Abstract
The judicial articulation of a “four walls” doctrine as a governing principle of constitutional interpretation, extant in both Malaysia and Singapore, is indicative of a particularized theory of constitutional interpretation that limits the legitimate sources of law which may inform constitutional construction. The “four walls” doctrine suggests an insularity discordant with the vigorous interest in “transnational judicial conversations,”‘ within a growing “world community of courts.” This trend is indicative of the openness of certain national courts towards citing, evaluating, and applying foreign decisions and international human rights law (“transnational law”) in adjudicating civil liberties. Indeed, comparative constitutional law has become something of a “cottage industry” in certain jurisdictions.3 While liberal democracies have engaged in cross-fertilization in the development of rights, it is clear that the participants in this conversation are limited. Indeed, one might discern that in contrast to liberal democracies, courts in non-liberal jurisdictions utilize transnational sources to buttress public order concerns rather than expand rights.