Beethoven symphony, can convey *something* even in the hypothetical absence of the complex negotiations of meaning we each pursue with them. (1991:247)

The foregoing comments are not meant to suggest that we must give up on musicology or music theory as ways of analyzing rock or getting at meaning. Nor do they open a space to be filled by formalist approaches supplemented by psychological and philosophical insights, for many such works (e.g., Meyer 1956; Kivy 1990) have the same problems that Tomlinson has critiqued. One assumption behind such analytical techniques is that, being "neutral," they are applicable to any musical genre or style (Nattiez 1990). What seems more true is that analytical schemes are well-suited to answer only the kinds of questions they were devised to answer. If anything, Tomlinson's comments suggest that a different set of concepts and tools need to be brought to our confrontations with rock, ones that have more to do with the ways that musicians make rock and the ways that they and their fans listen to and otherwise experience it.

Recording, Listening and Interpretive Moves

The activities that take place in recording studios, that make those entities we regard as songs become recordings, are often overlooked in

writing about rock. Because they are so central to the constitution of rock, however, they merit at least a cursory examination here. The following hypothetical sequence of events can serve as a model for the process whereby a recording is made for mass distribution. Once a band or recording artist decides or is contracted to make a new recording, the path to the final product is one filled with a seemingly infinite number of choices. They or their record label choose someone to produce the record, a person who will guide the musicians through the process of recording, keep them roughly on schedule and within the budget. The producer and/or the musicians also choose a recording studio (or several studios) for the project. Likewise, choices have to be made regarding who will engineer the recording, and therefore choose microphones, position them according to ideas about appropriate sound configurations, and operate the array of equipment available in the studio. The musicians may or may not come into the studio with songs already written. Whether they do or not, though, the musicians are in the studio to create, record and manipulate sounds. Once they deem the process of recording to be complete, the resultant tracks have to be "mixed down" to a two-track (stereo) pre-master by some combination of musicians, producers, engineers, and/or parties external to the recording process. That pre-master is then sent to a mastering engineer, who takes the two-track mix and creates a final master suitable for duplication on a mass scale.

The abbreviated description of recording just presented elides the most open-ended and amorphous portion of the process: the part that takes place in the studio and prior to mixing. It sometimes takes months to get the sounds "right" or to stumble upon the combination of equipment and processes that make a recording sound like (or much better than) what the musicians, producers, and engineers (hereafter referred to collectively as recordists) might have heard in their heads. For a particular track, does one want to use an electric guitar or an acoustic one? A six- or twelve-string guitar? If electric, should the guitar be a solid-, semi-solid, or hollow-body? Manufactured by Fender, Gibson, Martin, Paul Reed Smith, Gretsch, or Rickenbacker? Or will a series of guitars, chosen with the previous questions in mind, be used in combination? Will they be plugged directly into the mixing console or recorded via microphones placed in front of amplifiers? At what stage, if any, will the guitar signals be run through effects units (e.g., chorus, wah-wah, flanger, distortion, reverb) that will alter their timbres? If the tracks being recorded are to contain vocals, how are they to be recorded? Using what kind(s) of microphones? Should there be a single vocal line or should the singer's voice be double-tracked, so that he or she sings the same melodic line with him or herself? At what stage and how will the singer's voice be processed? Is

the singer's voice compressed "going to tape" to smooth out wide dynamic variations or does the engineer trust the singer's knowledge of when to move toward and away from the microphone? Will the recording use real drums recorded with microphones, programmed drums, or sampled drum and percussion sounds triggered by a live drummer's playing? If keyboard instruments are to be used, which ones will they be: piano, organ, Mellotron, vintage synthesizers, or state-of-the-art versions?[16] After choosing and recording the sounds of instruments and voices, recordists have to decide how further to process them. Are the vocals to be "dry" or enhanced with reverb? Are the guitar sounds to be distinct from one another or layered to form a dense sonic mass? Are the cymbal sounds to be bright and sizzling, or slightly less bright and crisp?[17]

In many cases, the sounds generated during the recording and mixing processes result equally from interesting applications of technology and from accidents. Thus, producer Tony Visconti, discussing his work with David Bowie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, details both the deliberation and fortuitous occurrences behind the sounds on albums like *Heroes* (1977) and *Scary Monsters* (1980). He explains that Bowie's ever-thickening vocals in successive verses of "Heroes" are the result of a deliberate and ingenious placement of microphones in a long corridor and the use of noise gates: as Bowie sang successive verses at higher dynamic levels, the more distant microphones were triggered, and their audio signals were added to the mix (B. Jackson 1997).[18] Likewise, the eerie synthesizer-like melody at the beginning of "Ashes to Ashes" (1980) is the result of a piano sound being run through a malfunctioning Eventide Auto-Flanger. The recordists liked the accidental effect so much that they made it part of the final recording (Molenda 1995). Myriad other discussions of the importance of getting particular sounds can be found in articles about the processes used for recordings by Portishead (Micallef 1997), Public Enemy (Dery 1990), and Ben Harper (Farinella 1997), for example.[19]

Strikingly, when recordists speak about sounds, they typically tend to describe them in the two ways mentioned thus far—instruments and processing—and in another: by referring to other recordings. Indeed, recordists might not waste time trying to find adjectives to describe sounds when they could say more directly, "I want the snare to sound the way it does on one of those funk records, like [James Brown's] 'Funky Drummer'" or "I want that guitar sound in 'Stairway to Heaven,' you know, the chorusy one in the part where Robert Plant starts singing 'ooh, it makes me wonder.'"[20] Robin Guthrie, the guitarist in the Cocteau Twins and a record producer of note, described in *Melody Maker* why certain records had "changed his life" (Guthrie 1993). Among the recordings he singles out for praise are the Birthday Party's "The Friend Catcher"

(". . . it was that big guitar noise . . . that was one of the things that inspired us."); the Pop Group's "She Is Beyond Good and Evil" ("Again, it was the noise he [Mark Stewart] made."); and The Ronettes's "Be My Baby" ("I could have picked any number of Phil Spector tracks—I don't suppose I need to explain why. I've been an obsessive collector of Phil Spector's stuff, I've got loads and loads on vinyl, lots of rarities. Nice tunes, big sounds—yeah, it was an obvious influence."). More than anything else, Guthrie's comments reveal the degree to which "recording consciousness" (Bennett 1980:126–29) is an essential part of the rock enterprise. Recordists are alternately challenged, inspired, motivated, and fascinated by the possibilities of sound generation opened to them by the tools of the recording studio and their use by other recordists (cf. Zak 2001).

While I do not want to assert that these recordists' ideas about the importance of sound are espoused equally by *all* rock musicians, producers and engineers, using sound as a point of departure enhances the earlier critique of lyrically and musicologically/theoretically centered analyses. Why does analyzing lyrics outside of their performance leave us cold? Why is it that seeing lyrics and music meticulously transcribed can leave us wanting? The simple answer is that the primary impact of recordings comes not so much from words or musical structure, but from *sound*, of which words and music are constituent elements. Even those people who claim to like recordings only for their lyrics and who explain that they do not understand or care about any of a recording's other features share a commitment to and fascination with sound. When presented with an alternative—"Why not buy collections of lyrics or, even better, copy lyrics from friends' CD inserts?"—many acknowledge that the sounds *do* attract them. One could reasonably assert that sounds get their attention and hold them captive long enough for lyrics to register.

Sounds, moreover, are not items that we simply relegate to the background as we apprehend lyrics. Perhaps in an age when music is everywhere available—in our homes, in cars, in supermarkets and waiting rooms, as well as on portable playback devices and computers—it is too easy to regard listening as an act of passive consumption. It is, however, a complex process not usefully explained by a communication theory, or any other model which regards recordings or other forms of cultural production as items to be deciphered. It is better understood as a culturally conditioned and individually inflected process intimately tied to (sometimes only tacit) ideas of what music is, how it functions, and what is valuable in it. Every listening experience, whether it involves an encounter with something new or something familiar, is a process of comparison, of association (Higgins 1991:18).

Steven Feld has suggested that listeners, as they attend to a recording or musical event, come to comprehend it and create its meanings through a series of "interpretive moves" (1994:86–89). Such moves, which he describes as locational, categorical, associational, reflective, and evaluative, can be highly individual and idiosyncratic, for they draw upon each individual's past experiences. Locational moves literally locate a musical event or a recording, placing it in a field of like and unlike events; categorical moves may more specifically characterize the event or object—relating it to specific classes of objects or sets of events. Associational moves relate the object to other kinds of verbal, musical, or visual imagery, while reflective moves relate the event "to social conditions, political attitudes . . . or personal experiences that include similar or dissimilar sounds, mediated or live" (87). Evaluative moves are perhaps self-explanatory: they comprise qualitative judgments of the object or event, such as good/bad, appropriate/inappropriate, or moving/uninteresting. Feld poses no specific hierarchy or order in which one might make these moves, and it is perhaps clear that the boundaries between them, if any, are quite porous.

Interpretive moves function, in a sense, as a "series of social processing conventions" that "do not fix a singular meaning; instead they focus some boundaries of fluid shifts in our attentional patterns as we foreground and background experience and knowledge in relation to the ongoing perception of a sound object or event. Meaning then is momentarily changeable and emergent, in flux as our interpretive moves are unravelled and crystallized" (88). Moreover, Feld asserts that the interpretive process is inherently social:

> A range of social and personal backgrounds, some shared, some complementary, of stratified knowledge and experience, and of attitudes . . . enters into the social construction of meaningful listening through interpretive moves, establishing a sense of what the sound object or event is and what one feels, grasps, or knows about it. At the same time, some very specific decisions (about seriousness, non-seriousness, intent, performer's attitude and meaning) can also be made by drawing on interpretive moves and other kinds of social knowledge. (89)

Taking a cue from Erving Goffman, he says that "each hearing, like human social interaction generally has . . . a biography and a history, and these may be more or less important to the particular hearing in question at a specific time" (89). Thus, a lyrical excerpt, a harmonic progression, a melodic pattern, a choice of instrumentation, a series of timbral nuances,

the use of certain recording techniques or kinds of signal processing, or the setting(s) in which one hears a recording—any of these are capable of setting in motion the interpretive moves that give rock its meanings.

Lyrical associations, in many cases as dependent on melody, context and positioning as they are on words, are perhaps the easiest links that one can make between recordings. Such links may range widely across what are sometimes thought to be impermeable musical boundaries. When, for example, the rapper Q-Tip asks "What's the matter with you, boy?" on A Tribe Called Quest's "Description of a Fool" (1990), the words as well as the way he presents them bring to mind Mick Jagger's asking of the same question in the Rolling Stones' "Miss You" (1978) and connect hip-hop musical discourse to rock.[21] Likewise, lyrical associations can function in the seemingly smaller universe of one musician's recordings over time. Fans of Sting's work with the Police and as a solo artist might have observed how fond he is of inserting an early lyric into subsequent recordings. Anyone familiar with "Every Little Thing She Does Is Magic" (The Police 1981) and the excerpt that begins "Do I have to tell the story of a thousand rainy days . . ." might recognize its incarnations on later recordings—for example, "O My God" (The Police 1983) and "Seven Days" (Sting 1993). On a more subtle level, the background voices in the second verse of Prince's "Space" (1994) might be read as homage to a classic late 1960s recording. Each of the first two lines of Prince's verse begins with the word "I." Underneath and above them, as it were, are background voices singing "I" on the first line and "Oh, I" on the second. Those listeners with a fair knowledge of Motown recordings might recognize the connection Prince's recording has to "I Can't Get Next to You" (1969) by the Temptations. His background vocals borrow both the lyrical content and the larger musical gesture from the background vocals of the Temptations's recording.[22]

Sometimes the associations that listeners make are based on the parameters easily represented in terminology of European music theory: melodic configurations and simple rhythmic patterns, for example. "Everyday" by the group Lucy Pearl (2000), for example, has recurring lines—e.g., on the words "I've been waiting all day long/ I feel like you know what's going on"—whose rhythmic and melodic patterning is nearly identical to recurring lines in Lenny Kravitz's "Thinking of You" (1998)—e.g., "Would you live your life the same, or come back and rearrange?"[23] Likewise, someone listening to Shawn Colvin's "Suicide Alley" (1996) might connect the electric piano figure near the track's fade-out— a $\hat{5}$–$\flat\hat{6}$–$\flat\hat{7}$–$\hat{6}$ melodic pattern—to another electric piano figure (with a similar melodic gesture) on both Stevie Wonder's "Living for the City" (1973) and Joe Zawinul's "Mercy, Mercy, Mercy," as recorded by the Cannonball Adderley Quintet (1966).

It is also possible that associations can be based on stylistic or timbral characteristics that are less easy to define. A difficult-to-quantify constellation of rhythmic, harmonic, instrumental, processing and timbral nuances might lead many rock fans to hear a connection between PJ Harvey's "Good Fortune" (2000) and nearly any work done by Patti Smith—e.g., "Gloria" (1975). Similarly, a friend of mine once remarked, upon hearing Jeff Buckley's "Dream Brother" (1994), that a portion of it reminded her of the Doors. Though she never named the Doors' song she had in mind, her remark came suddenly back into my consciousness several months later as I listened to "Soul Kitchen" (1967). When Jim Morrison sang/chanted the words, "Well, your fingers weave quick minarets, speak in secret alphabets," I instantly understood why the Doors had sprung into my friend's mind. Buckley's declamatory delivery isn't a direct imitation of Morrison's, but one could very compellingly describe it as *evoking* the work of the Doors' singer.[24]

An even more striking example comes from Garbage's eponymous 1995 album. When I first heard "My Lover's Box," I recognized a correspondence to another recording. It took days of sporadically scanning my CD racks and LP crates to find the corresponding recording. In the end, the connection was one having less to do with harmonic, melodic, or structural parameters in any conventional sense than with a larger gesture. Garbage's recording begins with a phased drum loop playing at low volume with its lowest and highest frequencies attenuated. A sustained keyboard line enters shortly thereafter and gradually increases in volume, giving way to full-frequency percussion and a loud, dense mass of guitar chords, produced partially by layering several guitar tracks on top of one another in the mix. A very similar gesture—repeated drum loop with attenuated frequency content giving way to full drums and massed guitars—opens "Soon" by My Bloody Valentine (1991).

What matters in each of these examples is that, in order to grasp them, one need not be a scholar or a trained music analyst. All they require is that a listener be capable of connecting the sounds of recordings from different historical moments. Hearing what one feels to be a connection between two or more items—one currently under consideration and others not being heard at the same moment—is simply a matter of recognition, one that operates on the level that Middleton describes as that of "primary signification" (1990:220) and Peirce would view as iconic (Turino 1999:226–27). Either way, the kinds of relationships on this level, whether predicated on melodies, harmonic gestures, stylistic or timbral references, are metonymic and indexical (Middleton 1990:224–25). Metonymically speaking, recognizing a fragment in recording A that seems to come from recording B is sufficient to bring recording B in its entirety to mind—in other words, part of "Soon" evokes all of "Soon."

Indexically speaking, a perceived reference to "Soon" directs our attention toward it even as we continue to listen to "My Lover's Box." Thus, even in those moments when one is "freely associating," likening a particular configuration of sounds to vaguely defined notions of calm or terror, one is recognizing, on a primary level, a connection to other sound configurations one might describe similarly, and then secondarily (or simultaneously) attaching the impressions we have from remembered sounds to those currently at hand. The primary level is so named because it is not dependent upon the secondary level for its existence, just as signs described as those of firstness or secondness in Peircian semiotic theory do not require the mediation of linguistic symbols to be apprehended (Turino 1999:233). Attaching connotative meanings, on the other hand, requires—even in the most intuitive or unconscious ways—that one make interpretive moves that say something more about the connections one has always already made.

There remains one other salient point to be made regarding the interpretive moves that listeners make as they listen: there is no sense in which one's moves can be described as "right" or "wrong." Rather than speaking in absolute terms of correctness or incorrectness, it is more appropriate to speak in terms of *degree*, as when we describe some interpretations, based on whatever criteria, to be more compelling than others. Other listeners may not hear, even upon having them pointed out, the connections we make. Likewise, they may not arrive at the same understandings of what recordings mean even when they do recognize the connections we have made. Other individuals, possessing different kinds of knowledge and drawing from different banks of experience, therefore, might have had quite different associations for the examples presented above. It is in that sense that the meanings of rock are not fixed or immutable but emerge instead from processes of communication between individuals and groups about the meanings of recordings or any other objects or experiences. It matters less whether the connections we make were part of the recordists' intentions—though possessing such secondary knowledge may make our claims more compelling—than it does whether others agree with us. An idiosyncractic interpretation is still in some sense a valid one, but it, like any other, is subject to constant renegotiation.[25]

Listening and meaning-making are never-finished interpretive processes, constrained by the recordings that are their objects. While lyrical, contextual, and technical issues all have a part to play in such processes, none of them wholly determines how those processes will work. Those different vantage points place limits upon interpretations, offer keys or guides, that need not be adopted by the various social actors who engage with rock as recordists or listeners. Ultimately, however, the mean-

ings of rock are constructed by a wide range of listeners, interacting with one another in a wide variety of contexts. And crucially, those contexts are not only the ones accessible in academic journals or even the popular press. They are, more often, those constructed by listeners who discuss recordings with one another, make recommendations, attend concerts, and compare interpretations in a discursive space occupied by other listeners, each of whom brings something different to the discussion.

Case Study: Recording and Listening to the Cocteau Twins

In order to describe the everyday world of rock discourse, I turn in the remainder of this article to a discussion of how one particular group, the Cocteau Twins, makes recordings and of the relationship their recording processes have to the ways that listeners interpret them. The principal focus is on writings in which the group members discuss studio techniques and on the observations fans of the group have posted to the Cocteau Twins mailing list and various pages on the World Wide Web.[26] Together, these two bodies of data open a window on rock rarely explored by academics or critics.

Formed in Grangemouth, Scotland in 1979, the Cocteau Twins have produced a body of recordings that offer an interesting challenge to anyone who wishes to interpret their work. The major difficulty their recordings present, especially those released between 1984 and 1990, is that the lyrics are not generally reconcilable with the words or syntax of English or any other language. Their playful and willfully obscure titles, like "Spooning Good Singing Gum" (1988), do little to clarify linguistic meaning. Elizabeth Fraser, who writes and sings all lyrics on their recordings, has advanced a number of different reasons why she prefers to eschew conventional linguistic usage in lyric-writing and performance.[27] Most prominently, she cites a lack of confidence in her abilities as a lyricist and a fascination with the sounds of words irrespective of meaning (Sutherland 1984:25; Morgan and Trimble 1994:113–15; Phoenix 1996:42). Fraser's approach to writing lyrics has led to some amusing attempts to decipher them, particularly for those who might feel themselves unable to confront a recording without knowing the words. The policies of the subsidiary responsible for releasing their recordings in Japan, for example, at one point mandated that each recording be released with a lyric sheet. When Fraser refused to comply, offering instead band photos or other items to fill CD booklets, the label hired transcribers to translate the lyrics. One unfortunate result, according to Fraser, was that there might have been dozens of people who thought that, on at least one song, she was singing "Yeah, baby, I'm a mud dancer" (Thompson 1994:28).

For their part, guitarist/drum programmer Robin Guthrie and bassist/keyboardist Simon Raymonde have focused on ambiguity of a different kind: that emerging from their creating densely textured sonic landscapes for each of their recordings. The sounds of guitars, for example, are routed through a lengthy chain of signal processing units, layered on top of one another and spread throughout the stereo spectrum. Sometimes the amount of signal processing makes it unclear exactly what instruments have been used to produce certain sounds. Steph Paynes, interviewing Guthrie about the techniques used on their 1990 album *Heaven or Las Vegas*, offers a description of Guthrie's studio (and live) setup and notes the confusion about sound it might create:

> [Guthrie says,] "I use a Paul Reed Smith guitar, which goes into—let me get the order right—a Boss Exciter, a Boss chorus, a Yamaha D1500 delay, a harmonizer, a Boss phase-shifter, a Boss hi-band flanger, a regular Boss flanger, a Boss vibrato, a volume pedal, a [Jim Dunlop] Cry Baby wah-wah, and another delay." Everything runs through a pair of Rivera combo amps. "Then," continues Guthrie, "the whole system goes through noise gates, which I trigger from [a] sequencer. . . . That way I can get weird tremolo effects and things like that. . . ." You'd swear, for example, that the sixteenth-note pulsations that drive "Pitch the Baby" were generated by a keyboard. But according to Guthrie, "the opening oscillating sound is from noise gates—it's just my guitar getting chopped up. You gate the guitar like you normally would, but instead of keying it from the guitar sound, you key it from the sequencer using the hi-hat or whatever." (Paynes 1991:25–26)

Such sonic sculpting has led to florid attempts to describe the group's sound:

> Cocteau Twins gush life's hues—the vermilion of sex, the charcoal shadows of fear, the icy cobalt of terror, and the erotic tangerine of sunsets. Their music caresses casino neon, skims lakes teeming with red algae, climbs into tree houses, creeps in the asylum. If you're susceptible to this kind of thing, you'll be hypnotized; if not, you'll shrug this Scottish trio off as New Age new wave. (Mandava 1990:70)
>
> Picture a calm sea rippled by gentle waves. Overhead a balloon floats, buffeted aloft by gusts of wind, then swooping down lazily to skim the water's surface. As soothing as this scene would appear to the eye, so too is the music of the Cocteau Twins to the ear. While Robin Guthrie and Simon Raymonde provide a rhythmic back-

> ground on guitars and synthesizers, singer Elizabeth Fraser leaps through octaves with vocals that sound like a cross between a lullaby, a yodel and a Middle Eastern chant. (Small 1989:31)

As tempting as it might be to dismiss these two examples as non-music-centered free association, it is more fruitful to contextualize and attempt to understand them. They each point to both the difficulty of characterizing sonic phenomena in words and the power of what Feld would call associative interpretive moves for listeners trying to describe their listening experiences. In other words, while the use of imagery and metaphor may strike us as hyperbole, the use of those devices *is* a response to the recordings.[28] While those responses to sound may be idiosyncratic, they are responses nonetheless. And in some ways, their imagery highlights certain aspects of the sound of the Cocteau Twins's recordings. Moreover, they strikingly illustrate the degree to which the critics responsible for those statements are as fascinated with sound as Guthrie's previously cited comments illustrate he is.

Indeed, in several descriptions of how he and the rest of the group approach recording, Guthrie has stressed "getting the sounds" as being the first and most important order of business. He and Raymonde generally begin working with guitar and piano/keyboards, running them through various signal processors to find sounds that interest them. From there, Guthrie explains, they tend to generate a firm "time base" on top of which to play, one that comes either from a vintage drum machine or a sampled percussion loop (Beyda 1993:130). The recording process is first and foremost one of discovery. Guthrie says,

> In the getting-the-sounds stage, . . . I do use a lot of old pedals and old tape echoes and really just noise—getting all the knobs up to 11 just to see what stuff can do. I've got some bizarre old pedals like the Maestro guitar and rhythm box, where you plug in the guitar, and drum sounds come out. When you start messing around with things like that, with frequency analyzers and pulse modulators, you can get some good sounds. Then when I get some stuff on tape, I can start messing about with some of the more modern technology, just things as simple as gating. (quoted in Beyda 1993:131)

Raymonde amplifies Guthrie's statement by saying: "You've got to have the sound that suits the song in particular. Sometimes you don't know what that's going to be until you're fiddling about with the parameters. You just know by mucking about with something when you're there" (ibid.:131). After the two of them have recorded instrumental tracks, they

take turns at the mixing console recording Fraser's main vocals as well as any overdubbed background or harmony parts. Fraser, like Raymonde and Guthrie, writes only when there is a recording project underway. In reflecting on her eschewal of standard linguistic patterns, she notes that she compiled a dictionary of sorts, containing found and newly coined words, and explains the freedom she derived from using words in that way: "Combining words in different languages that I couldn't understand just meant I could concentrate on the *sound* and not get caught up in the meaning . . . But it got to be more fun because I was able to make up lots of portmanteaus, literally hundreds and hundreds of words. I was really into it. . . . And it just kept on getting bigger and bigger" (Morgan and Trimble 1994:115). She continues by saying that, for her, words are merely sounds: "They don't mean anything, though, that's the thing. You know all the transcendent sounds. It's all sound all the way through" (115).[29]

Once all the instrumental and vocal sounds have been recorded, the most crucial part of the process, mixing, begins. For the final mixes, Guthrie is concerned with layering sounds to create the aural equivalent of space. Equally important are stereo (left to right) width ("A little part of every Cocteau Twins record is an ambient project. . . . I like to create space and atmosphere. You can change the atmosphere of a song just by the sound, without changing the chords at all—that's fantastic") and sonic depth ("If you listen closely to my records, there's always something going on in the background: a guitar feeding back or a weird delay thing. You don't always hear it on the first few listens, but as you listen more you uncover layers and layers of stuff") (both quotations from Rotondi 1996:57). Guthrie describes mixing as a "building process": "I like to slot everything into its own little place—using EQ for setting instruments [in the frequency spectrum, low to high], using panners [to position sounds in the stereo spectrum]. And then there's a big smoothing-out process, taking the lumps out—compressing things that need it, compressing the whole mix . . ." (quoted in Beyda 1993:132). And like many other recordists, Guthrie has to hear a mix in different environments before he can be satisfied with it: "I . . . mix something and then listen to it at home, in the car, then come back the next day [and] do some fine tuning . . ." (ibid.:132).

With regard to the way that listeners might approach their recordings, the members of the group draw a distinction between interpretations that try to pin down the meanings of their work and those that stem from creative engagement with sound. In other words, they prefer and fully expect listeners to make whatever they can of the music—that is, as long as they don't overload their responses to it with the purely associative

kind of response quoted previously. One point of contention they have is with the British music press's characterization of *them* as "ethereal" and otherworldly largely on the basis of the promotional video for the recording "Pearly Dewdrops' Drops" (1985a), which depicted the band members in a large church and standing at the edge of a small waterfall. In response to such writing, Raymonde complained, "People see something like that and make up their minds. . . . All this pre-Raphaelite business, it's all made up, it doesn't mean anything. Just because we had some stained-glass windows in it . . . that kind of imagery wasn't intentional. We didn't say, 'Look, we want a lot of church windows and angels flying around it'" (Sutherland 1984:24). Instead, Raymonde would rather have listeners pay attention to the sounds *on the recordings* and make what they will of them, even if what they make up does not match what is "really" there: "It's great to see people mouthing words that you know are totally alien to what they really are. It's good because people are just fantasizing and enjoying themselves" (Sutherland 1984:25, 35). Speaking of interpretation in a larger sense, Guthrie has made similar though more forceful statements:

> People tend to just want one song to be one message. It's all they can handle. They just want it all in black and white. Why can't they make up their own ideas about what some of the songs are about—that's what I do. I've got ideas about what some of the songs are about. They're probably a million miles from what they actually are about, but at least they're mine, y'know. (quoted in Sutherland 1990:18)

Interestingly, when Fraser returned to singing more intelligibly in the early 1990s, she confessed that she was apprehensive: "I thought it might spoil it for people if they could understand what I was singing" (Roberts 1993:26).

The thrust of such comments is that the band prefers interpretation to be an open-ended process, one that centers on a listener's engagement with the recording. One might say that they are most interested in the primary level of signification and the kinds of interpretive moves it sets in motion, that they are concerned with the comparisons listeners make between Cocteau Twins sounds and others in their auditory memories. In that sense, listeners are free to make up their own words. That same technique, after all, is part of the lyric-writing process. If listeners lose themselves in the width and depth of swirling instrumental textures, that is also part of what is intended by the recordings. Or, if at the same time, they listen repeatedly to hear all the sounds buried in the mix—each guitar overdub, each percussion part, each subtly panned effect—they are engaging with the recording

rather than trying to define it precisely in terms of received categories. What happens beyond that primary level is of less concern, provided the interpretations that emerge do not freight the recordings with associations that have less to do with them than with videos or reviews of their recordings in the press. In other words, they are most interested in listeners engaging with their recordings for whatever *they* think them to be.

Such a process is more or less what fans of the group favor in their discussions. They attempt to interpret the recordings based primarily on the sounds and secondarily on information about the group and its creative process. While much of what is presented here is culled from Internet-based discussions, it is important to contextualize such discourse. Prior to the proliferation of Internet mailing lists and web sites dedicated to specific musicians and groups, the meaning-making discourse of rock fans was largely carried out in untexted ways: through conversations at live performances, in record stores, or in various other social settings where music was a viable topic. My own experiences with the Cocteau Twins were a function of hearing recordings on the radio and in dance clubs in the early 1980s, seeking out those recordings, and enjoying them with friends who had similar musical tastes. Our conversations were as much about the band and how they did what they did as they were about other bands whose work inhabited for us a similar sonic universe (Dead Can Dance, Siouxsie and the Banshees, the Cure, the Smiths). Many of the fans who contribute to the email list, likewise, were drawn to the band either by the novelty of the recordings or by their similarities to work by other "dream pop" or "art" bands like Lush, My Bloody Valentine or Slowdive.[30] Quite frequently, a new list member tells the story of how s/he heard the band on a college radio station or acted on a suggestion from a friend and was thus introduced to music that touched them in striking ways. While "computer-mediated communication" has not supplanted those modes of discourse—for it employs the terms established in those prior settings—it has given them a new focus and enables larger numbers of fans with varying levels of listening experience to share and debate their ideas about music.[31]

Discussions on the Cocteau Twins mailing list, whose participants are primarily from North America, South America, Great Britain, and western Europe, have covered a wide range of topics. Musicians and recordists on the list discuss equipment and signal processing techniques in trying to understand and recreate the sounds on the recordings. All participants forward their reactions to and experiences with the work of the group, particularly when there are new releases (for example *Milk & Kisses* and *The BBC Sessions*). They discuss published interviews with band

members, televised appearances (e.g., on the *Tonight Show with Jay Leno* in May 1994), the ethnic and racial make-up of group's fans, and other recordings on which band members have worked (Guthrie as producer of Felt, Lush, and Medicine; Raymonde as performer and arranger on This Mortal Coil's *Filigree and Shadow;* Fraser as singer on recordings by Ian McCulloch, Massive Attack and Craig Armstrong). Likewise, they locate, categorize, associate, reflect upon and evaluate the group's sound by comparing it to that of other groups like those mentioned previously. They debate, as well, their favorite recordings by the group, the viability and necessity of lyrical interpretation, and the etymology of identifiable words and phrases used in lyrics and song titles, e.g., "Sugar Hiccup" (1983), "Great Spangled Fritillary" (1985b) and "Athol-brose" (1988). Finally, from time to time, members write about the ways in which they *use* the Cocteau Twins's recordings: to set a romantic mood, to cope with difficult times, and to measure the passage of time in their lives. Finally, even non-music-related topics are covered on the list, such as the financial and legal difficulties experienced by one list member and the depression and suicide attempts of another.

The most revealing threads of discussion have called for list members to vote on the songs which for them express the "essence of Twin-ness," the songs that most definitively capture the group's sound and approach to recording. In the postings that followed one such query, participants advanced a number of justifications why "Pur" (1993) is perhaps the best candidate. The recording (in $\frac{4}{4}$, $\text{♩}=146$) begins with a programmed bass drum playing softly on each eighth note, the chords $G^{\flat 5}$ and C^{6} being played on alternate, odd-numbered downbeats, different reverb-drenched cymbal sounds panned hard-left and hard-right, and heavily processed guitar sounds best described as "atmospheric" swirling around and filling the rest of the sonic space. In trying to describe the impact of the opening, one poster wrote,

> This is one of my favorite songs too, as you might have read before. While we [are] exchanging mental images, let me share mine. When the song starts, I feel like I am taking off into open space but not on a rocket but on something more beautiful (maybe diamonds, eh eh.) [B]ut it's sort of a lift off into beauty and space. I have never tried this (not yet anyway), but it is probably a great song to make love to.

Another contributor, attempting to describe "Sigh's Smell of Farewell" (1986a) says:

> First off, I like the carousel whirls of guitar, and the sense of texture which creates movement of a spinning mechanical nature. And, of course, in true CT style the song just being a prologue to the unfurling of sound and sensation which so abruptly ends. . . . I mean, when that song finally hits—it is simply amazing—the endless layers and trails of vocals, the warping flange panned throughout the mix . . . it's just incredible to me, and it breaks my heart.

What is most clear in descriptions like those just presented is how clearly they emerge from listeners trying to "force awareness to words" (Feld 1994:93) based on an engagement with sound. Whether discussing specific recordings or the group's entire recorded output, list members are constantly attempting to relate their impressions of sounds by drawing upon a wide range of strategies, ones that result from the interpretive moves they make as they experience recordings. Noting how tracks like "Pur," "Frou-Frou Foxes in Midsummer Fires" (1990), and "Seekers Who Are Lovers" (1996) all tend to mime the same larger gesture, for example, listeners insist on making sound paramount: "Don't you think that it is a wonderful thing, that the final track on any CT album is so absolutely fantasticly anthemic? It kind of says 'Bye bye. Do come back again soon.' Or am I just having one of my moments?"

Even when the discussion centers on lyrical meaning (or the lack thereof), comments posted to the list share the same emphasis. While the next two comments seem to be divergent, they in fact fit closely with the kinds of interpretive moves the band members hope their fans will make as they listen to their recordings. The first is an argument against lyrical interpretation, while the second, posted by a list member who sometimes went to great lengths to decipher the lyrics on recordings, is an argument for the activity:

> While I am very entertained by all the interpretations of CT lyrics, for me, it's not so much the words she uses, it's how she uses them with that beautiful voice, even words and phrases I recognize seem new the way she sings them. It reminds me very much of e.e. cummings, it's all very playful and free, and even when I (sometimes especially because) don't understand literally what's being said, I am struck more by how I connect with it emotionally[.] I think it's wonderful how much deeper a feeling and understanding I sometimes have for her singing when I can barely make out a recognizable word to my vocabulary.
>
> For those who either really don't care what the lyrics they are listening to are . . . hey, more power to ya! After all, "ignorance is bliss,"

> right? I totally follow that Liz would like her listeners to get their own experiences from a song rather than decipher the lyrics. It's sort of like looking at art, everyone sees things differently. I've already been there though! Been there done that. Liz has said that if you knew what was really being said then you would be less enthralled. I tend to disagree with her on that. The more I've found out the more excited I get. I think it's wonderful to realize the things that come from another mind. Her songs will always have a separate meaning for me that is all my own.

So that even though some participants find more to love and new avenues for interpretation upon learning that "Mellonella" (1985b), for example, is a listing of the genus and species names of butterflies, many others are equally happy with preserving the "mystery" of the words and their origins.

Such disagreements are an essential part of the discourse. When list members were polled in March 1999 to name their five favorite Cocteau Twins songs and one favorite album, forty respondents named over ninety-one songs and listed nearly every album the group produced from 1982 to 1996. The variance could not have been more striking. List members who had a long-term engagement with the group tended to be partial to earlier work like *Treasure* (1984), while more recent fans of the group favored *Heaven or Las Vegas* as the most popular of the eight full-length albums the group released while still active. Contributors were often surprised by the favorites of others but typically advanced alternate choices in terms that said, "I see what you mean, but I think . . ." or "Hmmm. I'll have to listen to that again." Even more telling was the companion poll started by another contributor, one that asked for list members' least-favorite tunes. When one poster placed "Sugar Hiccup" (1983) at the bottom of the list and asked others to explain its appeal, the following was among the replies she received:

> I can only tell you what I "feel" when I listen to the song. I like it because of a couple [of] factors. It has a large concert hall sound that I don't hear in every one of their songs. I like the melody of the vocals. At the time it came out (early 80's), I thought it defied everything else being written or recorded by other bands. Although not a very prolific song in terms of lyrics, I like it. Now I say prolific with hesitation because I really don't understand for certain what the lyrics are about (if anyone else does, please share it with us, 'cause I would love to get another perspective). My interpretation of the lyrics or rather what I "feel" is that Liz may be singing about a feeling of love, of being so in love, so much infatuated with a sweetheart to

> the point of getting a sugar hiccup. This is probably a very romantic, cute and perhaps even sick interpretation but I like it. But I know the lyrics imply other things perhaps . . . and of course, some of the members on this list have offered their fantasy interpretation of the words (i.e. Sugar Hiccup on Cheerios) which I find myself singing from time to time.

A consensus of sorts emerged from both discussions. "Favorite" and "least favorite" were to be seen as relative designations rather than absolute judgments. Many contributors suggested, as did the following, that the former category designated the tracks they most wanted to hear while the latter referred to those they did not feel as strong a desire to hear:

> Other ones I tend to skip are "Essence" [1993] and "Otterley" [1984] (I seem to be in cahoots with the other person who dislikes the whispery songs . . . however I *love Victorialand* [1986b] and I can't ever skip over a song on that or put it on random, I need to listen to it from start to finish). I also tend to skip past both "Ups" and "Eperdu" [both 1996] but I've just noticed that most of these songs precede ones I particularly enjoy . . . Summerhead [1993], Donimo [1984], Treasure Hiding [1996] . . . which is usually why I'll be compelled to pass over some . . . I'm impatient to get to the other songs.

Such consensus was not necessary for the discussions on the list to continue. Indeed, it was a temporary moment in the ongoing discussions on the list. It would, in fact, be modified a year later, the next time a similar topic was broached.

If on the list there is any grasping for a larger meaning, any attempt to mine a more weighty significance from musical engagement, it is perhaps best summed up by one poster's comment about music, taste, and sociability on the heels of the discussion of favorites:

> In the film *True Stories*, David Byrne asks the audience: "Do you like music? Everybody says they do. . . ." Nice line. Everybody likes music, but we sometimes do not want to believe it. That's because when we ask someone "Do you like music?" the real question behind it may actually be "Do we have something in common?". Or it might mean further . . . something like "Do you feel the same way I do about certain things?" A little as if our feelings will be at risk of never being valid if we never a get a chance to confirm them with someone else. Therefore, it's hard for us to accept other people's taste for music at

> times. Music means different things for different people. Indeed, many just see it as "words-in-a-tune," with words being a lot more important. CT freaks will favor other aspects of music.

This comment suggests that (rock) music is not so much a thing-in-itself as it is a way for listeners to engage with one another and to make their way through the world. To the degree that analysts, whether journalists or scholars, try to connect music to a wider world, they perhaps miss what is paramount for rock fans: how their musical experiences place them in the world, how their preferences connect them to other listeners and allow them to develop a sense of who they are and how they relate to others (Frith 1987; Stokes 1994). Asking Byrne's question, even about a specific recording or a specific group, is an invitation to share one's reactions, experiences, and interpretations—an invitation to make rock meaningful. While the recordings and the sounds in them are the focal point of discussion, the interpretive moves that they engender form the basis of rock's meanings. Those meanings change depending on the discussants involved and what they bring to their engagement—their knowledge of the techniques used to make them, their interpretations of what the recordings say to them, the ways in which music functions in their lives.

For rock listeners, in the end, music may indeed be about youth, subcultural resistance, or the parameters usually discussed by musicologists and music theorists. Its meanings, however, are neither exhausted nor contained by those ways of seeing it. Recordists and others may attempt to relate rock (and its lyrics) to wider social and cultural contexts, to decipher its meanings in the terms favored by academics and journalists. Far more frequently, however, they are engaged in a much more fluid and contingent process. As they engage with recordings, they experience sounds, relate them to others, make evaluations, generate interpretations and perhaps enter into a discourse about what makes the music they like work for them. Sounds become the basis for assertions about inclusion and exclusion, belonging and not belonging, about pleasure and pain, about beauty and ugliness, and all that lies in between those extremes. The problem with previous approaches to meaning is that they unnecessarily foreclose the possibilities for meaning in rock. In the world of rock fans, however, rock is not merely something produced for their decoding or leisurely consumption. It is the beginning of a process that can result in temporary consensus or disagreement and is filtered through what they bring to recordings and how recordings function in their lives. Meaning is not something *in* recordings: it is something that recordings allow listeners to make.

Notes

1. Albin J. Zak, III, Mark Clague, Erik Santos, and Aaron Fox deserve thanks for helping shape my ideas in conversation over the last three years. Stratton Davis and Leesa Beales from the Cocteau Twins Discussion List have my undying gratitude for helping me locate difficult-to-find magazine articles about the Cocteau Twins. I thank Cynthia Wong, Jerusha Ramos, and the journal's reviewers for discerning suggestions.

2. Of course, there are many instances where the selfsame group of fans might protest that *any* analytical standpoint would be suspect, given the numinous character of their most prized music. One might regard such moments as an index of the degree to which Romantic discourses on art have combined with a broader anti-intellectual climate to invalidate all talk or writing about music not purely descriptive of experience. Alternatively, one might adopt the view that "mediated, word-based evaluations . . . do not provide the feeling or direct experience" (Turino 1999:241) of music.

3. The use of the words "make" and "experience" is a deliberate attempt to escape the limitations of sociological studies predicated on the production and consumption of rock. As mass culture-based approaches, each tends to obscure the agency of recordists and music listeners and to efface the complexity and variability of the processes so described. For a nuanced discussion of the problems with the production/consumption dyad, see Laba (1986).

4. For varying approaches to defining rock, see Frith (1981), Grossberg (1990), and Middleton (1990).

5. Discographical information for these and most other recordings mentioned in the body of the article can be found in the discography at the end. Note that a year indicated in the discography corresponds to the year of the original release of the cited recording.

6. The historical dimension is crucial. As Goehr observes, paradigmatic examples can be described thus "not because they are associated with an unchanging set of essential properties, but because . . . they play, for a given time, a particular role in the practice in which they exist" (1992:95–96).

7. Music videos, while arguably an important part of how fans experience rock, are not as essential to interpretation in the long term, particularly since as promotional tools they are more transient than recordings and less widely distributed. For discussions of the role and interpretation of music videos, see Frith, Goodwin and Grossberg (1993).

8. Interestingly, despite the song's decidedly left-leaning meditation on such issues, conservative radio host Rush Limbaugh, much to Hynde's dismay, used "My City Was Gone" as the theme song for his radio program (Corn and Munger 1997).

9. Frith (1989:78–79) traces "reflection theories" to content analyses of song lyrics done in the 1950s. He also details a number of the problems with such analysis.

10. See, for example, Desmond (1987) and Greenfield (1987). Beginning in the late 1960s and inspired by the work of songwriters like Bob Dylan, literary scholars, rock enthusiasts and poetically oriented rock musicians have published

collections of lyrics (Goldstein 1969; Pichaske 1981; Springsteen 1998) that present them as entities capable of enduring scrutiny detached from their recorded manifestations. One extreme example of regarding rock lyrics as poetry is composer John Corigliano's setting of Dylan's lyrics to music reportedly without ever having heard them sung (Kozinn 2000).

11. Sarah McLachlan, for example, has lamented that "Possession" (1993) has been regarded as a love song. According to her, the lyrics are an adaptation of threatening letters she received from an "obsessed fan" who claimed that she'd been betrothed to him before birth and that he would "stop at nothing" to make his marriage to her a reality (Mundy 1998:42). The Police's "Every Breath You Take" (1983), intended by Sting to be a chilling account of stalking and surveillance, has been similarly misread (Connelly 1984:20).

12. Bowie's adaptation of the technique involves writing more or less conventional prose or lyrics and then deliberately rearranging sentences and phrases in order to create a collage-like, non-narrative text. In the past, some of his lyrics were literally cut-ups that involved his rearranging pieces of paper. More recently, he has used a specially written computer program to accomplish similar aims.

13. If such a position were defensible, it would almost require that we develop entirely different modes of analysis for instrumental rock recordings, which, lacking lyrics, would have nothing to reflect—except perhaps their titles. One wonders, for example, whether Johnny Marr's instrumental "Money Changes Everything" (1986) became somehow *more* meaningful when Bryan Ferry added lyrics and retitled it "The Right Stuff" (1986).

14. Allan Moore's skepticism regarding such analysis is instructive (1995c 185–87). Demonstrating that rock musicians think in long-range terms like concert music composers has less to do with the substance of rock than with legitimating it for those who see European concert music as the prime measure of musical value.

15. David Brackett (1995:157–59) examines a similar case in discussing Elvis Costello's disdain for technical writing about music. Brackett goes on to note, however, that Costello is quite at home with the use of terminology familiar to music theorists. Brackett's insight resonates well with Leslie Gay's discussion (1991) of the use of music-theoretical terminology—particularly chord names and formal designations—among New York rock musicians.

