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Editor's Note

The Acknowledgment—in which this note is, at least in part, an exercise—is a tricky genre: there are always too many people to thank but too few words fit for the task. A game presents itself: to avoid where possible repetitions of the golden word—the *T*–word—and its few synonyms; in other words, no thanks, no gratitude. Keith Richards (2010, 549), in his autobiography *Life*, has a tidy solution: a single "my thanks to . . ." and then two sober columns of alphabetically ordered names. Similarly, in one of the more moving exemplars, Roger Parker (2006, xi–xii) follows "thanks to . . ." with a sentence almost two pages long, where he honors each addressee with a personalized vignette held between semicolons. With tongue presumably in cheek, Tamara Levitz (2012, xvii) interrupts the steady toll of T–words when, rather than thank her proofreaders, she "thinks" them.

This note is no place to reinvent the genre, so I will borrow a little from (at least the first two of) these examples by thanking, in one fell swoop, all who have contributed in any way to this issue. Surrounding the names mentioned below (not to mention nor forget those that I may have forgotten to mention), please imagine bouquets of grateful expressions. I thank all the participants for their work and dedication, of course, but also for their patience as this issue inched towards completion; I also appreciate their forbearance with my occasionally neurotic editorial interventions—even as I write, some e–mail chains continue to creep into unrepeatable figures. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to work closely with the writers included here; these collaborations have populated the sometimes lonely road of scholarly life.

The impetus behind this issue came when Cornell graduate students Evan Cortens and Caroline Waight wrote to me to suggest we publish proceedings from their conference, *Music: Cognition, Technology, Society*, which took place over the weekend of May 11–13, 2012.[1] Although I did not take up their offer exactly, a few papers caught my eye; Cortens and Waight generously shared whatever contact information I requested. Three articles—those by Murray Dineen (former editor of this journal; welcome back!), Jonathan De Souza, and Carmel Raz—arrived via this route; however, after a lot of back and forth, only Dineen's retains its original Cornell title.

In that article—"The Historical Soundscape of Monophonic Hi–Fidelity"—Dineen examines a key moment in the history of sound recording, one in which the emerging figure of the audiophile finds himself (and it is usually a he) caught between the pleasure and anxiety produced by the pursuit of fidelity and optimal performance where (sonic) reproductive equipment is concerned. Warning: double entendres abound. With an impressive range of reference, Jonathan De Souza, in his "Voice and Instrument at the Origins of Music," engages histories and philosophies of technology, paleoanthropology, and psychology to revisit perennial speculations surrounding the prehistorical precedence of the voice over the instrument. With the concept of musical "technics," De Souza thinks through the complex of interrelationships between technique, technology, and vocality.

Carmel Raz, in "The Lost Movements of Ernst Toch's *Gesprochene Musik*," introduces us to "a forgotten milestone in the history of electronic music," Austrian composer Ernst Toch's "Geographical Fugue" from 1930 (37). Raz provides both an in–depth history of the work and its (only) performance as well as a close analysis of its two "lost" movements, "O–a" and "Ta–tam." Scores of these movements, edited by Christopher Caines—who, in addition to his notes, has submitted a delightful preface—are published here for the first time. I am especially excited to have been able to facilitate this publication, and I hope that the triptych of Toch items—the scholar's article; the editor's preface; the critical edition—will be a useful resource for musicologists and musicians of different stripes.

The two remaining articles in this volume are unrelated to the Cornell conference. Gavin Steingo reignites the discussion around Lydia Goehr's work–concept thesis in "The Musical Work Reconsidered, in Hindsight." Through an illuminating analogy with the history and philosophy of money, Steingo sidesteps the common (and hotly disputed) question of *when* the work concept, once and for all, appeared; instead, he explores "various types of related [work] concepts and practices" and shifts the narrative to the "transition or even inversion of 'where' music is located" (82). In "Images of Time and Timelessness: A Musical Reading of *Death in Venice*," Marlies De Munck takes Thomas Mann's famously musicological novel, along with Luchino Visconti's adaptation of the work, as the point of departure for an insightful meditation on her leading question "how to represent time in its fleetingness without halting, appropriating, objectifying, or transcending it?" (113).

The book–reviews section, expertly edited by Joshua Navon, is an exclusively in–house product: all contributors (including the section editor) are graduate students in the music department at Columbia. The authors of

these incisive and stylish reviews are historical musicologists Paula Harper, Anne Levitsky, and Ralph Whyte, and ethnomusicologist Andrés García Molina. Under scrutiny are three significant books on twentieth–century media studies: Carol Vernallis's *Unruly Media: YouTube, Music Video, and the New Digital Cinema* (Harper); David Novak's *Japanoise: Music at the Edge of Circulation* (Molina); and *The Sounds of Capitalism: Advertising, Music, and the Conquest of Culture* (Whyte). Levitsky reviews Sarah Kay's *Parrots and Nightingales: Troubadour Quotation and the Development of European Poetry*.

The journal's editorial board has been a great resource during the editing and proofreading of this issue; Didier Sylvain and Thomas Smith deserve a special mention in this regard, but I must insist on taking the blame for any undetected errors. I welcome Smith as the next editor–in–chief of the journal and look forward to his work as *Current Musicology* celebrates its 50th year in 2015. As my time as editor comes to an end, as I return my keys to the office, and as I wind down this note, I realize that I have painted myself into a corner: how can I end this Acknowledgment without writing, once more, a *thank you*? That game is, I suppose, up.

Thomas Fogg

Notes

1. Along with Cortens and Waight, the conference was organized by Taylan Cihan and Eric Nathan.

References

Richards, Keith. 2010. *Life*. New York: Little Brown and Company.

Parker, Roger. 2008. *Remaking the Song: Operatic Visions and Revisions from Handel to Berio*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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The Historical Soundscape of Monophonic Hi–Fidelity

Murray Dineen

An article in *High Fidelity* magazine, entitled "Listening is Believing?" and dated July/August 1953, sets forth the contemporary limits of sound reproduction in the inimitable style of advertisement copy: "Technical electronics can go only so far. The rest of the job must be done by the imaginative mind of the listener. That's not a platitude; it's a technical specification" (Campbell 1953, 28).[1]

The connection drawn between imagination and sound reproduction, that the imagination can be an aspect of "technical electronics," is meant to salve the "imaginative mind of the listener." In doing so, however, it betrays an anxiety: the relationship has gotten out of balance, with human imagination falling short in the face of advances in "technical electronics." The author, John Campbell, puts a firm boundary around the latter: it "can go only so far" (Campbell 1953, 28). But in this arrangement, human imagination is a supplement, an accessory to technology, not vice versa.[2]

Campbell situates this technical fusion of electronics and imagination in what he calls a "psycho–physiological" approach to music reproduction: "For true high–fidelity enjoyment, the total psychological aspect of the listener is an integral part of a psycho–physiological approach to music reproduction." This psycho–physiological angle seems to involve primarily a belief in one's equipment, in its veracity as the best "practible" equipment:

> A man with Equipment System A, who feels that he has the best practible system possible to him will enjoy his music greatly. Given the same equipment exactly, but the conviction that he was a fool not to have bought System B instead—he won't enjoy the music as much. Wherefore, for him, System B is in fact better. (Campbell 1953, 28)

In essence, confidence in one's equipment and a full aesthetic experience are assured only in the absence of suspicion.

The emphasis Campbell places on his equipment—"technical electronics"—marks a formal shift in our knowledge of musical sound. I shall call this *epistemic* in a moment. This shift produces an effect, an aesthetic effect. I quote Campbell again: "A man with a speaker system he knows within himself is *good*, an amplifier he convincedly believes to be top–notch—for him, the music is deeper, richer and more rewarding" (Campbell 1953, 28).[3]

Campbell's psycho–physiological approach encompasses belief in the merit of technical electronics as a determinant of musical enjoyment. All of this is encapsulated in the following, in which life and sound are breathlessly homogenized: "'Know thyself!' must be the ultimate ideal, and the basic instruction for enjoying life fully. But if that's too tough a job—'Know thy sound system'" (Campbell 1953, 28). The confusion between life and reproduced sound is worth addressing, and not merely dismissed as bad advertisement copy.

Such a confusion between truth and life is characteristic of what I call here the "historical soundscape" of monophonic hi–fidelity, a soundscape made explicit in the discourse of sound reproduction in the early 1950s. I label this "historical" and refer to it as "monophonic" because of its delicate position: poised between an early realm of sound reproduction prior to the hi–fidelity era and a later realm dominated by stereophonic sound reproduction. Its status as a "soundscape" is assured by the reputed integrity of the sound: the concern for hi–fidelity presumes a sonorous whole based upon veracity, as if the sound reproduced were a whole, or at least wholistic, "chunk of life." Such concern for matters such as fidelity and veracity is pathological; no referential object, no standard, other than the solipsistic listener is invoked. I shall label as "pathological" the mind set that engages both sides of this soundscape.[4]

On Campbell's account, in the reproduction of musical sound, the imagination is a supplement to "technical electronics," which, to repeat, can "go only so far," before imagination must take over. This supplementary relation of imagination to technology reverses the norm by placing imagination in a secondary position. Let us say that sound is normally a product of the musical imagination: the composer's imagination produces virtual sound realized in a performance or recording.[5] In this putative normal scenario, sound reproduction is an accessory, an action subsequent to an original act of imagination.[6] This is Campbell's key assertion—"Technical electronics can go only so far. The rest of the job must be done by the imaginative mind of the listener." It subordinates imagination, indeed listening per se, to the status of a supplement to an originating technical electronics. In this regard the term *sound reproduction* is a misnomer: the veracity of technical high fidelity is the originating object, to which *imaginative reproduction* is the supplement.

Campbell is equivocal on this point. In the instance of live music, the imagination is original. As he puts it, the act of "knowing" your physical situation, situating yourself concretely in Carnegie Hall is to know imaginatively that hundreds of other listeners are with you: "Part of the enjoyment of the Philharmonic at Carnegie Hall is knowing that you're at

Carnegie Hall, with hundreds of others, who enjoy with you the experience you're enjoying" (Campbell 1953, 27). When it comes to live music, on Campbell's account, the human capacity for imagination is the locus, *fons et origo* of the experience.

When, however, it comes to music "reproduced" by sound equipment, the position of musical imagination becomes fraught. Curiously, Campbell tries to make this clear by analogy to canned peas. Campbell initially poses the question as one of fidelity: if live music at Carnegie Hall is like garden–fresh peas, older forms of musical reproduction (including radio and wax cylinders, presumably) are like canned peas. By analogy, it was never difficult to distinguish fresh from canned in both peas and music: older forms of sound reproduction sound like canned peas taste, "tinny." But Campbell (1953, 27) asserts that such is no longer the case for "modern frozen peas are getting hard to distinguish from the garden–fresh article." He means, implicitly, that modern reproductions of music are getting harder to distinguish from the concert–hall article. With fidelity like this, one might conclude that nothing is left to the originating imagination: listening to a recording, one might as well be sitting in Carnegie Hall.[7] Except that, as Campbell reassures us, "technical electronics can go only so far" (28).

Perhaps he means that the horizon of veracity in the reproduction of sound will forever recede behind a foreground of technical electronics. On this account, imagination will be ever necessary, albeit squeezed into an ever declining space between the foreground of electronically reproduced sound and the horizon of live sound. On this account, imagination will be given an ever smaller portion of the pie as electronic reproduction reaches ever closer to fidelity to live performance.

Implicit in Campbell's thought, however, lies a far more generous possibility, albeit one given to a less positive aesthetic of hi–fidelity musical appreciation. Consider the possibility that Campbell's imagination is given to worry, to concerns of infidelity. As I shall show in a moment, the task of the merchants of sound equipment in the 1950s was not merely to show that high–fidelity could begin to be equated with real Carnegie–Hall sound. The task instead was to arouse, indeed to enrage the question of infidelity in the mind of the listener. To this end, an imaginative notion of infidelity became apposite. And this brought about a change in the nature of imagination from an originating impulse to a vehicle for growing a pathology.

At work here is an epistemology, or at least an episteme. I mean by *episteme* a system of possibility, more pointedly a shift bringing about a new system of possibility.[8] Evoking epistemology, I am referring not to rational value or objective form (as if sound fidelity could be measured rationally or objectively) nor to the history of the perfection of under-

standing (as if the perfection of fidelity were something historical). I refer instead to the conditions under which new values might appear, the "conditions of possibility" that might bring about a new valuation of fidelity. Something in the medium of sound reproduction changes around 1950 and transforms the issue of fidelity into an episteme.

The epistemic change lies in what Campbell calls the "psycho–physiological." The conscious awareness of one's equipment carries with it a certain anxiety, a pathological anxiety in some instances, which on Campbell's account has a physiological component. When the norm alluded to above (where musical sound originates in the imagination and is then supplemented by sound reproduction) is reversed, this makes the listener dependent upon technical electronics, dependent upon a vehicle of reproduction whose performance lies out of their immediate, willed control. (Hence the dependency upon the supplementary imagination, to enliven the merely technical.) How could this dependency not give rise pathologically to anxiety?

In what I call the normal state of affairs, the composer and listener are fully compatible, or at least sufficiently compatible to produce an act of musical creation. Sound reproduction is merely a vehicle by which to bring about the equation of two imaginations: creator and receiver, composer and listener. The satisfaction produced by the experience depends upon the balance of the equation, a mutual respect from both parties.

But in Campbell's scenario, the listener's imagination must defer to an inanimate object—technical electronics.[9] If the exercise of musical reproduction is to be consummated, the imagination must enliven the otherwise inanimate vehicle of sound, enlarge it to fit the task at hand. Under the aegis of the pathology alluded to above, the supplementing imagination must engorge the object of technical electronics. The supplement must grow beyond a size necessary for normal (live) musical consummation. Such distortion lends to technical electronics the quality of the fetish.

This is the pathology implicit in the concept of *soundscape*, to which I alluded above.[10] In concentrating upon a putative whole, the soundscape creator (Campbell's listener) elevates the "scape" above the actual sound in importance. The soundscape creator gives the status of original, or at least originating, to the acts of capturing raw sound and manufacturing a soundscape from them.[11] This turns the listener's imagination into a supplement: taking the sound captured raw in field recordings, for example, as an incomplete technical object, it works to make the raw sound into an originating whole, as if the soundscape thus produced were original. As I have suggested, this inverts the relationship of listener and original.

Instead of mutual agreement, the two are put in a dependent relationship: the soundscape is dependent upon the listener's imagination for its veritable wholeness. This produces what I call the *pathological soundscape*. I follow Emily Thompson (2001, 1), who, in her influential *The Soundscape of Modernity*, seems to make a similar distinction between equipment and imagination when talking about the soundscape in and of itself:

> I define the soundscape as an auditory or aural landscape. Like a landscape, a soundscape is simultaneously a physical environment and a way of perceiving that environment; it is both a world and a culture constructed to make sense of that world.

Thompson, however, sees no pathology in that relationship.

In live music, let us say, the direct equation of composer to listener is sustained by the imagination of the latter, even if the performance is bad. The category of performance competence is eclipsed by the question of fidelity to the score: even in a bad performance we can sense imaginatively what the composer had in mind. The sympathetic equation of composer to listener, then, is sustained, even if (and in some instances because) the performance is not true to the score. Infidelity in the form of a bad performance is accessory to the equation of composer and listener.

For Campbell, however, infidelity is as tangible to the listener as it was to Othello. In "psycho–physiological" terms, Campbell (1953, 28) describes a particular source of annoyance for the "high–fidelity" addict:

> Many and many a time the addict's wife insists that Bill Jones' sound system is better than her husband's. This frustration imposed upon hubby does *not* stem from [the] inherent cussedness of women, but from the fact that the music system embodies a psycho–physiological approach.

To paraphrase Campbell: the addict's wife insists that Bill Jones' reproductive equipment is better than her husband's. (Let us set to one side the slight of "inherent cussedness.") The root cause of our addict's problem is not Bill Jones per se, but rather the indisputable fact that the reproductive system embodies a "psycho–physiological approach." Freud was right.

My point here is that in the early 1950s, "music enjoyment" came to embrace a kind of anxiety that gave rise to a new musical understanding. Questions of fidelity began to carry with them questions of

infidelity and concerns of performance failure—it was not that the performer didn't get it right but that the reproductive equipment failed to perform. This might be described in terms of an epistemic shift: from listening as an act of sympathy or mindful tuning with an originating human (a composer) to listening as a form of covert labor. (I shall come back to labor in a moment). Given this anxiety, the listener must work imaginatively to supplement the basic material offered by their technical equipment. The listener must engorge the imagination so it rises to fulfill its expectation: putatively to reproduce sound but in truth to verify the veracity of technical electronics. Recall the first clause to my definition of soundscape: a "sonorous whole . . . as if the sound reproduced were a whole" (see above). Given the pathological second clause of my definition, I do not mean the reproduction of an original sonic whole. Instead by *pathological soundscape* in this instance I refer to a whole produced by the listener's imagination laboring to supplement the sound equipment. The epistemic shift involves the reconfiguring of labor: in lieu of the labor exerted by the live musician to create the equation of composer and listener, the listener must now labor imaginatively—and labor alone, without monetary recompense—to create the sounding whole.[12]

I turn now to a long–playing recording, an LP dated 1954 and entitled *Hearing is Believing*. The liner notes speak of "High Fidelity" in terms reminiscent of cigarette advertisements: "There really is no mystery to High Fidelity. It's simply a matter of brighter, clearer sound. You can easily tell it when you hear it, particularly when it is played side by side with old recordings for contrast, as it is on this recording" (*Hearing* 1954). Such unbridled fetishism approximates 1950s ad copy of a well–known cigarette manufacturer: "Try Marlborough cigarettes, fresher and with livelier taste. Most doctors recommend them."

The LP juxtaposes two recordings of one and the same work; for example, there are two recordings of a Brahms waltz. One half of the track is produced with older recording equipment suited to the Extended Play 45 rpm; the other half uses a technology suited to the new 33 rpm LP. But no exact standard for comparison is introduced. Instead, the standard of judgment applied here is that of the man who links the following two clauses together with faultless logic: "I know what I like, and I don't like that!" The clauses "I know what I like" and "I don't like that" lack any common basis for comparison: they are two distinct judgments—liking and disliking—with quite separate reactions involved. Their confusion, however, produces a spurious whole in the listener's mind.

In comparing the recordings, we would want to ask, "what is the measure of fidelity?" Our answer would be a solipsistic and fetishistic "us." The liner notes firmly declare this:

> Many people are confused about what High Fidelity means . . . and a lot of confusion comes from the technical language sound engineers use when they try to explain it. So in this recording we are not trying to explain the technique that made High Fidelity possible—we are simply giving you a chance to hear the tremendous improvement it makes in recorded sound. (*Hearing* 1954)

Here again is a covert form of labor: the listener, not the engineer, is put to work to discern the difference between High Fidelity and its low counterpart. In the live setting, the listener might have attuned themselves sensibly to the imaginative work of the composer as conveyed by the laboring performer; now, however, they are enlisted into a form of technical labor quite the opposite of attunement.[13]

Implicit here is a paranoia, the germ of what I call *monophilia*. I situate this paranoia in the shadow of impending *stereophilia*. If you can't hear the improvement which the liner notes declare as so very accessible, perhaps you lack the equipment with which to measure. Conveniently, the right side of the liner notes carries an advertisement of record players by which one might improve oneself and one's equipment.

There is a historical balance attained around the time of this recording, which I shall call the "historical soundscape of monophonic hi–fidelity." As noted earlier, this was a moment of poise. In the years prior to the early 1950s, sound–reproducing media was only a part of musical enjoyment, and reproduced sound could be referred to Carnegie Hall as a standard. Media's role was so new, so diminutive, that it could not provoke the anxiety of fidelity and infidelity that I touched upon above. By 1953, awareness of media had grown to the point that for some (witness Campbell's addict) the question of fidelity could be salved only through confidence in technical equipment, through being convinced your equipment was the best possible. Confidence and conviction—these were the key factors a listener brought to this new equation. Both involved unpaid imaginative labor and not just a little anxiety. By the late 1960s, however, such questions of fidelity or infidelity were rendered irrelevant by the exuberance of technologies like Quadrophonic sound.[14]

The historical soundscape of media circa 1953, then, existed in a delicate state of balance at the turning point of an epistemic shift. On the one hand, the capacity of media to steer the criteria of fidelity in new directions was not yet fully affirmed, waiting upon stereo sound equip-

ment for confirmation. On the other hand, the whole category of "High Fidelity" necessitated a break with the past, as the experiment conducted in *Hearing is Believing* sought to attest. Transitory moments such as the one just described tend to produce anxiety. In the mind of the monophile, the question of hi–fidelity becomes a source of anxiety that is specifically understood in relation to performance, the ability to accomplish "the rest of the job." To paraphrase Campbell, this anxiety becomes itself a "technical requirement" of the soundscape. The adherent of monaural sound reproduction—the *monophile*—was forced pathologically to invent an imaginary, mystical realm in which his rapidly–aging mono equipment might yet function with rigor.

This imaginary realm of recovered virility centers upon the notion of high–fidelity that Campbell so brilliantly makes the basis of his psycho–physiological epistemology. In 1953, the monophile, perhaps seeing where technology was leading, sought to justify a sound system that—given the exercise of *Hearing is Believing*—might reasonably be suspect as out of date. On this account (and despite Campbell's insinuations to the contrary), the question of recorded sound fidelity is not one of veracity but instead a question of postponing sterility.

If *fidelity* in the context of media means "truth in comparison with some thing," then the term presupposes a "thing," an object of fidelity as referent of truth. The relationship between the two is fraught, however, since the object need not reciprocate let alone confirm the comparison. Looking at the mirror in the morning, I ask myself: "Is that really me?" I don't hear the mirror confirm: "Yes." Yet I beg the question again day after day. Anxiety does not depend upon reciprocity; indeed, as Foucault's (1977, 195–228) familiar description of the Panopticon would suggest, anxiety depends in large part upon being unrequited. Since the mirror in my bathroom works "one way," I presume that the fellow on the other side goes about his business blissfully unconcerned about my graying beard and sagging jowls (having been born in the early 1950s). Indeed since he won't ever reassure me, won't ever say a word of reassurance, I grow more and more anxious every day. I might try to fool him with hair dye or a chin tuck, but in my instance these would be merely pathological, leading to an inordinate concern with appearance, futile given its present state of decline. I know he would not be fooled, but remain as silent as the Sphinx. I worry nonetheless at his lack of commitment. Such are the whiles of fidelity under suspicion.

A similarly fraught engagement with the Sphinx is happening in the instance of Campbell's hi–fi addict. I have relatives that embody the type. Rather than simply listening to the music, they are quite involved in un-

paid labor—they work quite hard—checking sound levels and balances, on guard, ever on guard for a speaker wire gone frayed or nasty interference from some errant radio. Ever on guard, lest their equipment should malfunction, flag in its rigor, and let us down.

Around the advent of stereophony as a force in retail sound reproduction, the much vaunted sexual revolution of the 1960s began to pick up. Its principal symptom, however, was not so much an increase in varieties of sexual intercourse. Instead its essence is to be found in the growth of popular and respectable writing about sexuality, in texts such as *The Joy of Sex*, texts that were meant to salve anxieties about sexuality but instead merely enraged them. Prior to the 1960s, let us say, sexual intercourse got along without much sexual discourse (at least where I presently work, in Anglophone Canada), certainly without the plethora of manuals meant to facilitate if not merely enable the act. And so too, I would contend, prior to the 1950s and monaural high fidelity, the field of sound reproduction got along largely without the kind of popular discourse we find exemplified in Campbell and in *Hearing is Believing*. But then along came lubricants, ribbed, colored, and flavored condoms, and high fidelities, and the whole epistemology of both sex and sound reproduction was transformed necessarily to include a discourse about fidelity; not, however, about whether your partner was being "true" to you, but rather whether you were getting the real, full, true experience of sex and sound. And that transformation of fidelity was the root cause of the anxiety I am attempting to identify here.

Curiously, this development in sound and sex—and perhaps even in the sounds of sex—coincides roughly speaking with the advent of what is called euphemistically "artificial intelligence." In order for something to be intelligent it must measure up to some standard. Prior to the invention of *artificial intelligence*, we drew a simple albeit capricious line in the sand: some people were intelligent, some were not, *tant pis*. The advent of an *artificial* intelligence—and all the fascinating discourse that came along with it—did nothing if not raise the anxiety level of those with mere human intelligence. It posed the unnerving possibility that the most naturally intelligent person, hitherto blissfully unconcerned with their indisputable superiority, might not measure up against a machine's superior equipment: "Open up the pod–bay door, Hal."

Prior to the advent of artificial intelligence, those with ordinary intelligence would make their way quietly into the study of quantum physics or the study of epistemology. In a similar way, prior to high fidelity, listening was a matter of taking a seat quietly in Carnegie Hall. Now, with the full flowering of artificial intelligence, we are only slightly disconcerted when Word (with its Biblical initial capital "W") magically completes our

thoughts as we type, or our iPad, iPod, or iWhatever begins to dictate its preferences in musical repertoire to us—as though they were *our* preferences. Now, with the protocol of the mp3 (among others), we are only slightly alarmed when the sound of Neil Young's guitar is reduced in its vigorous fullness, this for the sake of cramming several hundred thousand songs onto a portable drive.

I find this moment in the early 1950s fascinating, an ever rewarding field of examination.[15] No doubt, there have been developments in recording and sound reproductive technology since.[16] But these do not permit us to lose sight of a brief historical envelope—the historical age of monophonic hi–fidelity—in which a fraught epistemology of fidelity surged anxiously for dominion over the soundscape.

Notes

1. I am indebted to Eric Barry for this source.

2. This accessory role is not addressed by James Lastra's otherwise useful distinction between *fidelity* and *intelligibility*. Postulating from Lastra's account, let us say technology and imagination would be equal participants in sound reproduction. See Lastra 2012.

3. The emphasis is Campbell's.

4. Which is not to suggest that what comes after—our perennial engagement with stereo as a thing in its own regard—is any less pathological (but this is beyond discussion here).

5. See the account given in Lippman (1977, 150–55), which carries out this notion of composition to an extreme by making music itself an originating factor. Compare Matheson and Caplan (2011, 42–46), especially the passage entitled "Meta–ontology."

6. The act of sound imagination need not necessarily be realized in concrete terms. This is exemplified in the fugue, whose subject (or *sogetto*), as a product of the composer's conception, can be realized—made into concrete sound—in many different fugues as a fugal *res facta*. See Dineen 2004.

7. But see Thompson 2002 on the fraught nature of the concert hall.

8. I have in mind Foucault's (1972, 187) various "thresholds," most importantly the "threshold of epistimologization," where a "group of statements . . . exercises a dominant function . . . over knowledge . . ."

9. We cannot address here the role of the record cover in the reworking of imagination. See Auslander 2004.

10. The root of that pathology might lie in the nature of sound itself, especially in its fraught comparison with the visual. See Carpenter and McLuhan (1960, 68) and their concept of "Argus–eared." For a useful summary of the issue, phrased in terms of "soundscape," see Schulz 2008.

11. This pathology is not to be confused with the pathology of noise described by R. Murray Schafer (1969, 19–23). Also see Schafer's discussion of the concept of "schizophonia" (43–47). I find the missionary zeal of Schafer's approach disconcerting.

12. In fact, through the purchase of the equipment, the listener pays to labor. Here I am adapting an idea expressed by Adorno (1981, 149–50) in his *Prisms* essay where he suggests that Schoenberg's music requires work on the part of the listener, whereas the latter expected leisure. I have discussed this at length in my book *Friendly Remainders: Essays in Musical Criticism After Adorno*, where I suggest the analysis is as characteristic of all music under the aegis of capitalism as it is Schoenberg's. The latter is merely an extreme case (Dineen 2011, 9–10 and *passim*).

13. See Bull 2001. However, despite drawing extensively on Adorno, Bull does not express this in terms of labor. Following upon the work of Tia DeNora, Tim Edensor (2003, 160) addresses the fertile idea of reconstituting listening as a vehicle for the creation of use values, but in doing so ignores the durable nature of exchange value implicit in listening as discerned by Adorno. With reference to Jacques Attali, Jonathan Sterne (2003, 242–43) speaks of a use–value labor of accumulating recorded sound. I disagree: this is a covert form of exchange value. I am indebted, nonetheless, to Sterne who, hearing a similar paper read at Carleton University in 2012, questioned whether the idea of labor I raised here was "automatist" in either the Marxist sense (*operaismo* or *autonome*) or in the sense of Lacan's "automatism." After consideration, I think it is neither, although both involve a kind of virtual labor like pathological listening. Consider Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's (2000, 293) term *affective labor*: "This labor is immaterial, even if its corporeal and affective, in the sense that its products are intangible, a feeling of ease, well–being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion . . . Such affective production, exchange, and communication are generally associated with human contact, but that contact can be either actual or virtual, as it is in the entertainment industry." Their concept, however, is entirely positive, while mine denotes a pathology. See, however, their discussion of "biopower" and affect (364–65). Space forbids discussion of Lacan's concept, but see "Tuché and Automaton" in Lacan 1981, 53–56.

14. The use of four speakers to approximate the experience of being surrounded by sound. It arose in the 1970s.

15. And would accord it a kind of dystopian prescience like that attributed by Frederic Jameson to the thoughts of Jacques Attali. I paraphrase Jameson (1985, xi) thus: the music of the 1950s "stands both as a promise of a new, liberating mode of production, and as the menace of a dystopian possibility which is that mode of production's baleful mirror image."

16. See Sterne's (2012, 46) discussion of the term *surplus definition*.

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Voice and Instrument at the Origins of Music

Jonathan De Souza

During the summer of 2008, archaeologists uncovered some remnants of musical prehistory in the caves of Hohle Fels, Germany. There, among burnt animal bones and flint–knapping debris, they found fragments of three flutes (Conard, Malina, and Münzel 2009). One was remarkably complete. This delicate instrument, discovered in twelve pieces, had been fashioned from a vulture's wing bone. It was thirty–four centimeters long (roughly the length of a piccolo), with several finger holes and a notched mouthpiece (like the Japanese *shakuhachi* and other end–blown flutes; see Figure 1). The other flutes at the site were less complete but represented more complex manufacturing. They were made from pieces of mammoth tusk that had been split, hollowed out, and then rejoined. Yet headlines about the Hohle Fels flutes focused on neither their present condition nor their refined construction. Instead journalists and scholars emphasized the artifacts' age. These flutes were more than thirty–five thousand years old—the earliest musical instruments then known.[1] Incidentally, one of the earliest examples of figurative art, an ivory sculpture called the "Venus of Hohle Fels," was found less than a meter away from the bone flute (Conard 2009). Together these artifacts give compelling evidence for musical and artistic practices in the Upper Paleolithic Era. Writing and the wheel, by contrast, would not appear until almost thirty thousand years later, during the early Bronze Age (that is, around the fourth millennium BCE).


Figure 1: Bone flute from the caves of Hohle Fels. Photo © H. Jensen, Universität Tübingen. Used with permission.

Of course, such evidence is always incomplete, and these instruments reveal only traces of Paleolithic music making. Their sounds and social functions have not been preserved. They are tokens of a culture that can be reconstructed only provisionally, through a kind of principled speculation. For example, given the flutes' technological

sophistication, it is unlikely that they are the first instruments of their kind. Earlier specimens have surely been lost, presumably including instruments made from less durable materials. Indeed, a multidisciplinary review of archaeological evidence for the emergence of music, language, and symbolic behavior concludes that

> such instruments must, even at around 35,000 years, be several conceptual stages removed from the earliest origins, even of instrumental musical expression, to say nothing of those universal vocal, manual–percussive and dance forms which must have existed independently of—and before—any need for such tools. (d'Errico et al. 2003, 46)

"And before." With this aside, the review's twelve coauthors suggest that musicality originated with the body alone, that instrumental play came after singing. This claim is ubiquitous in writings on music and human evolution. Ian Cross (2007, 663), for example, argues that "the use of musical artifacts will have been preceded by the expression of musical capacities by voice and body." The idea has a long history. Charles Darwin himself wrote, "With man song is generally admitted to be the basis or origin of instrumental music" (1871, 2:333). But this idea already appears in the eighteenth century in Jean–Jacques Rousseau's reflections on human and musical origins.

This essay critically examines claims for the precedence of voice in musical prehistory, juxtaposing Rousseau and twenty–first–century authors. Though centered on music and evolution, this investigation more generally explores voice–instrument relations and their implications for a philosophy of musical technology—or, more precisely, musical "technics." The term "technics" refers to technical matters in the broadest sense. It is an English equivalent to the German "*Technik*" or the French "*la technique*," which, depending on context, may be translated as either "technique" or "technology." Lewis Mumford's (1934) *Technics and Civilization*, for example, explores the interplay of technology and technique, bringing out continuities between hand tools and machines. Technics thus includes—but is not limited to—modern technology. Philosophical work on technics, combined with research from paleoanthropology and psychology, will help complicate narratives of vocal precedence. They will suggest that music is essentially technical and that vocal and instrumental capacities emerged together.

