摘要
This note argues that from a theoretical point of view, the economic inducements which constitute an essential component of the PRC's population policies do not in fact violate international human rights laws relating to a couple's procreative rights. Reproductive rights, like many other types of "human rights,",4 are not totally unrestricted. A couple's rights, while indisputable under international law, are constrained by their duty to act responsibly and in a manner which will benefit their family and the community as a whole. Thus, parents who insist upon having more children in the face of economic sanctions, may, in the Chinese context, reasonably be viewed as behaving irresponsibly - as exposing their families to significant financial hardships and the community to a Malthusian nightmare.5 The author wishes at the outset to clarify that this note reaches that conclusion only with respect to the policies of the PRC as they are set forth in legal instruments and articulated in official statements by government representatives. This note does not specifically address the issue of policy implementation.6 Incidents of coerced abortions, forced sterilizations and involuntary insertion of interuterine devices (IUDs), which have occurred as a result of the policy, are repugnant and indefensible.
However, with regard to the theoretical interaction between legitimate State interest and personal procreative rights, the past five decades have seen the creation of a substantial body of international law which attempts to define the boundaries of encroachment. This note's modest goal is to examine the economic aspects of China's onechild policy in light of this international law to determine whether the policy is defensible when personal rights are placed within the broader context of social development. The author hopes that clarification of the theoretical situation will stimulate further discussion as to whether the underlying moral choices being made at the international level, and the harsh consequences they may have for specific populations, are those which humanity is willing to tolerate.
Part II of this note examines the current system of economic sanctions and incentives that constitutes official Chinese policy, and touches upon some of the cultural attitudes most deeply threatened by the one-child goal. Part III addresses certain threshold questions regarding human rights and their acceptance as international law. Part IV examines international human rights documents related to State duties and powers vis-a-vis the family, and forms an eight-principle model of international law concerning procreation and national development. Part V attempts to apply this model to the economic component of China's one-child family policy. Part VI offers brief concluding remarks. repeatedly
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