Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from China

How to Cite

Lin, L. (2017). Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from China. Columbia Journal of Asian Law, 30(2), 160–220.


This is the first article that analyzes Professor Ronald Gilson’s theory of “simultaneity” in engineering a venture capital market in the context of China. Based on both quantitative and qualitative data collected by the author, this article analyzes how China has created the fastest developing and the largest engineered venture capital market in the world within three decades. It concludes that the rise of venture capital in China is attributable to (1) increasing capital supply through various governmental programs, easing regulatory barriers towards institutional and foreign investors, providing tax incentives and improving exit environment; (2) enhancing the availability of financial intermediaries by introducing the limited partnership that creates an efficient relationship between venture capitalists and investors; and (3) encouraging entrepreneurship by improving the regulatory environment for small businesses. Through these measures, China has facilitated the simultaneous availability of capital with the appetite for high-risk, long-term investments and the emergence of a class of entrepreneurs with the skills and incentives to put that capital to work. One key factor to the rapid development of the Chinese market has been its increased reliance on market forces in allocating capital. On the other hand, a residual degree of bureaucratic allocation prevents the Chinese regime from being fully efficient. China serves as an (imperfect) model for other governments seeking to engineer a venture capital market where enfettered market forces have failed to do so.
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