Rousseau on Human Origins

Jean–Jacques Rousseau's 1755 *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* is concerned, more generally, with the origin of humanity. "For how can the source of inequality among men be known," asks Rousseau (1992, 12), "unless one begins by knowing men themselves?" To access humanity's original state, the philosopher adopts a strategy that is common to other eighteenth–century writers: an anthropological fiction (e.g., Condillac 1746; see Thomas 1995, 45). He uses an imagined past to explore society and culture, law and freedom, language and music. Rousseau sometimes bolsters this narrative with quasi–ethnographic evidence or claims for natural truth. But he can also be refreshingly clear about his speculations, which "must not be taken for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings better suited to clarify the Nature of things than to show their genuine origin" (1992, 19).

Rousseau's fantasy begins with "natural man" in an age of wild individualism. At this time, he says, people's only desires were physical—food, sleep, and sex. They did not live in families, much less larger social groups. An instinctive cry of nature provided some means of communication, but this was used only in emergencies, and humans had no everyday need for language. Tools were unnecessary, too:

> The savage man's body being the only [instrument] he knows, he employs it for various uses of which . . . our bodies are incapable; our industry deprives us of the [force] and agility that necessity obliges him to acquire. If he had an axe, would his wrist break such strong branches? If he had a [slingshot], would his hand throw a stone so hard? If he had a ladder, would he climb a tree so nimbly? If he had a horse, would he run so fast? (Rousseau 1992, 21; translation modified)

In their natural state, Rousseau argues, humans were strong, self–sufficient, and happy.

Yet as the population grew and spread, people encountered rough weather and, for the first time, needed something outside of themselves. They needed fire—but also each other. In their new communities, people began to cook food, wear clothes, and build houses; they collaborated in activities like hunting and shared knowledge of new techniques and tools. With social pressure to communicate, the universal cry of nature gave way to conventional articulations of voice, to a kind of language. All of this created a new kind of human. In Rousseau's mind, it eventually separated savage people from civilized people, natural people from artificial people.

Rousseau's narrative proposes a common origin for language, society, and technics. Of course, as Jacques Derrida (1976, 199) observes, Rousseau's "origin" is not truly the beginning but "the beginning of the

end." The "original" origin is always just out of reach, receding in a process of supplementary *différance*.[2] In other words, the origin of inequality, like original sin, is a second origin. It is natural man's corruption by society and technics, a fall into artifice.

In *Technics and Time*, the French philosopher of technology Bernard Stiegler critiques Rousseau's fiction by comparing it to another human origin story: the Greek myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus. When the gods created mortal creatures, these two brothers were given the important task of endowing the new beings with different qualities. Epimetheus would assign the qualities, and then Prometheus—the smarter brother—would inspect his work. Plato's *Protagoras* recounts the myth:

> To some creatures he [Epimetheus] gave strength, but not speed, while he equipped the weaker with speed. He gave some claws or horns, and for those without them he devised some other power for their preservation. To those whom he made of small size, he gave winged flight, or a dwelling underground; to those that he made large, he gave their size itself as a protection. And in the same way he distributed all the other things, balancing one against another. This he did to make sure that no species should be wiped out; and when he had made for them defenses against mutual destruction, he devised for them protection against the elements, clothing them with thick hair and tough skins, so as to withstand cold and heat . . . (1991, 13)

Yet Epimetheus made a foolish mistake. He used all of the qualities on animals, leaving nothing for people. When Prometheus came to inspect his brother's work, he found humans naked and defenseless. They had no fur for warmth, no fangs for protection. Prometheus, of course, saved humanity by stealing from the gods. In Plato's telling, he took not only fire but also *technē*. As Martin Heidegger (1977, 13) explains, "*Technē* is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts." This divine know–how compensates for the humans' lack of qualities and makes it possible for them to exist.

Technics, in this myth, does not supplement humanity; it is a *condition of* humanity. In Stiegler's terms, the human pursues "life by means other than life," through "organized inorganic matter." For Rousseau, by contrast, humanity was originally self–sufficient and powerful, needing neither tools nor artificial techniques. Stiegler (1998, 114–15) observes that "Rousseau . . . wants to show that there is no originary default, no prostheses, that the claws missing in man are not stones, or, should they be stones, they are precisely not cut or fabricated, being immediately at hand and not inscribed in any process of mediation." Besides claiming that the body is natural man's only instrument, Rousseau (1992, 20) assumes that

natural man always walked on two legs, "using his hands as we do ours." But here Stiegler (1998, 113) senses a contradiction, since we humans use our hands to manipulate tools, and this capacity for manipulation seems to distinguish hands from paws.

Here Stiegler invokes paleoanthropologist André Leroi–Gourhan (1911–1986). Considering early hominid fossils, Leroi–Gourhan (1993) argues that walking upright had profound effects on human evolution. It led to a bigger brain and a flexible vocal apparatus (see Mithen 2005, 147), and it freed the hands for gestural communication and tool use. From that point humans were co–evolving with their technology. This process was partially biological: human hands emerged in interaction with tools; the human digestive system emerged in interaction with cooked food; human toes in interaction with shoes. Yet technics also facilitated cultural evolution, the emergence of distinct social groups. Though many details in Leroi–Gourhan's work are now out of date, the basic idea stands (see Odling–Smee, Laland, and Feldman 2003; and Malafouris 2013). Many scientists still link Paleolithic technology to "aspects of behavior, economy, mental capacities, neurological functions, the origin of grammatical language, and social and symbolic systems" (Ambrose 2001, 1752).

On this level, Stiegler argues against Rousseau, asserting that technics is originary to humanity, not supplementary. But in other ways, he agrees with Rousseau. The *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, for example, argues that natural man has no understanding of death, no understanding of temporality; natural man is supposedly immersed in "present existence without any idea of the future, however near it may be" (Rousseau 1992, 28). Human experiences of time, then, also begin with the second origin, with the development of tools and communities. This connection is explained by Stiegler's central theses on technics and time—or, he would say, on technics *as* time. Technical objects represent an exteriorization of memory that outlasts the individual. This does not only happen with written records and other memory aids. Any technical object—say a stone handaxe or a bone flute—preserves traces of its users. Technics, then, provides access to a past through which we have not lived; it grounds the "historiality" (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of the world theorized by Heidegger (2010, 348–49). By forming the "already–there" into which we are inevitably thrown, technics makes cultural memory—and, indeed, culture itself—possible.

In sum, both Rousseau and Stiegler connect temporality, politics, and language to technology, to humanity's relation to exteriority. Rousseau (1992, 66) asserts that "the Savage lives within himself; the sociable man, always outside of himself." Stiegler, meanwhile, claims that this exteriority

constitutes the human. He concludes that "Rousseau's narrative of the origin shows us through antithesis how everything of the order of what is usually considered specifically human is immediately and irremediably linked to an absence of property, to a process of 'supplementation,' of prosthetization or exteriorization, in which nothing is any longer immediately at hand, where everything is found mediated and instrumentalized, technicized, unbalanced . . . Rousseau will not, therefore, have been mistaken; he will have been right, *almost*" (Stiegler 1998, 133).

The Technicization of Voice

Stiegler's critique is easily extended to Rousseau's writings on musical origins.[3] In his *Dictionary of Music* (1768), Rousseau (1998, 375) says that "Song does not seem natural to man. Although the Savages of America sing, because they speak, the true Savage never sang." Song, like speech, emerged with the second origin, when the cry of nature was transformed through social conventions. For Rousseau, then, music starts not with sound but with the voice. Furthermore, according to the 1781 *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, speech and song did not simply originate at the same time. In the past, Rousseau (1998, 318) claims, "there was no music at all other than melody, nor any other melody than the varied sound of speech."[4] Today, though, speech no longer sings, and song no longer speaks. These dual aspects of the voice grew apart in a process of technicization that repeated the fall into artifice. Rousseau suggests that writing distanced language from the emotional presence of voice. With music, he attacks the bloodless conventionality of French opera, Jean–Philippe Rameau's scientistic theories of harmony, and the denatured voices of castrati (see Derrida 1976, 195, 210–12; Christensen 1993; and Feldman 2008, 180).

For present purposes, though, I am more interested in the Essay's reference to an earlier stage in the technicization of voice, a stage before harmony:

> From the time of Menalippides and Philoxenus, instrumental players—who were at first the employees of the Poets and worked only under them and, so to speak, at their dictation—became independent of them . . . Thus melody, beginning to no longer be so attached to discourse, imperceptibly assumed a separate existence, and music became more independent of the words. That was also when the wonders that it had produced when it was only the accent and harmony of poetry gradually ceased . . . (Rousseau 1998, 329)

Here song is corrupted not by harmony but by instruments. Instrumental *mélodie* echoes vocal *chant*, while also distorting it (Waeber 2009, 109). Instruments supplement the voice, divorcing music from linguistic communication.[5] They exteriorize, conventionalize, and constrain music, forming the eventual basis for harmony. "The system of the Greeks had absolutely no harmony in our sense," Rousseau argues (1998, 328),

> except what was required to tune instruments on perfect consonances. All peoples who possess stringed instruments are forced to tune them by consonances, but those who do not possess them have inflections in their songs which we call false because they do not enter into our system and because we cannot notate them.

Song can still imitate primal, passionate voices (and that, for Rousseau, is the source of whatever affective power it retains), but it is permanently "shackled" by the instrumental system.

This shackling may be illustrated with a moment from Rousseau's most successful composition, *Le devin du village* (1752).[6] The one–act opera begins with the shepherdess Colette, who is weeping because her lover, Colin, has abandoned her. (After the piece's premiere at court, Louis XV reportedly sang this air all day [Robinson 1992].) When Colette exclaims "Alas! Alas!" her melody mirrors the falling inflection of an actual sigh (see Example 1). For Rousseau, this imitation grounds the melody's emotional appeal. Yet Colette's cry is also forced into the artificial steps of a chromatic scale. It is not continuous but discrete, divided according to the intervallic system of the keyboard and Western notation. Here Rousseau the composer gestures toward purer forms of vocalization—both the prelinguistic cry of nature and pre–instrumental speech–song—that civilized humans can never fully recover.

Example 1: Rousseau, *Le devin du village*, "J'ai perdu tout mon bonheur," mm. 43–46

Rousseau's musical polemics, then, recapitulate his anthropological speculations: song has its own double origin in which voice was supplemented by instruments, immediate expression turned to technique, and

natural music gave way to artificial music. Again, the contradictions here are revealing. Rousseau imagines a voice before articulation and before conventions, even though the prominence of these features distinguishes human voices from animal vocalizations. As Rousseau (1998, 326) himself claims, "Birds whistle, man alone sings." But from this perspective, there is no voice without vocal technique; technique constitutes the voice as such. Likewise, Rousseau idealizes a kind of song whose inflections are not constrained by intervals, even though intervallic spacing differentiates singing from expressive speech. Indeed, as Derrida (1976, 200) notes, Rousseau's own definition of song in the *Dictionary of Music* invokes the interval, indicating that intervallic spacing is not extraneous to song but "an originary accessory and an essential accident." In the end, it appears that music—like the human—emerges through mediation, exteriorization, and instrumentalization. Rousseau's quest for musical immediacy ultimately points to musical technics.

Language, Tool Use, and Music

Twenty–first–century writers on music and evolution often echo Rousseau. Steven Brown's (2000) theory of "musilanguage" and what Steven Mithen (2005) calls "Hmmmmm"—an acronym for "holistic, multi–modal, manipulative, musical, and mimetic" communication—both imagine a prehistoric form of vocal expression that would be equally protomusical and protolinguistic. Emotion is generally considered central to such communication (see Molino 2000, 171–72; Richman 2000; and Cross 2009). Furthermore, it aligns with the idea that "music is first and foremost vocal" (Molino 2000, 172. See also Lehmann 2010, 92). According to Nicholas Bannan (2012, 306), "vocal music, which arises directly from the potential of evolved anatomy, is far older than instrumental, which employs extra–somatic tools." Musical instruments may then be conceived as a supplement to bodily musicality. For example, Ian Cross (2007, 663) understands instruments as "prosthetic devices," "extending the sound–producing capacities of the human body (in terms of frequency range, intensity, and timbre)." Iain Morley (2013, 131) writes: "instruments constitute an accessory to existing human capacities; the origins of musical behaviour would not have relied upon the invention of instruments."[7] Of course, these writers' methodological and theoretical commitments differ significantly from Rousseau's, and the individual authors may not subscribe to all of these claims. Nonetheless, at each point the philosopher haunts contemporary discourse on musical origins.

These arguments often respond to perceived attacks from authors like Steven Pinker (1997, 534), who notoriously refers to music as evolutionary "cheesecake." They aim to show that music is not merely a form of non–adaptive pleasure seeking (Huron 2001, 45–46). They suggest instead that music is in our nature (e.g., Levitin 2008). To this end, scholars adopt various strategies, considering social benefits of music making, vocalization in animals, musical universals, or connections between music, language, and other domains of human behavior.

Speech, song, and musilanguage, for example, would all rely on "vocal emancipation" (Merker 2012, 222), an advanced capacity for voluntarily reproducing and varying vocal sounds. But this leads back to technics. For, as Merlin Donald argues, the "self–programmed" motor skills needed for protolanguage also support tool use. "All gestures and intentional vocalizations are ultimately actions of the musculature," Donald (1999, 141) writes, "and to generate greater varieties of gestures and sounds, primate motor behaviour must somehow have become much more plastic, less stereotyped, and subject to deliberate rehearsal." As such, he concludes that language evolution would require "a breakthrough in hominid motor evolution" (141). The ability to consciously refine skills through practice and to imitate others' actions would facilitate both communication and tool–based action, techniques of the body alone and techniques that incorporated external props. It would reflect the development of a mimetic system that would underlie "play, games, skilled rehearsal, nonlinguistic gesticulation, toolmaking, other creative instrumental skills, many nonsymbolic expressive devices used in social control, and reproductive memory in general" (Donald 1991, 193).

On a social level, mimetic skill would engender distinctively human forms of communication and cooperation based on shared intentionality (Donald 1991, 171). For Michael Tomasello (2008, 108), this is the central cognitive adaptation that distinguishes humans from other primates: unlike chimpanzees and other apes, we understand conspecifics as agents with intentions and feelings like our own. This distinction is crucial to humans' "capacity for culture" (Tomasello 1999, 325). Tomasello's evidence from primate and developmental psychology aligns suggestively with anthropological research by Tim Ingold. Drawing on ethnographic work with hunter–gatherer groups, Ingold (1993, 436–42) insists that the technical, like language, is always social and cooperative. Skill development is based in relationships between experts and novices (Ingold 2000, 37). It involves watching and copying, working or playing together. Tools, like gestures, then, already imply some intersubjective context of shared attention, understanding, and goals. In fact, an object is seen as a tool only when it is connected with some technique, some purpose (319).

This research strongly suggests that human capacities for gesture, language, and complex tool use—for communicative and material interventions in the world—evolved together. But the preconditions for the emergence of gesture, language, and complex tool use are equally preconditions for the emergence of singing and playing instruments.

The flutes of Hohle Fels demand practiced motor control and mimetic understanding. These instruments depended on the manual capacities that differentiated anatomically modern humans from other primates—mobile wrists, sturdy and flexible thumbs, and fleshy finger–pads. To borrow two terms from Raymond Tallis (2003), the flute was not just "brachio–chiral," involving the reaching, gesturing hand at the end of the arm; it required the precision of the "chiro–digital." Prehistoric flutists, like their modern counterparts, used their fingers, covering holes in different combinations to produce a range of pitches and coordinating such movements with the mouth and breath. As Jeremy Montagu (2003, 3) notes, this is not the easiest instrument to master: "with both end–blown and notch flutes, the player has to be careful to hold the instrument so that the air–stream impinges on the edge at precisely the right angle—otherwise there is only a hiss and no musical sound." Stiegler (2009, 66–69) would further emphasize how these techniques combine somatic memory and technical memory, the interiorized memory of an individual and the exteriorized memory of the group.

Singing, too, requires muscular self–programming, and vocal skill, no less than tool use, is cultivated in some social context. All cultures have vocal music (Nettl 2000, 468), because the voice, as part of the body, is everywhere at hand. But there is no universal voice. As Curt Sachs (1961, 85) notes, "nowhere outside the modern West do people sing with a voice for which we have coined the honorific title of 'natural.'" Singing always has an accent. The voice is always already technical.[8] And so, in a sense, the musical voice has always been a mediated "vocal instrument." This is not to ignore differences between instrumental and vocal practices, which are substantial, nor to collapse the distinction between techniques of tool use and "techniques of the body" (Mauss 1973). It is, instead, to point out a paradoxical interrelation of instrument and voice that resembles the relation between writing and speech: to paraphrase Derrida (1976, 46), the musical instrument is at the same time exterior to the voice, not being a mere imitation of voice, and interior to the voice, which is already in itself instrumentalized or technicized.

All of this implies that human vocal ability would not precede the ability to make music with objects. Any early human that could learn to sing could also learn to drum with sticks or stones. Indeed, the capacity

to perceive and produce rhythms—with hands, feet, voices, or tools—is a key example of mimetic skill (Donald 1991, 186–87). Of course, the *playing* of instruments, in this view, does not necessarily coincide with the *making* of instrumental artifacts. After all, communities of hunter–gatherers today often use found objects as musical instruments (Espi–Sanchis and Bannan 2012). Or perhaps the primordial act of instrument making is simply the taking–up of an object as a means to music, the act of connecting a thing, whether found or fashioned, with some musical technique.

Coda

Again Rousseau will have been right, *almost*. On this account, song and speech, voice and tools would have a common origin. Vocal and instrumental skill would both be features of a musicality that is deeply entwined with the human capacity for culture (Cross 2008)—a capacity, in other words, for technics. While reassessing claims for vocal precedence in terms of technics can help today's scholars avoid Rousseau's metaphysical assumptions (that is, his "phonocentrism"), it can also bring narratives of musical origins into better accord with perspectives on human cognitive evolution from Donald, Tomasello, and others.

If voice and instrument are not opposed in a metaphysical binary, they may interact more freely. Just as flutes may imitate voices, voices may imitate flutes or drums. David Burrows (2007, 90) even suggests that "stability of pitch in singing . . . could conceivably result simply from imitating the behavior of xylophones and other such instruments in which pitch level is built in." Interplay between vocal instruments and instrumental voices appears in countless repertoires—from jazz vocalise to pianistic cantabile, from *konnakol* vocal percussion in South–Indian classical music to the "mouth music" of eighteenth–century Scotland. Briefly consider a more recent example: beat–boxing often incorporates song and speech but is irreducible to either. The word "beat–box," now a verb, originally referred to the drum machine itself. Beat–boxers virtuosically interiorize the machine's rhythms, incorporating drum sounds into their bodies, their voices. Beside Mithen's "singing Neanderthals," then, it might be useful to imagine "beat–boxing Cro–magnons." Vocal percussion might be just as old as song.

Beat–boxing represents an instrumental mediation of voice that is grounded in technologies of sound reproduction. Yet before CDs or LPs, even before musical notation, musical instruments (including techni-

cized voices) and their associated gestural programs help preserve musical materials. They contribute to the kind of technical memory theorized by Stiegler, as forms of inscription or "recording" that ground musical culture (see Gallope 2011, 61). Making music repeatable, such mediation builds associations that direct future perception (Stiegler 2011, 17–21). It shapes a musical "already–there." This helps explain Stiegler's radical claim, made while he was director of the French music research institute IRCAM, that there is no music without instruments (Donin and Stiegler 2004, 7). This is to say, there is no music without technics.

From this perspective, Steven Pinker might, like Rousseau, be *almost* right. Pinker (1997, 529) writes that music, alongside art, religion, and philosophy, "is a technology, not an adaptation."[9] Saying that music is not adaptive does not mean that it is not functional, that it does not benefit individuals and communities who make it (see Fitch 2006); it would mean that music was not created through the competition of "selfish genes." Arguments for music's evolutionary significance, adaptive or otherwise, can easily replicate a dualistic metaphysics, trying to prove that music is natural not artificial for humanity. This essay suggests that it may be more productive to start from music's technicity, considering the co–constitution of instrument and voice, tool and technique. Ultimately this points to an ontological proposition demanding further thought. What if music is not simply produced *via* technology? What would it mean for music itself *to be* a form of technics?[10]

Notes

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1. Reports about the Hohle Fels flutes in the popular press include Allen 2009, Devlin 2009, and Ghosh 2009. Though an older bone artifact was once thought to be a Neanderthal flute (see Kunej and Turk 2000), microscopic analysis reveals that its holes were not manufactured by humans but were produced by carnivore teeth (d'Errico and Villa 1997; and d'Errico and Lawson 2006). On more recent dating of musical artifacts, see Higham et al. 2012.

2. The Derridean term *différance* is, characteristically for this philosopher, a pun. It encompasses two meanings of the French *différer*, both "to differ" and "to defer" (see Derrida 2011, 75).

3. Stiegler (1998, 116) does not investigate questions of vocality here, simply noting that Rousseau's natural man "does not exteriorize himself, does not ex–press himself, does not speak: speech is already a prosthesis."

4. Here Rousseau (1998, 318) mentions a classical source, Strabo's *Geography*, which assumes a common origin for poetry and song (see Strabo 2014, 50–51).

5. Instrumental supplements are considered in recent philosophical work on voice: see Cavarero (2005, 68) on the flute of Marsyas, and Dolar (2006, 52–56) on the shofar. It is interesting that these examples involve wind instruments, which Rousseau (1998, 440) thought to be the earliest type of instrument.

6. For discussion of Rousseau's musical career, including analysis of idiosyncratic passages from *Le devin du village*, see Gjerdingen 2007.

7. Christian Lehmann (2010, 101–2) even argues that musical instruments did not truly develop until the invention of ancient Greek music theory.

8. For further discussion of the singing voice as technology, see Eidsheim 2008.

9. Pinker (1994) believes that language is an evolutionary adaptation, a claim that is highly debatable (see Huron 2001, 44; and Sampson 2005). Accordingly, Pinker (1997, 534) privileges language over music, claiming that music may be partially founded on pre–established linguistic abilities.

10. For a response to Pinker that considers music as "transformative technology," see Patel 2008, 400–401.

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The Lost Movements of Ernst Toch's *Gesprochene Musik*

Carmel Raz

Gesprochene Musik, by Ernst Toch (1887–1964), is a forgotten milestone in the history of electronic music.[1] A three–movement suite consisting of spoken music for choir, it is one of the few paradigmatic representatives of the genre of *Gramophonmusik,* which made use of prerecorded gramophone discs in a concert setting. The work was premiered in 1930 at a Berlin festival devoted to new music, in a concert featuring original works for gramophone playback by two rising stars of the German contemporary music scene, Toch and Paul Hindemith. The pieces were performed only once, yet through the intervention of a young John Cage, the score of the third movement of *Gesprochene Musik*, the "Geographical Fugue," appeared in Henry Cowell's journal, *New Music*, five years later. Although Cage published the piece in the context of a collection of music written expressly for gramophone, his version led the "Geographical Fugue" to receive a new lease of life as a purely acoustic choral showpiece performed live, which would, ironically, become Toch's most famous work.[2]

Given that there was no further trace of the gramophone discs from the original concert, the first two movements of Toch's suite were long considered lost. However, Toch's original sketches were in fact fortunately preserved at the Toch Archive at UCLA. Guided by the composer's grandson, Lawrence Weschler, Christopher Caines rediscovered the sketches for "O–a" and "Ta–tam" in 2006, and created the first full edition of *Gesprochene Musik* as part of a project he choreographed entitled "Worklight." This was the first complete performance of *Gesprochene Musik* since the work's premiere in 1930. The current essay presents an introduction, contextualization, and analysis of the first two movements of *Gesprochene Musik* ahead of the publication of Caines's (2014) preface and edition in the current volume of this journal.

In recent years, the origins of the "Geographical Fugue" have begun to receive scholarly attention. Weschler (2003) has written extensively about his grandfather's life and career, and has produced a humorous report on Toch's encounter with John Cage in California in 1935. In *Capturing Sound: How Technology has Changed Music*, Mark Katz (2010, 109–23) has written about the relationship between *Grammophonmusik* in the context of early mechanical music and recovered various contemporaneous theories about the potential of the phonograph and gramophone to transform music

composition. In a previous article (Raz 2012), I built on Katz's work in a historical and analytical discussion of Toch's "Geographical Fugue." My research contextualized Toch's compositional choices within various artistic, political, and scientific discourses of his age, focusing in particular on the relationship between experimental art and technology, postwar constructions of the body, and the influence of contemporary research on phonetics and sound reproduction.

Caines's recent discovery and restoration of the lost movements of *Gesprochene Musik* open up exciting new avenues for research on *Grammophonmusik*. The relationship between the musical materials of the new movements and those of the "Geographical Fugue" can now be explored for the first time. Toch's handwritten notes within the original manuscript further reveal tantalizing hints about the compositional process of the pieces. Finally, locating Toch's work within the context of the early days of the Donaueschingen festival series, and the contemporary music scene in Weimar Berlin can enrich our understanding of the interaction between the music, technology, and society of the time.

Toch, Experimental Radio, and the Contemporary Music Festival Scene

Born in Vienna to a Jewish family, Toch studied medicine, philosophy, and music in Vienna, Heidelberg, and Frankfurt respectively. As a young composer he achieved significant success, receiving the Frankfurt–based Mozart prize in 1909 and the Mendelssohn Stipendium from the city of Leipzig in 1910 and 1913. He moved to Berlin in 1929, where he composed orchestral works, operas, and incidental music for radio plays, garnering substantial critical and popular success. Published by Schott, Toch's music was often programmed alongside his contemporaries Paul Hindemith, Igor Stravinsky, and Arnold Schoenberg.[3] In 1933, Toch fled Germany and ended up in Hollywood, where he wrote music for films in addition to a substantial body of chamber, solo, and orchestral music. In spite of notable distinctions in the US, including the Pulitzer Prize for his third symphony in 1956 and a Grammy four years later, Toch's career never fully recovered its pre–war momentum; towards the end of his life, he described himself as "the world's most forgotten composer" (Weschler 1996).

Up until his emigration in 1933, Toch was active in the *Gebrauchsmusik* circle, which included figures such as Paul Hindemith, Paul Dessau, Kurt Weill, Hanns Eisler, and Berthold Brecht. An especially prolific composer,

he was repeatedly commissioned by the *Kammermusik–Aufführungen zur Förderung zeitgenössischer Tonkunst*—an annual chamber music festival jointly directed by Hindemith, Heinrich Burkhard, and Josef Haas that would later become known as *Neue Musik Donaueschingen*.

The festival provided a prominent platform for electronic and mechanical music. As early as 1926, it featured works by Hindemith, Toch, and the young composer Gerhard Münch for the automatic Welte–Mignon–Klavier. The same festival saw the presentation of Jörg Mager's *Spärophon,* an electronic instrument similar to the theremin, which enabled the production of microtones using difference tones (sounds resulting from the difference between two frequencies).[4] Hindemith also employed a mechanical organ in his score for the *Triadisches Ballet*—a collaboration with painter Oskar Schlemmer that was considered by many to be the highlight of the festival (see Häusler 1996, 90).

In 1927, the festival moved to Baden–Baden, where it was renamed *Deutsche Kammermusik Baden–Baden*. Over the next three years, music and technology stood at the forefront of programming: all three events gave substantial attention to the interaction between film and music and featured a number of unusual collaborations, which included new scores to existent cartoons and news segments. These included episodes of the American animated series *Felix the Cat*, scored by Hindemith, Toch, and Walter Gronostay; the German children's cartoon *Die Kinderfabrik* (The Children's Factory) scored by Toch for six wind instruments; Darius Milhaud's original score for a news segment; Paul Dessau's score for the puppet movie *Der verzauberte Wald* (the Magic Forest); and an animated short entitled *Vormittagsspuk bewegter Gegenstände* (Ghosts Before Breakfast) scored by Hindemith for mechanical piano. The festival also foregrounded chamber music for amateurs, children, and community groups—a cause close to Hindemith's heart, and for which he strongly advocated by forging close partnerships with the Baden–Württemberg ministry of culture, local youth movements, and important figures in music pedagogy such as Fritz Jöde.

The 1929 production of the *Deutsche Kammermusik Baden–Baden* saw a major coup for the organizers in the addition of a new major body to the festival: the *Südwestdeutsche Rundfunk,* or Frankfurt radio, which at the time was directed by Hindemith's brother–in–law, Hans Flesch.[5] Together with conductor and new music advocate Hermann Scherchen, the *Südwestdeutsche Rundfunk* orchestra participated in two programs while the station provided technical assistance. The emphasis on music for radio provided mixed results in the domain of concert music and radio plays (Häusler 1996, 104), but there was one stand–out success: *Der Lindberghflugh*, a radio play by Bertold

Brecht with music, composed by Kurt Weill and Hanns Eisler, for tenor, baritone, bass, mixed choir, and orchestra. In an attempt to forefront the role of the listener within the radio play, the piece was presented twice: the first time it was played offstage and broadcast into the concert hall, and the next day it was performed live in the hall, with a selection of "listeners" onstage.

The resources of the *Deutsche Kammermusik Baden–Baden* were substantially reduced by the 1929 stock market crash; subsequently, the 1930 festival was moved to Berlin where Hindemith, Burkhard, and Flesch were newly based. With the appointment of the interim director of the Hochschule für Musik, Georg Schünemann, to the artistic direction committee, the festival found a home at the conservatory, which also featured a new *Rundfunkversuchsstelle*, or experimental radio laboratory.

Now renamed *Neue Musik Berlin,* the seventh instantiation of the festival took place in 1930 between July 18 and 21. It was smaller in scale than the events of the preceding years and dedicated only to two genres of music: vocal repertoire for amateurs (*Laienmusik*) and music for radio and gramophone (*Rundfunk* and *Schallplatte*). The former was represented by performances of didactic pieces, or *Lehrstücke,* as well as new works for children and lay choirs, while the latter was explored with the premiere of two radio plays scored for chamber ensemble: Hindemith's *Sabinchen* and Paul Dessau's *Orpheus.* Hindemith and Toch also contributed new compositions for the gramophone, and Friedrich Trautwein presented in a lecture his newly invented electronic synthesizer, the *Trautonium*. The lecture was followed by a performance on three Trautoniums of seven trios composed by Hindemith; joining Hindemith at the Trautonium were his student Oskar Sala and professor of piano Rudolph Schmitt.

Describing the atmosphere of the festival, Schünemann compared it to "the character of a professional conference, which, like an industrial laboratory, aims to evaluate artistic, technical and sociological ideas in the domain of music according to their potential usefulness in general musical life" (Häusler 1996, 112).[6] The materials testing laboratory, with its scientific and industrial context, is an unusual metaphor for a music festival. However, it closely aligns with the *Gebrauchsmusik* ideals of previous festivals as well as with the political and financial exigencies of the times. As Schünemann's statement attests, the *Gebrauchsmusik* composers were eager to carve out a utilitarian purpose for their work, particularly through the pioneering incorporation of new technologies. Indeed, both Hindemith's and Toch's compositions for gramophone record exemplify this experimental attitude. Hindemith contributed two works for the evening, entitled *Zwei Trickaufnahmen*: one consisting of overlaid recordings of himself on the viola and a xylophone–like instrument at different speeds; the other, sub-

titled *Gesange über Vier Oktaven*, was described by Willi Shuh as an "aria . . . in which the human voice extends to a range of approximately 3 ½ octaves" (quoted in Katz 2010, 111).[7]

Composing for gramophone record was a challenging affair. The records themselves were made of various fragile plastic substances that tended to easily scratch and break; in addition, of course, familiar audio editing techniques such as splicing and layering were impossible. The *Rundfunkversuchsstelle* used 78–rpm records that had a diameter of 25 cm and held between 3–5 minutes of music, thus limiting the duration of the compositions. Katz surmises that Hindemith probably used multiple discs for the different instruments, in something approaching the following process: "For the final version he would have had to play multiple discs–and therefore phonographs–simultaneously . . . In doing so he would have had to stop and start all the machines over and again; poor timing or clumsy movements could ruin the work" (Katz 2010, 111).

