Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S. Corporations

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Jens Dammann
Horst Eidenmüller

Abstract




The idea that a corporation’s employees should elect some of the corporation’s board members, a system known as codetermination, has moved to the forefront of U.S. corporate law policy. Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act calls for employees of large firms to elect forty percent of all board members. Bernie Sanders’s Corporate Accountability and Democracy Plan goes even further and states that workers should elect forty-five percent of board members.


Both Warren’s and Sanders’s plans are broadly similar to the German law on codetermination, which for many decades has allowed employees of large German corporations to elect up to half of all board members. It is therefore unsurprising that Senator Sanders points to Germany’s successful economic development as evidence that economic progress and mandatory codetermination can go hand in hand.


However, this Article argues that codetermination promises to be a poor fit for U.S. corporations. While Germany arguably reaps significant benefits from codetermination, legal, social, and institutional differences between Germany and the United States make it highly unlikely that the United States would be able to replicate those benefits. Furthermore, the costs of codetermination probably would be much higher in the United States than they are in Germany.




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How to Cite
Dammann, J., & Eidenmüller, H. (2021). Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S. Corporations. Columbia Business Law Review, 2020(3). Retrieved from https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/7809