Cabinet Rule in the Republic of China: A Constitutional Argument

摘要

Since the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of China (Constitution) in 1946, the government of the Republic of China (ROC) has often been characterized as a “strong-man” system. This appellation implies that an individual, or “strong man,” exercises full political power over people and policies within the state. It suggests also that to a certain extent such a person is able to raise himself above the confinements of the constitutional system in the exercise of such power. For example, a president has historically enjoyed substantial powers, while a premier of the Executive Yuan has served as the president’s subordinate. This arrangement departs from constitutional provisions that establish the presidency as a nominal position with merely symbolic powers. Yet, it is this office which today retains the ultimate decision-making power and remains accountable to the Legislative Yuan.

https://doi.org/10.7916/cjal.v4i1.3101