Unlike Hindemith, Toch's suite was scored exclusively for a speaking choir. The decision to use speech as the raw material for his piece resonated both with the festival's emphasis on amateur choral music as well as with its dedication to works for experimental radio and new technologies. Given that Toch and Hindemith were both spending time in the *Rundfunkversuchsstelle,* it is extremely likely that they were aware of the exciting developments in vowel synthesis resulting from Trautwein's invention.[8] In the words of Hindemith's student, Sala:

> Trautwein brought a large transformer and a narrowly packed rotating capacitor with 10,000 Picofarad and turned both on in an alternating current (*Kippschwingkreis*). I turned the capacitor and played a few tones. Then we suddenly heard vowels as if spoken in a low or middle range, at different pitches. When we changed the capacitor speed, we added a glissando to the tones, we heard "Wau–wau" and "Miaou." Can you imagine how surprised we were? I suspect that Trautwein had imagined something along these lines, but the result surely exceeded his expectations. (Oskar Sala Fonds am Deutschen Museum, 2013)

Trautwein used Carl Stumpf's formant theory in order to calculate the necessary frequency ranges for each vowel, and Sala notes that when Stumpf himself visited the *Rundfunk Versuchsstelle*, he was visibly shocked at the Trautonium's ability to produce electronic vowel sounds.[9] For Trautwein, however, the vowels were only a by–product of the Trautonium, a step on the way to synthesizing various instrumental timbres.

Of course, Toch was not the first to realize the idea of treating phonemes as raw material for musical compositions. Various nineteenth–century poets had explored the result of stripping poetic forms of their semantic content,

including the nonsense poems of Edward Lear and Lewis Carroll, which would later inspire the Swiss nonsense poet Christian Morgenstern. Toch was interested in the latter's work, and set his play *Egon und Emilie: kein Familiendrama*, for soprano, speaker, and seven wind instruments in 1928, only two years prior to the composition of *Gesprochene Musik.*

Along these lines, Toch's *Lehrkantate, Das Wasser,* a setting of a text by Alfred Döblin and a work also commissioned and premiered by *Neue Musik Berlin,* deserves careful consideration. The premise of *Das Wasser* is a conversation between two figures walking along the beach about the nature of water in general, and the sea in particular; a choir and a single speaker serve as neutral commentators. To call the work's text unusual would be an understatement; with vocal lines such as "Zwei Komma fünf Prozent Salz,"[10] "Wasserstoff und Sauerstoff, H zwei O,"[11] and even "Bei Null Grad gefriert es, bei hundert Grad seidet es, bei neunhundertfunfzig fallen die Atome auseindander,"[12] the *Lehrkanate* forefronts its didactic message relentlessly.

Undeterred by the highly technical nature of the text, Toch takes a neoclassical approach to *Das Wasser*, writing in a modal harmonic language and including familiar forms such as an arietta and fugue. His program notes, published in an issue of the music journal *Melos* dedicated to the festival, offer a glimpse into his compositional approach. Toch (1930b) first mentions that he did not select the text; it was given to him with the instruction to compose it *ad libitum*. He further notes that, in order to use a text, it has to "actually, not metaphorically, 'sound' . . . when Döblin read the 'Wasser' to me, it 'sounded' to me . . . it had to do with the words, which I can best describe as having an 'atmosphere' . . . lying in the naïve, inartificial, often banal language, which affected my musical sense" (221–22).

In his program notes, Toch also reports that while the closed forms of the music came from the words themselves, the division into movements did not necessarily follow the division of the text. In finding the music within a text as determinedly prosaic as Döblin's poem, it appears that Toch relied to a large extent upon the sonic properties of the words. Writing a fugue with a text as repetitive as "Das Wasser, das Wasser, was ist das Wasser"[13] necessitates paying attention to the timbres of consonants, vowels, and alliterations. Perhaps this procedure primed him for the challenge of *Grammophonmusik*, which, as we will see, features similar kinds of texts with even less semantic content.

Although they moved in very different circles, Toch may have been familiar with Kurt Schwitters, an avant–garde artist also based in Berlin, who had been publically performing a sound art composition he called the *Ursonate* since 1925. Schwitters used nonsense words to convey the

pure form of a sonata: introducing first and second themes, moving through development sections, ending with codas, etc. Toch would take a similar (albeit more sophisticated) approach in *Gesprochene Musik* by using various syllables and vowels to depict formal sections and episodes of development.

Toch's *Grammophonmusik*

Toch's approach to *Grammophonmusik* foregrounds human speech, and all three movements of the piece consist exclusively of spoken text. In the "Geographical Fugue," a four–part choir speaks a text consisting primarily of the names of various international locations, adhering to a strict fugal structure. All the customary trappings of the form occur: staggered TASB entry, subject and countersubject, stretto, and a climactic pedal (on the rolled syllable "R") before the final bars. As we will see, Toch's selection of his musical material, and specifically the type and order of the vowels, reflects the constraints of the gramophone's recording and playback capabilities.

Toch was intensely interested in the acoustic properties of speech, which, like music, can be understood in terms of rhythm, pitch, volume, and timbre. Approached from this angle, the spoken word provides ideal raw material for musical composition. As Toch (1930b, 221–22) explained in the program notes he wrote for the piece, the selection of materials was carefully planned:

> I chose to [explore] the spoken word, and let a four–part mixed chamber choir speak specifically determined rhythms, vowels, consonants, syllables, and words, which by involving the mechanical possibilities of the recording (increasing the tempo, and the resulting pitch level) created a type of instrumental music, which leads the listener to forget that it originated from speaking.

In addition, the technological limitations of the machine served as a fruitful impetus for artistic exploration. Upon increasing the playback speed, Toch (1930b, 221–22) noted: "Only in one respect did the machine unfortunately deceive me: it changed the vowels in a way that I had not foreseen. In two short movements and a 'Geographical Fugue,' I tried to address this problem from different angles."

In my previous article (Raz 2012), I explored Toch's solution to this problem in the composition of the "Geographical Fugue." Analyzing the acoustic properties of the locations featured in the work, I discovered a number of ways in which Toch's selection of words was designed to overcome the effect

of the faster gramophone speed, which caused all of the vowels to sound "higher," a distortion colloquially known as the chipmunk effect. I will briefly review these here before turning to the two newly discovered movements.

The "Geographical Fugue" consists of the following words:

> Ratibor!
> Und der Fluss Mississippi
> und die Stadt Honolulu
> und der See Titicaca;
> Der Popocatepetl liegt nicht in Kanada,
> sondern in Mexiko, Mexiko, Mexiko.
> Kanada, Malaga, Rimini, Brindisi,
> Kanada, Malaga, Rimini, Brindisi.
> Ja! Athen, Athen, Athen, Athen,
> Nagasaki, Yokohama,
> Nagasaki, Yokohama.

If we try to reconstruct Toch's criteria for selecting these words, we discover that the overwhelming majority of the syllables in the fugue are open (ending with a vowel), rather than closed (ending with a consonant). Furthermore, only a subset of eight vowels (out of the seventeen German monophtongs) appears in the fugue: *a, o, i, I, ɛ, e, u, v*. Of these, only the five cardinal vowels appear in the geographic locations in the fugue: *a, i, o, ɛ,* and *u*. These relationships are illustrated in Table 1, which tabulates the appearances of each vowel in the text. The column to the far right tabulates vowel pairs, i.e., the frequency with which two vowels follow each other within the same word.

As the table shows, the vowels and vowel pairs within words are not randomly distributed. We can employ a familiar linguistic heuristic: the vowel triangle illustrated below in Example 1, to analyze the acoustic quality of Toch's vowels. The vowel triangle is an abstract representation of the physical location of vowel production within the mouth, mapped horizontally and vertically. The x–axis (front–back) corresponds to the depth of the mouth: imagine it as a line running parallel from the center of the lips to the uvula. The y–axis (closed–open) corresponds to height within the mouth itself: imagine it as a line running from the nose to the chin. This geometrical representation correlates to the strength of the first two formants in different vowel sounds: the first reflects the horizontal position of the tongue within the mouth and the length of the oral cavity (i.e. the mouth's elongation through changes in the position of the lips), while the second formant reflects the degree to which the mouth is open or closed as well as the vertical position of the tongue within the mouth. An intuitive way to understand the vocal triangle is to pronounce the cardinal vowels to yourself while paying attention to the physical changes of your mouth and tongue.

Geographic Names	a=33	i=24	o=12	ε=10	u=2	Vowel Pairs
Ratibor	ra	mi (2)	bor	te	lu (2)	a–i (5)
Mississippi	ca (3)	ssi (2)	ho	pe		i–o (6)
Honolulu	ka (3)	si	no	tl		o–u (1)
Titicaca	na (5)	ppi	po (2)	then (4)		i–a (1)
Popocatepetl	da (3)	ti (3)	ko (5)	me		o–a (3)
Kanada	ma (4)	xi (3)	yo (2)			a–e (5)
Mexiko (3)	la (2)	ri				e–i (3)
Kanada Malaga Rimini	ga (4)	ni				
Brindisi (2)	a (4)	brin				
Athen (4)	sa (2)	di				
Nagasaki Yokohama (2)	ha (2)					

Table 1: Geographic Names, Vowel Occurrence, and Vowel Pairs (within the same word) in the "Geographical Fugue."

Example 1: Toch's Vowels Mapped onto Vowel Triangle. (Adapted from Raz 2012.)

Example 1 maps the information from the rightmost column of Table 1 onto the 2–dimensional vowel triangle. The dotted arrows display the directionality of vowel pairings, taking the ordering of the vowels into account. With two exceptions ("Honolulu" and "Titicaca"), the ordering of the vowels maintains a consistent clockwise direction. This means that vowel pairings tend to follow a certain order: the mid–front /open vowel (a) is followed by vowels that are more closed and front (e and i), while the closed/front vowel (i), is followed by closed / back vowel (o), which in turn is followed by the mid–front / open vowel (a). Moreover, one of the two words that disturb this pattern ("Titicaca"), is the subject of a tight canon in which the syllables appear to "right" themselves, as shown in Example 2. In Raz 2012, I argued that Toch takes great care in preserving this order because it maximizes the acoustic difference among the vowels while also generating tacit auditory expectation in the audience, both factors which helped preserve sonic intelligibility in light of the distortion caused by the sped–up recording.

Example 2: Canon of Titicaca; soprano and bass, m. 23. (Reproduced from Raz 2012.)

Unlike the "Geographical Fugue," "O–a," and "Ta–tam"—the first and second movements of *Grammophonmusik*—consist exclusively of nonsense syllables. Both pieces are quite short: "O–a" is 43 measures long (including repeats), while "Ta–tam" is made up of 34 measures. They feature intricate polyphonic textures, imitations, canons, and various other compositional techniques. Both movements also share the metronome marking of quarter–note = 144, which, given the sheer impossibility of performing the piece "live" at this speed, likely refers to the target tempo for the gramophone's faster setting. The subtitle "Kann ev. auch mit Soloquartet gem. w." (can also be performed by a solo quartet) appears at the top of "O–a"; however, this marking can apply only to the first movement, since the second calls for solo parts in addition to the choir.

Formally, "O–a" invokes a scherzo, presenting a large–scale rounded binary form with sections that can be subdivided to give two further embedded rounded binaries (in the first statement of the Scherzo and in the Trio). This formal scheme is sketched out in Table 2, which also includes the text of each section:

Form		Measures	Text
Scherzo	Intro	1–4	O–a
	A	5–12	O–a
			Tirilirili
			Klapp
	B	13–16	Täritiri
			Taritiri täritiri toritiri tŭritiri
	A	17–20	Tirilirili
			Klapp
Trio	C	25–32	Hiau äau (Hiaua äaua)
			Lala (Lalala)
			Iau äau (Iaua äaua)
			Gogogo gok
	D	33–36	Klapp
			Eae aoa oio iui uou
			Oao eao iao eao
			Uoe oio aoe
			Klapp
			Ŭoŭ ouo eae aia
	C'	37–39	Iai aia
			Karaba wăp
			Iau äau äau oau
			Klapp
Coda (Scherzo)	A	40–43	O–a
			Klapp

Table 2: The text of the piece is built from these words, some of which are repeated extensively. This list does not reflect repetitions within the piece.

Making explicit reference to various scherzo conventions, the piece opens with the tenor line prolonging an oscillation between the vowels *o* and *a*, which gradually increases in speed from quarters to regular sixteenth notes. The oscillation remains steady throughout measures 5–12 and serves as a pedal point over which the resulting texture is built. The alto line presents the first theme, "tirilirili" (A), using an onomatopoeic word associated with birdsong in German. The soprano and bass accompany with staccato "klapp klapp" interjections, evoking the castanets indicated in the performance instructions, or perhaps even the response of supporting lines in a string quartet. This can be seen in Example 3, where Toch assigns each voice a distinct vowel range. Thus, the pedal is on *o–a*, the "theme" is on *i*, while the accompaniment is *a*.

Example 3: "O–a" first theme; SATB, mm. 5–6. First theme in the alto line; pedal in the tenor. (Examples 3–11b are all excerpted from Christopher Caines's new edition of *Gesprochene Musik*.)

The contrasting section (B) of the first binary features predominantly *i* sounds in a playful exchange of the thematic material from the basses up through the sopranos and back again, as shown in Example 4. Toch pays careful attention to the vowel progression during the descent in measure 15, carefully scoring each downbeat differently, moving from a to ä to o and ü. The accompanying alto and bass peter out with "ta–ri" and "ti–ri" syllables in measure 16, preparing the repeat of the first theme once more in measures 17–24, with the alternating "tari tiri" accompaniment of measure 16 sustained by the bass and soprano throughout.

Following a full stop on the last beat of measure 24, the Trio section of the piece begins with contrasting musical material. Two new motives are introduced: a sequence of *i–a–u ä–a–u* over a half note and triplets in the alto, and an accompanying dotted figure in the tenor, underscoring the syllables "la–la." The three–measure phrase is capped by a sixteenth–note "go–go–go gok" motif, which starts in the bass and moves up through the alto and tenor to the soprano in measure 28, as shown in Example 5.

New material appears in the "D" section (measures 34–3). Sixteenth–note triplets with various vowel alternations (*e–a–e, a–o–a, o–i–o, i–u–i*, etc) alternate with unison statements of "klapp klapp." Measures 37–38 reprise the "C" material, with alternating "klapp" syllables in the inner voices and a new accompanying motif in the bass, "ka–ra–ba wăp," which is shown in Example 7. The piece ends with the inner voices reprising the opening *o–a* oscillation, before the final measure of the work ends with the "klapp klapp" motif spoken in unison.

Unlike "O–a," every syllable in "Ta–tam" begins with a consonant, and many of the figurations (unsurprisingly) evoke the onomatopoeic associations of percussion sounds, particularly repeated words like "būm," "tam," and "ta."[14] The piece is a march, both in character and in form, with an introduction followed by first, second, third, and fourth strains (the term strain is associated with the successive sections of the march form). The strains and their related material are shown in Table 3.

Form	Measures	Text
Intro	1–2	Ta tam
Strain 1	3–10	Gobūm gobe Gobetigabe Gedebe Bete katebe tŏn Bete katebe ta Liti pitipi ti Kati potupa tam taratipa tom Patapam
Strain 2	11–18	Quato p tope Ta pata Bogoto Liti pitipi ti Gita petogū tŭgita petogū tŭ Tagita Ta te ti ta
Strain 3	19–26	Tata patata Rūtūpe rŭtŭpŭtŭtŭ tŭm Taredi būm Tätä pätätä Tubum
Strain 4	27–24	Koteti patiteti bum Ten Tapita petapi Pŭtope tapitepo tŭ Kopete patekite po Klan plan

Table 3: The text of the piece is built from these words, some of which are repeated extensively.

The introduction begins with two measures patterned text in the solo tenor line (shown in Example 8), followed by strain 1, accompanied by the basses in a pianissimo dynamic. Strain 1 relies primarily on the consonants *g* and *b*. Strain 2 is taken up by the altos, who are accompanied by the tenors and sopranos. Each group has a different vowel sound, which helps to differentiate between the parts: the melodic line features primarily the vowel *a,* the sopranos the vowel *i,* and the tenors the vowel *o.* Unlike the first strain, the second features primarily open syllables, such as "ta," "pa," "bo," "go," and "to," as can be seen in Example 9.

Example 4: "O–a" contrasting section, "B" material; SATB, mm. 13–16. The motif ascends from the bass to soprano and back down again.

Example 5: "O–a" trio section, "C" material; SATB, mm. 25–28. The theme in the alto is accompanied by tenor.

Example 6: "O–a" excerpt from "D" material; SATB, mm. 33–35.

Example 7: "ⓔ–a" new motif accompanying "C" material; bass, m. 37 (the figure is repeated in m. 38).

Example 8: "Ta–tam" introduction and first two measures of strain 1; tenor and bass, mm. 1–4.

Example 9: "Ta–tam," strain 2; SATB, mm. 10–13.

Example 10: "Ta–tam," strain 3; SATB(B), mm. 19–20. Note that the bass line is divided in two.

Example 11a: "Ta–Tam," beginning of strain 4; SATB, mm. 27–28.

Example 11b: "Ta–Tam" ending; SATB, mm. 32–34.

Strain 3 features a mix of solo and choral parts: a single speaker sustains material related to strain 2 (first a soprano with "patata" then a bass speaker with "pätätä"), while the choir altos, tenors, and basses repeat the percussive pattern, "taredibūm." The fourth and last strain, shown in Example 11a, starts softly with a duet in which the melodic line's delicate "tapita" figure is accompanied with staccato pronunciations of the syllable "ten." This winds down to *pp* with a series of imitations between various parts in the choir. The march ends with a sudden brash cry of "klan plan," as illustrated in Example 11b.

Both "O–a" and "Ta–tam" differ from the "Geographical Fugue," most obviously in using nonsense syllables rather than place names. They also require additional vowels that do not appear in the fugue: "O–a" makes use of ă, ä, and ŭ, while "Ta–tam" employs ū, ŭ, and ä. I imagine the following hypothetical scenario as one possible explanation: Toch composed these two movements first, but found that his performers had trouble remembering and performing the random sequence of vowels. Rehearsals took a long time, and it was difficult to achieve an accurate performance. Having cut the record, Toch discovered that certain vowel nuances that he worked on with the choir—such as the distinction between *a* and ä—were completely lost when the piece was played back at a faster speed. The new speed also made it difficult to understand the distinctions between various strains and sections of the works, as it was difficult to make out the words pronounced by each voice. Toch subsequently decided to solve this problem by limiting his vowels still further, and using actual words rather than nonsense syllables.[15] Hence the "Geographical Fugue," which would have been not only easier for his choir to perform, but also for his audience to comprehend.

Toch's surviving holograph manuscripts for both "O–a" and "Ta–tam" shed some light upon the rehearsal process, although they raise many new questions as well. Written in pen on four single–lined staves ruled in pencil, the manuscripts contain a wealth of dynamic and articulation markings, as well as various performance instructions (such as "*wie Kastagnetten*," or "*wie ein Triller*"). As Caines notes in his preface to the edition, there are a number of markings that appear to be later additions. For example, in "O–a," question marks are penciled lightly over the downbeats of measures 28 and 32, coinciding with a missing text underlay at that point. It is not clear whether these queries came up during the proofreading process, or were added by a performer during the rehearsal process.

Furthermore, the *S* and *c* indications in "Ta–tam" were added in blue and red pencil, respectively. Caines (2014) surmises that during rehearsal, Toch may have "experimented with assigning the vocal figures of the piece alternately to soloists in each section and to full chorus." Finally, there is a

mysterious marking in blue pencil of a square divided into four (a marking that Caines terms the "windowpane") over the downbeats of measures 33 and 35 of "O–a," and over the downbeats of measures 3 and 5 of "Ta–tam." It is not clear what these markings mean. In "O–a," they appear alone, whereas in "Ta–tam," they appear over a tied half note, and a bracket appears over the target note.

Another intriguing point is the discrepancy in the neatness between the copy of "O–a" and "Ta–tam." There is only a single erasure in the former at measure 37, while the latter has numerous copying errors that were corrected on the spot. Perhaps Toch made these fair copies at different times, and they reflect changes in his degree of concentration. In any case, the nature of the corrections attest to the extent to which Toch was sensitive to the different colors and timbres of the work. For example, an erasure in measure 15 of "Ta–tam" reflects the care with which Toch structured his spoken text to reflect a coherent form and hypermetric flow. Here Toch scratches out his original "quato pato peta" in the tenor line, and replaces it with "gita patogo tŭ." Changing the words on the downbeat of a new group of regular four–measure phrases helps to sustain the temporal pattern of syllabic variance. The distribution of the text to the voices, moreover, was also carefully planned out, as can be seen in an erasure in measure 33 of the same movement, where Toch began mistakenly to write in the alto rather than the tenor line, and then caught himself before adding the text and dynamic indications. He corrected this error by copying out the notes again on the staff below.

Later in life, Toch's exquisite sensitivity to the sonic dimension of spoken text would become legendary; his grandson recollects that he was unable to participate in most social activities because "he was afflicted with perfect pitch and such sensitive ears that any conversation registered as music. The inevitable racket of intercutting conversations at a restaurant registered as very, very bad music—an actual torture." Whether this was a legitimate musical affliction or simply a reflection of the composer's mental state does not matter; it is clear that, as Weschler (1996) writes, in America the exiled Toch "was never to recover that lost sense of cultural resonance and buoyancy."

As a successful young composer in Weimar Germany, Toch was able to harness his musical and intellectual talents to create a work that captured a number of influences at a remarkable moment in the development of early electronic music. In *Gesprochene Musik* he incorporated advances in early recording technology, cutting–edge research in contemporary phonetics and vowel synthesis, and the technological leanings of the *Gebrauchsmusik* circle in Berlin. By showcasing the depth and sophistication of Toch's artistry

Plate 1: "O–a" holograph; SATB, mm. 27–32. Note the blue windowpane markings in mm. 29 and 31.

Plate 2: "Ta–tam"; SATB, mm. 36–41. Note the erasure in m. 37, and the blue and red indications "S" and "c" in m. 41, which probably correspond to "solo" and "chorus."

ahead of the publication of Caines's new edition in this volume, my hope is that further scholarly attention will be paid not only to *Gesprochene Musik,* but also to the many other valuable works in Toch's catalogue.

Notes

1. Special thanks are due to Christopher Caines for generously sharing his edition of Gesprochene Musik, and to Ren Weschler and Dina Ormenyi of the Ernst Toch Society for all their help. Additional thanks are due to Tom Fogg, Thomas Patteson, Courtney Thompson, and Nori Jacoby for their helpful suggestions, and to Dan Harrison, Evan Cortens, and Caroline Waight for their encouragement.

2. As Weschler (2003) writes, Toch himself considered the piece a joke.

3. For example, the Cologne Society for New Music's in program for 1930 included three orchestral concerts with works by Hindemith, Stravinsky, Schoenberg, Toch, Erdmans, Webern, and Jamasch, while in Berlin that same year, the renowned new music conductor Hermann Scherchen's ten concerts include works by Hindemith, Milhaud, Reger, Schreker, Schoenberg, and Toch.

4. For more on Mager's *Spärophon* see Patteson 2016, 52–81.

5. Radio, in particular, with its promise of real–time communication with a mass audience, was revolutionizing the consumption and creation of contemporary music at the time. Germany's first public radio station was inaugurated in Berlin in late 1923; by 1924, eight additional regional stations had been established throughout the country. Expanding from the core of approximately 200,000 demobilized military wireless operators, by 1926 there were over a million subscribers to the regional radio channels, a number that would triple by 1930. For a discussion on the origins of public broadcasting in Germany see Jelavich 2006, 36–61.

6. Unless stated otherwise, all translations are my own.

7. While both Hindemith and Toch's original records have been lost, Hindemith's work ended up in Schünemann's estate, where they were donated to the Staatliche Institute für Musikforschung in Berlin. Uninterested, the institute returned the records to Schünemann's son, who subsequently sold them to a junk dealer; however, their contents were fortunately preserved by a tape copy made by the musicologist Martin Elste (1996, 195–221).

8. For more on Trauwein's *Trautonium* and vowel synthesis see Patteson 2016, 114–151.

9. The relationship between Toch's *Grammophonmusik* and concurrent speech synthesis deepens when one considers that Stumpf was also the founder of the Berlin Phonogram Archive, housed at the conservatory.

10. Two point five percent salt.

11. Water and Oxygen, H_2O.

12. At zero degrees it freezes, at a hundred degrees it boils, at nine–hundred–fifty, the atoms separate.

13. The water, the water, what is the water?

14. A similar example can be found in Act 1 scene 3 of Alban Berg's *Wozzeck*, which uses the onomatopoeia "Tschin Bum, Tschin Bum, Bum, Bum, Bum!." Wozzeck premiered at the Berlin State Opera in 1925, four years before Toch moved to the city.

15. I examine the selection (and exclusion) of specific geographical locations in Raz 2012.

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Preface to *Gesprochene Musik,* 1. "O–a" and 2. "Ta–tam"

Christopher Caines

Think of the great composers of German and Austrian music in the last century, and certain names spring to mind: Arnold Schoenberg, Anton Webern, Alban Berg, Paul Hindemith, Kurt Weill. Among those names should be Ernst Toch. That for many musicians and music lovers this is not yet so is due not to the character of Toch's music but to the curtailment of his meteoric early career by the Nazi regime, which drove the composer into exile in 1933. In the United States, where Toch eventually settled, his major achievements in orchestral, chamber, and operatic music remain less familiar than those of his American and European peers.

Toch has long been best known for *The Geographical Fugue*, which is such a repertory staple that today it seems hardly a choral singer in the United States passes through high school and college without performing the piece at least once. The work is equally popular among avocational choruses of all kinds, and professional choirs of course also sing it. Given the *Fugue*'s renown, it is strange that the oddly stoic little note Toch (1950, 12) appended to the published score has apparently excited little curiosity over the years:

> "*This piece is the last movement of a suite GESPROCHENE MUSIK (Spoken Music), which, from different angles, tries to produce musical effects from speech. The suite was performed and recorded at the Berlin Festival of Contemporary music* [sic] *in 1930. The record got lost or was destroyed, likewise the music, except the manuscript.*" Ernst Toch

You might think conductors would have been tumbling over one another trying to get hold of the other movements of this suite: the existence of the manuscript for more music related to the *Fugue* has been no secret for decades. The full story is stranger still. Toch's note would lead the reader to imagine a live public performance and a commercially released live or studio recording. Yet there was no such show, nor any such album. It may come as a shock to its fans that, far from being designed as the reliable choral showpiece it has since become, the *Fugue* was not originally intended for performance by live singers at all.

As Toch indicates, the *Fugue* premiered with its original German text as *Der Fuge aus der Geographie* during the Neue Musik Berlin festival in July 1930 as part of a three–movement suite, whose first two movements

are published here for the first time. As Mark Katz (2001, 176; 2004, 99–113) recounts, the suite was one of the works debuted on the program of *Grammophonmusik* (gramophone music) as *Originalwerke fur Schallplatten* (original works for record albums) shared by Toch and Hindemith, both then rising young stars of German new music, during which the composers used phonographs in various ways to play prerecorded sounds onstage. This explains why there was only ever one "record" of *Spoken Music*, not *records*.

Toch's suite in performance was not played back at the speed at which it had been recorded—78 RPM—but much faster: that was the whole point. The score was conceived for the purpose of providing material for a pioneering experiment in the mechanical manipulation of sound: specifically, an investigation into the acoustical properties of speech as raw material for music that focused on how vocal sounds change when speeded up—to such an extent that, as Toch perhaps to his surprise discovered, they may be distorted beyond recognition. As the composer explained in the program notes he wrote for the concert, he sought to explore

> the spoken word, and let a four–part mixed chamber choir speak specifically determined rhythms, vowels, consonants, syllables, and words, which by involving the mechanical possibilities of the recording (increasing the tempo, and the resulting pitch level) created a type of instrumental music, which leads the listener to forget that it originated from speaking. (Toch 1930, 221–22)[1]

It must have been a weird sight: Berlin's hippest aficionados of avant–garde composition (as I picture them) assembled before a phonograph onstage out of whose great horn–shaped speaker piped the sounds of, well, Alvin and the Chipmunks on amphetamines chanting "Ratibor! Und der Fluss Mississippi und die Stadt Honolulu . . ." If we cannot help but conceive the results as sounding comical, or quaint, or banal to our ears today, we must try to imagine the shock of hearing human speech recorded and speeded up when that phenomenon had hardly ever been publicly heard before, and perhaps never in a musical context. By an odd turn of fate, the audience in 1930 did include at least one person fully capable of realizing the concert's implications regarding the role that technology would play in music in decades to come: none other than the eighteen–year–old John Cage.

The *Fugue* owes its American career to Cage's advocacy, while the oblivion to which Toch consigned the first two movements of *Gesprochene Musik* is perhaps due in part to Cage's apparent lack of interest in them. The fledgling American composer sought out Toch at his first American

home in Pacific Palisades, California, in 1935, and obtained his per-mission to have the *Fugue*'s score published in Henry Cowell's seminal magazine *New Music* in that same year, with the by now iconic English–language text that Cage and/or Cowell probably created or commis-sioned ("Trinidad! And the big Mississippi and the town Honolulu . . ."). Although Cowell published the score as part of a selection of music composed for gramophone, Cage promoted the work with zest, considering the *Fugue* a seminal work of genius, while Toch in later years tended to dismiss it as a youthful jeu d'esprit. Perhaps in some sense they were both right. Seriousness and whimsicality need not be strangers.

With *Gesprochene Musik*, Toch singlehandedly invented the genre of music for speaking choir, which the composer's grandson, the writer Lawrence Weschler (1996, 2003), has described only half–jokingly as "Weimar rap." As Toch of course well knew, the use of spoken instead of or in addition to sung text has deep roots in German music, especially music for the theater. Toch, who throughout his life considered himself "but a link in the chain" of composers, was always conscious of balanc-ing progressiveness, even prescience, in his work with an unshakeable reverence for tradition. To innovate by digging in soil tilled deeply by his predecessors was ever his method.

✎

"The record got lost or was destroyed, likewise the music, except the manuscript," which was among the papers that Toch and his wife, Lilly, succeeded in taking with them when they fled Germany with their little daughter (Weschler 2015). So far as the staff at the Ernst Toch Society in Santa Monica is able to ascertain, the suite's first two move-ments had never been heard since that single 1930 concert until 2006, when they were sung to accompany a ballet I choreographed for my ensemble, Christopher Caines Dance, set to Toch's complete works for speaking choir—which, in addition to *Spoken Music*, includes only one other work, the *Valse*, Toch's bemused parody of cocktail party chatter, composed in 1960 (published by Belwin Mills in 1962 but now unfor-tunately out of print). The dance was one section of a program–length work entitled *Worklight* (Castelnuovo–Tedesco 2006).

In order to make our performances possible, I prepared an edition of "O–a" and "Ta–tam" from a photocopy of the composer's holograph graciously provided to me by the Toch Society from the composer's archive at UCLA. The manuscript scores are written in ink on hand–penciled rhythm staves. They are complete drafts but by no means fair

copies prepared for an engraver. Although both pieces are in one sense simple (since there is no pitch notation) and brief (each lasts only a minute or two in performance), deciphering the manuscripts posed several challenges.

In editing the music, I have been guided by the principle of making the fewest possible changes necessary to render the pieces performable. (Some details of the music that conductors and singers may want to consider in preparation for rehearsal are discussed in the notes to the scores.) I have written out the manuscripts' repeats, eliminating the use of repeat signs in the interest of ease of reading; corrected a few missing and miscalculated rests and erroneous or confusing beams and ties; and added a few obviously missing dynamic markings (such editorial additions are printed in parentheses). I have spelled out abbreviations in Toch's German expression markings and annotations and added English translations of them.

The greatest difficulty in editing this music is posed by the text. While the *Fugue*'s text comprises phrases incorporating the names of cities and other geographical features from around the world, "O–a" and "Ta–tam" set expressive nonsense syllables of the composer's own devising. In effect, "O–a" concentrates on experimenting with vowel sounds, "Ta–tam" with consonants, and the *Fugue* puts both together, playing with the rhythmical possibilities of words as if discovering them anew—almost as if words themselves had only just been invented.[2]

I have added hyphens to connect Toch's syllables into "words" that match the notes' rhythmic groupings; without these hyphens, the text would be all but impossible to read at anything close to the rapid tempo Toch indicates (a tempo impossible for live singers that is explained by the use of the phonograph in 1930). I have also supplied three syllables missing in the text underlay, and I have made diacritics in a few repeated phrases congruent where Toch appears to have been somewhat careless with them.

Determining Toch's intentions regarding these diacritics, which crucially affect the pronunciation of his invented language, poses a particular problem. The composer's addition of breves and macrons (˘ and ¯; short and long marks, respectively) to indicate the precise German vowel sounds he intends makes it clear that vowel quantity is important in the performance of this music. However, Toch's use of the marks is often inconsistent and occasionally even contradictory. He tends to include the diacritics when introducing a new phrase for the first time but does not bother with them after that, seeming to take for granted that his copyist or engraver would understand his intentions,

or more likely intending to supervise the copying or engraving himself. Moreover, in Toch's rather hasty handwriting, it is sometimes hard to tell the two marks apart. I have followed Toch's predominant rendering of each phrase in question, which leaves certain choices—the vowels Toch writes without diacritics—to the performers' discretion. Had Toch, whose published scores testify to his meticulous scrutiny, seen these pieces into publication, he would without question have resolved every ambiguity himself. I can only hope to have managed largely to fulfill his intentions.

