摘要
A paper that deals with law, culture, and Confucianism is perhaps doomed to be a collection of vague and general platitudes. This is because all three of these terms are notoriously plagued with definitional problems. Legal theorists continue to disagree about the nature and scope of the concept of law, while anthropologists and sociologists constantly argue about the utility of the concept of culture. Similarly, philosophers, historians, journalists, politicians-indeed, almost anyone with a voice-seem to have different ideas about what Confucianism means. One of the main reasons for such disagreements, in my opinion, is an all-too-human tendency to want neat and simple categories that can encompass, represent, and take the place of the messy and intractable realities of life. We are all too familiar with the problem that "law" in modern life encompasses vastly different norms and institutions which cannot be easily grouped under the same rubric without in some sense straining the usefulness of the term "law."' The same is true of "culture" and "Confucianism"-with each term, it is often difficult to engage in any discussion beyond the most preliminary stages without being forced to ask, "culture in what sense of the term?" or, "Confucianism according to whose interpretation?' This shows that all these terms are very elastic and that different practices and ideas are often subsumed under the same concept, which in turn aggravates the lack of conceptual clarity.