16. The technological issues involved with electronic keyboards and drum machines in particular are discussed by Goodwin (1990) and Théberge (1997).

17. Thomas Porcello's work (1996) has been extremely important for mapping out the discursive terrain that musicians use in describing sound and negotiating the process of recording. He details, among other things, the importance of certain kinds of adjectives and how they "fit" the timbral nuances they describe.

18. A noise gate is a device that can be configured to effectively "mute" a microphone or instrument until its dynamic level exceeds a certain threshold, measured in decibels. In simpler terms, low-level sounds, such as the rustling of clothing or the "airiness" of a room, can be filtered out of an audio signal before it goes to tape. Other processing and technical terms are defined by Bartlett and Bartlett (1998).

19. Discussions of sound are prominently featured in *Electronic Musician*, *EQ*, *Mix* and a number of other periodicals for recording professionals and enthusiasts. *Mix*, for example, has long been publishing two columns dedicated to explicating such processes: one called "Classic Tracks" and the other "Recording Notes." In each issue, writers discuss the processes involved in the making of classic and new recordings, respectively, based on interviews with the musicians, producers and engineers involved.

20. In fact, Roland's VG-88, introduced in the mid-1990s, allows guitarists, using a special pickup, to emulate a nearly infinite combination of guitar, amplifier and effects settings. Using their unit, one could literally use a preprogrammed "Stairway to Heaven" patch without having to investigate the recording equipment and processes used by Jimmy Page.

21. This connection is less surprising than it might seem. I remember hearing "Miss You" on Nashville's primary rhythm and blues station, WVOL-AM, in the late 1970s. One could reasonably expect that people listening to R&B stations in other markets might have had similar experiences.

22. The Temptations' recording differs slightly in that their "I/Oh, I" pairings come on the first and third lines of verses. Prince's recording extends the gesture by using the words "You/Oh, you" on the third and fourth lines of his verses.

23. Both examples syllabically distribute the words over these scale degrees: $\hat{5}$–$\hat{5}$–$\hat{4}$–$\hat{3}$–$\hat{2}$–$\hat{1}$–$\hat{1}$.

24. A similar evocative gesture can be identified when one compares "This Is the Sea" (1985) by the Waterboys with "Sweet Thing" (1968) by Van Morrison.

25. For further discussion of some of these issues, see T. Jackson (1998:15–17, 233–34), Higgins (1991), and Crafts, Cavicci, and Keil (1993).

26. As of early February 2001, the Cocteau Twins Discussion List <COCTEAU@NS.PHAET.COM> is maintained by Stratton Davis. Subscription requests go to <LISTSERV@NS.PHAET.COM>. The band's official web site is <http://www.cocteautwins.com>. A separate fan site, maintained by Leesa Beales, can be found at <http://www.cocteautwins.org>. Crafts, Cavicchi, and Keil (1993) is one work that does focus specifically on the views of listeners. Robinson (1997) contains essays that do related work for concert music.

27. I should make clear that I am not claiming that the Cocteau Twins are the only group whose music presents such a challenge. They are one convenient example among a host of others (early R.E.M. recordings, for example). Where whimsical titles are concerned, Simon Raymonde revealed, in a private message to a member of the Cocteau Twins e-mail list, that Fraser had a habit of switching titles, for instance, using a phrase from the third track of a recording to title the second.

28. One might well argue that the enigmatic and evocative design of Cocteau Twins record sleeves suggests such interpretations to writers. None of the group's record sleeves has ever featured photos of the group, lyric sheets, or any but the most basic information: track listings and running times, copyright notices, songwriting and production credits. Instead, they contain ambiguous images, washes of color and texture crafted by Vaughan Oliver's design firm, 23 Envelope. Poynor (2000) discusses the visual identity Oliver constructed for their recordings.

29. She also asserts that wordless singing still communicates something: "Even when I'm not using words, I think people can understand what lies beneath [what I am singing]" (Paphides 1993).

30. The sonic character of work by such bands is discussed by Felder (1993: 115–42).

31. For discussion of varied issues related to computer-mediated communication and the establishment of "virtual communities" via web sites, mailing lists and Usenet groups, see Jones (1995) and Baym (1995).

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The Composer as Pole Seeker: Reading Vaughan Williams's *Sinfonia antartica*

By Michael Beckerman

It is a commonplace of history that we do not encounter events from the past, but rather descriptions of these events. To be more contemporary, and perhaps more accurate, we encounter "spins" on the events. While a kind of precise objectivity based on careful duplication of experiments may be prized by the "hard" sciences, most historians today do not believe that such things as "the past" or "culture" will yield to such treatment. Indeed, the more we seek to "pin down" an event, to argue for a document's "authentic" privileging, the more any kind of objective truth may recede, to be replaced by yet another false front. It is, of course, not necessarily the facts which are in doubt in a particular case, but how they are assembled, organized and presented. The reality of the past, if it appears to us at all, does so through what some have called the "convergence of evidence," and always requires a leap of faith on the part of any investigator or beholder.

If this is true of history in general, it must also be true for the written history of polar exploration, something which, surprisingly, has captured the imagination of the reading public. Twenty years ago it was difficult to find the classic works of the genre outside of an antiquarian bookshop; today bookshops are overflowing with paperback reprints. Thanks to Roland Huntford and others, authoritative biographies are available for such pioneers as Fridtjof Nansen, Ernest Shackleton, Robert Scott, Roald Amundsen, Robert Peary and Frederick Cook. The title of the classic misadventure chronicle, Apsley Cherry-Garrard's recently reprinted *The Worst Journey in the World*, hints at the appeal of this collective hoard of volumes, and a host of others on catastrophic journeys. Sitting in our warm homes, computers buzzing, these harrowing tales are like ghost stories around the fireplace, reminding us of our own comforts and teaching us lessons of heroism and bravery.

Some stories, however, tell better than others, and there has always been a tension between the desire to write history and the storytelling urge, where the requirements of crafting a good yarn do battle with the desire to "get it right." We shall argue here that the same is true when we attempt to understand music and musical meaning. As we take this journey, our guide will be a work "set," as it were, in the cold deserts of Antarctica, a piece that has had something of a mixed reception from audiences and critics—a possibly ambivalent symphony about an ambiguous hero.

Current Musicology, no. 69 (Spring 2000)

Ralph Vaughan Williams's *Sinfonia antartica* had its premiere in 1953, but its opening strains (ex. 1) were first heard by the public in the 1948 film *Scott of the Antarctic*, scored by the composer.[1] It is this passage, which does double duty as the title music from the film and the first bars of the symphony, that will be returned to throughout this study. The theme consists of a series of four consecutive ascending whole tones capped by an oscillating semitone. This is harmonized first by a third relation, E♭ minor–G, and subsequently by an A♭ minor chord (spelled A♭–B–E♭) which leads to an extended variant of the opening that ascends from G through B♭. The opening pattern is repeated a fifth higher, but this time the semitone oscillation is repeated twice in diminution. Initially, the theme is carried by the trombones, trumpets and oboes. Over the next forty measures the entire orchestra articulates a series of variants, culminating in fanfares at measure 48, after which the section comes to a conspicuously clear conclusion (ex. 2).

This opening theme permeates the work. It reappears in a new guise in the middle of the Intermezzo (ex. 3), in a foreshortened form taken from mm. 7–8 of example 1, and returns in full in the final movement. Because of the number of repetitions and their placement, the importance of the main theme in the work is unquestionable, and therefore we may argue that our response to it and our evaluation of the symphony itself are intimately connected.

So then what are we to make of this musical idea and its unfolding? In both the film and the symphony, we encounter it through a virtual barrage of extramusical suggestions that raise more questions than they resolve. What, if anything, does the opening passage have to do with Scott and his Antarctic adventure, and what might it mean in its symphonic context? To answer this we must go on one of the worst journeys of the world, voyaging through the roaring forties, fifties, and sixties to the coldest, highest, and driest continent, Antarctica, and traveling back in time four score and nine years.

For the most part, there is no disputing the facts. On Wednesday, January 17, 1912, after a journey of more than two months and hundreds of miles, Robert Falcon Scott and his group of five Englishmen reached the South Pole. It should have been their finest moment, but it was a living nightmare: paw prints in the snow, flags, and a tent quickly made it clear that Roald Amundsen and his band of Norwegians had been there a month earlier.[2] Scott's journal makes the mood clear: "The Pole. Yes, but under very different circumstances from those expected. We have had a horrible day—" (Scott 1913:424).[3]

Despondent and undernourished, Scott and his men made a desperate dash north, but were held up by a combination of scurvy, exhaustion and

Example 1: *Sinfonia antartica*, first movement ("Prelude"), mm. 1-9.



Example 2: *Sinfonia antartica*, first movement ("Prelude"), 4 mm. before 5 (mm. 48–55).



Example 2 (cont.)



Example 3: *Sinfonia antartica*, fourth movement ("Intermezzo"), 6 mm. after [7].



bad weather. Two men, Edgar Evans and Lawrence Oates died along the way, while the remaining three were stopped about eleven miles short of a large cache of supplies they had named One-Ton Depot. Sitting in their tent, lashed by blizzards, H. R. Bowers, Edward Wilson and Scott died one by one. Scott's final diaries and letters, beautifully written, show that he faced death with courage. Their chilling conclusion, penned when all food and fuel had been exhausted, still has a visceral effect today: "we shall stick it out to the end but we are getting weaker of course and the end cannot be far. It seems a pity but I do not think I can write more—R. Scott." And after a few minutes, hours, or even days: "Last entry For Gods sake look after our people [*sic*]" (ibid.:410).[4]

This tragic event comprises simultaneously one of the most awful and exhilarating pages in the annals of exploration. Many expeditions to the Arctic and Antarctic had met with difficulties and even disaster, most notably the Franklin party, the remains of which were discovered as recently as 1984. But the combination of Scott's tantalizing closeness to both his depot and home base, and his poise under the pressure of certain death render this tale particularly poignant.[5]

In a document titled "Message to the Public," Scott made it clear that he was not responsible for the tragic outcome of the expedition: "The causes of the disaster are not due to faulty organisation, but to misfortune in all risks which had to be undertaken" (Scott 1913:416). Finally, there was a strong appeal to national spirit: "We are weak, writing is difficult, but for my own sake I do not regret this journey, which has shown that Englishmen can endure hardships, help one another, and meet death with as great a fortitude as ever in the past" (ibid.:417).

With lines like this, it is easy to see why Scott became one of the great English heroes. Passages from his expedition diaries became required reading, usually prefaced by comments such as the following by Sir Clements R. Markham, the head of the Royal Geographic Society:

> From all aspects Scott was among the most remarkable men of our time, and the vast number of readers of his journal will be deeply impressed with the beauty of his character. The chief traits which shone forth through his life were conspicuous in the hour of death. There are few events in history to be compared, for grandeur and pathos, with the last closing scene in that silent wilderness of snow. The great leader, with the bodies of his dearest friends beside him, wrote and wrote until the pencil dropped from his dying grasp. There was no thought of himself, only the earnest desire to give comfort and consolation to others in their sorrow. (Scott 1913:v)

By the mid-1940s the Scott legend was known by almost everyone in England. Throughout the country, schoolboys learned the story in hushed tones. The official record of the journey, *Scott's Last Expedition*, had been through more than a dozen editions, and books by the survivors joined a huge number of volumes on the subject, both popular and specialized. In order to comprehend the English response to Scott's journey and tragic death we might think of the 1969 moon landing as an appropriate parallel. Considering that even the near miss of the Apollo 13 mission was enough to inspire a spine-tingling film, we can imagine the response if Neil Armstrong had somehow died on the moon after the Russians had gotten there first, and had left hours of gripping radio messages to his loved ones as he slowly ran out of oxygen. Indeed, such a thing did actually happen recently in a place as inhospitable as Antarctica: the now famous debacle on the slopes of Everest which has inspired several books and films.[6]

It seems fitting that the film *Scott of the Antarctic* was made on the heels of the Allied victory in 1947, as a further monument to British heroism. It was directed by Charles Frend and produced by Maichael Blacon, and first showed at the Odeon Theater on December 30, 1948. Ernest Irving, musical director of Ealing Films, was responsible for getting Vaughan Williams to do the score.[7] All the evidence shows that the composer was taken with the subject almost immediately and was said to have composed most of the score before he even saw the script. If this is true, the "meaning" of the opening music is thus closely tied to his own conception of Scott, rather than any interpretation by the director of the film. This is something to which we shall return below. At any rate, most Vaughan Williams scholars seem to agree that writing the music for the film, and subsequently the symphony, was highly significant for the composer, and gave additional range and depth to his later works. Michael Kennedy writes, "It has already been described how this next subject fired Vaughan Williams's imagination. The music must have been taking shape in his mind: it only needed the right subject to bring it into focus, and the heroic struggle of Scott and his men against fearful odds provided the stimulus" (1964:360ff).[8]

That Vaughan Williams became preoccupied with the Scott story is not the least bit surprising. First and foremost it is a fabulous yarn, with all the ingredients of an action adventure film, a sports event and a Greek tragedy. The members of the polar party—the gallant Scott, the powerful PO Evans, the stalwart Captain Oates, the Christ-like Dr. Wilson and the indomitable little "Birdie" Bowers—are distinctive personalities, and each time we read Scott's diary we cannot help hoping that they will somehow survive. Another reason was no doubt the attraction of Antarctica itself. As

David Campbell writes in his fascinating book, *The Crystal Desert*, "Antarctica has haunted the imagination of Western cultures" (1992:149). For centuries, the continent was almost the equivalent of a UFO, described occasionally by seafarers, but never documented. It was not really seen until 1819, and not still fully explored a century later.

There is something else that must have attracted the composer: Antarctica is an oddly perfect setting for the particular drama of national aspiration. It is an empty stage on which practically all is frozen and pristine white, a place of extraordinary beauty, but also one of amazing deception. The seemingly smooth snow may have the texture of sand at certain temperatures; pressure ridges create great humps, *sastrugi*, which must be traversed; immense ice falls and chasms appear without warning to swallow up sledges; and giant, jagged mountains must be scaled. It is simultaneously pre-Lapsarian Garden and frozen Hades. There is no film preserved from the expedition, only still photographs. These are eerily placid and cannot convey two of the hazards which eventually destroyed the party: the horrible piercing cold and the unbelievable wind that never stopped.

The great explorer Ernest Shackelton, whom Scott reviled, once remarked that the point of the pole was that it was *pointless*.[9] To make it more abstract, compared to something like Mt. Everest, the South Pole is hardly even a place, just an arbitrary intersection of points of longitude. The explorers at the turn of the century did not seek it to gain any wealth or trade opportunities (although it was gradually discovered that the flora, fauna, and minerals of the region were astonishingly valuable). Despite much discussion of science, both Scott and Amundsen raced for the sake of raw achievement and adventure; the only real aim of both expeditions was to achieve the Pole for their respective countries, and the fame that came with it.

Because of the alien terrain of Antarctica and the romantic aura of pole seeking, there are multiple parallels between Scott's expedition and nineteenth-century artistic aspiration. Antarctica was a barren landscape onto which a person or group could project a range of qualities, against which they could test themselves or the presumed virtues of their nation. It was a kind of "other": part neutral proving ground, part exotic locale, and part monster from a science fiction novel.

The race between Norwegian and English explorers was seen at the time as a competition of national virtues, a last gasp of Romantic nationalism. The Norwegians based their approach largely on a study of the Eskimos, with whom they were familiar. Their clothing, food, and transport were not technologically sophisticated, but simple, even primitive; they used skis and dog sleds. They were humble, rather taciturn people, and only wanted things to go without "adventure"—that is, as smoothly as possible. They adjusted to their environment and tried not to underestimate it.[10] These

were *Norwegian* virtues. It is no coincidence that the greatest Norwegian explorer of the time, Fridtjof Nansen, was also a significant political figure as well, for Norway was in the heyday of its nation building exercise and polar exploration was the equivalent of warfare, forging victories and creating mythic, latter-day Viking heroes.[11]

The English, on the other hand, tried to bring as many things from their home environment as they could, actually creating a polar newsletter and transporting many aspects of Victorian culture to the land of ice.[12] They even brought the latest in technology, the ill-fated motor sledges. Indeed, it was the failure of these marvels of industry that allowed Scott and his men to rise to heroic stature.[13] Though they tested themselves unsuccessfully, their solace was that no men could have survived such tests, that they had pushed human courage and bravery to its limit. They tried their damnedest and failed. These were *English* virtues.[14]

It is this notion of the English spirit that animated *Scott of the Antarctic*. The film focuses exclusively on Scott and the crew he assembles around him, with about two-thirds of the footage detailing the polar journey. John Mills portrays Scott as a mild-mannered man of enormous competence, modesty and integrity. The scientist, Edward "Bill" Wilson, and the rest of the men are treated as tough but gentle fighters and graceful losers. Liberal sections of Scott's diaries are quoted in the screenplay.

The success of the film depends strongly on the soundtrack which, more than many films of the time, is foregrounded in a particularly conspicuous way.[15] We hear the opening title music—later used as the opening of the symphony—twice in its entirety. It sounds first against a bright, blue-white background which after a few seconds yields to the film's title with a shot of the Scott monument in the background.[16] Several details in the material itself are exploited by the composer. The slowly ascending augmented fifth appears to create an atmosphere of struggle and achievement (in the list of musical numbers it is designated "heroism"), while the oscillating semitone suggests something darker, perhaps even the cruel Antarctic wind.

Thus we may well have the impression at this time that the music somehow represents both the vastness and alien grimness of Antarctica as well as the courage of the men who are marching through it. The monolithic quality and the spacious unisons seem an attempt to depict the scope of the landscape in which epic events will take place. It is a second cousin to "vast space" music in works such as *Appalachian Spring*, the "New World" Largo, and Borodin's *Steppes of Central Asia*; "mountain" music of the kind found in Pavel Novák's *In the Tatras;* and the type of "outer space" music used in Holst's "Neptune" from *The Planets* and many science fiction movies.

We are given clues about the semitone oscillation seventeen minutes into the film when Scott is testing his mechanical sledges in Norway.

Nansen (the only Norwegian character in the film) is trying to get Scott to use dogs and says, "This Antarctic of yours is a cold and cruel place." Against this we hear the semitone in the bass.

Our initial instincts about the theme as a whole are borne out in one of the most spectacular moments of the film, the ascent of the Beardmore Glacier. Here the title music returns in full as the ultimate metaphor for triumph gained through enormous struggle, as we see the party's agonizing ascent of the glacier, fighting the sledges which constantly threaten to slide down the mountain.

On the return from the Pole, the theme is fragmented (as in example 3): the first two pitches vanish and the semitones are repeated. This variation of the theme is associated with the notion of "desperate struggle." In the context of Scott and his men, this material also suggests a funeral dirge, since the final journey back from the pole must be considered a kind of death march. Fragments reappear at the death of PO Evans and when Titus Oates bravely goes off to die in the snow. Finally, it accompanies the graphic representation of the distance to One-Ton Depot, never gained by the remaining members of the expedition, who perished about eleven miles from it. The theme reappears at the conclusion of the film, and during the final credits, when the semitones are transformed, along with the theme, into a series of fanfares proclaiming the posthumous triumph of the expedition, resembling example 2.

The film is devoted to the praise of heroism, and, at least in its outlines, the *Sinfonia antartica* preserves this quality. Instead of visual images, there are now literary prefaces to each of its five movements derived from Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*, Psalm 104, Coleridge's *Hymn Before Sunrise in the Vale of Chamouni*, and Donne's *The Sun Rising*. Mixed in with these selections is a passage from Scott's last journal which stands as a epitaph for the final movement: "I do not regret this journey; we took risks, we knew we took them, things have come out against us therefore we have no cause for complaint" (ex. 4).

It is impossible to generalize about the effect of a symphony on its audience, but the reviews indicate that the first listeners to *Sinfonia Antartica* were richly engaged with its context. The story of Scott and his men was well known everywhere in England, and the film had been playing in theaters several years earlier. More immediate information was provided by program notes and the passage from Shelley.

Despite the tragic circumstances of his demise, Scott had become a kind of Napoleonic figure, a larger-than-life hero. While it would be simple-minded to expect to achieve any ultimate insights merely by invoking Beethovenian models, neither would such a thing have been unimportant in this case. The general shape and key of the theme invoke the "Eroica"

Example 4: Literary prefaces for the movements of *Sinfonia antartica*.

PRELUDE: Andante Maestoso

To suffer woes which hope thinks infinite,
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night,
To defy power which seems omnipotent,
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent:
This . . . is to be
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free;
This is alone life, joy, empire and victory.

SHELLEY: *Prometheus Unbound*

SCHERZO: Moderato

There go the ships
and there is that Leviathan
whom thou hast made to take his pastime therein.

PSALM 104

LANDSCAPE: Lento

Ye ice falls! Ye that from the mountain's brow
Adown enormous ravines slope amain—
Torrents, methinks, that heard a mighty voice,
And stopped at once amid their maddest plunge!
Motionless torrents! Silent cataracts!

COLERIDGE: *Hymn before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni*

INTERMEZZO: Andante sostenuto

Love, all alike, no season knows, nor clime,
Nor hours, days, months, which are the rags of time.

DONNE: *The Sun Rising*

EPILOGUE: Alla marcia moderato (ma non troppo)

I do not regret this journey; we took risks, we knew we took them, things have come out against us, therefore we have no cause for complaint.

CAPTAIN SCOTT'S LAST JOURNAL

Symphony and, as we have suggested, the opening gesture of the work has elements which allow it to be used both as an image of immensity, power, and triumph and also as a kind of dirge. It is easy to read Scott as the Promethian hero of the work and Antarctica as the arena in which the hero strives, fails, and posthumously triumphs—indeed, Vaughan Williams referred to the work as his "Scott Symphony."[17]

With its five movements and landscape painting, the *Sinfonia antartica* also shows similarities to Beethoven's nature work, the "Pastoral" Symphony. Vaughan Williams was clearly captivated by the musical possibilities for painting the Antarctic. A range of musical gestures in the third

movement, titled "Landscape," forcefully portray the "otherness" of this world and are set off against the main theme. This scene painting begins directly after the main theme in the first movement. There is an offstage voice and eventually an offstage choir, both wordless (ex. 5).

The wordless offstage choir, which first began to appear regularly in operas at the end of the nineteenth century, usually suggests something disembodied—the alien, inchoate voice from another reality. This is later coupled with a wind machine which, as much as anything in the symphony, makes it difficult to listen to the piece as an abstraction existing apart from an Antarctic scenario. Considering the amalgamation of the heroic and the landscape, it would not be inappropriate to argue that the symphony is constituted as a heroic Antarctic anti-pastoral.[18]

Though the work has generally been fairly popular, it has not pleased everybody. In his article in the *New Grove Dictionary*, based on his larger volume on Vaughan Williams, Hugh Ottaway suggests that the *Sinfonia antartica* is the least successful of his later symphonies, in part because it is neither programmatic nor symphonic enough (1980:576). One could take issue with either point. Certainly, there are numerous details that suggest a larger program for the symphony based on the notion of Scott's journey. On the other hand, many successful symphonies—Mahler's First, Chaikovskii's Fourth, and Dvorak's "New World," for example—have programs at their core, and it is difficult to reveal in what way these works lack such an elusive quality as "symphonicity." If Ottaway and others have felt some ambivalence toward the symphony, perhaps other readings and contexts may suggest some possible reasons.

The state of the Scott legend as Vaughan Williams encountered it remained more or less stable until 1979. In that year, polar historian Roland Huntford published a richly documented, 665-page book titled *Scott and Amundsen*, later edited and published as *The Last Place on Earth*.[19] In addition to being a wonderful thriller about the race between two very different men, this book was a scathing indictment of Scott's abilities and leadership. The reader might have been warned by the quote of Basil Liddell Hart which preceded the work: "It is more important to provide material for a true verdict than to gloss over disturbing facts so that individual reputations may be preserved."

Scott's reputation is hardly preserved. Huntford claims that Scott was an incompetent Naval officer and subsequently a terrible explorer, that he was a poor leader of men, remote and mired in the stultifying codes of the British Navy. He argues that virtually every aspect of the trip was poorly planned, and that Scott, not having the patience to learn how to use dogs or even skis, made virtue out of a torture called "man hauling," where in place of dogs the men themselves dragged weighted sledges up mountains

Example 5: *Sinfonia antartica*, first movement ("Prelude"), 7.



and on ice with the texture of sand.[20] By ignoring evidence that fresh meat (available either from seal or dog) was necessary for diet, almost all the English contracted the scurvy which probably contributed to their deaths. Huntford argues that by inexplicably adding a fifth member to the polar party at the last moment without increasing the food supply, Scott probably sealed the fate of the group. In a final ghastly irony, it appears that the party could easily have been found by those who had remained behind, but Scott's instructions about possible rescue were so contradictory that nothing was done. In short, the death of the Scott party was not a noble tragedy, but rather a pathetic memorial to mediocrity. About Scott's famous "Message to the Public" Huntford has this to say:

> This is special pleading. Scott had brought disaster on himself by his own incompetence, and thrown away the lives of his companions. He had suffered retribution for his sins. But he was justifying himself, finding excuses, throwing the blame on his subordinates. It is the testament of a failure, but because of its literary style, heroic failure. (1985:509)

Huntford also reveals that the Scott diaries were edited by his wife and Sir Clements Markham, President of the Royal Geographical Society, smoothing out all the rough edges to ensure that Scott appeared as a hero; any evidence to the contrary was suppressed. For example, the famous passage in Scott's diary, "Now for the run home and a desperate struggle. I wonder if we can do it," originally read: "and a desperate struggle *to get the news back first.* I wonder if we can do it."[21] Even with careful editing, there are times when Scott seems to lay the blame for his misfortunes on his sick and exhausted companions instead of realizing how poorly he had planned the return journey from the Pole. Finally, in what must be considered the ultimate blow to the Scott legend, Huntford argues (controversially of course) that Scott and his men probably could have made it to their depot:

> Scott would have to answer for the men he had lost.
>
> Shackleton would have the last laugh.
>
> That was something Scott could not face. It would be better to seek immolation in the tent. That way he could snatch a kind of victory out of defeat. Wilson and Bowers were persuaded to lie down with him and wait for the end, where the instinct of other men in like predicament was to keep going and fall in their tracks. For at least nine days they lay in their sleeping bags, while their last food and fuel gave out, and their life ebbed away. (1985:507)

Although there were numerous vigorous rebuttals to Huntford's work at the time—some accused the author of being an Anglophobe[22]—no one has really been able to refute his basic point (which, incidentally, is part of the reason for his hostility toward Scott): Amundsen was in many ways the rightful hero of the piece, having showed all the virtues which have been attributed to Scott. Amundsen was a true professional, who chose his party with great care, built in many fail-safe devices, and worked like a demon from dawn to dusk in order to make sure every detail had been worked out. For all this, the English have tended to write him out of the whole affair, or at least to treat him as an interloper or, even worse, as the man who, by breaking the spirit of Scott and his men, caused their death.[23]

Huntford implies that the Scott legend had much to do with the way the English wished to see themselves at a certain point in history, and thus it is part of a national myth. He writes that Scott's "actions and, above all, his literary style, appealed to the spirit of his countrymen. He personified the glorious failure which by now had become a British ideal. He was a suitable hero for a nation in decline" (1985:524). By mortifying their flesh, the English engaged in a kind of rite of purification, based on bravery, brute strength and self-sacrifice, while the Norwegians, by not suffering enough, by actually being *competent*, were accused of missing the point of the enterprise.

We may now ask what the effect of such disclosures might have on our experience with the *Sinfonia antartica*? If the Scott legacy is somehow ambivalent, or worse, a triumph of puffed-up mediocrity, what do we make of a musical work which, at least in terms of its inception, treats it as the essence of heroism? While a sympathetic reading of Scott's diaries may lay the foundation for perceiving the symphony as heroic and powerful, perusing Huntford has the opposite effect. And reversing things by using Huntford's work as a kind of "sound track" for the symphony does not entirely have a positive effect on our experience. Even though Huntford's book was written more than thirty years after *Sinfonia antartica*, much of the information on which he based his conclusions was available to Vaughan Williams, and we shall see that the composer's view was not entirely one-sided. Yet, although quite different in character, profession and ability, Vaughan Williams and the explorer certainly shared some general ideas about "nation" and the concept of the English national character; after all, they were contemporaries.[24] Certainly, for Vaughan Williams to have written a symphony about Scott must be seen as something significant of itself, for he certainly could have used his Antarctic material as a basis for a symphonic work without referring to the explorer. Yet he went even further by linking Scott's diaries with passages from Shelley,

Coleridge, Donne, and Psalm 104 to give his work an explicitly English character.

Accepting Huntford's arguments fully, both about Scott and the English response to him, makes it difficult to listen the symphony's first bars without thinking of them as a bombastic and misplaced bit of national rhetoric. Far from being tragic or heroic, the opening strains of the Huntford-Scott symphony seem overblown and melodramatic, a monument to foolish pride and trumped-up tragedy—in short, kitsch. The notes haven't changed but we hear them differently, as a kind of soundtrack of a hackneyed newsreel about the glories of the English character. It doesn't seem a coincidence that the words which directly precede the symphony are "joy, empire, and victory." This may be especially hard to swallow when we realize that the tendency of the British Empire to organize itself in somewhat rigid hierarchies, whether dealing with the Raj in India or the polar wastes, contributed directly to the failure of the expedition.[25] By destroying the initiative of his men through a stratified chain of command, Scott sealed his own fate. Musical sounds associated with this kind of overconfident incompetence could be analyzed, but it would seem meaningless since we have no serious stake in them.

This view of the music of *Scott of the Antarctic* was actually expressed to me directly by Huntford in a private communication. He writes: "The Scott film was of its times. Vaughan Williams is one of my least favourite composers, but in my view his 'Antarctic' music exactly fits; indeed reinforces the Scott legend. Exactly how this is achieved, I cannot say. I suspect it has something to do with blandness, predictability, and the striving to be virtuous; sycophancy set to music, as it were."[26]

While the solution to all conflicts does not lie in admitting that both sides have merit, there is certainly a more sympathetic view of Scott that also fits the evidence, one which might suggest a third way to explore and hear the opening of the symphony. We can admit that much of what Huntford says about the expedition and its leader is true, while at the same time admiring the courage and pluck of those five men tramping—some blindly and others with open eyes—to their deaths, and understand that Vaughan Williams responded strongly to them, even as we do today. Polar historian David Thomson articulates this view well: "the story of Scott's men must be simply that of ill-advised and not always very critical humans, going out in the great cold" (1977:311). Further, we can imagine a Scott who has figured out the enormity of his mistakes and with each step regrets his pride and arrogance more. His last words, "look after our people," are in no way self-glorifying, but a frantic, desperate plea for all the survivors, especially the families of those who perished. Scott *is* a hero, but like us, he is massively flawed and complex.

Oddly enough, it is the television film based on Huntford's work, *The Last Place on Earth*, that encourages such a portrait. Between the covers of Huntford's book, in black and white, it is possible to feel something like revulsion for Scott. Yet when a director, actor and cinematographer have to *realize* this story, something happens, and Scott, despite our reservations about him, becomes heroic once again. We feel pity for his failure, and see his fate as a cruel punishment for flaws all too common among us.

Is there evidence that Vaughan Williams had any awareness of such an ambiguous scenario? Did he accept the Scott myth completely, or was he possibly skeptical of it and the parallel myth of Empire?[7] In wondering about Vaughan Williams's response, we may remember that the conclusion of the film and the symphony are radically different. The former features a process analogous to Death and Transfiguration, ending with hymn-like fanfares of vindication. The symphony, however, concludes with the dark, enveloping death mask of nature: the "heroic" march of the opening yields to the wordless voice associated with the alien Antarctic terrain at the opening of the film, which the composer referred to as "the terror and fascination of the Pole" in his film scenario (see ex. 5). Is this not a strange way to end a heroic symphony, unless one has, perhaps, realized that the hero has feet of clay? There is evidence that from the very first, Vaughan Williams was ambivalent about various aspects of the project and Scott's expedition. Writing in her biography of the composer, his wife Ursula reports, "Ralph became more and more upset as he read about the inefficiencies of the organization; he despised heroism that risked lives unnecessarily and such things as allowing five to travel on rations for four filled him with fury" (1964:279). This ambivalence, apparently, was ongoing, as she also writes, "Ralph still fulminated against the amateurish organization of the last stages of the expedition, but he was pleased with his score" (ibid.:287).

We might consider, then, that both the problem and the redemption of the *Sinfonia antartica* come from a genuine ambivalence on the part of the composer, who knew full well on some level what the Scott Expedition was all about, and could not but allow his response to be reflected in his score. In this case, the symphony is not simply to be heard as a paean to the heroism of man and the massive power of nature, but is also meant to be associated with the bitterness of human failure, the pessimism of dreams dashed, and the futility of fools fighting the wind and ice. If we can believe in such a thing, the opening of the symphony becomes ambivalent, ominous and unremittingly tragic. The whole tone ascent becomes both more sluggish and more highly charged for us, while the semitone wavering carries an immense emotional weight. All seemingly triumphant gestures are rendered hollow, since we know, just

as we do when we read Scott's journal, how it will all turn out. Scott and his men are fools, and heroes both. The work is simultaneously nationalist and passionately anti-nationalist.

Of course, after all this, some will feel that we have missed the whole point, that trying to play with various extramusical impulses is as reckless as tackling the Pole in shorts and a T-shirt. Why not simply go back to the music and forget about the possibly confusing and contradictory programmatic images? But of course, we know that there is no such thing as "the music," in any case, and once we have been lured into the world of the program by the composer, trying to return to some notion of abstract aesthetic purity is more difficult than finding a depot in a blizzard. Even if we could attain such a place, it would rapidly become clear that the very thing that we wish to comprehend has become unintelligible, for we never approach works in a vacuum, without context. Without some parallel scenario, there is simply no meaning.

In fact, the most exciting kinds of analysis naturally suggest interpretive strategies. As a quick example, one of the peculiarities of the opening is the "misspelled" A♭-minor chord. The chord itself, while evocative, acts as a kind of phantom placed between two G major chords, the harmonic semitone relationship mirroring the melodic activity at the end of the line. Might we consider that this strangely spelled chord is an immediate symbol of the fact that, in this work, as in the Scott legend itself, nothing is as it appears to be?[28]

I have focused primarily on the relationship between the symphony and the Scott expedition because the composer stressed such a thing, but I could have easily looked at other features. For example, some critics have considered the work in terms of the *sublime*, seeing the tininess of the characters against the vast Antarctic landscape as the fundamental goal of the work.[29] Certainly, the way the formal unfolding of the symphony affects our response to the opening material is significant as well. It hardly matters which aspect of the work we choose to privilege. What is important is that depending on our attitudes towards such things as Scott, Antarctica, Amundsen, exploration, nationalism, semitones, Vaughan Williams, England, our momentary moods, whole tone scales, and countless other factors, we may find compelling reasons to hear the *Sinfonia antartica* as exhilarating, stuffy, heroic, tragic, ambiguous, or downright silly. All of these depend on the interaction between a multiplicity of real-world scenarios and the fiction we sometimes call "the music itself." And by fiction I do not mean to imply that the idea of "the music itself" is without value, merely that the retelling of a musical work as a Schenkerian reduction, a succession of chords, or an intricate formal

design is no more real than imagining it in connection with ideas, images and actions.

This is, of course, quite troubling, which is at least one reason why so much of the work in music criticism, theory, and scholarship is involved with sanctioned Masterpieces. It is not that they are "better" works, but rather that a collective assumption of value allows us to ignore the outside forces that shape our engagement with music. When we encounter a work such as the *Sinfonia antartica*, which has not been sanctioned, the thin ice on which our aesthetic judgements rest are immediately evident.

In this study, I have implied that a work like *Sinfonia antartica* may change its identity depending on our evaluation of its hero, its composer, and the ideological worlds surrounding both of them. Since this involves an ongoing process, it obviously follows that our listening experience, to choose an appropriate metaphor, is only the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, many of our most profound engagements with a work like this occur when we recompose and reflect, minutes, hours, and days after hearing its actual sounds. Thus a *contemplation* of such things as national striving, A♭-minor chords, and the composer's attempt to find a hero where there may not have been one, is not alien to the process of coming to terms with this symphony, nor is it a negligible part of determining its significance. This process may take a week, or it could take several years. Though in the end, it may be tempting to banish all extramusical considerations for their Scott-like amateurishness and unscientific meanderings, we may remember that much of the value ceded to music by our culture (i.e., why music departments exist) depends on the belief that music is somehow part of reality and communicates things about it, however imprecisely we can articulate them.

For Scott, Amundsen, Vaughan Williams, and so many others, the Poles were great metaphors: of the unknown, of striving, of death. We might continue the process by seeing in polar exploration certain more general analogues to intellectual and artistic activity. Amundsen-like preparation, in exploration or research, though not always glamorous, generally brings better conclusions, while Scott-like efforts usually involve great "adventures," but far less happy results. Looking at Vaughan Williams as an example, we also might suggest that the most successful artists seem to have combined aspects of both expeditions in their approach to material.

We might also note a distinction between expeditions to the North and South Poles. While the South Pole, despite its abstractness, is actually a place on a continent which can be visited time and again, the North Pole is quite elusive. There is no land there, simply ice floes. Two of Scott's cabins still stand in the Antarctic and there is a scientific base at the South Pole; there are few momentos in the far North. For this reason, not a single person disputes the fact that Scott and Amundsen made it to the

South Pole, while the debate about the North Pole still rages. Did Peary really make it? Was Cook's claim valid? Even today, we do not know.[30]

Perhaps these polar situations may serve as metaphors for the sciences and the humanities respectively. The South Pole appears to be like the hard sciences. Though the ice cap may shift, there is a continent below, just as many kinds of scientific experiments may be duplicated and verified by succeeding generations. But this is not so for most of the work in the humanities. In a wonderful passage from Amundsen's *The South Pole*, the author talks about his life as an explorer:

> The regions round the North Pole—oh the Devil take it—the North Pole had attracted me since the days of my childhood and so I found myself at the South Pole. Can anything more perverse be conceived? ([1912] 1976)

So too does this study end as far away as possible from where it began, for it is the North Pole, with its shifting ice floes, which is more like our discipline. Here context not only alters content, but serves to create content. There is no solid ground, nothing left behind remains at the same place, and this year's verities, about the *Sinfonia antartica* or any other work, are likely to be next year's laughingstocks, if they are remembered at all.[31]

Notes

1. The title of the symphony is curious in its origin. It was originally called *Sinfonia antarctica*. Presumably the name "sinfonia" was used to distinguish the work from his numbered symphonies, considering its uniqueness in both origin and approach. When it was pointed out to the composer that he was using Latinate ("sinfonia") and Greek ("antarctica") words together, he changed the second word to the Italianate "antartica" (Kennedy 1964:322).

2. The circumstances that led Amundsen to contend for the South Pole are themselves indicative of the vicissitudes of Polar exploration. It had been Amundsen's intention to be first at the North Pole, but while he was planning his expedition he received word that the North Pole, "the Big Nail," had been attained, first by Cook and then by Peary. Although the achievements of both these expeditions were later discredited, Amundsen felt that there was no prize to be had. For this reason he surreptitiously planned an assault on the South Pole, not even telling his men until they were at Madeira, his last European port of call. For more on this, see Huntford (1985).

3. In addition to this 1913 publication, the journals of Scott, obviously unedited, are also available in six volumes from University Microfilms LTD; they were published in 1968. Material about the expedition to the South Pole is found in volume 6.

4. See also the grisly facsimile of the handwritten entry between pages 402 and 403 of Scott (1913).

5. For a fascinating account of the Franklin expedition, complete with astonishing photographs of the preserved bodies of the victims, see Beattie and Geiger (1988). There is quite a substantial literature on polar subjects. For an excellent summary of polar exploration and a good basic bibliography see Maxtone-Graham (1988). For a good general history of Antarctic exploration see Fogg and Smith (1990). For more meditative and speculative views, see Pyne (1986), Parfit (1985), and Campbell (1992). The following books are useful descriptions of Scott and his expedition: Huxley (1977), Thomson (1977), and Pound (1966). For a wonderful visual record of the trip see Ponting (1975).

6. In this case, two experienced mountain guides, Stephen Fischer and Rob Hall, died, along with several others, in an ill-fated assault on Mt. Everest. There were video cameras there to film some parts of the disaster, and Rob Hall, who had heroically stayed at the top of Everest rather than leave a dying companion, was patched through to his wife's telephone in New Zealand, where he was able to say a poignant farewell before dying of cold and exposure.

7. See Kennedy (1964:297–300). Vaughan Williams had worked with Irving on a previous film, *The Loves of Joanna Godden*.

8. See also Ottaway's comment in his article in *The New Grove*: "He soon knew that what he was writing was no ordinary film score and that an Antarctic symphony might well come of it. In fact, he was achieving a reconciliation that would produce not one but three more symphonies and would affect almost everything he wrote in the very active ten years remaining to him" (1980:575).

9. For a richly layered portrait of Shackleton see Huntford (1986). The tension between Scott and Shackelton can be traced to the Discovery Expedition of 1902–04, when Scott had Shackelton "invalided out" because of scurvy. It came to a head in 1908 when Shackleton, in a heroic dash, came within ninety miles of the Pole, the Furthest South which had yet been achieved. He returned to London a hero. When his wife asked him how he had the will to turn back he replied: "I thought you would rather have a live donkey than a dead lion." This is a stark contrast to Scott's later choices.

10. Yet their polar expedition was not entirely without incident. Amundsen was so worried about Scott and so overestimated Scott's preparation that he at first left for the South Pole much too early. He and his men were forced to turn back and several almost died. See Huntford (1985).

11. Nansen's role in the whole race to the Pole was extraordinary. He counseled Scott to use dogs and was a true mentor to Amundsen, giving him the use of Nansen's special exploration ship, the Fram, and fighting to get support for the expedition. Finally, while Scott was down in the Antarctic, Nansen may have had a brief affair with Scott's wife Kathleen (Huntford 1985).

12. Several diaries are available which show well the camaraderie of the place. Perhaps the most thoughtful is *The Quiet Land: The Antarctic Diaries of Frank Debenham* (1992). The best evidence of the manner in which the English brought their donnish humor and behavior to the South can be seen in the facsimile of *The South Polar Times*, published as volume 4 of *The Diaries of Captain Robert Scott* (1968).

13. Scott brought three motorized sledges on his ship *The Terra Nova*. They were of a new design using caterpillar treads. One sank as it was being taken off

the ship and the other two stopped working shortly after the assault on the Pole. See Huntford (1985:224, 393).

14. Something of the extreme nationalism that was occasionally found on the polar journey can be seen in an entry from the diary of Tryggve Gran, the only Norwegian on the expedition. Unaware of Amundsen's plans to take the South Pole, Gran had accepted Scott's invitation to join his expedition. The passage describes a conversation between Gran and Titus Oates: "Oates was a closed book to me until I shared camp life with him . . . I gained the impression that I did not find grace in his eyes . . . On the return journey from 'One Ton Depot' Oates told me straight out that what he had against me was not personal; it was just that I was a foreigner. With all his heart he hated all foreigners, because all foreigners hated England." When Gran declared that he would support England if it were forced into war, "the next instant he grasped my hand. From this moment the closed book opened, and Oates and I became the best of friends" (Gran 1984).

15. For a list of the pieces used in the film see Kennedy (1964:583). Although the numbers are listed, they are not identified, and there is no thematic index to show, for example, that no. 1 and no. 19 are the same music.

16. It is ironic that Scott's "dark" journey took place entirely in the light, since the sun never set during the period of his assault on the Pole.

17. In a letter to Ernest Irving, Vaughan Williams wrote: "I cannot get on at all with the 'Scott' symphony, so it will have to wait a bit, I expect" (Kennedy 1964).

18. Other bits composed for the film make their way into the symphony: the Trio of the Scherzo is based on a section where Birdie Bowers encounters some bouncing penguins, while the Intermezzo comes from a theme associated with Wilson's wife, Oreana, which was not used in the movie.