Toch's insistence on precision of enunciation in this music is revealed in the text's refined details. Certain phrases, for example, are introduced only to be slightly varied right away: In "Ta–tam," the soprano answers the bass's "be-te ka-te-**be tŏn**" with "be-te ka-te-**be ta**," which she soon changes to "be-te ka-te-**pe ta**." Later, "gi-ta pe-to-**go tŭ**" is developed into "gi-ta pe-to-**gū tŭ**," in order to connect via "tŭ–gi–ta" to "ta–gi–ta." Such subtleties enhance the illusion that the singers are speaking a real language while at the same time reinforcing specific textural effects.

Carmel Raz's (2014) illuminating dissection of Toch's phonemic palette in "O–a" and "Ta–tam" underscores the intensity of Toch's preoccupation with *sound* in composing this music, and with the expressive fusion of vocal timbre and rhythm. Raz's formal analysis of the pieces as miniaturized versions of, respectively, a classical scherzo and a traditional march is also persuasive. In this regard, it may be worthwhile to recall the etymological meaning of *scherzo* (a jest), and to note that the vowel–dominant phonemic palette of "O–a" suggest strings and woodwinds, while the consonant–dominant array in "Ta–tam" suggests a marching band's percussion and brass.

Whatever interpretive choices are made, the key is to understand that, nonsense though it may be, this is in essence a German–language score, and all the syllables should be pronounced as they sound *in richtigem Hochdeutsch* (in correct High German). That said, I think that when the music is performed by singers whose first language is not German, and preceding the English version of the "Fugue," any inevitable local coloring of the sounds will not be out of keeping in a score that concludes with a celebratory ode to the joys of global geography.

I wish to note three other mysteries that only Toch himself could resolve with absolute certainty. First, in "O–a" there are lightly penciled question marks (in a hand other than Toch's, I think) over the downbeats of measures 28 and 32; I feel sure that these marks simply note the lack of text underlay for some of the voices in these two places, which I

have supplied. (Unless Toch himself had a *What was I thinking?* moment, the question marks suggest that someone other than Toch was involved in preparing a fair copy or engraved setting of the score in 1930.)

Second, "Ta–tam" has, in thick, soft colored pencils, letter S's in small circles and squares and circled letter C's at several points. I conjecture that, though he nowhere says so, Toch must have experimented at some point with assigning the vocal figures of the piece alternately to soloists in each choral section and to full chorus (designated S and C for *Solo* and *Chor*). I have included these markings, since the musical result of performing "Ta–tam" in this way would certainly be of interest; adopting a similar approach to "O–a" would also yield valid musical results. Toch's indication in "Ta–tam" to the effect that the piece could *also* be performed by vocal quartet (even though he used a small chorus in 1930 and even though the score's passage with *divisi* bass would in fact require a *quin*tet) suggests I think that conductors should feel free to experiment with the forces at their disposal (and also suggests that Toch must have considered a possible life for the music in live performance after the phonograph concert).

Finally, in "O–a" there are also square marks, in the same or a similar soft–penciled hand, divided in four like windowpanes, in all four voices over the "klapp" on the downbeat of measures 33 and 35; identical windowpane marks also appear over the downbeats of measures 3 and 4 in the tenor in "Ta–tam." Since I cannot guess what these puzzling marks might mean (and since standard music notation software does not offer such a symbol), I have not included them in the printed scores.

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Despite his distinguished career as a professor of composition and composer for film, a Pulitzer Prize (in 1956, for his Symphony no. 3) and a Grammy in 1960, and an extraordinarily rich output of major scores in his last years, Toch never regained in the United States the great reputation nor, more importantly, the feeling of belonging, of social embeddedness in musical society, that had anchored him in Germany in his early career. It is heartbreaking to read that in his later years Toch sometimes referred to himself ruefully as "the world's most forgotten composer" (Weschler 1977, xv). With a steady flow of new recordings and increasingly lively interest among musicians, especially in Germany, Toch's music is gradually coming to enjoy the appreciation that it has long deserved. I do not doubt that one day his symphonies and string quartets in particular will be acknowledged among the masterworks of the twentieth century.

Compared to them, the two pieces offered here are admittedly of much smaller scale, yet they are no less momentous for that. First, "O–a" and "Ta–tam" are challenging and fun to perform—worth singing and hearing in their own right. They cast light on a much–loved staple of the choral repertoire: heard as Toch originally intended it as the climax of *Gesprochene Musik*, the *Fugue* feels and *sounds* different from how it does in isolation. The suite deserves to take its rightful place in the history of the radically experimental tradition in modernist music.

In its original cultural context, a particular moment in the growth of the Weimar avant–garde, the suite was specifically an experiment in the areas of speech as music, the mechanical manipulation of recorded sound, and playback as performance—fields then closely allied to the earliest forays in electronic music and the exploration of radio as an artistic medium. From the vantage point of nearly a century later, *Gesprochene Musik* is revealed as anticipating or converging with many later developments: a whole wing of vocal music devoted to playing with language beyond words, whose most salient American exponent has long been Meredith Monk (scores by Cage and Stockhausen also come to mind); popular forms that emphasize rhythmical speech over singing, such as word jazz, Jamaican dancehall, and rap/hip–hop; sampling, looping, morphing, and other technological manipulations of music that are particularly applied to the recorded voice; as well as a distinctive strain of modernist humor (think P. D. Q. Bach). Even within only the field of acoustic choral music, these two tiny pieces point toward musical territory that remains uncharted.

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Toch's intentions sometimes seemed to be. Finally, I thank Carmel Raz for introducing me to recent scholarship, including her own, that illuminates this score, and for her assistance in the final proofreading and correction of this edition.

If making available the complete score of *Gesprochene Musik* plays a small part in redressing the unjust neglect that so much of Toch's music has had to endure for so long, it would gladden my heart.

Notes

1. Quotation translated by Carmel Raz (2014).

2. For the purposes of my dance, I inserted the *Valse* between "O–a" and "Ta–tam," ending with the "Fugue." I would commend this sequence to vocal ensembles interested in performing Toch's complete music for speaking choir as a set in concert. The problem is that if the *Valse* precedes *Gesprochene Musik*, it seems to preempt the suite's developmental structure—the "discovery" of words—while the *Fugue* upstages the *Valse* if the later–composed work is performed immediately following the suite. Programming some other piece between the suite and the *Valse* or allowing for applause or even an intermission between them might also be a good solution.

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1. "O-a"
For SATB Chorus

Ernst Toch (1930)

kann eventuell mit Soloquartett gemacht werden / can optionally be performed by vocal quartet [1]

2. "Ta-tam"

For SATB Chorus with optional soloists; or vocal quintet (SATBB)[1]

Ernst Toch (1930)

Editor's Note to *Gesprochene Musik*, 1. "O–a" and 2. "Ta–tam"

Christopher Caines

1. Use strict German pronunciation of all vowel and consonant sounds throughout, making special note of the umlauted vowels. (It is important to remember that German vowels are pure, like Italian vowels, not diphthongized, as in most English dialects.) The breves and macrons (˘ and ‾; short and long marks, respectively) are not to be interpreted as indications of light and heavy stress, as these symbols are used in prosody. Rather, they indicate German vowel quantity. For example, *tŭ–ri–ti–ri* and *ŭ–o–ŭ* should be pronounced with the *u* sound in the word *foot*; and the last syllable of *ka–ra–ba–wăp* sounds like "vup," rhyming with the English word *up*. I leave it to each conductor or group or singers to decide how to pronounce vowels that have no length mark, and suggest that they should probably in general be pronounced short, except for *i*, which I think should always be long.

2. The composer's manuscript metronome marking of quarter = 144 is clearly an artifact of the premiere, where the music was "performed" by a speeded–up recording. This would seem to be vocally impossible and should perhaps be interpreted to mean *as fast as possible without sacrificing clarity of articulation.*

3. Toch's intention in bracketing this figure in the alto part in mm. 5–10 is not entirely clear. I believe the composer means that, since the alto part has the leading line here, for the sake of clarity the alto(s) should not sing the *klapp klapp* figure unless necessary for reinforcement. In performances by a chorus, the altos could also sing mm. 4–12 divisi.

4. Toch forgot to include the text underlay for these notes. It is clear that the tenor should sing *–la* on the downbeat of m. 28 (cf. m. 32). I think that it is most idiomatic and musical for the alto to sing *–i* on the downbeats of m. 28 and m. 32; however, Toch might have intended the alto to prolong the previous syllable across the barline in both cases, singing *–u* into m. 28 and *–a* into m. 32.

5. The [C] in m. 10 and the [S] in m. 25 appear to be courtesy markings. It is however possible that Toch forgot to add an [S] marking in m. 6 in the bass and/or a [C] marking in m. 21 or m. 23 in the soprano.

The Musical Work Reconsidered, In Hindsight

Gavin Steingo

1. Introduction and Outline of the Argument

Certainly, the concept of the musical work has not always existed. Yet deciphering precisely *when* the work emerged has proved an immensely difficult task for musicologists.[1] In particular, the publication of Lydia Goehr's *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*—in which she famously argued that the work–concept crystallized around 1800—has provoked an endless litany of modifications and outright rebuttals.[2] In many cases scholars have retained the gist of Goehr's argument but have sought to push the date backwards, often to the period of their own specialization. Several scholars of Baroque music have argued that musical works existed in the seventeenth century (although not before) while several scholars of the Renaissance have argued that the musical work emerged during that era (although not earlier).[3] Indeed, there have been attempts—although somewhat muted—to locate the advent of the musical work in the Medieval period.[4] In particular, the question of whether J. S. Bach composed musical works has received a great deal of attention. Although he died a full fifty years before 1800, several scholars have argued that Bach did compose musical works and have used this argument as a refutation of Goehr's 1800 hypothesis.[5]

Most recent studies have in fact been written as direct confrontations with Goehr's seminal text. Goehr (2000, 2007) herself has occasionally been pulled into the fray and has defended her position valiantly and with gusto. Indeed, there are many reasons to take her arguments seriously and in some ways the historical archive seems to support the 1800 hypothesis. Nonetheless, if we consider the sheer number of scholars who have contested her hypothesis (or at least her dating) there is reason to suspect that perhaps the puzzle has not been adequately solved. In this essay, I revisit this crucial issue by shifting the emphasis from dating (that is, from the question of *when* the musical work emerged) to historiography. If quibbling about the precise date of the emergence of the musical work has proved largely ineffectual, then perhaps it is time to radically rethink our mode of historical investigation. I suggest that one useful way to proceed is to shift the emphasis from a search for origins to a focus on the very notion of historical change.

Every discussion, historicization, or analysis of the musical work must face the dilemma of defining what a musical work is in the first place. Few musicologists today would have difficulty accepting the argument that the musical work is historically contingent, that is, that it is not a transcendental category.[6] I take it as a given that the musical work is historical and, moreover, contested. One common—and, I would submit, quite reasonable—criticism of Goehr is that she too narrowly defines the parameters of the musical work. Perhaps the work–concept was not operative in the early eighteenth century in the same way that it was in the early nineteenth, but should this mean that there was no conception of a musical work in any way at all?[7] In other words, could we not argue for a *pluralization* of the very notion of work–ness and subsequently recognize different types of musical works at different historical periods?

It seems to me that we do need a flexible definition of the musical work. It is efficacious, in other words, to move away from a single moment at which *the* musical work emerged and to instead examine various types of related concepts and practices both before and after 1800. At the same time, it is not unreasonable to recognize major musical transformations where they have occurred. And indeed, few (if any) researchers deny that something we may call the musical work (however broadly defined) emerged at some point during the past five hundred years. The question is simply at what point it did so, under what conditions, and to what musical and social ends.

Despite the many disagreements surrounding the musical work, a relatively stable constellation of terms and ideas is readily discernable in recent scholarship on the topic. In particular, music's growing reliance upon the score is almost unanimously understood as a major development in the advent of the musical work. In reality, the score is only one part of a much larger story, which must necessarily also include issues such as compositional (or authorial) control, the possibility of repeatability, the notion of permanence, and the emergence of aesthetic autonomy as a core European ideology.

I will address and complicate many of these issues in the course of this article. At this stage, and at the risk of being overly reductive, it will be sufficient to tentatively characterize the development of the musical work as a transition or even inversion of "where" music is located. When music notation first emerged in the West, inscription was understood as secondary to musical performance. In other words, music was understood first and foremost as an act of performance and the function of notation was to supplement this act, either as a series of more or less (usually less) specific instructions, or as a form of memorialization after the fact. The advent of the musical work marks the point at which this relationship is inverted: now, performance is secondary and attests to a primary (or more fundamental)

"work" manifested most precisely in the form of a score. With this inversion, the basic ontological status of music changes such that individual performances are merely (better or worse) instantiations of a work that exists over and above all of the possible performances that may ever take place. Indeed, a work of music may exist that is *never* performed (as happens all too frequently in the lives of many young composers today).

My aim is neither to celebrate this inversion as a major achievement nor to bemoan it as a transformation complicit with the degradation of music *qua* act. Furthermore, I readily acknowledge that a musicologist could easily focus on aspects different to the ones I have emphasized here or even—as I have implied—dismiss the entire project of historicizing the musical work as so much nonsense, since the "history of the musical work" begs the very question that it seeks to answer. Nonetheless, refuting the inversion to which I point is actually not the primary target of most scholarly debate. On the contrary, scholars generally agree on this important shift in the ontological status of music and the musical score (although often not in exactly those terms) and disagree mostly on the issue of dating.

If we can tentatively assume that the musical work exists in a relatively coherent manner, then when did it emerge? Beethoven certainly wrote musical works, but did Bach? Did Monteverdi? Did Palestrina? What about Josquin, or Ockeghem? It seems to me that instead of answering these questions directly a more oblique response may prove more valuable.

To this end, I draw on the work of the philosopher Noam Yuran and propose a novel approach to the question of historical change. As a way into the argument, I begin by considering a structural analogy between the history of the musical work and Yuran's analysis of the history of money. I am not arguing for a direct causal relationship between the histories of music and money, nor am I proposing an economic "basis" for music's history. Instead, I use the analogy with money purely as a heuristic device and as a way to introduce Yuran's complex ideas.[8]

Yuran begins by observing that economic historians have long documented the use of precious metals as units of exchange in ancient civilizations. In the case of metals such as silver or gold, value was determined through weight. In Adam Smith's classic formulation, the institution of coins was borne of practicality:

> The inconveniency and difficulty of weighing those metals with exactness gave occasion to the institution of coins, of which the stamp, covering entirely both sides of the piece and sometimes the edges too, was supposed to ascertain not only the fineness, but the weight of the metal. Such coins, therefore, were received by tale as at present, without the trouble of weighing. (Smith 1904, 28)[9]

Smith's orthodox explanation is that the symbol (the "stamp") testifies to the material quantity (weight) of the piece of metal. The symbol tells the user about the material substance and by doing so relieves her of having to weigh the substance each time. This rather banal explanation of the institution of coins receives an interesting twist when viewed from the perspective of modern (or "fiat") money.[10] With modern coins (such as the ones we use today), the symbol (currency value) does not signify the material substance as much as the material substance attests to the legitimacy of the symbol.

In other words, directly following the advent of coins with stamps, a suspicion that the stamp (or symbol) was fake led to a suspicion about the material substance to which that stamp attested. If there was something fishy about the stamp on a piece of metal alleging to be gold, then one had every right to suspect that there was something wrong with the piece of metal as well. A dodgy stamp was probably a sign of some kind of counterfeiting, which meant that the metal bit under consideration was either of poor quality or did not correspond to the unit of weight that the (false) stamp alleged. (In the worst case, the metal itself may not be "precious" at all—instead of gold it may just be some kind of slag.)

With modern money, however, the reverse is true: any doubt about the legitimacy of the material substance can lead only to a suspicion that the *symbol* is fake. Put simply: if a one–dollar bill does not have a watermark then it is not worth one dollar. This explains why, when a large quantity of counterfeit coins or notes is discovered, the state's response is to compound and destroy the coins or notes and not simply to scratch off the currency signs. (On the other hand, it would have made more sense in the case of early fake coins to simply scratch off the stamp.)

Smith's history of coins presented above is therefore only interesting when we consider its surprising ending. As Yuran (2014, 133) observes: "The symbol is instituted to attest to its material substance but by this very attestation, it makes the material substance redundant; it renders materiality secondary in importance in comparison to the symbol. The symbol replaces in its function that which it symbolized." In other words, the stamp to which Smith refers *at first* attests to the material substance ("ascertain[ing] not only the fineness, but the weight of the metal," as he puts it), but through this "attestation" something strange happens. Precisely by attesting to the material substance, the stamp becomes more important than that substance, which is now relegated to secondary importance.

The exact same—or at least parallel—unexpected ending occurs in the case of the musical work. At first, the score serves to assist musicians in forthcoming performances of a particular piece or else memorializes a performance that has already taken place. But at some point an inversion

occurs and performances of a piece are understood as an instantiations of that piece—or what we could now call a *work*. In other words, and to paraphrase Yuran: the symbol (score) is instituted in order to attest to a material practice (musical performance), but by this very attestation it makes the material practice of performance redundant, it renders materiality of secondary importance in comparison to the symbol. Of course, strictly speaking neither the material substance of modern coins nor the material practice of performance is redundant. The point is simply that these material "bases" attest to, or are secondary to, their "symbols."[11]

Returning to the history of money, we may ask: at what point did things change? At what point did the symbol stop attesting to the material substance and become primary, only to have the material substance attest to *it*? Here, another surprising result announces itself, namely that it is theoretically impossible to discern when the shift from substance supported by symbol to symbol supported by substance took place. I quote Yuran (2014, 133–34) at length:

> The only possible temporality of this change is of that which *has already happened*. Indeed there can be points in time when people acknowledge the fact that a change has already taken place . . . A posterior recognition in change implies that a real change has already happened beforehand. Simply put, if we accept that there is a real difference between the two forms of coin in the story, between a gold coin and fiat coin—a distinction which does not seem at all far fetched—then the real transition between them must have occurred sometime. Yet it is theoretically impossible to locate this point in time. (emphasis in the original)

The notion of posterior recognition—which, we will soon see, was already obliquely suggested by Goehr—has tremendous explanatory power in terms of the musical work as well. In a manner structurally identical to money, it is theoretically impossible to determine when the shift from material practice (performance) supported by symbol (score) shifted to symbol (score) supported by material practice (performance). Indeed, I would argue that locating this shift is not only theoretically impossible but also *ontologically undecideble*. In other words, it is not simply that "we" as humans, because we have insufficient reasoning abilities, are unable to determine the shift. Instead, the shift itself is theoretically non–locatable because it did not ever "happen" as such. The best we can say is that the change has already taken place at some prior moment, but we cannot ever locate that moment in time.

If my argument holds any water, then perhaps it is possible to at last understand the frustration over determining the emergence of the musical work, because it is theoretically impossible to discern when the musical work emerged. I will return to this theoretical dilemma later and will suggest a way

to move beyond the impasse. But before doing so, it is necessary to more carefully examine the musicological controversies and debates surrounding the musical work. In the following sections I summarize Goehr's position and then proceed to more carefully evaluate several prominent criticisms leveled against it. In my view, the fact that Goehr's argument has remained standing at all in the face of a kind of total onslaught implies its veracity, if only partial. On the other hand, the fact that her argument has never ceased to provoke scandal seems to imply that there is something truly troublesome, or even aporetic, in the thesis she proposed more than twenty years ago.

2. Synopsis and Critical Analysis of *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*

Lydia Goehr's *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* is divided into two sections. The first section addresses strictly philosophical considerations by focusing on the work of aesthetically–oriented analytical philosophers. Goehr's main point in this first section is that all ahistorical approaches inevitably run aground because the musical work is a thoroughly historical concept.[12] I will not devote any more space to the first section of her book (which in any event acts primarily as a foil to the second part) because I assume that the vast majority of readers of this journal require no convincing. That is to say, few musicologists today *don't* believe that the musical work is historically contingent. If there are disagreements, these are only about the "when" of the work and sometimes also on how we should understand this quite complex concept.

In the second part of her book, Goehr turns to the history of the musical work. Her central claim is that the work–concept became regulative around the year 1800.[13] What, precisely, does this mean? One handy way to unpack the claim is to recall the title of her book: for Goehr, musical works are those that belong in an "imaginary museum."[14] The term "imaginary" immediately disqualifies one common interpretation of her thinking, namely the assertion that for Goehr works are equivalent to scores.[15] The importance of notation and scores notwithstanding, for Goehr musical works are reducible neither to their performances *nor their scores* (nor, in fact, to anything and everything else). Indeed, musical works are "ontological mutants" which:

> do not exist as concrete physical objects; they do not exist as private ideas existing in the mind of a composer, a performer, or a listener; neither do they exist in the eternally existing world of ideal, uncreated forms. They are not identical, furthermore, to any one of their performances . . . Neither are works identical to their scores. (Goehr 2007, 2–3)[16]

The "object" that we call the musical work was achievable only "through projection or hypostatization." Because scores and performances are "worldly or at least transitory and concrete items" they can never fully match the status of a musical work, which in the early nineteenth century were understood as the "permanently existing creations of composers". It is precisely for this reason that the only "museum" capable of housing musical works is an imaginary or metaphysical one (Goehr 2007, 174).

Having said this, the score remains a crucial piece of technology in Goehr's project. Scores, she says, translate the "ideal of untouchability into concrete terms" (Goehr 2007, 224). In her view, they mediate the relationship between "the abstract (the works) with the concrete (the performances)" (231). Furthermore, although Goehr does not equate works with notation, she does notice that the emergence of the concept of the musical work was closely tied to an increasing reliance on scores. "[A]s long as the composers provided incomplete or inaccurate scores," she writes,

> the idea of performance extempore could not acquire its distinct opposite, namely, the fully compliant performance of a work. Such a contrast emerged fully around 1800, just at the point when notation became sufficiently well specified to enable a rigid distinction to be drawn between composing through performance and prior to performance. (188)

In other words, although Goehr emphasizes that works are not equivalent or reducible to scores, it is the score and not a performance that most authentically mediates the work after 1800.[17]

The emergence of the musical work was also closely related to a reconfiguration of the category of music itself. For this reason, Goehr devotes a substantial portion of her text to the aesthetic theory of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Among the many defining characteristics of aesthetic theory, one thing stands out: the separation of art from the world of ordinary and mundane experience. In other words, a key factor of aesthetic theory is the *autonomy* of art. Music, as is well known, came to be understood in the course of the nineteenth century as the most autonomous and perhaps most "abstract" of all the art forms, primarily by dint of its alleged non–referentiality.

Nonetheless, music's autonomy was closely associated with its heteronomy: "the new romantic aesthetic allowed music to mean its purely musical self at the same time that it meant everything else" (Goehr 2007, 157).[18] What Goehr calls the "romantic illusion" presented the possibil-

ity "of an object, a person, or an experience, to exhibit simultaneously the character of the human and the divine, of the concrete and the transcendent" (158). In the case of music, this meant that the "emancipation" from extra–musical meaning was coupled with a counter–gesture in which music came to represent transcendence and the absolute.

Before 1800, by contrast, music was tied to—and in large part constituted by—its extra–musical *function* (Goehr 2007, 122). Performances were judged less in terms of how well a pre–existing work was executed than "on whether an audience had been efficaciously affected in a manner appropriate to the occasion" (192). The activity of performance, tethered to a particular social or political event, was always emphasized over and above the production of a "physical construction," namely the score (124). The social utility of performance was prized above all else, and the function of a score was mainly to assist in the execution of a successful performance. "[E]ven if musicians were beginning to see composition as an activity that took place quite independently of actual performance activity," writes Goehr, "they might still have continued to see the former as truly completed only in the latter" (198).

This brief summary of Goehr's seminal text is, of course, selective. And indeed, her central claim that the work–concept became regulative around the year 1800 can only be understood comprehensibly after a careful analysis of the terms "concept" and "regulative"—I return to those terms later. On the most basic level, though, her argument about the advent of the musical work turns on the same "inversion" that I referred to above. Before 1800, says Goehr, performance was prioritized over inscription. After 1800, by contrast, musical performances attest to a "work" that exists over and above all possible performances. Although Goehr does not equate the work with the score, she does suggest that the score is the material technology that most authentically mediates the metaphysical musical work. As such, although my tentative characterization of the musical work presented in the introduction places more weight on notation than does Goehr, it retains the deeply historical resonances of *The Imaginary Museum*, along with the notion that the work–concept comes—at some point in history—to dominate performance.

In order to more fully elucidate the advantages and limitations of Goehr's position, and as a pathway towards an elaboration of my own main argument, in the following section I examine in some detail the criticisms leveled against *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works.* One important point of contestation, to reiterate, is *when* the work–concept emerged. Goehr's answer—"around 1800"—has been the subject of numerous criticisms and it is to those criticisms that I now turn.

3. Conceptual Criticisms of *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*

Goehr's central claim that the work–concept crystallized around 1800 has been variously termed the "1800 thesis," "the Watershed Thesis" (Dyck 2010), and the "'Great Divide' Hypothesis" (Young 2005, 175). One frequent, and in some ways quite obvious, criticism of the 1800 hypothesis is that history unfolds gradually and that presenting a precise year is thus inherently reductionist. Commenting on the "sharp line of distinction between the concept of music composition as a craft—or *métier*—before 1800, and that of musical practice seen as a transcendental fine art, after 1800," William Erauw asks "whether such sharp distinctions can be made." For him, offering "drastic lines of division in history, i.e. dividing history into blocks, is always dubious"—so much so, he says, that "we could suspect the whole approach as being an anachronistic construction of the historian" (Erauw 1998, 111) . Echoing this sentiment, Reinhard Strohm asserts that expressions such as "for the first time" and "at this point"—which, he observes, are used frequently by Goehr—rely on "a demonstration that these things had never happened before." For Strohm, such a demonstration is "manifestly impossible" because all historical change is *gradual* (Strohm 2000, 135). Locating (or claiming to locate) an exact cut–off point is thus, for him, quite illogical.

Goehr is not particularly threatened by this criticism. As she clearly states in *The Imaginary Museum*, "Finding a 'rough' date is satisfactory because conceptual change, like the change in practices, has no sharply defined beginning or end" (Goehr 2007, 110). In other words, she agrees with her critics that historical change is gradual. The date 1800 is for her simply a convenient marker of what she takes to be an obviously much more stretched out historical development. Philip Tagg (2000, 163) thus states that he

> is in agreement Lydia Goehr that it *was around 1800*—and, it should be added, primarily among intellectuals in German–speaking Europe—that the concept of "work" (in the sense of musical end product or commodity) started to become more frequently identified with the superior aesthetic values that many keepers of the "classical" seal have attributed to a certain kind of Central European instrumental music ever since. (emphasis mine)

Tagg fully acknowledges that, as he says, "positing a conjuncture of ideas and events . . . cannot be explained in simple terms of linear causality" (162). His Marxian approach recognizes "the conflux of a multitude of

lengthy, sometimes contradictory historical processes in dialectical inter-action that crystallise into a more easily perceptible whole at a particular his-torical time and place" (162–63). For Tagg, none of this means that we should reject the 1800 hypothesis. On the contrary, the 1800 hypothesis simply means that *around that time* important changes took place.

In response to Strohm's critique, Goehr points out that he risks lapsing into a Sorites Paradox, a type of little–by–little argument. By this she means that if one year cannot be enough for historical change to occur (because change is always "gradual") then surely two years also cannot. But if two years cannot be enough then three years is also insufficient. From there, we enter an infinite regress in which no amount of time is sufficient for historical change. Thus, Strohm's argument that saying "at this point" requires a demonstra-tion of absolute newness would lead—by virtue of the Sorites Paradox—to the logical conclusion "that the work–concept existed from the first day of musical practice (whenever that was)" (Goehr 2000, 242). This conclusion, for anyone who believes that the work–concept is historically contingent, is patently absurd. The more reasonable position, Goehr believes, is therefore to propose a "rough" date for a concept's emergence.

Still, a certain skepticism lingers. Why? Reflecting on *The Imaginary Museum* fifteen years after its publication, Goehr (2007, xxvii) writes:

> Even though I explicitly rejected the idea that the history of the work–con-cept reflected a necessary, determinist, or essential development in music's history, my thesis was interpreted not only as prioritizing the 1800 turning point to an excessive degree, but also as essentializing the concept according to this singular historical moment.

Her words "to an excessive degree" perhaps betray more than they intend and belie a series of equivocations that run through her work. Consider, for exam-ple, her later reflection that she did not "mean (and I thought this would have been obvious) to equate 1800 with a year, a month, a day, or an hour" (xxviii). The apparent innocence of this recollection is undermined by the sentence that directly follows it: "Saying this, however, I had better quickly add that neither did I think that '1800' stood for all time." In other words, 1800 does *not* designate a particular year, but it also does not designate "all time." What, then, does it designate exactly? A decade? Two decades? With Goehr's hastily added caveat to her "obvious" point that she did not intend to specify a particular year (or month or day or hour), the historiographical problems become clear and the critics of the "1800 hypothesis" begin to seem more reasonable.

This is why, to those critics who have argued for pushing the 1800 hypothesis back in time *and* to those critics who have argued for push-ing it forward, Goehr (2007, xxxiii) can only respond: "The challenge is

well motivated in both directions."[19] The question again, is just *how* well motivated and just *how* far back or forward. The entire discussion begins to seem like a game of cat and mouse. Hence, to Goehr's observation that "[o]n the whole, musicologists recommended that I adopt a greater conceptual perspectivism regarding the work–concept, less, however, to undermine my thesis than to amplify it in a constructive way" (xxx), the question becomes: how much "perspectivism" can the central claim about work–concepts include before it becomes entirely meaningless?

Goehr's answer, apparently, is not that much. Consider, for example, her response to Elaine Sisman's quite reasonable request for more historical nuance, a request that might include something like the "opus–concept" alongside the work–concept. Goehr protests that honoring this request runs the risk of "unfurl[ing] into infinite speculation."[20] "Why not go further," she asks, "and add the composition–concept, the piece–concept, the oeuvre–concept, the tune–concept, the song–concept, the riff–concept, and even the improvisation–concept?" (Goehr 2007, xxxii). To this, I would respond: why *not*, indeed? Surely, this is precisely the kind of work that musicologists should be doing?[21] And surely serious studies of the song–concept, for example, would only throw *more* (and not less) light on the work–concept, if only by clarifying what is particular to the both?

One final, related point is brought to light by Goehr's response to Strohm's admittedly brutal criticism of *The Imaginary Museum*. We have already recounted Strohm's argument about the gradualness of historical change, an argument that Goehr refuted through recourse to the Sorites Paradox. Elsewhere, she writes:

> It is less importantly the specific date of the concept's emergence to which my thesis is committed than to the historical fact that the concept emerged, and with this at least Strohm has no disagreement. If works existed in 1450 and were named as such, then I am wrong as matter of fact. Still such an error would not undermine my claim that the work–concept should not be assumed naturalistically or essentially to exist in all music practices or whatever sort. (Goehr 2007, xlviii)

This is precisely the kind of claim that is likely to irk historians of music, for Goehr tells us that her argument still stands even if it is off by 350 years! From a certain perspective her argument is indeed well taken: she means only that *The Imaginary Museum* was primarily targeted against those who believe that the work–concept is ahistorical and that, if Strohm agrees that the work–concept is historically contingent, then in some sense there is nothing more to argue about. Having said this, however, one may tolerate a difference of 50 or even 100 years—but 350?

Surely, the dedicated historian may argue, if a scholar's argument can be off by 350 years and still be untouched then the argument itself must be rather weak?

This raises, once again, what I will call the "specter of nuance." By this, I mean that although nuance may add to and enrich larger–scale and more general claims (such as the "1800 hypothesis"), it may also have the opposite effect, causing a "central claim" to expand so far that it ultimately collapses. From a certain perspective, the entire "intellectual history" of the work–concept may be summarized by placing scholars along a spectrum of generality (on the one hand) and nuance (on the other). Goehr makes general claims that admit only a limited amount of nuance and will therefore inevitably irk those wishing for more specificity. Sisman, to take an example representing the other extreme, insists on specificity, nuance, and plurality, and therefore simply cannot entertain "central claims" that are as far–reaching and generalizing as Goehr's.

