When people hear the words, “global warming,” they typically don't think of terrorism. If they did, politicians would be far more likely to undertake drastic action to address the climate crisis.

The climate crisis has exacerbated loss of arable land and increased water scarcity, fueling rural-urban migration, civil unrest, and violence across many vulnerable regions. Worsening geopolitical instability has aided the rise of terrorism and violence in the Middle East, Guatemala, and the Lake Chad Basin of Africa. Global migration trends are also expected to worsen—by 2050, an estimated 200 million or 1 in every 45 people will have been displaced by the climate crisis. Yet many people do not link the climate crisis to terrorism, instead seeing them as wholly separate issues. Moreover, the climate crisis is perceived as a gargantuan problem, involving too many countries, corporations, and global systems to feasibly change. Conceptually connecting global warming to terrorism and national security in the minds of voters could create the political momentum needed to overcome this institutional inertia.

The US is vehemently opposed to terrorism as a matter of national security. According to the Pew Research Center, in early 2018, over three quarters of American adults believed terrorism should be a top policy priority for the government, the highest of any given option. Over 46 percent of American adults further favored increasing spending on anti-terrorism defenses, though the US military budget is already larger than the next seven highest-spending countries combined. The same survey showed that less than half of American adults believed climate change should be a top policy priority, ranking the second lowest of given issues.

Most voters do not conceptually link the climate crisis to terrorism, though it is well recognized among foreign policy and military experts, and has created an interdisciplinary field called “climate security.” Syria after 2011 is a well-known example of how the climate crisis multiplied existing threats. Water scarcity, which had been worsening over the years, contributed significantly to the outbreak of conflict. The increased death of livestock, reduced arable land, and rise in food insecurity, made it significantly easier for the terror organization calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to locally recruit over two thirds of its fighters. Extreme weather phenomena offered ripe opportunities for ISIS to increase support among locals. When a vicious drought swept through Iraq in 2010, ISIS distributed food baskets to local inhabitants. When high winds destroyed vegetation in 2012, ISIS handed out cash to affected farmers. By offering a source of income and opportunity for people when their livelihoods were destroyed by droughts and other extreme weather, ISIS was able to cultivate support and draw members from local populations. In other words, the climate crisis increased geopolitical instability and aided the growth of terrorism.

People see the climate crisis and terrorism as significant global threats, though they often do not conceptually link them. A 2017 global Pew Research poll shows that climate change and ISIS were almost tied for the greatest perceived global threat, with ISIS ahead by only one percentage point. Yet, the distribution of concern varies by region: respondents in Latin America and Africa were more likely to see the climate crisis as the greatest threat; whereas ISIS was a higher concern for respondents in the US, Europe, Middle East, southeast Asia, and Australia. Yet, people often do not conceptually link terrorism to the climate crisis. Approximately 3 in 4 Americans see “global warming” as an environmental issue, over two-thirds as a scientific issue, and almost two-thirds as a political issue. Over half of Americans do not see it as a national security issue. If we were to envision the climate crisis primarily as a matter of national security, it would be a much greater priority for people in power.

Over the past several decades, political rhetoric tended to diminish the severity of the climate crisis and depict it as something too far in the future to be of pressing concern. In 2003, Frank Luntz, a Republican political strategist, encouraged using the term “climate change” instead of “global warming,” because “while global warming has catastrophic communications attached to it, climate change sounds [like] a more controllable and less emotional challenge.” Moreover, presenting the climate crisis primarily through scientific data on global temperatures, atmospheric carbon concentration, and emissions levels does not galvanize people to action nearly as much as characterizing it as a matter of immediate national security.

To conceptually link the climate crisis to national security, climate activists should expand and increase rhetorical focus on how the climate crisis worsens migration, foments geopolitical instability, and thereby aids terrorist organizations. Presenting the climate crisis in security-centric concerns and consequences ensures that all Americans—including right-leaning voters and people who would not be swayed by conventional appeals to ecological conservation or species preservation—become aware of how consequential it is. The tone of climate activism should shift from solely encouraging global cooperation for the sake of future generations, to taking immediate and drastic action to circumvent the security concerns that the climate crisis exacerbates.

Reorienting climate rhetoric around national security also brings the action to a level that feels more achievable—at the national rather than global level. Whereas preserving the planet for future generations sounds aspirational and spiritually uplifting, it is an intrinsically international goal that calls upon many countries to work together for success. Framing plans to deal with the climate crisis in a way that requires concerted cosmopolitan goodwill tends to encourage cynicism and blame-shifting when countries fail to meet carbon emission reduction targets. The vast majority of countries are failing to lower emissions to levels that would keep global warming below 2 degrees Celsius, as the 2015 Paris Agreement aspires to do. This collective failure dissipates blame and often disincentivizes countries from shouldering the burdens of emission reduction. Furthermore, focusing overtly on country-level climate reduction targets conceals the fact that emissions are largely generated by a handful of international corporations—over a third of all carbon and methane emissions since 1965 have been produced by 20 companies, including Saudi Aramco, Chevron, Exxon Mobil, and Royal Dutch Shell.

Holding corporations accountable for emissions requires immense political momentum, which is more easily galvanized by framing the climate action as a necessary defense against immediate danger than as a voluntary restriction of certain economic activities for global well-being. While global cooperation to reduce emissions is what the international community should strive for, using nation-centered rhetoric that focuses on security threats can be an effective conduit to achieving this broader goal. Furthermore, linking the climate crisis to terrorism could increase the motivation and capital for countries to press hard in climate negotiations. In the face of immediate danger, the inertia of other countries or companies seems a paltry excuse for inaction.