19. This was later made into a BBC series by Trevor Griffiths titled "The Last Place on Earth," starring Martin Shaw as Scott, with a nice cameo by Brian Dennehy as the disgraced Frederick Cook. This is a marvelous piece of television theater, and should be seen alongside the film *Scott of the Antarctic*. The screenplay was also published in a volume entitled *Judgment Over the Dead* (Griffiths 1986). At the beginning of the volume, Mischa Glenney interviews Griffiths in a fascinating piece of print journalism.

20. One of Huntford's most damaging indictments is his successful attempt to show that the "awful weather" which held up the ill and demoralized Scott posed no threat to Amundsen at all, and that the Norwegians, using dogs and skis, frequently traveled enormous distances in the kind of weather which stopped Scott in his tracks. This is contested by Solomon (2001).

21. This, of course, cannot be blamed on Scott. These comparisons can be made between *Scott's Last Expedition* (Scott 1913) and the facsimile edition of the diaries (Scott 1968). The following passage appears in volume 6.

22. See Maxtone-Graham (1988:304). In Griffiths (1986), there is a good deal of talk in the abovementioned interview (see note 19) about how the forces around Scott's son, Sir Peter Scott, tried to suppress both the book and the television series.

23. After he had attained the Pole, and before Scott's disaster had been discovered, Amundsen gave several speeches in England. He was taken aback by the

rudeness and condescension of many of the members of the Royal Geographic Society. This statement by Lord Curzon was particularly galling to him: "I almost wish that in our tribute of admiration we could include those wonderful, good-tempered, fascinating dogs, the true friends of man, without whom Captain Amundsen would never have got to the pole" (Thomson 1977:288–89). In Amundsen's recollection Curzon said, "'I propose three cheers for the dogs', while he clearly emphasized his satirical and derogatory intention by turning towards me with a deprecatory gesture" (Huntford 1985:538).

24. Scott was born four years before Vaughan Williams, in 1868. The writing about Scott has always drawn on the issue of national character. A typical example is provided by Apsley Cherry-Garrard (1997) who wrote: "It is the great good fortune of England that Scott wrote—could feel so deeply and express his feelings—as he did. Those words which Scott wrote when he was dying, forced out of him by the circumstances and by his sense of duty, are part of England. Of this I am sure; the unselfishness, the sacrifice, the fight against hopeless odds immortalized by Scott in that last message and in those letters which he wrote as he died, had their effect upon the Great War and will go on having their effect for many years unknown."

25. For more on the organization of the British Empire, see David Cannadine (2001).

26. Personal communication, January 6, 1994.

27. Trevor Griffiths has this to say on the subject: "What is it about the Scott myth, the mythography that surrounds that? Why is that so important? I've known this for many years now, but I've never quite seen the essential adjacency, a contingency of the one with the other. . . . The myth had to be created to justify the war that followed. And it's because we live in times that are themselves not very different that I wanted to write this piece" (1986:xxxiii).

28. I am grateful to my colleague Lee Rothfarb for his insights into this passage.

29. This paper was first given at U. C. Berkeley, and I am grateful to the student respondents whose questions helped to shape my revisions.

30. The best evidence we have suggests that neither of them made it. At any rate, there is no evidence available in terms of careful diaries and sextant readings to prove either case. The matter is itself a fascinating tale of political power since, like Scott, Peary had the backing of the powerful National Geographic Society. The most important books by both explorers are Frederick Cook's *My Attainment of the Pole* (1911) and *Return From the Pole* (1951), and Robert E. Peary's *The North Pole* (1910). The following is a selection of fairly recent books on the subject with their general findings: Wright (1970), maybe Cook made it, Peary didn't; Rawlins (1973), neither made it to the Pole; Eames (1973), Cook yes, Peary no; Rasky (1977), probably neither did; Hunt (1981), neither, but especially not Cook!; Breton (1988), Cook not, Peary probably not; Herbert (1989), Cook no, and Peary no, but he got close; Abramson (1991), Cook made it, Peary didn't.

31. Indeed, things in the Antarctic have heated up just as this article goes to press. Susan Solomon, a scientist at America's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration who first visited Antarctica in 1986, has written a vigorous rebuttal to Huntford. Her monograph (Solomon 2001) argues that the temperatures Scott

encountered were significantly colder than the "normal" ones as measured in meteorological stations over the past seventeen years. Scott's failure, she insists, was not due to incompetence, but to the very "bad luck" the explorer mentions so frequently in his diaries. Huntford terms her arguments "codwaddle." And so the debate continues, in the *New York Times*, in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, and on numerous websites throughout cyberspace.

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Arnold Schering, "Die Eroica, eine Homer-Symphonie Beethovens?": Translated with an Introduction and Commentary

Translator's Introduction by Glenn Stanley

With this essay on the "Eroica" Symphony, the eminent German musicologist Arnold Schering (1877–1941) began the second phase of an ambitious project to develop a method for musical hermeneutics and apply it to the interpretation of individual works. The programmatic interpretation of the symphony, which makes Hector, the Trojan warrior of Homer's *Iliad*, the principal hero of the work rather than Napoleon, inaugurated a series of articles and books devoted to the explication of the symbolic content of Beethoven's most important instrumental music. Beethoven, Schering argued, was stimulated to compose through his engagement with literary works, which functioned as programs that were presented symbolically in his music.[1] After composing, he suppressed the programs. Although Schering often labored to present arguments about their plausibility, he was unable to provide concrete evidence for such programs and none has since emerged. Hence they must be considered fictions, products of Schering's own rich musical and literary imagination. Not surprisingly, as the editor's note (p. 89, n. 1) at the beginning of Schering's original "Eroica" essay in the *Neues Beethoven Jahrbuch* (1934) makes clear, the Beethoven analyses were controversial to say the least, sometimes provoking ridicule. But Schering's interpretations have never been entirely dismissed, indeed in the context of recent interest in reception history and hermeneutics, his work has received more attention (some of it guardedly positive) than in the decades following its first appearance and his death in 1941. To the best of my knowledge this is the first published translation of a Beethoven work analysis by Schering; Edward A. Lippman (1990:185–207) has translated one of his essays on the nature of musical symbolism (see pp. 72–73, n. 4). I hope it will be of use to readers interested in critical methodologies and Beethoven reception.

The theoretical basis for Schering's Beethoven criticism had been largely worked out in the first phase of his research, which produced a series of studies begun in 1912 on critical methodologies and the nature of musical symbolism (see appendix for a select bibliography).[2] Schering developed his ideas about symbolism with respect to Johann Sebastian Bach's texted music, showing how Bach represented emotions, ideas, human actions, natural events, and objects in music.[3] These different

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kinds of textual content gave rise to corresponding types of symbolism in Bach's music, and the interpretation of symbolic content became the basis for the hermeneutic method.

Schering established a confusingly dense network of categories, subcategories, and hierarchies in his attempt to answer questions about the symbolic process *per se* and about the forms of musical symbolism. He established two fundamental classes of symbolism that were linked to specific music symbols. Symbols of emotions and psychological states (*Affekt- und Stimmungs-symbolik*) are represented by musical symbols of motion and sound (rhythm, melody, dynamics, etc.). These are elementary symbols that can be grasped by the listener intuitively. On a higher level are two kinds of symbols of ideas (*Vorstellungs-symbolik*): depictive symbolism, which is musically transmitted by word-painting (*Tonmalerei*) and conceptual symbols, which involve musical rhetoric, historical styles, specific techniques (e.g., fugue), and culturally derived symbols (e.g., the Protestant chorale).[4] Their recognition requires varying degrees of musical knowledge and the ability to make abstract associations between musical events and their referential meanings.

An ardent non-formalist,[5] Schering was convinced that any music claiming aesthetic significance, whether texted or purely instrumental, must possess a symbolic content that is derived from extra-musical ideas. Musical ideas alone would not suffice; they would produce mere *Spielmusik*, whose aesthetic quality did not transcend mere play in a Kantian sense of the term. Moreover, the degree of aesthetic content in a work and aesthetic pleasure to be derived from it depend on the quality of symbolic content and the degree of its concentration in the work. Armed with his theory, Schering could proceed to the hermeneutic analysis of the instrumental music that possessed these attributes to the highest degree, posed the greatest problems of interpretation, and over the course of its reception history provoked the strongest methodological controversies: Beethoven's instrumental music. But he needed programs—content sources whose symbolic representation stimulated composition.

Schering selected the texts with a knowledge of Beethoven's reading preferences; they ranged from classical antiquity—Homer was one of Beethoven's favorite authors—to Italian Renaissance poets and Shakespeare, to the great contemporary German masters, Goethe and Schiller.[6] As Schering would have it, Beethoven suppressed these texts because he was sensitive to contemporary opposition to program music and also felt that music could and should stand on its own and nevertheless be "correctly" understood. This was possible because the musical ideas—motives and themes, harmonies, forms, in short every aspect of a work—were conceived through a mental process Schering called "transubstantiation" (a

term borrowed from the eucharistic transformation of Christ's body and blood into bread and wine), in which the content in a literary text is distilled into music and thus transmitted through the work. Hence a hermeneutic discussion of the music requires the "discovery" of the programs and the analysis of their symbolic representation in music. The use of explicatory programs derived from specific literary works originated in the mid-eighteenth century; one of the most notable early instances was Herinrich Wilhelm von Gerstenberg's underlay of Hamlet's monologue, "To be or not to be," to a keyboard fantasy by C. P. E. Bach, and the practice flourished in the nineteenth century (Momigny, Wagner et al.).[7] But this approach differed essentially from Schering's because the literary texts were to be understood metaphorically, as a convenient means of discovering common spiritual content. It was never claimed that the musical works under discussion arose as a result of the composers' reading and musical reinterpretation of the literary texts upon which the critics drew.

Schering found the program for the first three movements of the "Eroica" Symphony in the *Iliad*. The main part of his discussion focuses on the first movement. His decision to begin with the "Eroica" is not coincidental. As he notes at the beginning of the essay, the Third Symphony had always been one of the most discussed pieces in Beethoven's *oeuvre*, and the rich field of previous interpretations provided an opportunity for Schering, an aggressively polemical scholar, to expose weaknesses in the arguments of these writers in order to emphasize the rigor of his own methodology. (The astounding lack of self-awareness in this respect is wonderfully ironic.) His primary targets in this essay are A. B. Marx and Paul Bekker, whose work he both censures and praises (he relies on Bekker's discussion of the finale as based on the Prometheus legend rather than Napoleon). Schering does not, however, acknowledge two early French interpretations that were almost certainly known to him and come closer to his own reading: a lecture given at a Parisian society for the fine arts in the 1830s that was published in the *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik* in 1844, and a concert review by Berlioz for the *Gazette musicale de Paris* in 1837. Both associate the symphony not only with Napoleon, but also with the *Iliad*, most notably the scherzo, which, it was argued, depicts games in celebration of fallen heroes.[8]

Perhaps Schering felt justified in not disclosing these interpretations, because for him they embodied the vague impressionistic character he objected to in nineteenth-century criticism that treated literary programs only as metaphors.[9] Schering is concrete, quoting chapter and verse, a practice he continued in his later work: in the first three movements of the "Eroica," formal sections, shorter passages, and small details (e.g., the C♯ at the beginning of the first movement and the "premature" horn

entrance in the retransition of the development) are directly related to passages in the *Iliad*. Unfortunately—and this is symptomatic of the later Beethoven interpretations—he does not apply his symbol theory in any meaningful and explicit way. Never in the "Eroica" essay, and only rarely in his other writings, does the reader learn about the specific kind of symbolism that is operative at a given moment. Only at the beginning of the essay does he adumbrate some of the theoretical considerations introduced in previous essays and briefly discuss the nature of Beethoven's symbolic language. It appears that Schering wished to distinguish theoretical from exegetical emphases, as if he felt that work-interpretation should not be encumbered with a detailed technical analysis involving the varied categories of symbolism that he had already established in the theoretical essays.

It is a truism, but a worthy one, that an interpretation of a text reveals as much about the mind of the critic as it does about the original author. The symbol theory and the programs it required are instruments for a method developed within a synthetic cultural-historical perspective informed by Diltheyian historiography and hermeneutics and by theories of the unity of the arts and intellectual life (*Zeitgeist*). Schering's work both supports and is motivated by an implicit valorization of Beethoven as the equal of a Homer, a Shakespeare, or a Schiller and the elevation of his instrumental music to the status of the great canonic masterpieces of literature. As for the specific work analyses, if we accept Schering on his own terms, suspending our disbelief in the programs, we discover a sensitive listener who writes vividly and highly musically in enthusiastic response to music that moves him deeply. The musical analysis is sound, marked by great sensitivity to detail, although not particularly deep or systematic. For what it is worth, the programs correspond well to the musical events for the most part, despite one glaring inconsistency: Schering makes Patroclus the victim of the battle he locates in the development of the first movement, and Hector, whose death is not portrayed in his reading of the symphony, the fallen hero whose body is carried in the funeral procession of the second movement.

We can admire his interest in the hermeneutic process, which comes to life with his repeated use of verbs signifying purposeful endeavor (*trachten, versuchen*) and the attainment of a heuristic goal (*ankommen, nachkommen*). These words emphasize his, his readers', and other authors' acts of discovering meaning. And we can note—with skepticism or delight—Schering's own gift for metaphor and his own "heroic" style, which, however, produce texts that are often obscure in meaning and therefore very difficult to translate.[10] He himself becomes a co-author of the "Eroica" he describes, adding (if only dubious) meaning to Beethoven just as he claimed Beethoven did for Homer. Perhaps it is not *Beethoven's*, but the "Eroica" is certainly *Schering's* "Homer" Symphony.

Notes

1. A single exception to this rule is found in Schering's program for the Fifth Symphony (1934c, see appendix), whose topic was the idea of leadership (*Führung*). This essay was published in 1934 and concludes with an implicit but unmistakable reference to Hitler's accession to power and the changes sweeping Germany. This and other evidence, notably the dedication of his most important book on Beethoven (1936a) to "The Young Germany," and his role in the reorganization of the German musicological society and the removal of Alfred Einstein from his position as editor of the *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft* in 1933–34, is damning and has led to highly negative portrayals of Schering in the 1930s (e.g., Pamela Potter 1998). Schering was, however, never a member of the Nazi party and his scholarship does not reflect, in any meaningful way, the methodologies and the ideological and propagandistic agendas identified with the Third Reich. In my view, Schering was an opportunist, who did what he felt necessary to retain his academic position and influence and maintain his own intellectual independence. In the discussion of the Fifth Symphony, he concludes his remarks on leadership with a list of historical figures who have embodied this principle. The list begins with Judas Maccabaeus, the Old-Testament Hebrew military leader. Hitler's name does not appear in the list or elsewhere in the essay. Is the irony intentional? Was Schering a skilled practitioner of double-talk? I plan to write an essay on Schering and the Nazi question, which will incorporate archival material never before discussed.

2. In his seminal essay, "Zur Grundlegung der musikalischen Hermeneutik" (1914), Schering's discussion of musical hermeneutics emphasizes physio-psychological correspondences between musical and organic processes—a twentieth-century update on Baroque *Affektenlehre*. Here symbolism is viewed as a peripheral, extraordinary phenomenon, absent from all texted vocal music because this music is directly expressive of the thoughts and feelings contained in the text, and present in instrumental music only in explicitly programmatic works such as the "Eroica" Symphony or the *Faust* Symphony by Liszt. Schering shifted symbolism to the center of his ideas on musical meaning in the 1920s, when he began writing the Bach essays and several articles on more general aspects of musical symbolism.

3. Schering was not the first writer on music to make use of the symbol concept. In his essays on Bach, he praised but also criticized Albert Schweitzer's pioneering book on symbolism in Bach's sacred choral and organ music ([1905] 1908). He also referred to an article on the same topic by Hugo Goldschmidt (1921). To the best of my knowledge, Schweitzer and Goldschmidt were the first to discuss the expressive and depictive properties of music (including Wagnerian leitmotives) in terms of specific types of musical symbolism. Earlier uses of the term had been more metaphorical or abstract; the two authors are very concrete in labeling passages as symbolic and identifying the kind of symbolism they construe. However, although they explicitly announce their anti-formalist position, their work has no theoretical underpinning; it is conceptually naïve. Schering was the first to attempt a systematic, rigorous investigation of music symbolism.

4. Schering never set forth a general theory of musical symbolism. Two writings approach a synthetic discussion: the 1927 paper given in Halle and the article

based on it (see appendix) and a later article, "Musikalische Symbolkunde" (1936c), which has been translated by Lippman (1990:185–207). On symbol theory, see Lippman (1992:359–70). See also Stanley (2002).

5. Schering's interest in symbolism and his anti-formalist aesthetics were certainly influenced by the German musicologist Hermann Kretzschmar and the philosopher Johannes Volkelt, both of whom taught Schering at the University of Leipzig. Kretzschmar apparently introduced the term "hermeneutics" into musicological discourse and published numerous articles and books on methodology and critical work analyses. See Ian Bent (1994:31–38) and Kretzschmar ([1898] 1994). As early as 1876, Volkelt had argued that the question of symbolism lay at the heart of the great aesthetic controversy of the time, the debate about form versus content, and had proclaimed that the concept of the symbol, of "content becoming form," "will help lead the aesthetics of content to victory over formalism." Symbolism was the primary focus of his multi-volume *System of Aesthetics* (Volkelt 1905–14). In the 1920s, interest in symbolism intensified, spurred on by the work of Ernst Cassirer in linguistics and philosophy and Erwin Panofsky in art history. Schering gave his first public lecture on musical symbolism at an interdisciplinary session on symbolism of the 1927 conference of the Society for Aesthetics and the Sciences of the General Arts at Halle. Cassirer gave the keynote address. The lectures were published in the *Kongreßbericht, Halle, Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 21 (1927).

6. Beethoven owned copies of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* in German translation. He mentioned Homer several times in correspondence, although never during the composition of the *Eroica* and never in connection with the symphony, and entered several passages from both epics in his diaries. See Maynard Solomon (1988:254).

7. On Gerstenberg, see Helm (1972). On other instances of programmatic explication with a specific text or an invented program see Bonds (1991:169–71) and Bent (1994:58–68, on Wagner, 127–40, on Momigny).

8. The reception history of the symphony, including the relationship of Schering's essay to earlier interpretations, has been discussed in detail by Scott Burnham (1992:4–24) and Thomas Sipe (1998:54–75). Sipe also discusses the early French authors (59–61).

9. See Schering (1937d; 1936a:13–121).

10. Because I regard this essay as a literary text as much as an analytical one, I have attempted as close to a literal translation as was possible. Rarely, and only when no reasonable alternative presented itself, did I modernize Schering's language, or simplify his syntax, because I wanted to preserve his elaborate style (which was for its own time modern) and sometimes weighty rhetoric. The meaning of more than several passages was obscure and certain terms were used in a very colloquial fashion, notably *tonlos*, which appears several times but never once with respect to absolute silence!

The Eroica: Beethoven's Homer Symphony?[1]

By Arnold Schering
Translated by Glenn Stanley

Beethoven's *Eroica* has always held special interest for critics. It originated in conjunction with some notable circumstances, and its contents cannot be easily revealed in a single, clear interpretation free of contradictions. Each [critic] tried to consider the meaning of Beethoven's concept of heroism and—from Marx until Nef—came up with beautiful and poetic ideas. They mentioned Bonaparte, but otherwise did not consider him further, which corresponds to the fact that the work is only externally connected with his name. Even if Beethoven (according to Ries)[2] was attracted to the brilliant First Consul and inspired by him to conceive a work in heroic style, it is difficult to believe seriously that the great soldier, whose most famous deeds came after 1803, was the spiritual godfather [*Pate*] for its conception.

With which aspect of his person, about whom the reports and rumors had no doubt produced a still very sketchy image, could Beethoven have begun, if not simply with the idea of the extraordinary nature of the entire phenomenon? Why did he give the funeral march already to the second movement of the symphony?[3] Who were the mourners of the deceased? Why did he dedicate the entire work expressly to "the memory" of a hero [see note 2], indeed to one whom Beethoven no longer thought of as alive?

That Beethoven again associated the symphony with Bonaparte after its completion can easily be explained by his wish to honor him further as an expression of thanks for the initial stimulus [to composition].[4] There is no connection—this has long been known—between the music itself and the future French Emperor. Not even to his character, which on the basis of the musical interpretations [*Deutungen*], must have been an unusual mixture of strength and irresolution.[5] The famous destruction of the Bonaparte title page meant little more than the cancellation of the original dedication to the great man. Moreover, Beethoven biographers should allow the English General Abercrombie [*sic*][6] to rest in peace and treat all further anecdotes about the conception of the [individual] movements as that which they are: rumors that do not reveal anything decisive about that which first sparked the flame [of inspiration] in the breast of the composer, even if, for whatever reason, they issued from Beethoven himself.

Interpreters of the work's meaning have usually focused on an impersonal, ideal character and viewed Beethoven's music as the expression of

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thoughts and feelings that accompany the mental image of an equally abstract heroic life. Because certain groups of affects in the work are nothing other than clearly understandable, a certain common line of interpretation was attained. Today things have reached a point that no one sees or expects any problems. Nonetheless, although the symphony stands fast as an element of the cultural-idea "Beethoven" in our cultural heritage, although it speaks a clear, concise, and comprehensible language to anyone who listens with understanding, although a kind of interpretative canon has been developed by the important conductors, the question still remains whether all the mysteries have already been solved. For performance practice in all probability, but for the scholar, not yet. I have long been convinced that Beethoven—just like Sebastian Bach—possessed a "musical language" [*Tonsprache*], in which the clarity of ideas and affects is concealed behind a musical symbolism, the key to which we have not yet rediscovered. This key appears to have been lost already during Beethoven's lifetime, probably through the advent of the new romantic mentality. In his late years he complained to Schindler about the prevailing poverty of imagination. "The time," he said, "in which I composed my sonatas, was more poetic than now, for which reason such suggestions [about content] were superfluous. Back then everyone could sense in the Adagio of the Third Sonata in D [op. 10, no. 3] the representation of a melancholy state of the soul, with all the diverse nuances of light and shadow in the image of melancholy in its different phases. A title providing the key for this was not necessary. And everyone found in the two Sonatas of op. 14 the struggle between two principles or the representation of a dialogue between two persons, because it was so obvious in each case."[7]

These suggestive remarks have been taken to heart by all critics, and none of the explications of Beethoven's works has failed to apply wholeheartedly the affects in their attempt to pursue the meaning of the music. But it appears that Beethoven's "clarity" goes much further and pertains to things that cannot be correctly described only in terms of feelings. Just as we cannot scientifically approach Bach if we try to understand him only in terms of the emotions, it will not work with Beethoven. The study of Bach's musical symbolism teaches us that his affects—the expression of emotions—were never based on a vague, hazy, non-objective psychology, but rather were always tied to specific ideas, images, and impressions of the imagination. Later on, this remarkable link between the sense perceptions and feeling loosened, but never was completely lost. Beethoven must have still possessed it to a high degree. On the whole, I believe that much more of the Baroque intellectual heritage remained valid for him than we have hitherto believed. In all likelihood the affects will remain the

first and fundamental basis for the interpretation of his music, because they are related to the simple, elemental sensory facts about which there is little to argue. But this interpretation will only lead to basic comprehension [*Verständnis*] not to true knowledge [*Erkenntnis*], because knowledge activates the intellectual spirit, and spiritual content can only be attained through comparative, discursive, inquiring thought. If we want to make progress, our humanistic Beethoven scholarship in the future must do more to discover Beethoven's musical language and its symbolism, which differs considerably from that of Bach. We may do so in the hope that we can still unravel some mysteries.

Whoever in this context thinks about program music in the customary sense, errs as much for Beethoven as for Bach and will find the following discussion incomprehensible. Perhaps we even need a new music aesthetics that avoids the failures of the Romantics and develops new concepts. But this is not the place to pursue this further. Only this may perhaps be said, that there is nothing in the intellectual, emotional, and objective physical world that cannot assume musical form in a composer's imagination. On the strength of a mysterious process, which can be called musical transubstantiation [the eucharistic transformation of bread and wine to the flesh and blood of Christ], images of the fantasy and the mind become music. That which is conceived or perceived transforms itself into tone according to still undiscovered laws about the interdependence of mind and soul. It discards everything that cannot be musically transferred and retains only that which can be communicated through sound and the rules governing it, and in as concentrated form as can be imagined, that is, at the core of its essence. If we knew how an artist like Beethoven, for example, undertook this kind of transubstantiation, then we could discover such essences everywhere. The old controversy that took place years ago, whether the "Einfall" [a purely musical thought] or the "poetic idea"* was decisive for Beethoven, can be resolved in a Solomonic manner: neither will suffice without the other. Transubstantiation means nothing other than the transformation of every kind of impression into a tonal event. Every "Einfall" is itself a transubstantiation, whether a conscious process or one arising from the apparent unconsciousness.

Let us, however, return to the *Eroica*. The situation in the first movement has been recognized by all writers on the movement. They all agree about one point: that in the development Beethoven leads his hero into a battle from which he emerges the victor. The intensification of technique towards an extreme realism permits no doubt about the intentions. But they are less sure about the sections that frame this. Instead of asking how Beethoven linked the spirit of this realistic battle with the preceding and

following [music], they base their interpretation on the conception of a quite general, supposedly heroic portrait of character. Like Haydn, who acknowledged that he depicted "moral characters" in his symphonies, they believe that this explanation, which is certainly important, is enough. The master wanted to depict, they say, every essential aspect of this portrait of the hero: courage, determination, energy, reflection, depression, etc., and simultaneously to create a great synthesis of these characteristics and affects. This is largely correct; these interpretations are, at first glance, in part convincing. But when we look closer, we get the impression that a very confused psychological approach is operative here, an approach that lacks all logic. It indiscriminately throws together every possible impulse or emotion and does not shy from placing diametrically opposed catastrophes of the soul within spans of a few measures. The first fifteen measures alone supposedly establish the dual characters of strength and melancholy, the latter already with an undertone of tragedy. The hero appears to constantly change his form and color, like a kaleidoscope of the soul, like a ball tossed back and forth by opposing internal forces. The peculiarity of the formal structure, the strange disposition of themes, the exceptional instrumentation—about which only immaterial or self-evident claims have been made—these remain unexplained. I have nowhere found a clear explication of the spiritual contents of the movement. On the basis of the indefinite, vacillating analysis of the affects, one could well imagine a different but equally logical course of musical action.

Did Beethoven really conceive of the movement only as a vague character portrait and nevertheless risked placing the listener amidst the events of a real battle in the development? The richness of the ideas and the originality of the structure force us to assume that other, more important matters played a role.

After a long intellectual journey, for which the remarkable measures 3–15 formed the point of departure, I have become convinced that Beethoven took his image of the hero not from his own time, but rather from classical antiquity—to be precise, from Homer's *Iliad*. It appears to have been the character of Hector, more than any other, which radiated an extraordinary heroism for Beethoven, the enthusiastic reader and admirer of Homer since his time in Bonn. But this figure was not simply an abstraction, an ideal image without profile or contour, that he imagined. He extracted certain scenes from the poem, transubstantiated them into music, and with them designed the first three movements of the symphony. The numerous passages of a melancholy and resigned quality were the clues that led me to this. They seemed irreconcilable with the image of the man of deeds that is portrayed in the development. I believed that many of them must be related to a feminine character. The

analysis confirmed this, hence it may be stated that Beethoven did not only include the hero (Hector) but also his wife (Andromache) in his narrative field of vision.

Book 6 of the *Iliad* contains the famous episode of Hector's farewell to Andromache and to his young son Astyanax. If I am not completely mistaken, it was this which sparked Beethoven's fantasy. The first part of the first movement pertains to it. To it Beethoven related in the development the battle scenes (the death of Patroclus) that are depicted in Book 16, about which more will be said. In Book 23 we read of the war games and competitions in honor of the fallen Patroclus, which we rediscover in the scherzo of the symphony. And in Book 24 the funeral service for Hector, slain by Achilles, provided the sublime model for the funeral march.

The association of Homer and Beethoven is not surprising. Nor is the process which in Beethoven's mind transformed classical ideas into music. As we know, such ideas extend as far as the sketches for the Tenth Symphony and may rest, hidden from us, within some other works as well.[9] Beethoven was a spiritual child of German idealism; classical antiquity was a second homeland for him. As it bore fruit in Schiller, who translated large parts of the *Aeneid*, as it brought forth Goethe's *Iphigenie*, so may it have inspired the soul of Beethoven to the highest degree. I will skip over what can be read in the biographies about his interest in antiquity and his own comments about that, and only mention that the *Eroica* finale, in [its] association with the Prometheus music, is directly linked to Greek mythology.[10]

It has never been doubted that, with the *Eroica*, Beethoven wanted to write a program symphony. The work will lose nothing and retain its value for us when more details about the program emerge. It does not appear superfluous to emphasize this, because a one-dimensional aesthetic loves to devalue program music as a concept and reduce it to music of a second order. We can best protect ourselves from such misunderstanding by considering that Beethoven did not just meekly retrace Homer, although he did conform to the poem in its general outlines, but rather freely transformed into music the impressions he received, and, where it became necessary, made further independent additions to the poem.

When, therefore, in the following, we spin out the thread with which Beethoven wove the wonderful web of his work, the sobriety of each and every statement must be kept in mind. They may account only for the basic relationships between event and process, between action and experience, without distorting [anything] through the slightest overzealousness. Moreover, the step-by-step demonstration of the chain of small elements that directly inspired the creative spirit must always remain meticulous. Hence, only the constantly vivid exposure of each single turn [of events]

and, in response to each one anew, its placement in the broader context guarantee correct understanding. As we have heard, Beethoven did not reckon with Philistines, but rather with [listeners possessing] a talent for fantasy. The historical events themselves were not the primary consideration for Beethoven; instead it was the internal events that they triggered. But how could these have been represented without emphasizing the external ones that could be the basis for the imagination? What we have always admitted for the battle scene in the development, namely that it is one of the clearest and most graphic depictions of fighting in the entire musical literature, we cannot deny about many other parts of the work, which conceal less acoustically evident but similar cases. Everything rests on an inner logic that develops the program, and on the question whether both the music and the program are fully accounted for. Only if there is no other alternative will it be legitimate to reject this interpretation and begin anew.

Marx understood the first two chords in the sense of a "Hark, hark!"[11] That they mean more, namely that the hero energetically arises, will become clear in the following discussion, but it is also revealed in the original version[s] of these measures, which according to Nottebohm (*Ein Skizzenbuch aus dem Jahre 1803*) contain two sketches [ex. 1].[12]

Example 1:



Beethoven later weakened this abrupt beginning, which comes in the middle of already unfolding events. But he retained the character of a vehement gesture (Up! Up!). The image in his fantasy that determines the beginning can be thought of in the following way. Hector frees himself from his wife's embracing arms in order to join the fighting. Neither roughly nor boldly, but rather protectively, he tells her of his decision: the hero's theme appears in the most tender form in the basses. The move to C♯ [m. 7] can only signify a surprise, a kind of reflex facial reaction to that which is revealed in measures 7–15, because just now the loving wife raised her hands in supplication: do not go! [This is] an affective gesture possible only in music, a distillation of Homer's depiction of the scene (Book 6, 405–412):

> . . . but Andromache came close to his side weeping, and clasped his hand and spake to him, saying: 'Ah, my husband, this prowess of thine will be thy doom, neither hast thou any pity for thine

> infant child nor for hapless me that soon shall be thy widow; for soon will the Achaeans all set upon thee and slay thee. But for me it were better to go down to the grave if I lose thee, for nevermore shall any comfort be mine, when thou hast met thy fate, but only woes.[13]

Animated by the greatest anxiety, this compelling phrase intensifies; it cannot possibly be attributed to the hero, filled with determination, who had just made his decision. We are already in the middle of the action. Soothingly, he answers his wife, and the statement of the theme by the violins and woodwinds (mm. 15–22) has a loving and tender character. He promises her that his unbroken courage and strong hand will win the battle:

> Then spake to her great Hector of the flashing helm: 'Woman, I too take thought of all this, but wondrously have I shame of the Trojans, and the Trojans' wives, with trailing robes, if like a coward I skulk apart from the battle. Not doth mine own heart suffer it, seeing I have learnt to be valiant always and to fight amid the foremost Trojans, striving to win my father's great glory and mine own.' (Book 6, 440–46)

This warlike outburst, rising proudly, occurs in mm. 23–45. But Andromache pleads again (in the second theme, mm. 45–55); this time her entreaties are admixed with tenderness. Or is it Astyanax, whom she holds before the father?

> Smiling, the father regarded the child, as did the tender mother, and forthwith glorious Hector took the helm from this head and laid it all-gleaming upon the ground. But he kissed his dear son, and fondled him in his arms.[14] (Book 6, 471–74)

Manfully the hero interrupts the tender agitation of his wife (mm. 55–56); he speaks softly and comfortingly to her and reminds her again of [his] duty and [his] love of battle, not without cleverly diminishing its gravity to the fearful woman by emphasizing its sport. Her answer is a new, expressly painful reaction (mm. 83–86, woodwinds). With optimism and infinitely loving devotion Hector would calm her (mm. 87–91, strings), but this, however, calls forth an intensely heavy sighing from his wife (mm. 93–92, woodwinds again). For a moment both sink into dark thoughts of renunciation. But he is steadfast in his decision. He tears himself from her loving embrace and storms away, as the completely broken and quivering woman

reluctantly lets him go (mm. 99ff.). The rhythms of the tenderness- or Astyanax-motive from mm. 45ff. become militant (mm. 113–16), and in a splendid upsurge (mm. 119–31), he shows his beloved how his sword will fulfill its terrible mission:

> Dear wife, in no wise, I pray thee, grieve overmuch at heart; no man beyond my fate shall send me forth to Hades . . . Go thou to the house and busy thyself with thine own tasks, the loom and the distaff, and bid thy handmaids ply their work: but war shall be for men. (Book 6, 486–87, 490–93)

After a pledge [by Hector] in the sense of "Take comfort, I will return somehow and sometime" (mm. 132ff.) they wave to each other a last time, he exultant and she despairing:

> So spake glorious Hector and took up his helm with horse-hair crest; and his dear wife went forthwith to her house, oft turning back, and shedding big tears. (Book 6, 494–96)

Here the first part of the movement resignedly concludes, plunging into the depths. It comprises exclusively the episode of "Farewell of the Hero from his Wife." It portrays both characters in the throes of the emotions and contains neither an actual battle scene nor a suggestion of the tragedy that will befall the hero. Beethoven held very strictly to the poem. The music that presents melancholy and softness signifies the feminine element, the wife of the hero.

Beethoven wrote a repeat sign. However, it could only have been a concession to symphonic convention of the time and not seriously intended, as proven by the fairly mechanical transition to the repeat [of the exposition]. It strikes one as unorganic and foreign, for which reason it is often ignored by contemporary conductors.[15]

Although the interpretation to this point could be closely linked to Homer, now it must diverge, because Beethoven united all the battle scenes depicted in the poem into one concentrated portrait. This was obviously [necessary]. In a masterful manipulation of symphonic form, he freely added the following to the poem. The development[16] begins contemplatively. A heavy air of oppression weighs on the spirits [of Hector and Andromache] in the quiet and harmonically static [*tonlos gespannene*] measures 156ff. A short burst of energy in the *crescendo* (mm. 168–69), and we accompany the hero to the battlefield. He knows what he will defend there: wife and child, hence the tender motives of the second theme sound above the energetically running eighth-note figures in the violins

and woodwinds (mm. 172, 176ff.). With the move to C minor and the sudden *pianissimo*, the situation becomes serious. The enemy is seen and—after twice being pursued (mm. 182–89)—engaged (m. 190). The previous battle motives (mm. 65ff.), which had been more than harmless suggestions, now become real: the opponents test one another in close combat, back and forth (exchanges in the violins). Because they are equally strong, they charge at each other again (mm. 224ff.), the hero accompanied by the battle cries of the second theme. They become entangled. This same theme provides the rhythm for the dueling in the fugato, from which Beethoven develops slashing figures that rain down like blows above the winding eighth-note counterpoint (m. 240). They come ever faster and more brutally, and, when everything breaks apart into ghastly, screaming dissonances, the outcome of the battle appears clear:

> So the twain joined in strife for Cebriones like two lions, that on the peaks of a mountain fight for a slain hind, both of them hungering, both high of heart; even so for Cebriones the two masters of the war-cry, even Patroclus, son of Menoetius, and glorious Hector, were fain to cleave the other's flesh with pitiless bronze. (Book 16, 755–60)

Then the unexpected happens: in the middle of the battle the hero releases his staggering victim (mm. 284ff.). Why? The answer is expressed by the theme appearing for the first time at this point [ex. 2]:

Example 2:

The "regretfulness" of this phrase has never been misunderstood. But only now, and in this context, does it become justified. The hero recoils from the death-blow that he must deal the brave opponent. Shall this flourishing adolescent really perish? [This is] certainly not a Greek idea, but rather a Christian humanistic one, yet worthy of Beethoven's world view, and at this place [in the movement] highly poetic.

Incidentally, the interruption of the battle has a precedent in Homer. Before Hector kills him, Patroclus, who with his fellow Greeks is murdering crazedly, receives a mighty blow on the shoulders and back from Phoebus Apollo. His eyes fill with tears, his helmet rolls onto the sand and he must leave the battleground:

> But Patroclus, overcome by the stroke of the god and by the spear, drew back into the throng of his comrades, avoiding fate. (Book 16, 815–16)

The short *crescendo* in measure 303 puts an end to the hero's sympathy. The threatening C-major and C-minor intensifications in measures 304–16 and thereafter sound like a last warning that the enemy surrender. And now the hero is overcome with emotion for a second time, when he sees the mortally wounded Patroclus return. But because he [Patroclus] stubbornly persists, [Hector] goes all out. The violent explosions in the basses and the stretto on the hero-motive in the winds proclaim an accumulation of the utmost energy.

What follows is clear. The enemy sinks to the ground under fearful blows. He repeatedly tries to stand, but in vain. His strength ebbs, all that remains is a terrible moaning and death rattle.

> But Hector, when he beheld great-souled Patroclus drawing back smitten with the sharp bronze, came nigh him through the ranks, and smote him with a thrust of his spear in the nethermost belly, and drove the bronze clean through; and he fell with a thud, and sorely grieved the host of the Achaeans. (Book 16, 817–21)

Deeply moved and exhausted, the hero strains to hear, but only awakes from his stupor when a distant horn quietly calls his name. A split second struggle in his heart between the powers of life and death. Can we not understand that Beethoven boldly dared the utmost in order to describe the most extraordinary emotions?

Now, in measure 402, the reprise begins. The entire first part of the movement (until m. 145) is repeated with important changes. At measure 557 a second development section, about which more will be said, is introduced with the familiar violent harmonic shifts from E♭ to D♭ and C. But first the question, how, after the preceding, is the reprise to be understood?

If Beethoven had been able to use Liszt's model, the course of the movement would have been different. Sonata form required a repetition of the beginning, meaning—if we want to interpret the whole movement programmatically—the return to an earlier stage of events. We don't know whether Beethoven thought about this. But the appearance of the reprise can be interpreted [programmatically] even in view of its external formal requirements. It occurs not [only as] a matter of necessity, if we view it as the depiction of a recollection or a dream of the wife who remained at home. She experiences for the second time the farewell scene while the

hero is away—an interpretation that I believe can be supported with a few explanatory points. Because precisely here, in the last part of the first movement, Beethoven departs in a striking way from structural convention. This has often been noticed, but never explained. The continuation of our program provides the key.

With the end of the battle and the beginning of the reprise Beethoven clearly changes the scene. We are back at the beginning again: the departure for battle. The first motive of sorrow and pleading in mm. 7–15 re-appears (mm. 406–12), but in different colors: no longer is it despairing and suffering; it now moves confidently and strongly from E♭ major to F major. The horn call of her beloved reaches the inner ear of the wife. Was he victorious, as the instrument's proud repetitions of the high C imply? Was he defeated? As she ponders, the harmony abruptly slips to D♭ major on a sudden *piano*. Was he defeated? repeats the anxious soul. The progression becomes harmonically static and softens [*Die Bewegung wird tonloser . . .*] and returns to the dominant of the beginning. No, it cannot be! This is announced by the mighty upsurge of measures 428–34 and the entrance of the now truly "glorious" Hector-theme.

And now, as stated above, the entire farewell replays itself in a heart that sweetly remembers happier times during days of sorrow (Dante)—just as in the exposition, except that the brighter dominant harmony is now prominent. The dream, or recollection, lasts until the moment of the actual farewell, which had been reached shortly before the repeat sign [in the exposition]. What Beethoven now does appears to confirm almost absolutely this attempt to interpret the movement. The E♭ major in measure 555 begins nothing other than the equivalent of the opening [of the movement]: the scene of the reunion of the husband and wife. It has been prepared ever so sensitively, as only a poet can.

Andromache awakens, listening alertly. The hero-motive sounds softly in the woodwinds, while the unison E♭ of the strings is prolonged over four measures and fades to a *pp*. Did she hear it correctly? Once more, now in D♭ major and more strongly. Is it really him? The theme a third time, now in C major and in full strength! That cannot be an illusion, that is reality: he is coming! But unrestrained joy is premature. Only happy certainty, internal relief from all worry can be expressed: mildly and without excitement the hero-theme wells up in the second violin, again and again, as if it cannot stop, as if this C major would begin a new life in the woman's soul.[17]

Above this shivers the concealed nervousness of expectation: those minute, shy figures that no critic has tried to justify until now. And joining the expectation is the regret, introduced as a sudden change of mood through the descending eighths (mm. 581ff.), that the battle had claimed a victim (the woodwind theme from the battle episode, mm. 585ff.). But

the secret joy triumphs (mm. 599ff.), as the victor's strides can already be heard at a distance (mm. 607ff.) No explanation is required for that which follows. It is the moment in which the wife, full of pulsating intense expectation, is tumultuously reunited with her returning husband, who in measure 659 appears before us in all his greatness and—not without caresses (mm. 677ff.)—enjoys the fruits of his triumphs.

Beethoven himself created this scene of reunion, which reminds us of Oberon and Tristan. Just eleven years later Carl Maria followed him, although he did not live up to the greatness of his model. The contents of the *Konzertstück* in F Minor is related to similar thought processes. Its program, as recorded by Weber's friend Benedikt [*sic*] after Weber's own description and published in Max von Weber's biography of his father, is given here for comparison:

> The lady of the castle sits on the balcony. She looks mournfully into the distance. The knight has been in the Holy Land for years. Will she see him again? Many bloody battles have been waged. Not a word from him, who means everything to her. In vain her prayers to God, in vain her yearning for the great man. Finally a horrible vision takes hold of her. He lies on the field of battle—abandoned by his own men—bleeding from a wound to the heart. Ach, if she could be there and at least die with him! Exhausted she collapses and faints. Hark! What sounds there in the distance?! What is gleaming there in the forest under the sunlight? What comes closer and closer? The magnificent knights and pages, all with the sign of the cross, and waving flags and the jubilant crowd, and there, there he is! And now she throws herself into his arms. What a surge of love, what infinite, indescribable happiness! Rapturously the rolling waves and rustling branches proclaim the triumph of true love.[18]

Whether [in] the chivalry of antiquity or of the Middle Ages, the experiences of tragic conflicts of the heart always remain the same; the visions of Beethoven and Weber differ only in the power of the artistic depiction and design. Weber hated all "tone portraits with titles," as he once wrote to Rochlitz, because he feared that he would be "misunderstood and considered a charlatan" like Abbé Vogler. Hence he did not include the program in the print of the *Konzertstück*. Beethoven concealed the actual program [of the *Eroica*] for the same reason, and because it was more difficult than later in the *Pastorale* to make clear to the listener the difference between the "expression of feeling" (*Ausdruck der Empfindung*) and "painting" (*Malerei*). He left it open; one seeks and finds the hero and interprets his fate as best one can.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the interpretation developed here, one cannot dismiss the fact that it goes further than a simple, unspecific psychology of affects and that it offers a plan for the internal oppositions in the themes and for the peculiar structure of the entire movement that Beethoven could well have followed. Stripped of all novelistic form and considered only as a meaningful human experience, it was as worthy of his creative genius as the poetic models for the *Leonore* Overtures, and the Overtures to *Egmont* and *Coriolan*, more worthy in any case than *Wellington's Victory*. And now, for the first time, it can be understood why Beethoven, compelled by the program he had freely chosen, immeasurably expanded the form of the first movement, so that all ties to the first two symphonies were broken. After finishing the reprise, he needed space and time for the preparation and realization of the reunion scene, for which the second part was given not only its oft-discussed expansion but also a second inner climax. It comes at the conclusion and, after the preceding [music], almost possesses the meaning of a tumultuous coda to an overture, similar to the *Leonore* and *Egmont* Overtures. There can be no doubt that in this case Beethoven put traditional sonata form to the use of the logic of the ideal program.