Of course, there is no way to decide which approach is better—it's a matter, in the end, of what kind of scholarship one values, it is a matter of disciplinarity and perhaps even of taste. If this is true, then perhaps the only way to significantly contribute to the debate is to alter its fundamental terms. Allow me to emphasize that in my view changing the terms is the only way to contribute to the *debate*. There are certainly many ways to contribute to the history (or histories) of the musical work—for example, by doing meaningful historical and archival research, by studying the relationship between composers and performers, by looking at issues of copyright and fidelity, etc.. But none of these contributions, it seems to me, will ultimately add anything new to the theoretical debates surrounding the musical work.

As a pathway towards those larger theoretical questions, I turn to what has been perhaps the most contentious question in the intellectual history of the musical work: did Baroque composers compose musical works?

4. The Problematic of Musical Works During the Baroque Period

Several scholars have argued that the work–concept existed during the Baroque period, that is, fifty to one hundred and fifty years before 1800. According to James O. Young, for example, Goehr's assertion that music before 1800 was constituted by its extra–musical function while music after 1800 has been defined in "aesthetic" (or absolute) terms is untenable. In making this argument, Young emphasizes the issue of "attention." Presenting a very selective—and, I dare say, mildly distorted—reading of *The Imaginary Museum*, he asserts that Goehr's argument revolves around

the assumption that before "the great divide" (Young's term) "music was typically only one of several objects of attention." Other objects of attention were extra–musical and included religion, eating, and dancing. As Young observes, Goehr argues that after 1800 music became the "exclusive focus of aesthetic attention," particularly in the newly invented space of the concert hall (Young 2005, 175).

Although the general outline of Young's reading is not inaccurate per se, it is difficult to understand why he limits his discussion to the issue of *attention*, as though this alone can explain the complexities of Goehr's history of the musical work. In any event, having reduced Goehr's work thusly, Young immediately attempts to prove that she was wrong. His argument, in essence, is that it is possible to provide counter–examples. "While evidence can be marshaled for the great divide hypothesis," he writes, "evidence against it is also available." He then proceeds to illustrate that even after 1800 some people continued to divide their attention between "music" and other things. Furthermore, by drawing on a few examples from documentation about Handel, he asserts that before 1800 people did occasionally listen "attentively" (Young 2005, 177).

Young, in brief, offers a common rebuttal by providing counter–examples on either side of the "divide." I leave it to scholars more qualified than myself to evaluate whether or not one can say with any certainly that Handel's audience listened attentively. (It is easy to verify his other claim: indeed, post–1800 listeners do not always listen attentively.) But I think a more important question is what we gain from a series of counter–examples, even if they are accurate and numerous. What exactly is gained by shifting the "1800 hypothesis" back by fifty years, resulting in the "1750 hypothesis"?[22]

A similar question could be asked of Dyck (2010, 6), who rebuts the 1800 hypothesis by arguing, in part, that Goehr's claim that musical works are created only by "independent masters and creators of their art" is refuted by the "fact" that many Baroque composers owned their music. To be fair, this is only one small part of Dyck's massive refutation of Goehr's work, in which he attacks the Professor from all angles—philosophical, historical, cultural, etc.. But with regard to the issue of "independent masters" Dyck's only response is that 1800 is too late. To this, I would ask again what the value of such a refutation is.

There are, however, other critiques of Goehr that consist of more than simply providing Baroque examples of things that look like works. Harry White's work stands out in this regard; I will therefore consider it carefully. At first blush, White's critique does not seem to differ substantially from other Baroque scholars, since he too hones in on one aspect of Goehr's

work in order to rebut it: where Young focuses on attention and Dyck on ownership, White emphasizes "textual integrity." Indeed, he refers to "the concept of textual integrity [that] only becomes paramount in the wake of Beethoven's achievement" as Goehr's "central claim" (White 1997, 96). (We have seen already that Goehr's central claim is much more—and perhaps also much less—than this, and that for her the musical work is not reducible to its score, even though it is closely associated with it. But let this point not detain us.)

Like Young and Dyck, White wants to argue that works existed already during the Baroque period. He also—like his two peers—does this through counter–examples. But his argument is of a different order. Rather than accepting Goehr's definition of the musical work and then showing that it is applicable before 1800, White (1997, 96) presents the unusual argument that Goehr has paid insufficient attention to "the music itself." "No–one can usefully deny that [J.S.] Bach's cantatas were more immediately indentured to social function than the keyboard compositions of Beethoven," he writes, "but this does not mean that *Wachet auf, ruft uns die Stimme* is less emancipated in musical terms than the 'Waldstein' sonata. To suggest otherwise, as Goehr does, is to mistake the social function of music for its meaning" (100). At first glance, White's argument seems fairly reactionary: after all, what is music's "meaning" outside of its "social function"? To discern musical meaning *outside* of social function, in other words, seems at first rather conservative and smacks of pre–New Musicological ideology. But on closer inspection it is evident that White has something slightly different in mind. Substituting the "work–concept" with the "authority–concept," he refers to the "periodic censure which Bach's art induced." That Bach was the authority of his own music is borne out by the "gulf which lay between his duties as a Kapellmeister–composer and the insistent originality and extremism of his music." White writes: "Bach stringently tested the norms of the authority–concept (which in Leipzig derived from the canons of orthodox Lutheranism) to the point where they were habitually overtaken by the autonomous signatures of his art" (103). Seen this way, White's point is not so much that we ought to understand Bach's music "in itself," but rather that Bach himself actively resisted the social pressures of his day by composing music that was more stylistically extreme than was expected of him.

I have spent a substantial amount of time on White (1997, 103) because of the conclusion that he reaches: "[I]t is the work itself," he says, "and not the presence or absence of explicit verbal recognition—which argues the existence of a transcendent concept of artistic autonomy." In other words, unlike Young and Dyck who simply push the work–concept back fifty or

one hundred years, White proposes that although Baroque composers such as Bach wrote musical works, they themselves did not recognize their compositions as such.[23] This is a heterodox argument and differs substantially from arguments by other Baroque scholars. White's assertion also raises an issue that lies at the crux of this paper: can one say that Bach wrote works if he did not (and was not able) to recognize them as works?

5. On Regulative Concepts

How, then, do we answer the question, "Did Bach compose musical works?" Goehr's response is actually far more radical than is usually assumed. She writes: "Bach did not intend to compose musical works" (Goehr 2007, 8). Although not emphasized in *The Imaginary Museum*, in her new introduction to the second edition Goehr foregrounds the word "intend" (xlii).[24] But this does not solve any problems, for it still does not answer the following questions: *Did* Bach compose musical works? Could Bach have composed musical works if he did not *intend* to? What, precisely, does intention mean in this context?

In order to understand this wrinkle—a wrinkle, I would argue, that changes everything—it is necessary to consider the notion of the regulative concept. After all, Goehr is emphatic that Bach's compositions were not regulated by the work–concept. The question is only whether, if he had no work–concept, he necessarily also had no works.

Borrowed rather loosely from Immanuel Kant, Goehr uses the term "regulative concept" to denote the "as if" structure of musical works. When the regulative concept of a musical work is operative, she argues, then works are "treated *as if* they were givens and not 'merely' concepts that have artificially emerged and crystallized within practice" (Goehr 2007, 104; emphasis mine). In other words, a regulative concept is a concept that functions as if it is not a concept.

Strohm takes issue with Goehr's appropriation of this Kantian term, arguing that for Kant the distinction between constitutive and regulative concepts is not amenable to historical considerations. As such, "Kant would reject outright the hypothesis of a historical development from a constitutive to a regulative idea" (Strohm 2000, 144). This faithful reading of Kant forms the basis of Strohm's third "thesis":

> Philosophical concepts, and in particular the notion of a "regulative use of transcendental ideas" (Kant), are not suited to make up the criteria of historical chronology. The identification itself of the musical work–concept with one of these regulative [uses of] ideas is spurious. (151)

In her response to Strohm, Goehr recalls that when writing *The Imaginary Museum* she did not intend to suggest that regulative concepts followed from constitutive concepts, nor was she particularly invested in a strict application of Kant.[25] Her intentions, it seems, were both more modest and less rigorous: "I wanted merely to capture," she recalls, "how, around 1800, the musical work–concept became the concept that regulated—dictated or governed—the terms of musical practice" (Goehr 2000, 240).

Before 1800, Goehr insists, music was *not* regulated by the work–concept. Since roughly 1800, however, it has been common to speak anachronistically of pre–1800 compositions as works. It has been common, in other words, to "retroactively impose upon this music concepts developed at a later point in the history of music" (Goehr 2007, 115). Which returns us, finally, to the question of whether Bach composed musical works. It seems to me that a latent answer is discernable in *The Imaginary Museum*, although Goehr herself does not articulate that answer fully. Let us follow her argument carefully.

According to Goehr, only after 1800 could people conceive the music that they produced (or spoke about, or thought about) in terms of works. In other words, only after 1800 did the work–concept become regulative. But this does *not* mean, she emphasizes, that Baroque composers did not produce works. Nonetheless, although she insists that it does *not* mean that Baroque composers did *not* produce works, she has difficulty saying outright that Baroque composers *did* compose works. "*Maybe* Bach composed works," she writes, "even though he explicitly thought about music in different conceptual terms." She continues: "That *may* be so, but it is not so in any *straightforward* sense" (Goehr 2007, 115; emphasis mine).

Goehr then seems to pull back somewhat, asking: "*Can* a concept have, in fact, a form of existence, namely implicit existence, over and above explicit existence?" (emphasis mine). Without actually answering the question, she retreats to a much easier point:

> Ignoring the impending logical complexities [of whether a concept can have a form of existence over and above explicit existence], I am interested above all in resisting the inclination to say that the work–concept must always have functioned in some matter. (Goehr 2007, 114)

Certainly, but we already knew that the *work–concept* has not always functioned, the question now is whether before the work–concept composers were able to compose works—and this is a question that Goehr seems to continually avoid.

Still, she returns to the question of whether Baroque composers might have composed works, asking whether they may have had some kind of "implicit" understanding. Her answer to this is very interesting. She says that

from an *epistemological* standpoint concepts become explicit first, that is, before their *chronologically* prior implicitness can be detected: "Only with its explicit function realized can we in hindsight see the concept as functioning implicitly" (Goehr 2007, 114). Hence, only after the full and *explicit* development of the work–concept after 1800 could anyone ever say that Bach *implicitly* composed works. In fact, she suggests that if the work–concept had never emerged at all (something entirely possible in her view) then no one would ever have been able to say that Bach composed musical works in any manner at all, even implicitly.

Commenting on her 1992 proclamation that "Bach did not intend to create musical works," she writes:

> Contrary to how this line has too often been read, I did not say Bach did not compose musical works, only that he had not intended to compose them. I certainly did not say what I have most recently been accused of saying, that "there were no true musical works before 1800" (whatever this sentence actually means). The word "intend" was to serve as a placeholder for the idea that when Bach was composing his extraordinarily great music, he was able to think of its production, performance, and reception in terms different from those associated with work–production. (Goehr 2007, xlii)

Notice that Goehr forecloses the question of whether Bach composed musical works—when it comes to the question of whether there were or were not musical works before 1800 she appends the parenthetical clause "*whatever this sentence actually means.*" A similar sentence appears, in fact, in *The Imaginary Museum*, where she writes: "Prior to its explicit emergence, there is no evidence to suggest that persons were *really* (whatever that means) thinking about something in conceptual terms distinct from those indicated by their expressed thought and behavior" (Goehr 2007, 114; emphasis in the original). In brief, the question of whether people were *really* thinking in terms of musical works (although they were not doing so explicitly) is considered meaningless.

In her later reflections, Goehr writes that the question of whether or not Bach composed works has everything to do with the relationship between concepts and objects. "I now think," she writes,

> the problems in shifting between these two ways of talking are probably insurmountable, and therefore irreconcilable. In *The Imaginary Museum*, I kept my claims as best I could at the level of *concepts*, precisely because this left *open* the decision as to whether with or without the work–concept there either are or aren't works. (Goehr 2007, xliii)[26]

Here, Goehr states explicitly that the question of whether Bach composed musical works is aporetic. We can speak only of the musical work as a concept, and as a concept the musical work (that is, the "work–concept") emerged after 1800. As an object, we can say nothing whatsoever about the musical work.

6. Recapitulation and Elaboration of the Main Argument

In the final analysis, Goehr's writings take us very far but leave us with two fairly substantial "problems." First, they tell us little about how we might be able to think about works before the work–concept. Recall that for Goehr only after the full and *explicit* development of the work–concept after 1800 could anyone ever say that Bach *implicitly* composed works. But what kinds of music are implicitly works? What kinds of music have the "potential" to become works? Is Bach's music any more implicitly work–like than anything else? It seems that Goehr forecloses any discussion on this topic because, as she says, she does not deal with objects—she deals only with concepts (and Bach had no work–concept).[27]

The second "problem" that needs to be addressed is that Goehr presumes a particular form of retroactive—or even "teleological"—historiography in her work. Because teleological historiography is completely anathema to the vast majority of historical musicologists, few who have responded to *The Imaginary Museum* have said anything about this issue at all.[28] It seems to me, however, that Goehr's argument can only be fully understood by *radicalizing* teleogical history, and not by shying away from it. To do this requires a complete re–thinking of how history has been practiced by music historians in the past thirty or so years and it requires, moreover, resuscitating teleological historiography without falling into the many traps that haunt that mode of understanding history.

So, let us leave aside the extant debates surrounding the musical work for a moment and look elsewhere. In what follows, I radicalize and sharpen the notion of retroactive history by turning back to the relationship between the history of the musical work and a certain history of economics, outlined in the introduction to this essay. To recall my earlier argument: I suggested that the advent of the musical work marks the point at which the relationship between performance and score is inverted. But as Yuran observes, it is impossible to locate this point. Although there may "be points in time when people acknowledge…that a change has already taken place," this "posterior recognition implies that a real change has already" taken place. In brief, "The only possible temporality of this change is of that which *has already happened*" (Yuran 2014, 133–34; emphasis in the original).

How, then, might one theorize this peculiar temporality? One answer to the enigmatic question about when the shift from performance (supported by a score) to score (supported by performance) took place is to say that it had "been so all along": from the moment of inscription, that inscription had already replaced performance.[29] But this argument is false based on historical evidence, since people initially acted as if the score supported a more fundamental performance.[30]

This leads us to ask when the *real* shift occurred? Yuran offers us an ingenious solution to the riddle. "[T]he *real* change," he says, "*is nothing but the posterior recognition that the change had already occurred*" (emphasis mine). For this paradoxical idea to be meaningful it is necessary to understand recognition as itself eminently historical. As Yuran says: "recognition itself is viewed not only as a recognition *of* a historical fact (that money is not X but Y) but is viewed as a historical event" (2014, 134). The consequence of this idea is that recognition actually changes the status of the thing that it recognizes (money, music). In the first instance, "material" money (that is, money wherein the material substance is supported by a symbol) was constituted through misrecognition: "it was thought to be material but it was even then already symbolic. Therefore when the posterior recognition complements this missing knowledge, money necessarily changes: it can no longer depend on this specific non–knowledge" (Yuran 2009, 145).

The same can be said of musical works. Even when, initially and at the earliest stages of musical notation, scores supported performances it would have been possible to say—although it was not said—that performances supported scores, or that performances were instantiations of works. The "real" changes takes place, not when performances "actually" begin to support works (because, in a sense, this has always already happened since the moment of inscription) but with the *recognition* that at some prior time performances had begun supporting works.

It therefore seems that a historical investigation of musical works might benefit from reckoning with the notion of posterior recognition, that is to say, of hindsight. Historical knowledge is not reducible to a belated perspective on a stable object. Rather, historical knowledge—that is to say, that mode of thought defined by hindsight—is actually constitutive of historical objects.

This approach goes quite far towards "solving" some of the problems of the history of the musical work. It illustrates, for example, why it is so difficult to determine precisely when the musical work emerged. Furthermore, it sheds light on some of the more opaque aspects of Goehr's argument. But advocating a retroactive history based on hindsight also harbors certain dangers. It is therefore necessary to more carefully examine what Yuran (2014, 206) terms the "ontological status of the advantage of hindsight."

7. Hindsight, Teleology, and Historiography

As Yuran suggests, hindsight implies the affirmation of a certain form of teleology.[31] But surely, the reader may protest, nothing could be worse? In fact, what united so–called New Musicologists of many stripes was a total disdain for teleological history, to the extent that the "messy" contingency of history has become something of a truism in music studies for the past two or more decades. Certainly, there were many good reasons for launching an assault on teleological historiography, not least of which are its often pernicious, Eurocentric, and "phallogocentric" connotations. After all, what else is teleology than the (false) idea of Great Men who progress steadily in history towards Enlightenment and control over other people and over the entire world itself?

With the advent of the New Musicology, then, teleological historiography was seemingly banished forever. Already in the 1980s, Joseph Kerman (1985, 106) spoke derisively about the "heretofore accepted expectation by the Western historical consciousness of stylistic growth, development, progress, and teleology." And in the years and decades that followed musicologists, music theorists, and ethnomusicologists all had something to say about teleology.[32] Although these pointed responses reflected a larger intellectual and cultural shift and were not unique to music studies, musicologists often pointed to homology between teleological historiography and one of Western music's sacred cows: tonality. With characteristic insight and virtuosity, Susan McClary famously illustrated in numerous texts that teleology haunts not only historical discourse about music but also the very experience of Western music itself. So, for example, in her analysis of the first movement of J.S. Bach's Brandenberg Concerto No. 5, she begins by drawing our attention to the piece's "complex harmonic syntax that continually implies what the next cadence in the background ought to be—while deferring the actual arrival until the composer sees fit to produce it." She then writes that "[t]his *process is intensely teleological* in that it draws its power from its ability to make the listener desire and finally experience the achievement—usually after much postponed gratification—of predetermined goals" (emphasis mine). This musical logic, she suggests, expresses the "social values" of the middle–class, namely "beliefs in progress, in expansion, in the ability to attain ultimate goals through rational striving, in the ingenuity of the individual strategist operating both within and in defiance of the norm" (McClary 1987, 22).

Musicologists have thus critiqued "teleological" processes both within music and in histories and contexts external to it. And of course, if we take teleology (only) to mean beliefs in progress, expansion, rational attainment of goals, and individual strategies, then certainly there is reason for concern. Yuran likewise fully acknowledges the problems with (certain kinds of) teleology, observing for example that teleology "is unacceptable today, among other reasons, because of the religious overtones associated with it."[33] Furthermore, he says, teleology often "hints at an all–knowing observer of history or at an a–historical entity holding the *telos* of history" (Yuran 2014, 207).[34]

Nonetheless, it is also possible to discern certain advantages to a teleological view of history—at least if one radically transforms how this teleology functions. For one thing, says Yuran (2009, 112), "eradicating any effect of retroactivity eliminates the uniqueness of historical knowledge."[35] Elsewhere, he continues:

> Limiting oneself to recording events as they were "contemporaneously perceived" amounts to effacing the specific historicity of the past. It renders the "pastness" of the past, its position in time, a coincidental, external fact. It makes the past a sort of a present that only coincidentally is positioned in another time. (Yuran 2014, 205)[36]

Yuran then suggests that hindsight, by contrast, is perhaps what constitutes historical knowledge *qua* historical knowledge, or to put things another way, what makes *historical* knowledge a unique form of knowledge unlike any other. Following this suggestion, he can only lament that "[t]he price for this theoretical achievement is a certain necessary element of teleological form" (Yuran 2009, 112). In other words, to think history *qua* history one must admit a certain strain of teleology.

Of course, there are other ways to write history that avoid presenting "the past as a sort of a present that only coincidentally is positioned in another time." Gary Tomlinson's Foucauldian histories of Renaissance music (1993) and of opera over the past few centuries (1999) are exemplary in this regard. Tomlinson argues, for example, that between the Renaissance era and the "classical" age there was a shift in the conditions of possibility for knowledge that constrained and enabled different forms of expressivity, musical practice, and thought. In this Foucauldian view, history is marked by radical ruptures to the extent that we cannot ever fully know, for example, what the relationship between music and magic meant to Renaissance authors and composers.[37] Thus, although I propose a specific form of teleology in this article, I do not mean to suggest that this is the only historiographical model available.

Other recent musicological interventions arguably avoid the trap that Yuran finds in non–teleological histories, while simultaneously offering other insights. Of particular interest are interventions that challenge excessively anthropocentric historiography. It may be worthwhile, here, to clearly articulate how Yuran's historical materialist position differs from an approach such as actor–network theory.

A good place to start is Benjamin Piekut's (2014, 19) excellent article, "Actor–Networks in Music History: Clarifications and Critiques," which follows Bruno Latour's call for a "renewed empiricism that does not merely report facts based on evidence, but instead accounts for the multifarious labourers (human and not) that make something true but open to revision." From the vantage point of a renewed empiricism, privileging the work–concept in histories of classical and romantic music is problematic on both theoretical and political grounds. As Piekut suggests, "those who take [the] work concept for granted, simply ignore the many historical, social, and material mediations that occur whenever music is performed" (18–19).

Piekut (2014, 18) argues that the work–concept "denies music's material and social forms" and that it does not "constitute an ontology." The work–concept, he says, is just that—a "*concept* that emerges historically and that eventually regulates musical practice and discourse" (ibid.; emphasis in the original). Thus, one aim of historiography is "*adding back*" overlooked mediators into historical accounts (19; emphasis mine; see also Piekut 2011). In the case of the musical work, this might mean looking beyond works and including discussions of performers, concert spaces, and instruments.[38]

While Piekut's historiographical model offers an important alternative, it is useful to recall that Goehr had already suggested a different way to understand the word "concept." For Goehr, concepts are not "merely" human ideas. When the work–concept became operative around 1800, she argues, musical works were "treated as if they were givens and not 'merely' concepts that have artificially emerged and crystallized within practice" (Goehr 2007, 104).

Goehr's argument once again directly parallels Yuran's analysis of money. For Yuran, it is too simple to say that money has value only because people believe that it does. Money functions rather as disavowal: even though individuals know that money is just a useless piece of paper, they act *as if* it has value. But Yuran also goes further, drawing out the ontological implications of this "as if" structure. Based on the observation that money functions as money whether you—as an individual—believe in its value or not, he suggests that money is a concept that "confronts

the subject in the *shape of [an] external object*" (Yuran 2014, 56; emphasis mine). Money is therefore a peculiar or even uncanny type of concept: it is an objective concept, or what Sohn–Rethel (1978) would call a "real abstraction."

As a *historical* materialist, then, Yuran is not interested in "adding back" overlooked actors into an account of economic history. Instead, he focuses his attention on the manner by which social reality *assumes the form of an external object.*[39] To summarize: for the historical materialist, a "historical object" is not an "object from the past." Rather, a historical object is an object penetrated and shaped by history.[40]

My aim is not to advocate historical materialism over actor–network theory. Nor do I believe that Yuran's analysis obviates the need for alternative historiographical models. One might easily point, in fact, to certain limitations of historical materialism—at least as it is theorized by late twentieth–century Lacanian Marxists such as Yuran. There is something troubling, for example, about the conflation of social reality with reality all told. Furthermore, it would be difficult to see how a rigidly historical materialist position would adequately deal with certain practices of non–Western sound production, such as those of certain Amerindian groups who subscribe to a multinaturalist ontology (Ochoa Gautier 2014). Nonetheless, the mode of historical investigation that Yuran develops remains useful for a historical analysis of the musical work, in part because this construct is deeply embedded within Western modernity. As this paper has shown, debates regarding the history of the musical work have long been stuck in a cul–de–sac. If nothing else, Yuran's work provides us with one possible way out.

8. Solving the Riddle of The Musical Work—In Hindsight

I conclude by returning to Lydia Goehr's *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* and by considering what is perhaps the most complex (and polemical) passage in that book:

> Now we can make sense of the basic argument lying behind my central claim that prior to 1800 (or thereabouts), musicians did not function under the regulation of the work–concept. To be sure, they functioned with concepts of opera, cantata, sonata, and symphony, but that does not mean they were producing works. It was only later when the production of music began to be conceived along work–based principles that early operas, cantatas, symphonies, and sonatas acquired their status as different kinds of musical work. And this is why we can meaningfully say, nowadays, that Bach composed musical works. (Goehr 2007, 115)

This statement has usually been understood to mean that nowadays Bach's compositions may be considered works *for us*. Or, stated another way, that today we "conceptualize" Bach's compositions as works—performing them at concerts as works, analyzing them as works, etc.—even though during Bach's time people did not conceive them as such. Indeed, this is perhaps what Goehr had in mind.

But there is also a way to radicalize her statement that "we can meaningfully say, nowadays, that Bach composed musical works." I propose that we understand this statement to mean that even though Bach did not compose musical works in his own time, today we can say retroactively that Bach did compose musical works. Note well: the point is *not*—or at least, not only—that in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries we can treat Bach's "pieces" as works, for example, by performing them outside of a religious context and standardizing previously improvisatory parts and sections. (After all, it would be possible to do this with any music at all. For example, one could turn bebop recordings into musical works by standardizing them, transcribing them, and canonizing them.) The point is rather that *today we can say that Bach composed musical works in his own time*: although in his own time Bach did not compose musical works, today *we* can say (or after 1800 people have been able to say) that Bach did compose musical works in his own time. In this view, history itself has changed—in hindsight, we determine something about a historical moment that did not "exist" at that moment.

It is possible to make a similar argument by pointing to Goehr's distinction between emergence and origination. Her claim has always been "that the work–concept *emerged* with its full regulative force around 1800" and she has always "avoid[ed] the assumption that the concept *originated* then." Her claim allows for the possibility that the origin of the work–concept can be found in "periods long before" 1800, but it also emphasizes that those origins can only be identified after the full development of the concept (Goehr 2000, 238). This claim—which is already somewhat heterodox—receives its full force when we acknowledge that the work–concept was not an inevitable development of history and that it may, under different conditions, never have emerged at all.[41] If this is so, then the full development of the work–concept does not only allow for the *identification* of its origins in times prior to 1800; in a sense, the development of the work–concept actually *creates* its origins.

Certainly, the mode of historiography I have proposed in this paper does not solve everything. It does not, for example, help us to understand pre–1800 music "on its own (contemporary) terms." But neither does it foreclose any discussion of pre–1800 music in the way that Goehr pre-

scribes. Instead, it provides an unequivocal answer to the question of whether Bach composed musical works: he *did*. But Bach only composed musical works "because" of a regulative work–concept that fully developed after Bach's own death. Bach, of course, also composed cantatas, oratorios, and concerti. Today, we can say that Bach composed works as well.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Roger Grant, David Gutkin, and Emily Zazulia for feedback and conversations about earlier drafts of this article. Many thanks also to Thomas Fogg and to an anonymous reader for helpful comments.

2. Goehr's *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* was first published in 1992 by Oxford University Press. (In the UK, the book was printed by Clarendon, an imprint of Oxford University Press.) As Richard Taruskin (2007, v) points out in his forward to the 2007 revised edition, judging by the high price of the first edition "Oxford University Press was evidently counting on selling out a tiny press run to libraries." Nonetheless, a paperback edition followed in 1994 and in 2007 Oxford issued a revised edition including the forward by Taruskin just mentioned as well as a lengthy new introductory essay by Goehr titled "His Master's Choice." I will hereafter refer to *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* simply as *The Imaginary Museum*. All references, unless otherwise stated, are to the 2007 edition. In addition to being the subject of numerous book reviews and articles (many of these will be referenced below), *The Imaginary Museum* was the theme of an important symposium held at the University of Liverpool in 1998. Proceedings from the symposium were later published as *The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?*, and edited by Michael Talbot (2000). This collection contains numerous responses to Goehr's *The Imaginary Museum* and includes an important debate between Reinhard Strohm and Lydia Goehr.

3. Texts that explicitly argue for the emergence of the work–concept during the Baroque include White 1997; Erauw 1998; and Young 2005. German scholars have long located the advent of the work–concept in Nicolai Listenius's (1549) *Musica: Ab authore denuo recognita multisque novis regulis et exemplis adaucta*. See, for example, Wiora 1983 and Seidel 1987. (For Goehr's discussion of Listenius in *The Imaginary Museum*, see 115–19.) Probably the most sustained recent text to argue for Listenius as the key developer of the work–concept is Perkins 2003.

4. Here, I am only referring to those who locate the advent of the work–concept at the very beginning of music writing in the West. See, for example, Perkins 2003.

5. I return to the debate surrounding Bach at great length later in this paper and therefore will refrain from citing the various relevant sources here.

6. That this is the case largely due to the labors of Lydia Goehr.

7. At this point in the paper (since the main terms of debate have not yet been fully explicated), I use the terms "work" and "work–concept" somewhat loosely. As I show later, however, the conceptualization *of* the musical work was a key moment in its history.

8. It would be entirely possible, on the other hand, to draw more concrete connections. Richard Middleton (2000, 84) writes, for example: "It can hardly be accidental that the rise of the 'work' parallels and intermeshes with that of the 'commodity,' nor that the history of that sort of 'individuality' necessary to the former coincides with that of capitalism, whose success was powered, as the work of Weber and Tawney gives us good reason to believe,

by exactly the same species of property–conscious individualism. Fetishism of the work is not too far away from the fetishism of the commodity to which Marx drew attention, both in its characteristic psychology and in its social basis in the effacement of collective labour. Goehr attributes the success of work thinking to 'conceptual imperialism,' but it becomes easier to understand the political power that concepts can undoubtedly possess if we grasp the material forces in which they are rooted and which they help to sustain." For important examination of the relationship between the musical work and the commodity form, see also Adorno 1997. As an aside, note that Jacques Attali (1986) points to inversions similar to the ones I have mentioned here in his famous book, *Noise: The Political Economy of Music*. See, for example, his observation that although recording was first "produced as a way of preserving its trace, it instead replaced it as the driving force of the economy of music" (85).

9. The quote from Smith can be found in Yuran 2014, 132. The following argument draws heavily on Yuran's work.

10. Fiat money refers to money declared as legitimate by a formal institution, usually a state.

11. I hasten to reiterate that I am not attempting to valorize or celebrate this inversion. Furthermore, I am fully aware that many musicians and musicologists alike would balk at the idea that performance is secondary to a score or work. Indeed, we are currently witnessing a political, aesthetic, an ontological move *away* from the work–concept, a move spurred by increased dialogue with popular and non–Western musics. Having said this, I believe it difficult to deny the hegemonic view, at least within "classical" music, that works are prioritized over performances.

12. I do not mean to suggest that all "philosophical" ruminations of the musical work are useless or without merit. In fact, I believe that we need in a way to revive a more philosophical approach if the discourse is to move forward. Furthermore, it would be naïve to think that purely philosophical approaches to musical work are a thing of the past. On the contrary, such approaches are still frequently published in philosophy journals. The divide, then, is disciplinary. And because Goehr works closely in both philosophical and musicological communities she is forced to confront critics from both sides of the divide constantly.

13. See especially Chapter 4, "The Central Claim."

14. Goehr borrows this term loosely from André Malraux's (1978) "Museum without Walls." See Goehr 2007, 173.

15. Perkins (2003, 16) seems to suggest as much: "And although it may be stating the obvious, I would also suggest that the emergence of the work–concept was intimately linked from the outset with the development of a uniquely European historical phenomenon: an increasing reliance on musical notation for the study and performance of music." Perkins seems to equate the existence of the musical work with music's being "fixed." In making this argument, he draws on Sean Gallagher's (2000) account of music's becoming a "textually stable object" (as cited in Perkins 2003, 27–28). Similarly, Talbot (2000, 6) seems to agree that for music after 1800 "the work is its score *tout court*." By contrast, Wegman (1996, 433) states succinctly about the late eighteenth century: "Writing, as such, was not a defining criterion in this aesthetic: the latter centered on the composer's 'idea,' without which a counterpoint exercise, despite being written, could not aspire to the cultural status that composition then enjoyed."

16. Goehr borrows the term "ontological mutants" from Tormey (1974, 207).

17. The relationship between works, scores, and performances is clearly extremely complex. Here, it may be useful to add one additional remark, namely that scores are not merely "hypostasized" works but are in fact necessary for the very existence of works. Why is this the case? It is so because even though musical works may be meaningfully understood as the "permanently existing creations of composers" that are irreducible to scores and performances, they nonetheless require a score, or a performance, or some other material supplement in order to continue existing. For example, although Beethoven's Fifth Symphony (to use Goehr's favorite example) is not reducible to, or identical with, any possible score or performance, it would be difficult to say that this work still exists if every material trace of its existence is demolished. By "every material trace," I include not only scores and performances but also recordings and even the minds and bodies of those who remember the piece enough to reconstruct it in the event that all scores somehow disappear. My point, in short, is that although a musical work is not reducible to any or all of its material supplements, each work requires the existence of *at least one* material supplement to continue existing. This means that the "imaginary" museum of musical works—although imaginary—cannot *only* be imaginary. Or, to state things another way, although the works themselves are "imaginary" they require material supplements that are not.

