FERC: Energy Policy Today and the Story of an Independent Agency

Abstract

This article not only offers the first comprehensive treatment of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) history, but it further examines how FERC as an independent regulatory body might fare under a constitutional shift that would allow the President to remove without cause commissioners from an independent commission such as FERC. FERC, after all, is an apt agency for exploring the status and function of independent agencies and what such a constitutional shift might foster. Energy and climate are areas of intense political discourse, and as a policy arena, FERC offers a unique window into whether and how Presidential removal power could shape energy or climate policy moving forward. The article, consequently, offers insights into FERC’s historic role, if any, in establishing energy policy. It then situates FERC within the broader context of conversations surrounding the efficacy of independent  agencies, with an eye toward examining whether or how these dialogues could be informed by critical inquiries into the operations of specific independent agencies—in this case, FERC. And when that occurs, at least for FERC, the conclusion might suggest that our assumptions about independent agencies in the modern era require further exploration.