Let us move on to the second movement! If another link to Homer were not readily available, it would appear risky to make one. But "Hector's Interment" once belonged, together with "The Farewell from Andromache," to the most impressive scenes in this classical epic and was always a favorite for drawing and painting. The *Marcia funebre* shows how deeply Beethoven was moved by the depiction of the events in Book 24. It did not become a classicistic Greek funeral service, but one alive with all the compassion that Homer was able to render from the soul of one born later.[19]

> Come ye, men and women of Troy, and behold Hector, if ever while yet he lived ye had joy of his coming back from battle; since great joy was he to the city and to all the folk. So spake she [Cassandra] nor was any man left there within the city, neither any woman, for upon all had come grief that might not be borne; and hard by the gates they met Priam, as he bare home the dead. First Hector's dear wife and queenly mother flung themselves upon the light-running waggon, and clasping his head the while, wailed and tore their hair; and the folk thronged about and wept. (Book 24, 703–11)

Doesn't this read as an exact program for Beethoven's funeral music? And does not, in the *Maggiore*, the three-part woodwind *cantilena* seem to symbolize (not "represent") the three women: Hecuba (the mother of Hector), Andromache (the wife), Helen (the sister-in-law) at "the gate,"

their voices raised in weeping, when they see the approaching funeral procession. One only has to read the verses in which the poet conveyed the laments of the three women (Book 24, 724ff.). What the poet was forced to present successively, the musician could transform into a single simultaneous depiction of deeply moving, graphic beauty: "On this wise held they funeral for horse-taming Hector" [Book 24, 805].

A feminine element is also prominent in this movement, which—utterly in the sense of the eighteenth century—emphasizes feeling. The middle section in C major is devoted to this, while the dark, hard C-minor lament is reserved for the men.[20] This too completely corresponds to Homer's conception. But it could only be explained, if Beethoven had permitted something of his [own] time to influence his image of the scene from antiquity. In the imperial Vienna of his time the splendor of a funeral still drew on strong, old Baroque tradition. Perhaps it remained customary for solemn fanfares to drown out the laments of mourners when they lost control, as they do here [in the movement] twice so strikingly. Beethoven clearly conceived the C-major section as part of the action in the scene, that is at [Hector's] bier, because the cortege begins to move again only after the deeply painful unison descent of the melodic line that precedes the return of C minor.[21] Melancholy memories, sighs, outcries, silent footsteps and pious blessings accompany him until they fade away, suffocated by tears.

Until now, the Scherzo of the symphony could be associated with the two previous movements only with a kind of desperate exertion. About the horn calls of the Trio, Kretzschmar asked in puzzlement: "The hero at the hunt?"[22] How can that be believed, when he was just buried? Bekker, who did not very well know what to do with the movement, would like to see it played before the Funeral March, because he thought that the latter was more closely related to the finale.[23] Marx is of the opinion that Beethoven was depicting the merry life in the camp: "Is this camp-fun? Has peace come and is the army leaving for the beloved homeland? The horns call lightly and boldly, like nimble riders high on their horses and the soldiers watch contentedly and call back to them."[24] One sees the interpretative dilemma which arises from the impossibility of combining the merriment of the Scherzo with the Funeral March.

Once again Homer saves the day. As we know, when Patroclus fell at the hand of Hector, the Greeks staged splendid competitions in his honor. In Book 24 (257ff.), they are portrayed in colorful detail, vivid evidence of the Greek athletic spirit. Should Beethoven have celebrated his ideal Homeric hero in some other way, perhaps with sunken head and funeral decorations? He remained faithful to the poet and would have rejected a transposition of his movements with a reproachful reference to

this penultimate book of the *Iliad*. In Homer, the horsemen and the chariot drivers first appear, then the boxers and the wrestlers, the runners, the shot-putters and archers, finally the spear-throwers.

In the Scherzo, Beethoven retained nothing but everything of this. Marx came closest to the meaning, with the image of the exuberant camp life, but did not provide the objective reason for it. Now the mystery has been solved, because Beethoven was able to disregard that in Homer these games took place not in honor of Hector, but rather of Patroclus. He named no names and [thus] preserved the freedom of his artistic inclinations.

If one hears the music now—how it ascends from unclear, almost elemental sonorities and rushes by in breathless haste; how nimble figures pop up here and there; how the swarming riders and charioteers come ever closer and roar past in loudest *forte*, the one or the other tumbling over headfirst; how winds and strings in the most audacious tempo toss the smallest motives back and forth like balls; how the running and chasing begin again and again; how finally, in the Trio, new teams appear, hunters, jugglers, and others; and how it all is predicated on virtuosity and surprise—one will grasp that Beethoven's depiction of Homer's images bears the imprint of a second, additional artistic genius. This youthful commotion could not have been portrayed more economically, plastically, or impetuously: [it is] a "synthetic show" of artistic fantasy without equal.[25]

Not much remains to be said about the finale. The essence has been explained by Paul Bekker's convincing demonstration of both the [musical] thematic and the conceptual associations with the "Prometheus" music.[26] The *Iliad* concluded with the burial of Hector. Beethoven himself had to complete the final movement and he again seized on a concept of humanity quite in keeping with the nobility of his [own] convictions: the representation of the continuing impact of great men through all time and place. The myth of Prometheus made clear to him how greatness of the spirit and the soul can create dynamic life, joy, and inspiration from the least fertile soil. Into the rigid, cold, raw theme of the beginning, his creative spirit instilled ever more life—at first [primitive] organic [bass theme], then [higher-order] animalistic [contrapuntal variations] finally—at the entrance of the song-melody [the melodic theme]—human and soulful, which is taken through every conceivable form over the course of the variation cycle. With an apotheosis of splendor and power the work concludes.

And this idea also originates in Hellenism. It is completely tied to the concept of that "fine and strong free human being," as Richard Wagner epitomized the Greeks. And, as the epitome of all humanity, it was Beethoven's vision while he wrote the *Eroica*. It has not been conjured up psychologically; it is not a universal, cosmopolitan [*weltbürgerlich*] song, but rather is based on the clear conception of a very specific ethos, precisely

the one in keeping with his own convictions that he found in Homer's heroic song. If this work first came into the world as the Bonaparte Symphony, and was later elevated by Hans von Bülow into a Bismarck Symphony,[27] today it may be more correctly designated as Beethoven's Homer Symphony.

Notes

1. This article, which was completed in December 1933, was the first in which I attempted a new interpretation of Beethoven's music. It was submitted to the editors of the *Beethovenjahrbuch* in January 1934. External circumstances delayed the publication of the yearbook for such a long time that the article was preceded by two other similar publications: "Zur Sinndeutung der 4. und 5. Symphonie Beethovens" in the February 1934 issue of the *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft* and the book *Beethoven in neuer Deutung* I, Leipzig, C. F. Kahnt (the five Shakespeare-String Quartets opp. 74, 95, 127, 130, 131; the eight Shakespeare-Piano Sonatas opp. 27 [1 and 2], 28, 31 [1 and 2], 54, 57, 11; the Schiller-Sonata op. 106). I wish to mention these later essays to the readers, because they decisively develop the problems that are only cautiously approached in this article on the *Eroica*.

Editor's Note: It has naturally come to the attention of the editors [of the *Neues Beethoven Jahrbuch*] that the interpretations in the Beethoven articles mentioned above by Schering have met with strong opposition. Perhaps the present study will have a similar reception; but in the *Neues Beethoven Jahrbuch* everyone should have the chance to speak who is scientifically legitimate and whose integrity cannot be doubted.

2. Translator's Note: Schering refers to Franz Wegeler and Ferdinand Ries ([1838] 1972:77–78). Ries's account is one of the earliest that associates the symphony with Napoleon. Closely contemporaneous with it are F.-J. Fetis's groundless claims (1835–44) that Beethoven had first planned to end the symphony with a C-major movement that ultimately became the finale of the Fifth Symphony and, after hearing of Napoleon's coronation as Emperor, composed the Funeral March and a new finale. See Sipe (1998:60–61).

3. Translator's Note: Schering alludes to Paul Bekker's thesis that the funeral march would be more effective as the third movement. See Bekker ([1911] 1927:161).

4. Summarized in Thayer-Riemann II, 1910, pp. 418ff.

Translator's note: See Thayer (1973:348–51). Schering alludes here to the complex history of Beethoven's changing plans about dedicating the symphony to Napoleon and including his name in the title. Some of the main stages in this process include: the plan to dedicate it to him (letter to Ferdinand Ries of October 1803); the inscription of "Bonaparte" on the title page of the autograph manuscript; the destruction of this page by Beethoven in May 1804 when he learned that Napoleon had had himself crowned Emperor in Rome by the Pope; the crossing-out of the words "Intitulata Bonaparte" on a manuscript copy, upon which was later entered "Geschrieben auf Bonaparte"; and an August 1804 letter to Breitkopf und Härtel, with whom Beethoven wanted to publish the symphony

("The actual title of the symphony is Bonaparte"). The symphony was in fact published by the Kunst- und Industrie-Comptoire in Vienna in 1806 as "Sinfonia Eroica . . . composta per festeggiare il sovvenire di un grand Uomo" (composed in memory of a great man). It was dedicated to Prince Lobkowitz, one of Beethoven's most important patrons. See Carl Dahlhaus (1991:19–26) and Sipe (1998:30–53).

5. Translator's Note: The meaning is unclear. Schering writes "Deutungen" (interpretations) and the question remains whether the plural noun refers only to Beethoven's characterization of Napoleon (although Schering contends that Napoleon is not the hero of the symphony) or to music by other composers.

6. Translator's Note: General Ralph Abercromby (1734–1801) was killed in Alexandria, Egypt in 1801 during a victorious battle against Napoleonic troops. Here Schering rebukes Bekker ([1911] 1927:160) who had advanced the hypothesis that Beethoven composed the funeral march of the symphony in honor of Abercromby. A British connection to the funeral march (Lord Nelson was also proposed as the honoree) was also suggested by Joseph Bertoline, one of Beethoven's doctors. See Solomon (1988:83), who refers to Carl Czerny as an early source for this story.

7. Translator's Note: The German text in this citation departs in several insignificant details from that in the first two editions of Schindler's biography (Münster, 1840 and 1845, respectively). This is probably a result of Schering's hasty transcription. Schindler introduced changes into the text of the third edition (Münster, 1860), which is the basis for subsequent editions after his death and the twentieth-century English translation (Schindler 1966:406–7). Schering did not specify the edition he used, but it must have been either the first or the second.

The conversation is a fabrication. Schindler possessed a number of Beethoven's sketchbooks, apparently having illegally confiscated at least some of them after Beethoven's death, and he drastically altered their contents. This forged entry was included in Georg Schünemann's edition (1941–43, 3:541). On the forgeries see Dagmar and Grita Herre (1979, especially 12 and 40). On page 40 are the entries: "Erinnern Sie Sich, wie ich Ihnen vor einigen Jahren die Sonaten Op. 14 vorspielen durfte? . . . jetzt alles klar" (Do you remember that you allowed me to play the op 14 sonatas for you a few years ago . . . now it is all clear) and "2 Principe auch im Mitelsatz der Pathetique" (also two principles in the middle movement of the Pathétique). In addition to creating the idea of the "two principles," which become an important idea for Beethoven style criticism, Schindler, directly above this passage, also told the story that led to the nickname "Tempest" for the Piano Sonata op. 31, no. 2 in D minor.

8. Translator's Note: Schering alludes to a controversy that broke out in 1920 when Hans Pfitzner, in his polemical essay *Die neue Ästhetik der musikalischen Impotenz* (1926), attacked Bekker, who in his biography argued that a "poetic idea" was always the point of departure for Beethoven to begin a new work. Pfitzner argued for the inherently music idea—the *Einfall*—that stimulated composition. Schering also mentioned this controversy in his discussion of the history of Beethoven reception in the introduction to *Beethoven und die Dichtung* (1936a:52–54).

9. Translator's Note: Schering refers here to a memorandum Beethoven wrote in spring 1818 on the back of a sketchleaf containing work on the second movement of the "Hammerklavier" Sonata (Bonn, Beethoven Haus, Sammlung H. C. Bodmer, BsK 8): "Adagio cantique. Pious song in a symphony in ancient modes—Lord God we praise Thee—alleluia—either alone or as introduction to a fugue. The whole 2nd sinfonie might be characterized in this manner in which case the vocal parts would enter in the last movement or already in the Adagio. The violins, etc., of the orchestra to be increased tenfold in the last movement, in which case the vocal parts would enter gradually—in the text of the Adagio Greek myth, *Cantique Ecclesiastique*—in the Allegro, feast of Bachus [*sic*]" (Thayer 1973:888). Nottebohm published the original in *Zweite Beethoveniana*–N II ([1887] 1970:163), and this was in all likelihood Schering's source.

On Beethoven's plans for the composition of two symphonies in the years following 1818 and the controversies about its status, see Sieghard Brandenburg (1984), Barry Cooper (1987), and Robert S. Winter (1973/77, 1991).

10. Translator's Note: The ballet *The Creatures of Prometheus*, op. 43, first performed in 1801, contains the two themes that Beethoven used in the Piano Variations in E♭, op. 35 (which Beethoven referred to as the "Prometheus" Variations) and in the finale of the *Eroica*. The ballet has been interpreted as an allegory in honor of Napoleon; see Constantin Floros (1978:73–81) and Lewis Lockwood (1992:134–36), who cautiously endorses Floros's views.

11. Translator's Note: Adolph Bernhard Marx (1875, 1:245–86; see translation in 1997:158–88). Marx's hero is Napoleon himself; the action of the symphony takes place on a battlefield.

12. Translator's Note: Schering refers to sketches in Landsberg 6; see Gustav Nottebohm (1979:51–52), which contains the two sketches Schering cites. There are sketches for the symphony that precede Landsberg 6. They are found in the Wielhorsky sketchbook of 1802–03; see the edition by Natan Fisman (1962:44ff.). The sketches for the opening measures in Wielhorsky do not contain anything like the sketches in Landsberg 6 or in the finished work. See Lockwood (1992:134–50, especially his transcription on 138).

13. Translator's Note: I use the 1937 translation of Homer's *Iliad* by A. T. Murray. Schering does not indicate the source of the German citations.

14. Translator's Note: In Murray's translation, the first line reads: "Aloud then laughed his dear father and queenly mother" (297). I have revised this to conform to the German version in Schering.

15. See Nottebohm, op. cit., on Beethoven's inconsistency about the repeat.

Translator's Note: Nottebohm (1979:70–71) does not mention this problem explicitly, although one of his transcriptions includes repeat signs and he does discuss the detailed work on and revisions of the closing group.

16. For the reader's orientation, measure 156 is the first measure after the double bar (A♭ in the first violin).

17. One can note that the episode explained here as a dream-vision is removed from its context and stands by itself through characteristic harmonic shifts at the beginning and the end: the first time from F major to D♭ major and B♭ major (mm. 412–28), the second time from E♭ major to D♭ major and C major (mm. 555–65).

18. Translator's Note: Julius Benedict (1804–85) studied with Weber from 1821–1824. He was Weber's first student and was treated as a member of his family. Later, he had positions in Vienna and in Naples, and settled in London in 1835. Benedict's biography of Weber (1881) has been commonly accepted by Weber scholars as the original source for the program of the *Konzertstück* (composed in 1821). See Nicholas Temperley (2001). Schering cites Max von Weber ([1864–66] 1912, 2:311).

19. Translator's Note: Schering writes (174): "Eine antikisierende griechische Totenfeier ist sie nicht geworden, aber eine in der alles lebt, *was Homer aus der Seele des Nachgeborenen an Mitgefühl herauszuklagen konnte.*" The last clause (given in italics) is the most obscure passage in this difficult text. The main problem is the referential meaning of "Nachgeborenen," which can mean familial progeny, descendents in a more general sense of later generation, or posthumous survivor. Several interpretations are plausible, but none is definite; each also depends on the meaning of the preposition "aus." The previous sentence suggests that the reference is to Beethoven himself; the new sentence continues the thought that Beethoven is moved by Homer's text. This would, however, require that "aus" be translated as "in," which is contrived. The reference could also be to Homer himself, implying that Homer, who was believed to have been born after the time of the *Iliad*, was able to write so movingly because of the compassion he felt, which he rendered from his own soul.

20. Translator's Note: This argument seems counter-intuitive. After its gentle beginning, the C-major section (mm. 69ff.) assumes an overall strength and features musical gestures that, notwithstanding the presence of feminine heroism in the music of the classical period (e.g., Leonore in *Fidelio*), undoubtedly belong primarily to musical images of maleness. Moreover, the association of the major mode with feminine sentiments does not square with eighteenth-century thinking on this matter. See Gretchen Wheelock (1995).

21. Translator's Note: Schering implicitly critiques Bekker ([1911] 1927:161), who argues that the movement depicts "the emotions of a spectator" viewing a funeral procession from a distance.

22. Translator's Note: The reference is to Hermann Kretzschmar (1919: 199–207).

23. Translator's Note: See Bekker ([1911] 1927:163).

24. Translator's Note: Marx (1875, 1:273; 1997:173). Marx includes a musical example showing the three horns arpeggiating an E♭-major triad.

25. Let us note that Max Bruch, in his oratorio *Achilles* [op. 50 (1885)], also depicted the games during the burial rites for Patroclus with an instrumental movement.

26. *Beethoven* (1911) [*sic*], 1922, p. 223 [1927:163–65]. On the thematic connections alone see Thayer-Riemann, op. cit, pp. 422ff.

Translator's note: This is not included in the Forbes edition of Thayer (1973).

27. Translator's Note: Schering refers to remarks by von Bulow after a perfomance of the symphony in March 1892 (which he dedicated to Bismarck) on the occasion of his final concert with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra in Berlin. The concert, dedication, and remarks were repeated shortly thereafter in

Hamburg. At the concerts, von Bülow included in the program notes his own text to a "Bismarck-Hymne" that was underlaid to the melodic theme of the finale. For a brief period of time thereafter, the *Eroica* was referred to as the "Bismarck-Symphonie" in some newspapers. But reactions to von Bülow's homage to Bismarck were mixed; in Berlin it created a minor scandal. His remarks were published in the first edition of his letters and essays edited by Marie von Bülow (1896–1908, 8:371–78). Communication from Hans-Joachim Hinrichsen, Zurich. See also Sipe (1998:64).

Appendix: Arnold Schering's Writings on Musical Symbolism

J. S. Bach's Vocal Music

1925 Bach und das Symbol. 1. Studie: Insbesondere die Symbolik seines Kanons. *Bach-Jahrbuch* 22: 40–63.

1928 Bach und das Symbol. 2. Studie: Das "Figürliche" und "Metaphorische." *Bach-Jahrbuch* 25: 119–37.

1937a Bach und das Symbol 3. Studie: Psychologische Grundlegung des Symbolbegriffs aus Christian Wolffs "Psychologia empirica." *Bach-Jahrbuch* 34: 83–95.

1950 *Über Kantaten J. S. Bachs.* Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang.

Beethoven's instrumental music

1934a Die Eroica, eine Homer-Symphonie Beethovens? *Neues Beethoven-Jahrbuch* 5: 159–77.

1934b *Beethoven in neuer Deutung.* Leipzig: C. F. Kahnt.

1934c Zur Sinndeutung der 4. und 5. Symphonie von Beethoven. *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft* 16: 65–83.

1936a *Beethoven und die Dichtung.* Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt.

1936b Zu Beethovens Sonata pathétique. *Archiv für Musikforschung* 1: 336–67.

1936–38 Zu Beethovens Violinsonaten. Parts 1–4. *Zeitschrift für Musik* 103: 1041–48 (Die Sonata a-moll, op. 23); 103: 1308–18 (Die Sonate F-dur, op. 24); 104: 374–81 (Die Sonate D-dur, op. 30 no. 3); 105: 121–30 (Die Sonate Es-dur, op. 12 no. 3).

1937b Die Symbolik des Pizzikatos bei Beethoven. *Archiv für Musikforschung* 2: 273–84.

1938 *Zur Erkenntnis Beethovens. Neue Beiträge zur Deutung seiner Werke.* Würzburg: Triltsch.

1955 Über einige Grundsymbole der Tonsprache Beethovens. Posthumous in *Humor, Heldentum, Tragik bei Beethoven,* 65–76. Strasbourg/Kehl: Librarie Heitz.

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1936c Musikalische Symbolkunde. *Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters* 42: 11–23.

1937c Das Entstehen der instrumentalen Symbolwelt. *Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters* 43: 15–29.

1937d Kritik des romantischen Musikbegriffs. *Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters* 44: 9–28.

1941 *Das Symbol in der Musik*. Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang.

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Far Out: Intentionality and Image Schema in the Reception of Early Works by Ornette Coleman

By Janna K. Saslaw

In this essay I would like to examine two factors contributing to the categorization of music—authorial intentions and image schemas—and their perceptual consequences, in light of recent developments in cognitive science. Psychologist Raymond Gibbs (1999) has argued that many aspects of our understanding of language and artworks rest on a fundamental, often unconscious, tendency to seek the identity and communicative purpose of the creator. The writings of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and others[1] have suggested that human understanding works in a fundamentally metaphorical manner,[2] applying modes of understanding body movement to more abstract domains of thought. Combining these two approaches, this paper proposes that our understanding of musical creations as belonging inside or outside of an established cognitive category, in combination with our attribution of the composer's intent, colors our perception of the music to such a great extent that two people listening to the same composition might hear entirely different musical objects.

This idea poses a serious challenge to music analysts. We like to think that most musicians will agree on the basic "facts" of a musical work. This belief may seem to be confirmed when we focus principally on the classical canon, analyzed by a culturally-validated system. But I think this seeming consensus hides differences in perception that emerge more clearly with less mainstream repertories or alternative analytic techniques. For this paper I have chosen a repertoire disseminated primarily in aural form, which makes the issue of what is perceived to be the musical object even more acute: the early free jazz of alto saxophonist Ornette Coleman. A wide variety of reactions to this music were collected from reviews, articles, and record liner notes from 1958 to 1964. My research indicates that those who felt that this music exceeded cherished boundaries and who imputed destructive intentions to its creator had more difficulty perceiving its features (or perhaps had less motivation to note its characteristics) than those who felt it remained within the bounds of recognizable musical categories or broke through constricting limits.

Let me begin with some basic assumptions about intention. Raymond Gibbs views intentionality as a significant factor in understanding the meaning of an utterance or artwork. According to Gibbs, social psychologists

Current Musicology, no. 69 (Spring 2000)

> confirm that attribution of another person's intentions is necessary for forming an overall impression of that person and for sustaining social interactions. . . . Studies also suggest that attribution of dispositional qualities to another person on the basis of behavior may be made spontaneously, without awareness. (1999:78)

In fact, ascribing intentions to others is vital for making sense of human interactions.

> In the social world . . . a large number of complex variables are grasped easily and immediately, largely because people are perceived as the originators of their behavior in the sense that there is some intention motivating their actions. The attribution of intent to others is an important source for making the world seem relatively stable and predictable. (89–90)

People are so used to making predictions about the behavior of others that they routinely overattribute intention when the circumstance does not warrant it. For example, we tend to see intent in random events. According to Gibbs, the attribution of intention may occur very quickly, without conscious effort, or over a longer period of time. He asserts that

> [a]ll understanding, be it linguistic or nonlinguistic, takes place in real time ranging from the first milliseconds of processing to long-term reflective analysis. This temporal continuum may roughly be divided into moments corresponding to our comprehension, recognition, interpretation, and appreciation of linguistic utterances or artworks. (99)

For our purpose here, it is enough to realize that deciphering authorial intentions can take place in the comprehension stage, which comprises processes that take from a few hundred milliseconds up to a few seconds at most (100). This suggests that within seconds of hearing a musical phrase we may well have already attributed an intention to its creator, perhaps unconsciously. Just as it is advantageous in understanding conversation—for example, to attribute to a speaker the intention of asking directions—it may be advantageous in understanding music to attribute to the performers the intention of playing jazz, the intention of playing "Take the A Train," or the intention of soloing over the changes.

Now let me turn to image schemas.[3] Image schemas are cross-modal cognitive structures that shape percepts and concepts (Lakoff and Johnson 1999:30–44). They are formed from patterns of sensory and motor activity.

Lakoff and Johnson name these schemas from their simple, basic elements. A list of them includes "container," "source-path-goal," "part-whole," "center-periphery," "link," "cycle," "iteration," "contact," "adjacency," "forced motion" (e.g., pushing, pulling, propelling), "support," "balance," "straight-curved," "near-far," and vertical or horizontal orientation (ibid.:35). Some of these image schemas derive from the nature of the human body itself (e.g., "front-back"); others result from recurring body movements or interaction of the body and external entities (e.g., "source-path-goal," "forced motion"). Image-schematic concepts are reflected in many kinds of linguistic expressions. For example, when we say, "the butterfly is *in* the garden," we are imposing a container around a particular segment of land, air, and other features of the world, and we perceive the butterfly to be *inside* that space. When we say, "this piece is *in* D minor," we are mapping our understanding of containers onto the realm of music. In this case the "piece" of music (or the "music" itself), conceived of as an object, is understood as being inside a container holding the arrangements of tones that we associate with D minor.

It is important to recognize how fundamental image schemas are to human thought. It might seem that image schemas are choices imposed at the level of language,[4] or at the level of conscious reflection. But they are even more fundamental than that. Recent cognitive science research has put into question the old distinction between perception and cognition, a holdover from faculty psychology, in which separate faculties were posited for the activities of sensation and reason. In fact, work in neural modeling suggests that "the conceptual system makes use of important parts of the sensorimotor system" (Lakoff and Johnson 1999:39). Models cited by Lakoff and Johnson indicate that

> topographical maps of the visual field should be instrumental in the computation of image schemas that have topographical properties (e.g., the container schema); second, that orientation-sensitive cell assemblages should be able to compute the orientational aspects of spatial concepts that rely on body orientation (e.g., *above*); third, that center-surround receptive fields should be crucial to characterizing concepts like *contact;* and finally that the "filling-in" architecture . . . should play a central role in characterizing the notion of *containment.* (ibid.:40)

What we should take from this work is that there may well be no distinction between the neural structures that shape perception and those that shape cognition. It has even been suggested that "the same neural mechanism that can control bodily movements can perform logical inferences

about the structure of actions in general" (ibid.:42). In other words, image schematic concepts may indeed be formed by the same neural maps that carry out perception and body movement. According to this view, image schemas take part in every level of "perception" and "cognition."

The image schema of primary importance to this paper is "container," with the elements of an inside, a boundary, and an outside. This schema might also be called "in-out." These simple elements can be instantiated in a myriad of different ways as they are applied to physical and conceptual worlds. For example, the container schema is applied whenever we group entities together in a category.[5]

The music of Ornette Coleman in the late 1950s created intense reactions that may have resulted in part from metaphoric mapping of the container schema onto the domain of musical practice. In this case, on the inside of the container are the harmonic progressions, forms, and metric practices of jazz up to that point, as well as the normative procedure of basing solos on the harmony and form of the theme. Some critics called Coleman's music simply "far out."[6] Others reflected the lack of clear topography "outside" the normative container by calling the music "chaotic" or having "no form."[7]

The perception of chaos in a work often results in listeners mapping their response to the music onto the state of the composer's psyche. When trumpeter Rudy Braff states that Coleman's music "sounds like utter confusion and madness . . . disjointed and mixed up and crazy" (Feather 1960a: 37), he seems to be indirectly speculating about Coleman's mental stability as well. Critic John Tynan is more direct in his review of Coleman's 1960 album, *Free Jazz*, when he asks, "Where does the neurosis end and the psychosis begin? The answer must lie somewhere within this maelstrom" (1962:28). Just as the music falls outside the usual categories, the composer's mental state is perceived as outside of the norm: he's got to be out of his mind.

Roy Eldridge explicitly indicates where one goes outside of the normative container, referring to improvisations by Coleman's quartet: "They start with a nice lead-off figure, but then they go off into outer space" (Hentoff 1961:228).[8] Another musician claims, "those themes are so fresh and beautiful. Then they start to blow and it's Cape Canaveral!" (Williams 1963:24).[9]

Another container-schematic understanding of free jazz is displayed in a review of Coleman's 1960 album *This is Our Music* by Don DeMichael, editor of *Down Beat* magazine.[10]

> His is not musical freedom; disdain for principles and boundaries is synonymous not with freedom but with anarchy . . . [Coleman] has been made a symbol of musical freedom when he is the antithesis of that freedom. (DeMichael 1961:25)

DeMichael is placing Coleman outside the bounds of what he considers acceptable musical practice. This statement, at the head of the review, sets the tone for his subsequent treatment of Coleman's music. Early creators of free jazz were often portrayed as having bypassed normal boundaries, and they thus accrued the attributes of "outsiders." For example, outsiders may be strange, foreign in the sense of outside the bounds of one's own territory and behavior. Outsiders sometimes attack other territories, with the intention of destroying them. Thus free jazz creators may be labeled as destructive or dangerous. Sometimes these dangerous elements are thought of as coming from treasonous insiders who are destroying jazz from within. Thus Coleman is characterized as an "anarchist" or "nihilist."[11]

The clear ascription of destructive intent in DeMichael's review brings me back to Raymond Gibbs. According to Gibbs,

> We attribute more conscious intent to another when our goals or plans or intentions are clearly in conflict with another person's; . . . We [also] attribute more conscious intent to people if they deviate from a social convention they should know. (1999:90)

These conclusions imply that if we have, for some reason, understood others as being against our position, or if we assume that they know they are flouting convention, then we will strongly believe that they are acting consciously, with intent.[12] I would suggest that our natural disposition to categorize some human products—for example, new musical works—as "outside," and to view people who are outside of our belief system as having some intention that conflicts with ours, leads us to experience such products as conscious, intentional personal attacks.[13]

To Don DeMichael, the musical container seems to hold cherished traditional principles and values, and Ornette Coleman doesn't just pass over the boundary, he completely obliterates it. If one destroys this metaphorical domain's borders, then, DeMichael implies, the inhabitants are no longer "contained" by any organizing power. A state of anarchy and chaos results. Once categorized as a dangerous outsider, Coleman is considered by DeMichael to be a serious threat. At the end of the review, the nature of the threat is made explicit; if DeMichael doesn't metaphorically strike back at Coleman, then Coleman will destroy all that he holds dear:

> If Coleman's work is to be the standard of excellence, then the work of Lester Young, Louis Armstrong, Charlie Parker, Duke Ellington, and all the other jazzmen who have been accepted as important artists must be thrown on the trash heap. (DeMichael 1961:25)

Why does Don DeMichael have such a dramatic response to this record? It might be helpful to trace the point at which Ornette Coleman's music crossed over the boundary of acceptability for this critic. Luckily, we can locate that point in time somewhere between December 1959 and May 1961, because DeMichael gave a generally positive review to Coleman's 1959 album, *Tomorrow is the Question*, in the December 24, 1959 issue of *Down Beat*. The recording received a respectable three stars (the highest rating being five stars). Here are DeMichael's comments on Coleman's musical ideas and playing:

> To say this is a strange album is an understatement. Astonishing comes closer to the mark, for the LP is an exposition of Coleman's conception, and if it's anything, this conception is astonishing. Coleman is almost certain to create a furor and start the biggest controversy since Thelonious Monk.
>
> Most of his playing on this LP is very good, but some of it is outrageous. His wild, incoherent solos on *Tomorrow*, *Tears*, and *Mind* are marked by extremely bad intonation and sloppy execution. On the other hand, his work on *Lorraine*, *Compassion*, and *Giggin'* is startling in its emotional impact. Again, it must be emphasized that a greater percent of his playing is ★★★★★, but when he descends to playing hit-any-note-but-hit-it-fast, the rating falls to ★....
>
> All in all, this record demands attention and must be listened to many times before it can be digested even partly. Ornette Coleman may be the next great influence, but only time will tell. In the meantime, he should be heard so that a fair evaluation can be made. (DeMichael 1959:39–40)

The extreme difference in reaction to solos DeMichael perceives as either "wild" and "incoherent" or of "startling . . . emotional impact" is striking here. DeMichael apparently felt that these solos were either terrible or terrific, either outside the boundary of acceptable practice or within it. The reasons for this sharp delineation seem unclear today.[14] In any case, DeMichael concluded at the time that, in total, this recording deserved the many listenings that he claimed were required to understand it. Clearly he changed his mind after *This is Our Music* was released.

As we see even in DeMichael's 1959 review, Ornette Coleman's music seemed "strange" to some reviewers from 1958 to 1961. Several factors are involved in this reaction. First of all, Coleman literally was a stranger to many listeners. Several critics mention the fact that Coleman did not come up through the jazz "ranks" in the way that Dizzy Gillespie, for example, had. I think listeners, including many famous jazz players, did

not know how to interpret his musical intentions. Gibbs claims that readers feel more confident in their interpretations of what a speaker meant when that person is a friend than when he or she is a stranger. In other words,

> common ground (in this case "community membership") constrains both the interpretation of speaker's messages and the speed with which people comprehend those messages. (Gibbs 1999:130)

This may provide an explanation for the many early descriptions of Coleman's playing as "out of tune." Audiences had no common ground to help them determine whether his pitch manipulations were made intentionally or not. If Coleman was not able to play *within* the accepted norms of saxophone tone, then, as some responses indicated, he was not capable of presenting any coherent intention. In other words, because these listeners categorized Coleman's tone as simply out of tune, they were not able to form an impression of his having purposefully altered his sound.[15]

Returning to Don DeMichael's later review, which focuses on Coleman's solos from *This is Our Music*, we find the following assessment:

> Coleman's . . . ideas come in snatches, with yawning depressions between these snatches filled with meaningless notes, none having much relation to the main idea—if there is one—nor, for that matter, to each other. . . . His solo [on "Blues Connotation"], his "best" of the album, tends to wander, though it seems to have a direction, albeit an obscured one. (DeMichael 1961:25)

DeMichael seems to feel that Coleman is demonstrating a disregard for the "proper" relationship between themes and solos, a view expressed by other commentators of the time.[16] This view of "Blues Connotation," today one of Coleman's most well-known compositions, is in stark contrast to that of critic T. E. Martin in 1964, who states that in this tune

> Coleman improvises easily giving no sense of lack of control at any time (. . . his solo develops from theme [*sic*] with absolute logic of method) . . . This is not uncontrolled passion but a rational statement in a form of which Coleman can now demonstrate a consistent mastery. Its consistency perhaps is a feature worthy of attention by those who feel that the new wave cannot produce solos analogous in its way to those of [Johnny] Hodges. (1964:14)[17]

Since we have here two strikingly opposed accounts of "Blues Connotation," it is instructive to examine the solo to see what about it was

so disturbing to one listener who placed it outside of jazz tradition, yet seemed so "rational" to another who placed it in the same category as the work of alto saxophonist Johnny Hodges, perhaps best known as a featured soloist with Duke Ellington's orchestra from the late 1920s to the 1960s. Two excerpts drawn from a transcription of "Blues Connotation" will serve to illustrate Coleman's mode of improvising.[18] My aim here is not to prove that either DeMichael or Martin was "right" or "wrong" about the recording, but to focus on certain aspects of this solo and Coleman's style that may have prompted the responses by listeners in the early 1960s.

Looking at measures 1–12 of the theme (0:00–0:10, ex. 1), one will notice that m. 1 is a pickup, and m. 12 has only two beats in it, so this blues form is really ten and one-half bars. I will discuss Coleman's deviations from standard forms below. In example 1, I have marked two motives and some variants that will be useful in discussing example 2: motive a, an eighth-note upper-neighbor figure, and motive b, an ascending minor third with an upbeat-downbeat metrical relationship. Motives b^1 and b^2 are major third and perfect fourth variants of b. Several other motivic elements of the theme are contained in the solo, but for my purpose these two are sufficient. After a repetition of the theme (the bass line changes but the melody remains essentially the same), the solo starts at 0:21 with some blues-tinged phrases that stay around the tonal center of B♭. However, Charlie Haden's bass line immediately starts moving by half steps as the solo begins, perhaps leaving room for Coleman to move away from B♭. During the approximately three-minute-long solo, Haden often moves chromatically, which allows Coleman to shift tonal centers above him.

Just before the passage transcribed in example 2, Coleman starts to emphasize the tone B♮, while still retaining the B♭ tonal center. Example 2 (1:26–2:00) continues within B♭ at first, but in m. 102 we see that the B♮ recurs within a sharp-side phrase implying E major and then D major. Haden moves chromatically below (mm. 102–5). Although Coleman returns to his B♭ tonal center by m. 112, apparently for many listeners of the early 1960s this kind of deviation was fairly unusual (see below). In m. 118, Coleman uses motive a, now with a quarter-eighth-eighth rhythm, to begin a series of sequential repetitions. First, he shortens the figure to two eighths in m. 120, then augments its rhythm in mm. 122–24. In m. 127, Coleman plays motive b, shifted to the downbeat, but returns it to its original upbeat-downbeat placement in m. 128. The label "b + a" indicates a combination of the upbeat-downbeat leap of motive b with the descending neighbor figure from motive a. The statement of $b^1 + a^2$ in m. 128 begins a chromatic move upwards away from B♭ before being transposed at various intervals. By m. 131 Haden has followed Coleman to the sharp side. By m. 137 we are back in B♭ again, and largely remain there until the end of the solo at 3:19.[19]

The temporary shifts of tonal orientation illustrated in example 2 were apparently enough to give pause to even T. E. Martin, the reviewer who places Coleman within the bounds of jazz. In order to discuss this aspect of "Blues Connotation," Martin feels as though he must first define some terms, including "pantonality," "where all tonalities are possible."

> Coleman's work is generally pantonal . . . but given this, the method can be made to approach [tonality or atonality] by simulating the even flow of tonal music . . . or the vertiginous discontinuities of atonality. The second choice is made here, but in expanded form so that a key centre is retained long enough to be established as point of reference then destroyed by the shifting of the melodic shape to a dissonant key. The effect is something like that felt on a train rushing through the numerous switches of a large railway junction. It is not tonality that is shunned per se but tonal resolution . . . Coleman reserves the right to change tonality . . . at points which are determined solely by his conception of form, which is of course how

Example 1: "Blues Connotation" (mm. 1–12).



Example 2: "Blues Connotation" (mm. 97–136).



Example 2 (cont.)



harmonic development must have been introduced in the first place. (Martin 1964:14)

Regarding the melodic material of this tune, Coleman says in the liner notes to *This is Our Music*, "the minor thirds do not dominate but act as a basis for the melody. And as you get more accustomed to my music, you will realize that this is happening throughout all of it." Gunther Schuller discusses similar procedures in his liner notes to Coleman's 1961 album, *Ornette!*.

> Little motives are attacked from every conceivable angle, tried sequentially in numerous ways until they yield a motivic springboard for a new and contrasting idea, which will in turn be developed similarly, only to yield to yet another link in the chain of musical thought, and so on until the entire statement has been made.

T. E. Martin dubs this practice "motive evolution," and describes it as

> the modification, transmutation, replication and polymerisation of the melodic germ cell which may be defined in say three notes; the

> notes themselves are unimportant, so in fact are the strict intervals they imply, thus harmony ceases to exist as a primary concept . . . but the shape of this cell now becomes the essence. (Litweiler 1994:72)

We can see from the tonal digressions in example 2 why Don DeMichael may have felt that this solo "wanders," and what caused T. E. Martin to speak of "vertiginous discontinuities" (although from today's perspective it might be difficult to experience the shocking effect these authors describe). In addition, from the use of motives a and b, we can understand why Martin, Schuller, and others talk of "motive evolution" in Coleman's playing.

Let us return now to the sharply contrasting reviews of *This is Our Music* by DeMichael and Martin. The second song on the album is the ballad, "Beauty is a Rare Thing." First, DeMichael:

> Although it begins promisingly, *Beauty [is a Rare Thing]* descends into an orgy of squawks from Coleman, squeals from [trumpeter Don] Cherry, and above-the-bridge plinks from [bassist Charlie] Haden. The resulting chaos is an insult to the listener's intelligence. It sounds like some horrible joke, and the question here is not whether this is jazz, but whether it is music. (1961:25)

DeMichael denies the work not only inclusion in the body of jazz, but also inclusion as a piece of music, as evidenced by the combination of animal sounds and noises that he attributes to the players.[39] This reaction illustrates a feature of many container-schematic conceptions: a real-world object cannot be both inside and outside a container simultaneously. When this experience is applied to domains such as music, we get the absence of gray areas—it's either music or it's not; it's either *in* tune or it's *out*.

With respect to the same song, Martin, on the other hand, claims that

> This "dirge" . . . is arguably the greatest track to be discussed [from the album] . . . one of the most important achievements is the total form which allows the "theme" to crystallise, dissolve and recrystallise within the fabric of individual statements. (1964:14)

These opposed views, depicting Coleman as outsider vs. insider, persist as the authors deal with the third song on the album, "Kaleidoscope." First, DeMichael:

> Coleman's playing on *Kaleidoscope* strikes me as incoherent. It seems as if there is a given amount of space to fill with notes, but it makes

> no difference to the player what notes are hurled into it. His solo consists mostly of flurries of notes that have no relation to one another or to the time that he's supposedly playing in. It is not panrhythmic, it is anti-swing.[2] (1961:25)

Now Martin:

> As usual Coleman solos first and here he picks up the major motive to develop a strongly "thematic" solo retaining and exploring the vocalis legato of the theme. . . . We again find another of Coleman's ambiguous "quotations" as the patterns part at one stage on what seems to be a strongly stressed fragment of *There's a Small Hotel*. . . . The fusing substances are the basic melodic shapes and their pantonal echoes. (1964:15)

Yet again, we notice that Martin consistently seems to observe more detail in Coleman's work than does DeMichael. I would suggest that because DeMichael has categorized this music as "not jazz," even "not music," he is not going to look for the things one normally analyzes in jazz: the relationship of the solo to the theme, the quotation of previous tunes, some kind of musical direction or motion. In other words, the lack of analytical detail may well follow from his classification of the music and his attribution of negative intentions.

How did Ornette Coleman view his own work at the time? Much in the same vein as classical composers, the composers and performers of free jazz often tended to see their own work as extending rather than bursting the bounds of prevailing styles. Coleman put it this way:

> A new phase in jazz does not make previous styles obsolete, but instead *incorporates* qualities that have preceded it. While the term "bop" had its eclipse, its musical elements are very much in evidence *in* today's "modern" or "progressive" jazz. (emphasis added, Coleman 1960a)

Similarly, he felt that "Bird would have understood us. He would have approved our aspiring to something beyond what we inherited" (Coleman 1959c). The Modern Jazz Quartet's pianist John Lewis used equivalent terms: "I feel he's an extension of Charlie Parker, but I mean a *real* extension. He doesn't copy Parker's licks or style" (liner notes to Coleman 1959a). In these two statements Coleman is viewed as within the bounds of tradition, but expanding the container to encompass new contents.

On the other hand, when Coleman described his search for new means of expression, he stated: "The members of my group and I are now attempting a break-through to a new, freer conception of jazz, one that departs from all that is 'standard' and cliché in 'modern' jazz." For example, the song "Change of the Century" "expresses our feeling that we have to make breaks with a lot of jazz's recent past, just as the boppers did with swing and traditional jazz" (liner notes to Coleman 1959c). Thus Coleman is able to see himself as being within a historical tradition while at the same time seek to break out of standard clichés to achieve freedom. In other words, when the metaphorical container holds previous norms that Coleman views as the basis for his own innovations, like those of bebop, he places himself within the container, identifying with Charlie Parker and others who have come before him. When his focus is the stifling constrictions of certain procedures or entities that prevent his individual expression, then he must see himself as breaking free.