18. This central ambiguity of aesthetic theory has more recently been explored by Jacques Rancière (e.g. 2004, 2009). See also Moreno and Steingo 2012.

19. The full text reads: "Several critics have argued that something more or less like the work–concept was present not only around 1800 but also around 1700—or is it 1600, 1500, 1400, or 1300? Others, looking in the opposite direction, have said that if we take the standardization of the work–concept seriously into account, then instead of focusing on 1800 one ought to focus on 1900 with the onset, say, of 'high fidelity' recording. The challenge is well motivated in both directions" (Goehr 2007, xxxiii).

20. Here, Goehr is responding to a public discussion between Sisman and George Lewis. Shortly after the appearance of the revised edition of *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*, Sisman published a fuller critique of Goehr's work, a critique that presumably resembles her earlier remarks from the conversation with Lewis. See Sisman 2008, 79–107. For Sisman's critique of Goehr, see especially 80–81. "That Goehr's book has had such wide effect," writes Sisman, "is based partly on the clarity of its 'central claim' and the memorable date 1800, partly on the fact that the combination of Romantic music aesthetics and the works of Beethoven did wreak a substantial change of some kind, and partly on the easy critique it allows of the European classical canon (its reification, its hegemony, it eliteness, its composer–centeredness, its claims to autonomy, its museum–like concert halls, its text–based inflexibility, its masterpiece worship)" (81n4). According to Sisman, *The Imaginary Museum* is "based on a problematic understanding of the eighteenth century and a backdating of the idea of *Werktreue* . . ." Sisman argues that Goehr's "misreading of the evidence conflates and obscures publishing practice, composer intention, ontological status, performance traditions, and reception" (81).

21. Rob Wegman's (1996) study of a composer–centered musical concept in the Renaissance is exemplary in this regard. Focusing on the opposition between improvisation and composition, Wegman tells us even in the Renaissance period "the composer is seen to exercise authorial control over his work—evidently a projection of the humanist ideals of textual integrity, faithfulness to the original, and the related concern to remove nonauthorial 'corruptions'" (468). Around 1500, the definition of the composer becomes more clearly defined, and with it the distinction between the "composition as object" and improvisatory practice (477). In a footnote, Wegman seems to suggest that something re-

sembling the work–concept (as described by Goehr) was present in the sixteenth century. About the fifteenth century, he says only that "concept of the musical work is much more problematic" (433n69).

22. Note well: I am not saying that there *is no value* in revising the date of the work–concept. Indeed, there may be major musicological implications in doing this. Furthermore, precision is inherently valuable to any historian. My concern is only that offering up counter–examples (especially in the region of fifty years) to what may otherwise be a major historical statement is perhaps not very productive.

23. Dyck (2010) actually also addresses the issue of recognition. I leave his argument aside in this article, but direct the reader to 62–76 of his essay.

24. I return to the key sentence in question later in this section: "Contrary to how this line has too often been read, I did not say Bach did not compose musical works, only that he had not intended to compose them" (Goehr 2007, xlii).

25. Goehr (2000, 240) includes the following parenthetical remark: "(I was influenced, rather, by Rawls' adaptation of Kant)." In *The Imaginary Museum*, she writes in a footnote: "I have benefited from J. Rawls 'Two Concepts of Rules,' *Philosophical Review,* 64 (1955), 3–32, and Tormey's 'Indeterminacy and Identity in Art,' 210" (Goehr 2007, 102n22). It is interesting to note that in his *Philosophical Review* article, Rawls (1955) mentions neither Kant nor regulative concepts. In fact, his later work seems far more relevant. For example, he writes in *A Theory of Justice*: "Now let us say that a society is well–ordered when it is not only designed to advance the good for its *members but when it is also effectively regulated* by a public conception of justice" (1971, 4–5; emphasis mine). For Rawls, the principles of justice "*regulate* the choice of a political constitution and the main elements of the economic and social system" (7). Later in the same book he writes: "In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. This original position is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice" (12). To this passage, he appends a footnote, which reads: "Kant is clear that the original agreement is hypothetical" (12n5).

26. The basics of this decision were already outlined in the first edition of *The Imaginary Museum*. There, she states that her historical approach "does not obviate the need for ontology." On the contrary, the importance of ontology remains but is now "reconceived to become inextricably tied to history." What she sought first and foremost was the *compatibility* of historical and ontological claims, and she adjusted her "methodological approach" accordingly. In executing this approach, she writes, "[t]he major methodological transition is a move away from asking what kind of *object* a musical work is, to asking what kind of *concept* the work–concept is." See Goehr (2007, 89–90). In "On the Problems of Dating," she recalled that "My ontology, admittedly, moved from the domain of objects to that of concepts, from the world of objects to conceptual schemes; but this was by no means an unfamiliar or particularly radical move in philosophical method" (Goehr 2000, 236).

27. The impossibility of saying anything at all about what might implicitly be a "work" is evident from a statement in *The Imaginary Museum*, where Goehr writes that a "piece of pottery or pile of bricks" can potentially be "transfigured into a work of art through the importation of relevant concepts." Just as this transfiguration might take place, she says, so too since around 1800 one can speak of early music pieces as works by retroactively imposing the work–concept: "Implicit existence has become here essentially a

matter of retroactive attribution" (Goehr 2007, 115). But if this is so—if a pile of bricks can retroactively become a piece of art—then surely *anything* can become a piece of art, just as any sequence of sounds can become a work? This, in fact, seems to be Goehr's point precisely. And again, it says nothing at all about Bach's own music during his time: this, to take a Foucauldian view, would be to pass beyond the threshold of the knowable. With this logic, anything that falls under the work–concept at any time in history can retroactively be said to have implicitly been a work. Thus, for example, if a free jazz performance is later transcribed and performed note–for–note under the logic of the work–concept, then the free jazz performance was *implicitly* a work. It seems to me that this particular notion is blunt and requires more attention.

28. The only exception that I know of is Richard Middleton (2000, 86), who has suggested (following Richard Williams) that by "by rewriting Miles Davis and Bob Marley in the light of later musical developments," the bass player and producer Bill Laswell "reveal[ed] what they were 'really' (that is, latently) about . . ." "By turning the texture inside out," suggests Middleton, "Laswell has in one sense certainly discovered elements that were embryonically present and put them in the centre . . ." (68).

29. For a parallel argument about money, see Yuran 2014, 38.

30. Yuran writes that "[t]he claim that the transition occurs at the very beginning solves" the impossibility of locating the exact moment of transition at some later date. "But," he says, "it is important to note that it solves a fundamental enigma of the story not in a technical manner, by showing a mechanism that allows the transition from matter to symbol. Rather, it solves it by transforming these basic elements of the story, by forcing us to rethink the categories of 'material' and 'symbolic' that we use in telling the story, and so in this respect constitute it . . . To put it in the simplest terms *it is no longer a story of transition from material money to symbolic money. Rather, the real transition is from symbolic matter to material symbol: from a matter that obscures its own symbolic function to a symbol that obscures its own materiality*" (Yuran 2009, 146; emphasis in the original).

31. See especially Chapters 3 and 4 in Yuran 2014.

32. For an excellent critique from the perspective of music theory, see Christensen 1993.

33. Goehr also recognizes that retroactive histories harbor a certain danger. Referring to the difference between emergence and origin, Goehr writes that, "Strohm does not acknowledge this separation." And although Goehr herself insists on the distinction, she nonetheless acknowledges that Strohm is "[p]erhaps . . . right not to, given the potentially dangerous consequence he sees. The trouble with engaging in retroactive history—looking backward for origins of a fully developed concept—is that is encourages the tendency to read ideological and aesthetic baggage backward as well. What 'backward'–looking historians tend to do is to read past history as if it is rationally or naturally developing into the state from which they begin their inquiry" (2007, 238). Of course, Goehr (like Yuran) still *does* advocate a particular kind of retroactive (or what I would call "teleological") view of history, despite noticing its potential problems.

34. As a student of Slavoj Žižek, Yuran makes use of the notion that history is constituted not by omniscience (all–knowing) but rather by non–knowledge. In his seminal text, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (a book that Yuran has translated into Hebrew), Žižek (1989, 21) addresses this question in a discussion of ideology: "ideology is not simply a 'false consciousness,' an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already to be conceived as 'ideological'—'ideological' is a social reality

whose very existence implies the nonknowledge of its participants as to its essence—that is, the social effectivity, the very reproduction of which implies that the individuals 'do not know what they are doing.' 'Ideology' is not the 'false consciousness' of a (social) being but this being itself in so far as it is supported by 'false consciousness.'" See also Yuran (2009, 114).

35. Yuran's ideas are based, in part, on Gordon Graham's attempt to encourage historians to take the philosophy of history more seriously. Graham writes that "historians may, if they choose, restrict themselves to recording how events were contemporaneously perceived, but . . . a preference for doing so does not show that there is anything illegitimate about constructing a narrative which makes use of historical perspective and the benefits of hindsight. However, such a perspective will commonly employ ideas of success and failure, advance and decline, and these are concepts which frequently require philosophical analysis and conceptual imagination." See Graham 1997, as quoted in Yuran 2009, 111–12. See also Yuran 2014, 204–205, for a reworking of his earlier ideas.

36. "In this case," he continues, "historical knowledge in itself has no uniqueness in relation with other disciplines of knowledge of man—it is simply a sociology, anthropology, or economics of the past" (Yuran 2014, 205).

37. This point notwithstanding, Tomlinson's approach is more flexible than Foucault's. See his critiques of Foucauldian archaeology (Tomlinson 1993, xi, 35–43, 57–58).

38. As another example, Piekut (2014) considers the case of the musical circle that emerged around Karl Franz Brendel in the mid–nineteenth century. A full account, says Piekut, may include a reader of the *Neue Zeitschrift für Muzik*, but also "a cup of coffee, a café, and a text" (6). For Piekut, a coffee cup and a café are not essences, nor are they vibrant materialities whose morphogenetic properties act on the world. Instead, the various actors in his hypothetical account (reader, cup, café, text) constitute a reality when they enter into a network. Reality, from an actor–network theory perspective, is constituted through multiple associations between an ultimately unknown set of actors: "Being means 'being related' and 'being in the world'" (10).

39. In a similar vein, as the work–concept took on a regulative function during the course of the nineteenth century, the "concept" of the work took on the form of musical works themselves—Beethoven symphonies, Wagner operas, and so on. In this way, the work–concept was treated as if it was not a concept at all.

40. For historical materialists like Yuran and Goehr, social reality is materialized within particular objects. Hence, historical materialism does not seek the mysteriousness of history in the places where Latour looks for it. Here is a typical list of "added back" actors for Latour (1988, 198), "the tree that springs up again, the locusts that devour the crops, the cancer that beats others at its own game, the mullahs who dissolve the Persian empire, the Zionists who loosen the hold of the mullahs, the concrete in the power station that cracks, the acrylic blues that consume other pigments, and the lion that does not follow the predictions of the oracle." (This "litany" is famously quoted in Bogost 2012, 39.) Historical materialism, by contrast, seeks the mystery of the social inside the object. As Yuran (2014, 64–65) says, a thing "assumes a social role precisely insofar as there is a mystery in it that marks that aspect of the social that is not reducible to the perception of individual subjects. It assumes an irreducibly social and historical role precisely to the extent that it is uncanny, that there is something in it that transcends our knowledge of it."

41. This implies that "teleological history" means only that historical inquiry can benefit from hindsight and *not* that history is predetermined.

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Images of Time and Timelessness: A Musical Reading of *Death in Venice*

Marlies De Munck

This essay is based on an old, well–known question in aesthetics: how to represent time in its fleetingness without halting, appropriating, objectifying, or transcending it? The question inspires a reading of Thomas Mann's *Death in Venice* as the account of a transformation in which a wish to *overcome* time turns into the erotic desire of being delivered *to* time. As such, the story reflects the tension between two competing views of music: music as an Apollonian play of time–transcending, auditory forms, and music as the Dionysian art *in* time. A phenomenological reading of Luchino Visconti's adaptation of the novella complicates this plainly dualistic opposition. The essay traces how the aesthetic suspension of time is contrasted with, but also depends on, the spectator's real–time experience. Similarly, the two classical, competing views of music stand in a complex dialectical relation to each other and reflect our existential relation to time.

Like the harmony of the spheres, the time that is not our time—time in general—is excluded from immediate sensory perception. Yet, as it is filled with things, episodes, and actions, we can abstractly distinguish between its worldly effects and time as the cause that transcends experience. Still, it is hard to conceive of time in itself without imaginatively turning it into an abstract state of timelessness, a static, eternal realm of time. To be sure, many great thinkers have questioned the "out–thereness" of time and have regarded it, rather, as a universal *post rem* or *a priori* form of intuition. Even within the confines of human experience time causes philosophical puzzlement. It dictates our whole lives, imposes its monomaniac regime of irreversibility on everything it touches, but eludes our grasp whenever we try to engage in it, in and of itself. At first sight, its intangibility may facilitate a common desire to bracket time or our consciousness of it. Who has never longed for a world in which the persons and things we love simply stay the way they are? On the other hand, we are also obsessed with time, as we love punctuality and as we delight in races against the clock. The obsession with exact time can easily be exposed, however, as yet another attempt to control its unceasing and unforgiving movement. It is as if time plays with us, being both present and absent, not only in and to our experience but even in our thoughts. Time does not just fly—it plays hide–and–seek.

In and Out of Time

In its play of presence and absence, the experience of time is closely related to the fear of death. To appease this fear, it is often said that death needs to be given a face. Following Emmanuel Levinas and Philippe Ariès, Rudi Visker argues that naming or representing death symbolically separates it from life and fends it off as a heterogeneous element. The correct way to exorcize the dead and keep them from haunting the living consists neither in explaining death philosophically nor in calculating its medical probability. To be a successful image of death, not even resemblance is needed. All that is required is for us to put it boldly in its proper place—on the shelf—thereby isolating it from life (Visker 2007, 140–54). Similarly, time can be represented symbolically. Successful images of time offer a handle on its otherwise uncontrollable fleetingness; by bringing it under our explicit attention and making it graspable to the senses they enable us to relate to time and vicariously help us deal with life's transience. The question, however, is what kind of time such images relate us to. When time is placed "out there," is it not transfigured into something else—a timeless object—just like symbols of death are purported to do? To what extent, then, is it still an image of *time*?

Music—not the celestial, inaudible music of the spheres but our own earthly music—has often been considered to be the perfect medium to represent time. According to Arthur Schopenhauer, however, music offers an escape from the threat of time by taking us *out* of it. It creates a safe realm of timelessness while we play or listen. Schopenhauer (1969) thought of music, on the one hand, as the purest art in and of time,[1] but also held it capable, on the other hand, of engendering the aesthetic experience in which "the individual . . . is pure will–less, painless, *timeless* subject of knowledge" (179; emphasis mine). Other philosophers maintain that music does not take us *out* of time but rather delivers us *to* it: for them, music is an attempt to come to terms with time and to control its powers. Theodor Adorno (1995, 66), for instance, often pointed out that music structures time:

> The self–evident, that music is a temporal art, that it unfolds in time, means, in the dual sense, that time is not self–evident for it, that it has time as its problem. It must create temporal relationships among its constituent parts, justify their temporal relationship, synthesize them through time. Conversely, it itself must act upon time, not lose itself to it; must stem itself against the empty flood.

Music, in his view, *deals* with time, rather than escapes it.

Through music we can interfere with time's pace, slow it down or speed it up, stop and repeat it as much and as often as we like. Since it allows us to manipulate time, music seems to be able to go against its grain. It cuts time–slices out of the continuum of history and holds them fixed, saves them from the omnivorous appetite of the past. Music, in this sense, lives in the realm of the aesthetic "as if"—as if time were not so unforgiving. This is why, according to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (2011), we sing or play refrains: in doing so we create our own territory and keep our fear of death at bay. Their "plateau" on the refrain opens accordingly:

> A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his breath. He walks and halts to his song. Lost, he takes shelter, or orients himself with his little song as best he can. The song is like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos. Perhaps the child skips as he sings, hastens or slows his pace. But the song itself is already a skip: it jumps from chaos to the beginnings of order in chaos and is in danger of breaking apart at any moment. (343)

And yet, if we conceive of music primarily as a container of time, we risk denying it as a phenomenon *in* time. Time might be held captive in acoustic structures but music also unfolds in time and is enfolded by it. We can understand Adorno's remark in this sense: if it is music's primal goal to overcome time's merciless hold over it and to afford us a glimpse of what it would mean to reverse the odds, it does so primarily by structuring time, not by halting it. Repetition, for instance, takes place *in* time and yet it challenges the irreversibility of it. Thus, music aims at a kind of timelessness—it seeks to overcome time—not by escaping or stopping it but by playing with it—indeed, by domesticating it.

Deleuze and Guattari (2011) push the argument for music's time–bound nature even further and contest music's repeatability itself. Repetition makes the refrain *un*musical, they say, because it renounces the developmental nature of music as a becoming in time. "The refrain," the authors maintain, "is rather a means of *preventing* music, warding it off, or forgoing it" (331; emphasis mine).[2] In the same vein, Vladimir Jankélévitch (2003, 20) suggests that the idea of perfect repeatability in music classifies, just like the idea of musical symmetry, as a "spatial projection of the temporal process of becoming." Reflecting on music's temporal nature he wonders: "Thus, is repetition in music not a priori a shock, are the refrains and ritornellos of strophic song, or the periodic recurrences of rondo form, not also a shock?" (21). Influenced by Henri Bergson's concept of *durée*, Jankélévitch takes the irreversibility and the diversifying effects of time seriously, the consequences of which naturally extend to the very nature of music. Even though we can recognize a theme or a whole piece of music

when played more than once, it can never be exactly the same precisely because it is repeated *in* time. Thus, Jankélévitch provides an answer to his earlier question:

> Independent from any memory, the pure fact of succession and the pret-
> erite, in other words the naked past–ness of the past, prevents the "same"
> from remaining exactly the same; this continuous conditioning, in the
> process of Becoming, assumes the form of a continuous alteration. This
> is why the da capo is a ravishing surprise, why a theme does not give up
> all that stirs us in its meaning until it is recognized again. (24)

This answer not only implies that music, like everything else in life, is subjected to time's irreversibility; it also confirms Adorno's earlier suggestion that music lives *by virtue of* a struggle with time—a struggle that, though it can never be won, proves more than fertile for the sake of music itself. "For if it is entirely temporal," Jankélévitch (2003, 97) writes, "music is at the same time a protest against the irreversible and (thanks to reminiscence) a victory exacted from the irreversible, a means of resuscitating the same in the form of the other." Apparently, as much as music is an art in and of time, it is always also on its way out. It cannot help but try to overcome its time–bound condition.

Vanity

A look into iconology suggests the same, deep connection: traditionally, music has always been linked to time and its dreaded companion, death. *Tempus fugit* and we better be aware of it. Music renders time tangible, makes it perceptible not just to the ear but also, through its instruments and scores, to the eyes. As such it has become a particularly strong pictorial symbol of life's transitoriness, as is prominently shown in the vanitas still lives of seventeenth–century Flemish and Dutch painters.

Vanitas tableaux typically consist of objects symbolizing either the passing of time or death itself, such as hourglasses and clocks, musical instruments and scores, skulls, withered flowers, bubbles, rotten fruit, and many more. Each depicted object in Pieter Claesz's famous *Vanitas with Violin and Glass Ball*, for instance, symbolizes the finiteness of worldly activities and pleasures: the violin and bow take up a prominent place in the composition as the rival art of painting, yet they are muted by the painter. The glass is overturned, empty, and the book remains prominently closed, overshadowed by a skull—the accompanying quill and holder remain forever still. A candle is extinguished, a solitary walnut cracked, and a watch

lies upside down with its mechanism exposed, as if someone had tried to unravel the secret of time. Reflected in a glass ball, the image of the painter looks frail and quasi–transparent, ready to burst like a bubble and vaporize in the air.[3] Even though these images are non–temporal themselves, they do evoke the idea of passing time, of mortality and the ephemeral nature of human existence. They remind the viewer, in accordance with the then prevailing Calvinistic spirit, that it is vain to search for beauty or happiness in *this* life. Pious humbleness and serene devotion: these are the keys to the afterlife. "*Memento mori,*" vanitas paintings say: remember your own mortality, do not use up time as if it were unlimited but aspire for the timeless world beyond—accordingly, do not waste time on the mundane, fleeting joys of music making.

Example 1: Pieter Claesz, *Vanitas Still Life with Violin and Glass Ball*, c. 1628, oil on panel, 36 x 59 cm. Germanisches Nationalmuseum, Nuremberg.

However, didn't music also contain that particular *promesse de bonheur*, essential to the appeal of the afterlife: the promise of eternity, a utopian escape from time? Isn't it precisely music's tendency to conceal time or its attempt to overcome it, rather than its mundane use of it, that makes it such an appropriate symbol of vanity, perhaps even of hubris? Indeed, the iconological relation between music and time is ambiguous: does the image of music, in vanitas painting, symbolize the plain consumption of time or rather its ingenious aspiration to create its own realm of timelessness *within* time? According to Wayne Martin (2006) such ambiguity is characteristic of

the genre of vanitas painting. Their semiotic structure consists of different layers of meaning and results in so–called "dialectical polysemy." By accumulating multiple symbolic codes, one set of meanings, i.e. the connotations of pleasure and accomplishment, is balanced by an opposing set of meanings, i.e. vanity and death, to the effect of a subtle critique that works both ways. "Like the Book of Ecclesiastes," Martin writes, "the still–life tradition catalogs and celebrates the very worldly pleasures and accomplishments which it at the same time submits to a critique" (564).[4] Apparently music owed its central place in vanitas painting precisely to its ambiguous relation to time—or, perhaps more accurately, to its treacherous aspiration to a "false" kind of timelessness. For the pious Calvinist, music's vanity shone through either way: it either appeared as a sheer waste of time or as a vain challenge to time itself.

Throughout Western history, the tension between music's transcendent aspirations and its worldly pleasures has elicited ambivalent reactions, not in the least from philosophers and church fathers, often leading to elaborate censorial claims. The ancient Greeks solved this ambiguity pragmatically by simply assigning music to two different gods. Under the reign of Apollo, music was perceived as a crystalline structure that seals up time and turns it into a stabile, intelligible order. Under the influence of Dionysus, music revealed a seemingly irreconcilable aspect: as a time–devouring medium it embodied life in its most transient, bodily form and was therefore closely connected to death. And yet, according to Friedrich Nietzsche (1993), the Dionysian art, even though it implied the dissolution of the *principium individuationis*, unmasked the Apollonian principle as the true antagonist of life. That is to say, by making the Dionysian bearable for human ears and eyes, Apollo was the greater deceiver because he lent a blissful aura to the delusive idea of a world beyond time:

> Apollo overcomes the suffering of the individual by means of the luminescent glorification of the *eternity of the phenomenon*; beauty triumphs over the suffering inherent in life; pain is, in a certain sense, deluded away from amongst the features of nature. In Dionysiac art and its tragic symbolism, the same nature addresses us with its true, undisguised voice: "Be like me! The Primal Mother, eternally creative, eternally impelling into life, eternally drawing satisfaction from the ceaseless flux of phenomena!" (80; emphasis in the original)

Music, according to Nietzsche, does not offer an escape from time in the Schopenhauerian sense. Being both Dionysian and Apollonian, it inherits all the ambiguities that circle the experience of time in life. Still, in *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche regarded music more as a Dionysian than as an Apollonian art. The inevitable question is therefore not whether music

embodies time rather than timelessness, but *how* it does so. How can music represent "the ceaseless flux of phenomena" without at once hypostatizing it, if only by making it repeatable, and thus isolating it from life? How can it retain its Dionysian nature without being ultimately neutralized by its Apollonian appearance?

Death in Venice

Time's Janus–faced appearance is a prominent theme in Mann's early novella *Death in Venice* ([1912] 1989). The story has often been read as a moral tale about the Apollonian ideal being shattered by the destructive forces of Dionysus. According to this interpretation the main character of the story, the famous writer Gustav von Aschenbach, gradually falls prey to a moral decline during a holiday at the Venetian Lido.[5] As soon as the stunning appearance of the young Tadzio catches his eye, Aschenbach is infatuated with the boy and becomes increasingly intoxicated by his own desire. His blatant incapacity to react properly to the situation soon amounts to an emotional paralysis that hinders the healthy channeling of his forbidden desire, and this, slowly but steadily, strangles him. Meanwhile, Venice is struck by a devastating cholera epidemic and turns into the mirror image of Aschenbach's inner state: both are heading straight, like the title ominously foretells, for a fatal ending.

Put like this, the story reveals itself as a clear instance of the age–old conflict between the intellect and the passions and is indeed easily translated into Nietzschean vocabulary as an example of the clash between the Apollonian and the Dionysian principle. Inspiring Aschenbach's pedophilic desires, the Dionysian is understood as an immoral force of decay, whereas the emblem of his professional success evokes the Apollonian realm. This, however, is a distorted use of Nietzsche's terminology since he never defined the terms as morally good or bad, nor did he consider the Greek tragedy as a contest to be won either by Apollo or Dionysus. An interpretation concerned with the experience of time, on the other hand, can preserve the genuine ambiguity of the story and avoid moral one–sidedness. Thus, Aschenbach, who has always lived the static life of a disciplined man, rediscovers time as an essential part of his life. The confrontation with illness and death makes him acutely aware that his time is continuously ticking away, whereupon he feels an increasing need to give in to his passions.

As a fictional representation of the experience of time one can wonder whether *Death in Venice* is not a variant of the vanitas–genre. Could it be read as a literary still life, a novelistic *memento mori*? Is it meant to de-

liver a moral message, a reminder that no one is immune to the workings of time—that time cannot be deceived with idle tricks and gimmicks? A short passage in the novella supports this reading as it explicitly refers to a typical vanitas–object: the hourglass. Near the end of the story Aschenbach remembers that

> long ago, in his parental home, he had watched the sand filter through an hourglass—he could still see, as though it stood before him, the fragile, pregnant little toy. Soundless and fine the rust–red streamlet ran through the narrow neck, and made, as it declined in the upper cavity, an exquisite little vortex. (Mann 1989, 61)

Just like music, the hourglass traditionally symbolizes life's transience and therefore often serves as an image of death. In Mann's *Doctor Faustus* the motif of the hourglass pops up several times, always in connection to the main character's appointed death. Hourglasses not only display the present in the trickling sand, they also visualize the future and the past by keeping the two neatly separated yet simultaneously present inside the two glass bulbs. This makes them a remarkably strong symbol of time's omnipresence. However, the passage just quoted does not refer to the object as a straightforward symbol of time as such. Aschenbach's recollection of the hourglass is far more ambiguous than the traditional, moralistic understanding of vanitas symbolism suggests. As he marvels at the object, he realizes that it does not draw attention to the passage of time but rather conceals it by hiding the sand's movement inside, the escape of the fine streamlet being hardly visible. Only in the end does the little vortex reveal time's true fleeting nature, as an insight that comes too late. It is not clear which aspect of time the hourglass symbolizes here: does it stand for time's omnipresence or rather for its tricky concealment? Or, is it meant to remind of our desire for control over time? After all, the hourglass is an instrument designed by man, to be turned upside down, again and again, just as long as we want.

In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche (2001) introduces his famous idea of the eternal recurrence of the same, a passage very well known by Mann. The demon who first utters the idea uses the image of an hourglass to evoke a distorted version of the more common anxieties about time:

> [the demon] "This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The

eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!" [Nietzsche] Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? (194)

The dilemma is reversed, it is no longer the thought of death's inescapability that is frightening but the idea that time will never cease, that death will never come as a relief. In the hands of the demon the hourglass becomes an instrument of torture, it is turned *against* man to keep time going, always and forever.

On further consideration these vanitas symbols prompt more and more questions. What does the saying "*tempus fugit*" actually teach us about time? Is it to be handled with care or to be feared as an enemy? Should we try to stay out of its haunting hands, use it sparingly, or should we conscientiously use up every minute as if it were our last?[6] These are precisely the questions that suffuse Aschenbach's time in Venice. For his whole life, in order to attain the disembodied, panoramic view of a true historian, he has systematically neglected an entire range of time–bound pleasures, only to get paralyzed by the revenge of his severely suppressed emotions, having forgotten how to engage in life:

> Aschenbach had once given direct expression—though in an unobtrusive place—to the idea that almost everything conspicuously great is great in despite: has come into being in defiance of affliction and pain; poverty, destitution, bodily weakness, vice, passion, and a thousand other obstructions. And that was more than observation—it was the fruit of experience, it was precisely the formula of his life and fame, it was the key to his work. (Mann 1989, 10–11)

Only in Venice, upon the encounter with Tadzio, does he realize that his so–called Apollonian way of life has been a pose all along, a streak of vanity based on an illusory and even dangerous ideal. Moreover, the hourglass reminds him that his time has actually been ticking since the very beginning, deeply hidden inside his dry, sedentary life. Only now, when looking back, can he see that he has in fact always participated in time, albeit it without taking the slightest delight in it, simply because there is no life outside it. There is no way either, however, to retrieve all the time lost to his experience. His last, frantic efforts to turn back the clock merely result in embarrassing traces of hair dye and the artificial smell of cosmetics, now mixed with the shameless odor of disinfectant that penetrates the city.

If the story centers on the removal of the life–denying Apollonian veil, shouldn't we conclude that Aschenbach's attempts to embody his emotions are fundamentally healthy, rather than a sign of moral decline? Aschenbach indeed wonders,

> . . . has not form two aspects? Is it not moral and immoral at once: moral in so far as it is the expression and result of discipline, immoral—yes, actually hostile to morality—in that of its very essence it is indifferent to good and evil, and deliberately concerned to make the moral world stoop beneath its proud and undivided scepter? (Mann 1989, 13)

The moral seems to be reversed: timelessness equals death, whereas time is the condition of real life. Isn't Aschenbach's fall from the Apollonian paradise, therefore, a return to life rather than the victory of death—doesn't he die willingly, perhaps even happily? This is hard to say, given the fact that after his supposed illumination in Venice Aschenbach immediately falls back on evenly idle ways to camouflage time with make–up and hair dye, the very attributes of fakery that he had so much despised before. Moreover, in his *Lebensabriß,* Mann (1930, 754) referred to *Death in Venice* as "*die Tragödie einer Entwürdigung,*" which hardly supports an interpretation in terms of a moral resurrection.

It is difficult to formulate a straightforward interpretation of the story, especially if one seeks to decipher and spell out its moral content without misusing Nietzsche's terminology one way or the other. All interpretations seem to get entangled in the paradox that circles the experience of time: as a force ruling over our lives it is something we seek to escape, while we regret not having lived it more consciously when we risk falling out of it for real. Time, like timelessness, is bound up with life *and* death. Thus, regardless of how we interpret the story morally, it seems safe to conclude, for now, that a reading in terms of the conflict between the Apollonian and the Dionysian principle will be misleading as long as it is presented as a clean dilemma with a clear outcome. A phenomenological approach, on the other hand, allows for a subtler, dialectical understanding of the story by taking into account the sensory perception of time and not merely its symbolic representations.

Death in Venice—The Film[7]

Although the adaptation to film required considerable changes and adjustments, Visconti succeeded in preserving the ambiguity of Mann's original story as he keeps the protagonist wavering between life–denying and life–affirming forces. In Visconti's hands it is precisely the *experience* of time that becomes palpable as a crucial key to the story. The heart of the matter, therefore, lies in the question of whether Visconti's adaptation can be considered successful on account of the temporality of the cinematographic medium. How do the music and the moving images on the screen affect

our understanding of the story? In my view, Visconti's use of the filmic medium brings about a layer of meaning that complements and deepens the narrative.[8]

In the novella (Mann 1989) music is mentioned only a few times. There is a reference to the music of strolling players (57) and another one to flute music in an orgiastic dream (65). Each of these scenes bathes in an oppressive atmosphere dominated by the life–threatening power of Dionysus. In Visconti's film more music is added to the story, yet it does not unambiguously confirm nor contradict these Dionysian connotations. Furthermore, since film consists of *moving* images, the question needs to be raised of how this influences our perception of Aschenbach's pursuit of timeless, ideal beauty, and how it connects to the vanitas–theme that is normally associated with *still* lives. As I shall try to demonstrate, it is through specific audiovisual effects that Visconti's *Death in Venice* captures the unassailable reality and irreducibility of time, both closely connected to the fear of running out of time, *and* to the longing for timelessness, i.e. the desire to escape from the shackles of time. Both drives are acutely present in Aschenbach's long chain of hesitations and it is only when we look at their deep entanglement that we can truly comprehend his frustrations. In what follows, I analyze the film's moving images and music from the point of view of the spectator, as they heighten the viewer's sensitivity to precisely those elements in the story that relate to Aschenbach's changing experience of time. That is to say, rather than imposing a clear interpretation, the film makes the spectator *feel* the tensions that make up the nucleus of the plot. It does not merely represent the double mode of experiencing time but presents it in a way that cannot be released from the images and the music itself.

