Constitutional Supervision and Interpretation in the People's Republic of China

摘要

According to article 62 of the Chinese Constitution of 1982 ("1982 Constitution"), the National People's Congress ("NPC") has the power "to supervise the enforcement of the Constitution."' Article 67 stipulates that the NPC's Standing Committee has the power "to interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement." Thus, the NPC and its Standing Committee share the power to exercise constitutional supervision, whereas the Standing Committee alone wields the power of constitutional interpretation.

In characterizing the subject of my research, I have chosen to use the term "constitutional supervision" rather than "constitutional review," a term more commonly used in Western countries. This distinction is based on the vast differences between the organizing political principles of China and those of Western countries.

Section II contains a brief chronological synopsis that shows how the various Chinese constitutions since 1954 have dealt with the subject of constitutional supervision and interpretation. Section III explores the elements and boundaries of constitutional supervision and interpretation, and their applicability in contemporary China. Section IV is a brief history of actual instances of constitutional supervision and interpretation in China. In Section V, I trace the various attempts of China's leaders and legislators to establish a constitutional supervisory organ in China. Section VI concludes with my analysis of the political, legal, and constitutional issues currently confronting those interested in establishing a system of constitutional supervision.