Proponents of free jazz talked frequently about freedom of expression, equating the breaking out of boundaries with the removal of restraining force.[22] For example, Art Farmer recognized that "this style of playing is very extreme but it does show that there is more freedom to be taken advantage of than is as a rule" (Feather 1960b).[23] One reviewer stated that "freed of the 'restrictions' of bar lines, conventional harmonic sequences, et al, [the performers] are thus enabled to follow, individually and collectively, their own musical stars" (Welding 1962a). Elsewhere, the same reviewer again explicitly mentioned the removal of bonds, resulting in expressive freedom:

> In [Coleman's] *Free Jazz* the soloist is free to explore any area of his improvisation that his musical aesthetic takes him to; he is not bound by harmonic, tonal, or rhythmic framework to which he must adhere rigidly. (Welding 1962b)

Such persistent metaphorical projections of the container schema in statements from the late fifties and early sixties, referring to confining forces that must be surpassed, attest to a need for new means of expression. Several authors posit "the chord" as the restraining force that must be overcome. George Russell, composer and jazz theorist, speaks of "liberation of the melodic idea from the chord prison" and claims that John Coltrane is "bursting at the seams to demolish the chord barrier" (Russell and Williams 1960:9). Martin Williams, in his liner notes to Coleman's *The Shape of Jazz to Come* (1959b), elaborates on this view:

> [I]f you put a conventional chord under my note, you limit the number of choices I have for my next note; if you do not, my melody may move freely in a far greater choice of directions. [Ornette] can work through and beyond the furthest intervals of the chords. . . . As several developments in jazz in the last few years have shown, no one really needs to state all those chords that nearly everyone uses, and as some events have shown, if someone does state them or if a soloist implies them, he may end up with harassed running up and down scales at those "advanced" intervals like a rat in a harmonic maze. Someone had to break through the walls that those harmonies have built and restore melody—but, again, we realize this only after an Ornette Coleman has begun to do it.

Chords were not the only perceived restraint to free expression. Williams uses similar container-schematic terms with respect to Coleman's approach to form:

> [H]e breaks through the usual thirty-two, sixteen, and twelve bar forms both in his compositions and in his improvising, all spring from an inner musical necessity, not from an outer academic contrivance.

In the liner notes to the album *Tomorrow is the Question*, Shelly Manne, Coleman's drummer, focuses on the metric freedom that Coleman helped him achieve:

> I've always been bugged by having to stay within certain boundaries. Here is a guy that came along that was able to free me—from my having played with him—of all those things I wanted to throw off. Meter structure, for example. Sometimes Ornette ignores it. He makes you listen so hard to what he's doing in order to *know* where he is in the tune and what he's trying to express. It's just a complete freedom from every way you might have been forced to play before.

Neither the intentions of the creator nor our image-schematic mode of understanding may be on our minds as we sit down to listen to or write about music, but, in fact, they color our emotional responses to music, they affect the very way in which we define what it is we are hearing, they affect the choice of analytical tools that we use, and they shape the kinds of results that we obtain. As Raymond Gibbs concludes, people pay attention to information that seems most relevant to them (1999:119). Ornette Coleman seems to have recognized this fact when he said about his music:

"If you listen with pre-conceived ideas, you might miss a lot that's in it" (Coleman 1960bc38).

I have suggested here that intentional and image-schematic understanding of musical works may be immediate and unconscious. So what are we to do with this information? First of all, we must recognize that we do not have conscious access to many of our own cognitive processes. There are undoubtedly many more structuring processes like intentionality and image schema that operate without our awareness. We must then realize the results of this lack of access, which include the feeling of certainty that our perceptions are objectively real; it feels like there just is a butterfly *in* the garden or that a piece of music is *in* D minor (or that Ornette Coleman's music is/is not jazz). However, these convictions need to be questioned. I do not mean to question that the butterfly or the music exist in the world, but rather I mean that the structuring of that world is largely determined by the make-up of our minds and their being situated in our bodies. This is a conclusion that should inform any conscious consideration of musical works. When we assess the analyses of others, we can use our knowledge of these processes to understand views that are different from our own. And in our own reception and analyses, this knowledge might enable us to move outside of our old categories/ containers and hear music in a new way.

Notes

1. Although Lakoff and Johnson (1999) is the most recent publication from these authors, also important are Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987), and Turner (1996).

2. These authors' definition of metaphor differs from the standard sense of the term. In this case "metaphor" means the cognitive process of mapping understanding from one domain of thought to another, such as body motion to music, or military conflict to personal relationships.

3. I have dealt with image schemas in the conceptualization of music in two previously published articles. See Saslaw (1996, 1997–98).

4. Although Lakoff and Johnson do not make it clear exactly what kind of cognitive structures image schemas are, they do refer to "image schematic concepts." This phrase implies that image schemas may be concepts or they may exist prior to concepts. Neurobiologist Gerald Edelman has considered the biological mechanism of concepts. See Edelman (1989, 1992) and Edelman and Tononi (2000). Edelman cites Lakoff's work as consistent with his theory of the biological mechanisms of thought (Edelman 1992:246–52). Edelman and Tononi underscore the fact that "concepts are not propositions in a language (the common usage of this term); rather, they are constructs the brain develops by mapping its own responses prior to language" (2000:215–16).

5. According to Antonio Damasio (1999), the ubiquity of the container schema is supported by the significance given to inside/outside distinctions in living creatures. Damasio states, "Life is carried out inside a boundary that defines a body. Life and the life urge exist inside a boundary, the selectively permeable wall that separates the internal environment from the external environment. . . . If there is no boundary, there is no body, and if there is no body, there is no organism. Life needs a boundary. I believe that minds and consciousness, when they eventually appeared in evolution, were first and foremost about life and the life urge within a boundary" (137).

6. Even today, jazz musicians and aficionados describe jazz that is considered to deviate from set chord progressions and forms as "outside" or "out."

7. See, for example, Hoefer (1960).

8. The quotation continues, "They disregard the chords and they play odd numbers of bars. I can't *follow* them" [emphasis added]. This statement shows inference based upon a container-schematic conception. If the musicians have gone into "outer space" then one can't "follow" them.

9. Cape Canaveral, Florida is the site of a U.S. Space Center.

10. DeMichael's views on Coleman's work were chosen because they are somewhat representative of other negative sentiments expressed at the time, because they were presented in such clear container-schematic terms, and also because they were in such striking contrast to the reception of the same music by T. E. Martin (see below).

11. See also Andre Previn on Coleman's "Focus on Sanity"—"turning your back on any tradition is anarchy" (Feather 1961b)—and John Tynan on Coleman's *Free Jazz:* "'Collective improvisation?' Nonsense. The only semblance of collectivity lies in the fact that these eight nihilists were collected in one studio at one time and with one common cause; to destroy the music that gave them birth" (Tynan 1962:28). Rudy Blesh applies the same terms to swing music (Blesh 1958:290).

12. Corroboration for this view comes from an account of deviance contemporaneous with Coleman's early work by Howard Becker. Becker states: "People usually think of deviant acts as motivated. They believe that the person, even for the first time (and perhaps especially for the first time), does so purposely" (1963:25). Becker's book includes a discussion of swing band musicians as deviants.

13. A biological basis for the rejection of radically new perceptual stimuli, specifically artworks, is posited in Perlin (1994).

14. I had initially thought that the presence of pitch bending, fast passages, and/or deviation from the form or harmonies of the theme might have caused the rejection of the three solos singled out by DeMichael. However, close comparison shows that each of these features occurs in the tunes he liked as well. It is possible that the more nasal tone or slightly more hesitant quality of "Tomorrow" and "Tears" played some part in his negative response. I played these tunes for two other jazz musicians, including a saxophonist, and neither could discern any sharp differences in practice between the two sets of solos.

15. Some favorable reviews, however, compared Coleman's sound to human vocalization. For example, Whitney Balliett stresses the importance of "Coleman's tone, which is replete with attempts to reproduce the more wayward sounds of the human voice" (1959:151). Coleman himself stated at the time, "There are some intervals . . . that carry that *human* quality if you play them in the right pitch. You

reach into the human sounds of a voice on your horn if you're actually hearing and trying to express the warmth of a human voice" (Hentoff 1961:241).

16. Trumpeter Art Farmer said about "Endless" from *Tomorrow is the Question*: "I like Ornette's approach to writing. I wish I could see more of a link between the writing and the solos. It's like a building without any foundation, and something's got to keep it up in the air. You can't just fly around forever, even an atom-powered submarine has to go back to home base sometime. If you had an airplane that could fly around the world 3,000 times, it would still have to land sometime. You've got to know where home is . . . you've got to acknowledge that somewhere" (Feather 1960b). Quincy Jones used terms similar to those of DeMichael with respect to Coleman's "Ramblin'": "now it's just wandering, and because of the lack of a certain basis for form, you know, it has a restless feeling—which, of course, they might be looking for. . . . I think a little bit more in terms of form, construction" (Feather 1961a).

17. One might think that the three-year difference in the dates lies behind the differences between these reviews. However, another assessment by Michael James, dating from 1961, uses much the same terms as Martin does later: "For all his virtuosity in rhythmic and melodic fields, [Coleman] displays real continuity of line. In Blues Connotation his solo evolves with astonishing logic, each phrase growing almost inexorably out of the one before, whilst the general melodic shape bears continual affinity to the tune" (James 1961:21).

18. Measures 1–133 (0:00–1:58) are my own transcription, based on the rereleased version on the CD compilation *Beauty is a Rare Thing* (Coleman 1993). All timings provided come from this compilation, which is a collection of all of Coleman's Atlantic Records releases. The CD also contains an alternate take of "Blues Connotation," recorded at the same session, but previously released only in 1975 (in Japan) as "P.S., Unless One Has." (All the titles on this album were portions of a sentence: "Music Always/Brings Goodness/To Us/All/P.S. Unless One Has/Some Other/Motive For Its Use"). The solos in this version are, in fact, fairly similar in character and motivic work to the ones in the original. For the notation of the head, I also consulted the version in *The New Real Book* (Scher and Bauer 1988:27). I would like to acknowledge the aid of Joshua Q. Paxton in transcribing measures 134ff. Since I have edited his version, I take full responsibility for any errors in that section.

19. With respect to rhythm, one may note that at various points in the solo Coleman seems to float above the beat, or moves ahead or behind it (e.g., at m. 118 of example 2 at 1:44), and that the transcription only approximately captures where his notes fall. The full impact of tone quality and pitch slides or bends was also difficult to capture in the transcription. Although false fingerings and pitch bends (the latter in mm. 107, 112, 116, etc.) are indicated, their effect does not really come across on paper. Downward- or upward-pointing arrows in example 2 indicate that the pitch is slightly lower or higher than the written note.

20. One need only look through Slonimsky (1965) for similar rhetoric describing new music by classical composers.

21. In other reviews in *Down Beat* from 1960, the most often mentioned feature of a recording deemed good by DeMichael is "swing." For example, DeMichael

praises a recording by Donald Byrd as "a steaming, swinging, utterly satisfying performance" (1960a:34) and one by Pee Wee Erwin as a "nice album for Sunday swinging" (1960b:36). This might explain DeMichael's violent reaction to "Kaleidoscope" and also to "Beauty is a Rare Thing," the latter of which displays the boldest tonal and temporal experiments on the album, including a lack of any regularly articulated meter by drummer Ed Blackwell.

22. For a general discussion of various kinds of force image schemas see Johnson (1987) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999). For the role of force schemas in the conception of music, see Saslaw (1996, 1997–98).

23. The recording to which Farmer responded was "Endless" from Coleman's *Tomorrow is the Question* (1959a).

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Marsyas Agonistes

By Maria Rika Maniates

Introduction

It is generally acknowledged that *mousike* (music and poetry) played an integral role in ancient Greek culture and that it continued to do so, albeit to a lesser and different degree, in Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman times. When performing religious rites, soldiering in wars, laboring in town and country, entertaining at parties, introducing sporting events, or accompanying theatrical productions, Hellenes considered the services of *mousikoi* (musicians) to be indispensable to the success of an enterprise. Although athletic competitions held the spotlight in the games so cherished by the Greeks, music contests (for instruments alone as well as poetical recitations with instrumental accompaniment) were featured in the Pythian Games at Delphi and the Panathenaic Games at Athens, though not in the prestigious Olympic Games at Olympia. So deeply embedded was *mousike* that philosophers, music theorists, and dilettantes discussed its abstract structure, its good and bad practice, its famous practitioners (mythical or actual), its influence on human society, and its role in cosmic organization. Only in this context could dreamers of utopias envision the strict regulation of musical genres, types, and instruments. Only in this context could there exist such a rich and manifold repertory of myths about *mousikoi:* for example, Amphion, Arion, Linus, Marsyas, Olympus, Orpheus, Terpander, Thamyris, and Timotheus.

Among the most often treated in ancient writings is the Phrygian satyr Marsyas, whose contest with Apollo is the theme of hundreds of written accounts and visual representations—certainly more numerous than any other single figure, with the possible exception of Orpheus. Of all the mythical subjects in music, that of *Marsyas Agonistes* (Marsyas Contender) has been an inexhaustible source of pathos and horror, of moralistic and mysterious significance. The ancient visual sources for this myth form a large body of works that requires separate and meticulous examination.[1] Suffice it here to mention that in the Renaissance and later, the story of Marsyas was painted by Raphael, Titian, Lorrain, and Ribera. *La divina commedia* by Dante contains three lines destined to become famous, the poet's invocation of Apollo: "Penetrate/pierce my breast and breath into/inspire me, as you did when you drew Marsyas's limbs out of their sheath/skin" (*Paradiso* 1:19–21).[2] In this century, the myth of Marsyas has been mentioned as a literary emblem

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by such eminent writers as George Steiner (1996:406–7) and Northrop Frye (1990:146). It has also furnished the basis for a number of modern poems and plays, and inspired ballets set to music by Luigi Dallapiccola and Manos Hadjidakis, among others, as well as a comic opera by Einojuhani Rautavaara and an electronic composition by Janet Eveline Beat.

As well as being a myth about music, the contest between Marsyas on the *aulos* (a single/double reed wind instrument) and Apollo on the *kithara* (a plucked string instrument), culminating in the defeat and punishment of Marsyas, belongs to the category of the agonistic myth. This type of myth, by definition, features the clash of sharply opposing characters and forces. In interpreting the metalanguage of such myths, one must consider not only the denotative level, but also the connotative level of the story. The latter, of course, does not map exactly onto the former; it is, however, shaped by it and in turn shapes the meaning(s) of the myth (Brillante 1990:120–21). All myths are polysemic, and the story of Marsyas is no exception, for its concrete motifs create an internal skein of multiple implications and, hence, interpretations.

In addition to internal meanings that have to do with musical values and issues, the myth of Marsyas presents a narrative and a cast of characters with extensive implications that go beyond the story-line, and these shed light on deep, significant non-musical issues that preoccupied ancient Greek society. The myth of Marsyas does more than relate the events of a musical contest. It encapsulates the core conundrum expressed in ancient Greek myths: the perilous relationship between mortals and divinities, between heroism and *hybris* (hubris), glory and ignominy, honor and shame, fame and infamy. These issues transcend the boundaries of the musical aspects of the story and make it one of the fundamental myths of ancient culture. Like many other myths and the ancient Greek tragedies based on them, the story of Marsyas, when put into sociocultural context, retains the capacity to spellbind and even disturb its audience. Its manifold retellings, literary and philosophical allusions, and visual representations should indicate to us that this myth wielded a similar power over the ancients as well.

The following routine epitome summarizes the myth of Marsyas:

> In Greek mythology, Marsyas was a Phrygian satyr. When Athena abandoned the double flute because playing it distorted her face, Marsyas took it up and became famous for his beautiful music. He challenged Apollo to a musical contest, on the terms that the winner could do what he wished with the loser. At first both played equally well, but Apollo then challenged Marsyas to play his instrument upside down; this could be done on Apollo's instrument, the lyre,

> but not on the flute, so the Muses, who were judges, awarded the contest to Apollo. He hanged Marsyas from a pine-tree and flayed him. Marsyas's blood, or the tears of his friends, is said to have formed the river Marsyas. In another version, the judge was Midas, who declared Marsyas the winner; Apollo punished Midas by giving him the ears of an ass. Marsyas was a popular subject of Roman art; his statue stood in the Forum (Grolier 1995).[3]

Most accounts present the same basic story, but with varying details and interpretations in its retellings. Although a system of motifs can be discerned in the repertory of stories, Greek myths, as has been noted, had no standard or orthodox version (Buxton 1994:15; Dowden 1992:8). Some accounts present fairly detailed stories. Others are cursory interstitial references, some so brief as to be enigmatic.

Starting from the premise that there is no wrong approach to decoding myths, this study presents the motifs of the story in a structuralist mode, insofar as the historical provenance of sources will rarely be taken into account.[4] Structuralism maintains that no single version of a myth should take precedence over any other, since all accounts are valid and valuable; every retelling and rereading adds something to the myth. What ensues on these pages then, as well as what the readers take from it, will become part of the myth of Marsyas, even as we heed the warning that myth "resists all dogmatic advances while appearing to consort with each passing catechist" (Eisner 1974:ix).

When interpreting the myth of Marsyas, one must bear in mind that the *agon* (competition) was a pervasive element of ancient Hellenic society and not just in the formal arena of athletic and artistic games. For instance, the dialogues of Socrates can be decoded as conversational contests. All competitors sought glory or fame and in this respect attained the status of hero. Agonistic heroes became more heroic. Reflecting societal custom and protocol, agonistic myths narrated conflicts of opposites: the more stark the contrast, the more dramatic the myth and the more crucial the *agon*. Since one of the profound issues explored in ancient myths was the relationship between humans and gods, *agones* between heroes and divinities had special significance. To choose or to accept to fight with a god was the ultimate heroic gesture: heroic, but dangerous in that it came close to *hybris*. And the price paid by the loser in these encounters (almost inevitably the mortal antagonist) was severe, even fatal. The audience of agonistic myths, then as now, loved to gape at a hero's attempts to exceed the limitations of mortality and also to thrill at his inevitable ruin.

In the *agon* between Marsyas and Apollo, it was therefore not unexpected that the loser should pay a penalty, even with his life. And yet,

among the more perplexing elements of this story is the nature of Marsyas's punishment: Why was he flayed alive by victorious Apollo? Martin Vogel, among others, comments that the flaying seems an odd outcome for a musical contest (1964:35). Gotthold E. Lessing remarks, "Who can recall the punishment of Marsyas, in Ovid, without a feeling of disgust?" ([1766] 1957:163). Ovid's account in the *Metamorphoses* is certainly vivid and, what is more, troubling in its absorption with Marsyas's suffering. But even without these unseemly delights, the ending of the myth is an unsettling enigma. To arrive at some sort of understanding of the outcome of Marsyas's encounter with Apollo, one must consider how the sources (see appendix F) narrate and evaluate the events and the role of the players in them: the challenge, stakes, judges, proceedings, verdict, and finally, the punishment and its aftermath.

The Musical Contest between Apollo and Marsyas

The Challenge

The most blatant and widely accepted rationale for Marsyas's death is that he dared to challenge the god Apollo. Indeed, most ancient writers seem to agree that it was Marsyas who initiated the musical contest in which Apollo would play his lyre or *kithara* and Marsyas his *aulos* or *auloi*.[5] A fair number skip over the challenge phase of the story—taking it for granted, as it were—while some suggest either that there was a rivalry rather than a formal challenge, or else that the issue entailed something more than mere musicianship.

According to Agathias, auletic *epistemē* (knowledge) was at issue, although in his view the notion that Apollo condescended to compete as an aulete (*aulos* player) was patently ridiculous.[6] His statement exemplifies one aspect of the dual and conflicted focus of the Marsyas myth: on the one hand, the implied baseness of *auletikē* (*aulos* playing) that renders this art unworthy of Apollo and, on the other, the implied intellectual dignity of the contest that renders Marsyas an opponent worthy of Apollo. A similar duality can be discerned when Nonnus calls Marsyas's *aulos* "proud" and yet hints at the challenger's unassuming invitation to a contest, a friendly rivalry. Pseudo-Apollodorus characterizes the meeting as *eris peri mousikēs* (a disagreement/rivalry about music), even though he goes on to describe a contest in musical skill. Other writers also refer to a rivalry (*philoneikia, eris*). Such a rivalry could well have resulted in an actual contest, as affirmed by Lucian and the anonymous Alexandrian proverb recorded by Pseudo-Plutarch.

It is possible, however, to construe the rivalry in a different way: divine punishment could have proceeded from Marsyas's careless comparison of

his own musical skill to that of Apollo—a sort of *hybris* that called down the wrath of the god—or simply from Marsyas's great musical skill—a sort of *hybris* that aroused the envy of the god. A similar ambiguity marks the famous and well-documented contest between Thamyris, the legendary bard of Thrace, and the Muses (who were the judges in the Marsyas-Apollo contest). Most of the sources state that Thamyris challenged or otherwise incited the Muses to enter into a singing competition. A respectable number, however, suggest that Thamyris was the victim of their resentment, their envy of the beauty of his person and his singing. The Muses blinded him, broke his *kithara*, and destroyed his creative gifts.[7]

On the grounds of perceived rivalries in skills sacred to Apollo or actual challenges flung at the god, a number of ancient Greek heroes were slain by Apollo's far-shooting arrows. The list includes the great archer Eurytus, said by some to have been Apollo's grandson, who received his mighty bow from his divine grandfather;[8] the glorious *lyrodos* (singer to the lyre) Linus, son of Apollo by one of the Muses, for whom a famous lament, *Linos* (Song of Linus) or *Ailinos* (Lament for Linus), was handed down through many generations; Cinyras, king of Cyprus and beloved priest of Aphrodite, who dared to rival in music the god Apollo, his lover and master. Father-son, grandfather-grandson, teacher-pupil, lover-beloved—all relationships that could be fraught with exaltation and desecration.

In the case of Marsyas and Apollo, the preponderant evidence tells us that the satyr challenged the god. In this connection, two sources reflect yet another duality: a Greek proverb in the Bodleian Codex notes the foolishness of this challenge, whereas a Latin inscription on a terracotta flask notes Marsyas's pursuit of glory. But tradition emphasizes Marsyas's effrontery, a trait that bred impiety or blasphemy and ended with his execution. And this interpretation led to a characterization of Marsyas as a fool and a madman. The other victims of the Muses and Apollo mentioned above may have been unhinged in their improper behavior towards the divinities, but they were not risible. Was Marsyas so despicable as to merit death by torture?

The Stakes

In the games of ancient Greece, winners of athletic and artistic competitions were awarded only a leafy crown of honor. This image of the cherishing of glory for its own sake reinforces the commonplace view of noble amateur competition in ancient times. But the truth of the matter is not at all what was later envisioned on the playing fields of Eton and their nostalgic heritage (the idealizing of the modern Olympics). Ancient cities and patrons gave substantial material prizes to the winners and their families.

And at funeral games all contestants received rewards for participating, the rewards graduated to match their placement in the competition. That cheating, whenever discovered, was penalized leads one to suspect that notions of fair play were by no means universal; for every competitor caught out, at least one must have escaped detection.[9] Tricks and duplicity (*dolos* and *metis*) in trials of all sorts were as complex a subject as it was omnipresent (Detienne and Vernant 1991). In some versions of the Marsyas-Apollo contest, *dolos* and *metis* played a conspicuous role.

For contests that took place outside the venue of established formalities, the participants were responsible for setting out the rules, including the all-important designation of the wager: the prize of the winner and the forfeit of the loser. Unfortunately, the extant accounts of such contests do not provide details about the stakes, with one notable exception: the contest between Thamyris and the Muses.

Asclepiades describes the wager as made by the Muses: if they won, they could do as they pleased with Thamyris; if he won, he could take as many of them to wife as he wished. All other writers give essentially the same wager, as laid down by the Thamyris, except that all the Muses would have sex with him if they lost the contest, and if they won, he would submit to mutilation in their hands.[10] Nicephorus says that Thamyris claimed he would be satisfied with victory (glory), and for its sake was prepared to take any unspecified risk. In the latter contest, Thamyris exhibited self-confidence, even arrogance, inasmuch as his challenge presumed the possibility of his winning. But no challenger entered a contest hoping to lose.

The same must have been true for Marsyas. Only Pseudo-Apollodorus tells us that at the outset the contestants agreed that the winner could do whatever he wished with the loser. When writing about a painting of the flaying scene, Philostratus of Lemnos explains that Marsyas himself offered to be flayed alive should he lose, thus exhibiting extreme arrogance and self-confidence. None of the other sources describe what each protagonist proposed as his prize, a factor that would have established the gravity of a contest in which the mortal contestant could forfeit his life. If a vengeful Apollo sought his rival's death, what did Marsyas hope to gain? One must assume it was glory, the ultimate prize of all ancient *agonistai*. A few sources verify this assumption, albeit in an indirect manner. Any sources that mention the wager itself do so to prepare the readers for the gruesome way in which Marsyas is put to death by Apollo. Thus the nature of the wager acts as a warning to all, including the ill-fated and, in the view of many writers, foolhardy mortal who dared enter such a contest against a god. Even Marsyas's search for glory is often, but not always, depicted as dangerous, vain, blasphemous or unwise—again to justify the terrible penalty paid by the seeker in this case.

The Judges

Exactly who selected the judge or judges is never made explicit. And the identity or number of adjudicators as well as listeners varies from version to version. The presence of an assembly of witnesses is often presumed, to judge by the accounts of responses to the events as they unfolded. The implications of the actions and reactions of jury and audience cannot be properly assessed without considering the identity and character of the judges.

The Muses were popular candidates as judges. Apuleius, Lucian, Pausanias, Pseudo-Libanius, and the scholia on Plato declare or infer that they voted for Apollo. Only Hyginus claims that they were chosen by both contestants. Apuleius adds Minerva (Athena) to the group of nine. As will become clear, Athena has an intriguing connection with the *aulos* and Marsyas. The nine Muses, daughters of Mnemosyne and Zeus, were born in Pieria in Thrace. The connection of each with a specific art varies from writer to writer, although *mousike* in the ancient sense of poetry and melody was dominant in the group as a whole.[11] Indeed, the Muses followed *Apollo Musagetes* (Apollo Leader of the Muses)—singing, dancing, and playing musical instruments for the enjoyment of the gods.[12] However the Muses came to be chosen as judges, it seems not to have occurred to Marsyas that, given their connection, and indeed subservience to Apollo, these divine ladies could hardly be relied on to give an unbiased verdict. It did occur to the satirist Lucian, who wrote a dialogue between Hera and Leto arguing the virtues of their respective offspring. When Leto boasts of her son's delightful *kitharistike* (*kithara*-playing) at Olympian dinner parties, Hera retorts: "O Leto, what a laugh! Truly admirable is Apollo whom Marsyas would have flayed after prevailing over him in musical competition, had the Muses chosen to judge fairly."

Besides the Muses, other judges are named in ancient records. The Nysaeans were inhabitants of Mt. Nysa in the Near East or India where Marsyas, accompanying Cybele (the Asiatic Great Mother of the gods) on her wanderings, encountered Apollo. Mt. Nysa was the seat of a group of nymphs, led by Nysa, to whom Zeus had entrusted the upbringing of his infant son Dionysus. The fetus, rescued from the womb of the dying Semele, had been sewn by Zeus into his thigh until the baby came to term.[13] Dionysus kept Nysa as his headquarters during his conquest of India and the Eastern Mediterranean. It was perhaps not fortuitous that the contest should have occurred on Dionysian territory, thereby signaling the intricate relationship of Apollo and his half-brother. Dionysus, whose cultivated effeminacy, patronage of wine, female entourage of Maenads, and ritual practices of orgiastic ecstasy, introduced a specific gender-sexual tension heretofore absent in the pantheon.

Another set of two judges are Tmolus, the eponymous daemon of the mountain in Lydia near the river Pactolus and the Mygdonian (i.e., Phrygian) king Midas, son of Tmolus. Hyginus states that the contest adjudicated by this pair involved either Marsyas and Apollo or Pan and Apollo. This uncertainty may have arisen because the infamous judgment of Midas in the latter contest was often transferred to the former by Latin writers. The pairing of Midas and Tmolus as joint judges appears only in the Apollo-Pan contest. Suffice it to say that Tmolus gave the palm to Apollo and Midas to Pan. Pan played the *syrinx*, today commonly called pan-pipes or shepherd's pipe. This simple, flute-like instrument was made of a set of reeds of unequal length (see appendix A).

Where Midas is named the sole judge of either contest, he declared Apollo's opponent the victor (Pan or Marsyas). That Apollo rewarded Midas with a pair of ass's ears for his egregious judgment may be taken as a sign that the god won the contest against either rival. The forfeit required from Pan is not recorded; perhaps there was none, aside from the ignominy of losing to his divine uncle, even though Pan issued the challenge. Midas's ears, on the other hand, became symbols of just punishment for those who pretended expertise in musical discernment.[14] No commentator, ancient or modern, has suggested that Apollo's punishment of Midas was anything less than appropriate or that it was motivated by less than honest sentiments. However, in view of Apollo's considerable irritation with challenges to his musical skill, it does not seem amiss to suggest that his punishment of Midas was somewhat mean-spirited. Although the question of mortals and divinities with animal attributes is more abstruse than mere sanctimonious admonitions and satiric gibes, "You have the ears of Midas" was a well-known ancient epigram.

The Proceedings

According to Diodorus, the contestants agreed to take turns. Apollo performed first on the *kithara*, and Marsyas then amazed the listeners with the strange music of his *auloi*. At this point, the judges ranked Marsyas above Apollo. In the second round, Apollo sang a song in harmony to his *kithara*, and thus outclassed the instrumental music performed by Marsyas. Enraged, Marsyas argued that this judgment was unjust as well as illegal: the contest was one of instrumental skill (*techne*), and not of voice (*phone*); moreover, it was unfair to compare two skills with one. Apollo offered a deft rebuttal. He had not taken unfair advantage. All he had done was use his hands and mouth as did Marsyas in playing the *auloi;* both should either be allowed to use both skills, or else be confined to manual dexterity. When the judges sided with Apollo, a third round was called to decide

the match, since the score was tied at that point. This time Marsyas lost to Apollo. Plutarch summarizes this story by saying that Marsyas was punished by Apollo for daring to compete with auletic melody alone (*psilon*) against the superior combination of song and *kithara*.[15]

Another tradition, reported by Pseudo-Apollodorus, attests that Apollo won by turning his *kithara* around, or back to front (*ten kithara strepsan*), and inviting Marsyas to do likewise.[16] Hyginus recounts that because Marsyas was victorious in the first round, Apollo turned his instrument upside down (*citharam versabat*) and played the same music, a feat that Marsyas could not match. Vatican Mythographer II echoes Hyginus, but varies the tale by suggesting that Apollo was unable to beat Marsyas after many attempts until, that is, he hit on the idea of inverting his instrument and singing at the same time.

Whatever crafty maneuvers Apollo used to win, it cannot be denied on this evidence that the god resorted to some kind of trick (*dolos*). Such trickery would have disqualified Apollo in any formal competition.[17] In the mythical context, such trickery may explain in part the penalty he imposed on his rival. Marsyas turned out to be a formidable opponent, one who was hard to beat. Except for the hapless Midas, the judges—even those who initially favored Marsyas—finally decided in favor of Apollo. No writer suggests that they pronounced a sentence. Evidently, Apollo alone was responsible for the punishment.

The Punishment

The tradition of depicting Marsyas bound to or hung up from a tree—either alone or before a triumphant Apollo, with or without assistants and the instrument of torture—is largely limited to the visual arts (Weis 1992). Four late antique sources describe such statues, ranging from the marble *Marsyas Religatus* (Marsyas Bound) in the Temple of Concord in Rome, a statue featuring his strained muscles and dejected face, to terracotta statuettes of Marsyas tied to a tree. The most striking feature of sources that allude to such artworks is the irony deployed, biting or mocking, to hint at the impending torment of the bound Marsyas. These two kinds of irony reflect a divided opinion about Marsyas and his ultimate fate: dignified and heroic in the face of unwarranted agony, or shameful and pathetic in the face of deserved torture.

Death by Whipping

A total of four sources recount that the bound Marsyas was whipped to death. In his epigram, Archias describes the unfortunate satyr suspended from a leafy pine like a hung animal, left to endure the scourging of the

winds. This image, of course, is connected to the legends surrounding the suspended skin of Marsyas. It does not preclude his ensuing death by flaying.

Vatican Mythographers I and II state that Marsyas was hung up or tied to a tree, stripped naked, and flogged to death by Apollo with a rod that the god himself cut. Martial's epigram to a schoolmaster, on the other hand, refers to the splayed leather (*lora*) of the Scythian's rough whip that flogged Marsyas of Celaenae. Aside from a hint of sadism, scholastic and other, these lines introduce us to a third person implicated in the punishment of Marsyas—a Scythian slave, whom modern scholars sometimes call *lorarius* or flogger. Although Scythian bondsmen acting as a police force of sorts were known in ancient Athens,[18] this servant of Apollo, evidently charged with the whipping or skinning of Marsyas, was an invention of Hellenistic sculpture and became a fixture in the Roman visual arts.

Death by Flaying

The traditional grouping of figures sculpted for the scene of Marsyas's punishment is described by two writers. Philostratus of Lemnos portrays the victim standing near the pine tree from which he will be suspended as he looks at the barbarian (*barbaros*) who sharpens the edge of his knife. In a Greek inscription on a marble slab in Apamea Cibotus mention is made of a group of four bronze figures that decorated the thermal baths built there by Lucius Julius Agrippa. The group included Apollo, Marsyas, a Scythian, and Olympus (see appendix B). Olympus—pupil, lover, and follower of Marsyas—was usually depicted mourning for the fate of his mentor or pleading for mercy from Apollo. Apamea Cibotus, a Syrian city in Phrygia, was founded on the ruins of Celaenae in the late-third or early-second century BC by the Seleucid successor of Alexander the Great. Celaenae, the birthplace of Marsyas, is one of the locations given for the contest, for there the river Marsyas rose from an underground source. An alternate location is the gorge of Aulocrenae, some ten miles away from Celaenae/Apamea.

Most sources state that once he had won the contest, Apollo punished Marsyas by flaying him alive, in effect, torturing him to death. Only Hyginus introduces a Scythian as the executioner to whom Apollo surrendered the defeated rival, and his narrative reflects the popularity of imperial Roman depictions of the flaying scene. The horror of this punishment is left usually to the imagination of the audience, except for the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid and some scattered comments on the excessive, cruel, even insane (*maniode*) punishment wreaked by Apollo, as in Agathias, Diodorus, Plutarch, and the Alexandrian proverb recorded by Pseudo-Plutarch. Diodorus attributes the severity of the penalty to Apollo's anger at the quarrel launched by Marsyas over the fairness of the competition.

Ptolemy declares that Marsyas was flayed during the festival of Apollo when the pelts of all animal-victims were offered to the god. Marsyas thus becomes something of a ritual sacrifice—dignified, as it were, provided one overlooks a detail: animal-victims were stunned and probably killed at the start of sacrificial rites. Nonetheless, animal sacrifice was a bloody business, one that many scholars consider an ancient sublimation of blood-lust (Burkert 1982:52–54; 1983:33–36; Kirk 1990:227). This cultural context suggests that the torment of Marsyas, ceremonial or not, must have had a mysterious and unnerving significance for the ancient Greeks. Perhaps this interpretation in part explains the fascination of the myth. Bloodletting in ritual sacrifice, performed by a priest or anointed leader, was done with a special sacrificial knife, the *machaira*.[19] The eponymous river Marsyas was so named, according to Agatharchides, because it contained a stone called *Machaira* that looked like a sword; and anyone initiated in the mysteries of the goddess (perhaps Cybele) who touched it was driven mad. Since Marsyas was connected with Cybele, the horror associated with this specific sacrificial knife could render those even remotely connected with the victim or the goddess insane.

Latin writers verify that Marsyas's skin (*cutis*) was stripped off his body. Several, most notably Ovid, dwell on the cruelty of his slow death: like a bear, he was left hanging with entrails exposed, his viscera bared, his body one wound; as he screamed in agony—sinews bared, veins throbbing, entrails palpitating—his blood flowed everywhere down his body. Two writers are content to encapsulate these gory details by pointing out that Marsyas died in cruel torment by torture. The Latin *a tortoribus* calls to mind that Apollo, according to Suetonius, was known in one district of Rome as *Apollinе Tortore* (Apollo Tormentor).[20] Before leaving this motif, it should be noted that this sort of cruel treatment of defeated foes was one associated by Hellenes and Romans alike with eastern (that is, foreign and barbaric) potentates.[21]

Marsyas's Skin

Askos dedarthai (To be skinned for a pouch/wineskin) was a well-known phrase in ancient Hellas, occasionally linked to the fate of Marsyas. It cropped up in both comic and serious contexts. According to mythical tradition, Marsyas's skin apparently hung as a memento or votive offering in the place of his execution. This location is variously given as a river near Celaenae, a river in the market-place of Celaenae, Midas's Spring, a cave near Celaenae which concealed the sources of the Marsyas and Maeander rivers. Claudian and Statius declare that it brought honor to Celaenae, though whether this honor was positive or negative remains unclear.

One reason that might account for the fame or notoriety of this suspended skin is that it made music. Nonnus's account of this singular characteristic tells us that Apollo fashioned a wind-bag (*empnoos askos*) which he left floating from a high tree. When the wind filled it, Marsyas's skin swelled up into the shape of his body, and from the sounds it then made a listener could imagine that Marsyas, unable still to keep silent, produced his music once again. This phenomenon was corroborated by Lucian who found it ironic that after Apollo was through with him, the only whistling sound Marsyas could make emanated from his skin dangling in the wind. Aelian adds a learned touch to this element of the myth: if one played a Phrygian harmonia on the *aulos*, Marsyas's skin moved; if one played music appropriate to Apollo, the skin, as if deaf, kept still.

The *askos* fashioned from the skin of Marsyas is the subject of diverse interpretations by music historians. Vogel suggests that the central motif of the Marsyas myth was the invention of the wind-sack, and hence the discovery of the bagpipe and its potential for part-music (1964:48–49, 53–56; 1966:88–91). Ingomar Weiler (1974:52–53) and Hannelore Thiemer (1979:59–60) disagree, pointing out that sacks of animal skin were recorded before the first extant sources of the myth, and that the double-*aulos* itself was capable of producing part-music. The dating of animal-pouches, however, does not necessarily invalidate the etiology of the Marsyas story, for myths do not have to antedate or coincide with the phenomena they seek to explain. Moreover, the part-music of the double-*aulos* does not controvert the significance of the bagpipe.

There are other problems in Vogel's thesis that require further investigation: for example, the etymology of *marsippos*, the relationship of *ascaules* (Latin) and *askaulos* (perhaps Greek), other ancient Greek words meaning bagpipe, and so on. Vogel's thesis has much to recommend it. It does not, however, explain why Apollo had to flay Marsyas alive in order to make from his skin a sack, whatever its primary or ultimate purpose. Even if one accepts the etiological meaning of the outcome of this myth—the musical skin of Marsyas and its connection to the bagpipe—this meaning would not be weakened by a story that ended with the flaying of the dead Marsyas.

Marsyas and Water

That there existed a river Marsyas, near or in Celaenae, flowing into the famous river Maeander was a geographical datum known by many. Some sources simply connect the eponymous river to the person of Marsyas, others to the horrible death he suffered at that place. Still others offer specific reasons, adding detail to the myth, to explain how the river came to be or why it took on its name. The sources are almost evenly split

between those that connect the river's name or its very creation to the blood shed by Marsyas and those that attribute the name of the river either to the skin-pouch which hung there or fell into the river, or else to the actual body of Marsyas which was flung into the river, or ended up there because he went mad and drowned himself.

Aristides Quintilianus puts forth an idiosyncratic interpretation of the skin-sack hung over the eponymous river, an interpretation that shows traces of Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophies. For him, Marsyas represented the shadowy, breathy air between water (an earthly element) and ether (a celestial element), whereas Apollo embodied the pure ethereal essence. Pausanias records that Marsyas's *auloi* fell into the river Marsyas and were swept down the Maeander and Asopus until they washed ashore in Sicyon. A shepherd found them and took them to the Temple of Persuasion (*Peitho*) in Corinth, a temple associated with the purification of Apollo after the killing of the dragon at Delphi. Three Latin writers ascribe the creation of the river to the tears shed by the many friends who mourned over Marsyas's cruel fate—a metamorphosis more maudlin than macabre.

Behavior at the Contest

Aside from oblique hints of blasphemous or mad audacity on the part of Marsyas, there exist more obvious and explicit indications of his misplaced and ridiculous self-confidence in confronting the god Apollo. Among writers who count Marsyas as a human being, some characterize him as a rustic herdsman or shepherd, and others as a *philosophos*, or lover of wisdom. But the prevailing image is one of an uncouth and presumptuous challenger, as depicted in a lyric fragment by Simonides: "He bound the fringes of his temples with shining gold, and bound his boisterous mouth with backward-bound thongs (i.e., the *phorbeia*)."[22]

The most exaggerated example is the description of Apuleius: a barbarous Phrygian with a filthy beard, shaggy face (one of the signs of a satyr), and hairy body. Not content to limit his impudence to the music contest, Marsyas introduced his performance by praising his own appearance in contrast to that of Apollo—with his long curly hair, smooth skin, beautiful face and body, luxurious raiment, and golden lyre encrusted with jewels.[23] In a different context, Marsyas's depiction of Apollo could have been taken as justified criticism of an aristocratic and conceited dandy. In this context, however, Athena and the Muses at first hid their mirth, but could not contain their laughter at Marsyas's words. They judged in favor of Apollo, and left the wretched loser, mangled entrails open to the air, skinned and hung up like a two-footed bear.

Apuleius goes on to say that Apollo was ashamed of so degrading a victory. Apollo's repentance is narrated by Diodorus: so distressed was the god that he tore the strings of his *kithara*, shattering the harmony he had invented, and for a time he would have nothing to do with music. Nonnus credits Apollo's pity with the transformation of Marsyas into the eponymous river. This explanation, of course, is a commonplace motif found in countless myths of metamorphosis. The first two reactions attributed to Apollo—shame and regret—are more personal in tone; however, they reflect more the unease of the authors, than the distress of Apollo.

As was mentioned earlier, the tears shed by Marsyas's mourners (who witnessed his grisly fate) became the river Marsyas. Among them were fellow satyrs, nymphs, sylvan deities, fauns, rural folk, shepherds, his father Hyagnis, and Olympus. Hyginus indicates that Apollo gave the body of Marsyas for burial to his pupil Olympus. Although this author may have borrowed the notion of Olympus's presence from Ovid, the active role assigned to him was in all likelihood influenced by the many imperial Roman depictions of Olympus begging Apollo for mercy on behalf of his mentor and lover. So saddened was the pine tree from which the flayed Marsyas was hung, according to Nicander, that it wept and spread its passionate lament throughout the valleys. Who was Marsyas that his admittedly brutal end should elicit such reactions?

Marsyas the Musician

Genealogy

Several sources make Marsyas the son of a river-god: Oeagrus or Maeander. According to an anonymous Alexandrian proverb, Maeander had two musical sons, Marsyas and Babys. Babys played on a single reed (*kalamos*) whereas Marsyas invented the playing of two reeds. In spite of the apparent limitations of his musical instrument, Babys also competed against Apollo. Six Greek writers document the story of Marsyas's brother. His claim to fame is an eponymous adage that was applied to those who performed badly because they were ignorant, naïve, and untalented. Having won the contest, Apollo prepared to inflict on Babys the punishment of his brother Marsyas. Athena, who must have been the judge, intervened to say that Babys was the least gifted aulete she had ever heard, and Apollo set him free. In this myth, the comical aspect of the competition is matched by the upshot: one is left with an image of Apollo laughing with Athena at the ineptitude of poor Babys. The unfortunate Marsyas, whose artistry threatened Apollonian musical authority, was not so lucky. And considering the dreadful end of Marsyas's story, there is a jarring inconsistency with the comical elements introduced into it by some writers.

By far the greatest number of writers declare that Marsyas was the son of Hyagnis the Phrygian. Hyagnis, called "pretty" by one writer, is variously credited with being the first to perform the Phrygian and other *nomoi* on the *aulos* in honor of Cybele, Dionysus, and Pan, as well as the first to produce sweet harmony by separating his hands and fingering each pipe of the double *aulos*. He is also said to have invented the Phrygian, Mixophrygian, Mixolydian, and Diatonic *harmoniai*, the trichord, the wax-bound *syrinx*, and the *aulos*. He was taught by Mariandynus, and in turn taught his son Marsyas, who then taught Olympus (see appendix B).