The importance of the music is emphasized by Visconti's decision to make Aschenbach into a composer instead of a writer. Throughout we hear parts and even entire movements of Gustav Mahler's third and fifth symphonies, mildly suggesting that they are Aschenbach's own creations.[9] Most prominent is the fifth symphony's famous *Adagietto*, which resounds at least four times at key moments in the story. Furthermore, Mahler's setting of Nietzsche's *Mitternachtslied* from *Also sprach Zarathustra* plays a pivotal role.[10] This song is heard only once, in the middle of the film, where it literally underscores the hinge point of the story when Achenbach fails, semi–deliberately yet irrevocably, to seize on the occasion to be cured from his infatuation. The last lines of the verse couldn't be more appropriate, not only because they illustrate Aschenbach's failure but because the song's words draw attention to the paradoxical nature of his desire in relation to time: "*Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit—,—Will tiefe, tiefe Ewigkeit!*"

The *Adagietto* introduces and concludes the film. While the opening credits roll it resounds for almost three full minutes before the first shot appears on the screen. It continues as we see the hazy panorama of the Venetian sea, blinking in the twilight of a glorious sunrise and providing the most enchanting setting for the slowly approaching boat that brings Aschenbach to his final destination. From this very first moment on, both the music and the images set the pace: this story will be slow—very slow. *Adagietto* means "slightly faster than *adagio*" (but still rather slow) and as a dynamic indicator it refers not only to the music but also to the visual tempo on the screen. Visconti's images are anything but typical for a "*motion* picture" as they display a strong tendency to slow down. Not only the panoramic opening shot but nearly all the following scenes—notoriously those in the hotel lobby and those on the beach—evoke a particular kind of nostalgia: the yearning for a standstill.

The camera moves sluggishly inside static settings of practically immobile persons and objects. Alternately, the images look like landscape paintings, still lives, and portraits in the most traditional sense of the genre, for instance the first shot of Tadzio, and they hardly conceal the artificial poses and the weariness of their models. We can almost smell the museum–like mustiness of the hotel lobby where the guests are waiting endlessly for dinner to start. Here, the atmosphere of profound boredom is only worsened by the out–of–tune scraping of a local string quartet, which fossilizes the scene to the extent that the images really appear to be heading back to their still ancestors, fleeing from the immense weight of waiting. This remarkable tendency to slow down is acutely palpable by contrast with the real portraits of Aschenbach's wife and daughter. When he takes them out of his luggage and kisses them, these images give the impression, ironically, of containing more life, albeit it in the past, than the entire next scene in the lobby. The curious aspiration of the film's moving images to escape from their own temporality by searching for the point where they become stills again persists throughout—a tendency that certainly accounts to a large extent for the often heard critique that the film is too long and, above all, too slow.

Not surprisingly, Mahler's *Adagietto* does not help in this regard. The movement illustrates with great precision how music can slow down time—in fact, the composer added the instruction "s*ehr langsam*" to this movement. The broadly spun out melody drags the chords along, changes them like arpeggios spread out over a long stretch of time. Passing from one note to the other we can only anticipate what lies within each momentary horizon of time as there is no momentum or cadence to project us further into the future with a sweep of *élan*. In this sense the *Adagietto*

can be heard as a vivisection, a close–up of the musical experience: in slow motion it allows us an intimate view of the music's deepest inside while still at work. We experience the isolated pulse of time that usually passes by unnoticed. Precisely by *not* going fast, by *not* making grand gestures but flirting with the idea of prolonging every moment into eternity—by pushing every note onto the very brink of timelessness, but never beyond—does the music draw our attention to its vital dependence on time. We get to hear how every note is called into existence by the preceding one and only then can lead us to the following, their links utterly arbitrary yet forever knitted together into one particular fabric of musical time. While every note keeps the music in the moment, each one of them also seems to yearn heartbreakingly for the next, calling out for continuation and, as we silently assume about most music, heading towards an eventual resolution.[11]

Dialectical Plays of Time and Timelessness

In Visconti's hands, Mahler's *Adagietto* makes one wonder to what extent music can possibly slow down before it stops being music. Evidently, it cannot come to a complete standstill, lest it stop being music. But how long can one chord be spun out, how long can a melody survive on one single note? What is the minimal input we need in order to hear music?[12] The feeling of excessive slowness—yet not timelessness—is enhanced by the images prompting a similar question: how long can one single shot remain immobile before it stops being a "moving image"? How long does it take for a film shot to return to its cradle and become photography again?[13]

How can music span time without falling apart in meaningless bits and pieces? Or, how can the arch of expectation be stretched without the listener losing the thread? These are important questions for all music, not only for slow or long movements. Adorno, as we have seen, refers to the formal aspect of music as that which sews together all the notes and makes for a coherent whole, a being in time. "*Zeitkunst*," he writes,

> the temporal art, is equivalent to the objectification of time. This applies to the individual events, or musical content, to the extent that they come together in a context by means of the organization of their sequence, rather than dissolving as they pass away; and to the temporal dimension itself, which aims, potentially, at its own self–transcendence, based on the strength of the unity of what occurs within it.

Music's formal organization not only makes a composition into a whole, in doing so it also transcends the "real time" of its own performance. Some have said, therefore, that musical form necessarily also appropriates time—a fact that Adorno obviously didn't fail to notice:

> If time is the medium that, as flowing, seems to resist every reification, nevertheless music's temporality is the very aspect through which it actually congeals into something that survives independently—an object, a thing, so to speak. (Adorno 1995, 66)

Objectification through structures and forms allows the listener to grasp time as embodied by the music and to achieve a unified experience of it. In other words, by reifying time, musical form overcomes time's otherwise ungraspable fleetingness but also turns it into a kind of timelessness.

In Visconti's film the music and images make time graspable as well, yet, I maintain, not primarily by appealing to an all–embracing form. The effect is equally dialectical as the one described by Adorno but it is achieved by virtue of a play of presence and absence that closely resembles the experience of time in life. By testing the limits of the temporality of their medium, the music and images evoke the idea of timelessness as the object of their desire and fear. They embody the Midnightsong's punch line in an unexpectedly literal sense: "*Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit.*" Precisely by *not* arriving at a complete standstill but by approaching it ever so closely, the music and images, in all their slowness, evoke the idea of being out of time. In doing so, however, they draw attention to the thin line that separates them from it and thus demonstrate the impossibility—and, ultimately, the undesirability—of absolute stillness. Instead, they become even more palpable as being radically situated *within* time.

This dialectical mechanism draws on a common experience of time in life, when by the desire to forget, escape, or reverse time we are made most aware of its obstinate irreversibility. Just like Aschenbach, the music and images can only aim at a crystalline world beyond time, asymptotically, without ever being able to fully reach that final point, unless they cease being the temporal medium they are. Thus they evoke a realm of timelessness as the other side of the line that is permanently there—sometimes astonishingly close, but always, like Tadzio in the *Mitternachtslied*–scene, just beyond reach—only to the effect of throwing Aschenbach back into the real world of longing. It is this real world of longing, then, that we hear and see, *through* the aspirations to a timeless, Apollonian world beyond.

The story can be understood accordingly, as the account of the transformation of Aschenbach's purely aesthetic, distant fascination for Tadzio's Apollonian beauty into an erotic desire for proximity. Urged by a strong

sense of death approaching, he starts to engage in the daily routines at the Venetian Lido. Soon he no longer wishes to contemplate the object of his desire as a timeless ideal but wants to engage in it, touch and feel it, incarnate his desire *within* his life. Precisely by being confronted with the frigidity of the Apollonian ideal—the plain fact that timelessness excludes life, and thus equals death—he becomes aware of his strong need to participate in life. The more death gets a hold on Aschenbach, the more he becomes aware of his own time ticking away. He increasingly realizes how his former refuge into a timeless world of beautiful forms will not help him escape from death. Consequently, he feels less and less inhibited to live every minute as if it were the last. In this sense, the story recounts how the longing for an Apollonian ideal is inevitably bound up with the Dionysian lure of the "ceaseless flux of phenomena."

The film conveys this complex connection by tying the spectator down to the here and now of the filmic experience itself. Neither the story, nor the excessive visual beauty or the intoxicating, opulent music, allow the audience to be entirely carried away into a strictly separate aesthetic realm. Rather, the excessive slowness elicits an almost bodily experience of *real*, un–transfigured time passing; it installs impatience in the spectator, the subtle frustration of eager anticipation, or at least a subliminal sensory awareness of the impossibility to accelerate or transcend the film's pace, as it is only *in* the moment that the images can be seen and the music heard. The film, then, asks its spectators to engage in it, to pay close attention to its every detail, without offering a real escape route to an aesthetic realm where time is objectified or domesticated. Indeed, there is no transcendence, no transfiguration or forgetfulness of time. It is the flow of time itself that we are asked to experience while the music and images linger on.

Two Musical Images of Time

Phenomenologically, the film works by virtue of effects of *contiguity*—it makes palpable the quasi–physical pull of "almost–continuity" between time and timelessness—instead of relying on a reifying mechanism of form that unifies what is and remains essentially heterogeneous. It is the promise *and* the all–too–real danger of this "almost" that allows timelessness to shimmer through, rather than the detachment of the illusory "as if" that creates a timeless realm as a product of the aesthetic imagination. This difference is important, since the "almost," dialectically, heightens our attention to the insurmountable presence of the moment, whereas the "as if" sooths our longing by separating us from it. In the face of death, then,

Aschenbach catches sight of a kind of timelessness that does not, like his former Apollonian world of timeless beauty, lock him out of his own life but instead makes him conscious of the momentous here and now of his experience.

The distinction resembles an opposition between two modes of temporality described by Deleuze and Guattari (2011). The first mode—*Aeon*—refers to the so–called "plane of consistency" where only relations of speed and slowness obtain, while the second—*Chronos*—indicates a "plane of transcendence" that consists of proportional relations of structure and development (288– 98). With regard to music, they indicate different modes of organizing time: "to the transcendent, organizational plane of Western music based on sound forms and their development, we oppose the immanent plane of consistency of Eastern music composed of speeds and slownesses, movements and rest" (298). On a deeper level, the opposition between *Chronos* and *Aeon* reflects two conflicting modes of conceptualizing time that underlie the practices of composing, performing and listening. On the phenomenological level, however, music's transcendent and immanent plane are always competing, so that either the former is felt to dominate the latter, or the latter is perceived as undermining the former. In order to rehabilitate the dimension of "becoming," i.e. the immanent plane, the authors seek to deflate the role of musical forms and structures in what they see as a typically Western conception of musical time:

> the whole becoming of Western music, all musical becoming, implies a minimum of sound forms and even of melodic and harmonic functions; speeds and slownesses are made to pass across them, and it is precisely these speeds and slownesses that reduce the forms and functions to a minimum. (298)

Whether or not the authors are phenomenologically accurate in claiming that a heightened awareness of the immanent mode of consistency necessarily reduces the appreciation of music's formal aspects, is open to debate. What matters most for the present discussion is that the mere possibility to distinguish between the two modes reveals a tension that can be felt in *all* music and that is relevant even to our understanding of non–temporal art works. In his essay on Rembrandt's portraits, for instance, Georg Simmel (2005) similarly distinguishes between two modes of representing the relation between life and death in art, thereby revealing a fundamental difference between the underlying conceptions of death. Given the remarkable parallel to the two conceptions of the relation between music and timelessness that we have distinguished—the "as if " versus the "almost"—it is worth quoting him at length:

> Now, his way of experiencing death speaks out of Rembrandt's concep-
> tion of the human being only there, where he draws this conception up
> from the ultimate depths; not in an elegiac or emotionally emphasized
> sense, because the latter originates precisely there, where death appears
> as a violation of life from the outside, as a fate that has waited for us at
> some point on the course of our life, unavoidable as a fact, not as a neces-
> sity out of the idea of life itself but as that which contradicts it. If death
> is conceived of in this way—as an extraneous power over this life—then
> it attains the atrocious, deplorable character against which one either re-
> volts heroically, or toward which one lyrically subjugates oneself, or with
> which one has nothing to do inwardly. (71–72)

Death, when conceived of in sharp opposition to life, is a stranger with
whom we have nothing to do. This is frightful, as it seems to be utterly
arbitrary and unrelated to who we are as a person. Death, in this sense, is
"out there"; it is a murderer. When understood as an intrinsic part of life,
however, death becomes more personal and less frightening. It is our own
death as it reveals itself gradually within our lives.

According to Simmel, it is the nearness of death, its being "almost"
present, that is palpable in Rembrandt's portraits, and this is precisely what
makes them so touchingly accurate. They do not "signify" death by sym-
bolically referring to it, but instead represent individual lives as embracing
life and therefore also death:

> Rembrandt's figures have the half–light, the muteness, the questioning
> into the darkness; exactly that which in its clearest, finally, absolutely
> dominating appearance is called death, and which, regarded superficially,
> precisely to that extent appears to contain less life. In reality, they con-
> tain precisely thereby the *whole* life. (Simmel 2005, 74; emphasis in the
> original)

Life and death, Simmel maintains, are no strict opposites. Instead, death
inhabits life the way time inhabits it: hidden at first, but more and more
visible as time goes by. Death as we commonly know it is nothing more
than that little vortex, the last stage in which it fully reveals itself, but as it
is part of life, it is also in time. The parallel with Aschenbach's reflection on
the hourglass is striking. "It seems to me beyond doubt," Simmel writes,

> that death *inhabits* life from the onset. Indeed, death reaches macro-
> scopic visibility—absolute domination, so to speak— only at the moment
> of death. But life would be different from birth on, and in each of its
> moments and cross–sections, were we not to die. (71; emphasis in the
> original)

Similarly, Visconti's film installs an almost physical awareness of the complex relation between the experience of time, and the longing for and fear of transcending it. All are present yet not strongly opposed—rather, they dialectically reinforce each other. It is no surprise, therefore, that even the moment in which Aschenbach eventually passes away is stretched out in time. Only when bystanders come to his aid do we see that the unavoidable has taken place; that the long, drawn out "almost" of his death has finally given way to the full presence of its "now." Indeed, Aschenbach's two dominant preoccupations—his desire to petrify time and his fear of succeeding all too well in that task—have reinforced each other in a dispute that could only be decided by that ultimate gesture of time. Not coincidentally, the little streamlets of hair dye trickling over the deceased Aschenbach's forehead evoke strong iconic reminiscences of Christ with the thorn crown. Aschenbach—the former Apollonian artist—is now wholly exposed: the hourglass is broken and finally releases what was always hidden inside. The warm blood of a human being has replaced the trickling sand. In dying, he is revealed as a fully incarnated, true being in time.

Who wins? Apollo or Dionysus? Depending on how we approach it, music can show itself as a structure transcending time or rather reveal its radical being *in* time. Traditionally, western aesthetics has prioritized the first: it is only by creating the auditory illusion of "timeless" time that music attains its place among the fine arts. The according ideal of "disinterested" listening turns music into the *object* of an aesthetic experience and so reifies its musical time. The other conception of musical time is less discussed, perhaps also less appreciated as the basis for an aesthetic mode of perception, yet it surely is just as real in listening practices. It asks the listener to engage in music without objectifying its flow or hypostatizing its forms. It is only in this second mode of listening that we can truly experience what Jankélévitch called the "delightful shock of repetition," as we recognize time as it is in us, not "out there."

Notes

1. "I might still have much to add on the way in which music is perceived, namely in and through time alone, with absolute exclusion of space" (Schopenhauer 1969, 266).

2. Wittily, the authors oppose the refrain to "music": "Music is a creative, active operation that consists in deterritorializing the refrain. Whereas the refrain is essentially territorial, territorializing, or reterritorializing, music makes it a deterritorialized content for a deterritorializing form of expression. Pardon that sentence: what musicians do should be musical, it should be written in music" (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, 331).

3. Pieter Claesz, *Vanitas Still Life with Violin and Glass Ball*, c. 1628, oil on panel, 36 x 59 cm. Germanisches Nationalmuseum, Nuremberg.

4. Vanitas painting derived its name from the opening sentence of the Book of Ecclesiastes: "*Vanitas vanitatum et omnia vanitas.*"

5. For example: "Underlying this complicated process which, in Mann's phrase describing *Death in Venice*, 'turned the intoxicate song into a moral fable,' there is the dualism of a book which deeply influenced Mann's whole way of looking at life and art, Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* . . . In the orgiastic dream that destroys the last shreds of Aschenbach's self–esteem Apollo is routed by Dionysus, Aschenbach cannot preserve 'his own god' against the onslaught of barbaric lust and the 'stranger god' becomes 'his own'" (Becket 1973, 579).

6. Similarly, Wayne Martin (2006, 5) asks: "What lesson does one take from the insistent reminder of the vanity of worldly pleasure and accomplishment? What ethics is prescribed by a skull? Here we may be tempted to close the semiotic structure by presupposing a Christian moral: Lay up your stores in heaven; live not for pleasure but for final judgment; pursue the good rather than delight . . . however, the paintings sometimes resist or at least question such hopeful closure."

7. Luchino Visconti, *Death in Venice*, 1971.

8. Many reviewers and theorists did not find Visconti's adaptation successful at all. See, for instance, Hutchison 1974, 36: "The film does not provide, with regard to aesthetics, the subtlety, the depth of analysis that the novella Death in Venice can accommodate." Or Vaget 1980, 171: "Thus the film has reduced and considerably simplified the complexity of Mann's case against Aschenbach."

9. Visconti's motives for turning Aschenbach into a composer ranged from personal preferences over biographical and interpretive considerations to purely filmic concerns. He meticulously modeled his protagonist after the image of Gustav Mahler, just like Thomas Mann had paid tribute to the recently deceased composer by adorning Aschenbach with Mahler's first name and fine physiognomy. As many have noticed, this particular adaptation is not entirely unproblematic from a dramatic point of view. How could the composer of such dazzling, sensual music ever be so fatally incapacitated when confronted with his own emotions? In fact, the music seems to take over the task of embodying Aschenbach's emotions every time he fails to do so himself.

10. The *Mitternachtslied* is part of the fourth movement of Mahler's third symphony, indicated as "s*ehr langsam—Misterioso.*"

11. This description is closely connected to Husserl's (1991, 5–53) analysis of the perception of melody in terms of protention and retention. Our present focus, however, is not on how we come to hear a series of notes as a melody but on the experience of music as an embodiment of time. In the philosophy of music, the borderline between phenomenological descriptions of the musical experience and metaphysical claims about the nature of music has oftentimes been blurred. The danger to slip from one into the other has lurked especially in discussions concerning the perceived movement in and of music. See, for instance, Victor Zuckerkandl's (1973, 94) ambiguous description of the "motion of tones": "We have understood the dynamic qualities of tone as the particular kind of unfulfillment peculiar to each tone, its desire for completion. No musical tone is sufficient unto itself; and as each musical tone points beyond itself, reaches, as it were, a hand to the next, so we too, as these hands reach out, listen tensely and expectantly for each next tone. To be auditively *in* the tone now sounding means, then, always being *ahead of* it too, on the way to the next tone. Inasmuch as we thus continually participate in the transition from tone to tone, we hear each interval as a step, as motion" (emphasis in original). It is important to keep in mind that the present account does not intend to make any metaphysical or ontological claims about the nature of music itself, but always and only refers to the products of different modes of perception, as shaped by particular concepts of time.

12. Evidently, Mahler's *Adagietto* is not particularly experimental or groundbreaking in this regard. It is only within the context of the present discussion about time and in relation to Visconti's use of the music that it becomes paradigmatic for such a line of thought. In fact, many twentieth–century composers, for instance John Cage, to name but the most obvious example, have been much more explicit and radical in testing music's dependence on time, whereas this was surely not on Mahler's mind when he wrote his fifth symphony.

13. A similar remark ought to be made here: most probably, Visconti was not intentionally experimenting in this sense, whereas many contemporary video artists, for instance Bill Viola, actually do test the medium with this particular question in mind. Visconti's *Death in Venice* becomes interesting in this regard mainly because of the particular story that it tells and the central role of time in it. It is noteworthy, though, that Visconti was working on an adaptation of Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu* right before he started shooting *Death in Venice*. Unfortunately, this project was canceled before the actual filming ever took place.

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Carol Vernallis. 2013. *Unruly Media: YouTube, Music Video, and the New Digital Cinema*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Reviewed by Paula Harper

"I love the media swirl," begins Carol Vernallis's (2013) *Unruly Media*. In this exploratory, whirlwind, and sometimes frustrating volume, Vernallis acts as an exuberant tour guide through the bleeding edges of twentieth– and twenty–first–century media content. Vernallis cares deeply about the material under scrutiny in her book—pop culture artifacts from the "Sneezing Baby Panda" video to Baz Luhrmann's 2001 *Moulin Rouge!*—and the thesis of *Unruly Media* is, in part, that these objects are worthy of serious scholarly attention. Outing herself so blatantly as a fan of her material is a bold scholarly move, and, despite weaknesses in *Unruly Media*'s argumentation and execution, Vernallis's call for further, rigorous, interdisciplinary attention to music video and other contemporary audiovisual phenomena is one that deserves to be heeded by scholars across a wide spectrum of disciplinary backgrounds.

In *Unruly Media*, Vernallis triangulates a contemporary audiovisual aesthetic paradigm, emerging from music video and feeding into other media forms and genres—specifically, YouTube and digital cinema. Vernallis dubs this paradigm "intensified audiovisual aesthetics," and argues for specific investigation of the "musical" qualities and parameters of these genres. In many respects, *Unruly Media* fits squarely into Vernallis's body of work, from her 2004 *Experiencing Music Video*, to her work as editor of *The Oxford Handbook of Sound and Image in Digital Media* and *The Oxford Handbook of New Audiovisual Aesthetics*. While Vernallis's disciplinary roots in film theory clearly resonate through *Unruly Media*'s attunement to issues of narrative and the visual parameters of media, Vernallis's work is anything but silent, championing the *audio* of the audiovisual. Her analyses of pop culture artifacts always take sonic features into account, often using sound, music, or "musicality" as an entry point into the reading of a particular scene or video.

When a reader is swept along in the unrelenting current of evocative metaphor and wide–ranging association, Vernallis's prose is exhilarating. Her writing is vivid, distinctive, perhaps even "musical" in its striking juxtapositions and giddy tumultuousness. But as soon as one is jolted out of this stream by a moment of skepticism or critical inquiry, *Unruly Media*'s mode of address can quickly become frustrating, obstructive, baffling. Key

concepts are rarely explicitly theorized; the reader is left to glean the meanings of terms like "flow," "musicality," or even "music video" through context and Vernallis's varied usage. Additionally, the analyses in *Unruly Media* assume a single vantage point, indicated by a near–ubiquitous use of the pronoun "we." *We* hear a set of sounds, *we* experience a scene in a movie, *we* escape from our day jobs into the three–minute stasis of a YouTube clip. This collective second person is accompanied throughout the book by the also near–ubiquitous "might"/"may be"/"perhaps" auxiliary verb constructions. One assumes that the perpetual "perhaps"es are an attempt to mitigate the singular and privileged subject position enunciated by the "we," but this once again is never explicitly laid out; the whole complex highlights the precariousness of Vernallis's aesthetic arguments, but never grounds that precariousness in a—potentially quite productive—theorization of the author's own vantage point. Might we experience some primal fear upon viewing the "Badger Song" on YouTube? Sure—but we might not. Any such distance between the reader's own perspective and *Unruly Media*'s ubiquitous "we" opens up a productive and tantalizing space, in which the plurality of spectator experience in the digital age manifests as a site for much–needed scholarship.

Unruly Media is divided into three segments, one for each of the media forms in the title's post–colonic. Three chapters on digital cinema come first, followed by three on YouTube, and three on music video. This configuration might initially seem somewhat confusing, as Vernallis's central argument is that music video functions as the "supertext" from which these new "intensified audiovisual aesthetics" emerge. However, Vernallis offers the interpretation that music video "synthesizes the genres of post–classical film and online viral media," making its placement sensible (21). Additionally, the book's structure foregrounds aesthetic and media interpenetration in its inclusion of "crossover" chapters that begin and end each of the three sections, performatively mirroring a central tenet of Vernallis's argument: contemporary media aesthetics bleed across genre boundaries. In that regard, no linear ordering of Vernallis's three genres would afford a truly intuitive progression. The book's introductory chapter functions as a highly comprehensive road map for the book that follows, laying out Vernallis's arguments and objects of inquiry with some specificity.

Unruly Media's first section, dealing with digital cinema, comprises six short chapters, across which Vernallis tracks an emergent set of aesthetics that break from those of classical Hollywood cinema. These "intensified audiovisual aesthetics" also, Vernallis argues, engage the human body in new ways, reflecting the situation of late–modern identity (40, 96). Throughout this argument, Vernallis sets up an implicit binary, situating linear narra-

tive (normative, homologous with classical Hollywood tradition) opposite "musicality" or "music video aesthetics." "Music," "music video," or the "audio" of "audiovisual" thus frequently get mapped onto cinematic moments that Vernallis perceives as "non–narrative" or "anti–narrative." *Run Lola Run*'s looping plot line "turn[s] the film into a music video. There is no past, no future"; *Moulin Rouge!* is notable for how it "holds us in its 'now,' rather than letting us stray to its future"; in *Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind*, "[a]s with music video, it is difficult to see where we are going; the viewer just has to go with the flow" (46, 79, 96). Such a stance is unsurprising given Vernallis's own scholarly positioning—in this section, her theoretical reference–point is overwhelmingly the work of film theorist David Bordwell, who is cited dozens of times throughout the first section and numerous times throughout the rest of the book. His theorization of "intensified continuity" is a clear antecedent to Vernallis's own "intensified audiovisual aesthetics," and his concept of filmic "parameters" underpins Vernallis's arguments of how audiovisual components shape narrative and meaning. In relying so heavily on Bordwell, however, *Unruly Media* sometimes feels insular, detached from broader scholarly and theoretical dialogues in music, film, and media theory.

The second section of *Unruly Media* focuses on YouTube, which Vernallis alternately understands as a platform and a genre, often problematically conflating the two. While characterizing the site as "vast and uncharted," Vernallis mainly concerns herself with a particular strain of YouTube videos that are entertainment–oriented, employing music and visuals (9, 127). Vernallis acknowledges the existence of YouTube videos outside this paradigm—for example, archival footage, pirated media, or tutorials on everything from Photoshop features to cat nail clipping—but these other genres play no significant part in her analyses. It is clear that, for the purposes of *Unruly Media*, "YouTube" is largely synonymous with "viral videos," those mega–popular phenomena disseminated to and consumed by an enormous, content–hungry audience. In this vein, Vernallis suggests the "Badger Song" as a contender for "one of the best exemplars of YouTube," perhaps unaware that the song in fact predates YouTube, originating as a looping flash video on Weebls–stuff.com in 2003. In its original format, the "Badger Song" was essentially endless, playing until the viewer navigated away from the website—quite different from the finite form of YouTube videos, which in 2006 were capped at a length of ten minutes. The "Badger Song" misstep, while seemingly minor, is symptomatic of the problems that can arise from close readings that don't attend to platform specificity and, more broadly, the variety of lived practices and media products that comprise twenty–first–century audiovisual consumption.

Vernallis seeks, in this middle section of *Unruly Media*, to establish a typology of YouTube aesthetics, and suggests a "map" of "aesthetic features" that typify the YouTube landscape: 1. pulse and reiteration; 2. graphic values; 3. a sense of scale that matches the medium 4. irreality and weightlessness (what [Vernallis calls] the "digital swerve"); 5. reanimation; 6. unusual causal relations; 7. intermediality and transmediality; and 8. sardonic humor and parody (130). Vernallis moves through a dizzying array of media objects in a survey of these aesthetic parameters, which blur and bleed into each other kaleidoscopically. Throughout, voices of critical media theorists like Lev Manovich, Alexander Galloway, and Jonathan Sterne are promisingly proffered, and terms like "just–in–time" production practices, "speedup," and "precarious labor," suggest engagements with issues of contemporary capitalism and circulation. However, Vernallis's arguments often skim, skipping–stone–like, over the complicated economic and political issues in which her "intensified audiovisual aesthetics" are implicated; the above scholars and concepts feature suggestively. *Unruly Media* opens tantalizing doors, offering ways in which its aesthetic claims *might* be related to shifting modes of perception, embodiment, and social relations in the twenty–first century—but Vernallis rarely stays in one place long enough to work through the implications of any of these suggestions. At times, the reader might find herself distracted by an awareness of what's bracketed out of such aesthetically–focused analyses: the downward and upward head gestures in will.i.am's "Yes We Can" video might well have helped convey an emotional shift to viewers, but that hardly fully accounts for the video's success in Barack Obama's 2008 presidential bid. To treat the conditions of such a video's material existence and circulation as vestigial to its aesthetics—rather than as collaborative, constitutive factors—seems remiss, especially given that Vernallis champions contemporary audiovisual media in part *because of* its ubiquity and mass dissemination (165).

Springing as it does from Vernallis's previous scholarship, *Unruly Media*'s treatment of music video is the most nuanced and richly theorized set of chapters in the book. In the third and final section, Vernallis first considers music video aesthetics diachronically, juxtaposing the music video language of A Flock of Seagulls to that of Lady Gaga. These chapters are refreshingly grounded in historical and material reality, as Vernallis considers the technological affordances and constraints of various eras of music video production. A further chapter is dedicated to the consideration of the proprietary styles of auteur music video directors, while an epilogue considers possible aesthetic futures, in the shifting mediascape under Vernallis's perceived and imagined purview. Here, Vernallis advances some of her most intriguing potential arguments, like how accelerated or

intensified aesthetics might be related to contemporary modes of attending, cognition, and perception. In these arguments at *Unruly Media*'s close, a reader is offered tantalizing provocation towards further scholarship.

Throughout the book, a number of weaknesses occur on an editorial level. Whether as an artifact of the book's formal arrangement, or by design, *Unruly Media* is shot through with repetition. At times, lines or paragraphs are re–used verbatim (for examples, see 9 and 127; 85 and 93; 130 and 184). Numerous introductory chapters are often so similar in structure and content to those that follow that a reader might easily find herself in a state of bewildered déjà vu—didn't I *just* read this? One might understand this repetitiveness as performative on the part of the author; after all, Vernallis posits that "insistent reintegration" is the key feature of an emergent YouTube aesthetic (127). Other factors, however, like absent or uninformative citations, copy–editing errors (most egregiously, in the book's first sentence) or the lack of a bibliography, might vex a reader eager to build on Vernallis's work. Vernallis variously adopts the notions of "glance" and "multitasking" to describe her *Unruly Media* methodology, playfully appropriating otherwise pejoratively–inflected terms for the inattention characteristic of (and, for some opponents, engendered by) the digital age (42–43). Performative or not, however, this analytical mode does a disservice to the material it considers if it brackets film, music video, and viral phenomena as aesthetic objects, and engagement with them as merely "practice" for contemporary social experience, rather than giving real attention to their imbrication in the contemporary political, economic, material, and social realities of their audience.

The strength of *Unruly Media* lies precisely in its author's acknowledgement of its limitations. At a number of points, Vernallis presents her work as door–opening, a cartographical exploration. She poses a number of questions for future scholars to take up in their own research. How, for example, does a scholar deal with the *in*accessibility of data from corporate bastions such as MTV and YouTube (152)? How can one best construct an "archive" of YouTube and other viral materials, for personal use or scholarly study (150)? What, apart from aesthetic parameters, makes a successful YouTube clip (135)? Finally, as Vernallis asks in her epilogue, how does the increasing interpenetration of cross–platform media aesthetics relate to the broader media and labor landscape of the early twenty–first century (227)? Ultimately, *Unruly Media* is an effusive (if at times vexing) ride through a number of contemporary cultural forms. Its value lies in the problems it raises, rather than those it solves.

David Novak. 2013. *Japanoise: Music at the Edge of Circulation*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Reviewed by Andrés García Molina

First, a disclaimer: this is not a review if "book review" implies the existence of an explicit map or the provision of a summary of sorts. *Japanoise* is an extraordinary book that requires something else, a different strategy. Just like a project around Noise with a capital N (a musical genre), and noise (a more general concept), required from David Novak a different kind of engagement, a different kind of listening, a different kind of writing. Novak's *Japanoise,* based on over ten years of fieldwork in Japan and North America, provides no transparent, easy definitions, nor does it strive to produce a definitive history of Noise in any sense, whether as genre or metaphor. And while Novak's work pushes towards an approximation to Noise as a potent critique of many things (some of which will be addressed in this review), in *Japanoise* he manages to investigate generative questions around Noise without merely opposing it to other categories (like music, signal, or information), enacting an all–out critique of a tendency to define objects and subjects too neatly in ethnomusicological and anthropological research. In Novak's hands, Noise can refer to an underground genre of music, forms of circulation, a commodity, and everyday techniques of creating and listening.

