https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/hrlr/issue/feed Human Rights Law Review 2022-02-17T15:37:02+00:00 Open Journal Systems <p>The <em>Columbia Human Rights Law Review</em> (<em>HRLR</em>) seeks to publish and distribute legal analysis and discussion of civil liberties and human rights under both international and domestic law.</p> <p><em>HRLR</em> believes that thoughtful discussion of human rights issues and broad dissemination of information about legal remedies for human rights violations promote human rights around the world. To this end, <em>HRLR</em> has published a law review of scholarly articles and commentary covering domestic and international human rights issues since 1968. </p> <p>Due to the journal’s expansive view of human rights, <em>HRLR</em> articles cover a wide range of topics and are considered a valuable resource for academics and practitioners alike. In addition, the <em>HRLR</em> enjoys a wide circulation-our subscribers are individuals, institutions, human rights organizations, and libraries in over forty countries. By virtue of the breadth of <em>HRLR</em> articles, and the wide audience that is reached, the <em>Columbia Human Rights Law Review</em> has a truly profound impact on the field of human rights.</p> https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/hrlr/article/view/9312 Hard Drive Heritage: Digital Cultural Property in the Law of Armed Conflict 2022-02-17T15:33:23+00:00 Richard Ong columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com <p>This Note considers the question of how to protect cultural property in an era of rising cyberwarfare. The Note argues that the law of armed conflict (LOAC)—also referred to as international humanitarian law (IHL)— should apply to protect the three categories of cultural property which cyberwarfare could affect: real-word cultural property, digitized cultural property (cultural property which has been converted into digital form), and digital cultural property (cultural property which has always existed in digital form). Lastly, this Note argues for a novel interpretation of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection for Cultural Property that would encompass digital and digitized cultural property.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> 2021-12-30T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Human Rights Law Review https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/hrlr/article/view/9313 Evaluating Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Dichotomic Lens of Military Value Accountability 2022-02-17T15:35:09+00:00 Emily L. Drake columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> 2021-12-30T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Human Rights Law Review https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/hrlr/article/view/9314 A “Bedrock Principle” That Wasn’t: Alliance for Open Society II and the Future of the Noncitizens’ Extraterritorial Constitution 2022-02-17T15:37:02+00:00 Nicholas Romanoff columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> 2021-12-30T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Human Rights Law Review https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/hrlr/article/view/9137 Scorched Border Litigation 2022-01-31T01:37:09+00:00 Briana Beltran columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com Beth Lyon columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com Nan Schivone columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com <div class="page" title="Page 1"> <div class="layoutArea"> <div class="column"> <p>Each year, employers bring hundreds of thousands of temporary foreign workers into the United States only to return them to their communities of origin when their visas end. During their short months working in the United States—whether in agricultural fields, hotels, traveling carnivals, or private homes—many of these workers experience violations of their rights: wages are stolen, injuries are ignored, and those who complain are punished on the spot or sent home.</p> <p>Temporary foreign workers who choose to file a lawsuit to vindicate their rights typically do so once they are no longer in the United States, often litigating from rural communities in other countries. During litigation, the employers and the employers’ lawyers regularly use the fact that the workers are no longer present in the United States to gain a procedural or substantive advantage in litigation. This strategy, which we call “scorched border” tactics, is a standard litigation practice and is enabled by the very design of temporary foreign work programs, themselves rooted in the United States’ long history of low-wage foreign labor exploitation. Scorched border litigation drives up costs for a deeply under-resourced public interest bar and can chill lawyers’ case selection, shutting down access to justice for some of the most vulnerable of the working poor. However, to date, there exists no study documenting or analyzing this undeniable phenomenon.</p> </div> </div> </div> 2021-12-30T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Human Rights Law Review https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/hrlr/article/view/9139 Dead Right: A Cautionary Capital Punishment Tale 2022-01-31T02:16:23+00:00 Joseph Margulies columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com John Blume columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com Sheri Johnson columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com <p>At least 228 people executed in the modern era—or more than one in every seven—were right too soon. That is, they had claims in their case that today would render their execution unconstitutional, but were killed because of a legal regime that arrived too late. Roughly 30% of our total include the children and persons with intellectual disability who were executed prior to <em>Roper v. Simmons</em> and <em>Atkins v. Virginia</em>, respectively. But the great majority of the people identified in our study raised claims based on doctrine that had already been clearly established by the Supreme Court. If the lower courts had applied Supreme Court caselaw correctly, these people would have gotten relief. Yet the lower courts resisted the doctrine and for years the Supreme Court did nothing to correct them. This resistance was particularly egregious in Texas and Florida. In Texas, at least 108 people were executed after the Supreme Court had already established the relevant basis for relief, and in Florida, the total is at least 36. At least when it comes to the death penalty, the lower courts seem especially unwilling to follow Supreme Court doctrine that would save a person from execution. The result is a system that routinely kills people even when they are right.</p> 2021-12-30T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Human Rights Law Review https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/hrlr/article/view/9310 There Is No Such Thing As A “Legal Name” 2022-02-17T15:24:13+00:00 Austin A. Baker columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com J. Remy Green columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com <p>The phrase “legal name” appears everywhere. And wherever it appears, it seems to come with an assumption that it picks out one, clear such name for each person. So, do “legal” names as the phrase is commonly understood really exist? As far as federal and most state law is concerned, it turns out the answer is a clear no.</p> <p>This article seeks to highlight the legal, moral, and philosophical wrongness of the notion that people have one uniquely identifying legal name. To do that, we survey the status of names in various legal domains, highlighting that legal consensus tends to be that there is no one “correct legal name” for individuals (if anything, people often have many “legal” names). We argue this common notion that every person has a single, clearly defined “legal” name is a kind of collective delusion we all seem to share (emerging somewhere in the late twentieth century), but is not grounded in legal or social reality. To address this harmful delusion, we present a series of ready-to-cite conclusions about the current state of the law and introduce a normative framework for how institutions and individuals ought to choose between people’s various legal names. Engaging with legal theory, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of language, we discuss the social function of names and argue that names enable people to communicate important social information about themselves—which can include their gender, religion, and familial relations. Thus, we conclude by arguing that individuals and legal institutions have a normative responsibility to respect peoples’ preferred legal names, thereby allowing them to authentically represent these facets of their social identities.</p> 2021-12-30T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Human Rights Law Review https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/hrlr/article/view/9311 The Time Trap: Addressing the Stereotypes that Undermine Tribal Sovereignty 2022-02-17T15:27:47+00:00 Adam Crepelle columbia.hrlronline.submissions@gmail.com <p>History is deeply embedded in federal Indian law. According to jurisprudence, Indians were nonagricultural “savages” prior to 1492. Indians’ supposed lack of sophistication played a vital role in foundational cases determining Indian rights and the extent of tribal sovereignty. The process of stare decisis has resulted in repetition of the principles formulated on the belief in Indian simplicity; consequently, historic ideas of Indians continue to impact present-day Indian rights—often for the worse. This is the time trap.</p> <p>The time trap is the popular belief that Indian cultures were simple, non-commercial, hunter-gatherers prior to European arrival. Encapsulated within this belief is the idea that indigenous cultures are static and erode as they merge with mainstream society. However, this perception is incorrect: the indigenous peoples of North America had complex societies prior to 1492, including agriculture and expansive trade networks. Indian tribes organically incorporated previously unknown items from Europe, such as the horse and gun, into their cultures. This Article asserts that reexamining how society and the law view Indian history is the key to unlocking the time trap.</p> 2021-12-30T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Human Rights Law Review