Achievements

Just as Midas stood as a symbol of riches or foolishness, Marsyas's name connoted eloquence, either beneficial and corrupt. Noteworthy among the numerous acknowledgements of Marsyas's eloquence is Socrates' praise for the authoritative auletic *nomoi* of Marsyas and his pupil Olympus, celestial music that moved the souls of those ready for divine possession.

Marsyas was so intelligent that he could imitate the many-reeded *syrinx* on the *auloi*, and thus surpassed his father Hyagnis as an aulete, according to Diodorus and Dioscorides. His mastery of the *auloi* was recorded by many writers, even those who laid the invention of the *aulos* at the feet of Athena. Aristophanes' scholiast calls Marsyas *aristos* or pre-eminent in *auletike*. Only Pseudo-Palaephatus claims that the wondrous music produced by Marsyas was due to the divine properties of Athena's invention and not to the dexterity of the aulete. Thus his dire fate came about in part because, in his *hybris*, he ignored the supremacy of the goddess. Of course, Marsyas was also credited with inventing the *auloi* (see appendix C). If not the *auloi* themselves, then the invention of the *phorbeia* was associated with Marsyas. Pausanias claims that he (and not Hyagnis) invented the auletic Song of the Mother (i.e., Cybele). Malalas, Pseudo-Suidas, and Tzetzes consider him a philosopher. And Pausanias tells us that the Phrygians of his native city, Celaenae, honored him as the savior of the city, for he helped them repel an attack by the Galatians by sounding his *auloi* and flooding the river Marsyas.

The sources that consider Marsyas a satyr or silen far outweigh those that count him among the humans. When treating these theriomorphs, modern scholars believe that it is useless to attempt to distinguish between satyr and silen, for their characteristics not only change but are interchangeable (Carpenter 1991:15; Gantz 1993:136; Lissarrague 1990:54). Thus, although I distinguish the words in connection with the sources, here the general category of satyr serves to designate these hybrid creatures. The aged inebriate and bon vivant satyr, Silenus, is a particular personage in the Dionysian retinue.

Graced with horses' hooves, tails and ears, the bodies of satyrs sported the ithyphallic condition (phallic display), clearly visible since they were usually portrayed in the nude. Very rarely did they have goat-like appendages similar to those of the demigod Pan. Although their body types (aside from equine appendages) were not unusual, their faces featured wild hair and coarse features, including the snub nose. Satyrs belonged to the *thiasos* (ecstatic following) of Dionysus, along with Maenads and other revelers. They played instruments (principally but not exclusively the *aulos*, a phallic symbol), carried wine-skins, drank wine (for which they had a passion), played games, and engaged in acts of debauchery (for which they also had a passion) with persons of either sex, with animals, and with autoerotic abandon. But the most excessive scenes of sexual licentiousness take place independently from Dionysian processions; and it is not insignificant that such scenes were usually painted on wine vessels associated with symposia. From one point of view, satyrs exemplified the extremes of male sexuality. They occupied and trespassed the frontiers of normative behavior by exploiting freedom from constraint almost to the point of perversion. Thus from another point of view, they, like gorgons and centaurs, were the Other (Calame 1992:70; Dowden 1992:165–66; Lissarrague 1990:234–35; Stewart 1997:184). And like so many Others they were but one aspect of the Self.

Before one dismisses satyrs out of distaste or opprobrium, it is well to recall the fate of Pentheus of Thebes. After all, ithyphallicism was a divine sign of Dionysus, as noted by Aretaeus. So was wine and merry-making, not to mention ecstasy and ravishment of body and spirit alike. It is also well to remember that in ancient Hellas, each playwright was expected to include a satyr-play to be presented after his three tragic entries in festive *agones* for the theater. Though hardly a trifling matter, the satyr-play was a naughty piece of humor rather than an idyllic pastoral.

What characteristics peculiar to satyrs, aside from features of his outward appearance, did Marsyas exhibit? Not many. Was he always a satyr? Several scholars conjecture that originally Marsyas was a human being, one who was transformed into a satyr at some point. Andrew Barker (1984:210, n. 32) and Max Wegner (1960:1696) attribute the metamorphosis to the Hellenic imagination, to interpretations of the myth that came together in classical times. Françoise Frontisi-Ducroux, on the other hand, makes it part of Marsyas's life story, though without attempting to place the event in time or place—admittedly an impossible task given the lack of evidence (1994:242, 244). Her notion that Marsyas's invention of the *phorbeia*, ostensibly to hide the deformity of

his face, indicated his recollection of his former human condition is not compelling.

Marsyas and Athena

Among the putative inventors of the double *aulos*, the goddess Athena is by far the most august in the social and divine hierarchy as well as the most ubiquitous in the sources (see appendix D). The link between Athena and Marsyas occurred when he collected the musical instrument which the goddess had discarded.

A number of Latin sources indicate that after she had invented the *auloi*, Athena proceeded to entertain the Olympian gods during a banquet. The gods, Juno (Hera) and Venus (Aphrodite) in particular, burst out laughing and ridiculed her inflated cheeks. Athena verified the reasons for their mockery by looking at herself in a water source. Fulgentius and Hyginus also mention the goddesses' mirth at Athena's gray eyes; their catty behavior smacks of a *kallisteion* (beauty contest). But Athena's gaze—usually described as *glaucopis*,[24] an epithet variously translated as gray, owlish, or flashing—signifies more than the tribulations of exhibiting female pulchritude; it signals the harrowing and unwavering stare of a warrior goddess, superb, stunning, and fearsome. Like the stare of the gorgon Medusa, it symbolizes alterity, the Other, one might say (Detienne and Vernant 1991:183; Stewart 1997:184).

A much larger number of Greek and Latin sources omit the banquet scene, stating simply that Athena played the *auloi* near some sort of water so she could see her reflection. Shocked by the distortion of her face, she threw them away. Melanippides and Ovid provide the goddess with words that dramatize her horror at the ugliness of her visage, whereas Fulgentius merely implies that Athena chided herself. But Aristides Quintilianus, Aristotle, and Telestes reject the notion that Athena, goddess of war and wisdom, could have been concerned with the issue of beauty; they insist rather that she must have realized that *auletike* did not enhance intelligence and knowledge. These authors conveniently overlooked the famous beauty contest between Athena, Aphrodite, and Hera judged by Paris of Troy. That Athena cursed the *auloi* is suggested only by Hyginus who, influenced by Graeco-Roman literature and visual art of his time, strove to find a justification by these horrific depictions of Marsyas's fate. The curse of Athena may be discounted as a marginal detail.

From most accounts one may assume that Marsyas came upon the *auloi* after Athena had left the scene. Three writers imply that Marsyas not only took them surreptitiously, but also claimed the invention as his own. Plutarch and Tzetzes, on the other hand, describe an encounter between

goddess and satyr. In this scenario, Marsyas came upon the goddess playing the *auloi* and rebuked her. Her appearance was so unbecoming, said he, that it would behoove her to take up her weapons and abandon the *auloi*, thus putting her cheeks to rights. Athena ignored Marsyas's comments, but followed his advice after she saw herself reflected in the water. Tzetzes goes on to say that at this point she gave the *auloi* to Marsyas. Plutarch omits this step, but attributes the subsequent invention of the *phorbeia* to Marsyas, who used it to hide the deformation of his face.

Two sources, one Greek and one Latin, mention Myron's famous statue-group on the Athenian Acropolis (c. 440 BC), and give it two different readings. According to Pliny, it showed two figures: Minerva and the satyr Marsyas marveling at the *tibia*, whereas according to Pausanias it revealed Athena about to strike the silen Marsyas for picking up the discarded *auloi*. These readings may reflect the variations in the literary treatment of the myth, although it should be noted that the meaning of the Greek passage is open to question.[25]

Aftermath: Decoding the Myth

Why did Apollo inflict such a savage mode of death on the loser of a musical contest? Was Apollo unjust and cruel in inflicting such a dire punishment in Marsyas? Did Apollo react to Marsyas's complaints of unfair tactics in the contest itself? Was Apollo's victory a close call? Did Apollo win by trickery and, as a consequence, loathe himself as much as the rival that brought him to this pass? Was Marsyas's *hybris* so heinous that he deserved to die in agony?

In a single reference to this myth in his book, *Apollo the Knife-Wielder*, Marcel Detienne says that Apollo flayed Marsyas voluptuously with a sharp knife (*machaira*) like the one he dedicated to his Delphic priests (1998:11).[26] There exist very few ancient sources that suggest a ritualistic element to Marsyas's death, although this aspect cannot be entirely discounted. Readers of ancient Greek literature are familiar with the phenomenon of human sacrifice—usually that of young virgins. They were slaughtered like consecrated animals, throats cut for purposes of ritual blood-letting. They were not tortured to death. Even if, as one Greek writer says, Marsyas's skin was to be dedicated to Apollo on his feast day, it could have been removed after he was dead. However, Detienne's choice of the adverb "voluptuously" conveys vividly the love-hate relationship between victim and torturer. Something other than ritual slaughter or mortal combat is secreted beneath the surface of this rivalry.

On the denotative level of action-motifs in the narrative, the contest between Apollo and Marsyas, between god and daemon-satyr, has been frequently read as the archetypical opposition of string to wind

instruments (Neumann 1962:21; Thiemer 1979:40); vocal to instrumental music (Fétis 1969–76, 3:13; Frontisi-Ducroux 1994:250); the familiar to the exotic (Clay 1989:10; Segal 1998:97; Thiemer 1979:40); the traditional to the new (Frontisi-Ducroux 1994:248; Haas 1985:59); the aristocratic to the plebeian (Frontisi-Ducroux 1994:249; Neumann 1962:21; Winternitz [1959] 1979:208); and the civilized to the uncouth (Laporte 1969:57; Segal 1998:97; Wiora 1961:63). Any or all of these antipodes are substantiated by the story, and the observation that the elements represented by Marsyas eventually became an accepted part of Hellenic music practice does not negate their agency in the myth. However, if one were to read the main denotation of the myth as the story of an arrogant and conceited competitor against an unassailable deity, then these oppositions lose their model status and dwindle to narrative stratagems. Indeed, the musical content of the myth becomes irrelevant, a mere scaffold on which to hang a tale.

Vogel rejects all of the above antipodes, yet insists on the musical significance of the myth. His pair of opposites consists of monophonic and polyphonic instruments; thus Marsyas's fate at the hands of Apollo becomes a myth about the introduction of the bagpipe into Hellas. Such a reading has its merits. But like all etiological interpretations, it delves only superficially into the connotative level of the myth. It passes over some crucial motifs of the story and, most important, fails to address the striking feature of Marsyas's fate: the grisly manner of his death. To recapitulate, Apollo did not need to flay Marsyas alive in order to make a bag of his skin, whether the bag was to become a musical instrument, an agonistic trophy, or a votive offering.

A closer look at the oppositions outlined above reveals that the first two sets (string and wind instruments, vocal and instrumental music) can be subsumed under the last two (the familiar/traditional and the exotic/new, the aristocratic/civilized and the plebeian/uncouth), and that the latter slide imperceptibly into the connotative level of the myth, inasmuch as they derive from value judgments either enunciated in the ancient sources or read into them by successive interpreters. The *aulos* came from Phrygia. Essentially a solo instrument, it was used nonetheless to accompany singing, particular choral recitations. The lyre originated in Arcadia, the heartland of Peloponnesus. The *kithara*, on the other hand, probably came from the Near East—a provenance overlooked by both ancient and modern mythographers who wish to stress the kinds of antipodes under discussion here. In any event, even if the *aulos* were identified by Hellenes as Asiatic, exotic, and foreign, this styling in itself was not sufficient reason for the instrument to be shunned (see appendix C). Phrygia, to be sure, was not part of Hellas. But then, neither was Thrace. It is worth noting that after his eastern

wanderings Dionysus, the Olympian Other, entered Hellas through Thrace to introduce his bizarre and savage rituals (Detienne 1979:68; Parry 1992:129). Thamyris and Orpheus sojourned in Thrace, and the gracious Muses, followers of *Apollo Musagetes*, hailed from this region as well. Indeed, much of *mousike* was not originally Hellenic.

Modern scholars who refer to a foreign element as a salient attribute of the music of Marsyas characterize it further as (semi)-barbarism, wildness, untamed and primordial nature, unreason, orgiasm, ecstasy, mysticism, and/or Dionysian religion. And of course these scholars state or infer the opposite qualities of the music of Apollo, drawing their pairings from the attributes they construe from the ancient sources. One of the problems with the structural analysis of myth is its potential for rigidity and abstraction (Burkert 1982; Burridge 1969; Graf 1996; Lévi-Strauss 1958; Piaget 1970; Runciman 1969). Matters are seldom so tidy in the myths themselves. As in all agonistic myths, the tangled web evident in ancient sources was woven from strands of ingrained assumptions, assumptions that twisted reality and betrayed deep-rooted insecurities in Hellenic attitudes. All the same, taken singly or collectively, these modern readings of the myth of Marsyas and Apollo provide illuminating insights into many of its connotative contents. How well do they answer the main question posed in this essay?

The perennial opposition of Apollonian and Dionysian principles is often cited as one of the archetypes behind the myth of the musical contest between Apollo and Marsyas. Stemming in part from Friedrich Nietzsche's influential work *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, the notion that Marsyas embodied the moral and physical characteristics of the satyrs in Dionysus's retinue as well as the frenzied and disruptive music typical of Dionysian revelry and delirium has retained some currency among a number of historians of the arts and ideas (Anderson 1966:9; Frontisi-Ducroux 1994:247; Keuls 1974:148; Lippman 1964:45–46; Vernant 1985:13; Wind 1968:172). Grafted onto this basic concept is the assessment of the flaying of Marsyas as a form of purification or transcendence, an ascent from the soggy warm darkness of earth to the hard cold light of the heavens. Marsyas's fate thus comes to symbolize the punishment-redemption of one who dared to threaten the cosmic harmony maintained by Apollo's lyre or *kithara* and by the eternal measures of the song and dance of the Muses. Such allegoresis goes back to Graeco-Roman Neoplatonism that flourished from the first to the fourth centuries AD.

Oddly enough, none of the scholars who espouse this interpretation discuss Nietzsche's more concrete point that those who use Dionysian wisdom, an unnatural abomination, to plunge the world into an abyss of destruction must suffer the dissolution of the nature of their own person

(Nietzsche [1872] 1967:67–68).[27] The implications of Nietzsche's concept are manifold: Apollo, with his ethereal *kithara*, represents the pure and disembodied; Marsyas, with his phallic *aulos*, the impure and carnal; Apollo, the upholder and savior of normality, rightness, and clarity, is the agent of chastisement of the foolhardy and dangerous; Marsyas, the follower and proponent of abnormality, impropriety, and anarchy, is the perpetrator of a heinous *hybris*. Thus, Marsyas is doomed to lose his skin (the casing or sheath of corporeality) and then to be dissolved into water, the most liquescent and shapeless element of the earth.

A number of scholars deny the opposition of Apollonian and Dionysian principles, or at least qualify it as an overly simplified interpretation of the relationship between the two deities (Dowden 1992:99; Williams 1993:210; Wyss 1996:27). The main thrust of their objections is either that the opposition is the fabrication of analysts and historians of myth or, barring this, that the starkness attributed to the opposition is overvalued. Thiemer points out that the cult of Cybele also featured extreme worship, and like the cult of Dionysus dealt with mystical death and resurrection (1979:76).[28] Whereas J. Michael Walton calls Dionysus the "darker twin" of Apollo (1998:xxxi), Detienne equates the two: both gods experienced the pollution of dementia and both were responsible for murders (1998:202). True, Dionysus did not kill with his own hands; rather, he drove unfortunate mortals to insanity so that they shed the blood of friends and relatives. Apollo did both. And yet Apollo and Dionysus offered healing and purification to practitioners of their cults. They are separate gods, yet they are linked.

To the misgivings of these scholars one should add the observation that much of the supposed opposition between the Apollonian and the Dionysian in sources of the Marsyas myth rests on the association of the *aulos* with cultic frenzy and sexual ribaldry. Neither of these associations is put forward in the myth in clear and indisputable terms. In the myths connected with Dionysus satyrs play an insignificant role, as they do in ancient Greek myths in general, unlike centaurs and other hybrids. They do figure prominently in the visual arts, both with and without Dionysus, and in the latter case they appear in scenes of bibulous and erotic immoderation. Even though Marsyas is more like Chiron, the wise centaur (who taught the young Achilles on the lyre, among other skills), Marsyas is tainted by association. Furthermore, the *aulos* figures prominently in scenes of postprandial pastimes at symposia—most often played by naked *auletrides* (female auletes), whose state of undress signals that they performed things other than music. Given that Dionysus was connected with the enjoyment of wine, the loosening of inhibitions, and the antics of *aulos*-playing satyrs, one may assume that the subtext implied by satyrs and *aulos*

was not lost on ancient audiences of the myth of Marsyas's *agon* against Apollo, even though Dionysus never appears in written accounts and seldom in visual depictions. The latter come down to us mainly in the form of Graeco-Roman funerary monuments where Dionysus is cast in the role of psychopomp (conductor of souls to the realm of the dead). This role was sometimes assigned to Apollo as well. Once again, two apparently disconnected gods are connected.

True, the Dionysian cult was followed mainly by groups which Hellenes considered inferior in civic status: women, peasants, slaves, metics (foreign-born citizens with limited rights), and strangers. These were the marginalized, as were the inhabitants of certain geographical areas adjacent or near Hellas: for example, Thracians, Lemnians, Lesbians, Trojans, Ithacans, Boeotians, and Euboeans. These groups teetered on the verge of barbarism and, depending on political circumstances, they often skidded out of that category to join the outright barbarians; for example, Persians, Scythians, Teutons, Indians, and others further afield. Though always latent in Hellenic and especially aristocratic Athenian thinking, anti-barbarian sentiment became rampant xenophobia after the Persian Wars of 490 and 480 BC (Gouldner 1965:118; Hall 1989:21, 126; Raeck 1981:1; Stewart 1997:26). These persons constituted Others and, in the main, Others who could be disparaged and dismissed as inconsequential.

One notable exception was the category of women, a category that inspired misogynism tinged with awe and fear. It is almost as if women as Others were placed on the same level as hybrids and monstrous creatures: fascinating and terrifying. In the main, hybrids encapsulated the tension between culture and nature, as seen in the myths about centaurs and cyclops (Kirk 1970:153–54, 160–61). Nature was mysterious and seemed to the Hellenes to govern men and their culture with sometimes benign and sometimes malevolent powers. Hybrids thus occupied a middle ground between heroes and gods, belonging to neither, and yet possessed of superhuman, even magical qualities as daemons of nature. Marsyas, the hybrid satyr/silen, was a river daemon whose daring challenge and entrancing *auletike* threatened the authority and harmonic hegemony of Apollonian *kitharistike* and *kitharodia* (singing to the *kithara*).

Many heroes challenged Apollo and died for it. But none in so terrible a fashion, and never was their heroic stature undermined as a result. Their challenges were a form of *hybris* against the god and against the proper boundaries of self-confidence.[29] There operated a narrow legal definition of *hybris* as improper behavior by one citizen against another, behavior in which perpetrators shamed victims by violating what the law saw as their rights. In this context, *hybris* was a deliberate action designed to insult, demean, or dishonor another for the sake of the pleasure of the

agent (Allen 2000:131–32; Cairns 1996:11; Dover 1978:34–35; Fisher 1992:1). In shame cultures like that of ancient Greece this kind of *hybris* was highly censured and punishable by law. And the gods were not immune to this sort of *hybris*, committed by other divinities or even by mortals. The gods jealously guarded their rights, and with good reason. Apollo, it seems, was especially vulnerable in this respect (Calasso 1994:54). When stressing the arrogance and presumption of Marsyas's challenge, ancient and modern writers in effect place his transgression (crime?) within this category of *hybris*. And in a sense Marsyas's act can almost, but not quite, be subsumed by the legalistic definition. The missing factor is that of personal pleasure. Marsyas did not seek pleasure, but glory: the great good pursued by all ancient Greek heroes.

The pursuit of glory brings to bear another ancient Greek view of *hybris*, a definition that grew out of the excessive side of heroic energy. All too easily heroes could be blinded by the delusions of ambition, forgetting decency and puffing themselves up, as it were (Fisher 1992:2–5; Grant 1995:59–60). Such *hybris* is the result of unrestrained exuberance (Cairns 1996:22, 32). And yet exuberance and energy are integral characteristics of the hero. By their very nature, even when not indulged, they invoked *nemesis* (retribution) and *phthonos* (envy). And the gods were the most envious of all. Herein lay the tragedy of heroes. Whether or not their demise involved an overt action, their downfall and suffering validated their heroic status. If one jettisons the prejudices against satyrs in particular and the bold in general—prejudices which are evident in many of the ancient sources—and if one considers instead the glorious contest in which excruciating death was suffered for the sake of music, Marsyas then becomes a hero. Better, Marsyas *was* a hero, and his agony confirmed his heroism.

The stratagems deployed by Apollo to secure victory over Marsyas have been described earlier. Had the outcome of the contest not been so horrifying, the god's tricks would have amounted to nothing more than a musical mountebank's shenanigans—undignified, perhaps, but harmless. Still, one might be tempted to conclude, like Lucian, that Marsyas was swindled. Ancient Greek myths acclaimed the feats of countless "trickster-heroes," especially in agonistic situations (Weiler 1974:258–59). But Apollo was a god, and the fact that he had to resort to such tactics to prevail against an opponent who was at best semi-divine suggests two things: either Apollo stooped to deceit for no good reason, or else the opponent was stronger than he anticipated.

Although the point is unclear in ethical treatises of the time, it seems that some distinction was drawn between *dolos* (trickery) and *metis* (craftiness). *Metis*, typical of the goddess Athena and the man of twists and

turns—her favorite hero was the *polymetis* Odysseus—was a positive aspect of deceit in that it entailed the subtle and skillful resourcefulness needed to prevail in circumstances that looked to be as uncertain as they were unpromising (Detienne and Vernant 1991:3–4, 14–16, 27). *Dolos*, ascribed by ancient Hellenes to wolves and women, was a negative side of deceit in that it entailed the fraudulent and treacherous cunning needed to prevail in circumstances that were innocuous and non-threatening (Buxton 1988:64; Dowden 1992:117). In allowing a hero to win against bad odds, *metis* was commendable, whereas *dolos* was deplorable in allowing an anti-hero to win an undeserved victory. What makes ancient myths intriguing is that this distinction was anything but firm and precise.

Apollo's tricks are disconcerting because they elude strict categorization as either *metis* or *dolos*. According to one Latin writer, Apollo was ashamed of his victory. A Hellene would have said that Apollo did not achieve *kallinikon* (a glorious or ennobling victory). From this perspective it is unclear whether the god was ashamed of winning over so base an opponent or of winning by means of so base a subterfuge. If the latter, his sense of shame may have been exacerbated by having to argue his tactics before the judges. As Detienne points out, Apollo was ill at ease and unsuccessful in juridical proceedings (1998:211) and, though he won his case, he may have resented having to perform rhetorically as well as musically.

Structural analysis of the motifs of action and reaction in this myth are well and good, as far as they go. They do not, however, plumb the hidden and mysterious significance of Marsyas's fate. To understand it one must consider Apollo's cruelty, his dark side (see appendix E). A selection of adjectives from the modern literature demonstrates the negative appraisals of Apollo: unnatural and autistic (Calasso 1994:51), narcissistic (Eisner 1974:141, 145), arrogant and cold (Detienne 1998:11), reckless (Clay 1989:36), detached and sterile (Calasso 1994:54). Marsyas's challenge and his performance in the *agon* was a dire threat to Apollo who, upon winning, imposed the ultimate penalty to be paid in as excruciating and un-Hellenic a manner as possible. More was at stake than a hybristic challenge, a bad-tempered rival, a difficult victory. Marsyas, the Other, revealed aspects of Apollo's godhead, his Self.

Conclusion

Insofar as the satyr Marsyas belonged to the *thiasos* of Dionysus, then like his divine master, Marsyas represented the Other, the opposite of Apollo and his devotees. But Marsyas's Otherness is even more profound. He played the *aulos*, instruments invented by Athena to imitate the death throes of Medusa and the monstrous howling of her sisters (see appendix

D). The grotesque mask of Medusa, the absolute and extreme Other, wielded a dreadful magical power and spawned the terror of petrifaction, annihilation of the Self. As Jean-Pierre Vernant points out, when Athena produced the gorgon sound on the *aulοi*, the goddess ran the danger of being transformed into what she imitated, of wearing the skin, the face, the mask of Medusa (1985:29, 56–57). Could it be that Athena's rejection of the *aulοi* involved something more than a matter of female vanity? Did she recognize the hybrid creature she had helped to slay? Did she see in her reflection the Other, magical and awful? Marsyas assumed this mask as well as the magical music produced by the gorgonic instruments, a music at once entrancing and dangerous. Not only did his *aulemata* (*aulos* music) represent the opposite of the well-tuned and well-organized *mousike* of Apollo, it also betrayed a monstrous secret to anyone who could, like the god, discern it. Their musics were different and yet the same, for every *nomos*, *genos*, and *harmonia*—the pedantry of theoretical tagging notwithstanding—had the potential to deceive, to calm or arouse the spirit, to assuage or infuriate the psyche, the ego, the Self. Apollo, more than any other divinity, knew this with a certainty that went deeper than ratiocination. He could not countenance the equality, let alone superiority, of *aulos* music. He deployed all means at his disposal to win the contest. And having succeeded, Apollo not only slew his challenger, but also savagely and sensuously removed his mask, his face, his skin. In one sense, the god conquered the threat posed by *aulos* music. But in another, Apollo succumbed to its overwhelming power, for he allowed the dark side of his Self to answer its siren—better, its gorgonic call—so that he became the Other.

Marsyas transgressed limits and paid for it. This was a hero's error: to dare to go beyond the boundaries set for mortals by the gods. But the gods themselves, in setting these limits and in goading or envying mortals, invited such challenges. Whatever the circumstances, it is true that only the hero would find himself in these circumstances and only the hero would make a hero's mistakes (Eisner 1974:191).[30] As Peter Levi points out, "Only losers can be heroes" (1991:184).

Marsyas was a hero, unsung except by lovers of his music. His *aulos* music embodied a grave and grand challenge to Apollonian principles. His tragedy is a cautionary tale, not only a warning against presumption, but also a reminder that certain truths are fraught with peril. All the myths that tell of musical *agones* with *Apollo Musagetes* merit close examination. And among these myths, the most intriguing and profound is that of Marsyas the aulete, *Marsyas Agonistes*.

Appendix A: The *Syrinx*

The myth attributing the design of the *syrinx* to Pan, goat-footed son of Hermes and the Arcadian nymph Dryope, comes down to us from relatively late sources, the earliest of which is Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. The nymph Syrinx, fleeing the lecherous pursuit of Pan, arrived at a pond and fearing capture and rape, begged the gods to transform her into some sort of plant life. Out of pity, they changed her into a bed of reeds. Out of anger or desperation, Pan cut the reeds and fashioned them into a musical instrument.

Aggressive and tender erotic imagery, thinly veiled in Pan's slashing of and playing on the reeds, is explicit in Tatius's conclusion: Pan kissed the pieces of severed reed as if they were the nymph's wounds; he then put the reeds to his amorous (*erotikoi*) lips and breathed into them as he kissed them. Pan's passion found a voice. Capella introduces a more subtle, if insidious note: as Pan pressed his beloved (i.e., the *syrinx*) to his lips, she sighed forth as if from kisses. Syrinx was seduced.

Pan is not the sole contender for invention of the *syrinx*. The other principal candidate is his father Hermes, who devised the shepherd's pipe after exchanging Apollo's stolen cattle for the *chelys-lyra* (tortoise-lyre), which he had also invented. In addition to Daphnis, the Sicilian shepherd and son of Hermes, Satyrus or Silenus is also credited with inventing the panpipes. However Pan came by the *syrinx*, he was celebrated for his bittersweet music, haunting and redolent of the sufferings of love and lust. Pan usually played the *syrinx* in the evening, after a day of hunting (animals and nymphs) on the slopes of Arcadia. While disporting himself on Mt. Tmolus, Pan entertained the nymphs with the trifling melodies of his shepherd's pipe. Buoyed by the praise of his audience, Pan dared to disparage the music of Apollo. He then invited the god to a musical contest in which, of course, he was bested. Foolish Pan escaped punishment.

Confusion over proper names of musical instruments is common in the sources. Thus, Euphorion advances the notion that while Silenus invented the many-reeded (*polykalame*) *syrinx*, Marsyas was responsible for the wax-bound (*kerodete*) instrument. Marsyas, after all, was considered a satyr or silen by many. A mistaken association of Marsyas with the *syrinx* is also evident in the suggestion by Metrodorus that Marsyas invented this instrument and played it (*aulein*) at Celaenae, the venue of his contest against Apollo. Somehow the *syrinx* is here equated with the double-*aulos*, for Metrodorus says that before Marsyas, musicians played with only one reed (*kalamos*).

Appendix B: Olympus

The name of Olympus was often encountered in conjunction with that of Marsyas, usually in passages of praise or condemnation, or in straightforward commentaries on the development of the *aulos* and the art of playing it. Some documents simply join the two names without specifying the relationship between the musicians, referring to the two as Phrygians who performed *aulemata*, or who invented the *aulos*, or the Phrygian and Lydian *nomoi*.

Some writers get into a muddle, perhaps by misreading other sources, and state that Olympus was the father of Marsyas. Others designate Olympus simply as the pupil of Marsyas. The notion that Marsyas, the elder teacher, was the lover of his young pupil Olympus was not shocking, given the accepted practice of homoeroticism between adult males and young boys in ancient Greece, and particularly in Athens (Calame 1992:96–97; Gouldner 1965:63–64; Sergent 1986:177; Stewart 1997:177). In some Greek sources, Olympus was called Marsyas's beloved (*eromenos*) and in a more playful vein his darling (*paidika*). Plato's epithet, *paidika*, is connected to the pederast connotations of boy (*pais*) that may range from the subtle to the ribald, as in Aristophanes' comedies.[51]

More somber is the observation that Marsyas loved Olympus even at the moment of death, and that his flayed body was surrendered for burial to Olympus by Apollo. Alcibiades' attraction to the charm (*charis*) of Socrates, like the relationship of Olympus to Marsyas, was taken by Maximus of Tyrus as an expression of noble homoerotic love between a younger pupil and an elder master. But the sophist Alexander of Seleucia could not resist the mordant, well-turned phrase: "Marsyas lusted after Olympus, and Olympus after *aulos* playing."

Olympus himself was a legendary figure in the history of Hellenic music. On Mt. Olympus, the Muses sang to the accompaniment of Olympus's *auloi*, and this grandeur is reflected in the idea that it was Olympus who introduced instrumental music (*krousata*) into Hellas. Instrumental music, probably for solo *aulos*/*auloi*, was often ascribed to Olympus. His *aulemata* were famous among Hellenes for their divine beauty, threnodic force, and power to inspire ecstasy in the soul. With the *aulos* and its music are associated the Lydian *harmonia*, the enharmonic *genos* and, probably, the polycephalic *nomos* on the slaying of the Python by Apollo. This was the *nomos* played by the victorious auletе Sacadas at the Pythian Games in Delphi (see appendix C). The invention of the *aulos* was also attributed to a much more exalted personage, the goddess Athena (see appendix D). Still, the mythical reputation of Olympus was such that the poet and statesman Cercidas of Megalopolis told his friends as he lay dying that he was happy, for he hoped in the afterlife to meet Pythagoras the sage, Hecataeus the historian, Homer the poet, and Olympus the musician.

Appendix C: The *Aulos*

In addition to Hyagnis, Marsyas, and Athena, there are other putative inventors of the aulos. Ancient writers mention Phrygians, Lybians, and Egyptians in general; the Lybian Siretes, who was also the first to play the *Metroos* (Song of the Great Mother) on this instrument; as well as Mariandynus, Ardalus son of Hephaistus, Olympus, Silenus, the muse Euterpe, and Apollo. From the association of Mariandynus with the *aulos* comes the adjective Mariandynian, especially with regard to the shrill, threnodic *aulema* which he devised to mourn for his younger brother Bormus, killed in a hunting accident. The *aulos* is also called Mygdonian, Berecynthian, Dorian, Lydian, Phrygian, and Libyan. The first of these adjectives is a poetic coinage meaning Phrygian. The second designates Mt. Berecynthus in Libya or Phrygia. Dorian, Lydian, and Phrygian appear as the three types of *aulos* used before the famous auletе Pronomus, according to Pausanias.

Pronomus of Thebes (in Boeotia), the outstanding aulete of the late-fifth to early-fourth centuries BC, was brought to Athens by Pericles to tutor his nephew Alcibiades on the *aulos*, according to Athenaeus. Pronomus was a virtuoso who amazed everyone by playing all kinds of *harmoniai* on the same double-*aulos*, a feat hitherto considered impossible; he also knew how to ingratiate himself with audiences by means of a seductive stage manner. So famous was he that his portrait was identified by name on a contemporary Attic volute-krater, where he is shown playing the *aulos* in a satyr-scene performed before Dionysus and Ariadne (Boardman 1995:fig. 323; Vogel 1966:pl. 19; Schindler 1988:fig. 80).[32]

According to Pausanias, there existed a period of intense rivalry between Pronomus and Sacadas, between Boeotian and Argive styles of *auletike*. Sacadas of Argos, renowned as the composer of the Pythian *nomos*, was a legendary aulete active in sixth century BC. The Pythian *nomos* was played by Sacadas in the first competition for solo *aulos* at the Pythian Games in 586 BC. He won first prize, and the god Apollo, long hostile to auletes since his contest with Marsyas, was finally appeased by the performance of this aulete. Sacadas also won first prize in auletics in the two subsequent Pythian Games.

Regardless of the skill of Alcibiades' teacher (whether it was Pronomus or Antigenidas of Thebes, another famous virtuoso aulete), the rebellious pupil broke the *aulos* into pieces. Alcibiades condemned the instrument as ignoble and illiberal in contrast to the lyre which allowed a player to pronounce words. Besides, said he, blowing the *aulos* rendered him unsightly. Alcibiades led his fellow students in revolt against *aulos* lessons, and as a result the authorities dropped *auletike* from the liberal education of the aristocratic youth of Athens. The comments on the *aulos* and lyre attributed to Alcibiades betray elements of later Neoplatonic doctrine and are for this reason somewhat suspect. Along with passages from late classical philosophers, they have been extrapolated by many modern scholars into a model of Apollonian-Dionysian antagonism: rationality versus mysticism (Wyss 1996:26–27). Although there is an element of truth in this generalization, it does not do justice to the complicated relationship between the two gods and what they represented to ancient Hellenes, and it certainly does not suit Alcibiades' character. The remark about personal appearance is closer to the mark. One must remember that Alcibiades was a privileged young man—vain, self-centered, arrogant—an ephebe who flaunted his refinement, male beauty and glamour, a beloved (*eromenos*) who taunted his lovers (*erastai*) (Fisher 1992:97).

While an ephebe, Alcibiades had many male followers; his relationship with Socrates, a lover of beautiful boys, was problematic. That he admired the philosopher is unquestioned. The most striking example of this admiration is the wordy speech given by the inebriated Alcibiades at a banquet in the house of Agathon, memorialized in the Plato's *Symposium*.[33] Alcibiades arrived suddenly with his drunken retinue of revelers, interrupted the proceedings, and appropriated the position of symposiarch. His equivalence of Marsyas and Socrates—the silen-doll whose outward ugliness hid a god-like interior, the talker as alluring as Marsyas and Olympus, the *hybristes* who exploited his power to ravish the soul of the listener—points to the hypnotic, even erotic spell wielded by Socrates' words. Alcibiades, recipient of so much adoration, was bewildered to find himself in the

position of ardent admirer, and more to the point, an admirer of an older man who remained enigmatic, ironic, and impervious to his charms. For the teacher had once rebuffed Alcibiades' offer to become his *eromenos* in exchange for private revelation of wisdom. Like a desperate lover, he had tried to escape the desire for Socrates' words, but to no avail. In the end, Alcibiades was reduced to making a mawkish wish that his enchanter might vanish, and thus set him free.

Maximus of Tyrus interprets Alcibiades' eulogy as an example of high-minded homoerotic love (Nussbaum 1986:167, 184).[34] This motif is certainly present in much of recurring imagery of Alcibiades' speech; however, it serves less to verbalize same-sex passion and more to insinuate the startling, troubling, and dangerous intellectual magnetism wielded by Socrates (Davidson 1998:48; Eisner 1974:217, 221; Halperin 1990:116; Nussbaum 1986:185–92; Steiner 1996:406–9; Weiler 1974:37). And the subtle reference to Marsyas and his inferred fate beings yet another level of meaning to this Platonic love-affair—not so much the received symbolism of suffering and subsequent purification (as in Wind 1968:172–75), but rather the atypical (for us) warning of the jealousy of the gods and their mysterious vengeance. Socrates and Marsyas dared. Both were put to death.

Negative comments on the *aulos*/*auloi* and on auletes abound. Many of these have to do with the discarding of this instrument by Athena. A typically misogynistic commentary by Aristides Quintilianus asserts that the *auloi* produced music of a female character with few benefits, and these—such as they were—could be realized only by the exercise of knowledge and self-control. Athena, though a female, was self-controlled and warlike. Aristides should have added that she was a virgin goddess. According to Aristides and Iamblichus, Pythagoras disliked the *aulos*, an illiberal and theatrical instrument which in his view encouraged insolence. Like the words attributed to Alcibiades, this opinion embodies elements of Neoplatonic philosophy. Fulgentius declares that persons skilled in music despised the *tibiae* for their poverty of musical sounds, a view echoed by Vatican Mythographer III, who places the *aulos* at the lowest level in a hierarchy of instruments. Several writers comment on the appearance of auletes, whose bodily movements, whether involuntary or contrived, verged on the libidinous. In short, auletes resembled *auletrides*, the female entertainers at male symposia. When defining similes, Aristotle offers what may have been a well-known and quite unflattering aphorism: an aulete resembled an ape. Another comparison is made by Lucian in a satirical vignette put into the mouth of Pan concerning philosophers who begin their discussions peaceably enough, but all too soon raise their voices to such a strained pitch (*orthion*) that their veins distend like those of auletes who blow into the narrow aperture of an *aulos*.

The *aulos* of course does not lack positive assessments. Called the clever (*sophon*) instrument of the clever Athena by the Greek playwright Telestes, its pleasing sound is confirmed to Ovid by Athena herself, the goddess who founded the Roman guild of *tibia* players. At the marriage feast of Cadmus and Harmonia, Athena gave to the happy couple the gifts of a necklace, a robe, and a pair of *auloi*. The Corybants combined the drum with the high sweet sound of Phrygian *auloi*, and Aphrodite delighted in the deep-voiced *aulos*. Apollo, it was said, played the *aulos*, having learned this art from Athena. As divine patron of *mousike*, Apollo was

credited with the invention of both the *kitharis* and *aulos*, overshadowing the putative candidacy of Marsyas, Olympus, and Hyagnis. *Auloi* were indispensable for funeral rites and libation rites at banquets; they added a religious tone to paeans, and calmed the troubled mind if played in a moderate manner without virtuoso display. Indeed, people went frantic when they heard the Phrygian *aulos* only if they were possessed by the goddesses Rhea (Cybele). And contrary to the view that the human voice was best accompanied by lyre or *kitharis*, Pseudo-Aristotle suggests that solo singing was more enjoyable with *aulos* accompaniment, because, like the voice, the *aulos* used the breath and concealed errors in the song.

Appendix D: Athena

Many sources name the virgin goddess as the inventor of the *aulos*/*auloi*. Most of these are cursory references made in the course of remarks on other subjects or stories. In some cases the deep-toned *aulos* is conflated with the *salpinx* (battle trumpet). Some writers use the occasional adjective, such as "deftly pierced reeds," to insinuate a value judgement on the skill of Athena. Theophrastus and the scholiast on Pindar maintain that the best reeds for making *aulos* tongues grew in Lake Copais or its tributary river Cephisus in Boeotia. Others posit that the original *aulos*/*aulai* were fashioned out of the bone of a deer or faun, or out of boxwood rather than reeds. One Greek writer claims that the river-daemon Alphaeus, son of the river Sangarius, taught Athena how to play the *aulos*. When he tried to assault the goddess (perhaps during a music lesson), he was struck by a thunderbolt from Zeus.

The most detailed account of the invention of the *aulos* is given by Pindar and his scholiast. *Pythian Ode 12* celebrates the victory of the aulete Midas of Acragas (Agrigento) at the Pythian Games of 490 BC. The scholiast recounts a strange accident that befell the aulete during the competition. During his performance one of the tongues (*glottai*) broke off and stuck to his palate. Despite this handicap Midas continued to play, and the sound he produced was so exotic that he won the competition. The scholiast states that without the tongue the *aulai* were played like a *syrinx*. But it is also possible that the *glotta* continued to function inside the aulete's mouth, though no doubt producing a somewhat different timbre than the usual one. It became a second internal tongue. Midas thus had three tongues: two "natural" and one "artificial."[33]

The invention of the *aulos* by Athena occurred after Perseus (with Athena's help) slew Medusa, the mortal Gorgon whose terrible look turned anyone who looked at her to stone. By observing Medusa's reflection on his shield, Perseus was able cut off her head, transforming the Gorgon's burning eyes, protruding tongue, and snaky hair into an apotropaic emblem and threat against enemies. After Perseus showed the monstrous object to the court of the evil king Polydectes, petrifying everyone, he gave it to Athena to attach to the very center of her aegis. The slaying of a female monster capable of rendering men impotent, the decapitating of a fecund female power by a rather insipid hero aided and abetted by a virgin non-maternal goddess, is a treasure trove of symbols for psychoanalytical readings of this myth (Feldman 1965; Ferenczi [1923] 1939–64, 3:54–55; Freud [1922] 1959:105–6; Segal 1998; Slater 1968; Zeitlin 1978).

A serpentine relationship existed between Medusa (She Who Commands) and *Athena Parthenos* (Athena Virgin). Originally Medusa was a very beautiful girl who compared her looks to those of Athena (another beauty contest?). According to another tradition, Medusa, a beauty proud of her lustrous hair, abandoned her many suitors for Poseidon who, in the shape of a horse, ravished her either in a meadow, or more perilously, in one of Athena's temples. For any one of these reasons, then, Athena changed her into a Gorgon. Pausanias states that Medusa was beautiful even as she was slain by Perseus, who then took off her head as a trophy; in this account Medusa was not a monster but rather the queen of the people around Lake Tritonia in Libya. And in the opinion of modern scholars, these are the reasons why Athena ensured the success of Perseus's quest: Medusa may have been guilty of *hybris* on several counts, but Athena may have been purely jealous of her beauty and voluptuousness. Medusa was pregnant by Poseidon at the time of her mutilation, and from the blood of her severed neck sprang the winged horse Pegasus and the semi-divine giant warrior Chrysaor, later called Bellerophon.

The layers of meaning in this myth are deep and murky, and they inform the narrative of Athena's musical invention. The goddess fashioned the *auloi* and on them played the *nomos polycephalos* (many-headed *nomos*), music destined for Apollo's Pythian festival in honor of his slaying of another female monster, Pytho. *Athena Parthenos*, whose bloodless birth from the head of Zeus and whose commitment to the male hegemony of the Olympians rendered her warlike yet docile, was impressed by Medusa's birth/death pangs and the feral dirge of Medusa's sisters, Sthenno and Euryale. The goddess imitated the strident cries of these monsters on the *aulos*, as well as the hissing of the myriad snakes that made up their hair. With this act, she neutralized the wail of women when giving birth and when keening the dead.

In effect, Athena appropriated Medusa's gaze, her fearful image, and the terrible clamor produced by female and serpentine mouths. The bloody birth of twins through Medusa's slashed throat and the demonic laments emitted through the throats of her siblings have been constrained by the artificially woven sounds of the skilled musician's (usually male) breath blown through the synthetic tongues and reeds of twin *aulos*—all this for the masculine *agon* celebrating male dominance, both human and divine. This interpretation offers many insights into the myth, although it relies by and large on the assumption of an archetypal opposition between Athena and Medusa. But like so many seeming antipodes, some of which have been explored in this essay, the relationship of Athena and Medusa was a complementary one, fraught with dangers.