Methodologically, Novak's work is an intensive application of how to engage with a slippery subject, one that appears to be virtually inapprehensible and not reducible to a straight, linear story with a set of discretely identifiable ancestors sitting atop a family tree. Part of Novak's merit lies in resisting writing an account that adduces a limited group of people as calling the shots or having direct or singular accountability. Any traceable lines of kinship and communication, relation, and exchange are overlapping and uneven. Similarly, Noise cannot be reduced to a single place or places. Novak admits it is constantly changing, as ubiquitous as it is unperceived. In that sense, Novak's style of ethnography is vigorously detectivesque minus the fetish. Novak writes that ethnographic writing can be "as much a force of ambiguity as of explanation," admitting that the project he embarks upon might be "unsettling" (26).

Japanoise is careful in and committed to writing against exoticization and reification. And while there is no clear family tree, throughout the book we are presented with a host of characters, people of bone and flesh with first and last names; at stake is nothing less than livelihoods and

ways of being. There are performers of varying renown and those who travel from near and far to hear their performances. *Japanoise* follows the circuitous paths activated by Noise through multiple cities: Osaka, Tokyo, and Kyoto in Japan; San Francisco, New York City, Providence, and London, Ontario in North America. Within those cities, there are multiple places that Noise—and consequently, Novak—treads: record stores, live performance venues, coffee shops, bars, recording studios, radio stations, living rooms, even the intimacy of headphones blasting dangerously loud sound waves. And Noise travels in various forms: mail–order albums and cassettes, in–person exchanges, subsequent listening sessions at home or in public spaces, but also through live performances.

In 233 richly detailed, poetically descriptive pages, Novak manages to also pay equal attention to the wider historical contexts of these histories of circulation, all the while maintaining an accessible tone that is unwaveringly rigorous. Novak's admittance of unsettling–ness, "I will not touch down in particular sites for long," is deceptively simple (26). For describing a performance that takes place, say at a small bar in Osaka, also means knowing about the history of that small bar. Who runs it, who owns it, who else has performed there, what kind of public goes there, which kinds of practices are enacted. It might also mean knowing about that neighborhood's history. If a performance is part of an annual event, say, like the No Fun Fest, Novak doesn't downplay the importance of knowing which record labels might be involved, who the organizers might be, which other festivals and publics might intersect. Novak also discusses a range of magazines that were and a part of Noise's circulation, drawing on the various kinds of discourse presented in different publications. Entering a record store, too, is not simply entering a record store: in Novak's treatment, it also means paying attention to the broader history entailed, to the store's connections in town, nationally, and internationally. Or take, for example, Novak's engagement with Drugstore, an alternative listening "free space" in 1980s Kyoto, a site that played an important role in the coming together of a generation of Noisicians. But engaging with Drugstore means, for Novak, also engaging with the broader historical sociality of "listening cafés" in Japan, and in particular, the institution of *jazu–kissa*. Novak guides us through a particular way of listening that consolidated across Japan in the post–War decades. In doing so he engages a particular history of jazz circulation and a broader history of US–Japan relations. Novak is complex and thorough in his treatment of encounters between the United States and Japan, encounters that "have historically been un-

equal, but unequal in particularly repetitive, cyclical ways" (25). Novak explores these "asymmetries" in detail, asserting that his "extension of Japan studies into a context of transnational reception . . . is also a step toward globalizing American studies through the circuits of Japanese media. In both contexts, distinct projects of cultural and subcultural identity emerged from shared but separate loops of consumption" (25). Novak seems equally well informed and familiar with Japanese scholarship and forms of popular culture as he is with those of the West. All of this, of course, implied doing an impressive amount of fine–grained ethnographic research and archival work.

And despite all the specificity that at times comes through in *Japanoise*, Novak insists on a productive paradox: he writes rigorously while taking head–on the challenges posed by a reflexive authorial voice that does not strive to be authoritative. In a gesture I read as densely significant, the introduction of *Japanoise* does not end with the usual roadmap characteristic of Anglo–American academic publications: "In Chapter 1, I explore . . . Chapter 2 traces an outline of . . . Chapters 3 and 4 theorize . . ." In leading us through detailed histories, in presenting with great care the different work ethics and aesthetics of a wide range of international artists like Merzbow, Incapacitants, Sonic Youth, Masonna, Nihilism Spasm Band, Hijokaidan, and their numerous ilk, Novak consistently resists any totalizing act, steadily writing against a style of singularity that has been uncritically produced and received in our disciplines. For maps, as Novak puts it, also draw the outsider.

Japanoise is also a sustained critique of Jacques Attali's seminal *Noise: The Political Economy of Music* (1977), a critique that is only spelled out explicitly at the very end of the book, in the Epilogue. Novak presses the fact that what Attali means by noise presupposes a narrow, Romantic understanding of what "music" is. Attali limits noise to the outside, as a noise that can only exist in the margins and "can never enter into the spinning wheel of musical systems" (231). Attali's noise is strictly negative, disallowing any possibility of it having any kind of productive presence in a circulatory present; it is too neatly the opposite of music. The Noise Novak describes

> did not emerge through its pure distinctions from Music but in the overlapping and repetitive feedback between "noise" and "music," "local" and "global," "old" and "new" that generates new modes of musical and social experience. Even when these fluctuations of identity, production, mediation, and creative practice are drawn into specific and observable loops of sound and performance, Noise does not settle. (232)

Along similar lines he writes, "Any story of Noise must account for the transnational circuitry of its subjects, and also acknowledge their dogged pursuit of antisocial, antihistorical, antimusical obscurity. This multisited struggle against cultural identification makes Noise extremely difficult to place" (15).

Novak also writes about the lower case noise, a broader concept deployed in discourses about technology, globalization, race, class, ethnicity, modernity, and the environment, in disciplines ranging from history to musicology, anthropology, media studies, to science and technology studies. In critiquing such uses of "noise" as a concept, Novak draws attention to how "[s]ome narratives take for granted its *unity as a sonic object*" (229; emphasis mine). What simultaneously becomes apparent is a powerful critique of the way boundedness is too easily attributed to objects of study, how a *sonic object's unity* is indeed often left unproblematized.

Novak's theoretical agenda is particularly rich in the complex interweaving of Noise, circulation, and feedback. His understanding of circulation is one that openly challenges existing models that "represent circulation as something that takes place *between* cultures" (17; emphasis in the original). In a radical move, in privileging the concept of feedback, Novak proposes that "circulation itself *constitutes* culture" (17; emphasis in the original). It is also important to note that he sustains this position without simply proposing another version of medial determinism à la Friedrich Kittler. At the same time, Novak is deeply concerned with "how technological mediation transformed the global scale of cultural exchange, even as it undermined its historical continuity" (17). His account is not simply about how culture travels and appears changed elsewhere, but it is also about remediation as feedback. Whatever circulates doesn't end as diffusion, propagation, or dispersion; it comes back, feeding back onto itself.

If there is some critique I offer, I must first preface it with acknowledging again Novak's open admittance of not necessarily resolving, of writing an unsettling ethnography, and also foregrounding the ambitious scope of *Japanoise*. Novak writes, "[a]nother goal of this book is to examine the role of technology in the formation of cultural subjects," naming a fundamental question in the social sciences and the humanities (23). While Novak presents detailed literature reviews in other areas of academic enquiry, his engagement with the literature that deals with the various ways in which the relationship between humans and technology is understood to unfold seems lacking. While Novak is convincing in his account of technology as something central to Noise's aesthetics of live performance, ways of circulation, and techniques of creating and listening, his account does not present explicit theorization about ways

in which we might be able to think about the unfolding of the human and the technical within specific localities. In this particular point, his approach is empirically rich, leaving ample room for theorization.

There is that famous line—"We murder to dissect"—in William Wordsworth's "The Tables Turned." But if we turn the tables another time—if we *dissect to murder*—we find precisely that which Novak *does not do* but, that which an inordinate amount of academic work does: divide a "problem" in order to conquer it, in order to get closer to "the truth." Mirroring Novak's resistance to laying out neat maps, I am risking writing a non–review, something far from a summary or a faithful–enough miniversion of the book that could stand in place of reading the book. In this risk I hope to purposefully provoke readers to go do some reading and listening for themselves, but perhaps more importantly, to do something beyond finding out or getting lost in a map.

Timothy D. Taylor. 2012. *The Sounds of Capitalism: Advertising, Music, and the Conquest of Culture.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Reviewed by Ralph Whyte

If some associate Christmas with "Hark! The Herald Angels Sing" or "Jingle Bells," it takes only a mention of the word "holidays" to set off the chugging rhythmic ostinato of an old earworm in my mind: "Holidays are coming, holidays are coming." Whether or not this song has convinced me to buy more Coca–Cola at Christmas, it has made an indelible impression on my imagining of the festive season. Music's power to impart impressions and to make the forgettable maddeningly memorable was recognized by advertisers long before Coca–Cola released its ads of branded trucks traversing winter landscapes. It is the task of Timothy Taylor's *The Sounds of Capitalism* to detail the history of this field in which musicians, record companies, and advertisers have all interacted.[1] The narrative is largely chronological, although some chapters are organized thematically. The historical account is infused with copious examples, which can be experienced on the companion website, soundsofcapitalism.com. Despite these profuse examples, Taylor steers clear of close readings, preferring to engage with the words of those involved in the world of advertising music. Taylor wears his two hats as historian and ethnographer, drawing on large quantities of trade discourse and numerous interviews: 37 in total, 24 of which he carried out personally. Such a study looks beyond the facts of the history of the business and seeks to understand how participants have understood what they do, not merely as individuals, but en masse. The volume of information Taylor includes towards this end is impressive. It is unsurprising that the book was a decade in the making (xvii).

The first two chapters (1, "Music and Advertising in Early Radio" and 2, "The Classes and the Masses in the 1920s and 1930s") chart the "pre–jingle" era of radio advertising. During this time advertisers and sponsors would produce entire radio programs; more programs were produced this way than by the networks. Music was a relatively cheap resource for filling broadcast time, but advertisers knew relatively little about the profile of radio audiences and were therefore anxious about picking music audiences would like. One method of selection was to choose music that would give a brand a "personality" or that would "animate" a product (6); for example, the bright timbre of the banjo of the band *Clicquot Club Eskimos* was thought to capture some of the effervescence of Clicquot Club ginger ale.

Faced with uncertainty about who was listening and what music to play, advertisers engaged in market research by asking listeners to write in, even luring them with free photographs of stars. These letters provided researchers with critical data: "types of paper, grammar, spelling, punctuation, and sentence structure" revealed the social profile of a program's listening public (47).

The third chapter, "The Great Depression and the Rise of the Radio Jingle," describes the advent of the jingle. Taylor sees early jingles as the first instance of music that was composed specifically for advertising crossing over into the wider popular–music market, as the most popular jingles were sold widely on record and in print. Thus begins an important thread for Taylor: the thesis that since the 1920s the distinction between advertising and creative industries has become increasingly fuzzy. Taylor considers the jingle as a way to sugarcoat the hard–sell tactics that were effected by the Depression. Networks were initially reluctant to sell jingle–length timeslots, but they succumbed and thereby generated the ad–break format as we know it today (87). This is fascinating history, but when Taylor writes that "because of the Depression, advertisers demanded more effective ads for less money" (67), "the Depression" represents a zeitgeist or "context" that is assumed to be all–affecting rather than established to be germane. A phenomenon as broad as "the Depression" surely had variegated effects on different industries, different parts of society, and the relationship between retailers and advertisers.

Taylor interrupts his chronology when he reaches the 1950s (4, "Music, Mood, and Television") in order to focus more intently on the emergence of the rhetoric of emotion and affect in advertising discourse. This marks an important shift around midcentury in ad tactics from emphasizing the attributes of a product to "invad[ing] the subconscious" (110). While the idea of using music to set a mood or emotional tone is present in early film trade discourse, Taylor discovers that those in music and television advertising were slower on the uptake: the first pioneers only began thinking of music in these terms in the late '50s and early '60s. Here Taylor references the fashionable Freudianism of the '50s. Similar to his discussion of the Depression as a context for the hard sell, this connection is roughly rendered: the connection between the new emphasis on "mood" in the advertising world and Freud, Freudianism, or psychoanalysis is suggested but not explored in any detail. Despite this, the larger point is clear: the language of emotion became the primary means of communicating about and classifying music—for clients of music production companies describing what they wanted as well as for record labels trying to make their offerings easily searchable (121–23).

Chapter 5, "The Standardization of Jingle Production in the 1950s and After," continues the chronology of the jingle. Reaching its happy heyday between the '50s and the '70s, the jingle became increasingly professionalized and sonically standardized—or, to use Taylor's term, "rationalized." The unique jingle style during this period drew from popular music yet remained distinct from it: consisting of choir with or without soloist, it became known as the "Madison Avenue Choir" sound (138). Taylor follows the jingle's story until its death knell sounded in the '80s and '90s; he describes how the jingle's decline came about largely because of its inability "to sound like anything other than something that was industrially produced": the cheerfulness sounded formulaic, canned, and inauthentic to the younger generation (142). The irony of this distinction between "inauthentic" industrially produced jingle music and the "real" music of industrially produced pop is not lost on Taylor, who makes reference to Jean Baudrillard's writings on the untenability of distinctions between reality and fabrication in the postmodern world (145); nevertheless, the distinction is crucial to a trend that dominates the final four chapters—the advertising industry's adoption of the "cool and hip" as a governing aesthetic framework.

The first two of these four chapters (6, "The Discovery of Youth in the 1960s" and 7, "Consumption, Corporatization, and Youth in the 1980s") deal with the advertising industry's "discovery of youth" and the symbiotic relationships between advertising, youth, and counterculture from the '60s to the '80s. On the one hand, youth and counterculture shaped the advertising industry as baby boomers took up positions in advertising agencies; on the other, the industry was able to co–opt youth and counterculture, even if that counterculture had originally been intended to serve as an arena for critique of and resistance to the very forces that engulfed it (176). In musical terms this was manifested in the displacement of the traditional jingle by the licensing of pre–existing songs. Subsequently, the sound of rock–and–roll gradually infiltrated into advertisements despite initial resistance from advertising executives who feared the possibly deleterious effects of "low–class" music (151). Part of this shift Taylor attributes to the arrival in 1981 of MTV, whose significance "can't be overstated," although his eschewing of close reading leaves more to be said about this confluence of styles (185).[2] The precedence of music in MTV's audiovisual nexus certainly furthered the favor of pre–existing pop. By the neoliberal years of the mid to late '80s, enormous sponsorship deals were being made between advertisers and pop stars: Pepsi paid Michael Jackson $5 million to appear in TV commercials in 1984 and paid him $15 million more for further appearances three years later (187). This leads Taylor to the conclu-

sion that "the advertising and music industries were becoming more like businesses in this era, more exclusively concerned with profits" (193). In contrast, Taylor provides the case of Nike's appropriation of the Beatles' "Revolution" for an ad campaign in 1987–88: the resultant uproar and litigation demonstrates the dissent sometimes provoked by this new direction in advertising (199–202).

The embrace between Taylor's protagonists—the music and advertising industries—tightens further in the penultimate chapter (8, "Conquering [the] Culture"). Taylor argues that these changes amount not just to the "conquest of cool," as Thomas Frank (1997) has argued, but the "conquest of culture" (Taylor, 206). Taylor provocatively proclaims "there is no popular music that is not, to varying degrees, advertising music" (8). What this means is that the advertising industry has infiltrated the world of popular music production and dissemination. No longer does advertising music mimic or lag behind popular music styles; advertising professionals are at the forefront not only of trendspotting but also increasingly of trendsetting. At the same time, Taylor notes, similarly to Bethany Klein (2009) in her *As Heard on TV: Popular Music in Advertising*, that popular musicians fear less than ever that they might be considered "sell outs" for commercial tie–ins (229). A risk–averse music industry—affected by the decline of the influence of MTV, the loss of local radio, and declining sales—has left a void for upcoming musicians that advertisers have partly filled.

The conclusion that a "conquest of culture" (the book's subtitle) has taken place, which Taylor recognizes as reminiscent of Theodor Adorno, may seem inevitable and pessimistic (5). If there is no popular music, not already embedded in commerce, does it really constitute a "conquest"? And while Bethany Klein has suggested that musicians themselves have shouldered disproportionate blame for the increased influence of ad men in the creation and dissemination of their work, does "conquest" too much portray musicians as passive when the reconfiguration of cultural production may in fact provide them with new professional and creative opportunities (Klein 2009, 126–127)? Nevertheless, it raises stimulating questions: for example, if selling out to advertisers no longer carries the same stigma for musicians, what does it now mean for a popular musician to be authentic? Which musicians and audiences remain hostile to advertising arrangements? And do advertising professionals maintain their influence in a world where broadcast media is decreasingly prominent?

The conclusion is a theoretical consideration of advertisers as a social group who populate the "field of cultural production" that is advertising music (231). Taylor equates this group with Bourdieu's "new petite bourgeoisie" and discusses their new position as arbiters of taste in an environ-

ment where commercial and aesthetic considerations have intersected and the music and advertising industries have become so intermingled as to be inseparable (232). Of particular interest in this chapter is Taylor's discussion of the rhetoric of "creativity" in the advertising world, which proves to be an excellent example of the type of insight discourse analysis can offer. While the rest of his narrative deals primarily with the commercialization of music, this chapter presents the flipside: the aestheticization of advertising. As with Bourdieu's "new petite bourgeoisie," the advertising professionals of Taylor's study do not equate legitimacy with highbrow culture but rather with the "hip" and the "cool" (237). Even though those who work in advertising seldom consider what they do as art, they understand it as a "creative" endeavor (240). The word "creative" therefore operates within the advertising industry as a justification for doing the otherwise unpalatable job of selling "needless commodities"; it provides a positive self–image for advertising practitioners who self–identify in opposition to those who "merely" work in the humdrum business/financial/commercial worlds (245).

The theoretical ambition of this conclusion is welcome. Although Taylor's prose is laudably jargon–free, sometimes the book starts to feels like a series of examples and interviews, a feeling that could have been mitigated by the inclusion of a few more of the aperçus that litter this final chapter. It is possible that Taylor is aiming his book beyond a small academic market, and the book is certainly clearly written and highly readable, while many of his anecdotes add all the pep and sparkle of Clicquot Club ginger ale.

Notes

1. Taylor compliments and considerably expands upon the historical purview of Bethany Klein's (2009) *As Heard on TV: Popular Music in Advertising*. Research on earlier instances of music–advertising interaction includes work on the business practices of Tin Pan Alley (Suisman 2009) and, even more relevantly since it implicates music in the sale of non–musical goods, the practice of musical performance in late nineteenth– and early twentieth–century department stores (Tyler 1992).

2. In *Unruly Media: YouTube, Music Video, and the New Digital Cinema* Carol Vernallis (2013) asserts that the influence of music video has transformed the aesthetic of YouTube and contemporary cinema, but Taylor's history points to a much earlier convergence with advertising. In her early study of MTV, *Rocking Around the Clock: Music Television, Postmodernism, and Consumer Culture* (1987), E. Ann Kaplan considers the videos of MTV to be in essence a form of advertising but without examining any specific connections with the forms or personnel of advertising.

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Sarah Kay. 2013. *Parrots and Nightingales: Troubadour Quotation and the Development of European Poetry.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Reviewed by Anne Levitsky

The troubadour lyric corpus has fascinated other authors and scholars since it flourished in the twelfth century. Quotations and citations of the lyric appear in a variety of medieval genres, preserved today in sources from a number of different geographical locations. Sarah Kay's detailed book examines the processes of quotation and citation of the Occitan lyric that appear in numerous medieval texts (in Italian, French, Catalan, Latin, and a few Occitan sources), and the effects inclusion of the lyric in these texts had on an understanding of both the newer works and the older lyric.

Kay separates the sources she analyzes into two large methods, or "ways." Direct quotations of Occitan lyric, labeled the "parrots' way," are differentiated from cited instances, labeled the "nightingales' way" (which emphasize re–creation of the lyric Occitan texts rather than repeating them word–for–word). The majority of the book is concerned with the parrots' way, which elevates and promotes the Occitan language via direct quotation.

Kay is primarily interested in the quotation's ability to alter the meaning of a text. She argues that quotation of the lyric "plays with expectations of knowledge and recognition; it summons subjects of knowledge and recognition into existence; but it does not necessarily ratify them" (Kay 2013, 19). Kay bolsters her argument with help from Jacques Lacan's concept of "the subject supposed to know" ("le sujet supposé savoir"), which allows her to interact with the subjective ambiguity and connection between knowledge and desire that defines the troubadour lyric corpus. Quotation and citation create a web of subjects and subject positions that are never fully revealed or explained. The subject of the quoted lyric is obscured—the reader is led to assume or presuppose knowledge of the quotation's speaker by virtue of the quoting author's positioning of the quotation itself. The author frames the quotation, allowing the reader to assume ideas about the quoted subject. The reverse is also true—the author may assume his reader has certain knowledge of the lyric tradition and will recognize and read the quote in a specific manner. This act of assumption or presupposition is based on the idea that "knowledge presupposes a series of subjects that are difficult to locate, and that subjects

are supposed to have knowledge that is difficult or impossible to specify" (19). The speaking subject of the quoted text remains ambiguous, while the reader and author desire knowledge of the material the quotation presumes knowledge (or ignorance) of.

Kay's psychoanalytical method offers a beneficial entry point for understanding the complicated intersubjective structure of desire, power, and subjectivity that comprises each lyric text and the corpus as a whole. A number of different "worlds" collide in any given lyric text—the physical world of the living poet and the carefully regulated world of courtly love chief among them. The concept of a psychoanalytic subject that changes depending on the subject's position in the lyric offers a possible means of comprehending the relationships between these worlds. Kay's psychoanalytic approach is a useful tool in the exploration of the connections between subjects, as it allows modern scholars to understand the myriad changes in subject position that occur (sometimes rapidly) within both the quoted material and its quotation in later sources.

After a brief introduction to the study of troubadour poetry (which makes the rest of the book accessible to scholars who are not intimately familiar with the lyric and Occitan poetry), the book divides into three large parts, each containing shorter chapters devoted to the text of one or two authors who quote or cite the troubadours. Part I explores in its first chapter the *Razos de Trobar* of Raimon Vidal de Besalú and other grammar treatises, evaluating how their authors seek to make Occitan poets authorities just as Latin poets were treated in Latin grammars. Much is at stake here, including the expansion of Occitan from a regional poetic language to a more universal one and the extension of a Latin–style scholasticism into the vernacular, and Kay lucidly delineates the ways in which the authors of Occitan grammars push their language beyond its lyric boundaries. In the second chapter, Kay turns to Raimon Vidal de Besalú's *novas* (short didactic verse narratives), evincing how the quotation of the lyric in the *novas* relies not only on the knowledge transmitted by the lyric quotation itself, but also on what knowledge the reader has of their poetry—it is a challenge to know what one is supposed to know, and who already knows it. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the act of creating compilations of troubadour poetry, both in *chansonniers*, or songbooks, of the lyric, and in florilegia, a compilation of excerpts from other writings. Kay situates her discussion of the Occitan *vidas* and *razos* found in *chansonniers* within the relationship between quoting and other forms of copying. She highlights the ways in which the semi–biographical texts serve as both texts and paratexts, both indicating the organization of the manuscript's contents while providing biographical information for the troubadours whose works they

accompany. Florilegia, on the other hand, compile excerpts of works to create anthologies, "mutilating" the poems by preserving only one stanza and leaving out the rest. The distortion of the poems frees them from their original frameworks, allowing their quotation and transmission in new contexts.

Part II elucidates the differences between the nightingales' way and the parrots' way through investigation of two thirteenth–century texts. Chapter 5 analyzes the interpolated romance *Le Roman de la Rose ou Guillaume de Dole*, an example of the nightingales' way that uses lyric as a kind of saturation point to mark where the text is particularly rich in affect and underscores the song's status as a song. Chapter 6 is devoted to two Occitan short stories that exemplify the themes of quotation Kay discusses throughout the book: the "otherness of language to the speaker, the fabrication in language of identities and desires, and the repetitions it involves whether it is explicitly quoted or not" (118). The chapters at the book's center serve to make plain Kay's distinction between quotation and citation, exemplifying the two methods and how their usage might affect the text in which they are incorporated.

Part III looks at several Occitan sources and two Italian texts. The sources examined in Part III expand on and transform the methods of quotation outlined in Part I, as each author presents himself differently to obtain diverse forms of knowledge and authority from his troubadour sources. Kay includes discussions of Dante and Petrarch along with troubadours such as Matfre Ermengau to illustrate the trajectory of the parrots' way and its transition into the works of later authors.

Kay investigates the different sources in each chapter through the lens of subjectivity, a theme intrinsic to the lyric corpus. As seen in Kay's (1990) earlier work and the subsequent scholarship of Judith Peraino (2011), the concept of a "subject" or a "subject position" is often at stake within troubadour lyric. This subjectivity—which Kay argues is changed via quotation—is charged with certain types of power and expertize, connected to desire for certain ideas and objects. For example, the subject position of the lover in the lyric desires his (usually unattainable) beloved, or the subject position of the poet may desire favor from his patron. Numerous subject positions can appear in one poetic text, making any discussion of the lyric difficult without a frame through which to view these subjective shifts. Kay (2013, 16) explores how quotations and citations illuminate the intersubjectivity of the lyric, which she describes as "the relations forged between and thereby constituting subjects." Her study of this intersubjectivity looks at the problems surrounding the construction of a subject position within the quoted material by both original author and quoting author.

While Kay's work attends to a written tradition, her framework for examining quotation and citation is valuable for understanding the poetic discourse initiated through live performance of troubadour songs. Live performance of the songs precipitates an ambiguous subject in a similar manner to the lyric, as the performer simultaneously interacts with numerous subject positions. Live performance also instigates presuppositions of knowledge and desire for that knowledge, as the performer seemingly becomes an authority on the relationships presented within the song. The listening, physically present audience desires knowledge of the authorial subject's "story" and connection to historically viable people.

The book also exhibits how quotation and citation can be used to understand authorial intent. While Kay does not explore in detail the question of medieval authorship in *Parrots and Nightingales*, she has eloquently and succinctly addressed it in her earlier work (see Kay 1990). The idea of the medieval author is especially problematic in the troubadour corpus, where the concept of an author does not approach today's definition of the word (a single figure who is the intellectual origin of the material produced). The names and attributions we have today are transmitted in the *chansonniers* and the other sources Kay includes in her book, most of which were compiled or written a century or so after the height of troubadour performance and production. The concept of "autobiographical assumption," clearly articulated in *Subjectivity in Troubadour Poetry*, engages with the thirteenth to mid–twentieth–century assumption that the "I" of troubadour lyric referred to a "supposed author and that the ideas and feelings expressed there [in the lyric] are in some sense his or hers" (Kay 1990, 2).[1] The introduction to *Subjectivity* parses the concept of an individual author, its history and reaction against it, and reworks it for Kay's own analyses. Reading Kay's earlier work alongside *Parrots and Nightingales* provides a coherent discussion of the question of medieval authorship while thickening the complexity of her arguments regarding supposed knowledge.

The music associated with troubadour poetry does not make much of an appearance in the book, though it is no fault of Kay's. She makes clear early on that most quotations are transmitted without music, but she demonstrates that even without melodic transmission the appearance of song–as–poetry in medieval texts can reflect on their melodies and their position as songs, positing their musical elements as supposed or desired knowledge. In her discussion of Jean Renart's *Le Roman de la Rose ou Guillaume de Dole* as an example of the nightingales' way in Chapter 5, the songs present in the narrative romance appear not as songs with lyrics that can be read and understood, but as unintelligible, purely musical

examples of the "art of song." Kay argues that the songs in *Guillaume de Dole* (including three troubadour songs: Jaufre Rudel's "Lanquan li jorn," Daude de Pradas's "Bele m'est la voix altane," and Bernart de Ventadorn's "Quan vei la lauzeta mover") act as aural stains on the written language, and are referred to as such by Jean Renart in his prologue—as embroidery on the fabric of the narrative text.

Reading the song as blot allows Kay (2013, 96) to interpret the instances of singing in the text as "points where the text becomes dense with sexual or social affect without necessarily assigning it meaning." The lyric in the romance highlights not the meaning of its text but its essence as song, accentuating its function as a form of vocal expression and receptacle for the sound of the singing voice. Guillaume's romance produces a clear distinction between the nightingales' use of the musical sound of the lyric to conceal linguistic significance and the parrots' use of the lyric as text imbued with meaning.

The idea that music symbolizes an object that defies meaning while possessing the ability to be written down is particularly intriguing. It connects somewhat to the ideas of *vox articulata* and *vox confusa* that appear in numerous musical and grammar treatises.[2] *Vox articulata*, or articulate voice, is defined by its ability to be written down, which also makes it "rational." *Vox confusa*—confused, or undifferentiated voice—cannot be written down. These two early categories are further partitioned by sixth–century grammarian Priscian (and enumerated in later treatises, including Thomas of Cantimpré's thirteenth–century *Opus de natura rerum* and the early fifteenth–century *Nova musica* of Johannes Ciconia), who explains that articulate voices are named as such because they contain the ability to be written down, but also because they restrict the listener to themselves alone for understanding. This distinction means that voices can be either rational or irrational and literate or illiterate, giving rise to four possible combinations. The aural blot Kay describes in Renart's *Rose* can be written down but, according to Kay, is too concentrated in affect to be restricted to itself alone for understanding, and therefore falls into the category of *vox confusa*.

Kay's description of the songs as objects that transition (via citation) from carrying meaning and the ability to be written down (clear examples of *vox articulata*) to objects stripped of their ability to be understood on their own can help modern scholars understand more about the role of song and singing in medieval courtly society. In Renart's romance, song is used in a very different way both from the way it appears in lyric *chansonniers* and from the way scholars of the lyric assume it was performed in courtly settings. Kay's reading of Renart's *Rose* shows us that song, even

sans melody, can be used as a textual device to stand in for the experience of feeling or emotion, performing social or emotional connection without an explicit explanation.

A similar phenomenon appears in the recent work of Marisa Galvez, though the connection runs in the opposite direction. In a paper given at the 2015 SUNY–Binghamton CEMERS Conference, Galvez argues that, in the *Jeu de St. Agnès* (a fourteenth–century hagiographic play written in Occitan) the fragmentary melody of "Bel seiner Dieus," commonly recognized as a contrafact of Guilhem IX's "Pos de chantar," imbues Guilhem's poem with pious affect purely through the use of its melody as a contrafact. Here, meaning is also transferred into affect by separation of the "original" words from the melody. The earlier melodic element of Guilhem's song is reframed, its newly sacred setting lending a previously secular melody a tinge of piety. Renart's *Rose* and the *Jeu de St. Agnès* reveal that the musical components of troubadour lyric and Occitan texts can be quoted just like their textual counterparts, and that their inclusion in textual sources (whether or not musical notation is included) can similarly enter the web of supposed knowledge that is enacted with every quotation of Occitan lyric.

Kay's discussion of Jofre de Foixà's *canso* "Be m'a lonc temps menat a guiza d'aura" and Gilles de Viés–Maison's *trouvère chanson* "Se per mon chant me deüse aligier" showcases another way in which the musical elements of Occitan texts can be quoted and enter into the supposition of knowledge. Both songs include incipits from other songs (Jofre quotes his at the end of each stanza) and are influenced by Gace Brulé's *trouvère chanson* "Tant m'a mené force de signorage," which leads Kay to speculate about the possibility that Jofre adopted Gace's melody for performance as well. She explains that if Jofre did use Gace's melody as a contrafact, the incipits of the famous songs Jofre quotes (supposing the audience had knowledge of their melodies) would be displaced by the final line of Gace's melody and would relate musically to its preceding melodic lines, creating a rift between the audience's association of the quoted troubadour incipits with their original melodies and the reality of the performance of Jofre's song—but as the song is transmitted without a melody, we cannot know for certain what actually happened.

Sarah Kay's book has manifold implications for musicologists working on medieval song, poetry, and literature. Her analyses supply numerous methods for approaching and understanding quotation and citation as both poetic and musical objects. They allow for exploration of the role of quotation and citation within the realm of sung performance, offering starting points from which to examine the way

quotation changes the authority of singing the lyric, and what type of relationship is re–forged between the words and the melody of lyric quotations.

Notes

1. For more on the concept of "autobiographical assumption," see Kay 1990, 2–5; 132–170.

2. For an excellent explanation and summary of these terms and their appearance in numerous treatises, see Leach 2007, 11–54.

References

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