Columbia Journal of Tax Law https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw <p>The&nbsp;<em>Columbia Journal of Tax Law</em>&nbsp;provides a needed forum for academics, practitioners, and policymakers to explore ideas in tax law and policy. The Journal aims to bridge the worlds of both theory and practice. Our commentary section,&nbsp;Tax Matters, features current perspectives from tax practitioners.</p> en-US taxjournal@law.columbia.edu (Columbia Journal of Tax Law) Thu, 30 Apr 2026 16:29:56 +0000 OJS 3.3.0.10 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 Solving One Problem, Creating Another: Religious Preference in the Johnson Amendment's Latest Exception https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw/article/view/14783 <p>This Note examines the constitutional concerns raised by a proposed consent decree in recent litigation challenging the Johnson Amendment, which bans electoral intervention by 501(c)(3) organizations. It argues that the Amendment’s justification as a conditional government subsidy mischaracterizes case law and the tax code, and that the Amendment is not narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny. It then argues that the consent decree proposed by the IRS and plaintiff organizations, which creates a carve-out exempting only religiously motivated speech from a religious leader to their congregation, violates the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause of the Constitution by privileging religious viewpoints. The decree also fails to address the Johnson Amendment’s defects: it preserves vagueness and risks distorting the political landscape by channeling electoral advocacy into entities that are already exempt from disclosure requirements applicable to other 501(c)(3)s, while continuing to silence secular nonprofits that must comply with such requirements. Finally, this Note proposes a neutral, activity-based legislative alternative that would protect free speech for all 501(c)(3) organizations while safeguarding against large-scale, tax-favored electoral campaigning through targeted taxation and disclosure requirements.</p> Astrid Obadia Copyright (c) 2026 Astrid Obadia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw/article/view/14783 Thu, 30 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000 Taxing Subjective Value: Floors as a Response to Heterogeneity https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw/article/view/14781 <p>This Article takes a fresh look at the problem of taxpayer heterogeneity—how the same good or service can have very different value depending on who receives it. This issue is well known in the fringe benefits context. Every tax student wrestles with <em>Benaglia</em>, trying to figure out how much income someone receives from free room and board. But the problem goes far beyond fringe benefits. It also shows up when a parent loans money to a child, when luxury brands offer employee discounts, or when tech workers receive stock options. These examples come from separate corners of the tax literature, but they all point to the same underlying issue: income is hard to measure when value varies by taxpayer. Taxpayers vary not just in their consumption preferences, but also in their creditworthiness, likelihood to switch jobs, and other characteristics that affect the accurate measurement of income. This Article makes two main contributions. First, it identifies taxpayer heterogeneity as a cross-cutting problem that links many of tax law’s toughest income measurement questions. Although each area has been studied separately, prior scholarship hasn’t connected them through the common thread of heterogeneity. Recognizing that connection opens the door to broader insights and more unified solutions. Second, the Article explores a practical and intuitive way to deal with this problem: focusing on setting floor valuation using minimum benefits. Many goods or services provide at least a baseline value to any taxpayer. The tax code already hints at this approach in a few places but fails to make the floor explicit. This Article shows how building minimum benefit “floors” into the law can improve both the accuracy and the fairness of the income tax—while also making the rules simpler to administer.</p> Jason S. Oh Copyright (c) 2026 Jason S. Oh https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw/article/view/14781 Thu, 30 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000 The Motor Fuels Tax Dilemma: How to Fund Road Construction and Maintenance Without Tanking the EV and Hybrid Vehicle Market https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw/article/view/14782 <p>Since 2008, excise taxes on gasoline, diesel, and other motor fuels—motor fuels taxes (“MFTs”)—have failed to raise enough revenue to support the construction, maintenance, and repair of U.S. highways, bridges, and roads. This shortfall has been caused by a combination of stagnating MFT rates, inflation, increasing fuel efficiency in the nation’s automobiles, and, to a far lesser degree, increased usage of hybrid and electric vehicles (“EVs”), which use little or no motor fuel. Governments and legal scholars have introduced three proposals to remedy the shortfalls in MFTs that focus on requiring owners of EVs and hybrids to pay additional fees and taxes. This Article evaluates these three proposals and demonstrates that they are ineffective, impractical, and disincentivize drivers from purchasing electric and hybrid vehicles without raising enough revenue to justify this interference. When appropriate, the Article offers solutions to improve the proposals. Finally, it discusses two proposals to address the shortfall in MFT revenue as effective solutions that do not disincentivize EV and hybrid adoption: raising MFT rates and funding roadwork through general revenue.</p> Alice E. Keane Copyright (c) 2026 Alice E. Keane https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw/article/view/14782 Thu, 30 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000