This relationship did not end with Medusa's death. In Sophocles' eponymous tragedy, the agonized Ajax called Athena "the Gorgon-Eyed One" upon realizing that the goddess had driven him mad. His actions in this state were such that he decided to commit suicide. And of course Athena wore the terrible aegis into battle to instill fear and panic in the enemies of her beloved heroes, as well as a more irenic emblem of protection. In some accounts, Medusa was associated with Lake Tritonia in Libya. Athena was often called "Tritogenia," though the meaning of this epithet is today disputed (Knox 1990:625; Solomon 1994:208; Vernant 1982:23). And some ancient writers

claimed that as she played the *aulos*, Athena observed her appearance in the waters of Lake Tritonia.

Appendix E: Apollo

Apollo has been associated with the *aulos*, *kithara*, *chelys-lyra*, and *phorminx*. In the visual arts Apollo is depicted playing any of the three string instruments, but most often the *kithara*. The Latin sources generally call his instrument "cithara," whereas the Greek sources vary between lyre or tortoise-lyre and *kithara* in an indiscriminate way. The tortoise-lyre was invented by Hermes and later given by him to Apollo; Apollo subsequently gave this instrument to Orpheus.

In his various guises, Apollo gathered different epithets. *Apollo Musagetes*, kitharode and leader of the Muses, delighted the gods with his music. In this mien he became the Neoplatonic emblem of harmony in the universe. *Apollo Paean* (Apollo Healer) had a salutary effect on mankind both individually and communally—the latter when he sent down plagues as punishment and was afterwards propitiated. *Apollo Hecatebolus* (Apollo Far-shooting Archer) brought down men in their prime, and more mercifully, gave the gift of a swift and painless death to old men. (The same fate for women was the domain of his twin sister Artemis.) *Apollo Loxias*, as we saw, was the purveyor of ambiguous prophecies from his oracle at Delphi. *Apollino Tortore*, for an unexplained reason, was worshipped in Rome as Apollo Tormenter.

While still an ephebe, Apollo took possession of the oracle at Delphi by slaying the she-dragon who guarded it. Upon inflicting the fatal arrow-wound, Apollo taunted the dragon with his intention to leave her to rot on the spot. Some writers call the dragon Pytho or Delphyne, others leave her nameless. Several sources state that the dragon's rotting was the reason why the place came to be called Pytho and why Apollo earned the epithet *Pythius*. Zeus compelled Apollo to seek purification while spending eight "great years" (one celestial cycle) in exile. Apollo was not punished for slaying the pythoness, but rather for leaving the carcass to rot. This cruel and thoughtless god not only failed to pay due honor to the slain, but also defiled the location with blood-pollution. Once Apollo had fulfilled the requirements set by Zeus he returned as *Apollo Pythius* (Pythian Apollo) and *Apollo Phoebus* (Bright/Pure Apollo) and took over the Pythian Oracle at Delphi. He has been condemned as an impenitent usurper by some modern scholars (Detienne 1998:136).

"Apollo Machairophorus" (Apollo the *Machaira*-Wielder) an epithet of my coinage, echoes the title of Detienne's recent book, *Apollon le couteau à la main*. In his reflections on this side of Apollo's persona, Detienne discusses Apollo's literal and figurative use of the knife: to slay or murder enemies, both real and perceived (1998:11, 180, 186–87); to sacrifice animals for his own rituals and to feed the Delphic *machaira* with its own portion of animal-flesh (176, 179); to punish transgressors against his divinity (63); to slaughter animals and men by the hundreds, to induce mortals to kill (180, 186–87); to disarm heroes and render them vulnerable in combat (43, 186); and to conquer and carve out territories, to set limits for cities, towns, and temples, and to mark out roads (232–33, 256). Some of Apollo's victims were the seven sons of Niobe, Orestes, the Hellenic army on the plains of Troy, Patroclus, Achilles, Priam, and

Neoptolemus (murdered inside Apollo's sanctuary at Delphi). The plight of most, but not all, of these victims is examined by Detienne and linked to his scrutiny of Apollo's character. And yet, only a single passing reference is accorded to Marsyas, whose fate is surely the conspicuous instance of Apollo's excessive anger and cruel disposition.

What Marsyas revealed to Apollo by his *hybris*, by his heroic performance on the *aulos*, was so spellbinding in its sorcery and so menacing in its potency that the god celebrated the agonistic victory of the *kithara* by torturing his rival to death. As I suggested earlier, Apollo not only slew Marsyas, but also savagely and sensuously removed his mask, his face, his skin. Indeed, the details of the challenge, contest, punishment, and after-effects could be taken as a complex and profound emblem of the dark side of Apollo, the god of light, harmony, and reason.

Appendix F: Sources of *Marsyas Agonistes*

Aelian of Praeneste, Claudius (AD 170–235). *Historical Miscellany.*
Agatharchides of Samos (fl. 170–45 BC). *Phrygian Topics.*
Agathias the Scholastic of Myrina (sixth century AD). *Five Books of History on Emperor Justinian.*
Aeschylus (525–456 BC). *Agamemnon, Eumenides, Seven Against Thebes, Persians, Prometheus Bound, Thamyris.*
Alexander (Cornelius) of Miletus (fl. 88 BC). *Notices of Phrygia.*
Alcaeus of Messene (fl. 600 BC). *Epigram* 16.8 (*Anthologia Palatina*). Fragments.
Anaximandrides of Rhodes (fourth–third century BC). *Protonilaus.*
Anonymous (third–second century BC). *Aulos-Songs.*
——— (first century BC?). *Carmina* 127 (*Anthologia Latina*).
——— (Cleobulus) (fl. 532 BC). *Epigram* 7.153 (*Anthologia Palatina*).
——— (first–second century AD?). *Epigrams* 9.504, 9.505, 9.525 (*Anthologia Palatina*).
——— (first century BC–first century AD). Epigram on wall-painting. Casa dei Epigrammi, Pompeii, V 1.18.
——— (Cynaethus?) (c. 700 BC). *Homeric Hymn to Apollo, Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite.*
——— (sixth–fifth century BC). *Homeric Hymn to Artemis, Homeric Hymn To the Muses and Apollo.*
——— (sixth century BC). *Homeric Hymn to Dionysus.*
——— (seventh–sixth century BC). *Homeric Hymn to Hermes.*
——— (fifth century BC). *Homeric Hymn to Pan.*
——— (second century AD). Inscription on the Apamean marble slab.
——— (third century BC). Inscription on the Parian marble.
——— (first century BC?). Inscription on a terracotta flask. Saint Germain-en-Laye, Musée Nationale des Antiquités, 9684.
——— (second–third century AD). *Miscellany.*
——— (Onomacritus?) (late-sixth century BC). *Orphic Argonautica.*
——— (second century AD). *Prayer* 245 (*Codex Bodleianus*).
Antipater of Sidon (second century BC). *Epigram* 16.220 (*Anthologia Palatina*).

Antipater of Thessalonica (first century BC–first century AD). *Epigrams* 9.266, 9.517 (*Anthologia Palatina*).
Antiphanes of Rhodes (fifth–fourth century BC?). *Thamyris.*
Antoninus Liberalis (second–third century AD). *Commentary on Metamorphoses.*
Apollonius of Rhodes (third century BC). *Argonauts.*
Apuleius of Madaura, Lucius (c. 123–after AD 180). *Florida.*
Archias of Mitylene (third–second century BC). *Epigrams* 6.195, 7.696 (*Anthologia Palatina*).
Aretaeus of Cappadocia (first–second century AD). *On the Causes and Signs of Acute and Chronic Ailments.*
Aristides Quintilianus (fl. AD 200). *On Music.*
Aristides, Publius Aelius (AD 117–180). *Orations.*
Aristophanes of Athens (457/45–c. 385 BC). *Assemblywomen, Birds, Clouds, Frogs, Knights, Lysistrata, Peace, Wasps, Wealth, Women at the Home-Feast.*
Aristophanes of Byzantium (257–180 BC). *Dialects.*
Aristotle of Stagira (384–322 BC). *Art of Rhetoric, Politics.*
Aristoxenus (fourth–third century BC). *On Music.*
Athenaeus of Naucratis (fl. AD 200). *Banquet of Scholars.*
Bacchylides of Ceos (c. 485–50 BC). *Pythian Odes.*
"Bellermann's Anonymous" (second–fourth century AD). *On Music.*
Callimachus (c. 305–c. 240 BC). *Hymn to Apollo, Hymn to Delos.* Fragments.
Callistratus (third century AD). *On Hercules.*
Capella, Minneus Felix Martianus (fl. AD 410–439). *The Marriage of Philology and Mercury.*
Cicero, Marcus Tullius (106–43 BC). *On Divination.*
Claudian, Claudius (c. AD 370–c. 404). *Against Eutropius.*
Clearchus (fourth–third century BC). *A Life.*
Clement of Alexandria, Titus Flavius (c. AD 150–c. 215). *Miscellanies.*
Curtius [Rufus], Quintus (first century AD). *History of Alexander the Great of Macedonia.*
Conon (first century BC). *Stories.*
Corinna (sixth century BC?). Fragments.
Diodorus of Sicily (fl. 60–21 BC). *Library of History.*
Dioscorides, Pedianus (first–second century AD). *Epigram* 9.340 (*Anthologia Palatina*).
Duris of Samos (c. 370/60–c. 281/80 BC). *On Agathokles.*
Epicharmus of Sicily (fl. 440 BC). *Atalanta. Muses.*
Eratosthenes the Scholastic (sixth century AD). *Epigram* 6.78 (*Anthologia Palatina*).
Euphorion of Chalcis (d. 220 BC). *On Song-Writers.*
Euripides (c. 480–406 BC). *Alcestis, Andromache, Bacchai, Elektra, Helen, Ion, Orestes.*
Eusebius, Bishop of Caesaria (c. AD 250–337). *Preparatory Studies in the Gospels.*
Eustathius, Bishop of Thessalonica (fl. AD 1172–92). *Comments on Homer's Iliad, Notes on Dionysus's Guide to the World.*
Eutecnius the Sophist (second century BC?). *Summary of Nikander's Antidotes.*
Evemeridas of Cnidos (first century BC–first century AD?). Fragments.
Evemerus of Messene (c. 300 BC). *Sacred Scripture.*

Firmicus Maternus, Julius (third–fourth century AD). *On the Errors of Pagan Religions.*
Fulgentius, Fabius Planciades (AD 468–533). *Mythologies.*
Gellius, Aulus (c. AD 123–c. 180). *Attic Nights.*
Hagiopolites (c. 700–750 AD). *Book on Good Training in Musical Techniques.*
Hermesianax of Cyprus (third century BC). Fragments.
Herodotus (c. 484–c. 425 BC). *History.*
Hesiod (eighth century BC). *Catalogue of Women, Theogony.* Fragments.
Hesychius of Alexandria (fifth century AD). *Lexicon.*
Hipponax of Ephesus (sixth century BC). Fragments.
Homer (eighth century BC). *Iliad, Odyssey.*
Horace/Horatius Flaccus, Quintus (65–8 BC). *Satires.*
Hyginus, Gaius Julius (first century AD). *Myths, Poetic Astronomy.*
Iamblichus of Chalkis (c. AD 250–326). *Life of Pythagoras.*
Isidorus of Spain (AD 560?–636). *Etymologies or Sources.*
Josephus, Flavius/Joseph ben Matthias (AD 37/8–c. 100). *Jewish Antiquities.*
Juvenal, Decimus Junius (AD 55–128). *Satires.*
Lactantius Placidus (c. AD 250–317). *Commentary on the Thebaid of Statius, Mythological Stories in the Metamorphoses of Ovid.*
Leonidas of Taras (third century BC). *Epigram* 6.120 (*Anthologia Palatina*).
Livy, Titus (59 BC–AD 17). *From the Founding of a City.*
Longus (second–third century AD). *Daphnis and Chloe.*
Lucian of Samosata (AD c. 120–c. 180). *The Dead Come to Life. Dialogues of the Gods, Indictment, Letter to Nigrinus, Tragedy of Goat.*
Lucan, Marcus Annaeus (AD 39–65). *On The Civil War.*
Macrobius, Ambrosius Theodosius (fl. AD 400). *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio from Cicero's Republic.*
Malalas of Antioch, John (c. AD 490–c. 578). *Chronicle.*
Martial, Marcus Valerius (c. AD 40–104). *Epigrams.*
Maximus of Tyrus (second century AD). *Dissertations.*
Melanippides of Melos (fl. 520 BC). *Marsyas.*
Metrodorus of Chios (d. 70 BC). *Trojan History.*
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Zosimus of Byzantium (AD 425–518). *A New History.*

Notes

1. Although some of the nuances in the Marsyas myth may elude art historians, their studies have nonetheless made an important contribution to our understanding of the subject. See, for instance, Clairmont (1957), Rawson (1987), Small (1982), Weis (1992), and Wyss (1996).

2. These lines allude to Ovid's celebrated description of the death of Apollo's victim and his final words: "Why do you tear me from myself? Oh, I repent! Oh, a *tibia* is not worth this price!" (*Metamorphoses* 6.385–86). Dante alters Ovid's blunt and bloodthirsty treatment of Marsyas's suffering to a quasi-Neoplatonic and quasi-Christian expression of the artistic rewards won through the torments of divine inspiration.

3. The Forum statue depicted a silen/satyr with wineskin and right hand raised in salutation. According to writers of the imperial Roman period, Marsyas was an envoy of Father Liber or Lyaeus (Bacchus/Dionysus), and his statue symbolized the freedom of the city in which it stood. Latin sources refer to several Marsyases active during the mythical prehistory of Italy, none of whom is identified with Marsyas the Phrygian *aulos* player. Silius Italicus, however, does precisely this: he claims the *Mesi* of Italy got their name from *Marsia*, who fled in fear across the sea from Phrygian Crenae (Aulocrenae) when his pipe was defeated by Apollo's quill. Such musings have to do less with the Marsyas of Greek myth and more with the Marsyas of popular Roman legend.

4. This method makes it inappropriate to consider interpretations of the Marsyas myth that link specific writings or artistic artifacts to political events. It is true that myths were exploited, displaced, and even invented by politicians for their own purposes, and that the conjectures made about such uses of the Marsyas myth are thought-provoking: on the war between Athens and Boeotia (famous for its auletes) in 457–47 BC, see Boardman (1956:19), Schindler (1988:117), and Thiemer (1979:53); on the production of Melanippides' *Marsyas* around 450 BC, see Boardman (1992:83); on Pericles' attempt to censor Athenian comedy around 450–440 BC, see Schindler (1988:117); on the fortunes of Pergamon and Celaenae

or Apamea Cibotus, see Fleischer (1972–75), Lippold (1955), Rawson (1987:9–10), Smith (1991:155), and Weis (1992:108–9).

5. In visual sources Marsyas is shown blowing on either a single *aulos* or a *diaulos* (double *aulos*). In literary sources the latter instrument is designated usually by the simple plural *auloi* (Greek) and *tibiae* (Latin). Apollo is usually shown in visual sources either holding or plucking the *kithara*, the "concert" or professional version of the lyre. The *kithara* was more elaborate in design, larger in size, and stronger in tone, with a wooden sound-box. All competitors at musical games used this instrument. In some contexts, pedantry in terminology may be misplaced; however, little is gained by the casual (and ubiquitous) use of the English "flute/flutes" to translate either *aulos/auloi* or *tibia/tibiae*. To avoid any misapprehensions, I use the original Greek and Latin terms when discussing the ancient sources.

6. Agathias misunderstood his source, probably a cryptic note on an athletic contest between Apollo and Marsyas. All ancient sources cited in the text can be found in appendix F.

7. The jealousy or envy (*phthonos*) of the gods was acknowledged by Hellenes as an ever-present danger, even to those who honored and obeyed them. The blind bard or seer was, of course, a topos in ancient Greek literature. In return for the gift of poetry, song, or prophecy, divinities took away one's sight. To be loved by goddesses and Muses was a mixed blessing, as everyone understood. Blinding was also interpreted as a punishment for the eroticized male gaze or as a symbol for another kind of mutilation, emasculation; for instance, Anchises, Orion, Tiresias, and Thamyris, among others.

8. Eurytus's son Iphicles later gave the bow to Odysseus as a gift. This was the cherished bow that remained in Ithaca while Odysseus was away from home, the bow the suitors could not string, the bow that sang their slaughter at the hands of Odysseus.

9. With respect to the Olympic Games, a fair number of cases of misconduct, especially bribery, are recorded by Pausanias. And cheating in funeral games is recorded in the epics of Homer and Virgil.

10. Today, his sexual advances might be interpreted as offensive, but we must remember, on the one hand, that polygamy or cohabitation of one male with many females was the usual practice in Thrace and, on the other, that the "reign of the phallus" in ancient Hellas allowed males, especially divine or semi-divine males, to abduct, seduce, or rape mortal, semi-divine and divine females (Carson 1990; Keuls 1985; Loraux 1990; Stewart 1997; Winkler 1990).

11. Among the musical instruments mentioned as belonging to one or another of the Muses are: *chelys-lyra*, *kithara*, *barbiton*, *pharminx*, and *aulos*. Sophocles called the Muses "*aulos* loving."

12. Apollo was also known as Kitharodus (Apollo Singer to the *Kithara*), thus signaling his mastery and patronage (together with the Muses) of sung poetry to the accompaniment of the *kithara*. The Muses themselves competed in a number of musical contests; for instance, against the nine Emathides or Pierides, the three Sirens, and Thamyris.

13. Eva Keuls cites Zeus's action as an exceptional example of womb-envy in a predominantly patriarchal society, and goes on to suggest the choice of the thigh reflects ancient Greek homoerotic sexual practice (1985:41–42). Carl Kerenyi, on the other hand, interperts the sewing of Dionysus in Zeus's thigh as a substitute for self-emasculation, a rite associated with Cybele (1996:274–76). Many historians of mythology point out that the Greek myths tended to validate male supremacy; for example, Grant (1995:138), Greene and Kahn (1985:3), Slater (1968:7, 11, 131), and Stewart (1997:92).

14. Johann Sebastian Bach composed a comic secular cantata around 1729, *Der Streit zwischen Phoebus und Pan*, BWV 201, to a libretto by Picander. Midas's reputation for stupidity rests not only on the ass's ears he received from Apollo, but also on the gift of the "golden touch" he received from Dionysus. As in the case of Marsyas, this characterization, based largely on Latin authors, is too one-sided. Many accounts show Midas to have been a wealthy, powerful, and shrewd ruler in the Near East. As for his ears, the myth could be an allusion to the turban worn by Persian potentates or, as some ancients believed, to Midas's strain of satyr-blood. The latter, even if fictional, makes Midas akin to Marsyas.

15. The heated dispute between the contestants over proper procedure inspired an epigram by Martial written to Laurus, who was aiming to qualify as an attorney. Martial points out that since the courts were seething with lawsuits, even Marsyas could have become a lawyer.

16. The Greek *strephein*, later Latin interpretations notwithstanding, is closer to the meaning of turning backwards than to turning upside down.

17. In Lucian's dialogue between the two goddess-mothers, Leto and Hera, the latter launches into a stinging ridicule of Apollo who, in her opinion, pretended mastery of archery, *kithara*-playing, medicine, and prophecy; he even set up oracle factories that specialized in sneaky (*loxa*) pronouncements. Hera concludes, "As it was, the wretch Marsyas was undone by sophistry and unjustly destroyed." The ambiguity of Apollo's oracles was legendary and more often than not the cause of disaster for the suppliant. One of Apollo's epithets was "Loxias" (Devious/Twisted Apollo).

18. Scythian archers were brought into Athens by Pisistratus in the sixth century BC (Hall 1989:138). Less policemen and more bouncers (Davidson 1998:214), these public slaves were the butt of Aristophanic comedy.

19. The barbarian, as described by Philostratus of Lemnos, whets a *machaira*.

20. The Roman district may have been the one near the Circus Flaminius, the site of corporal punishment and execution of slaves and prisoners (Weis 1992:67). The epithet *Apolline Tortore*, though deserved, arose from a misunderstanding of one of the Greek names of the god recorded by Pausanias: *Apollo Deiradiotes*. This title was frequently translated as "Apollo Tormentor," until modern scholarship showed that it came from the place-name of a temple—Deiras in Argos. Deiras means ridge; hence, "Apollo of the Ridge."

21. For instance, the threat against Persian nobles uttered by prince Hormisdas, as well as the punishment of the satrap Achaeus by Antiochus III, the warrior Nachoragan by Chosroes, the judge Sisamnes by Cambyses, and the diplomat Bassicus by Pecorius.

22. The *phorbeia* was a performance aid: it supported the player's facial muscles, thus helping to maintain air in the cheeks, and providing the reserve of power needed to push air through or over the reed(s) and down through the tube of the instrument. When wearing this contraption, the aulete breathed in through the nose and out through the mouth.

23. Apollo's hair was unshorn even in adolescence, and only his mother Leto was allowed to touch it.

24. The Greek adjective derives from *glaux*, the nocturnal screech-owl that terrified its prey into immobility with the fixity of its unblinking gaze. The owl, today tamed into a symbol of wisdom, was one of the attributes of Athena.

25. Gisela Richter suggests the verb *paiousa* could mean "advancing upon" (1970:162). It can also mean to "warn" or "approach." Each of these variants carries with it a different set of resonances. Reputed Roman copies of Myron's lost Minerva-Marsyas are damaged and fragmented; thus it not possible to ascertain the poses of the two. Was Athena menacing, warning, or simply drawing near Marsyas?

26. The translation of the French title is mine.

27. Nietzsche's remarks refer not to Marsyas but to the archetypal hero and tragic figure Oedipus.

28. Thiemer alludes to orgiastic behavior in general in the rituals associated with Cybele, without specifying one of the most notoriously excessive forms of worship by her male devotees: self-castration.

29. It is not entirely satisfactory to explain Apollo's cruelty as an appropriate punishment of Marsyas's *hybris*, as does Wyss (1996:26).

30. In the context of some wall-paintings in Herculaneum and Pompeii, Karl Schefold surmises that Marsyas was cast in the heroic mold, along with Chiron, Theseus and Hercules (1962:87).

31. The same sort of titillating humor is evident in a description by Philostratus the Elder of a painting of the young Olympus at Celaenae: the sweet youth sleeps, *auloi* beside him. With Marsyas away, a group of satyrs admires Olympus as they scatter flowers over his tender body. One satyr withdraws the tongue (*glotta*) from one of the *aulos* pipes and eats it, dreaming that he kisses Olympus and tastes his breath.

32. Pausanias records that Pronomus's fame was such that the Thebans erected a statue in his honor. It is likely that Pronomus invented the rotating collars of the *aulos* that allowed individual holes to be opened or stopped, and thus permitted the aulete to play different *harmoniai* on one instrument (West 1992:87). Tempting as it might be to conjecture that the Pronomus mentioned in Aristophanes' *Assembly-women* is the same as the aulete, as in Schindler (1988:1190), Pronomus was the lover of Agyrrhius, an Athenian politician of the early-fourth century BC.

33. The tragic poet Agathon, known to be a homosexual, was lampooned as such by Aristophanes in *Women at the Home-Feast*.

34. The solemnity of Alcibiades' comparison of the aged Silenus Socrates to Marsyas is skewered in one cheeky diminutive tossed at the philosopher by Strepsiades in Aristophanes' *Clouds*: "*O Sokratidion*! (O Sokratikins!)."

35. Apparently, the *aulos* reeds were placed in the mouth and enclosed by the lips of the player, not gripped by the teeth (Anderson 1994:34; Vogel 1966:89).

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reviews

Mary Hunter. *The Culture of Opera Buffa in Mozart's Vienna: A Poetics of Entertainment.* Princeton University Press, 1999. xiii, 329 pp.

Reviewed by Dale E. Monson

In 1997, Mary Hunter and James Webster edited a series of essays for Cambridge University Press entitled *Opera buffa in Mozart's Vienna*. Two years later, Hunter borrowed and emended that title for her own monograph, *The Culture of Opera Buffa in Mozart's Vienna: A Poetics of Entertainment*, a work that won the American Musicological Society's Kinkeldey award in 2000. Through her methodology and substance, made plain by the modified title, she seeks to establish a context for opera buffa in the culture of Josephinian Vienna, within which the genre's meaning for contemporaneous audiences was perceived. She probes the elements, heritage, aesthetic ideals, modes of expression, and, most importantly, the cultural symbols in the text and music of opera buffa. The rich interweaving of meanings she illustrates unveils opera buffa as a sort of *Glasperlenspiel* (to borrow from Hesse): a symbolic matrix of the aesthetic complexity and cultural icons of the age.

A study of this sort would not have been possible until recently. The uncovering, cataloging, and description of archival holdings, manuscripts, libretti, and other documents from the period have been extraordinary in the last twenty years. Interpretations of those materials, alongside known resources, are increasing in number and diversity.[1] The Cambridge volume made this plain in its introduction. While Hunter and Webster found two overriding themes among their collection of essays—the desire to provide a context for the study of Mozart's late operas on the one hand, and the exploration of new methodologies, asking new questions, on the other—most published reviews of that first book in fact focused on its extraordinary richness and diversity of methodology and materials. Each author sought to find value and meaning, but often in different ways.

Hunter herself now uses these textual and musical materials to focus on the cultural meanings of opera buffa in Vienna. In doing this, she does not seek to reveal the importance of individual arias or operas or even composers, though her work is generously laced with expansive musical and

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textual examples (including entire arias and ensembles). Rather, she attempts to illustrate cultural norms and expectations. On the issue of characterization, for instance, she writes, "I am less concerned with the ways particular characters emerge as plausible or unique individuals than with the ideological significance of the categories into which most characters more or less unproblematically fall" (103). It is the way in which the form of an aria, the pace of an ensemble, the metaphors of a text, or the intent of a joke acts as a reflection of the living culture of the day that interests her. Many anthropologists would probably be sympathetic with her approach; William A. Haviland writes that culture itself "must strike a balance between the self-interests of individuals and the needs of society as a whole" (1999:35). In addressing the culture of opera buffa, Hunter consistently describes that very balance: how the characters and what defines them in their roles (their "self-interest") are portrayed within the society of the genre (the particular Viennese cultural icons of class, status and expression in the text and music) from which they were either drawn or which they parody. This juxtaposition of individuals within their society swells to a dynamic interplay of soloists, characters, ensembles, and audience, and gives our reading of opera buffa a rich new meaning. In this way, her book is one of the most important studies in eighteenth-century music and culture yet to appear.

Hunter's investigation follows a methodological pattern set by Leonard Ratner's watershed study, *Classic Music: Expression, Form, and Style* (1980), which has since borne many children, often with distinctive personalities. Wye J. Allanbrook's *Rhythmic Gesture in Mozart: "Le nozze di Figaro" and "Don Giovanni"* (1983) was among the first, followed by such recent monographs as Robert S. Hatten's *Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, Correlation, and Interpretation* (1994). While tellingly different in approach, such works seek to decipher what they find to be the symbolic messages of music, to establish a musical epistemology. Those symbols range from clear, contemporaneous connotations (e.g., the use of a minuet for Figaro's "Se vuol ballare," a dance suitable for the "contino") to complex constructive interpretations (e.g., the "tragic-to-transcendent" genre of Hatten). Hunter's particular use of symbols unfolds by distinguishing between what was "mere" entertainment and what carried social meaning, though these fields are, of course, not mutually exclusive. Her work follows from John Locke's view that many cultural symbols "have their signification from the arbitrary imposition of men" (1689:bk. 3, chap. 9), and that symbols for every age carry an innate richness of possibilities, a multiplicity of meanings. By following this path she is able "to portray the ways opera buffa functioned as *entertainment* in late-eighteenth-century Vienna, or, in other words, to suggest ways in which the social and aesthetic world of this genre interacted with the social and aesthetic world of its context" (4).

While commentaries on eighteenth-century opera are generally quick to acknowledge that the music was written for its singers, tailored like a suit of clothes (to use the common metaphor found even in Mozart's letters), it is still difficult to discuss this today in much detail; the state of the sources and lack of modern studies on singers make this an enormous challenge. Probably for that reason, Hunter at times acknowledges the importance of singers,[2] but with few exceptions does not pursue this in detail. To what degree are the musical characteristics she describes as intrinsic to the social and cultural messages of this music also a reflection of an individual singer's predilection for a certain type of aria or mood, pitch range or melodic character? The notion of the influence of singers is intrinsically bound to the idea of the performance itself. The Italianate performer-centric orientation was quite different than the developing Germanic view of music arising from the composer's genius. An explanation of the collision of these two worlds, which surely was unfolding in Mozart's Vienna (as attested in his letters), would have also been helpful.

Some singers excelled in their acting and dramatic projection, while others favored lyric singing, and such preferences were minded by composers. A ready example among the most famous buffo singers of a slightly earlier age was Francesco Baglioni (singing from at least 1729 until 1761), who was a crucial influence on the dissemination and style of comic opera in its formative years (Mackenzie 1993:256–65).[3] The sheer pleasure that such singers provided is important, as she notes, but those performers were also fundamental in shaping the very elements of their operas, and this increases their importance. The changes made by Mozart in *Don Giovanni* and *Figaro* to accommodate new singers might be a good example—how does the sociological affect or imagery of those passages change with the singer, and how far can the altered cultural nuances be traced to a singer's personal musical preferences? When Hunter discusses the vocal range of "Sono una fanciullina" from Giuseppe Sarti's *Fra i due litiganti il terzo gode*, noting that it encompassed "a mere octave," she asks the reader in a footnote to "Compare the relative independence and strongly gestural aspects of the accompaniment in Petronio's aria quoted above" (136). Can any such differences be laid at the feet of the singers?

Hunter points to the "'naturalness' of interaction [in opera buffa] that contrasts with the supposed 'stiff artificiality' of opera seria." Though serious opera was more or less absent in the 1770s and 1780s from the Viennese stage, I wonder if its influence on opera buffa has been undervalued. Hunter does draw on seria models for comparisons, such as noting how the endings of buffa arias, with their repeated cadential patterns, are analogous to the lengthy coloratura embellishments that conclude seria arias. It may be that such seria conventions played more of a role in

Viennese opera buffa than their presence in this study may imply. Certainly early Neapolitan comic opera, before it found its way north, was thoroughly grounded in opera seria conventions, and not only in the *parte serie* roles. To what extent, after the expansive development of comic opera in the 1750s and 60s, was that true for the Viennese productions by Cimarosa, Anfossi, and Paisiello, in addition to the "longstanding norms of comedy and carnival" (21) that Hunter cites?

As Hunter recounts details of the structure and symbols of opera buffa, seria models often come to mind. When she suggests that the happy endings of opere buffe are important messages of those works, surely opera seria is lurking in the background. When she points out that Giovanni Battista Casti's libretto *La grotta di Trofonio* appealed to familiar Classical authority to validate its message, we are reminded of the hundreds of seria libretti that do exactly that. The unfolding of the typical duet as a pattern of individual solos later joining into a homophonic section is a seria device. Likewise, establishing character types for the roles in a libretto by boldly announcing them at the beginning is an analogy to a seria tradition (34).[5] If opera buffa affirmed the stability of Viennese society, as she proposes, it surely must have been heard against the backdrop of the seria libretto, whose goal (at least in its Metastasian ideals) had been that each character would act naturally within his or her own station, and that the aristocracy would be shown models for appropriate behavior.

Among the many valuable contributions of Hunter's study, the formation of aria categories is particularly useful. The use of aria types has held great appeal for writers on opera of the eighteenth century. Hunter's own classification for buffa arias works well, particularly because it lends itself to distinctions of class and social relationships. These categories are carefully drawn and consider details of tonal, melodic, and formal construction. Though Hunter notes that many modern classifications of aria types are inconsistent, even in their *methods* of classification, it is really not so clear that eighteenth-century authors were much better.

Hunter's numerous insights are often individually helpful in the extensions the reader can make from them. She notes, for example, that expressions of sentiment are most commonly sung by women, and that "the woman's guarantee of pedigree is her capacity to express her sentiments directly and movingly, [while] the man's is his capacity to be moved rather than to demonstrate comparable expressive power" (150–51). The aristocratic men in *Don Giovanni* might be seen in this light. Though it is the power of Giovanni's seductive wiles that is his greatest weapon, those expressions of sentiment are certainly anything but genuine or heartfelt. On the other hand, he cannot be "moved" by pity or love—these faults then help frame the musical, textual, and cultural backdrop for his

ultimate demise. Likewise, according to this model, Don Ottavio's often faulted weakness might be a reflection of his expressions of sentiment being seen as somehow too much for a man.

Hunter's work establishes a pattern for interpreting opera that will surely be imitated. If her thoroughly systematic approach to unraveling meaning in opera is followed in similarly uncompromising, contextual analysis, there is much of eighteenth-century opera, of all kinds and locations, that we will yet learn. This is a marvelous beginning.

Notes

1. Important studies on Viennese theater life continue to appear, as demonstrated by Hunter's bibliography. Some of these studies make Viennese materials widely available, such as that by Dorothea Link (1998). Others point to new directions or redefine old ground, such as Bruce Alan Brown (1991), the many articles by John Platoff (e.g., 1990, 1993, 1997), Daniel Heartz (1990, 1995), and the previous year's Kinkeldey winner, John A. Rice (1998).

2. For example, in her concluding chapters on *Così fan tutte*, Hunter points to Vincenzo Calvesi and Adriana Ferrarese and their roles in *Così*, noting the similarity of their music to what they had sung in other operas by other composers (252).

3. Baglioni carried four influential comic operas throughout Italy: Latilla's *La finta cameriera* and *La commedia in commedia*, and Rinaldo di Capua's *Madama Ciana* and *La libertà nociva*. His views were likely sustained by his many singing children, among them his daughter Clementina (fl. mid-1750s to late 1770s), perhaps the most famous, who sang in both serious and comic operas. Antonio Baglioni, who may have been Francesco's son, was the first Don Ottavio and Tito for Mozart.

4. In the first few lines of Metastasio's *L'Olimpiade*, for example, we know exactly how the work will unfold, and what roles the key characters will play, when Aminta scolds Licida, "Deh modera una volta / questo tuo violento /spirito intollerante" (Alas! Temper, for once, your violent, intolerant spirit).

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Peter Wade. ***Music, Race, and Nation: Música Tropical in Colombia.*** University of Chicago Press, 2000. xi, 323 pp.

Reviewed by Janet L. Sturman

Music, Race, and Nation: Música Tropical in Colombia is an especially welcome addition to the distinguished Chicago Studies in Ethnomusicology series edited by Philip Bohlman and Bruno Nettl. First, it boosts the relatively small body of published scholarship in English on Colombian music,[1] and second, it promotes new theoretical directions for research by focusing on commercially popular music and the constructive role it plays in Colombian social politics.

Wade departs from the venerable practice in Latin American music studies of seeking to identify musical and textual evidence of Iberian heritage, a topic addressed by both George List (1973) and Susana Friedmann (1993). When he raises the issue at all, it is not to elucidate the essential character of the music, but instead to evaluate why the identification of Hispanic ancestry has been esteemed. Wade is more interested in the social negotiations and musical reconceptualizations undertaken by Colombians as they reconcile new patterns of musical reception that threaten long-standing attitudes regarding social status.

Scholars other than Wade have explored Afro-Colombian musical practice. George List must be counted as one of the pioneers in this area, but much of his work concerned folkloric practice. Wade, in contrast, directs his attention to commercially disseminated popular music. He also devotes more attention to music of Colombia's Atlantic coast, and he is more interested in the social construction of musical practice than in the construction of melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic patterns that dominates many of List's analyses. Matters of musical reception, appropriation, and re-identification, as well as the connection between these behaviors and social politics, concern Wade as much as sound itself. His statement that "The way people think about identity and music is tied to the way they think about place" (2) makes it clear that *Music, Race, and Nation* focuses on the social interpretation of sound.

Like the American scholar Lise Waxer (1998, 2001), who has explored links between local Colombian popular music and the now globally popular salsa, Wade is especially interested in how the development of a commercial music industry in Colombia and abroad affected musical practice in central Colombian cities as well as in outlying regions. The *música*

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tropical of his title refers to the popular industry label for a broad category of music of Caribbean character, including salsa, *pachanga*, *merengue*, *balada*, calypso and *cumbia*, all of which have exerted mutual influences upon each other and enjoy support across Latin America, the U.S. and Europe. The title also indicates the rather new position Colombian music has come to assume in defining this broad category, both at home and abroad. Today, industry marketers are as likely to refer to the Colombian *cumbia* as any other genre in defining *música tropical*. Not surprising, Colombian musicians and listeners have more nuanced ways of perceiving and referring to *música tropical* and these distinctions are at the heart of Wade's study.

Peter Wade is a Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of Manchester. His previous work on race and ethnicity includes the books *Blackness and Race Mixture* (1993) and *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (1997). In many ways this new book extends arguments raised in his earlier books, but the much richer discussion of music in this new book will surely attract wider interest. Wade's principal question in *Music, Race, and Nation* is how music from the Caribbean coastal regions of Colombia, known as *música costeña*, came to be central to that country's popular music repertoire and even came to represent the nation. As he explains in the course of the book, social views would have made such an occurrence unthinkable prior to the mid-twentieth century. The relatively new identification with the Caribbean is also surprising if one considers geographic and ethnic criteria.

Colombia covers a geographic area roughly equal to the size of France. It is Latin America's fourth largest country and, in its position at the northeast corner of the continent, is the only one with coasts on both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Its geographic diversity results in a corresponding cultural diversity. The nation is frequently divided into four zones: 1) the Pacific zone along the west coast, which shares a border with Panama; 2) the Andean zone defined by three central mountain ranges; 3) the Caribbean zone along the northern coast; and 4) the largest region, known as the *llanera*, featuring the vast plains that border Venezuela and Brazil. Some scholars, such as Ahadía Morales (1995), include a fifth zone, known as the island region, which includes the two Caribbean islands that belong to Colombia: San Andres and Providencia. The capital city of Santa Fé de Bogotá is in the Andean zone and hence the country has long been dominated by cultural policy emerging from this region.

The ethnic population of the country is at least as diverse as the geography. A general breakdown, using categories common in Colombian discourse, estimates that 47% of the country's population is *mestizo* (people of mixed ancestry, blending indigenous and European lineages); 24% is *mulato* (of mixed African and other ancestries); 20% is white; 6% is black;

and 3% is of indigenous ancestry (Abadía Morales 1995:18). The same adjectives used to describe population groups are frequently applied to musical genres and activities, as Wade points out in his introduction.

From the earliest stirrings of independence, elite Colombians worked to create a centralized vision of national culture. Their efforts favored the Andean region and positioned the coastal regions, as well as the people and culture that flourished there, as marginal and provincial. This view was aided by prevailing attitudes regarding race and national identity. Blending of ancestries—African, Hispanic, and other European, with indigenous—occurred throughout Colombia, but the influence of African ancestry has always been strongest along the coasts. The voices guiding the central government supported a racially-defined conception of national identity that highlighted the dominant role of Colombians of white, European ancestry. Thus, although the Colombian elite recognized the distinctive character of regional ethnic (and musical) variety, they generally valued local traditions for what they might contribute to a centralized composite; such traditions were to be absorbed rather than valued for their independent integrity.

Correspondingly, indigenous, mixed, and in particular, black residents and traditions were viewed as lower in status. Wade therefore begins his study by asking how music with undeniably black roots came to represent the entire nation. In chapter 1, he introduces a host of related issues he has considered in answering such a question and presents an extensive literature review. He discusses the tensions between homogeneity and heterogeneity, transformation and appropriation, and nationalism and transnationalism, and how these issues figure into the discourse on Colombian identity. He also presents a general discussion of theories linking gender, sexuality and racial identity. Ideas concerning sexuality and the body in music and dance, as well as those concerning music and capitalism, play an important role in Colombia's rather surprising embrace of music once viewed as provincial and coarse. Perhaps most important is Wade's theory that the history of Colombian popular music reveals a more nuanced understanding of the constructional potential of social identification via popular music. He reminds us that Colombian nationalist elites do more than absorb and modify diverse regional culture; they "resignify a diversity that they also partly contruct" (7). He contrasts this view with positions explored by other scholars of Caribbean popular music, like Pacini Hernandez (1995) and Averill (1997), which emphasize the oppositional potential of music.

In chapter 2, "La Costa and Música Costeña in the Colombian Nation," Wade develops his examination of how attitudes toward the music and culture of the Caribbean coast connect to Colombian attitudes regarding

national identity. Drawing on resources that include published literature, school texts, and cultural policy, he explains the positions of the Ministry of Communications, which oversees radio broadcasting; the Ministry of Education, which provides radio programs for state broadcast; and the Ministry of Culture, which directs programs at museums and other state institutions. In particular, he observes how the issue of cultural diversity is treated by these national agencies, noting a persistent tendency to treat diversity as a regional matter, i.e., something characteristic of specific areas of the country, but not a national trait. Wade reminds his readers of the constructive vision at work in such representations since cultural diversity is actually much more pervasive than official policy implies: plenty of Afro-Colombians reside in the central city of Bogotá and not just along the coasts.

Of particular value is Wade's investigation of the growth of the recording industry in Colombia. Far from merely describing stages of development, he uncovers and highlights the importance of the ongoing dialogue between domestic and international markets. The construction of a Colombian national identity, and music repeesenting it, was not simply a national project. Beginning with the first commercial recordings of Colombian music such negotiations had an international character and involved non-Colombian voices. Thus, while prominent Colombian journalists, authors, and politicians were waxing eloquently about how the Andean *bambuco* (a dance song adapted for urban consumption in middle-class salons) best represented the country's national character, the genre was not included in the first recordings of Colombian music made by the Columbia Grammophone Company and Victor Talking Machine Company in 1910 and 1917 respectively. The recordings did, however, include Colombian versions of the waltz and polka, dance genres popular not just in Colombia and elsewhere in Latin America, but around the world. Wade concludes, "apparently at this stage *bambucos* did not interest record companies which were catering to an international audience" (49). *Bambucos* and other forms of central Colombian music popular in the middle-class salons of the era were eventually recorded and Wade discusses the rise of this and other central Andean genres with the central bourgeois public. However, his overriding point is that although music from the Colombian interior regularly dominated national discourse, the international recording market consistently prompted wider visions of national music, especially favoring links between Colombian music and Caribbean styles which were growing increasingly popular with international, especially American, listeners.

Chapter 3 of *Music, Race and Nation*, "Origin Myths: The Historiography of Costeño Music," is dedicated to the popular narratives that circulate

regarding the history of three categories of music: *porro*, *cumbia*, and *vallenato*. Wade's task is a complicated one. While it is convenient to think of these categories as genres of music, such a classification is somewhat misleading as each term embraces a set of representative song types and dance genres. The array of contemporary *cumbia* practices, for example, reflects its mediation in Mexican films, tropical dance bands, and general international circulation, as well as local folkloric custom. According to Abadía Morales, "classic cumbia is never sung" (1995:68), a noteworthy point since even in contemporary commercial variants dance remains most critical. Sung *cumbias* did surface in certain regions, such as Cartegena, and include *mapalé*, a song form featuring call and response between a soloist and chorus, as well as *bullerengue*, *salome*, *malla*, and *porro*, i.e., genres in their own right. Similarly, *vallenato* songs are performed in various rhythms such as *son*, *paseo*, *merengue*, and *puya* whose accompanying dance steps range from slow and song-like to wildly fast, respectively. While Wade argues that Abadía Morales is too eager to draw connections between folkloric and commercially defined practice, many of these distinctions persist in contemporary Colombian practice and are recognized by listeners as well as performers.

Wade's basic categories (*porro*, *cumbia* and *vallenato*) also evoke favored instrumental combinations as well as song styles and dance rhythms. Here again, simple definitions are impossible. A *vallenato* ensemble featuring the signature instrumental combination of accordion (*acordeón*), scraper (*guacharaca*) and box drum (*caja*) might perform a *cumbia* or *mapalé* while a typical *porro* ensemble featuring brass and wind instruments might play a *cumbia* or even a *currulao* associated more with the Pacific Coast. In short, it is better to think of *cumbia*, *porro*, and *vallenato* as the signature designations for stylistic traditions. Wade focuses less on the distinctions within the traditions and more on aspects they share.

Wade finds that in all three traditions folklorists and historians[7] have projected the origins of the style further back in time than can be confirmed by material evidence; in fact such evidence often contradicts popular assumptions. Another tendency is to ascribe the origins of the genres to one specific region, such as *vallenato* to the town of Valledupar, and define early performances as a process of re-casting folk practice by incorporating modern European instruments. Local historians have also typically portrayed the genres emerging from these coastal traditions as triumphs of *mestizaje*, or racial mixture, representing the idealized cultural blending of tri-partite roots: indigenous, European, and African. Wade rejects the simplifications embedded in such popular narratives and offers explanations that reveal the bids for power that lie behind their construction. He notes, for example, that the conventional narratives of

mestizaje regularly embody an ideology of erasing cultural difference through blending (or, in many cases, whitening).[3] While these narratives frequently appear to celebrate diversity, they also have the little-recognized effect of reinforcing cultural hierarchies by continually articulating difference. Thus the narratives that define *costeño* traditions as authentic (meaning rooted in folkloric practice and reflecting an idealized cultural blend) tended to simultaneously define these traditions and their supporters as backward and less cultivated (66).

Wade's general skepticism regarding accepted narratives derives in part from his study of Gilard (1987) and Bermúdez (1985, 1996), but the revised version he offers in his book is groundbreaking, if nothing else for the breath of his explanations. He has worked assiduously to discover the perspectives that have shaped conventional explanations regarding music history and practice. As noted earlier, he shows the role of the recording industry in the development of various *costeño* styles, in contrast to the myths that posit a purely rural gestation.

That said, two concerns come to mind. First, despite his unveiling of existing origin myths, one might argue that Wade has constructed a myth of his own. His tendency to lump together different musical practices into one general category called *costeño* music is a construction that many will see as an oversimplification, albeit one that is frequently favored by the record industry.

Wade's acceptance of this generic categorization is somewhat surprising when one considers that historically the styles of music that he examines have embodied "blackness" (to use Wade's term) in rather different ways. The *currulaos* of the Pacific Coast, and even the many types of *cumbia* associated more with the Atlantic coast, embody far more overt African traits than does the *vallenato* tradition. While Wade may be emphasizing the similarities across styles because it has become fashionable to do so in the contemporary entertainment industry, it is not my experience that Colombians hear these styles as one undifferentiated group, as the repeated use of the term might imply.

At various points in the book Wade does distinguish between different styles and practices in Colombian music, notably in chapter 2 where he provides a historical overview of various styles. He also invites readers to explore specific musical differences between a modern *porro*, *cumbia*, and *vallenato* (in *paseo* rhythm) in appendix B where he has included a representative transcription of each. The transcriptions, prepared by Alex Miles, are prefaced by a description of instrumentation and conventional practice for each ideal type. Wade's own discussion of musical characteristics does not refer to these transcriptions, but he does detail individual performers' approaches to instrumentation, rhythmic choices, singing

styles, program formats and recording policy. However, later in the book his references to *costeño* music as a general category become more prominent. Wade is likely aware of his own myth building; indeed, he discusses briefly his role in the "tangled webs of knowledge production" in the final chapter of the book (232). Thus a reader should be prepared to do some de-tangling.

Second, while Wade's research has facilitated analyses of popular genres that reveal fascinating processes of social negotiation, his revisionist stance is also complicated. Although he never defines his work in terms of advocacy, the reader would be hard-pressed not to sense that Wade applauds (at least on some levels) Colombia's relatively recent embrace of Afro-Colombian culture. At the same time, by unveiling the rationalization, and continued racism, that underlie the integration of coastal customs into the central Colombia consciousness, Wade risks undermining the integrity of the people whose story he is telling, particularly when his conclusions stress the ultimate flexibility of interpretation. This is a danger that Wade is well aware of and that he addresses more directly in *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (1997:116–17).

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 outline the history of *costeño* music, again focusing on the three genres of *porro*, *cumbia*, and *vallenato*. Exactly how these styles changed over time, how their practices overlapped, and how people viewed such developments form the heart of Wade's investigation. He identifies three major periods of activity. In chapter 4, he reviews the 1920s and '30s during which *costeño* traditions develop as commercial music popular in Colombia. Chapter 5 surveys the 1940s and 50s when the coastal style made inroads into the Colombian heartland, though not without inciting intense reactions. One example is the Colombian composer and musicologist Daniel Zamudio, who claimed that all music with African roots was "insidious" and that *costeño* music was "like the rumba," a threat to a "truly genuine" Colombian national identity (126). Wade also examines the views of central Colombians who were attracted to *costeño* music, in part because they perceived it as happy, sensuous, and representing a warmth they felt missing in the elite social circles in the central cities. In chapter 6 Wade discusses the 1950s and 60s, the period during which Colombian popular music, increasingly dominated by *costeño* forms, gained new international footing, primarily as dance music. *Cumbia*, in particular, represented Colombia's answer to the popular rumba, tango, and mambo sweeping U.S., Latin American, and European markets.

This last period was spurred by the growth of Colombia's domestic recording industry. Conventional readings of this development tend to consider *costeño* musicians as the exploited victims of a recording industry that appropriated and commercialized their authentic music. Wade resists

these readings as overly simplified and points out that *costeño* musicians shared in, and even directed the commercialization of *vallenato*, *cumbia* and *porro*.

Wade further insists that the increasing commercial success of this music rests to a large degree on its associations with happiness and sexual openness and he discusses this issue for different time periods and geographical regions, but not with equal attention to each. Clearly Colombian attitudes regarding the sensuous nature of the music contributed to both acceptance and rejection of *costeño* music, but the overall discussion of this issue is too general. Although a brief paragraph in the final chapter (235) summarizes shifts in social mores and changing attitudes towards sexuality in society, more detailed discussion of such shifts is needed as well as clarification of how sexuality relates to changing visions of national identity.

Wade's most convincing analysis of sexual associations appears in chapter 7, "Costeños and Costeño Music in the Interior." Here he focuses on listener reception, drawing on a collection of sixty-one interviews of residents in the central cities of Bogotá and Medellín, and, for comparison, from Barranquilla on the Atlantic coast. Compiled with the aid of four assistants, these accounts supplemented printed documentation and Wade's first-hand observations and provided the basis for a comparative analysis of individual attitudes towards *costeño* music. For residents of central Colombia, music of the coast has long been associated with overt sexuality, a carefree and happy manner, and sensuous dancing and courtship. This view contributed both to popular acceptance and elite resistance. Respondents' comments regarding dance lead Wade to theorize that dance provided an opportunity for coastal Colombians to express their sensuality and for central Colombians to embrace, even embody, both a desired sensuality and their corresponding interpretations of racial difference.

However, despite the growing acceptance of coastal music in elite social circles, *costeño* people continued to be viewed with suspicion. Wade writes, "elements of *costeño* identity could be appropriated, even while *costeños* themselves—or perhaps more precisely the image of them as a category—might be kept at arms length" (210). Later in this section he reflects on the methodological difficulty of discussing *costeños* as a group as well as the difficulty of understanding a repertory of commercial music as belonging to a specific group (although at times he has done both in this book). It is a cautionary statement worth noticing, because it reminds readers of how the very constructive practice Wade is examining necessarily pervades his own theoretical explanation.

In "Multiculturalism and Nostalgia in the 1990s," chapter 8, Wade directs the reader's attention to some of the most recent artists to re-interpret Colombian popular music, particularly the music of the 1950s

and 60s, for a new global market. Among the musicians that Wade profiles here is the singer Carlos Vives, who became a contemporary superstar when he chose to reinterpret classic *vallenato* for new audiences using the technology and sound resources commonly associated with rock performance. Wade observes that Vives's project, despite being more self-conscious, is not entirely new for Colombian musicians. It involves balancing personal aspirations for commercial success with a genuine respect for local tradition—a process Wade outlines earlier in the book. He notes that similar balancing acts back in the 1940s, such as by singer Lucho Bermúdez, to name just one example, account for the very existence of *porro* and related genres as commercial popular music. Indeed the repertory that came to be regarded as "golden" in the subsequent decades resulted from the negotiations between regional recording artists and the international recording and communications industry.

The concluding chapter briefly addresses the problems of postmodern interpretation of culture. Throughout *Music, Race and Nation* Wade highlights how popular music is constantly subject to multiple interpretations. He concludes that the role of the ethnographer today is to "challenge categories which are taken for granted *in a given social context*" (232, emphasis in the original). He then offers several answers to his original question regarding why *costeño* music with its associations of blackness and tropicality, came to be regarded as Colombian national music. First he suggests that the coast was the first region to profit from industrialization, and thus it and its music came to represent modernity in the eyes of many Colombians. A second reason is that music of this region represented a multicultural perspective that could be, and has been, interpreted in many different ways, as the above discussion of race and sensuality indicates. Wade mentions that the diversity of the region was further enhanced by affiliations with other Caribbean cultural products, especially Cuban dance music that has long dominated the Latin American entertainment industry. Wade also notes the additional impact of the international attention garnered by Colombian author and Nobel prize-winner Gabriel García Márquez, whose writings about his country celebrate its ties to Caribbean culture.

It is at this point that a reader might wish that Wade had taken pains to elaborate or at least draw clearer connections between these points and the data presented earlier in the book. His early analysis of the communications and recording industry emerging along the coast did not emphasize any status the region itself accrued as being modern. Wade's ultimate conclusion regarding the flexibility of interpretation is also somewhat disappointing. His final chapter would be more useful to scholars hoping to build upon his theories if he had summarized how this flexibility operates,

especially since his earlier discussions suggest more definitive conclusions than he presents at the end. As Wade has shown, the dissemination, and reception of *costeño* music permit it to be interpreted as representing one ideological pole or another; the same music might simultaneously represent both modernity and tradition, regional and international affiliation, political purpose and sensuous entertainment, and/or racial distinction and racial transcendence.

Despite these minor criticisms, *Music, Race and Nation* is a very fine book. It provides an enormous wealth of data on Colombian popular music and raises a provocative set of theories regarding how race, sexuality, commerce, and technological development intersect as Colombians, individually and collectively, draw on music to define their identity in local, national, and international contexts. The identification of these contexts, and their nuanced components, is a valuable contribution to both popular music scholarship and social science. Although Wade's observations concern Colombian experience, they are relevant to anyone interested in popular music studies and will be of special interest to scholars of Latin American music and culture.

Notes

1. See Bermúdez (1985, 1996), Friedmann (1993), Gradante (1998), List (1973, 1980, 1983, 1991), Manuel (1988), Marre and Charlton (1985), Pacini Hernández (1995), and Waxer (1998, 2001).

2. Wade examines a large body of literature concerning each of the genres of popular music featured in his book. While some, like the traditional studies by List, Abadía Morales, and Perdomo Escobar (1963), represent work by highly respected scholars, other sources include transcriptions of oral lore such as the widely cited work by Fals Borda (1979–88). Scholars who challenge these well-established readings include Gilard (1987) and Bermúdez, and Wade draws on their work as well.

3. Indeed, it maybe that Wade is best known among social scientists and scholars in Latin American studies for his theory of *mestizaje* as a whitening process.

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viewpoint

Current Musicology Now And Then

By Austin Clarkson

I never did quite fathom the gleam in William J. Mitchell's eye when, some time in the spring of 1963, he proposed to a meeting of Columbia graduate students that we start a journal in musicology. It wasn't that we needed more to do than to get on with our degrees and careers. I can only surmise that his vision was that if the younger generation had a forum for their ideas, they might bring new life to what must have seemed to him a very hidebound discipline. It was two years after the Eighth Congress of the International Musicological Society in New York; the Society for Ethnomusicology was only a few years old; the Society for Music Theory was still to come; and the Group for Contemporary Music, with Charles Wuorinen and Harvey Sollberger at the helm, had given its second season on the Columbia campus in what is now Miller Theater. Professor Mitchell's suggestion struck home, and, as I wrote in the first editorial of *Current Musicology*, "Blissfully ignorant of such matters as content, sources of finance, the actual need for a new journal, our capabilities, and available time, the meeting responded with reckless approval" (Clarkson 1965:42).

A steering committee studied what such a journal should be, and I have vague memories of innumerable consultations with faculty and classmates as we surveyed existing journals in many fields and worked out the proposal. The title we picked was modeled on the journal *Current Anthropology*, with the implication of shifting the discipline to more empirical, socially situated, and contemporary concerns. The early issues moved in that direction with articles on Adorno, aesthetics, and the revision of the copyright law, along with historical essays and reviews of an eclectic selection of dissertations and master's theses. We thought that the latter would be a valuable service, and we were fortunate to inveigle distinguished authors to write them for us. But sometimes the reviewers transgressed our unwritten code of permissible invective, and we would ask them to temper their language. This resulted in one particularly abusive review being withdrawn in a huff by the eminent author. A considerable number of the "articles" were in fact reports on conferences and festivals, with an emphasis on ethnomusicology and new music as much as historical musicology, and a major enterprise was a special issue on musicology and

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music education. Today, ensconced before a computer with modem, I am trying hard to remember what it was like to rely solely on the mail, typewriters, and carbon paper for putting out a journal. I suppose the files, if they still survive, would provide hard evidence of all the letters that went back and forth while setting up an international network of corresponding editors.

It is remarkable that issue no. 63 of *Current Musicology* is recognizably a descendent of no. 1 in both appearance and contents. The design we developed with George Chien has withstood the test of time, although the cover drawing by Gene Vass has become greatly diminuted.[1] The excellent articles and substantial reviews in no. 63 continue to fulfill the intent to define "musicology" in the broadest sense, though their extent and sophistication far surpass the efforts of the inaugural authors. And the five authors who reported on the 1997 Congress of the International Musicological Society (Fallows et al. 1999) and Professor Nketia's communication from Ghana (1999) carried on the tradition of the Reports Department, which was an important feature of the original plan.

I regret that reports have been terminated. The web and e-mail do now make information about conferences and symposia available, but where does one find considered critiques of such events? Not having attended that IMS Congress, but having recently experienced Musical Intersections 2000 in Toronto, I would be most interested to know what those five authors (or their counterparts) would say about the latest assembly. Would David Fallows still complain that musicology is a threatened pursuit, that the musical profession gives musicologists little respect, and in the academy musicology is a second-class discipline (Fallows et al. 1999:150–53)? I would dearly appreciate a few words from Harry White, whose wise overview and acute assessments of particular sessions make informative reading (ibid.:156–61). And would Honey Meconi still be as impatient with the over-specialization and insularity of music scholars (ibid.:166–68)? Where would we find such thought-provoking reports if an enterprising editor of *CM* had not invited these authors to write about that congress? I expect that younger scholars who couldn't afford to go to London are especially appreciative as well.

As with such congresses, it is the fortunate and unplanned-for serendipities that are often the most meaningful. And so after reading Sean Williams's excellent essay on Sundanese performing arts in the same issue, the reports on the IMS struck repeated sparks. Her subheadings alone conjure up entirely fresh perspectives on international scholarly congresses and national meetings: "Sponsoring a Competition," "Preparation for a Competition," "Anatomy of a Competition," "Jury Selection and Criteria," "Becoming a Star," "Gossip and Scandal," "Firing up

Enthusiasm," "Competitions: Threat or Inspiration" (Williams 1999). Further cautionary thoughts arise from the following statements in Williams's article: "The audience tends to look for mistakes that can be discussed in detail later" (33); "Several highly respected elderly artists . . . repeatedly expressed serious concerns about what appeared to be a looming twilight for some of the most significant traditional art forms" (38); "The strongest criticism, brought up again and again, was concern about the chilling effect of competitions upon individual innovation" (40); and "The chance to launch a decent career as a performer is an important incentive in a region where unemployment is high" (42).

Competition, in all the positive and negative aspects that Professor Williams so clearly delineates, is certainly an important theme for all congresses such as the IMS. But where is it ever discussed? What if the editors of *CM* commissioned Williams to attend the next national meeting of the American Musicological Society and report on "Competition Among Musicologists of North America"? This would follow up on Professor Meconi's recommendation regarding the IMS Congress that, "Perhaps we need an influx of non-Western scholars looking at Western art music so that Westerners can experience being 'others' for a change" (Fallows et al. 1999:167). An idea for a future issue of *CM*? With few other journals publishing such reports (*The Musical Quarterly* gave them up long ago), *CM* would be providing an important service and sustain its distinctive character. Judith Olson was the mainstay of the reports section since 1980 and deserves congratulations and thanks for doing such a splendid job for so long. I do hope that the editorial board will find someone to put on her mantle and restore the department.

Four decades have made a notable difference in language that is sensitive to gender and approaches that assume that music is something to be listened to. One's ears redden on reading the exclusively masculine pronouns in the early issues of *CM*. But then that was an era when Professor Paul Henry Lang, in a seminar in which sat several female students, could still raise the issue of whether women should become musicologists. It was also a time when a professor of musicology (not from Columbia) was known to discourage students from performing the music they studied for fear of clouding their objectivity. Brian Harker (1999) makes exemplary use of sound recordings in his incisive study of Louis Armstrong, and Daniel Thompson (1999), in an even-handed, but resolutely negative, critique of Martha Bayles's book on American popular music, lists three recordings of *Tommy* to point out errors of fact. It is time that musicologists follow these leads and assume, wherever possible, that what they are writing about is meant to be heard. Throughout his lucid and most helpful review of Andrew Mead's book on the music of Milton Babbitt, Jason

Eckhardt (1999) is at pains to distinguish between writing that explains how the composer wrote the music and writing that guides the listener how to hear it. How much more useful and persuasive his critique would be had he referred to specific recordings to drive home his points! Isn't it time for editors of musicological journals to insist that authors provide a discography and make critical use of it wherever possible? Or are we, even in the age of Napster, forever consigned to "reading" music?

This provoked another fugitive thought as I compared *CM* then and now. Then, the origin myth of musicology in North America was that the discipline was a transplant from Europe that was growing fitfully in the hostile soil of North America. Professor Edward Lippman wrote the following in *CM* no. 1: "It has been apparent for some time that musicology would not easily take root in this country. The discipline has been expanding, but hardly flourishing, making its way, but winning few friends. At the 8th Congress of the International Musicological Society, which met at Columbia University in 1961, our success in the eyes of the world made it all too clear that we lacked recognition at home" (1965:55). Now, the observations on the 1997 IMS Congress in London from *CM* no. 63 indicate that we are still reaping the doubtful rewards of that origin myth. Harry White: "Indeed, the anxiety of influence was so pronounced (in the round tables especially) that the congress as a whole seemed to be characterized by a fundamental division between the claims of musicology as a manifestation of European art history on one side, and of musicology as a (chiefly American) mode of deconstructive criticism on the other" (Fallows et al. 1999:156). Honey Meconi: "Non-Western music was practically invisible" (ibid.:166).

An alternative origin myth for musicology in America would begin with Charles Seeger, who did not accept the primal rupture between historical and systematic musicology on which the Europeans built the discipline. In the tradition of American pragmatism, Seeger posited an inclusive field that privileges contemporary musical thought wherever it occurs—in concert, popular, or traditional musics. For Seeger, who problematized at length and in depth the "musicological juncture" between the language of music and language about music, the prime critic of music should be the producing musician (1977:51). The emigration from Nazi Germany undoubtedly brought extraordinary enrichment to the cultural life of North America, but we must acknowledge that it reinforced the paradigm that took *Western* civilization to mean "European," and musicology to mean historical musicology. Even Glen Haydon (1941), who declared his debt to Seeger as his first teacher of musicology, nevertheless dedicated his book to the European-trained Otto Kinkeldey.

As a thought experiment, let us suppose that the Seegerian model for musicology had been adopted by the major centers of graduate studies in music across North America instead of the Adlerian. Would the first sentence in the book of abstracts for Intersections 2000 be, "The dawning of the new millennium accentuates the urgent need to address the obvious under-representation of music by non-European artists in the college curriculum" (Konye and Romero 2000)? Might the difference between the "old" and the "new" musicologies be the difference between the discipline with a Muse with one eye in the back of her head (after Satie and Seeger) and a Muse with two eyes and two ears in front (Seeger 1977:212)? Would composers and musicologists be such distinct life-forms, even while occupying adjacent offices on college campuses? And would composition be taught only after candidates have survived long bouts of theory and musicianship training? I bring up these alternative origin myths, because while still at Columbia I was very much impressed with Seeger and made contact with him to have a symposium in *CM* on his ideas. But in 1967 I left for New Haven, and the plan did not proceed. Is it too late to have such a symposium on Seeger now?

With those grandfatherly queries, I close these words and am grateful for the opportunity to contribute them to this special alumni/ae issue of the journal. I am sure I speak for all who labored to bring out the early issues of *CM* when I say how gratifying it is that thirty-six years later the journal continues to fulfill the original vision and has remained so vital a contribution to the field.

Notes

1. The painter Gene Vass made two drawings for the cover. The plan was to alternate them for the two issues per year, the original schedule of publication. I can't resist noting that one member of the faculty let us know that he thought the designs were "obscene." Vass died in San Francisco in 1996.

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recollections

Patricia Carpenter in Commemoration

Compiled by Murray Dineen

As research scholars, we are known for our students as much as by our publications. Patricia Carpenter's published writings, listed at the end of this tribute, constitute a major contribution to music theory and aesthetics. But her many students, a few of whom are represented in this commemoration, measure her legacy. As these memorial sketches reveal, she shaped countless students during her twenty-six years at Barnard College and Columbia University. For Pat, scholarly investigation was inextricable from teaching: everything tendered in the classroom was subject to the same scrutiny she brought to her own research. Everything she set before us as students around the long grey tables in Dodge Hall was a commitment as earnest as any address before a forum of learned colleagues. And from all of us she demanded the same high standard that she demanded of herself: endless curiosity tempered by unflagging criticism. In this regard, her students were indivisible from her publications, each formed rigorously to become a self-standing component in the broad intellectual circle that was Patricia Carpenter.

Patricia Carpenter died on July 8, 2000 at the age of 77. She is survived by her long-time companion Sylvio, two nieces, and a nephew. Born in Santa Rosa, California on January 21, 1923, she studied piano with Ruth Leginska, as well as percussion, bassoon, and conducting. She conducted the San Bernardino Symphony and served as an assistant conductor to Jacques Barzun in New York. Learning of Schoenberg from her teacher, she wrote a letter asking for composition lessons. From 1942 to 1949 she was Schoenberg's student in formal classes at UCLA, in the "Sunday Morning" sessions she initiated with a colleague, and in private instruction. She wrote the following sketch of Schoenberg and the UCLA courses, which describes the effect his teaching had upon her musical consciousness, an effect she replicated with her own students at Columbia. The text was written for the panel discussion "Schoenberg in Hollywood" (August 22, 1999) at the Bard Music Festival *Schoenberg and His World*, and is reprinted here with the kind permission of the panel chair, Sabine Feisst.

> Schoenberg's classes at UCLA were held in a little room on the top floor of Kirkoff Hall. He would come in with his big easel (his

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blackboard, for he saved everything), his assistant (Clara Silver Steuermann in my time), and whoever was at the piano (probably Warren Langlie; Schoenberg liked to tease Warren about his studies with [Nadia] Boulanger: "What would Mme. Boulanger have said about this, Mr. Langlie?"). The character of his classes might surprise you. Although some students were musically sophisticated, most, I suspect, were—like me—quite naïve; we played an instrument, majored in music for various reasons, and really didn't know much music. Looking back I am astonished at how much of his vast musical heritage he transmitted to these motley groups of Southern California youngsters.

The curriculum replicated that of the traditional European conservatory: harmony, composition, counterpoint, form and analysis, orchestration, and composition. But it was extraordinary, because Schoenberg taught them all. It was indeed the unified musical theory about which he has written so much. In [the course] "Structural Functions of Harmony" we worked on tonal forms. In "Double Counterpoint, Canon, and Fugue" we began with chorale preludes, for practice in writing cadences to all degrees of a key. In "Form and Analysis" we learned many pieces, focusing our techniques on concrete works (we began with Beethoven piano sonatas; Mozart, Schoenberg said, was too difficult). The composition course followed the lines of *Models for Beginners in Composition*, but in effect everything was composition. Composition, Schoenberg has said, is thinking in tones and rhythms. Essentially, that is what he taught: musical thinking, at whatever level we could learn it.

Somehow he reached all of us—beginner and sophisticate—in this immense project. . . . Because I was weak in harmony, for my private lessons I wrote dozens of scherzos, in which the problem is the modulating model and sequence. I remember an exam in which we were to write a fugal exposition. Schoenberg brought in a fugue subject for each of us, written for whatever difficulty he judged each could handle. I was sitting on some steps, working on mine, when a long finger pointed over my shoulder, and his voice asked, "Miss Carpenter, what is that G doing there?" He did not talk about theory—we practiced. But his ability to project to each student how to think in music seems to me to have been profound.

Schoenberg has shaped my musical thinking, although at this point, it is hard for me to draw a line between his thought and my own. Let me try to convey to you the most important thing I learned from him, which has to do with the wholeness and concreteness of the musical work. We are in a little room in Kirkoff and have been

> analysing the first movement of a Brahms string quartet for a few days. We have examined it in detail: harmonically, motivically (both entail rhythm), texturally, formally. Schoenberg indicates a short passage, makes a few squiggles on the easel, and the entire movement comes together. The piece is illuminated, it shines, as a complete unity of technique and intuition. Aha! Every detail falls into its place in the whole. What I learned from my years of such experience was to try to become conscious of and to formulate my real, complete encounter with a musical work, that is, to think in music.

In 1944, Patricia Carpenter gave the premiere of Schoenberg's Piano Concerto, in a two-piano version, in Los Angeles. She composed several chamber and orchestral works, one of which was performed by the San Bernardino Symphony. Accepted into the composition program at Columbia, she came to work with Douglas Moore in composition and Albert Hofstrader in philosophy. She discovered Paul Henry Lang and embarked upon studies in musicology. Her Ph.D. in Music and Philosophy at Columbia University was completed in 1971. An active member of the music theory community, she contributed in many ways—both scholarly and administratively—to its advancement. The first woman to present a keynote address to the Society of Music Theory, she served as its Vice-President from 1992 to 1994.

Her scholarly interests lay in the aesthetics and theory of music, which she sought to demonstrate through analysis. Perhaps her best known early work is the article "The Musical Object" (1967), published as the centerpiece of a forum in *Current Musicology*, with responses by Leo Treitler and Richard Crocker. The article grew out of her abiding interest in musical wholeness, a subject she explored in a debate with Joan Stambaugh in the *Journal of Philosophy* and at length in her dissertation on the phenomenology of the fugue (1971a). In the 1970s, her interests turned to analysis informed by historical music theory, with a demonstration of coherence in a Dufay motet using an analytic framework adapted from compositional treatises of Dufay's day (1973). Much of her later work took as its starting point Schoenberg's theories of tonal harmony, and the crowning achievement of her later career was the publication of his so-called "Gedanke" or the "Musical Idea" manuscripts. The most influential and explicit adaptation of Schoenberg's thought is to be found in the article "Grundgestalt as Tonal Function" (1983), although the innovative analytic concept referred to as the "tonal problem" is explored in other articles. In her work with Schoenberg's thought there is a readily discernible individual approach that distinguishes her own insights from those of her former teacher.

Patricia Carpenter was the driving force behind the establishment of the doctorate in music theory at Columbia University. A pillar in the Department of Music, she was a constant friend to *Current Musicology*. As the following sketches reveal, she taught many subjects in music theory and aesthetics, from lecturing in harmony and counterpoint for entering classes at Barnard College to leading advanced seminars in aesthetics, analysis, and the history of theory for Ph.D. candidates at Columbia. Seminars in her later years were occupied with Schoenberg's theories of tonal harmony. Clad in purple, clutching her violet coffee mug, she is perhaps best remembered at the head of a seminar table dotted with a translation of Schoenberg's *Harmonielehre*, which the publisher had unwittingly but obligingly wrapped in a deep purple cover. Pat, we miss you.

—MD

* * *

The first month after entering my doctoral studies at Columbia, I crossed Broadway to Barnard College, heart in mouth, for my first interview with my advisor. Pat's appraisal of my abilities that day was accurate and succinct: "You're doing fine. But you need to learn harmony." At the time, I was enrolled in her seminar on Schoenberg's studies of harmony. I displayed, probably quite clearly, my lack of skill at four-part voice leading, to which the opening part of Schoenberg's *Harmonielehre* is devoted. Having read Schenker's *Freie Satz* and *Harmonielehre*, I was completely at a loss. Where were all the "natural forces" of *Urlinie* and its bass counterpoint in Schoenberg? Wasn't harmony simply the revelation of these natural forces as they were tempered into gracefully descending lines drawn irrevocably by a musical gravity above and beyond human question?

I think the defining moment of my harmonic understanding was produced by Pat's pencil. Holding the pencil with its eraser tip before me, she inquired: "What is this?" I replied, "A pencil." She questioned, in turn: "How do you know it's not merely an eraser?" To much the same end Schoenberg, her teacher, apparently used a hat, while Webern relied upon an ashtray. The answer, which Schoenberg, Webern, and particularly Pat illustrated at length, is that we know an object, be it pencil or musical work, through the critical vehicles of memory and projection. Music is not a surrender, however enlightened, to forces beyond our control. It is not determined mechanistically by nature or any other force above human affair. In Schoenberg's words, which blow through his *Harmonielehre* like a cool breeze, music is as much the product of a brain as it is produced by the forces of a naturally gravitating heart. In this regard, as in so many others, Patricia Carpenter taught me harmony.

Murray Dineen

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I often hear Pat's voice as I teach young composers, patiently repeating her simple phrases that served as an anchor in moments of bewilderment: "start at the beginning," "beginnings, middles, and ends," and the question with which she always started an analysis, "What strikes you?" Remembering Pat's classes, what strikes me is the amazing feeling that one had of seeing "how it was done." As a composer this glimpse behind the "tapestry," as she used to call it, seemed like miraculous and lost information. She often used the metaphor of the tapestry to describe the kind of thing we were doing by analyzing pieces, looking at the way the object was constructed. Analysis is like carefully observing the back of a tapestry: one glimpses the way in which the parts of a piece are related and integrated into the whole of the work. Occasionally a sense of mysticism would emerge, an experience of something beyond ourselves in the massive integration of a work. At these moments Pat would often exclaim, "oh, isn't that elegant!" Sometimes these glimpses made composing a daunting task. After studying Brahms with Pat, one could no longer rely on artifices like "gesture" or simply write chains of linked aphorisms. Musical ideas had implications and demanded adequate treatment and completion. On the other hand, one had more tools at hand for carrying through musical thoughts. And of course when one was daunted, one could remember her simple advice: "start at the beginning," "beginnings, middles, and ends," and "what strikes you?"

James Paton Walsh

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It is somewhat rare to have an esteemed colleague who is also a dear friend, but such was Patricia Carpenter to me through all our years at Columbia. She was also my teacher in the broadest and deepest sense—broadest in that her subjects ranged from flower gardening to philosophy and even astrological systems, deepest in that she was my best instructor in the meaning of music and the other arts. My files carry dozens of drafts, analyses, and outlines that Pat shared with me to my profit.

None of the contributors here can have known the California Pat, but very occasionally they might hear her speak of her girlhood. (She fondly remembered her grandfather who served as a drummer boy in the Union army and was lucky enough to have seen Abraham Lincoln.) I think that anyone, however passingly acquainted with Pat, would feel she was a woman at home with her past, though her life and work were moved by a pioneering spirit. In fact, an implicit Westernness shone through her intellectual and personal independence, her originality, and her extraordinary generosity.

Chris Hatch

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Pat had the great gift of reaching straight to the individual, even in large classes. She would play a piece and ask "What strikes you?" prepared to deal with any answer. She told me once she had played some Bach in an introductory music class, and when she asked what struck anybody, one student said, "It sounds like God." While the other students rolled their eyes, Pat pursued it: "Well, what do you mean, Miss _____?" She was often able to develop a good discussion from such a starting point, by drawing the student out, without appearing to lead. She made her students feel like important contributors.

Pat paid attention not only to our ideas, but also to our instincts, feelings, and desires. She used to say: "You have to train your instincts." The urge to shape and discipline a mind was also apparent in her gardening. The broad wooded slope behind her house gradually, over several years, became a park filled with plantings, paths, benches, and other ornaments. She said she was "articulating the space," the same terms she used in analyzing musical structure. For her, garden, music, and mind were all material to be formed.

Peter Schubert

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Patricia Carpenter came into my life in the fall of 1971 as I began my second year at Barnard. I vividly remember entering the classroom on the sixth floor of Dodge Hall for Music Theory III. Even the urbane New York girls were unusually subdued as we awaited our professor's arrival. We'd heard many rumors: she wore purple, she lived in Greenwich Village, and most unbelievable, she had been a student of Schoenberg. Patricia Carpenter arrived, tall, commanding, serious in demeanor, speaking in a slight lisp but with distinct enunciation. Her tone of voice was penetrating, but at the same time she was interested in hearing our remarks. "What do you have going there?" she would ask. We certainly saw what Bach, Beethoven, Schubert and Brahms "had going" as she led us through fugues and sketched out entire symphony and sonata movements before our eyes. When we had difficulties, she listened and helped, where others might simply have closed the door. For our final exam in Theory IV, she sent us off to search out all the tones foreign to the key in the first movement of Brahms's Symphony No. 4. That still ranks as one of the greatest adventures of my life. In the Program in the Arts junior colloquium on "Imagination," she taught us how to read an aesthetic text, to identify a concept and see it grow as a thought throughout the article. We read Schelling, Coleridge, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and the writings of her good friend Rudolf Arnheim, and we learned how a concept could grow in many directions and emerge in different fields—in philosophy,

literature, anthropology, or in the theory of art. The classes were great adventures as much for her as they were for us. With what relish she spoke about ideas, with what respect for them and what decorum as a teacher—how much she taught us by example!

I thought of her as a modernist but later found out that she loved Rossini, Donizetti, Tchaikovsky, and that *Die Fledermaus* was a great favorite. I pictured her growing up in California near the ocean, the orange groves, and the dry purplish hills, but learned that she lived in a little colony of European emigres—her neighbor Lotte Violin having known both Thomas Mann and Theodor Adorno (and called them Tommy and Teddy!). Pat commanded every space around her, whether seminar room or dining room (but admitted being terrified of her cat Clancy). Walking through the house at Yorktown Heights, one saw her sister's paintings, a drawing of her as a young woman, face in profile turned at an interesting angle, to show shoulder and arm. One noticed her great-grandfather's mustering-out papers from his Iowa regiment in the Civil War (yes, he shook the hand of Lincoln), and her grandfather's clock. How privileged we were to enter the dwelling of so very rich a heart and brain. She was the fostering mother of our intellectual lives, *alma mater* in the truest sense.

Jo-Ann Reif

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Patricia Carpenter and Leonard Stein were guests for a day at our home on the Mills College campus in the spring of 1994. The occasion was the annual meeting of the West Coast Conference of Music Theory and Analysis. Pat was the keynote speaker, and Leonard Stein performed several works by Arnold Schoenberg. We live in a small cottage, once occupied by Darius and Madelcine Milhaud. Pat stayed in our master bedroom; Leonard Stein shared one of the two bunk beds in my son Jeremy's room, who was then four years old. In the morning, our two distinguished guests, clad in bathrobes, were sitting at our dining room table sipping coffee when suddenly a rubber tipped arrow, which Jeremy had shot from across the room, narrowly missed both of them and stuck to a nearby window. My wife Jamie and I were mortified, but Pat merely turned around and smiled at Jeremy with a twinkle in her eye.

Pat invariably handled every difficult situation with grace. She was among the most refined and dignified people that I have ever known. Pat also had an extraordinary strength of character backed up by the courage of her convictions. I imagine that these latter qualities may have stemmed in part from her California upbringing during a time when that part of the country still retained aspects of the "Wild West." When I was offered a teaching position at Mills, Pat was amused after I expressed concerns

about moving to "earthquake country." She told me about driving down the freeway with her father during an earthquake, nonchalantly dodging crevices in the road.

Pat's most formidable challenges occurred during her career as a professional music theorist and faculty member at Columbia University. She was a pioneer in a field where women still remain underrepresented. The first woman to present a keynote address before the Society for Music Theory, she was highly respected by everyone in the profession. Year after year during the Society's annual meetings, I remember how much everyone valued her tactful and always supportive, yet keenly critical responses to the latest research. Pat was a gifted teacher. Her graduate seminars at Columbia were intense, for she always encouraged a free exchange of ideas among students that were traditionally very outspoken. I can remember more than a few occasions when several wild-eyed young music theorists engaged in a rapidly escalating argument over such minute details as the interpretation of a passing tone in a Beethoven piano sonata. Pat would let things run their course and then elegantly demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses inherent in both positions. She taught us that intellectual rigor need not be ideologically narrow. This lesson served her students well; it is not surprising that those who studied at Columbia during her relatively short tenure as head of the graduate theory program now occupy teaching positions at colleges and universities throughout the United States and Canada.

David Bernstein

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Patricia Carpenter had many special gifts as a teacher, among them her deep knowledge of music (in part the result of her work with Arnold Schoenberg), her philosophical bent, and her knack for asking just the right question to help a student sort out a complex idea. For me, however, one specific incident encapsulates what I thought was her greatest gift.

In the fall of 1978, Professor Carpenter offered a seminar on Schoenberg's tonal theories. While looking for a topic for a term paper, I became fascinated by Schoenberg's attempts to define a musical idea, not knowing at that time that it was one of the key notions of his theories and that he had attempted to write an entire treatise on the subject. One day, I encountered Professor Carpenter on the walkway at Barnard College. I found myself telling her how intrigued I was by Schoenberg's attempts to define the musical idea, which to me remained a mystery. I told her that I would really like to write my paper for her course on that subject rather than one on the topic of the seminar. To my surprise, Professor Carpenter agreed, saying that she would accept simply the attempt to write such a paper. The result was published later in *Current Musicology* as "Three

Levels of Idea in Schoenberg's Thought and Writings," an article that has brought me much recognition as a Schoenberg scholar.

To this day, I do not know what Professor Carpenter's reasons were. I do know that nothing was expected of the paper other than that I try. For the first time in my academic life, I was granted the freedom to pursue something that truly inspired me. As a result, I discovered the work that has carried my career for over twenty years and which I still feel moved to do. Professor Carpenter's gift to me was to allow me to follow my own inspiration.

Charlotte M. Cross

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I first met Pat as a student in her 1971–72 graduate seminar in early music theory. Pat's door was liberally open for office hours, and she and I would discuss my progress in the self-imposed task of understanding as much of Gerbert, Coussemaker, and other theorists as was feasible in a year. Pat would encourage me and suggest parallels in twentieth-century aesthetics and psychology that were worth looking into. After the course and until my dissertation was completed, Pat and I continued to write and meet with each other, at Columbia or at her home. We talked mostly about my work on French monophonic songs around 1500, and later about music in the most general sense.

Pat always seemed much more at ease with ideas than with theories, methods, techniques, or systems. Although her classes and our conversations never flagged for an instant—even her thoughtful pauses had a continuity of their own—Pat said very little. Instead, like a virtuoso interviewer or moderator, she steered participants through the more important points. In her seminar she made two recurrent points: it is generally valuable to consider what the "givens" in a piece are (for example in a polyphonic texture, the cantus firmus); and if one gets bogged down in analyzing an intricate contrapuntal work, it is often helpful to consider its "discant structure" (a comment Pat would often make on her way to the blackboard to clarify a piece or passage). Pat's continual recourse to "discant structure"—a linear heuristic, unencumbered by theoretical orthodoxy or rigidity—provided a remarkably reliable way of sorting through complicated possibilities. Pat's insistence on considering what was "given" in early music encouraged me in trying to comprehend the texts and tunes that were the focus of my dissertation and the basis of much Renaissance counterpoint. Beyond this, a concern with what is "given" quickly led me far from early music into an Ockham's-razor quest to distinguish between what is really given and what has been taken for granted in analyzing music.

Another direct influence of Pat's teaching upon me has been a concern with musical process and Gestalt principles. Whereas I had been aware of

such notions at a second remove (mostly through writings by Leonard Meyer and Victor Zuckerkandl), Pat emphasized the relevance for music of Kohler's *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* and Arnheim's *Art and Visual Perception*. Their thoughts, via Pat, have pervaded almost all my subsequent work. I doubt that Pat, or many others, would find congenial the way I currently frame my response to the challenges of form and process, by means of a Gestaltist behaviorism, according to which the more enduring, "robust" Gestalt principles might be understood as embodying highly generalized reinforcers. All the same, I feel my wayward development exemplifies an important effect of the best teachers, even on their most prodigal students.

Rather than inculcating a "method" or "approach" in their "disciples," teachers like Pat vividly convey ideas with which their students can run for several years, ideas "with legs." In other words, the outcomes of creative teachers, like Pat, can be divergent, rather than convergent with what has been immediately "taught." Though Pat and others might put it differently, these teachers can shape the activity of searching in their students with rewards according to a variable-ratio schedule: a word now, a laugh then. Set loose in the world, their former students—like gamblers, the superstitious, or foragers—will persist, will get "hooked on," will find it difficult to discontinue the albeit arguably worthwhile activity of trying to make "sense" of things.

Jay Rahn

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I remember Pat's undergraduate analysis class. At one point we were analyzing the development sections of the first movement of Brahms's Fourth Symphony and making four-part reductions of the voice-leading. Suddenly, it became clear to me like a ray of light that this music, which had seemed so mysterious, was constructed as a set of models and sequences that I could understand. The "Liebestod" from *Tristan* opened up to us similarly. During the year I realized that music is not magically created, but rather that composers do real things with comprehensible musical techniques. Pat had a way of penetrating to the heart of a musical work the same way she penetrated to the heart of others' arguments, asking just the right question or making just the right comment. Pat's kindness was constantly evident. For her, there was no such thing as a stupid question. She would make something important out of any response. I saw her correct people so gently they never realized it. Her approach came from a deep sense of seeking the truth rather than personal aggrandizement. My greatest regret is that Pat never got to complete a career-culminating book after she retired. Right up to the last moment I was hoping she would put her thoughts on paper for posterity. But cancer intervened, and she bravely fought it. I miss her very much.

Janna K. Saslaw



Plate 1: Handwritten note by Arnold Schoenberg to his student, Patricia Carpenter, on corrected musicianship exercises.

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Pat's luminous enthusiasm filled our conversations with bracing life as she shared with us her passions for Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, the I Ching, Jung, and so many others. Her thoughts about music were instilled with love for music. She showed us that an affair of the head and an affair of the heart could be one and the same. The mauveness of her presence and the generous songness of her voice enlivened Columbia's halls with fresh swerves, and her generosity of feelings saw us and enriched us, for which we enduringly give thanks.

Beverly Bond and Austin Clarkson

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In October 1991, Pat and I flew to a conference at the Arnold Schoenberg Institute. The occasion was the retirement of Director Leonard Stein. She was in a mood to reminisce and spoke of Schoenberg: "When I first met him, I told him I hated Wagner—I was a kid, you know. He told me that he thought I would change my mind." One day she was working on "vagrant" chords outside UCLA's music building. Suddenly, a bony finger came over her shoulder. Schoenberg said, "Miss Carpenter, I would think again about that line." She recalled that at the Sunday morning analysis class in the study of Schoenberg's home, "he would illustrate his points on the easel he kept in front of the class. His analysis would progress, and then at one amazing point, the whole piece would become a whole—it was miraculous!"

A day before the conference ended, the Ronald Schoenbergs invited participants to their house in Brentwood—the former home of Schoenberg himself. I could sense Pat's anticipation as we approached the front door. She immediately turned into his study and insisted that each person in the room sit in Schoenberg's old leather armchair from which he expounded musical wisdom. She talked about how she delivered spools of corrected examples for his counterpoint book (see plate 1) to this very place. She also said that here she typed Schoenberg's famous letters to Olin Downes, the New York Times critic, who had made negative statements about Mahler. She added, "We all had chores, you know. That's how we paid for lessons."

A few hours later the party was ending, and we walked to the bus bringing us to our hotel. Pat looked back at the house—a long look full of living memories. To my knowledge, she never visited there again.

Severine Neff

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